B.
Safety of Passengers
NOCUM vs. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO.
Facts: A passenger boarded the respondents bus carrying a box which such
person attested to the conductor as containing clothes and miscellaneous
items.
Appellee, who was a passenger in appellant's Bus No. 120 then making a
trip within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was injured as a
consequence of the explosion of firecrackers, contained in the box brought
by the co-passenger.
Issue: Did LTB Co. exercise the extraordinary diligence required?
Held: Yes, fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty
towards its passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance that should
be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to
their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take
with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers,
not to speak of his own. Not to be lightly considered must be the right to
privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any
unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and
nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other
words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's
baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this,
constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed.
Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by the service manual invoked
by the trial judge, in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid
inspection, after the passenger had already declared that the box contained
mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a
constitutionally protected domain.
MECENAS vs. CA
Facts: M/T "Tacloban City," a barge-type oil tanker owned by the
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and operated by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC Shipping), having unloaded its
cargo, left for Negros Occidental when it collided with a carrier ship named
Don Juan. When the collision occurred, the sea was calm, the weather fair
and visibility good. As a result of this collision, the M/V "Don Juan" sank and
hundreds of its passengers perished. Among the ill-fated passengers were
the parents of petitioners, the spouses Perfecto Mecenas and Sofia
Mecenas, whose bodies were never found despite intensive search by
petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents were negligent?
Held: Yes, the behaviour of the captain of the "Don Juan" in tills instance-
playing mahjong "before and up to the time of collision constitutes
behaviour that is simply unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel
to whose hands the lives and welfare of at least seven hundred fifty (750)
passengers had been entrusted. Whether or not Capt. Santisteban was "off-
duty" or "on-duty" at or around the time of actual collision is quite
immaterial; there is, both realistically speaking and in contemplation of law,
no such thing as "off-duty" hours for the master of a vessel at sea that is a
common carrier upon whom the law imposes the duty of extraordinary
diligence.
The record shows that the "Don Juan" sank within ten (10) to fifteen (15)
minutes after initial contact with the "Tacloban City. While the failure of
Capt. Santisteban to supervise his officers and crew in the process of
abandoning the ship and his failure to avail of measures to prevent the too
rapid sinking of his vessel after collision, did not cause the collision by
themselves, such failures doubtless contributed materially to the
consequent loss of life and, moreover, were indicative of the kind and level
of diligence exercised by Capt. Santisteban in respect of his vessel and his
officers and men prior to actual contact between the two (2) vessels. The
officer-on-watch in the "Don Juan" admitted that he had failed to inform
Capt. Santisteban not only of the "imminent danger of collision" but even of
"the actual collision itself " There is also evidence that the "Don Juan" was
carrying more passengers than she had been certified as allowed to carry.
Under these circumstances, a presumption of gross negligence on the part
of the vessel (her officers and crew) and of its ship-owner arises.
NEGROS NAVIGATION CO. vs. CA
Facts: Private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros
Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets for his wife, daughter, son and
niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion boarding
the Don Juan. Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T
Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a
result, the M/V Don Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the
sea tragedy. The bodies of some of the victims were found and brought to
shore, but the four members of private respondents' families were never
found.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners exercised the extraordinary
diligence required?
Held: No. As with the Mecenas case, this Court found petitioner guilty of
negligence in (1) allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew members
in playing mahjong during the voyage, (2) in failing to maintain the vessel
seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to carry more passengers than it was
allowed to carry.
 Also, the duty to exercise due diligence includes the duty to take
passengers or cargoes that are within the carrying capacity of the vessel.
KOREAN AIRLINES CO. vs. CA
Facts: Juanito C. Lapuz, an automotive electrician, was contracted for
employment in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Lapuz was supposed to leave via
Korean Airlines. Initially, he was "wait-listed," which meant that he could
only be accommodated if any of the confirmed passengers failed to show
up at the airport before departure. When two of such passengers did not
appear, Lapuz and another person by the name of Perico were given the
two unclaimed seats. As he was about to board the said airline a KAL officer
pointed to him and shouted "Down! Down!" He was thus barred from taking
the flight. When he later asked for another booking, his ticket was canceled
by KAL. Consequently, he was unable to report for his work in Saudi Arabia
within the stipulated 2-week period and so lost his employment.
Issue: Whether or not KAL committed a breach of the Contract of
Carriage?
Held: Yes. The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed to
that of a confirmed passenger when his name was entered in the passenger
manifest of KAL for its Flight No. KE 903. His clearance through immigration
and customs clearly shows that he had indeed been confirmed as a
passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a breach of the
contract of carriage between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his
destination.
This Court has held that a contract to transport passengers is different in
kind and degree from any other contractual relation. The business of the
carrier is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to avail
themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Passengers have
the right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is that any discourteous conduct on the part of these
employees toward a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier.
FORTUNE EXPRESS vs. CA
Facts: Petitioner is a bus company in northern Mindanao. A bus of
petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney, including
two Maranaos. The Constabulary officer found out that certain Maranaos
were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its
buses.
On November 22, 1989, three armed Maranaos who pretended to
be passengers, seized a bus of petitioner at Linamon, Lanao del Norte while
on its way to Iligan City. They started pouring gasoline inside the bus, as
the other held the passenger at bay with a handgun then ordered the
passenger to get off the bus. A passenger Atty. Caorong pleaded with the
Maranaos to spare the bus driver but the Maranaos shot him.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were guilty of a breach of the
contract of carriage?
Held: Yes, Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is
responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of
other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have
prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of
petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men
was made possible.
Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the
Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some
of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado
Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did
nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. Had petitioner and its
employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the
malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the
circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of
passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages,
preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before
allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the
passenger's constitutional rights.
The acts of Maranaos could not be considered as caso fortuito
because there was already a warning by the PC.
No contributory negligence could be attributed to the deceased.
The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos
as a result of the collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in
which the two Maranaos were riding. The armed men actually allowed
deceased to retrieve something from the bus. What apparently angered
them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life.
GATCHALIAN vs. DELIM
Facts: Petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded respondent's mini bus.
While the bus was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang,
Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and,
shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of
the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch as a result
petitioner sustained injuries. As she and several others were confined in a
hospital, respondent Delim paid for the hospitalization expenses and had
the passengers sign a waiver stating that they were no longer interested to
file a complaint. Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gathalian filed a
complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the private respondent were negligent.
Held: The record yields affirmative evidence of fault or negligence on the
part of respondent common carrier. The driver did not stop to check if
anything had gone wrong with the bus when the snapping sound was heard
and made known to him by the passengers, instead told them that it was
normal. The driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same "snapping
sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This could only
mean that the bus had not been checked physically or mechanically to
determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so
frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it. Such a sound is
obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating condition, and even a
modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that the bus be
checked and repaired. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look
after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's
refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the
"snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers,
constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the passengers, and
hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.
Because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for
injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common
carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such
purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to
be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy
or good customs. A cursory examination of the purported waiver will readily
show that appellees did not actually waive their right to claim damages
from appellant for the latter's failure to comply with their contract of
carriage. All that said document proves is that they expressed a "desire" to
make the waiver which obviously is not the same as making an actual
waiver of their right. A waiver of the kind invoked by appellant must be
clear and unequivocal.
A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that
integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual
or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is
entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was
before mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting
from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving
raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her condition ante.
DEL CASTILLO vs. JAYMALIN
Facts: Mario del Castillo, a deaf-mute, son of plaintiff Severo del Castillo
boarded a bus of private respondent bus line. Upon alighting from the bus,
he fell and died as a result. Respondents contend that the proximate cause
of Mario's death was his recklessness and gross negligence in jumping out
of the bus while in motion.
Issue: Whether or not respondents exercised extraordinary diligence.
Held: No, common carriers are responsible for the death of their
passengers (Articles 1764 and 2206 of the Civil Code). This liability includes
the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. It appears proven that the
defendant corporations failed to exercise the diligence that was their duty
to observe according to Articles 1733 and 1755. The conductor was
apprised of the fact that Mario del Castillo was deaf and dumb. With this
knowledge the conductor should have taken extra-ordinary care for the
safety of the said passenger. In this he failed.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES vs. IAC
Facts: Catalina Pascua with several others boarded the jeep owned by
spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino
Manalo bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan.
Upon reaching Tarlac the right rear wheel of the jeepney was
detached, so it was running in an unbalanced position. Manalo stepped on
the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney which was then running on the
eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and eventually
stopping on the western lane and was hit by the petitioner companys bus
causing the death of Catalina Pascua and two other passengers.
Issue: Wether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the
case at bar?
Held: No, The principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for
application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding
vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from
the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable
to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground
that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence."
It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor
neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the
manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. The
bus driver's conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to
the passengers of the jeepney. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling
at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90
kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within
the speed limit allowed in highways.
The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case
of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily
discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the
passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively
responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the
negligence of his driver. In other words, the carrier can neither shift his
liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's
negligence is his. Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and severally
liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal
instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the
share which corresponds to the driver, contradictory to the explicit
provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code.
BUSTAMANTE vs. CA
Facts: A collision occurred between a gravel and sand truck, and a Mazda
passenger bus along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The front
left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side
wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the driver's seat to
the last rear seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were
thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained, Among those
killed were Rogelio Bustamante and his spouse and children, and several
others.
During the incident, the cargo truck was driven by defendant
Montesiano and owned by defendant Del Pilar; while the passenger bus was
driven by defendant Susulin. The vehicle was registered in the name of
defendant Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger bus
jointly by defendants Magtibay and Serrado, under a franchise, with a line
from Naic, Cavite, to Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila, and vice versa,
which Novelo sold to Magtibay on November 8, 1981, and which the latter
transferred to Serrado (Cerrado) on January 18, 1983.
After a careful perusal of the circumstances of the case, the trial
court reached the conclusion "that the negligent acts of both drivers
contributed to or combined with each other in directly causing the accident
which led to the death of the aforementioned persons. It could not be
determined from the evidence that it was only the negligent act of one of
them which was the proximate cause of the collision. In view of this, the
liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary.
From said decision, only defendants Federico del Pilar and
Edilberto Montesiano, owner and driver, respectively, of the sand and
gravel truck have interposed an appeal before the respondent Court of
Appeals, which set aside the trial courts decision. Hence the present
petition.
Issue: Whether the respondent court has properly and legally applied the
doctrine of "last clear chance" in the present case despite its own finding
that appellant cargo truck driver Edilberto Montesiano was admittedly
negligent in driving his cargo truck very fast on a descending road and in
the presence of the bus driver coming from the opposite direction.
Held: The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The
doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears
that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the
plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance
means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a
position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to
recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear
chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the
opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of
the accident. (Sangco, Torts and Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p. 165).
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held
liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly
negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or
according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the
reasonable exercise of due case, had in fact an opportunity later than that
of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (57 Am. Jur., 2d, pp. 798-799).
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent Court
committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as
between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the
owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs
of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the
colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the
owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.
LARA vs. VALENCIA
Facts: The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry stationed
in Davao. The defendant is engaged in the business of exporting logs from
his lumber concession in Cotabato. Lara went to said concession upon
instructions of his chief to classify the logs of defendant which were about
to be loaded on a ship anchored in the port of Parang. Lara boarded with
several others a pick-up bound for Davao and were seated at the back on
an improvised bench. Lara accidentally fell from the pick-up and as a result
he suffered serious injuries which lead to his death.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent failed to exercise the ordinary
diligence required?
Held: Yes. The owner and driver of a vehicle owes to accommodation
passengers or invited guests merely the duty to exercise reasonable care
so that they may be transported safely to their destination. Thus, "The rule
is established by weight of authority that the owner or operator of an
automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care in
its operation, and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by
increasing the hazard of travel. The owner of the vehicle in the case at bar
is only required to observe ordinary care, and is not in duty bound to
exercise extraordinary diligence as required by our law.
A passenger must observe the diligence of a father of a family to avoid
injury to himself which means that if the injury to the passenger has been
proximately caused by his own negligence, the carrier cannot be held
liable.
NECESSITO vs. PARAS
Facts: Severina Garces and her one-year old son boarded passenger auto
truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. The truck entered a wooden bridge,
but the front wheels swerved to the right; the driver lost control, and after
wrecking the bridge's wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side into a
creek where water was breast deep. The mother, Severina Garces, was
drowned; the son,the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water
was breast deep. The mother, Severina Garces, was drowned; the son
sustained injuries.
Issue: Whether or not the carrier is liable
Held: While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers,
it should nevertheless be held to answer for the laws its equipment if such
flaws were at all discoverable. In this connection, the manufacturer of the
defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the
good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability.
The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has no
privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence, he has no
remedy against him, while the carrier usually has.
JAPAN AIRLINES vs. CA
Facts: Private respondents boarded the JAL flights to Manila with a stop
over at Narita Japan at the airlines' expense. Upon arrival at Narita private
respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko Narita for the night. The next day,
private respondents went to the airport to take their flight to Manila.
However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption rendered NAIA inaccessible to
airline traffic. Hence, private respondents' trip to Manila was cancelled
indefinitely. JAL then booked another flight fort the passengers and again
answered for the hotel accommodations but still the succeeding flights
were cancelled.
Issue: Whether or not JAL was obligated to answer for the
accommodation expenses due to the force majeure.
Held: No, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his
obligation because of "force majeure," the general rule is that he cannot be
held liable for damages for non-performance. Corollarily, when JAL was
prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt.
Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and
meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL.
Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for
their unexpected overnight stay on June 15, 1991.
It has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the
mode of travel. In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme
climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the
consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect.
While JAL was no longer required to defray private respondents' living
expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the fortuitous event, JAL
had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport private
respondents on the first available connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL
reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its
passengers when it declassified private respondents from "transit
passengers" to "new passengers" as a result of which private respondents
were obliged to make the necessary arrangements themselves for the next
flight to Manila.
LAYUGAN vs. IAC
Facts: Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo
Isidro, alleging that while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff
and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was
parked along the right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truck,
driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result,
plaintiff was injured and hospitalized.
Defendant countered that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not
a truck helper being a brother-in-law of the driver of said truck and hence
must suffer the damages. The trial court decided in favor of the plaintiff,
which was reversed by the CA, hence the present petition.
Issue: W/N defendant is absolved by virtue of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
Held: No. Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine which states thus: "Where the thing
which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care.
It is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because
he apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he
did he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right
was cut, and could have repaired it and thus the accident could have been
avoided. Moreover, to our mind, the fact that the private respondent used
to instruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver was
licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any accident, as found by
the respondent court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence
of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the trial The
private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have
conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to
drive it. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that
Isidro failed to prove that the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of his employees which would exculpate him from solidary
liability with his driver to the petitioner.
Respondent Isidro posits that any immobile object along the
highway, like a parked truck, poses serious danger to a moving vehicle
which has the right to be on the highway. He argues that since the parked
cargo truck in this case was a threat to life and limb and property, it was
incumbent upon the driver as well as the petitioner, who claims to be a
helper of the truck driver, to exercise extreme care so that the motorist
negotiating the road would be properly forewarned of the peril of a parked
vehicle. Isidro submits that the burden of proving that care and diligence
were observed is shifted to the petitioner, for, as previously claimed, his
(Isidro's) Isuzu truck had a right to be on the road, while the immobile cargo
truck had no business, so to speak, to be there. Likewise, Isidro proffers
that the petitioner must show to the satisfaction of a reasonable mind that
the driver and he (petitioner) himself, provided an early warning device,
like that required by law, or, by some other adequate means that would
properly forewarn vehicles of the impending danger that the parked vehicle
posed considering the time, place, and other peculiar circumstances of the
occasion. Absent such proof of care, as in the case at bar, Isidro concludes,
would, under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur, evoke the presumption of
negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his
helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck.
Respondent Isidro's contention is untenable.
LA MALLORCA vs. DE JESUS
Facts: Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their minor children,
boarded a La Mallorca bus. Upon arrival at their destination, plaintiffs and
their children alighted from the bus and the father led them to a shaded
spot about 5 meters away from the vehicle. The father returned to the bus
to get a piece of baggage which was not unloaded. He was followed by her
daughter Raquel. While the father was still on the running board awaiting
for the conductor to give his baggage, the bus started to run so that the
father had to jump. Raquel, who was near the bus, was run over and killed.
The Lower Court rendered judgment for the plaintiff which was
affirmed by CA, holding La Mallorca liable for quasi-delict. La Mallorca
contended that when the child was killed, she was no longer a passenger
and therefore the contract of carriage had terminated.
Issue: Whether or not the deceased is considered to be still a passenger of
the bus to which the petitioner could be held liable.
Held: Yes. It is a recognized rule that the relation between carrier and
passengers does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the
carriers premises, to be determined from the circumstances. In this case,
there was no utmost diligence. Firstly, the driver, although stopping the
bus, did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even
before the bus conductor gave him the signal and while the latter was
unloading cargo. Here the presence of said passengers near the bus was
not unreasonable and the duration of responsibility still exists.
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. CA
Facts: Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel owned by defendant ABOITIZ, at
the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. Said vessel
arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein
disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the
vessel to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana
disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier. After
said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the
exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the
Memorandum of Agreement between the third party defendant Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation and defendant Aboitiz. The crane owned by the
third party defendant and operated by its crane operator Alejo Figueroa was
placed alongside the vessel and one hour after the passengers of said
vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from
said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had
already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of
his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it
was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where
his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the
side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital
where he later died. Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for
damages against Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage. Aboitiz denied
responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was
completely under the control of Pioneer as the which handled the unloading
of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz. It is also averred that since the crane
operator was not an employee of Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held liable
under the fellow-servant rule. Judgment is rendered in favor of the plantiffs.
The trial court absolved Pioneer from liability for failure of the Vianas and
Aboitiz to preponderantly established a case of negligence against the
crane operator which the court ruled is never presumed. Aboitiz appealed
the same to respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of of
the trial court except as to the amount of damages awarded to the Vianas.
Hence the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not the responsibility of Aboitiz to the victim ceased
when it disembarked from the vessel.
Held: No. The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues
until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left
the vessel owner's dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not
ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination,
safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable
opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the
premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed
passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this
rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a
reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The
carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the
person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such
person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage.
When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading
his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. Even if
he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's
premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which
was possible only one hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly
standard procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading
operations shall start only after that time. Consequently, under the
foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a
passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that
there was a cordon of drums around the perimeter of the crane, as claimed
by petitioner. It also adverted to the fact that the alleged presence of
visible warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and not indubitably
established. Thus, we are not inclined to accept petitioner's explanation
that the victim and other passengers were sufficiently warned that merely
venturing into the area in question was fraught with serious peril. Hence,
Aboitiz is negligent. Pioneer had taken the necessary safeguards insofar as
its unloading operations were concerned, a fact which appears to have
been accepted by the plaintiff therein by not impleading Pioneer as a
defendant, and likewise inceptively by Aboitiz by filing its third-party
complaint only after ten months from the institution of the suit against it.
Parenthetically, Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on extraordinary
diligence required of, and the corresponding presumption of negligence
foisted on, common carriers like Aboitiz.
MALLARI SR. vs. CA
Facts: The passenger jeepney driven by petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. and
owned by his co-petitioner Alfredo Mallari Sr. collided with the delivery van
of respondent Bulletin along the National Highway in Barangay San Pablo,
Dinalupihan, Bataan. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall
on its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel
Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries. The widow of
the victim, filed a complaint for damages against petitioners and also
against BULLETIN, its driver Felix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands
Insurance Company. The trial court found that the proximate cause of the
collision was the negligence of Felix Angeles, driver of the Bulletin delivery
van, considering the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck
driven by Felix Angeles hit and bumped the left rear portion of the
passenger jeepney driven by Alfredo Mallari Jr. Hence, the trial court held
that BULLETIN and Felix Angeles are jointly and severally liable. It also
dismissed the complaint against the other defendants Alfredo Mallari Sr.
and Alfredo Mallari Jr. On appeal the Court of Appeals modified the decision
of the trial court and found no negligence on the part of Angeles and
consequently of his employer, respondent BULLETIN. Instead, the appellate
court ruled that the collision was caused by the sole negligence of
petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. who admitted that immediately before the
collision and after he rounded a curve on the highway, he overtook a Fiera
which had stopped on his lane and that he had seen the van driven by
Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are negligent.
Held: Yes. The Court of Appeals correctly found, that the collision occurred
immediately after petitioner Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle in front of it while
traversing a curve on the highway. This act of overtaking was in clear
violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise
known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing.
(a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of
a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle proceeding in the same
direction, unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming
traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing
to be made in safety.
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass another vehicle
proceeding in the same direction when approaching the crest of a grade,
nor upon a curve in the highway, where the driver's view along the highway
is obstructed within a distance of five hundred feet ahead except on a
highway having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction
where the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle:
Provided That on a highway, within a business or residential district, having
two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction, the driver of a
vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle on the right.
The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose
of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to
it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety.
When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special
necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not
have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to
turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into
view.
In the instant case, by his own admission, petitioner Mallari Jr. already saw
that the BULLETIN delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and
failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in
the morning mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook two vehicles in
front of it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the
collision resulting in the death of Israel Reyes, a passenger of the jeepney,
was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner
Alfredo Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane
where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the
Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. As found by the appellate
court, petitioners failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this
legal presumption.
Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the
circumstances. Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of
death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed
extraordinary diligence. Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it
is liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or
willful acts of the former's employees. This liability of the common carrier
does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection of its employees. Clearly, by the contract
of carriage, the carrier jeepney owned by Mallari Sr. assumed the express
obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely and to
observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the circumstances,
and any injury or death that might be suffered by its passengers is right
away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier.
BAYASEN vs. CA
Facts: Petitioner was charged of Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence, being
then the driver and person in-charge of Rural health Unit Jeep, drove along
Suyo Municipal Road, Sagada, Mountain Province in a negligent, careless
and imprudent manner. Said jeep fell over a precipice in the
abovementioned place causing thereby the death of Elena Awichen. After
trial, the petitioner was found guilty of the charge. The decision was
affirmed in CA, hence the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to acquittal on the ground that
the finding of the Court of Appeals that the proximate cause of the death of
Awichen was the petitioner's "negligence in driving at an unreasonable
speed" is openly contrary to the evidence of the prosecution.
Held: Yes. It is obvious that the proximate cause of the tragedy was the
skidding of the rear wheels of the jeep and not the "unreasonable speed" of
the petitioner because there is no evidence on record to prove or support
the finding that the petitioner was driving at "an unreasonable speed".
It is a well known physical tact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery
roads, as in the instant case, without fault on account of the manner of
handling the car. Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the
car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. It may occur
without fault.
No negligence as a matter of law can, therefore, be charged to the
petitioner. In fact, the moment he felt that the rear wheels of the jeep
skidded, he promptly drove it to the left hand side of the road, parallel to
the slope of the mountain, because as he said, he wanted to play safe and
avoid the embankment.
Under the particular circumstances of the instant case, the petitioner-
driver who skidded could not be regarded as negligent, the skidding being
an unforeseen event, so that the petitioner had a valid excuse for his
departure from his regular course. The negligence of the petitioner not
having been sufficiently established, his guilt of the crime charged has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He is, therefore, entitled to
acquittal.
CERVANTES vs. CA
Facts: PAL issued to the petitioner a round trip plane ticket for Manila-
Honolulu-Los Angeles-Honolulu-Manila, which ticket expressly provided an
expiry of date of one year from issuance, i.e., until March 27, 1990. On
March 23, 1990, four days before the expiry date of subject ticket, the
petitioner used it. Upon his arrival in Los Angeles on the same day, he
immediately booked his Los Angeles-Manila return ticket with the PAL office,
and it was confirmed for the April 2, 1990 flight. Upon learning that the
same PAL plane would make a stop-over in San Francisco, and considering
that he would be there on April 2, 1990, petitioner made arrangements with
PAL for him to board the flight In San Francisco instead of boarding in Los
Angeles. On April 2, 1990, when the petitioner checked in at the PAL
counter in San Francisco, he was not allowed to board. The PAL personnel
concerned marked the following notation on his ticket: "TICKET NOT
ACCEPTED DUE EXPIRATION OF VALIDITY." Petitioner Cervantes filed a
Complaint for Damages, for breach of contract of carriage. But the said
complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. On appeal, the lower courts
decision was upheld, hence the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming subject ticket
extended the period of validity of petitioner's ticket.
Held: No. Since the PAL agents are not privy to the said Agreement and
petitioner knew that a written request to the legal counsel of PAL was
necessary, he cannot use what the PAL agents did to his advantage. The
said agents, according to the Court of Appeals, acted without authority
when they confirmed the flights of the petitioner. Under Article 1989 of the
New Civil Code, the acts an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not
bind the principal, unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly.
Furthermore, when the third person (herein petitioner) knows that the
agent was acting beyond his power or authority, the principal cannot be
held liable for the acts of the agent. If the said third person is aware of such
limits of authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover damages
from the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's
ratification.
In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the
breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible
acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Petitioner knew there was a
strong possibility that he could not use the subject ticket, so much so that
he bought a back-up ticket to ensure his departure. Should there be a
finding of bad faith, we are of the opinion that it should be on the petitioner.
What the employees of PAL did was one of simple negligence. No injury
resulted on the part of petitioner because he had a back-up ticket should
PAL refuse to accommodate him with the use of subject ticket. Neither can
the claim for exemplary damages be upheld. Such kind of damages is
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, and the
existence of bad faith is established.
CALALAS vs. CA
Facts: Private respondent Eliza Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in
Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney
owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled
to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an
"extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of
the vehicle. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the
jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the
vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing
so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva
bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of
the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a
third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant
and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu
truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another
case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for
quasi-delict, in which the same court held Salva and his driver Verena
jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground
that Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-
delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required
under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party
complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the
accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make
the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends
that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso
fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on
the ground that it is not supported by evidence.
Issue: Should be petitioner be absolved if his contentions are considered?
Held: No. There is no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case
No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to
petitioner's jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the
negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract.
The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is
created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation,
and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by
the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common
carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption
of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers.
In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of
contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of
the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier,
failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death
or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in
Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human
care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by
Art. 1755? We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked,
its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders
of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle.
The petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating
capacity of the jeepney. These are violations of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his
jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions
for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items
enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such
damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the
death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of
the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or
bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.In this case, there is no legal basis for
awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the
appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the
contract of carriage.
PESTAO vs. SUMAYANG
Facts: Ananias Sumayang was riding a motorcycle along the national
highway in Ilihan, Tabagon, Cebu. Riding with him was his friend Manuel
Romagos. As they came upon a junction where the highway connected with
the road leading to Tabagon, they were hit by a passenger bus driven by
Pestao and owned by Metro Cebu which had tried to overtake them,
sending the motorcycle and its passengers hurtling upon the pavement.
Apart from the institution of criminal charges against Pestao, Respondent-
heirs, filed this civil action for damages against petitioners. The cases were
consolidated. The lower court found petitioners liable. Said decision was
affirmed by CA, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Pestao was negligent
Held: Yes. Petitioners contend that Pestao was not under any obligation to
slow down when he overtook the motorcycle, because the deceased had
given way to him upon hearing the bus horn. Seeing that the left side of the
road was clearly visible and free of oncoming traffic, Pestao accelerated
his speed to pass the motorcycle. Having given way to the bus, the
motorcycle driver should have slowed down until he had been overtaken.
They further contend that the motorcycle was not in the middle of the road
nearest to the junction but was on the inner lane. This explains why the
damages on the bus were all on the right side - the right end of the bumper
and the right portion of the radiator grill were bent and dented. SC
disagreed with this contention and considered the findings of CA, based on
the testimony of the witnesses, wherein, it was found out that as the two
vehicles approached the junction, the victim raised his left arm to signal
that he was turning left to Tabagon, but that the latter and his companion
were thrown off the motorcycle after it was bumped by the overspeeding
bus. As a professional driver operating a public transport bus, Pestao
should have anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous
maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme caution.
Petitioners also aver that the CA was wrong in attributing the
accident to a faulty speedometer and in implying that the accident could
have been avoided had this instrument been properly functioning. This
contention has no factual basis. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their
employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an
employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in
the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption may
be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the
care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the
supervision of its employee.
GILLACO vs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
Facts: Lieut. Tomas Gillaco, husband of the plaintiff, was a passenger in the
early morning train of the Manila Railroad Company from Calamba, Laguna
to Manila. When the train reached the Paco Railroad station, Emilio Devesa,
a train guard of the Manila Railroad Company happened to be in said
station waiting for the same train which would take him to Tutuban Station,
where he was going to report for duty. Emilio Devesa had a long standing
personal grudge against Tomas Gillaco, because of this, Devesa shot Gillaco
with the carbine furnished to him by the Manila Railroad Company for his
use as such train guard, upon seeing him inside the train coach. Tomas
died. Devesa was convicted of homicide. A complaint for damages was filed
by the victims widow. Damages were awarded to the plaintiff, hence the
instant petition. Appellant's contention is that, no liability attaches to it as
employer of the Emilio Devesa because the crime was not committed while
the slayer was in the actual performance of his ordinary duties and service
and that no negligence on appellant's part was shown.
Issue: Whether or not appellant could be held liable for the acts of its
employee.
Held: No. While a passenger is entitled to protection from personal
violence by the carrier or its agents or employees, since the contract of
transportation obligates the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his
destination, the responsibility of the carrier extends only to those acts that
the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care
and diligence required of it. In the present case, the act of the train guard
of the Manila Railroad Company in shooting the passenger (because of a
personal grudge nurtured against the latter since the Japanese occupation)
was entirely unforseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no
means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet, nor could it
reasonably forsee every personal rancor that might exist between each one
of its many employees and any one of the thousands of eventual
passengers riding in its trains. The shooting in question was therefore "caso
fortuito" within the definition of Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code (which is the
law applicable), being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given
circumstances; and pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach
of the company's contract of safe carriage with the deceased was excused
thereby.
MARANAN vs. PEREZ
Facts: Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab
owned and operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by
the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in
the Court of First Instance of Batangas and was found guilty. While appeal
was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's mother,
filed an action to recover damages. The court decided in plaintiffs favor.
Hence the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not defendant- operators could be held liable for
damages
Held: Yes. Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in
Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no
absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers. The
attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very
different however. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the
scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee. Now here, the killing
was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger,
in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract
of carriage. In other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the
passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and
when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil
Code of 1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon
common carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers against
wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death
of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which
exempted the carrier from liability.
The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers are new and
were taken from Anglo-American Law. There, the basis of the carrier's
liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on
(1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the
carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when
the act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is
not sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only. Under
the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is
enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty.
It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority
or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carrier's liability here is
absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from
assaults committed by its own employees. As can be gleaned from Art.
1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule based on
the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. (1)
the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger
that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree
of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the
hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of
the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said
liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the
result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of
his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the
duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law;
and (3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear
the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against
passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and
remove them.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and
similar employees with due regard not only to their technical competence
and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality,
including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.
Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower
court rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of
the Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was
also correct. Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of
carriage7 and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is
covered in the criminal case wherein he was convicted by final judgment.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. CA
Facts: Winifredo Tupang, husband of plaintiff, boarded a train of appellant at
Libmanan, Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to
some mechanical defect, the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for
repairs. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon,
Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death.The train did not
stop despite the alarm raised by the other passengers that somebody fell
from the train. Upon complaint filed by Rosario the lower court after trial,
held PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage. The decision
was sustained by the appellate court hence the present petition, wherein
PNR raised for the first time, as a defense, the doctrine of state immunity
from suit. It alleged that it is a mere agency of the Philippine government
without distinct or separate personality of its own, and that its funds are
governmental in character and, therefore, not subject to garnishment or
execution.
Issue: Whether or not PNR can raise the defense of doctrine of state
immunity from suit.
Held: No. The PNR was created under Rep. Act 4156, as amended. Section 4
of the said Act provides:
The Philippine national Railways shall have the following powers:
a. To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or
indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the
purpose of the corporation; and
b. Generally, to exercise all powers of a corporation under the Corporation
Law.
Under the foregoing section, the PNR has all the powers, the characteristics
and attributes of a corporation under the Corporation Law. There can be no
question then that the PNR may sue and be sued and may be subjected to
court processes just like any other corporation.
Now, is PNR negligent? Yes. The appellate court found, the petitioner does
not deny, that the train boarded by the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so
over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit
on the open platforms between the coaches of the train. It is likewise
undisputed that the train did not even slow down when it approached the
Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time, Neither did the train stop,
despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off
the train at lyam Bridge. The petitioner has the obligation to transport its
passengers to their destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in
doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to
the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation
under the contract of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled by the respondent
court, the petitioner failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence
with clear and convincing evidence.
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by
law, it appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory
negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the
coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the
upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from
the speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the
PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount
adjudicated as moral damages and exemplary damages. Exemplary
damages may be allowed only in cases where the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
ISAAC vs. A.L. AMMEN TRANS. CO.
Facts: Plaintiff boarded defendants bus as paying passenger from Albay.
The bus collided with a pick-up truck which was coming from opposite
direction trying to swerve from a pile of gravel. As a result, his left arm was
completely severed. Plaintiff chose to hold defendant liable on its
contractual obligation. Plaintiff brought an action for damages which the
lower court dismissed holding the driver of the pick-up car negligent and
not that of the bus.
Issue: Whether or not the common carrier is liable.
Held: The bus was running at a moderate speed. The driver of the bus
upon the speeding pick-up truck swerved the bus to the very extreme right
of the road. Said driver would not move the bus further without
endangering the safety of his passengers. Notwithstanding all these
efforts, the rear left side was hit. This finding of the lower court was
sustained.
Also, of the carriers employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, he
is not held to the same degree of care he would otherwise, he required in
the absence of such emergency.
By placing his left arm on the window, he is guilty of contributory
negligence cannot relieve the carrier but can only reduce its liability (ART.
1762), this is a circumstance which further militates against plaintiffs
position. It is a prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for passengers on
a railroad to protrude any part of his body and that no recovery can be had
for an injury.
BACHELOR EXPRESS, vs.CA
Facts: The bus owned by Petitioners came from Davao City on its way to
Cagayan de Oro City passing Butuan City. While at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan
City, the bus picked up a passenger, that about fifteen minutes later, a
passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused
commotion and panic among the passengers. When the bus stopped,
passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found lying down
the road, the former already dead as a result of head injuries and the latter
also suffering from severe injuries which caused her death later. The
passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the bushes but
was killed by the police. Thereafter, the heirs of Ornominio Beter and
Narcisa Rautraut, private respondents herein filed a complaint for "sum of
money" against Bachelor Express, Inc., its alleged owner and the driver
Rivera. The lower court dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision,
hence the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is negligent.
Held: Yes. The liability, if any, of the petitioners is anchored on culpa
contractual or breach of contract of carriage. Art. 1732, 1733, 1755 and
1756 are applicable. There is no question that Bachelor is a common
carrier. Hence, Bachelor is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. In the case at
bar, Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus
belonging to Bachelor and, while passengers of the bus, suffered injuries
which caused their death. Consequently, pursuant to Article 1756 of the
Civil Code, Bachelor is presumed to have acted negligently unless it can
prove that it had observed extraordinary diligence in accordance with
Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.
Bachelor denies liability for the death of Beter and Rautraut in that
their death was caused by a third person who was beyond its control and
supervision. In effect, the petitioner, in order to overcome the presumption
of fault or negligence under the law, states that the vehicular incident
resulting in the death of passengers Beter and Rautraut was caused by
force majeure or caso fortuito over which the common carrier did not have
any control. The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause
of the incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic among the
passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole exit
shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter
and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger
who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the context of force
majeure. However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from
liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was
caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove that it was
not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident. In this
case, Bachelor was negligent.
Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus
driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the
bus was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell from the bus door when it
was opened or gave way while the bus was still running; the conductor
panicked and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus;
and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law-it
is clear that the petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of
fault and negligence found in the law governing common carriers. The
petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their
passengers" deserves no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to
prove that the deaths of the two passengers were exclusively due to force
majeure and not to the failure of the petitioners to observe extraordinary
diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destinations as
warranted by law.
FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC., vs.CA
Facts: A bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norter, resulting in the death of several passengers
of the jeepney, including two Maranaos. A constabulary agent investigated
and found out that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao and that
certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by
burning some of its buses. The operations manager of petitioner was
advised to take precautionary measures. Four days after the accident, three
armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers seized a bus petitioner
bound for Iligan City and set it on fire. Atty. Talib Caorong, whose heirs are
private respondents herein was a passenger of the bus and was shot and
killed during the incident. The private respondents brought this suit for
breach of contract of carriage. Complaint was dismissed in the lower court
but its decision was reversed in CA, hence the instant petition, with
petitioners contention that the acts of the Maranaos is caso fortuito.
Issue: Was there breach of contract of carriage?
Held: Yes. Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is
responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of
other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have
prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of
petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men
was made possible.
Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the
Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some
of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado
Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did
nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. Had petitioner and its
employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the
malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the
circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of
passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages,
preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before
allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the
passenger's constitutional rights.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, and De Guzman v.
Court of Appeals, in support of its contention that the seizure of its bus by
the assailants constitutes force majeure. In Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, it
was held that a common carrier is not liable for failing to install window
grills on its buses to protect the passengers from injuries cause by rocks
hurled at the bus by lawless elements. On the other hand, in De Guzman v.
Court of Appeals, it was ruled that a common carriers is not responsible for
goods lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by grave or irresistable
threat, violence, or force.
It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the
prensent case. Art. 1755 of the Civil Code provides that "a common carrier
is bound to carry the passengers as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard for all the circumstances." Thus, we held in Pilapil and De Guzman
that the respondents therein were not negligent in failing to take special
precautions against threats to the safety of passengers which could not be
foreseen, such as tortious or criminal acts of third persons. In the present
case, this factor of unforeseeability (the second requisite for an event to be
considered force majeure) is lacking. As already stated, despite the report
of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were planning to burn some of
petitioner's buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager
(Diosdado Bravo) that the necessary precautions would be taken, nothing
was really done by petitioner to protect the safety of passengers.
The petitioner contends that Atty. Caorong was guilty of contributory
negligence in returning to the bus to retrieve something. But Atty. Caorong
did not act recklessly. It should be pointed out that the intended targets of
the violence were petitioners and its employees, not its passengers. The
assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a
result of the collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the
two Maranaos were riding. Mananggolo, the leader of the group which had
hijacked the bus, ordered the passengers to get off the bus as they
intended to burn it and its driver. The armed men actually allowed Atty.
Caorong to retrieve something from the bus. What apparently angered
them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life.
He was playing the role of the good Samaritan. Certainly, this act cannot be
considered an act of negligence, let alone recklessness.