Interphil Laboratories Employee Union vs

Interphil Laboratories
OCTOBER 23, 2012 ~ VBDIAZ

Interphil Laboratories Ee Union vs Interphil Laboratories

GR 142824
Facts:
Petitioner is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-
file employees of Respondent. They had a CBA.

Prior to the expiration of the CBA, respondent company was

approached by the petitioner, through its officers. The Union
inquired about the stand of the company regarding the duration of
the CBA which was set to expire in a few months. Salazar told the
union officers that the matter could be best discussed during the
formal negotiations which would start soon.

All the rank-and-file employees of the company refused to follow

their regular two-shift work schedule. The employees stopped
working and left their workplace without sealing the containers and
securing the raw materials they were working on.

To minimize the damage the overtime boycott was causing the

company, Salazar immediately asked for a meeting with the union
officers. In the meeting, Enrico Gonzales, a union director, told
Salazar that the employees would only return to their normal work
schedule if the company would agree to their demands as to the
effectivity and duration of the new CBA. Salazar again told the union
officers that the matter could be better discussed during the formal
renegotiations of the CBA. Since the union was apparently
unsatisfied with the answer of the company, the
overtime boycott continued. In addition, the employees started to
engage in a work slowdown campaign during the time they were
working, thus substantially delaying the production of the company.

Respondent company filed with the National NLRC a petition to

declare illegal petitioner unions overtime boycott and work
slowdown which, according to respondent company, amounted to
illegal strike. It also filed with Office Secretary of Labor a petition for
assumption
of jurisdiction. Secretary of Labor Nieves Confesor issued an
assumption order over the labor dispute.

Labor Arbiter Caday submitted his recommendation to the then

Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing. Then Secretary
Quisumbing approved and adopted the report in his Order,
finding illegal strike on the part of petitioner Union.

Issue: WON the Labor Secretary has jurisdiction to rule over an

illegal strike.
Held:
On the matter of the authority and jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment to rule on the illegal strike committed by
petitioner union, it cannot be denied that the issues of overtime
boycott and work slowdown amounting to illegal strike before
Labor Arbiter
Caday are intertwined with the labor dispute before the Labor
Secretary.

The appellate court also correctly held that the question of the
Secretary of Labor and Employments jurisdiction over labor-related
disputes was already settled in International Pharmaceutical, Inc. vs.
Hon. Secretary of Labor and Associated Labor Union (ALU) where
the Court declared:

In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article

263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a
labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same
accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over
the said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and
controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the labor
arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.

Moreover, Article 217 of the Labor Code is not without, but

contemplates, exceptions thereto. This is evident from the opening
proviso therein reading (e)xcept as otherwise provided under this
Code x x x. Plainly, Article 263(g) of the Labor Code was meant to
make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the
labor arbiters share jurisdiction,
subject to certain conditions. Otherwise, the Secretary would not be
able to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. To
hold the contrary may even lead to the absurd and undesirable
result wherein the Secretary and the labor arbiter concerned may
have diametrically
opposed rulings. As we have said, it is fundamental that a statute is
to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than
defeat it.

In fine, the issuance of the assailed orders is within the province of

the Secretary as authorized by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code and
Article 217(a) and (5) of the same Code, taken conjointly and
rationally construed to subserve the objective of the jurisdiction
vested in the
Secretary.

Petition denied.
NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter vs. CA, G.R. No. 163942,
Nov. 11, 2008

Facts: Because of the collective bargaining deadlock, petitioner Union staged a

strike against the Hotel, herein private respondent. This strike was declared illegal
by the SC.

Issue: The effects of an illegal strike on employees.

Held: Regarding the Union officers and members liabilities for their participation in
the illegal picket and strike, Article 264(a), paragraph 3 of the Labor Code provides
that any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status x x x. The law
makes a distinction between union officers and mere union members. Union officers
may be validly terminated from employment for their participation in an illegal
strike, while union members have to participate in and commit illegal acts for them
to lose their employment status. Thus, it is necessary for the company to adduce
proof of the participation of the striking employees in the commission of illegal acts
during the strikes.

Additional facts:

Clearly, the 29 Union officers may be dismissed pursuant to Art. 264(a), par. 3 of the
Labor Code which imposes the penalty of dismissal on any union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike. We, however, are of the opinion that
there is room for leniency with respect to the Union members. It is pertinent to note
that the Hotel was able to prove before the NLRC that the strikers blocked the
ingress to and egress from the Hotel. But it is quite apparent that the Hotel failed to
specifically point out the participation of each of the Union members in the
commission of illegal acts during the picket and the strike. For this lapse in
judgment or diligence, we are constrained to reinstate the 61 Union members.

Further, we held in one case that union members who participated in an illegal
strike but were not identified to have committed illegal acts are entitled to be
reinstated to their former positions but without backwages.
The Union is the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file employees of
Dusit Hotel Nikko (Hotel), a five star service establishment owned and operated by
Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. located in Makati City.

On October 24, 2000, the Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) negotiation proposals to the Hotel. As negotiations ensued, the parties failed
to arrive at mutually acceptable terms and conditions. Due to the bargaining
deadlock, the Union, on December 20, 2001, filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of
the bargaining deadlock with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)

Soon thereafter, in the afternoon of January 17, 2002, the Union held a general
assembly at its office located in the Hotel's basement, where some members
sported closely cropped hair or cleanly shaven heads. The next day, or on January
18, 2002, more male Union members came to work sporting the same hair style.
The Hotel prevented these workers from entering the premises claiming that they
violated the Hotel's Grooming Standards.

In view of the Hotel's action, the Union staged a picket outside the Hotel premises.
Later, other workers were also prevented from entering the Hotel causing them to
join the picket. For this reason the Hotel experienced a severe lack of manpower
which forced them to temporarily cease operations in three restaurants.

Subsequently, on January 20, 2002, the Hotel issued notices to Union members,
preventively suspending them and charging them with the following offenses: (1)
violation of the duty to bargain in good faith; (2) illegal picket; (3) unfair labor
practice; (4) violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards; (5) illegal strike; and (6)
commission of illegal acts during the illegal strike. The next day, the Union filed with
the NCMB a second Notice of Strike on the ground of unfair labor practice and
violation of Article 248(a) of the Labor Code on illegal lockout, which was docketed
as NCMB-NCR-NS-01-019-02. In the meantime, the Union officers and members
submitted their explanations to the charges alleged by the Hotel, while they
continued to stage a picket just inside the Hotel's compound.

On January 26, 2002, the Hotel terminated the services of twenty-nine (29) Union
officers and sixty-one (61) members; and suspended eighty-one (81) employees for
30 days, forty-eight (48) employees for 15 days, four (4) employees for 10 days,
and three (3) employees for five days. On the same day, the Union declared a
strike. Starting that day, the Union engaged in picketing the premises of the Hotel.
During the picket, the Union officials and members unlawfully blocked the ingress
and egress of the Hotel premises.

Consequently, on January 31, 2002, the Union filed its third Notice of Strike with the
NCMB which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-01-050-02, this time on the ground of
unfair labor practice and union-busting.

Issue: 1.WHETHER OR NOT THE UNION, THE 29 UNION OFFICERS AND 61 MEMBERS
MAY BE ADJUDGED GUILTY OF STAGING AN ILLEGAL STRIKE ON JANUARY 18, 2002
DESPITE RESPONDENTS' ADMISSION THAT THEY PREVENTED SAID OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS FROM REPORTING FOR WORK FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE HOTEL'S
GROOMING STANDARDS

2.WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS IN PREVENTING UNION OFFICERS AND

MEMBERS FROM REPORTING FOR WORK COMMITTED AN ILLEGAL LOCK-OUT

Ruling:

First, the Union's violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards was clearly a
deliberate and concerted action to undermine the authority of and to embarrass the
Hotel and was, therefore, not a protected action.

Second, the Union's concerted action which disrupted the Hotel's operations clearly
violated the CBA's "No Strike, No Lockout" provision, which reads:

ARTICLE XXII - NO STRIKE/WORK STOPPAGE AND LOCKOUT

SECTION 1. No Strikes
The Union agrees that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, stoppage or slow-down of
work, boycott, refusal to handle accounts, picketing, sit-down strikes, sympathy
strikes or any other form of interference and/or interruptions with any of the normal
operations of the HOTEL during the life of this Agreement.

Third, the Union officers and members' concerted action to shave their heads and
crop their hair not only violated the Hotel's Grooming Standards but also violated
the Union's duty and responsibility to bargain in good faith.

Fourth, the Union failed to observe the mandatory 30-day cooling-off period and the
seven-day strike ban before it conducted the strike.

Last, the Union committed illegal acts in the conduct of its strike. The NLRC ruled
that the strike was illegal since, as shown by the pictures21 presented by the Hotel,
the Union officers and members formed human barricades and obstructed the
driveway of the Hotel.

court ordered termination of 29union officials and reinstatment of 61 union wihtout

backwages for participating in illegal strike
Club Filipino vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 168406, July 13, 2009

Facts: Petitioner and the union had a CBA which expired on May 31, 2000. Within
the freedom period, the union made several demands for negotiation but the
company replied that it could not muster a quorum, thus no CBA negotiations could
be held. In order to compel the company to negotiate, union filed a request for
preventive mediation with NCMB but again failed. On April 2001, a notice of strike
was filed by the union and thereafter, a strike was held. Petitioner filed before the
NLRC a petition to declare the strike illegal. The LA, in its decision, declared that the
strike is illegal. On appeal, the NLRC decision is affirmed the LA decision. Upon
elevation to CA, the court set aside the ruling of the LA and NLRC as far as other
respondent but dismissed the other respondent. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the strike staged by respondent is legal.

Ruling: The court ruled in affirmative. It is undisputed that the notice of strike was
filed by the union without attaching the counter-proposal of the company. In cases
of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state the
unresolved issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the written
proposals of the union, the counter-proposals of the employer and the proof of a
request for conference to settle differences. In cases of unfair labor practices, the
notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts complained of, and efforts taken to
resolve the dispute amicable. Any notice which does not conform with the
requirements of this and the foregoing section shall be deemed as not having been
filed and the party concerned shall be so informed by the regional branch of the
Board. The union cannot be faulted for its omission. The union could not have
attached the counter- proposal of the company in the notice of strike it submitted to
the NCMB as there was no such counter- proposal. The union filed a notice of strike,
after several request for negotiation proved futile. It was only after two weeks, when
the company formally responded to the union by submitting the first part of its
counter-proposal. Nowhere in the ruling of the LA can we find any discussion of how
respondents, as union officers, knowingly participated in the alleged illegal strike.
Thus, even assuming Arguendo that the strike was illegal, their automatic dismissal
had no basis.
Santa Rosa CocaCola Plant Ph. Union v CocaCola Bottlers, GR No. 164302,
Jan 24, 07

Facts: The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the regular daily paid workers and the
monthly paid non-commission-earning employees of the Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant.

Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to
renegotiate its terms. The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999, where the
Union and the Company discussed the ground rules of the negotiations. The Union
insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be
allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings. The Union officers and
members also insisted that their wages be based on their work shift rates. For its
part, the Company was of the view that the members of the Alyansa were not
members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees
of the Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization.
Thus, an impasse ensued.

On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a
Notice of Strike with the NCMB.

The Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa in front
of the Companys premises. Thus, the Union officers and members held a picket
along the front perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999. As a result, all of the
14 personnel of the Engineering Section of the Company did not report for work,
and 71 production personnel were also absent. As a result, only one of the three
bottling lines operated during the day shift. All the three lines were operated during
the night shift with cumulative downtime of five (5) hours due to lack of manning,
complement and skills requirement. The volume of production for the day was short
by 60,000 physical cases versus budget.

On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal
Issue: WON the strike, dubbed by petitioner as picketing, is illegal.

Held: Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of
work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute. In Bangalisan v. CA, the Court ruled that the fact that the conventional
term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe their common
course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its
appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.

Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer,
usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the
facts involved in a labor dispute. As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the
stationing of one or more persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose
of pickets is said to be a means of peaceable persuasion.

The basic elements of a strike are present in this case. They marched to and fro in
front of the companys premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in
a concerted activity which already affected the companys operations. The mass
concerted activity constituted a strike.

For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art 263 of
the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days
before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b)
strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining
unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose, (c)
notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the
intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to
comply therewith renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners
totally ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike.
MSF Tire & Rubber, Inc., vs CA, G.R. No. 128632, August 5, 1999

Facts: Respondent Union filed a notice of strike in the NCMB charging (Phildtread)
with unfair labor practice. Thereafter, they picketed and assembled outside the gate
of Philtreads plant. Philtread, on the other hand, filed a notice of lockout.
Subsequently, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute
and certified it for compulsory arbitration.

During the pendency of the labor dispute, Philtread entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with Siam Tyre whereby its plant and equipment would be sold to a new
company, herein petitioner, 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre and 20% by
Philtread, while the land on which the plant was located would be sold to another
company, 60% of which would be owned by Philtread and 40% by Siam Tyre.

Petitioner then asked respondent Union to desist from picketing outside its plant. As
the respondent Union refused petitioners request, petitioner filed a complaint for
injunction with damages before the RTC. Respondent Union moved to dismiss the
complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

Petitioner asserts that its status as an innocent bystander with respect to the
labor dispute between Philtread and the Union entitles it to a writ of injunction from
the civil courts.

Issue: WON petitioner has shown a clear legal right to the issuance of a writ of
injunction under the innocent bystander rule.

Held: In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Cloribel, this Court,
through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stated the innocent bystander rule as follows:

The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a

phase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried
out, it cannot be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship.
The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to
protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe the courts are not without
power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to
the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate
establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally
foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be regulated at the
instance of third parties or innocent bystanders if it appears that the inevitable
result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they
have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or
constitute an invasion of their rights.

Thus, an innocent bystander, who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the
court it is entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever to, either party
to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally foreign to the context thereof.

In the case at bar, petitioner cannot be said not to have such connection to the
dispute. We find that the negotiation, contract of sale, and the post transaction
between Philtread, as vendor, and Siam Tyre, as vendee, reveals a legal relation
between them which, in the interest of petitioner, we cannot ignore. To be sure, the
transaction between Philtread and Siam Tyre, was not a simple sale whereby
Philtread ceased to have any proprietary rights over its sold assets. On the contrary,
Philtread remains as 20% owner of private respondent and 60% owner of Sucat
Land Corporation which was likewise incorporated in accordance with the terms of
the Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre, and which now owns the land were
subject plant is located. This, together with the fact that private respondent uses
the same plant or factory; similar or substantially the same working conditions;
same machinery, tools, and equipment; and manufacture the same products as
Philtread, lead us to safely conclude that private respondents personality is so
closely linked to Philtread as to bar its entitlement to an injunctive writ.
PLDT vs. Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas, G.R. No. 161783, July
13, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. (PLDT) is a domestic
corporation engaged in the telecommunications business. Private respondent
Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP) is a labor union of rank and file
employees in PLDT.

The members of respondent union learned that a redundancy program would be

implemented by the petitioner. Thereupon it filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on 04 November 2002. The Notice
fundamentally contained the following:

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES, to wit:

1. PLDTs abolition of the Provisioning Support Division, in violation of the duty

to

bargain collectively with MKP in good faith.

2. PLDTs unreasonable refusal to honor its commitment before this Honorable

Office that it will provide MKP its comprehensive plan/s with respect to personnel
downsizing / reorganization and closure of exchanges. Such refusal violates its duty
to bargain collectively with MKP in good faith.

3. PLDTs continued hiring of contractual, temporary, project and casual

employees for regular jobs performed by union members, resulting in the

decimation of the union membership and in the denial of the right to self-
organization to the concerned employees.

4. PLDTs gross violation of the legal and CBA provisions on overtime work and

compensation.
 5. PLDTs gross violation of the CBA provisions on promotions and job grade re-

evaluation or reclassification.

On 11 November 2002, another Notice of Strike was filed by the private respondent,
which contained the following: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES, to wit: PLDTs alleged
restructuring of its GMM Operation Services.

A number of conciliation meetings, conducted by the NCMB, National Capital

Region, were held between the parties. However, these efforts proved futile.

On 23 December 2002, the private respondent staged a strike. On 31 December

2002, three hundred eighty three (383) union members were terminated from
service pursuant to PLDTs redundancy program.

On 02 January 2003, the Secretary, Patricia Sto. Tomas, issued an Order[4] in NCMB-
NCR-NS-11-405-02 and NCMB-NCR-NS-11-412-02. Portions of the Order are
reproduced hereunder:

xxx Accordingly, the strike staged by the Union is hereby enjoined. All striking
workers are hereby directed to return to work within twenty four (24) hours from
receipt of this Order, except those who were terminated due to redundancy. The
employer is hereby enjoined to accept the striking workers under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. The parties are likewise directed to
cease and desist from committing any act that might worsen the situation. xxx

ISSUE: WHETHER THE SUBJECT ORDERS OF THE SECRETARY OF THE DOLE

EXCLUDING FROM THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER THE WORKERS DISMISSED DUE TO
THE REDUNDANCY PROGRAM OF PETITIONER, ARE VALID OR NOT.

RULING: Valid. . . . Assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute, or as in this case

the certification of the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, always co-
exists with an order for workers to return to work immediately and for employers to
readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike or lockout.
Time and again, this Court has held that when an official bypasses the law on the
asserted ground of attaining a laudable objective, the same will not be maintained if
the intendment or purpose of the law would be defeated.

One last piece. Records would show that the strike occurred on 23 December 2002.
Article 263(g) directs that the employer must readmit all workers under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Since the strike was held on the
aforementioned date, then the condition prevailing before it, which was the
condition present on 22 December 2002, must be maintained.

Undoubtedly, on 22 December 2002, the members of the private respondent who

were dismissed due to alleged redundancy were still employed by the petitioner and
holding their respective positions. This is the status quo that must be maintained.
Capitol Medical Center vs. Trajano, G.R. No. 155690, June 30, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner is a hospital with address at Panay Avenue corner Scout

Magbanua Street, Quezon City. Upon the other hand, Respondent is a duly
registered labor union acting as the certified collective bargaining agent of the rank-
and-file employees of petitioner hospital.

Respondent sent petitioner a letter requesting a negotiation of their Collective

Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

Petitioner, however, challenged the unions legitimacy and refused to bargain with
respondent. Subsequently petitioner filed with the (BLR), Department of Labor and
Employment, a petition for cancellation of respondents certificate of registration.

For its part, respondent filed with the (NCMB), National Capital Region, a notice of
strike. Respondent alleged that petitioners refusal to bargain constitutes unfair
labor practice. Despite several conferences and efforts of the designated conciliator-
mediator, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.

Respondent staged a strike.

Former Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, now Associate Justice of this

Court, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ordering all
striking workers to return to work and the management to resume normal
operations, thus:

xxx all striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours
from

the receipt of this Order and the management to resume normal operations and
accept

back all striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the

strike. Further, parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any act
that may
exacerbate the situation.

Moreover, parties are hereby directed to submit within 10 days from receipt of this
Order

proposals and counter-proposals leading to the conclusion of the collective

bargaining

agreement in compliance with aforementioned Resolution of the Office as affirmed

by the

Supreme Court. xxx

ISSUE: Whether or not Secretary of Labor cannot exercise his powers under Article
263 (g) of the Labor Code without observing the requirements of due process.

RULING: The discretion to assume jurisdiction may be exercised by the Secretary of

Labor and Employment without the necessity of prior notice or hearing given to any
of the parties. The rationale for his primary assumption of jurisdiction can justifiably
rest on his own consideration of the exigency of the situation in relation to the
national interests.

xxx In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued operation of such hospitals,
clinics or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking union or locking-out
employer to provide and maintain an effective skeletal workforce of medical and
other health personnel, whose movement and services shall be unhampered and
unrestricted, as are necessary to insure the proper and adequate protection of the
life and health of its patients, most especially emergency cases, for the duration of
the strike or lockout. In such cases, therefore, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment is mandated to immediately assume, within twenty-four (24) hours
from knowledge of the occurrence of such a strike or lockout, jurisdiction over the
same or certify it to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. For this purpose,
the contending parties are strictly enjoined to comply with such orders, prohibitions
and/or injunctions as are issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the
Commission, under pain of immediate disciplinary action, including dismissal or loss
of employment status or payment by the locking-out employer of backwages,
damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal prosecution against either or
both of them.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the Philippines shall not be
precluded from determining the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to
the national interest, and from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction
over any such labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same.xxx
Phimco vs. Brillantes, G.R. No. 120751, March 17, 1999

FACTS: On March 9, 1995, the private respondent, Phimco Industries Labor

Association (PILA), duly certified collective bargaining representative of the daily
paid workers of the petitioner PHIMCO filed a notice of strike with the NCMB against
PHIMCO, a corporation engaged in the production of matches, after a deadlock in
the collective bargaining and negotiation. Parties failed to resolve their differences
PILA (during the conciliation conferences), composed of 352 members, staged a
strike.

PHIMCO sent notice of termination to some 47 workers including several union

officers.

Secretary Brillantes assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute; issued a return-to-
work order.

Hence, petitioner files this petition.

ISSUE: whether or not the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in assuming jurisdiction over subject
labor dispute.

HELD: YES, the petition is impressed with merit.

Art. 263, paragraph (g) of the Labor Code, provides:

(g) When, in his opinion, there exist a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary
of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration . . .

The Labor Code vests in the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what
industries are indispensable to the national interest. Accordingly, upon the
determination by the Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to the
national interest, he will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in the said
industry. 8 This power, however, is not without any limitation.

It stressed in the case of Free telephone Workers Union vs. Honorable Minister of
Labor and Employment, et al., 10 the limitation set by the legislature on the power
of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute, thus:

xxx cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to strikes or lockouts
adversely affecting the national interest. 11

In this case at bar, however, the very admission by the public respondent draws the
labor dispute in question out of the ambit of the Secretarys prerogative, to wit.

While the case at bar appears on its face not to fall within the strict categorization
of cases imbued with national interest, this office believes that the obtaining
circumstances warrant the exercise of the powers under Article 263 (g) of the Labor
Code, as amended. 12

The private respondent did not even make any effort to touch on the
indispensability of the match factory to the national interest. It must have been
aware that a match factory, though of value, can scarcely be considered as an
industry indispensable to the national interest as it cannot be in the same
category as generation and distribution of energy, or those undertaken by banks,
hospitals, and export-oriented industries. 13 Yet, the public respondent assumed
jurisdiction thereover.

To uphold the action of the public respondent under the premises would be
stretching too far the power of the Secretary of Labor as every case of a strike or
lockout where there are inconveniences in the community, or work disruptions in an
industry though not indispensable to the national interest, would then come within
the Secretarys power. It would be practically allowing the Secretary of Labor to
intervene in any Labor dispute at his pleasure.
This is precisely why the law sets and defines the standard: even in the exercise of
his power of compulsory arbitration under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the
Secretary must follow the law.
FEU-NRMF vs FEU-NRMF Employees Association, G.R. No. 168362, October
12, 2006

FACTS: In 1994, petitioner FEU-NRMF (a medical institution organized and existing

under the Philippine laws), and respondent union (a legitimate labor organization
and is the duly recognized representative of the rank and file employees of
petitioner), entered into a CBA that will expire on 30 April 1996. In view of the
forthcoming expiry, respondent union sent a letter-proposal to petitioner FEU-NRMF
stating their economic and non-economic proposals for the negotiation of the new
CBA.

Petitioner FEU-NRMF rejected respondent unions demands and proposed to

maintain the same provisions of the old CBA reasoning that due to financial
constraints, it cannot afford to accede to a number of their demands. In an effort to
arrive at a compromise, subsequent conciliation proceedings were conducted before
the NCMB, but the negotiation failed.

Respondent union filed a Notice of Strike before NCMB on the ground of bargaining
deadlock. Union staged a strike.

Petitioner FEU-NRMF filed a Petition for the Assumption of Jurisdiction or for

Certification of Labor Dispute with the NLRC, underscoring the fact that it is a
medical institution engaged in the business of providing health care for its patients.
Secretary of Labor granted the petition and an Order assuming jurisdiction over the
labor dispute was issued, thereby prohibiting any strike or lockout and enjoining the
parties from committing any acts which may exacerbate the situation.

On September 6, 1996, Francisco Escuadra, the NLRC process server, certified that,
on September 5, 1996 at around 4:00 P.M., he attempted to serve a copy of the
Assumption of Jurisdiction Order (AJO) to the union officers but since no one was
around at the strike area, he just posted copies of the said Order at several
conspicuous places within the premises of the hospital.

Striking employees continued holding a strike until 12 September 1996, claiming

that they had no knowledge that the Secretary of Labor already assumed
jurisdiction over the pending labor dispute as they were not able to receive a copy
of the AJO.
The Secretary of Labor issued another Order directing all the striking employees to
return to work and the petitioner FEU-NRMF to accept them under the same terms
and conditions prevailing before the strike. A Return to Work Agreement was
executed by the disputing parties. Subsequently, petitioner FEU-NRMF filed a case
before the NLRC, contending that respondent union staged the strike in defiance of
the AJO, hence, it was illegal. LA declared the strike illegal and allowed dismissal of
union officers for conducting the strike in defiance of the AJO. Respondent union
filed an Appeal before the NLRC. NLRC affirmed in toto the Decision of the LA.
Respondent union filed MR, it was denied. Respondent union brought a Petition for
Certiorari before CA. CA granted the Petition and reversed the Resolutions of NLRC.
Petitioner filed MR but it was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the service of the AJO was validly effected by the process server so
as to bind the respondent union and hold them liable for the acts committed
subsequent to the issuance of the said Order.

RULING: No. The process server resorted to posting the Order when personal
service was rendered impossible since the striking employees were not present at
the strike area. This mode of service, however, is not sanctioned by either the NLRC
Revised Rules of Procedure or the Revised Rules of Court.

The pertinent provisions of the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure read:

Section 6. Service of Notices and Resolutions.

(a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, shall be served on the parties to the
case personally by the Bailiff or duly authorized public officer within 3 days from
receipt thereof or by registered mail; Provided that in special circumstances, service
of summons may be effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court; Provided further, that in cases of decisions and final awards, copies
thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel or representative by
registered mail; Provided further, that in cases where a party to a case or his
counsel on record personally seeks service of the decision upon inquiry thereon,
service to said party shall be deemed effected upon actual receipt thereof; Provided
finally, that where parties are so numerous, service shall be made on counsel and
upon such number of complainants, as may be practicable, which shall be
considered substantial compliance with Article 224(a) of the Labor Code, as
amended.

An Order issued by the Secretary of Labor assuming jurisdiction over the labor
dispute is not a final judgment for it does not dispose of the labor dispute with
finality. Consequently, the rule on service of summons and orders, and not the
proviso on service of decisions and final awards, governs the service of the
Assumption of Jurisdiction Order.

Under the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, service of copies of orders should be
made by the process server either personally or through registered mail. However,
due to the urgent nature of the AJO and the public policy underlying the injunction
carried by the issuance of the said Order, service of copies of the same should be
made in the most expeditious and effective manner, without any delay, ensuring its
immediate receipt by the intended parties as may be warranted under the
circumstances. Thus, personal service is the proper mode of serving the AJO.

Personal service effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional
requirement of due process is accomplished. If, however, efforts to find the party
concerned personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be
completed by substituted service, that is, by leaving a copy, between the hours of
eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the partys or counsels residence, if
known, with a person of sufficient age and

discretion then residing therein (RULE 12 of Rev Rules of Court).

Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is therefore

required that statutory restrictions for effecting substituted service must be strictly,
faithfully and fully observed. Failure to comply with this rule renders absolutely void
the substituted service along with the proceedings taken thereafter. The underlying
principle of this rigid requirement is that the person, to whom the orders, notices or
summons are addressed, is made to answer for the consequences of the suit even
though notice of such action is made, not upon the party concerned, but upon
another whom the law could only presume would notify such party of the pending
proceedings.
In the case at bar, presumption of receipt of the copies of the Assumption of
Jurisdiction Order AJO could not be taken for granted considering the adverse effect
in case the parties failed to heed to the injunction directed by such Order. Defiance
of the assumption and return-to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor after he has
assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for the loss of employment status of any
striking union officer or member. Employment is a property right of which one
cannot be deprived of without due process. Due process here would demand that
the respondent union be properly notified of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order of
the Secretary of Labor enjoining the strike and requiring its members to return to
work. Thus, there must be a clear and unmistakable proof that the requirements
prescribed by the Rules in the manner of effecting personal or substituted service
had been faithfully complied with. Merely posting copies of the AJO does not satisfy
the rigid requirement for proper service outlined by the above stated rules.
Needless to say, the manner of service made by the process server was invalid and
irregular. Respondent union could not therefore be adjudged to have defied the said
Order since it was not properly apprised thereof. Accordingly, the strike conducted
by the respondent union was valid under the circumstances.

Union of Filipro Employees vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 91025, December 19, 1990

FACTS: On June 22, 1988, the petitioner Union of the Filipro Employees, the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of Nestle Philippines,
(private respondent) filed a Notice of Strike at the DOLE raising the issues of CBA
deadlock and unfair labor practice. Private respondent assailed the legal personality
of the proponents of the said notice of strike to represent the Nestle employees,
before the NCMB. This notwithstanding, the NCMB proceeded to invite the parties to
attend the conciliation meetings and to which private respondent failed to attend
contending that it will deal only with a negotiating panel duly constituted and
mandated in accordance with the UFE Constitution and By-laws. Thereafter,
Company terminated from employment all UFE Union officers, and all the members
of the negotiating panel for instigating and knowingly participating in a strike
staged at the Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao and Cagayan de Oro on September 11,
1987 without any notice of strike filed and a strike vote obtained for the purpose.
The union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA upheld the validity of the
dismissal; NLRC en banc affirmed. Subsequently, company concluded separate
CBAs with the general membership of the union at Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de Oro
units; Assailing the validity of these agreements, the union filed a case of ULP
against the company with the NLRC-NCR Arbitration Branch Efforts to resolve the
dispute amicably were taken by the NCMB but yielded negative result. Petitioner
filed a motion asking the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the dispute
of deadlock in collective bargaining between the parties. On October 28, 1988,
Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon certified to the NLRC the said dispute between the
UFE and Nestle, Philippines.. which reads as follows: xxx The NLRC is further
directed to call all the parties immediately and resolve the CBA deadlock within
twenty (20) days from submission of the case for resolution. Second Division of the
NLRC promulgated a resolution granting wage increase and other benefits to
Nestles employees, ruling on non-economic issues, as well as absolving the private
respondent of the Unfair Labor Practice charge. Petitioner finds said resolution to be
inadequate and accordingly, does not agree therewith. It filed a motion for
reconsideration, denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON WHETHER OR NOT THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE NLRC ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION, THE SAME
BEING RENDERED ONLY BY A DIVISION OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT AND NOT BY
EN BANC;

HELD: This case was certified on October 28, 1988 when existing rules prescribed
that, it is incumbent upon the Commission en banc to decide or resolve a certified
dispute. However, R.A. 6715 took effect during the pendency of this case. Aside
from vesting upon each division the power to adjudicate cases filed before the
Commission, said Act further provides that the divisions of the Commission shall
have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases within their respective territorial
jurisdiction. Section 5 of RA 6715 provides as follows: xxxx The Commission may sit
en banc or in five (5) divisions, each composed of three (3) members. The
Commission shall sit en banc only for purposes of promulgating rules and
regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases before any of its divisions
and regional branches and formulating policies affecting its administration and
operations. The Commission shall exercise its adjudicatory and all other powers,
functions and duties through its divisions. xxxx In view of the enactment of Republic
Act 6715, the aforementioned rules requiring the Commission en banc to decide or
resolve a certified dispute have accordingly been repealed. Confirmed in
Administrative Order No. 36 (Series of 1989) promulgated by the Secretary under
his delegated rule-making power. Moreover, it is to be emphasized and it is a matter
of judicial notice that since the effectivity of R.A. 6715, many cases have already
been decided by the 5 divisions of the NLRC. We find no legal justification in
entertaining petitioners claim considering that the clear intent of the amendatory
provision is to expedite the disposition of labor cases filed before the Commission.
To rule otherwise would not be congruous to the proper administration of justice.
ACCORDINGLY, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions
of the NLRC, dated June 5, 1989 and August 8, 1989 are AFFIRMED, except insofar
as the ruling absolving the private respondent of unfair labor practice which is
declared SET ASIDE.
OWWA vs. Chavez, G.R. No. 169802, June 8, 2007

FACTS: OWWA traces its beginnings to 1 May 1977, when the Welfare and Training
Fund for Overseas main objective, inter alia, of providing social and welfare services
to OFW, including insurance coverage, social work, legal and placement assistance,
cultural and remittances services, and the like.

On 1 May 1980, PD 1694 was signed into law, formalizing the operations of a
comprehensive Welfare Fund (Welfund), as authorized and created under Letter of
Instructions No. 537. On 16 January 1981, PD 1809 was promulgated, amending
certain provisions of PD 1694. Subsequently, EO 126 was passed renaming the
Welfare Fund as the OWWA. On January 9, 2004, as there was yet no formal OWWA
structure duly approved by the DBM and CSC, the OWWA Board of Trustees passed
Resolution No. 001, Series of 2004, depicting the organizational structure and
staffing pattern of the OWWA.

On March 24, 2004, DBM Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin approved the organizational
structure and staffing pattern of the OWWA. In her approval thereof, she stated that
the total funding requirements for the revised organizational structure shall be
P107,546,379 for 400 positions. On May 31, 2004, an advisory was given to the
officials and employees of the OWWA that the DBM had recently approved OWWAs
also placement staffing pattern.

On June 3, 2004, DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas issued Administrative Order No. 171
creating a Placement Committee to evaluate qualifications of employees, and to
recommend their appropriate placement in the new organizational chart, functional
statements and staffing pattern of the OWWA.

On June 18, 2004, DOLE Acting Secretary Imson issued Administrative Order No.
186, Series of 2004, prescribing the guidelines on the placement of personnel in the
new staffing pattern of the OWWA. Herein respondents filed a complaint to nullify
the organizational structure with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against petitioner OWWA and its Board of Trustees. According to the
respondents, the resulting decrease in the number of employees due to
Organizational Structure will result in the constructive dismissal of at least 110
employees. Meanwhile, the deployment of the regular central office personnel to
the regional offices will displace the said employees, as well as their families.
Respondents challenged the validity of the new organizational structure of the
OWWA. In fine, they contended that the same is null and void; hence, its
implementation should be prohibited.

RTC granted respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner, thru
OSG and the RTC to restrain, for the meantime, the implementation of OWWAs
reorganization to prevent injury until after the main case is heard and decided.
Petitioner, thru OSG filed the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether CA erred in affirming the RTC in its grant of the assailed writ of
preliminary injunction.

RULING: No. Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, defines a preliminary

injunction as an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or
final order requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the
action without the court issuing a final injunction. To be entitled to an injunctive
writ, and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. A writ of evidence required to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction in the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete.

Preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case

subject to the latters outcome, the sole objective of which is to preserve the status
quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. The status quo usually
preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested
status which preceded the actual controversy. The status quo ante litem is the state
of affairs which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. The trial court must
not make use of its injunctive power to alter such status. In the case at bar, the RTC
did not maintain the status quo when it issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
Rather, it effectively restored the situation prior to the status quo, in effect,
disposing the issue of the main case without trial on the merits. What was
preserved by the RTC was the state OWWA, and the subsequent administrative
orders pursuant to its passing. The RTC forgot that what is imperative in preliminary
injunction cases is that the writ cannot be effectuated to establish new relations
between the parties.

Courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect
dispose of the main case without trial. In this case, the RTC also did not maintain
the status quo but restored the landscape before the implementation of OWWAs
reorganization. In thus issuing by the trial court. What was done by the RTC was
quite simply a disposition of the case without trial. Furthermore, we find that the
RTC similarly prejudged the validity of the issuances released by the OWWA Board of
Trustees, as well as the other governmental bodies, which approved the
organizational structure and staffing pattern of the OWWA. This Court is not
convinced that respondents were able to show a clear and unmistakable legal right
to warrant their entitlement to the writ. A mere blanket allegation that they are all
officers and employees of the OWWA without a showing of how they stand to be
directly injured a right in esse. There was no showing that Respondents are the
employees who are in grave danger of being displaced due to the reorganization.
Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future
rights; it will not issue to protect aright not in esse and which may never arise, or to
restrain an action which did not give rise to a cause of action. Indeed, the question
as to the validity of the OWWA reorganization remains the subject in the main case
pending before the trial court. Its annulment is outside the realm of the instant
Petition.

Univ. of the Immaculate Conception vs. Sec. of Labor, G.R. Nos. 151379,
Jan 14, 2005

Facts: This case stemmed from the collective bargaining negotiations between
petitioner University of Immaculate Concepcion, Inc. (UNIVERSITY) and respondent
The UIC Teaching and Non- Teaching Personnel and Employees Union (UNION). The
UNION, as the certified bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of the
UNIVERSITY, submitted its collective bargaining proposals to the latter on February
16, 1994. However, one item was left unresolved and this was the inclusion or
exclusion of some positions in the scope of the bargaining unit.

The UNION it filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and ULP.
During the thirty (30) day cooling-off period, two union members were dismissed by
petitioner. Consequently, the UNION went on strike.

On January 23, 1995, the then Secretary of Labor, Ma. Nieves R. Confessor, issued
an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute.

On March 10, 1995, the UNION filed another notice of strike, this time citing as a
reason the UNIVERSITYs termination of the individual respondents. The UNION
alleged that the UNIVERSITYs act of terminating the individual respondents is in
violation of the Order of the Secretary of Labor.

On March 28, 1995, the Secretary of Labor issued another Order reiterating the
directives contained in the January 23, 1995 Order. Hence, the UNIVERSITY was
directed to reinstate the individual respondents under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to the labor dispute.

The UNIVERSITY filed a MR. In the Order dated August 18, 1995, then Acting
Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes denied the MR, but modified the two previous Orders by
adding:

Anent the Unions Motion, we find that superseding circumstances would not
warrant the physical reinstatement of the twelve (12) terminated employees.

Hence, they are hereby ordered placed under payroll reinstatement until the validity
of their termination is finally resolved.

Issue: WON payroll reinstatement, instead of actual reinstatement, is proper.

Held: With respect to the Secretarys Order allowing payroll reinstatement instead
of actual reinstatement for the individual respondents herein, an amendment to the
previous Orders issued by her office, the same is usually not allowed. Article 263(g)
of the Labor Code aforementioned states that all workers must immediately return
to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The phrase under the same terms
and conditions makes it clear that the norm is actual reinstatement. This is
consistent with the idea that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular
industry can be detrimental to the national interest.

In ordering payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement, then Acting

Secretary of Labor Jose S. Brillantes said:
Anent the Unions Motion, we find that superseding circumstances would not
warrant the physical reinstatement of the twelve (12) terminated employees.
Hence, they are hereby ordered placed under payroll reinstatement until the validity
of their termination is finally resolved.

As an exception to the rule, payroll reinstatement must rest on special

circumstances that render actual reinstatement impracticable or otherwise not
conducive to attaining the purposes of the law.

The superseding circumstances mentioned by the Acting Secretary of Labor no

doubt refer to the final decision of the panel of arbitrators as to the confidential
nature of the positions of the twelve private respondents, thereby rendering their
actual and physical reinstatement impracticable and more likely to exacerbate the
situation. The payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement ordered in these
cases, therefore, appears justified as an exception to the rule until the validity of
their termination is finally resolved. This Court sees no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Acting Secretary of Labor in ordering the same. Furthermore, the
issue has not been raised by any party in this case.

Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union vs CA, G.R.No. 140518, December

16, 2004

Facts: The Union filed a petition for a certification election, which was dismissed by
the DOLE. Despite the dismissal of their petition, the Union sent a letter to the Hotel
informing the latter of its desire to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement.
The Hotel, however, refused to negotiate with the Union, citing the earlier dismissal
of the Unions petition for certification by DOLE.

Failing to settle the issue, the Union staged a strike against the Hotel. Numerous
confrontations followed, further straining the relationship between the Union and
the Hotel. The Hotel claims that the strike was illegal and dismissed some
employees for their participation in the allegedly illegal concerted activity. The
Union, on the other hand, accused the Hotel of illegally dismissing the workers.

A Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code was
later filed by the Union before the Secretary of Labor. Thereafter, Secretary of Labor
Trajano issued an Order directing the striking officers and members of the Union to
return to work within twenty-four (24) hours and the Hotel to accept them back
under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike.

After receiving the above order the members of the Union reported for work, but the
Hotel refused to accept them and instead filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Secretarys Order.

Acting on the motion for reconsideration, then Acting Secretary of Labor Espaol
modified the one earlier issued by Secretary Trajano and instead directed that the
strikers be reinstated only in the payroll.

Issue: WON payroll reinstatement is proper in lieu of actual reinstatement under

Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.

Held: Payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement is not sanctioned under

the provision of the said article.

The Court noted the difference between UST vs. NLRC and the instant case. In UST
case the teachers could not be given back their academic assignments since the
order of the Secretary for them to return to work was given in the middle of the first
semester of the academic year.

The NLRC was, therefore, faced with a situation where the striking teachers were
entitled to a return to work order, but the university could not immediately reinstate
them since it would be impracticable and detrimental to the students to change
teachers at that point in time.

In the present case, there is no similar compelling reason that called for payroll
reinstatement as an alternative remedy. A strained relationship between the striking
employees and management is no reason for payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual
reinstatement.
Under Article 263(g), all workers must immediately return to work and all employers
must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike or lockout.

The Court pointed out that the law uses the precise phrase of under the same
terms and conditions, revealing that it contemplates only actual reinstatement.
This is in keeping with the rationale that any work stoppage or slowdown in that
particular industry can be inimical to the national economy.

The Court reiterates that Article 263(g) was not written to protect labor from the
excesses of management, nor was it written to ease management from expenses,
which it normally incurs during a work stoppage or slowdown. This law was written
as a means to be used by the State to protect itself from an emergency or crisis. It
is not for labor, nor is it for management.