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The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One-Hundredth
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1988), pp. 435-439.
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Wed Nov 7 00:44:35 2007
IS IT MONEY OR CREDIT, OR BOTH, OR NEITHER??
Most standard models of aggregate de- credit are viewed as perfect substitutes for
mand, such as the textbook IS/LM model, auction-market credit ("bonds"), and finan-
treat bank assets and bank liabilities asym- cial markets clear only by price. Models with
metrically. Money, the bank liability, is gven a distinct role for credit arise when either of
a special role in the determination of aggre- these assumptions is abandoned.
gate demand. In contrast, bank loans are Following James Tobin (1970) and Karl
lumped together with other debt instruments Brunner and Allan Meltzer (1972), we choose
in a "bond market," which is then conve- to abandon the perfect substitutability as-
niently suppressed by Walras' Law. sumption and ignore credit rationing.' Our
Much recent research provides reasons to model has three assets: money, bonds, and
question t h s imbalance. A growing theoreti- loans. Only the loan market needs explana-
cal literature, based on models with asym- tion. We assume that both borrowers and
metric information, stresses the importance lenders choose between bonds and loans
of intermediaries in the provision of credit according to the interest rates on the two
and the special nature of bank loans. Empiri- credit instruments. If p is the interest rate on
cally, the instability of econometric money- loans and i is the interest rate on bonds,
demand equations has been accompanied by then loan demand is: Ld = L(p, f, ). The
new interest in the credit-GNP relation- dependence on GNP ( y ) captures the trans-
ship (see especially the work of Benjamin actions demand for credit, whch might arise,
Friedman). for example, from working capital or liquid-
We have developed several models of ag- ity considerations.
gregate demand which allow roles for both To understand the genesis of loan supply,
money and "credit" (bank loans). We pre- consider a simplified bank balance sheet
sent a particularly simple one, a variant of (whch ignores net worth) with assets: re-
the textbook IS/LM model, in t h s paper. serves, R; bonds, B"; loans, LS; and liabili-
Though it has a simple graphcal represen- ties: deposits, D. Since reserves consist of
tation like IS/LM, t h s model permits us to required reserves, rD, plus excess reserves,
pose a richer array of questions than does E, the banks' adding-up constraint is: B b +
the traditional money-only framework. +
LS E = D(1- 7). Assuming that desired
portfolio proportions depend on rates of re-
I. The Model turn on the available assets (zero for excess
reserves), we have L" A(p, j ) D ( l - r ) , with
The LM curve is a portfolio-balance con- similar equations for the'shares of B" and
dition for a two-asset world: asset holders E. Thus the condition for clearing the loan
choose between money and bonds. Tacitly, market is
loans and other forms of customer-market
111. Comparative Statics5 the model, such a shock should reduce credit,
GNP, and the interest rate on government
Most conventional shocks work in our bonds while raising the interest rate on loans.
model just as they do in IS/LM. For exam- Another notable example with the same pre-
ple, an expenditure shock shfts the CC curve dicted effects is the credit controls of
along a fixed LM curve, and a money- March-July 1980. In this instance "tight
demand shock shfts the LM curve along money" should, and apparently did, reduce
a fixed CC curve. The effects are familiar interest rates on government bonds.
and need not be discussed. The only note-
worthy difference is that a rise in bank re- IV. Implications for Monetary Policy
serves might conceivably raise the rate of
interest in the credit model. Graphically, the We turn next to the traditional target and
ambiguity arises because an increase in R indicator issues of monetary policy. The so-
shlfts both the CC and LM curves outward. called monetary indicator problem arises if
Economically, the credit channel makes the central bank sees its impact on aggregate
monetary policy more expansionary than in demand only with a lag but sees its impacts
IS/LM and therefore raises the transactions on financial-sector variables like interest
demand for money by more than in the rates, money, and credit more promptly.
conventional model. What does our model say about the suitabil-
Greater interest attaches to issues that ity of money or credit as indicators?
elude the IS/LM model. An upward shift in Table 1 shows the qualitative responses of
the credit supply function, A ( . ) (whlch might GNP, money, credit, and bond interest rates
correspond, for example, to a decrease in the to a wide variety of shocks, assuming that
perceived risluness of loans) shfts the CC bank reserves is the policy instrument. Col-
curve outward along a fixed LM curve, umns 1 and 2 display a conclusion familiar
thereby raising i and y. The interest rate on from IS/LM: money is a good qualitative
loans, p , falls, however. An upward shft in indicator of future GNP movements except
the credit demand function, L ( . ) , which when money demand shocks are empirically
might correspond to a greater need for work- important. Columns 1 and 3 offer the corre-
ing capital, has precisely the opposite effects. sponding conclusion for credit: credit is a
We find it difficult to thnk of or identify good qualitative indicator except when there
major shocks to credit demand, that is, sharp are important shocks to credit demand. If
increases or decreases in the demand for money demand shocks were indeed more
loans at given interest rates and GNP. But important than credit demand shocks in the
shocks to credit supply are easy to con- 1980's, credit would have been a better indi-
ceptualize and to find in actual hstory. For cator than money.
example, Bernanke's (1983) explanation for What about the target question, that is,
the length of the Great Depression can be about the choice between stabilizing money
thought of as a downward shock to credit vs. stabilizing credit? Rather than try to con-
supply stemming from the increased risk- duct a complete Poole-style (1970) analysis,
ness of loans and banks' concern for liquid- we simply ask whether policymakers would
ity in the face of possible runs. According to respond "correctly" (i.e., in a stabilizing way)
to various shocks if they were targeting mon-
ey or targeting credit.
Consider first an expansionary IS shock.
Table 1 (line 5) shows that both money and
5Most comparative statics results require no assump- credit would rise if bank reserves were un-
tions other than the ones we have already made. But, in changed. Hence a central bank trying to
a few cases, we encounter theoretical ambiguities that stabilize either money or credit would con-
can be resolved by invoking certain elasticity assump-
tions spelled out in a longer version of this paper. If tract bank reserves, whch is the correct
output is fixed on the supply side, y would be replaced stabilizing response. Either policy works, at
by P in Figure 1 and in the text discussion that follows. least qualitatively. A similar analysis applies
438 AEA PAPERS A N D PROCEEDINGS MA Y I988
Bank Reserves + + + -
Money Demand - + - +
Credit Supply + + + +
Credit Demand -
-
+ -
Commodity Demand + + + + "Growth rates are first differences of natural loga-
rithms.
"On bonds Correlations in nominal terms come first; correla-
tions in real terms come second.
to shocks to the supply of credit or to the
money multiplier.
But suppose the demand for money in- Table 2 shows the simple correlations be-
creases (line 2), whch sends a contractionary tween GNP growth and growth of the two
impulse to GNP. Since t h s shock raises M, financial aggregates during three periods.
a monetarist central bank would contract Money was obviously much more hghly cor-
reserves in an effort to stabilize money, whch related with income than was credit during
would destabilize GNP. Ths, of course, is the period of stable money demand, 1953-73.
the familiar Achlles heel of monetarism. But the two financial aggregates were on a
Notice, however, that t h s same shock would more equal footing during 1974:l-1979:3.
make credit contract. So a central bank try- Further changes came during the period of
ing to stabilize credit would expand reserves. unstable money demand, 1979:4-1985:4;
In t h s case, a credit-based policy is superior money-GNP correlations dropped sharply
to a money-based policy. whle money-credit correlations fell only
The opposite is true, however, when there slightly, giving a clear edge to credit.'
are credit-demand shocks. Line 4 tells us More direct evidence on the relative
that a contractionary (for GNP) credit- magnitudes of money-demand and credit-
demand shock lowers the money supply but demand shocks was obtained by comparing
raises credit. Hence a monetarist central bank the residuals from estimated structural mon-
would turn expansionary, as it should, while ey-demand and credit-demand functions like
a creditist central bank would turn contrac- D(.)and L ( . ) in our model. We used the
tionary, whch it should not. l o g a r i t h c partial adjustment model, with
We therefore reach a conclusion similar to adjustment in nominal terms, whch we are
that reached in discussing indicators: If not eager to defend but whch was designed
money-demand shocks are more important to fit money demand. Hence, our procedure
than credit-demand shocks, then a policy of seems clearly biased toward finding rela-
targeting credit is probably better than a tively larger credit shocks than money shocks.
policy of targeting money. Unsurprisingly, estimates for the entire
1953-85 period rejected parameter stability
V. Empirical Evidence across a 1973:4-1974:l break, so we con-
centrated on the latter p e r i ~ d Much
.~ to our
The foregoing discussion suggests that the
case for credit turns on whether credit de-
mand is, or is becoming, relatively more from Flow-of-Funds data). For details and analysis of
stable than money demand. We conclude the latter. see Blinder (1985).
'similar tindings emerged when we controlled for
with some evidence that t h s is true, at least many variables via a vector-autoregression and looked
since 1979.6 at correlations between VAR residuals.
8Estimation was by instrumental variables. Instru-
ments were current, once, and twice lagged logs of real
61n what follows, "money" is M I , "credit" is an government purchases, real exports, bank reserves, and
aggregate invented by one of us: the sum of intermedi- a supply shock variable whlch is a weighted average of
ated borrowing by households and businesses (derived the relative prices of energy and agricultural products.
VOI_ 78 V O 2 IS IT W O V L ) OR CREDIT, OR BOTII. OR " v I T I I E R ' 439
REFERENCES
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[Footnotes]
1
Credit Rationing and Effective Supply Failures
Alan S. Blinder
The Economic Journal, Vol. 97, No. 386. (Jun., 1987), pp. 327-352.
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References
Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression
Ben S. Bernanke
The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 3. (Jun., 1983), pp. 257-276.
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