People Vs Nasario Molina

2/25/2017 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDVOLUME352
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Molina
*
G.R. No. 133917. February 19, 2001.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs.

NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMAT @ BOBONG and
GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ BOBOY, accused
appellants.
Constitutional Law Criminal Procedure Searches and

Seizures Arrest Constitution mandates that searches and seizures
be carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the
strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a
probable cause Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, bolsters and
solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.The fundamental law of the land mandates that
searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion, that
is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated
upon the existence of a probable cause. x x x Complementary to
the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under
Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Same Same Same Same Instances where search and seizure
may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible.Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be
admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest (2) search of a moving motor vehicle (3) search in
violation of customs laws (4) seizure of evidence in plain view (5)
when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search).
Same Same Same Same Under the first exception, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be
madethe process cannot be reversed As a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest The
Rules of Court recognizes permissible warrantless arrests.The
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015a74a432200ad29fc4003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/16
first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a

valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this
instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before
a search can be madethe process cannot be reversed. As a rule,
an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant
of arrest. The
________________
* EN BANC.
175
VOL. 352, FEBRUARY 19, 2001 175
People vs. Molina
Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless

arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto) (b)
when an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it
(arrest effected in hot pursuit) and (c) when the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest
of escaped prisoners).
Same Same Same Same In cases of in flagrante delicto
arrests, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense Arresting officer must have personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable
cause Meaning of Probable Cause.In People v. Chua Ho San,
the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal
knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or

constitutive of probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria,
probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Same Same Same Same It is settled that reliable
information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.As applied to in flagrante
delicto arrests, it is settled that reliable information alone,
absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not
sufficient to
176
People vs. Molina
constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto

arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin, it was held that the
accusedappellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or
that he had just done so.
Same Same Same Same Two requisites to constitute a valid
in flagrante delicto arrest.To constitute a valid in flagrante
delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Davao City, Br. 17.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiffappellee.
Ateneo Legal Aid Office for accusedappellants.
YNARESSANTIAGO, J.:
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in

the name of protecting the society from lawbreakers is to
make the government itself lawless and to subvert those
values 1upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty
depend. 2
For automatic review is the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No.
37,26496, finding accusedappellants Nasario Molina y
Manamat alias Bobong and Gregorio Mula y Malagura
alias Boboy,
3
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Section 8, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
________________
1 Dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.

465, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1105 [1976].
2 Dated April 25, 1997, Rollo, pp. 1124.
3 Sec. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs.The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof.
177
VOL. 352, FEBRUARY 19, 2001 177

People vs. Molina
(Republic
4
Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty
of death.
The information against accusedappellants reads:
That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed accused, in conspiracy with each other, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously was found in their
possession 946.9 grains of5 dried marijuana which are prohibited.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused

appellants
6
pleaded not guilty to the accusation against
them. Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented
Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y.
Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S.
Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.
The antecedent facts are as follows: Sometime in June

1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the
Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3,
Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the7
presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City.
The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in
person was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1
Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle
passed by. His informer pointed to the
________________
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the

Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.The penalties for offenses under
Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in
any of the following quantities:
5) 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana
x x x x x x x x x
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity.
4 An Act Imposing the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes.
5 Filed on August 10, 1996 Rollo, p. 7.
6 Records, p. 14.
7 TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 24.
178

People vs. Molina
motorcycle driver, accusedappellant Mula, as the pusher.

As to accusedappellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no
occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names
and addresses of the accusedappellants came to the
knowledge8
of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were
arrested.
At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1
Paguidopon received an information that the alleged
pusher will be9 passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time
that morning. Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of the
same day, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No.
3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the
team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2
Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and
SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon 10
where they would wait for the alleged pusher
to pass by.
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while
the team was positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon,
a trisikad carrying the accusedappellants passed by. At
that instance, SPOI Paguidopon pointed to the accused
appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team11 boarded
their vehicle and overtook the trisikad. SPO1
Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty
12
meters from where
the accusedappellants were accosted.
The police officers then ordered the trisikad to stop. At
that point, accusedappellant Mula who was holding a
black bag handed the same to accusedappellant Molina.
Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a
police officer
13
and asked accusedappellant Molina to open
the bag.
14
Molina replied, Boss, if possible we will settle
this. SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which
revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter,
________________
8 TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 79.

9 Id., pp. 10 and 18.
10 TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 45 (Direct examination of SPO1
Pamplona).
11 TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 56.
12 TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 1415.
13 TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 68.
14 Id., p. 14.
179
VOL. 352, FEBRUARY 19, 2001 179

People vs. Molina
accusedappellants15 Mula and Molina were handcuffed by

the police officers.
On December 6, 1996, accusedappellants, through
counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending
that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is
inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in
violation of their constitutional
16
right against unreasonable
searches and 17
seizures. The demurrer was denied by the
trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
accusedappellants, but this was likewise denied.
Accusedappellants waived presentation of evidence and
opted to file a joint memorandum.
On April
18
25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed
decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone

without any evidence from both accused who waived presentation
of their own evidence through their counsels, more than sufficient
to prove the guilt of both accused of the offense charged beyond
reasonable doubt, pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act
7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA, are
sentenced to suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through
lethal injection under Republic Act 8176, to be effected and
implemented as therein provided for by law, in relation to Sec. 24
of Rep. Act 7659.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to
immediately elevate the entire records of this case with the Clerk
of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for the automatic review
of their case by the Supreme Court and its appropriate action as
the case may be. 19
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule

122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated
to this Court on automatic review. Accusedappellants
contend:
________________
15 Id., p. 9.
16 Records, pp. 3237.
17 Records, pp. 3943.
18 Penned by Judge Renato A. Fuentes.
19 Decision, Rollo, p. 24.
180

People vs. Molina
I.
THAT THE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE

FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF
APPELLANTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
II.
THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE

GOVERNMENT HAS NOT OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND
III.
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN

PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE IMPOSABLE
PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF RA No. 7659 (sic), IN
THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING20
CIRCUMSTANCE, IS
LIFE IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion (In

Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for the acquittal of both
accusedappellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that
searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable
fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search
warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing
21
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
________________
20 Rollo, p. 40.
21 Constitution, Article III, Section 2.
181
VOL. 352, FEBRUARY 19, 2001 181

People vs. Molina
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the

exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3,
paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies 22the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section

shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of

words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties so too, without this

rule, the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be
so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence as not to merit this Courts high regard 23
as a
freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is
not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom
may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle (3) search in violation of customs laws (4) seizure
of evidence in plain view (5) when the accused himself
waives his24
right against unreasonable searches and 25
seizures and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search).
________________
22 People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, 443 [1999].

23 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. ed. 2d 1081, 1090
[1961].
24 People v. Doria., 301 SCRA 668, 705 [1999] citing Hizon v. Court of
Appeals, 265 SCRA 517, 527 [1996] People v. Fernandez, 239 SCRA 174,
182183 [1994] Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687, 697 [1986] Bernas, The
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, p. 169 [1996] Cruz,
Constitutional Law, pp. 147153 [1986] Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, Rule 126, Section 12, and Rule 113, Section 5 People v.
Bagista, 214 SCRA 63, 69 [1992] People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122,
126128 [1991] Roldan, Jr. v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336, 348 [1975] Papa v.
Mago, 22 SCRA 857, 871874 [1968] People v. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144, 153
[1993] Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil. 33, 48 [1937] and People v. Kagui
Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 226 [1936].
25 People v. Chua Ho San, supra citing Terry v. Ohio, 20 L Ed, 896
adopted in Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 [1990] and People
v. Ramos, 222 SCRA 557 [1993].
182

People vs. Molina
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest)

includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant
to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede
the search. In this instance, the law requires that there be
first a lawful arrest before a 26
search can be madethe
process cannot be reversed. As a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of
arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible

warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(arrest in flagrante delicto) (b) when an offense has just
been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in
hot pursuit) and (c) when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from 27
one confinement to another (arrest
of escaped prisoners).
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment
of conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of
accusedappellants, and the subsequent search conducted
by the peace officers, are valid because accusedappellants
were caught
28
in flagrante delicto in possession of prohibited
drugs. This brings us to the issue of whether or not the
warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case
fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement. 29
In People v. Chua Ho San, the Court held that in cases
of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private
person may,
________________
26 Id., at 449 citing Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159, 175
[1997].
27 Id., at 444 and the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (as
amended), Rule 113, Section 5.
28 Decision, Rollo, p. 22.
29 People v. Chua Ho San, supra citing People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
[1986] People v. Encinada, 280 SCRA 72 [1997] People v. Montilla, 285
SCRA 703 [1998] People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 [1988] People v.
Maspil, Jr., 188 SCRA 757 [1988] People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122
183
VOL. 352, FEBRUARY 19, 2001 183

People vs. Molina
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence,

the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The
arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge

of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative
or constitutive
30
of probable cause. As discussed in People v.
Doria, probable cause means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion
are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is
based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled
that reliable information alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and
within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient
to constitute probable cause that would justify an 31 in
flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin, it
was held that the accusedappellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown
that he was about to do so or that he had just done so.
What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the
M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of
the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the
carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect
and so subject to apprehension.
________________
[1991] People v. Tangiben, 184 SCRA 220 [1990] Posadas v. Court of

Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 [1990] People v. Malmsteadt, 198 SCRA 401
[1991].
30 People v. Doria, supra citing Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251, 263
[1991]: United States v. Santos, 36 Phil. 851 [1917] People v. Bati, 189
SCRA 97 [1990] People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388 [1990] and People v.
Ramos, 186 SCRA 184 [1990].
31 163 SCRA 402, 409410 [1988].
184

People vs. Molina
32
Likewise, in People v. Mengote, the Court
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015a74a432200ad29fc4003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False did not consider 11/16
32
Likewise, in People v. Mengote, the Court did not consider
eyes . . . darting from side to side . . . [while] holding . . .
[ones] abdomen, in a crowded street at 11:30 in the
morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to
arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause.
According to the Court, [b]y no stretch of the imagination
could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense
had just been committed, or was actually being committed,
or was at least being attempted in [the arresting
33
officers]
presence. So also, in People v. Encinada, the Court ruled
that no probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding a
motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs. 34
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, the trial
court concluded that petitioner was attempting to commit a
crime as he was standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda
and Quezon Boulevard with his eyes moving very fast and
looking 35at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to
them. In declaring the warrantless arrest therein
illegal, the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto . . . arrest

preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on
the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on
the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been 36
committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
It went on to state that
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or

conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very
fastan observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu
and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it
was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner
and his companions were merely standing at the corner
and were not creating any commotion or trouble . . .
________________
32 210 SCRA 174, 179180 [1992].

33 280 SCRA 72, 8687 [1997].
34 283 SCRA 159 [1997].
35 Id., at 169.
36 Id., at 175.
185
VOL. 352, FEBRUARY 19, 2001 185

People vs. Molina
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to

believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None
was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
discovered inside the front waistline of petitioner, and from all
indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any
telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner 37was indeed hiding a
grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two

requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime
and (2) such overt act is done 38
in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.
In the case at bar, accusedappellants manifested no
outward indication that would justify their arrest. In
holding a bag on board a trisikad, accusedappellants could
not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have
committed a crime. It matters not that accusedappellant
Molina responded Boss, if possible we will settle this to
the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such
response which allegedly reinforced the suspicion of the
arresting officers that accusedappellants were committing
a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone
will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante
delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but
merely pointed accusedappellants to the arresting
officers), accusedappellants could not be the subject of any
suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his
informer conducted a surveillance of accusedappellant
Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only
learned Mulas name and address after the arrest. What is
more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized
accusedappellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before
the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once,
pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the
side of the road. These circumstances could not have
afforded SPO1
________________
37 Id., at 178.
38 Concurring Opinion of Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in People v.
Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 720 (1999).
186

People vs. Molina
Paguidopon a closer look at accusedappellant Mula,

considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle
when SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With
respect to accusedappellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon
admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest.
This belies the claim of SPOl Pamplona that he knew
the name of accusedappellants even before the arrest, to
wit
Q When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to

another person and how did you know that it was Mula
who handed the black bag to another person?
A Because I have already information from Paguidopon,
regarding Mula and Molina, when they pass by through
the street near the residence of Paguidopon. He told
that the one who is big one that39is Gregorio Mula and
the thin one is Nazario Molina
The aforecited testimony of SPOl Pamplona, therefore, is

entirely baseless. SPOl Pamplona could not have learned
the name of accusedappellants from SPOl Paguipodon
because Paguipodon himself, who allegedly conducted the
surveillance, was not even aware of accusedappellants
name and address prior to the arrest.
Evidently, SPOl Paguidopon, who acted as informer of
the arresting officers, more so the arresting officers
themselves, could not have been certain of accused
appellants identity, and were, from all indications, merely
fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer in
the said case knew appellant Encinada even before the
arrest because of the latters illegal gambling activities,
thus, lending at least a semblance of validity on the arrest
effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court
declared in said case that the warrantless arrest and the
consequent search were illegal, holding that [t]he
prosecutions evidence did not show any suspicious
behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or
while he rode the mo
________________
39 TSN, November 26, 1996, p. 7.
187
VOL. 352, FEBRUARY 19, 2001 187

People vs. Molina
torela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise

could be ascribed40
to appellant under such bare
circumstances.
Moreover, it could not be said that accusedappellants
waived their right against unreasonable searches and
seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was
any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent 41
at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused
appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the
rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was
likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the
peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against
accusedappellants, and the Court is thus, left with no
choice but to find in favor of accusedappellants.
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the
government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our lawenforcement officers towards this drive, all
efforts for the achievement of a drugfree society must not
encroach on the fundamental rights and liberties of
individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
protection extends even to the basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37, 26496,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused
appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias Bobong and
Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias Boboy, are ACQUITTED
and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are
validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,

Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, GonzagaReyes, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval
Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
________________
40 People v. Encinada, supra.

41 Id., at 91 citing Aniag v. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 424,
436437 [1994].
188

People vs. Awing
Judgment reversed and set aside, accusedappellants

acquitted.
Note.Wellentrenched in this country is the rule that

no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid
warrant issued by competent judicial authority. (Asuncion
vs. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 490 [1999])
o0o
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People Vs Nasario Molina

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2/25/2017 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDVOLUME352

174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs.

Constitutional Law Criminal Procedure Searches and

first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a

VOL. 352, FEBRUARY 19, 2001 175

People vs. Molina

Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless

knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or

176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Molina

constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto

AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in

1 Dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.

VOL. 352, FEBRUARY 19, 2001 177

That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao,

Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused

The antecedent facts are as follows: Sometime in June

Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the

178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

motorcycle driver, accusedappellant Mula, as the pusher.

8 TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 79.

VOL. 352, FEBRUARY 19, 2001 179

accusedappellants15 Mula and Molina were handcuffed by

WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone

Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule

180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

THAT THE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE

THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE

GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND

THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN

The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion (In

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

VOL. 352, FEBRUARY 19, 2001 181

Complementary to the foregoing provision is the

Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section

Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of

charter of inestimable human liberties so too, without this

22 People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, 443 [1999].

182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest)

arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible

VOL. 352, FEBRUARY 19, 2001 183

without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence,

arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge

[1991] People v. Tangiben, 184 SCRA 220 [1990] Posadas v. Court of

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto . . . arrest

It went on to state that

Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or

32 210 SCRA 174, 179180 [1992].

VOL. 352, FEBRUARY 19, 2001 185

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to

Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two

186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paguidopon a closer look at accusedappellant Mula,

Q When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to

The aforecited testimony of SPOl Pamplona, therefore, is

39 TSN, November 26, 1996, p. 7.

VOL. 352, FEBRUARY 19, 2001 187

torela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise