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To cite this article: James G. Roche & Barry D. Watts (1991) Choosing analytic measures ,
Journal of Strategic Studies, 14:2, 165-209, DOI: 10.1080/01402399108437447
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Choosing Analytic Measures1
James G. Roche and Barry D. Watts
165
166 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
for enemy vessels, ratios of air-to-air kills versus losses, exchange rates
between submarines and surface vessels, and measures of accuracy for
aerial bombing or naval gunfire are representative of the various analytic
measures described by Morse and Kimball in their 1946 text on the methods
of operations research.24
To be emphasized, however, is that measures such as sweep rates and
kill ratios, straightforward though they may appear, were considered by
Morse and Kimball to be, at best, coarse-grained criteria which manifested
significant analytic limitations. Even in the case of simple operational
situations for which theoretical values of the constants of the operation
could be computed, their rule of thumb was that unless the theoretical
values were at least 'a factor of three' greater than those actually observed,
it was 'extremely unlikely' that 'significant improvement' could be made
on the basis of operational analysis.25 As for more complex situations
in which theoretical values could not be readily computed, Morse and
Kimball admitted they included many important problems of choice.
Enemy submarines, for example, could be combated by convoying, by
direct attacks on the high seas, or by going after them in port; similarly,
aircraft could be used to attack enemy front-line troops or the factories in
which their weapons and munitions were produced. But when World War
II operations researchers tackled these broader problems of choice, they
usually found it 'hard to find a common unit of measure', and, as a result,
decisions between such 'strategic' alternatives were frequently influenced or
made on the basis of 'political or other non-quantitative' considerations.26
Nor were these systemic problems of how best to scale and measure
effectiveness solved when systems (or cost-effectiveness) analysis was
brought to the Pentagon in the early 1960s by Robert S. McNamara and
applied to major resource-allocation issues.27 As thoughtful practitioners
such as James R. Schlesinger were the first to admit, even the so-called
'hard' elements with which systems analysis started - calculations of
costs (or inputs) and effectiveness measures (or outputs) - were not
without their problems and limitations. First, implicit in the very term
'cost-effectiveness' was (and remains) a presumption that political, social,
and other non-economic factors could be assigned little, if not zero, weight
in cost-benefit analyses.28 This questionable tendency was reinforced by
a preference among systems analysts for formal, mathematical models
which, in many cases, led to the neglect of important political, social,
and other variables.29 Second, there was the bureaucratic fact of life
that analyses could be easily skewed, biased, or constrained by decisions
about terms of reference, choice of scenario, or strategic assumptions of
the decision makers whom the analysis was intended to serve. Finally,
the analytic measures devised by defense secretary McNamara's analysts
suffered the same inability to cope with higher-order strategic choices
noted by Morse and Kimball. In fact, there remains every reason to
believe that Schlesinger's 1967 observation that 'adequate measures of
merit have yet to be devised' for 'most higher-order problems' continues
to be valid right down to the present day.30 For example, the probability
172 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
the air attacks was to increase . . . output'.52 The basic fact of the CBO, in
Galbraith's view, was that
German war production had . . . expanded under the bombing. The
greatly heralded efforts, those on the ball-bearing and aircraft plants
for example, emerged as costly failures. Other operations, those
against oil and the railroads, did have military effect. But strategic
bombing had not won the war. At most, it had eased somewhat
the task of the ground troops who did. The aircraft, manpower and
bombs used in the campaign had cost the American economy far more
in output than they had cost Germany.53
Having sketched the opposing sides of the seemingly endless (and often
bitter) debate over the effectiveness of the CBO, we will now attempt to
illustrate the pivotal role played by the choice of analytic measures in
assessing the campaign. Galbraith, as knowledgeable as he undoubtedly was
on the bombing of Germany, was also, by his own admission, emotionally
traumatized by it. In his 1981 autobiography, for example, he noted that
while he quickly got over the appalling poverty he encountered when he
first went to Calcutta, the 'utterly sickening sight' of the devastation of the
German (and, later, the Japanese) cities was still with him.54 Yet as appalled
by the results of the bombing as Galbraith was, and evidently remains, he
seems to evidence 'not the slightest suspicion that his feelings about war
might have corrupted the conclusions he came to as a director of the survey
of the effects of strategic bombing on the wartime German economy'.55
In retrospect, the most obvious point at which Galbraith's visceral
reaction to strategic bombing clearly conflicted with his analysis was in the
narrow choice of measures. The USSBS study he directed asserted that 'it
was to the lowering of the level of Germany's finished munitions output that
the Allied strategic bombing offensive was in the main addressed'.56 In other
words, the fundamental analytic yardstick he and his colleagues applied
was that if the level of bombing was increasing but German armaments
production was not leveling off or falling, the strategic bombing had to
be deemed a failure. Both non-economic military effects of the bombing,
as well as indirect economic effects, were thereby largely excluded.
On one hand, Galbraith's emphasis on the analytic measure of munitions
output as a basis for judging the effects of strategic bombing on Germany's
war economy is by no means inherently implausible. It does attempt
to relate quantifiable inputs (bomb tonnage delivered over time) to
quantifiable outputs (German production of eight main types of finished
munitions).57 It is also the metric suggested by the enthusiastic claims
for daylight precision bombings that its ardent supporters in the Army
Air Corps made throughout World War II. What American airmen
optimistically promised was to shatter the supposedly taut, fragile web
of Germany's war economy. And, last but not least, the measure of the
bombing's impact on finished armaments production was undoubtedly
compatible with the charter of Galbraith's Overall Economic Effects
Division. Galbraith's focus on production indices versus the weight of the
CHOOSING ANALYTIC MEASURES 177
Germany, coming on the heels of three attacks on the Romanian oil fields
in April, produced immediate and dramatic drops in German production
of aviation fuel.67 Granted, the large stocks of reserves the Germans had
accumulated enabled them to delay the impact of the April-May 1944
oil attacks until August. But it is still hard, if not impossible, to dismiss
the strong likelihood that German oil production was a genuinely vital
military target during the first half of 1944. Whether oil was also an
economically vital target system in the full sense intended by American
precision bombing doctrine at that point in the war is a broader issue on
which debate continues to this day.68
Of course, the operational rub regarding oil at the time was that, due
to events such as General Dwight Eisenhower's March 1944 decision to
focus the Anglo-American strategic air forces on transportation prior to
the Normandy invasion, oil did not again receive the priority many felt
it deserved until the late fall of 1944. Nonetheless, the lesson regarding
aggregate input/output measures seems clear enough. 'Net bombs dropped'
versus 'munitions produced' give little insight into the detailed effects of
bombing German oil supplies in general and aviation fuel production in
particular. In this sense, the industrial measures Galbraith utilized to
criticize the CBO are simply too coarse and unappreciative of all but the
most direct economic and military effects of strategic bombing.
To this point, the measures by which we have tried to assess the CBO's
effectiveness have been the traditional: target damage or destruction,
bomb tonnage versus armament production, industrial dispersal, indirect
production losses, the creation of 'bottlenecks' in the supply of 'vital'
resources such as oil, the attainment of air superiority, etc. To illustrate
the potential importance of alternative measures, we turn next to the
potential of strategic air attack to divert enemy economic resources into less
productive areas and the associated 'opportunity costs' of such diversions.
This sort of 'second-order' effect not only entails more subtle measures
than any we have considered so far, but it also leads to a more favorable
bottom-line judgment of the CBO's effectiveness than Galbraith's.
The 'second-order' effect we want to consider first is the potential
diversion of German economic resources to defending against the Com-
bined Bomber Offensive. Intriguingly, Galbraith's report on The Effects
of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy is by no means
oblivious to this particular effect. 'It is', his division's report noted,
'just as much a loss by bombing if a rifle, for example, is not produced
because resources have been diverted to the output of anti-aircraft guns
as it is if a rifle is not produced because the rifle plant is bombed out'.69
Yet the general impression left by the discussion of anti-aircraft artillery
and ammunition which follows this passage is that the commitment of
resources to these items was neither great nor disproportionate. 'In 1943
and 1944 the value of anti-aircraft artillery was from 25 to 30 per cent
of the value of all weapons produced, while the value of anti-aircraft
ammunition was between 15 and 20 per cent of the ammunition total'.70
Moreover, the entire cost of anti-aircraft artillery could not be attributed
180 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
the late summer of 1944, as monthly fighter production climbed toward its
wartime peak, the reality was more and more that German factories were
turning out hundreds of aircraft a month which 'had neither fuel to fly nor
pilots'.81 Even though fighter output soared, the pay-off in operational
capability declined.82
TABLE 1
SELECTED GERMAN MONTHLY ARMAMENTS PRODUCTION DATA 7 7
combat potential and war production, the Doolittle raid was, at most, a
pinprick.
Indeed, the direct and predictable military effects of the Doolittle raid
were so modest that it is possible to question whether the operation should
have been mounted at all given the likely benefits, costs, and risks it
entailed. Regarding predictable benefits, the bombs of a mere 16 B-25s
could never have been expected to inflict any appreciable damage on the
Japanese military, or to eliminate any vital link in Japan's war industry.
Concerning costs, there was no expectation that the bombers would be
recovered for further use by the Americans. After bombing Japan the
planned mission profile was for the B-25s to head for China and attempt
to reach bases in the Chuchow area, presumed to be under the control of
Chiang Kai-shek, where the aircraft would be turned over to his forces.100
As for the risks, to give the B-25s a chance of reaching China, the original
planning called for them to be launched at a distance of about 395-485
nautical miles (450 to 550 statute miles) from Japan, which in turn meant
that two of the US Pacific Fleet's four carriers, Hornet and Enterprise, along
with their accompanying cruisers and destroyers, would have to sail into
what were, at the time, Japanese-controlled waters. (To indicate how far
into Japanese waters the carrier task force had to penetrate, Iwo Jima lies
about 790 nautical miles from Tokyo.) And because American naval power
in the Pacific during early 1942 essentially rested on the four carriers that
survived the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Doolittle raid risked far
more than a handful of B-25s and their crews.101 In light of this substantial
risk, American naval officers have tended to doubt whether the raid was
worth the risk. Edwin Layton, for example, who was the Pacific Fleet
intelligence officer from December 1940 to the end of the war, concluded
in 1985 that the 'effects of the raid were not momentous, nor commensurate
with the American risk of two of our four precious aircraft carriers in the
Pacific'.102
Yet with the advantage of hindsight, we can see that the daring raid by
Doolittle's B-25s had second-order effects on the war in the Pacific that
went far beyond the modest amount of physical damage inflicted on 18
April 1942. To begin with, there were the obvious psychological goals of
the raid: to boost American morale and dent that of the Japanese. The
extent to which the raid achieved its psychological goals can be seen in
such triumphant post-strike headlines in the United States as 'JAPAN
BOMBED, DOOLITTLE DOOED IT' and the outrage expressed in
Japanese newspapers that innocent school children had been 'murdered' by
US fliers.103 On the American side, the feat 'lifted the morale of Americans
still shaken by the fall of Bataan' and gave 'fresh hope' to Allied forces
worldwide.104 On the Japanese side, there was outrage, shock, and loss of
face.
The loss of face the raid inflicted on the Japanese military was, by far,
the raid's most important psychological effect because of its impact on
subsequent Japanese operations, deployments, and strategy. Some 53
battalions of the Japanese Army were dispatched on a punitive expedition
CHOOSING ANALYTIC MEASURES 187
the US 'an invaluable breathing space', constituted 'the turning point that
spelt the ultimate doom of Japan'.111
Consequently, the broader strategic significance of the Doolittle raid
stems from the second-order effects it had on Japanese thinking and
strategy. In the early 1970s the Japanese Defense Agency's official history
of the war concluded that Doolittle's raid: (1) caused the Japanese great
morale problems; (2) caused Japanese military leaders to lose face because
they had said Tokyo could never be bombed; (3) caused diversions of
Japanese forces such as the four fighter groups recalled for homeland air
defense - a fact that most historians overlook; (4) caused the Japanese
Army to join the assembly for the Midway operation; and (5) aligned the
Imperial General Headquarters unreservedly behind the Combined Fleet's
Midway-Aleutian operations plan (which, at the Battle of Midway, resulted
in a further dilution of Japanese strength).112
What do these second-order consequences of Doolittle's raid imply
about the problems of choosing adequate analytic measures? Simply put,
they suggest that if we concentrate exclusively on the direct, measurable
damage inflicted on enemy forces by a given military action, we could
very well overlook its most important consequences. The principal impact
Doolittle's B-25s had was to influence the minds of the Japanese. Affecting
the thinking of the Japanese military, in turn, produced at least three
second-order military consequences. First, some Japanese ground forces
were diverted to peripheral operations (the punitive expedition in Chekiang
province); second, other Japanese forces, the four fighter groups, were
tied down in homeland defense because the Japanese perceived their
home islands to be at risk to American bombers, thus costing the
virtual attrition of these air groups for many months; and, finally,
Japanese military commanders and their staffs were provoked into
committing what proved to be operational and strategic mistakes (the
decisions which led to the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway).
The common thread in these diverse effects would appear to be the
psychological consequences of the Americans' ability to demonstrate that
the Japanese home islands were at risk. Again, the 60 bombs delivered by
Doolittle's B-25s during their '30 seconds' over Tokyo and other Japanese
cities did little physical damage. Moreover, American bombers did not
again overfly Tokyo until November 1944.113 Yet the personal loss of face
felt by key Japanese military leaders that immediately resulted 'from the
public having witnessed enemy planes winging over the imperial palace'
produced 'fundamental changes' in their plans for, and subsequent conduct
of, operations in the Pacific.114
To be emphasized is the lack of continuity that occurred because,
suddenly, Japan's 'sacred soil' was demonstrably at risk to American
bombers. As Admiral Layton later wrote, in the minds of the Japanese
the Doolittle raid had 'a far greater impact than any of us at CINCPAC
could have calculated'.115 Manifestly absent in this 'far greater impact' on
Japanese strategic thinking seems to be any direct, linear, quantifiable
linkage to the bombs delivered, or even bomb damage inflicted. There
CHOOSING ANALYTIC MEASURES 189
indicated by the use of italics, however, this listing can be readily divided
into at least two distinct classes: those which are relatively quantifiable and
linear in their effects, and those, shown in italics, which are not.
TABLE2
SELECTED ANALYTIC MEASURES
conventional forces was not risky for the West because the Soviets
could not win the breakthrough battles on which their campaign strategy
depended. Based on what Mearsheimer portrayed as the 'widely accepted
rule of thumb' that an advantage of three-to-one or more (in armored
division equivalents) would be needed to break through,121 he confidently
predicted that a Pact blitzkrieg in central Europe would fail because 'severe
force-to-space' constraints would limit the Soviet spearheads to, at best,
'temporary local superiorities in the vicinity of 1.6:1'.122
While Epstein essentially agreed with Mearshimer's global judgment
that a Pact conventional assault against NATO in central Europe would
fail, he did so on the basis of an entirely different set of calculations.
After criticizing Mearsheimer's three-to-one rule as being 'akin to bean
counts' and unsupported by any data, Epstein went on to offer, instead,
his own Adaptive Dynamic Model as a more credible basis for examining
conventional force balances.123 Epstein used his model to run two different
scenarios: one in which the Pact was willing to suffer high attrition in order
to gain ground; and one in which the Pact attack was less ferocious. In the
ferocious case, the Adaptive Dynamic Model indicated that Pact forces
would be 'annihilated after 91 days' while penetrating only 7.1km into
NATO territory; in the less ferocious scenario, Epstein's model showed
the Pact losing after 136 days while gaining no ground whatsoever.124
The main dispute between Mearsheimer and Epstein in the spring of
1988, then, was over methodology-specifically which of their respective
models offers a more credible or 'scientific' tool for conventional-force
analysis. Their disagreement persisted as recently as the spring 1989 issue
of International Security. In this round of the dispute, both of them basically
dug in and defended their previous positions. Mearshimer argued that his '3:1
rule' appears 'quite reliable' when 'evaluated against the proper evidence'.125
Epstein, for his part, expanded his criticisms of the 3:1 rule, Mearsheimer's
defense of it, and offered a ringing defense of his Adaptive Dynamic Model.126
Having characterized both of their positions in 1989 as reflecting a strong
preference for quantitative measure, we should note that Mearsheimer at
least has subsequently leaned more toward qualitative ones. Although he
has not abandoned the 3:1 rule, his prescient prediction in mid-January
1991 that the US-led coalition would clobber Iraq's forces and score a
stunning victory with far fewer than 1,000 American casualties was not
only vindicated by events, but was based primarily on qualitative measures
of military power.126a Of the two of them, it is Epstein who appears to
remain even after the 1991 Gulf War, stubbornly wedded to quantitative
measures.128b As Epstein wrote at the end of his spring 1989 rebuttal to
Mearsheimer's defense of the 3:1 rule: 'The main issue before us here is not
the 3:1 rule versus the Adaptive Dynamic Model. The main issue is whether
the field of security studies is going to move in the direction of science'.127
However, the kind of science towards which Epstein hopes security
studies will move is, plainly, the linear science of Pierre Simon de Laplace
(1749-1827).128 Linear science, after all, rests on two propositions: (1)
that 'changes in system output are proportional to changes in input
194 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
(proportionality); and (2) . . . that we can deal with the effects of a system
either as a whole, or we can break it into its component parts and then
add the effects of the parts together to represent the effect of the whole,
so that F(x+y) = F(x) + F(y)'.129 And even the most cursory inspection of
the equations underlying Epstein's Adaptive Dynamic Model reveals that
his 'calculus of conventional war' embraces both these assumptions, just as
did Laplace's physics.130
Still, what is wrong with attempting to move security studies in the
direction of linear science akin to nineteenth century mechanics? There
are two reasons for thinking movement in this direction makes no sense.
First, we now know something that Laplace did not: namely that linear
science is not all the science there is. Again, the discovery of simple,
deterministic systems whose long-term behavior is non-linear in the sense of
not being completely predictable shows that, even in mathematical physics,
proportionality does not hold universally and that the whole is not always
equal to the arithmetic sum of its parts.131 Laplace, in short, was wrong
when he assumed the universe is relentlessly linear.132 Second, one area
of human endeavor in which the assumptions of linearity surely do not
hold is the realm of war. If there is one idea that we have tried to place
beyond reasonable doubt in this paper, it is that in war non-linear effects
occur and the whole is not always equal to the arithmetic sum of its parts.
Human involvement alone argues that combat interactions and processes
cannot be universally linear, that effects can be all out of proportion to
their causes. As a result, the measures and analyses by which we attempt
to deal with such complex interactions as strategic bombing cannot be
wholly linear, not even in principle. Contrary to Laplace, Lord Kelvin,
Lanchester, Epstein, and numerous others, war cannot be adequately
captured by explicit, linear mathematical formulas anymore than can
chaotic dynamic systems.
The brute fact of non-linearity dooms the plausibility and adequacy
of wholly linear approaches to operations analysis, policy formulation,
procurement choices, systems analysis, military modeling, wartime plan-
ning, assessments of operational effects, comparative force assessments,
and the rest. These fields cannot be reduced to linear equations and
predictive measures. Other measures and other forms of analyses are
required to supplement the Procrustean bed of linear science into which
we have been finitely trying to force the study of war since at least the time
of Clausewitz. It is, in our judgment, that simple.
NOTES
1. This essay presents the views of the authors on the general problem of selecting analytic
measures. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the Northrop Corporation or any
agency of the US Government. While accepting full responsibility for the arguments and
conclusions expressed herein, we want to acknowledge Andrew W. Marshall's constant
encouragement, wise counsel, and numerous suggestions. We also want to thank Eliot
A. Cohen and Thomas A. Fabyanic for their invaluable comments on an earlier draft.
2. Andrew W. Marshall, Problems of Estimating Military Power (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND paper P-3417, Aug. 1966), p.9.
3. James R. Schlesinger, 'Systems Analysis and the Political Process,' RAND paper
P-3464, June 1967; Selected Papers on National Security 1964-1968 (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND paper P-5284, Sept. 1974), p.93.
4. John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., 15th ed., 1980),
p.594.
5. C. A. 'Bert' Fowler, 'The Never-Never Land of Defense Analysis', keynote address,
Cruise Missile Workshop, MIT Lincoln Laboratories, 2 May 1989, p.2.
6. David A. Armstrong, Bullets and Bureaucrats: The Machine Gun and the United States
Army, 1861-1916 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp.210-13. There were also
occasions when the opposition of particular individuals severely obstructed adoption of
the machine gun. For example, during the American civil war, the War Department's
chief of ordnance, Brigadier General James W. Ripley, was so strong in his conviction
that imperfect prototype machine guns were not worth purchasing that, ignoring the
desires of both President Abraham Lincoln and the field commanders it was his duty
to support, he was able to prevent the Union repeating gun from being adopted for
general issue (Ibid., p.22).
7. Ibid., pp.15, 23, 210.
8. In 1862, for example, the Raphael repeater was rejected for service with the Union
army by the Frankford Arsenal on the grounds that the gun 'possessed all the
restrictions on movements and requirements for infantry support of conventional
artillery pieces without having the "great moral effect of Artillery,"' (Armstrong,
Bullets and Bureaucrats, p.23).
9. Ibid., p.211. Interestingly, the US Army's tendency to emphasize standardization for
CHOOSING ANALYTIC MEASURES 197
33. Discussion with Andrew W. Marshall, 19 Nov. 1988. Marshall has been the Director of
Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense since the fall of 1973; in this
capacity he has been both a producer and consumer of defense analyses.
34. Arthur B. Ferguson, 'POINTBLANK', in Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The
Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol.2, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, August
1942 to December 1943 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976 imprint),
pp.665-6.
35. The POINTBLANK target system, nevertheless, continued to be the basis for precision
bombing operations by the US heavy bomber forces through the end of the war in
Europe (J. Kenneth Galbraith, Burton H. Klein, et al., The Effects of Strategic Bombing
on the German War Economy (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 31 Oct.
1945), p.3).
36. 'The Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom', C.S.S. 166/1/D, 21 Jan. 1943, in
The Casablanca Conference, January 1943: Papers and Minutes of Meetings, Office of
the Combined Chiefs of Staff, file 119.151-1, Alfred F. Simpson Historical Research
Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, p.88. By the time the detailed plan implementing this
directive was presented in late April 1943, the mission statement had been explicitly
construed to mean that Germany would be 'so weakened as to permit initiation of
final combined operations on the Continent' (Major General Ira C. Eaker, Minutes
of Meeting: Presentation of the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, US National Archives, Record Group 218, CCS 334, 71st-86th Meetings, 29
April 1943, p.A31826).
37. Franklin D'Olier, Henry C. Alexander, et al., Over-all Report (European War)
(Washington, DC: GPO, 30 Sept. 1945), p.10. The British suspended strategic
bombing of German cities on 7 April 1945, and the American strategic air forces
in Europe ceased strategic operations on 16 April 1945 (Craven and Cate, The Army
Air Forces in World War II, Vol.3, Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, January 1944
to May 1945, pp.753-4).
38. Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., Strategic Air War Against Japan (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1980), p.3; Hansell, The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta, GA:
Higgins-McArthur/Longino & Porter, 1972), pp.33, 37, 46; Donald Wilson, 'Origin of
a Theory for Air Strategy', Aerospace Historian, March 1971, pp.19-20, 25.
39. David Maclsaac, Strategic Bombing in World War Two: The Story of the United
States Strategic Bombing Survey (New York, NY: Garland, 1976), p.8. MacIsaac's
encapsulation is a concise, literate summary of the theory of strategic air attack worked
out by Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., Donald Wilson, and other Army Air Corps officers at
the Air Corps Tactical School during the 1930s.
40. USAFHD 168. 491 (Operational letters), Vol.1, 21 July 1943, cited in William R.
Emerson, 'Operation POINTBLANK: A Tale of Bombers and Fighters', The
Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959-1987, ed. Harry R. Borowski
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1988), p.455.
41. W. W. Rostow, Pre-invasion Strategy: General Eisenhower's Decision of 29 March 1944
(Austin, TX: University of Texas, 1981), p.45.
42. Fagg, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol.3, pp.754-5. This 1951 conclusion
from the official Army Air Forces history is strikingly similar to that reached in 1945 by
the United States Strategic Bombing Survey's overall report on the European theater.
The USSBS offered the following summary: 'Allied air power was decisive in the war
in western Europe. Hindsight inevitably suggests that it might have been employed
differently or better in some respects. Nevertheless it was decisive'. (Franklin D'Olier,
et al., Over-all Report (European War), 30 Sept. 1945, p.107).
43. USSBS Interview 11-A, Albert Speer, 22 May 1945, cited in Fagg, 'Mission Accom-
plished', The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol.3, p.786. Speer has subsequently
stuck with his original judgment that air power alone could have won the war. See,
in particular, Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. Richard and Clara Winston
(New York, NY: Collier, 1981; Verlag Ullstein GmbH., 1969), p.285.
44. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1959), p.107. More generally, Brodie argued that the purely strategic successes of
200 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
Germany was 'to reduce the general level of German industrial production' (Guido
R. Perera, Leaves from My Book of Life, Vol.2, Washington and War Years (Boston,
MA: privately printed at the Stinehour Press, 1975), pp.ix-x).
60. Colonel Carl Norcross, et al., Aircraft Division Industry Report (Washington, DC:
GPO, 1st ed. 2 Nov. 1945), Chart 'The German Aircraft Industry Under Allied Air
Attack'.
61. Ferguson, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol.3, p.62; James H. Doolittle with
Beirne Lay, Jr., 'Daylight Precision Bombing' in IMPACT: The Army Air Forces'
Confidential Picture History of World War II (New York, NY: James Parton, 1980),
Vol.6, p.xv. It is our sense that the full contribution of US long-range escort fighters
to the Luftwaffe's loss of daytime air superiority over central Germany in the spring of
1944 remains one of the least appreciated aspects of the CBO.
62. Norcross, et al., Aircraft Division Industry Report, pp.24-5.
63. Ibid., p.26.
64. Ibid., p.7.
65. 'Beginning in March [1944], the Eighth Air Force discontinued efforts to evade enemy
fighters in its operations. To accomplish our mission, [the command's planners
reasoned,] we must not only bomb the aircraft factories, but also force enemy
fighters into the air. We now sought to provoke enemy fighter reaction'. (Major
General William E. Kepner, Eighth Air Force Tactical Development: August 1942-May
1945 (England: Eighth Air Force and Army Air Forces Evaluation Board, July 1945),
pp.76-7). The overriding strategic mission at this stage was, as General H. H. Arnold
emphasized in his 27 Dec. 1943 New Year's message to the commanding generals of
the Eighth and Fifteenth air forces, to destroy the enemy air force 'wherever you find
them, in the air, on the ground and in the factories' as a prerequisite for Overlord and
Anvil (Arthur Ferguson, 'Winter Bombing', The Army Air Forces in World War II,
Vol.3, p.8). In this regard, General Doolittle viewed his decision in Jan. 1944 to allow
Eighth Air Force's escort fighters to take the offensive and begin seeking out German
fighters wherever they could be found as his 'most important decision of World War II'
(Doolittle with Lay, IMPACT, Vol.6, p.xv).
66. Oil Division Final Report (Washington, DC: GPO, 1st ed. 25 August 1945), p. 4 and
fig. 7.
67. Oil Division Final Report, Figure 2; Rostow, Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategy, pp.53,
68, 78-9; Emerson, pp.447-8 and 468-9; ULTRA: History of US Strategic
Air Force Europe vs. German Air Forces, Special Research History 013, National
Archives, Record Group 457, pp.179-80. German aircraft fuel production dropped
from 180,000 tons in March 1944 to 54,000 tons in June, and was down to only 10,000
tons a month by September (Rostow, p.53). The German Air Force was the first to
feel the pinch. From September the Luftwaffe, with a monthly minimum requirement
of 160,000 tons of octane, was allotted only 30,000 tons for operations (Ibid., 79).
ULTRA decryptions in May 1944 following the US attacks showed that the Germans
reassigned 'oil defense a priority over even the defense of aircraft manufacture' (SRO
013, p.179).
68. Walt Rostow, who was part of the Enemy Objectives Unit (EOU) of the Economic
Warfare Division of the US embassy in London during World War II, was still
arguing in 1981 that General Dwight D. Eisenhower's 29 March 1944 decision to
focus the strategic air forces on transportation rather than oil was a major strategic
error (Rostow, Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategy, pp.75-84). Yet Alfred Mierzejewski
has recently taken the position that the nexus of transportation and coal, not oil, was
the only target system that 'was both sufficiently well defined to enable concentration
of effort and functionally broad enough to strike at the root of the German economy
while preventing it from shifting resources to counter losses' (Alfred C. Mierzejewski,
The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944-1945: Allied Air Power and the
German National Railway (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988),
p.182). Major General Haywood Hansell, who was one of the architects of the CBO
and earlier American strategic air plans, has consistently maintained that the German
electric power system (some 45 generating plants and 12 switching stations) could have
202 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
been destroyed by mid-May 1944 without lessening the attacks on the Luftwaffe or
oil, and that doing so 'would have caused the prompt collapse of the Reich' (Hansell
The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler, pp.267-8). Guido Perera, who was a member of
both the Committee of Operations Analysts and the US Strategic Bombing Survey, has
argued that ball bearings could have had similar effects if only a bit more effort had been
focused on this target system in 1943 (Perera, Leaves from My Book of Life, Vol.2,
pp.139, 156-9). Perera also supports Rostow in arguing that had a heavy, coherent
bombing effort been focused on oil prior to Normandy, 'the war might have been
ended in later 1944 or early 1945' (Ibid., p.169). So the debate over strategic targeting
priorities against Germany during the CBO period persists. Indeed, disagreement over
target selection appears to be as deep today as it was during World War II.
69. Galbraith, Klein, et al., The Effects of Strategic Bombing, p.185.
70. Ibid., p.187.
71. Ibid., p.l85.
72. Klein's basic thesis in 1959 appears to have been derived from the USSBS observation
that had 'Germany's leaders decided to make an all-out war effort in 1939 instead of
1942, they would have had time to arm in "depth"; that is, to lay the foundations of
a war economy by expanding their basic industries and building up equipment for the
mass production of munitions' (Galbraith, Klein, et al., The Effects of Strategic Bombing
on the German War Economy, p.7). Williamson Murray, however, has criticized this
contention on the grounds that it assumes 'the circumstances that determined German
rearmament in the 1930s and American rearmament in the 1940s' were essentially the
same when in fact they 'were vastly different' (Williamson Murray, The Change in the
European Balance of Power, 1938-1939 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1984), p.12). One clear weakness in Klein's case is his contention that the 'tremendous
increase in military output which occurred from late-1942 to mid-1944 was accomplished
with a relatively small increase in the resources available for the German war effort'
(Klein, Germany's Economic Preparations for War, p.213). As Murray has noted,
the resources available to the Germans in 1942, after they had gained control of 'the
resources of almost the entire European continent', were much greater than they were
in 1938-39, and 'German success in expanding production throughout the last three
years of the war. . .occurred because the Germans were able to exploit ruthlessly the
resources of the occupied and neutral countries within their sphere of control' (Murray,
The Change in the European Balance of Power, pp.13-14).
73. Burton H. Klein, Germany's Economic Preparations for War (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1959), p.206. Nevertheless, Klein does emphasize that the
overall economic effects report was written under such a pressing deadline that those
involved were not able to go through all the captured German economic documents
before the report had to be completed (Telephone conversation with Burton H. Klein,
2 Jan. 1990).
74. Klein, pp.232-3. Klein's assessment of the CBO also indicates that the claim that
the bombing had opened up a 'second front' against the Germans by early 1944 is
not without merit.
75. Galbraith, Klein, et al., The Effects of Strategic Bombing, pp.144-6, 149, 181-3,
276. The portion of total aircraft production due to defensive aircraft was estimated
as follows. The percentage of German finished armaments production consumed by
aircraft of all types in June 1944 was, as shown in Table 1, 46.1 per cent, and roughly
half of German aircraft production by weight was going to defensive fighters. So if we
assume that aircraft costs are proportional to airframe weight - which they basically
were in that era - then the portion of finished armaments production due to defensive
aircraft would be 46.1 per cent/2 = 23.05 per cent.
76. Galbraith, Klein, et al., The Effects of Strategic Bombing, Table 84 (II), p.149.
77. Tables 80 and 81, p. 145; Table 100, p.275. Tables 80 and 81 give values in constant
prices for total munitions and aircraft for just a few selected months. Table 100 contains
monthly and annual indices for the entire war based on Jan.-Feb. 1942 being 100 in each
category. These indices were used to calculate constant prices for months not listed in
Tables 80 and 81.
CHOOSING ANALYTIC MEASURES 203
78. Regarding the circumstances in which Overall Economic Effects. Division's report was
written, Klein stresses that there simply was not sufficient time to consider more than
the most direct and narrow effects of strategic bombing (conversation with Klein, 2 Jan.
1990).
79. Klein not only used a wider set of measures than Galbraith. His associated conceptual
framework was different. Implicitly at least, Klein seems to look at the war in Europe
as a two-sided competition to generate men, armament, ammunition, etc. for use in
military operations. From this perspective, it was natural to go beyond mere monthly
production rates and consider the broader question of how effectively the two sides
were able to translate industrial output into operational capabilities over a period. In
this regard, perhaps the overriding conclusion Klein drew from Germany's experience
was 'that a nation's economic war potential may be a very poor measure of her actual
military strength' (Klein, Germany's Economic Preparations for War, p.238). By the
time of his 1959 book, what was most surprising to Klein about Germany was not that
she eventually lost the war to a combination of powers whose economic strength vastly
exceeded hers, but 'how well she did despite the economic odds against her' (Ibid.).
80. B. V. Panov, V. N. Kiselev, I. I. Kartavtsev, et al., Isloriua voyennogo iskusstva
[History of Military Arts] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1984), Ch. II, section 3; Colonel
David M. Glantz, The Great Patriotic War and the Maturation of Soviet Operational
Art: 1941-1945, Soviet Army Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, April 1987 draft,
p.78.
81. Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 (Maxwell AFB:
Air University Press, 1983), p.275.
82. The great missed opportunity in this story for the Germans, of course, appears to have
been their failure to begin producing the Me-262 in operationally significant numbers
earlier. Had the Germans fielded the Me-262 in the fall of 1943 - Burton Klein believes
they could have easily done so - the CBO might well have turned out very different
(Klein, Germany's Economic Preparations for War, p.238). However, the first Me-262s
did not appear in combat until July 1944, and by then Germany no longer had the fuel
or the pilots to fully exploit its potential against the American bomber streams. Even
so, it is clear that from July 1944 to early 1945, US bomber commanders in Europe
were genuinely fearful that the 'daylight offensive could be seriously impeded by the
introduction . . . of the jet fighter in force' (Major General F. L. Anderson, letter to
Air Vice Marshal W. Coryton, 13 July 1944, Library of Congress, Spaatz papers, Box
50; also, Lt. Col. Donald R. Baucom, 'The Coming of the German Jets', Air Force
Magazine, Aug. 1987, p.90).
83. The initial operational employment of a German V-weapon against England did not
occur until the night of 12-13 June 1944, when the first V-1s were launched from
sites in France (Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol.3, p.84).
The last V-1 fired from France fell in Kent on the afternoon of 1 Sept. 1944 (Ibid.,
p.541).
84. Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945, pp.300-01. Neither
Germany nor Japan fielded long-range bomber forces in World War II comparable to
those of the British or the Americans. The closest analog fielded by either Axis country
would be the Germans' V-1 and V-2. But compared to the B-29, or even the B-17, the
German V-weapons were relatively short range. They were also committed to battle
too late and in insufficient numbers to affect the outcome of the war in Europe.
Furthermore, because the V-weapons were only used against England, the Soviets
in the east were never required to defend their war industry, rear areas, or lines of
communications against German strategic air attack.
85. MacIsaac, 'Voices from the Central Blue', p.636. Noble Frankland, together with Sir
Charles Webster, authored The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, 1939-1945,
the official history of the British Bomber Command during World War II.
86. For a sense of how great the disagreement over target selection during the CBO remains
to this day, see Note 68.
87. Galbraith, Klein, et al., The Effects of Strategic Bombing, pp.124-6; Hansell, The Air
Plan That Defeated Hitler, pp.259, 261-2, 267-8, 286-97. The primary reason
204 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
German electric power was never systematically attacked during the years 1943-45
was the opinion of many American economic analysts, both in Washington and London,
that the target system was too dispersed and too difficult to be vulnerable to strategic
bombing. Not surprisingly, Galbraith's overall economic report repeated some of these
same objections to electric power as a target system. Yet the overall economic effects
report, which Galbraith characterized in 1981 as a 'competent and literate document'
which was 'published without censorship of any kind', contains an overall assessment
of the potential vulnerability and decisiveness of this target system which is strikingly
at odds with Galbraith's pointed denigration of strategic bombing as a whole (A Life in
Our Times, pp.225,227). Notwithstanding the obvious difficulties of bombing elements
of the system such as transmission lines and towers, the report offered two pivotal
judgments about electric power: first, that the critical nodes in Germany's electric
power system - notably the 40-60 largest generating plants and the 9-12 vital
switching, control, and transformer stations - would not have been an unreasonable
target set for the bombers to have attacked; and, second, that electric power, unlike
most other elements of the German war economy during the early years of the war, ran
out of excess capacity by the fall of 1941 and was thereafter stretched taut (The Effects
of Strategic Bombing, p.126). So Galbraith's own volume of the USSBS concluded that,
on balance, attacking electric power 'might well' have been 'significant enough to have
had a decisive effect on the ability of the industrial war economy to continue to supply
the needs of war' (Ibid.).
88. Hansell, The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler, p.259; Craven and Cate, The Army Air
Forces in World War II, Vol.2, p.362; Perera, Leaves from My Book of Life, Vol.2,
p.96. German electric power was accorded first priority in the AWPD-1 air plan done
in Aug. 1941; and in the post-Pearl Harbor update conducted in Sept. 1942, AWPD-42,
electric power was given fourth priority behind the German Air Force, submarine yards,
and transportation system (Hansell, The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler, p.259). Based
on the arrangement of the COA's final report and certain oral statements made by the
Committee to General Arnold, electric power was dropped to tenth priority in a list of
14 target systems (Perera, Vol.2, p.96; Craven and Cate, Vol.2, pp.361-2).
89. Interview of Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., conducted by Thomas A.
Fabyanic, Boiling AFB, 21 Jan. 1987, p.15. Guido Perera essentially ran the COA
and was among the authors of its European reports. He has pointed out that the
COA's report of March 1943 (on the advice of the Eighth Air Force, the Economic
Warfare Division of the American Embassy, and the British Ministry of Economic
Warfare) did not provide a 'formal list of target priorities' for the bombing of Germany
(Perera, Leaves from My Book of Life, Vol.2, pp.95, 96). Instead the report offered
criteria by which others might carry out such a prioritization. But the ever impulsive
General Arnold quickly produced a prioritized list of target systems from the COA's
work in which electric power was tenth out of 14 (Ibid.).
90. Hansell, The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler, p.259. Perera, however, has emphasized
that all the COA's assumptions concerning capabilities were provided by the Eighth
Air Force (Interview of Guido R. Perera, conducted by Thomas A. Fabyanic and David
MacIsaac, Boston, MA., 10 June 1987, tape 1, side 2).
91. Perera's understanding of the COA's charter was that the committee had been tasked
by General Arnold to look at targets whose disruption would 'have an immediate and
maximum effect upon [German] front line military strength', thereby making 'possible
the earliest invasion of Europe' (Perera, Leaves from My Book of Life, Vol.2, pp.77,
151). On the basis of these criteria electric power did not appear operationally feasible
to the COA. On the other hand, members of the COA (including Perera) did journey
to England in late-January 1943 and visit the Eighth Air Force, the Enemy Objectives
Unit (EOU) of the Office of Strategic Services, and the British Ministry of Economic
Warfare (Ibid., pp.84-92). Furthermore, the EOU is known to have concluded prior
to the COA's visit that electric power was not only a difficult target system to attack, but
even if attacked successfully 'would yield relatively small returns' which would be 'long
delayed' ('The German Electric Power System as a Bombing Objective: With Special
Reference to the Rhineland and Westphalia', 5 Jan. 1943, EOU, US National Archives,
CHOOSING ANALYTIC MEASURES 205
Record Group 243, Box 18, Folder 3a79). Therefore, if the members of the COA were
guilty of rendering an operational judgment about the feasibility of attacking electric
power they were unqualified to make, they were not alone in having done so.
92. Interview of Hansell, 21Jan. 1987, p.15.
93. Following the AWPD-42 effort in Sep. 1942, both the Navy and the Joint Intelligence
Committee had begun to argue vigorously that airmen were not qualified to select
industrial target systems for strategic air attack. It was this line of objection to the
AWPD-42 program that led General Muir S. Fairchild to provoke General Arnold
into establishing the COA in order to provide a 'scientific' basis for target selection
(Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol 2., p.349; Perera, Leaves
from My Book of Life, Vol.2, pp.68-71). As Hansell later said, this overarching goal
for the COA left him with a dilemma regarding the priority of electric power in the
CBO: 'If I ordered electricity put back in top priority I would be opening up the whole
problem of selecting industrial targets. If I should do that I would be challenging the
competence of the Committee of Operations Analysts. This was the very agency that
we had pulled together to save us from having industrial targets and the whole idea of
strategic air warfare eliminated all together. . .So I went along with the elimination of
electric power'. (Interview of Hansell, 21 Jan. 1987, pp.15-16).
94. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol.1, Plans and Early
Operations: January 1939 to August 1942, p.441.
95. Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton with Captain Pineau and John Costello, 'And I Was
There': Pearl Harbor and Midway - Breaking the Secrets (New York, NY: Quill,
1985), pp.380-1, and 385. The Doolittle mission was conceived in Washington
D.C. during Jan. 1942, evidently with some involvement by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt (Craven and Cate, Vol.1, p.438). 'President Roosevelt had expressed his
desire to see the Japanese home islands bombed; Britain's Air Chief Marshal Sir
Charles Portal had suggested a carrier raid on Japan to General Arnold at ARCADIA
[in Dec. 1941]. Arnold thought the suggestion impractical. But a few days later Admiral
King's operations officer, Captain Francis S. Low, suggested a plan for such a raid. It
would use army bombers, launched from carriers outside the range of Japanese fighters.
With King's approval, Low and Captain Donald B. Duncan, King's air officer, prepared
a detailed proposal. They submitted it to Arnold in mid-Jan.. The air force chief, who
was already thinking of operating bombers from aircraft carriers in connection with a
projected invasion of North Africa, readily agreed. Arnold assigned Lieutenant Colonel
James H. Doolittle, a distinguished aviator and an aeronautical engineer, to head the
mission'. (Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun (New York, NY: The Free Press,
1985), p.154).
96. Unless otherwise noted, the details of the Doolittle raid - officially Special Aviation
Project No.l - have been based on correlating four documents in file 142.034, Alfred
H. Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. These documents
include a 95-page historical manuscript, originally classified SECRET, recounting the
operational details of Special Aviation Project No.l.
97. Nagoya is about 140 nautical miles west of Tokyo. Kobe and Osaka lie about 85 nautical
miles west of Nagoya.
98. Spector, p.155.
99. Layton, Pineau, and Costello, p.387.
100. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol.1, p.440.
101. In the event, Admiral William F. Halsey, who commanded the task force that launched
Doolittle's raiders, elected to launch the B-25s some ten hours earlier than planned at a
distance of 800 statute miles from Japan following detection of the task force's presence
by a Japanese picket ship on the morning of 18 April 1942 (Craven and Cate, The Army
Air Forces in World War II, Vol.1, p.441). Layton notes that the picket ship did manage
to alert Tokyo by radio before being sunk (Layton, Pineau, and Costello, p.385). Apart
from forcing the B-25s to fly further than planned, Halsey's decision changed their
arrival time over their targets from night to midday. This change not only increased their
vulnerability to Japanese fighters, but prevented darkness from masking the number of
bombers employed.
206 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
102. Layton, Pineau, and Costello, p.387. Admiral Layton was not only a naval intelligence
officer, but fluent in Japanese as well.
103. Layton, Pineau, and Costello, p.387.
104. John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire,
1939-1945 (New York, NY: Random House, 1970), Vol.1, p.386.
105. B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York, NY: Putnam's Sons,
1971), p.345.
106. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War 11, Vol.1, p.444.
107. Liddell Hart, p.345; Layton, Pineau, and Costello, p.385.
108. Layton, Pineau, and Costello, p.403.
109. Spector, pp.162-3. It is ironic in light of the reduction of Nagumo's carrier striking
force from six to four carriers at Midway that a post-war Naval War College study
could find 'no serious strategical reason' for the Doolittle raid other than to raise Allied
morale (Ibid., p.154).
110. Layton, Pineau, and Costello, pp.419-32. The decryption and analysis effort that
literally made possible the American success at Midway focused primarily on
information gleaned from a version of the JN-25 operational code system used
by the Japanese fleet (Ibid., p.174). By 27 May 1942, Layton's signals-decryption
unit on Oahu under Commander Joseph J. Rochefort had given Nimitz most (but
not all) of the essentials of the Japanese plan for attacking Midway, including timing.
As a result, when Admiral Nagumo began launching ground-attack configured aircraft
against Midway on the morning of 4 June 1942, he had no idea that three American
carriers were almost within striking range (Ibid., p.437).
111. Liddell Hart, pp.352-3.
112. Senshi Sosho [War History Series] (Tokyo: Defense Headquarters History Office) as
paraphrased in Layton, Pineau, and Costello, pp.387-8. The success of the US
decryption unit in Hawaii in the weeks preceding the Japanese effort against Midway
rendered Admiral Yamamoto's occupation of Attu and Kiskas in the western Aleutians,
intended to divide American forces, worthless. The decryptions allowed Layton and
Nimitz to recognize the diversion for what it was, and all available American naval
forces were concentrated against the Japanese at Midway. Moreover, between the
battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, Nimitz sent Halsey with two carriers to a
position east of the Solomons where he was under secret orders to reveal his presence
to Japanese patrol planes attached to an invasion force headed for Nauru and Ocean
islands before himself setting off for Pearl Harbor and Midway (Katherine Herbig,
'American Strategic Deception in the Pacific, 1942-44', Strategic and Operational
Deception in the Second World War, ed. Michael Handel (London: Frank Cass, 1988),
p.262). This action, coupled with simulated message traffic from two ships which
remained off the Solomons following Halsey's departure for Pearl in radio silence,
left the Japanese Naval General Staff in Tokyo convinced as late as 30 May that the
Americans remained ignorant of their plan to attack Midway, and had at least two of
their three carriers deployed elsewhere (Ibid., p.263).
113. Hansell, Strategic Air War Against Japan, p.36.
114. Layton, Pineau, and Costello, p.387.
115. Ibid., p.388.
116. The basic empirical fact underlying the growing field of nonlinear dynamics is the
discovery of simple, deterministic systems whose few elements can, despite being
governed by wholly unambiguous rules, exhibit nonlinear or unpredictable behavior
(J. P. Crutchfield, J. D. Farmer, N. H. Packard, and R. S. Shaw, 'Chaos', Scientific
American, Dec. 1986, p.46). 'Although most modern physicists and gamblers would
concede that dynamical systems with large numbers of degrees of freedom, such as
the atmosphere or a roulette wheel, can exhibit random behavior for all practical
purposes, the real surprise is that deterministic systems with only one or two degrees
of freedom can be just as chaotic' (Roderick V. Jensen, 'Classical Chaos', American
Scientist, March-April 1987, p.168). Moreover, because nonlinear dynamic systems 'can
exhibit all the attributes of an idealized random process', gathering or processing more
information will not make the fundamental randomness exhibited by such systems go
CHOOSING ANALYTIC MEASURES 207
sectors flies in the face of substantial evidence. Moreover, the US Array's OPFOR
(Opposing Force) at Fort Irwin has been regularly achieving Soviet force-ratio attack
norms at the tactical level since it was created in the 1970s (Ibid.). Eliot Cohen, of
course, has made similar points in more than one issue of International Security, but,
as of the spring of 1989, Mearsheimer continued to ignore them (Eliot A. Cohen,
International Security, Spring 1989, p.169).
123. Joshua M. Epstein, 'Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe',
International Security, Spring 1988, pp.155, 157, 162-4.
124. Epstein, p.163.
125. John J. Mearsheimer, 'The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics', International Security, Spring 1989,
p.55.
126. Joshua M. Epstein, 'The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of
Security Studies', International Security, Spring 1989, especially pp. 121-3, 125-7.
126a. John J. Mearsheimer, 'A War the US Can Win - Decisively', Chicago Tribune, 15
January 1991, p.13.
126b. See Joel Achenbach, 'The Experts in Retreat: After-the-Fact Explanations for the
Gloomy Predictions', Washington Post, 28 February 1991, p.D12.
127. Ibid., p.127.
128. Laplace's world view was that if a vast intelligence could comprehend and analyze
all the forces by which nature is animated, that intelligence 'would embrace in the
same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of
the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past,
would be present to its eyes' (Pierre Simon de Laplace, 'Concerning Probability',
The World of Mathematics: A Small Library of the Literature of Mathematics from
A'h-mose the Scribe to Albert Einstein (Redmond, WA: Tempus, 1988 reprint of 1956
original), Vol.2, p.1301).
129. Alan D. Beyerchen, 'Nonlinear Science and the Unfolding of a New Intellectual
Vision', Rethinking Patterns of Knowledge, ed. Richard Bjornson and Marilyn
Waldman, Papers in Comparative Studies (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University,
1989), No.6, p.30.
130. Joshua M. Epstein, The Calculus of Conventional War: Dynamic Analysis without
Lanchester Theory (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1985), pp.21-31.
131. Those unfamiliar with how a simple, deterministic system can, nevertheless, give rise to
unpredictability may wish to explore the logistic mapping for themselves. This example
of a nonlinear system is based on the equation xn = kxn(l - x|)) where k is a constant
such that 0 < k < 4 and 0 < x < 1. The logistic mapping for a particular value of the
constant k is then generated by picking some starting value for the variable x between
0 and 1, plugging it into the equation, and thereafter using each new value of x as the
input for its successor. The unpredictability has to do with the long-term behavior of the
sequence of numbers x,,, Xj, x2,. . .With k = 2, for example, the successive values of x
converge to 0.5 in less than ten iterations using a Hewlett-Packard HP-41CV calculator
and initial values of x from 0.1 to 0.9. But with k = 3.58, the mapping generates a
random sequence of numbers which never repeats. Or at least the present authors were
unable to find any hint of convergence to a finite set of point attractors through the first
10,000 iterations or so. The ambitious reader can readily verify these claims with a hand
calculator (preferably programmable). For a more thorough discussion of first-order
difference equations, of which the logistic mapping is an example, see Robert M. May,
'Simple Mathematical Models with Very Complicated Dynamics', Nature, Vol.261,10
June 1976, pp.459-67.
132. From the standpoint of Laplace's perceived perfection of Newtonian mechanics,
the most telling evidence against his presumption that linear predictability prevails
universally comes from contemporary astronomy. Contrary to Laplace's apparent
success in demonstrating the complete absence of chaos or long-term unpredictability
in the solar system, it is now thought, for example, that Hyperion, one of Saturn's
smaller moons, tumbles chaotically as it orbits that ringed planet (Anita M. Killian,
'Playing Dice with the Solar System', Sky and Telescope, Aug. 1989, p.138). It also
appears that the orbit of Pluto becomes unpredictable on a time scale of about 20
CHOOSING ANALYTIC MEASURES 209
million years (Gerald Jay Sussman and Jack Wisdom, 'Numerical Evidence That the
Motion of Pluto is Chaotic', Science, 22 July 1988, p.437).
133. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic and Military Conflict from
1500 to 2000 (New York, NY: Random House, 1987), p.534.
134. Samuel P. Huntington, 'The US-Decline or Renewal?' Foreign Affairs, Winter 1988/89,
p.90.
135. Huntington, p.90.
136. Huntington, p.91.