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General Concept

A. DEFINITIONS AND TERMS

Reform presupposes that something is defective, hence, needs reformation and


correction.

Land Reform denotes a broad concept of conventional and revolutionary measures


intended to correct certain defects in the relationship between landowner and tiller
regarding their rights and obligations in the cultivation and management of landholding.

Agrarian Reform refers not only to land reform but also embraces a full range of
measures designed to improve the relationship between landowner and tiller, employer and
employee, corporate management and stockholders, cooperatives and members, and other
farmers organizations including their economic, social and political relations with the
community and the government.

Comments:

Under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (R.A. No. 6657), Agrarian Reform is
defined as the redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced, to farmers and
regular farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement.

HISTORY AND EVOLUTION

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Even before the Spaniard came into these Island, the idea of private ownership of land was
not prevalent. Land was commonly owned by the community or barangay, cultivated
communally or individually by members of the barangay.

When the Spaniard came in 1521, common ownership of land slowly took the backseat, and
private property became dominant, paving the way to Encomienda system.

The encomienda was a vehicle used to collect taxes from Filipinos, who tilled the land and
surrendered part of their produce to the encomendero as tribute in the form of agricultural
crops, poultry, woven mats, etc. Towards the end of the 18 th century, there was a mad
scramble for wealth thru world trade. Thus, encomienda were replaced by haciendas.

List of Laws
Rice Share Tenancy Act (Public Act No. 4054) - which provided for a 50-50 sharing of
the crop, an interest rte ceiling of 10 percent per crop year, and safeguards against arbitrary
dismissal of tenants by landlords.

Commonwealth Act No. 178 which improved the provision of Act No. 4054 the Rice
Share Tenancy Act, giving more teeth and protection to the rights of tenants of agricultural
lands.

Republic Act. No. 34 amended certain Sections of the Rice Share Tenancy Act providing
for a 70 30 crop sharing method.

Republic Act No. 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy Act) infused an added boost to the tenurial
rights of tenant tiller.

Land Reform Act (R.A. No. 1400, 1955) - guaranteed the expropriation of all tenanted
landed estates. It set a retention limit of 300 hectares for individually owned estates, and
600 hectares for corporate owned estates.

Republic Act. No. 3844 marked the abolition of share tenancy and / or the system of
share cropping between landowner and tenant, and the automatic conversion of share
tenants into leaseholders.

Republic Act No. 6389 (Code of Agrarian Reforms) an improvement of R.A. No. 3844,
this amendatory Act featured the creation of the Department of Agrarian Reforms (DAR).

Presidential Decree No. 2 declaring the entire nation as a land reform area.

Presidential Decree No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of the tenants, transferring to


them the ownership of the land they till. Rice and Corn Land

Proclamation No. 131 Instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program which


covers, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in the Constitution.

Executive Order No. 228 Declaring full landownership to qualified beneficiaries covered
by Presidential Decree No. 27.

Executive Order No. 229 Providing for the mechanisms for the implementation of the
comprehensive agrarian reform program, creating the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC). All lands

Republic Act No. 6657 - As primary agrarian land reform measure in the country today,
its operation covers all public and private agricultural lands, including other lands of the
public domain suitable for agriculture.

In order to implement the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988. (R.A. NO. 6657) which was signed into law by the President of the
Phillippines on June 10, 1988, and took effect on June 15, 1988. This is the main law on
agrarian reform in the Philippines today. The CARL provides that all other laws on agrarian
reform not contrary or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall have suppletory
effect.

SOCIAL JUSTICE
ART. II SECTION 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.

ART XIII SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of
property and its increments.

SECTION 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.

Calalang vs. Williams

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to
the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of
one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of
theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles
are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?

Held:

2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption
of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi
estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence


among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent
with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and
quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.

GONZALES v CA

FACTS: The now deceased spouses Ignacio and Marina Gonzales were the registered owners
of two parcels of agricultural land situated at Barrio Fortaleza, Cabanatuan City, covered by
TCT No. 2742 and denominated as Lot 551-C and Lot 552-A. Herein petitioners are the
successors-in-interest or the children and grandchildren of said Gonzales spouses. On the
other hand, private respondents are the farmers and tenants of said spouses who have been
cultivating the parcels of land even before the World War II either personally or through their
predecessors-in-interest.

On May 7, 1969, Marina Gonzales died intestate and appointed as administratrix of her
estate was petitioner Lilia Gonzales. Prior to the partition of the said estate, Ignacio Gonzales
executed a Deed of Donation on July 12, 1972 conveying his share of the property,
specifically Lot 551-C, in favor of his 14 grandchildren. The said donation was not registered.
Thus, when PD No. 27 took effect on October 21, 1972, the landholdings of the spouses
Gonzales were placed under Operation Land Transfer by virtue of said decree, and private
respondents were accordingly issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer and
Emancipation Patent.

On March 5, 1974, the administratrix Lilia Gonzales filed an application for retention with the
then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, requesting that their property be excluded from the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer. After initial investigation, Hearing Officer Melchor
Pagsolingan recommended the denial of said application for retention and this action was
affirmed by the Assistant Secretary of Agrarian Reform Benjamin Labayen, in an order dated
September 12, 1977. Apparently, however, a reinvestigation was conducted, resulting in the
present DAR resolution dated February 23, 1983, recommending that the land subject of the
deed of donation, or Lot 551-C, be exempt from Operation Land Transfer. On September 3,
1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin Leong issued an order declaring that the subject
landholdings covered by the deed of donation are exempt from Operation Land Transfer, and
cancelling the Certificates of Land Transfer issued in favor of private respondents.

Aggrieved by this ruling, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals which rendered a decision on March 15, 1993, reversing the action of the DAR and
upholding the certificates of land transfer and emancipation patent. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated May
17, 1993. Thus, the instant petition was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation executed affects the rights of the farmers and
tenants in the case at bar.

RULING: No. Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that in order that the donation
of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. Corollarily,
Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that the titles of ownership, or other rights
over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of
Property shall not prejudice third persons. From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred
that as between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is required is for
said donation to be contained in a public document. Registration is not necessary for it is to
be considered valid and effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the donation must
be registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds). Although
non-registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of
registration comes into play when the rights of third persons are affected, as in the case at
bar.

From the foregoing, the ineluctable conclusion drawn is that the unregistered deed of
donation cannot operate to exclude the subject land from the coverage of the Operation
Land Transfer of P.D. No. 27, which took effect on October 21, 1972. To rule otherwise would
render ineffectual the rights and interests that the tenants-farmers immediately acquired
upon the promulgation of P.D. No. 27, especially so because in the case at bar, they have
been cultivating the land even before World War II. Accordingly, the Certificates of Land
Transfer and the Emancipation Patents respectively issued to private respondents over the
land in question cannot be cancelled. It should be noted that one of the recognized modes of
acquiring title to land is by emancipation patent which aims to ameliorate the sad plight of
tenants-farmers. By virtue of P.D. No. 27, tenants-farmers are deemed owners of the land
they till. This policy is intended to be given effect by a provision of the law which declares
that, "the tenant-farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall be DEEMED
OWNER of a portion constituting a family size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and
three (3) hectares if irrigated" (P.D. No. 27, third paragraph). It may, therefore, be said that
with respect to Lot 551-C, private respondents became owners thereof on October 27, 1972,
the day P.D. No. 27 took effect.
EMINENT DOMAIN

SECTION 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA MODAY, petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL


COURT, AGUSAN DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN, respondents.

FACTS: Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an
expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Modays land. Purpose of which was to
erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the
resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said
resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned
by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the
expropriation nonetheless.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a


municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the
instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is
governments right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the
power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public
entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid,
the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground
upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order
invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon
the council or president making the same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the
SP merely stated that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not
even bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

EPZA v DULAY PD 1533 unconstitutional because it eliminates courts discretion


in appointing administrators

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export
Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San
Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are
registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them
reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an
order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was
later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square
meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just
compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of
the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such
objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set
for the reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and
mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.

Petitioner maintains that PD 1533 is the applicable law, the basis of the compensation shall
be the fair and current market value declared by the owner therefore there is no more need
to appoint commissioners.

Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation
in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD
1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to


judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may
only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it
may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function.
The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a
party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not
be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can
mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the
courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.

PD 1533 is unconstitutional because it eliminates the courts discretion to appoint


commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the ROC.

PD 1533: the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or
administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or determined by the assessor,
pursuant to the Real Property tax code, whichever value is lower, prior to the
recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government agency.

REPUBLIC v CASTAVELLI

Facts: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into
a lease agreement over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When
Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused because of the
permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and
already established on the property. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the
AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land
in question.

After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in
1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959.
During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the
property when the contract of lease commenced (1947) and not when the proceedings
begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government
commenced to occupy the said land as lessee.
Issue: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that
just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property that
year .

The requisites for taking are:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property;

2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;

3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;

4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and

5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the taking of Castellvis
property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947
when the republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.

Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court, momentary when
applied to possession or occupancy of real property should be construed to mean a limited
period -- not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one
year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary,
and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through AFP, constructed some
installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the lant was
transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent of
the owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the republic, as lessee,
undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time the
property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to
occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent
improvements. But this intention cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the
lease contract.

The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic into the
property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her
of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Cstellvi remained as owner, and was continuously
recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract from
year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to
return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi
deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to
pay, and had been paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed
the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.

It is clear, therefore, that the taking of Castellvis property for purposes of eminent domain
cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy
the property as lessee thereof, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvis
property should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.
The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the taking of the property under
expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of


the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of
the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for
eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint.

POLICE POWER

UNITED STATES v POMPEYA

FACTS: That on or about March 20 of the current year, 1914, in the jurisdiction of the
municipality of Iloilo, Province of Iloilo, Philippine Islands, the said accused did willfully,
illegally, and criminally and without justifiable motive fail to render service on patrol duty; an
act performed in violation of the law.

Section 40 of Act No. 82 (the Municipal Code) relates to the power of municipal councils. Act
No. 1309 amends said section (section 40, paragraph "m") which reads as follows: "(m) With
the approval of the provincial governor, when a province or municipality is infested with
ladrones or outlaws (the municipal council is empowered) :

(a) To require able-bodied male residents of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55
[50], to assist, for a period not exceeding five days in any one month, in apprehending
ladrones, robbers, and other lawbreakers and suspicious characters, and to act as patrols for
the protection of the municipality, not exceeding one day each week; (b) To require each
householder to report certain f acts, enumerated in said amendment.

The specific purpose of said amendment is to require each able-bodied male resident of the
municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55 [50], as well as each householder, when so
required by the president, to assist in the maintenance of peace and good order in the
community," by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of the
existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment contains a punishment for those
who may be called upon for such service, and who refuse to render the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not -the ordinance upon which said complaint was based (paragraph "m"
of section 40 of the Municipal Code) which was adopted in accordance with the provisions of
Act No. 1309 is constitutional.
HELD: No. Said Act attempts simply to designate the cases and the method when and by
which the people of the town (pueblo) may be called upon to render assistance for the
protection of the public and the preservation of peace and good order. It is an exercise of the
police power of the state.

The police power of the state has been variously defined. It has been defined as the power
of the government, inherent in every sovereign, and cannot be limited; the power vested in
the legislature to make such laws as they shall judge to be for the good of the state and its
subjects; the power to govern men and things, extending to the protection of the lives,
limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the
state; the authority to establish such rules and regulations for the conduct of all persons as
may be conducive to the public interest. The police power of the state may be said to
embrace the whole system of internal regulations by which the state seeks, not only to
preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state, but also to establish, for the
intercourse of citizen with citizen, those rules of good manners and good neighborhood
which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to ensure to each the uninterrupted
enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of the rights
of others.

ICHONG v HERNANDEZ

FACTS: The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its
purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold
upon the peoples economic life.

a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations


the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade

aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to
continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law,
until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after
the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.

provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of
the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and
other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.

provision against the establishment or opening by aliens engaged in the retail


business of additional stores or branches of retail business

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business, filed to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of
the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates
international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of
the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession,
and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to
engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8
of Article XIV of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law

Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or
by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare
involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislatures
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or
reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the
legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not
merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask
when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there
can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can
deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and
persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal
protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation
must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there
must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation
and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably
protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives
appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but
actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the
Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government
may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this
suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population
affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may
not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

Police power is far-reaching in scope, and it is almost impossible to limit its sweep. It derives
its existence from the very existence of the State itself, and does not need to be expressed
or defined in its scope. It is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as
such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential,
insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the
demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the
field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public
interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human
foresight.

DECS v SAN DIEGO

Facts: The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of
Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and
flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his
application on the 1 basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.

After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the
challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that
the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an
arbitrary exercise of the police power.

HELD: Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the
State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the
proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrenc of a lawful subject and a lawful
method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It
is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is
not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and
health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of he law
nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical
schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be
doctors.
While every per son is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional
right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved;
and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition.

The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are
not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a
manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of
satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients.

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a
guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his
preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his
persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.

We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The
issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged
at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk
rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the
medical profession. There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it
to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b)
the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health;
Three flunk rule, intention ofIn other words, the proper exercise of the police power
requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject of the
challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and
indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated
by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method
employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and
ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional
right to be a doctor.While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not
have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public
interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to ones ambition. The
State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not
dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner
that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of
satisfaction.

The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-
taken; Reasons.The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection
clause is not well-taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or
things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. There can be no
question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students
who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly
affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not
require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally
respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the
physician and so need not be similarly treated. There would be unequal protection if some
applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are
denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among
equals.

YNOT v IAC

FACTS: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO
626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement
of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984,
Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in
violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be
heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to
outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court
ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote
general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in
precise and unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct
interpretation. That is the ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was
deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal
to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it
was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights,
who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body.10

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently
resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the
fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very
elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation,
enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may
require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due
process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the
elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead,
they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be
"gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision
of cases as they arise."11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for
example, would go no farther than to define due processand in so doing sums it all upas
nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play."

The minimum .requirements of due process are notice and hearing13 which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against
official arbitrariness.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary
to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because
the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons,
we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

CHAPTER V
Land Acquisition

Section 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. For purposes of acquisition of private
lands, the following procedures shall be followed:

(a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send
its notice to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail,
and post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the
place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a
correspondi

CHAPTER XII
Administrative Adjudication

Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with the primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and
decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of
the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious
and inexpensive determination for every action or proceeding before it.

It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission
of reports, compel the production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue
subpoena, and subpoena duces tecum, and enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized
officers.t shall likewise have the power to punish direct and indirect contempts in the same manner
and subject to the same penalties as provided in the Rules of Court.

Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow farmers, or their
organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: provided, however, that when there are two or
more representatives for any individual or group, the representatives should choose only one among
themselves to represent such party or group before any DAR proceedings.

Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be immediately
executory.

DAR AO 07, 2011

SEC. 4 When Lands Deemed Private. As a general rule, untitled public alienable and
disposable (A&D) lands are within the jurisdiction of the DENR pursuant to Commonwealth
Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) However, such lands are deemed private and for coverage
by the DAR, if all the requisites specified in RA No. 6940, as amended by RA No. 9176, for
the determination of whether or not private rights over a landholding have already been
acquired exist, based on the following:

a. Continuous occupancy and cultivation by oneself or through ones predecessors-in-


interest on or prior to 04 December 1972

b. Classification of the land as alienable and disposable on or prior to 04 December


1972

c. Payment of the real estate tax Theron; and

d. Non-existence of adverse claims on the land

In cases where the DAR and DENR have jointly identified specific untitled properties that
may be covered under the LAD component of CARP, the DENR Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)/Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) or Regional Technical Director (RTD) LMS shall issue the certification that the
subject tract of land is within an area classified as A&D. The MARO shall, thereafter, initiate
the acquisition process for the landholding concerned.

CONSTITUTION

1935 Art. XIII SEC. 4. The State shall promote scientific research and invention. Arts and
letters shall be under its patronage. The exclusive right to writings and inventions shall be
secured to authors and inventors for a limited period.

1973 Art. XIV SEC. 12. The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program
aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals
enunciated in this Constitution.
1987 Art. XIII

Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform

SECTION 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively
the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress
may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and
subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall
respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for
voluntary land-sharing.

SECTION 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and landowners, as
well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers organizations to participate in the
planning, organization, and management of the program, and shall provide support to
agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial,
production, marketing, and other support services.

SECTION 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever
applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources,
including lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture,
subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous
communities to their ancestral lands.

The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates
which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.

SECTION 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of local marine and fishing resources, both inland and
offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and
research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The
State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend
to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers
shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

SECTION 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the
agrarian reform program to promote industrialization, employment creation, and
privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for their
lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.

JURISPRUDENCE ON CONSTITUTIONALITY

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs Secretary of Agrarian


Reform
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A.
No. 3844).

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes
a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law,
undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted
in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of
private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits
for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still
unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P.
No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later,
E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131s) implementation, was also enacted.
Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988.
This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives
them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.

[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of
ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that
since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute
their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till
their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because
they claim to belong to a different class.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229)
on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program
and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides
that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due
process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.

Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their
land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has
always been in the form of money and not in bonds.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms
of cash.

HELD:

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt
from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not
shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to
share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who
will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is
allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to
the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in
classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from
determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon
by the landowner and the government even without judicial intervention so long as both
parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the
landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law
however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely
preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the
final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court
of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional
exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of
eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have
to be made in cash if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient
money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just
compensation.

DE CHAVEZ v ZOBEL

These two petitions1 for the review of a joint decision of respondent Court of Appeals,
sustaining the right of respondent-landholder, Enrique Zobel to eject petitionertenants and
thus reversing a judgment in their favor by the Court of Agrarian Relations, present the
crucial issue of how far this Tribunal is bound by the cardinal policy set forth in a presidential
decree2 that ordains the emancipation of tenants and confers on them ownership of the
lands they till, upheld as part of the law of the land under the Revised Constitution.3 This
too, in the face of its avowed primordial objective: The State shall formulate and implement
an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil
and achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution.4 As thus posed, its resolution is
rather obvious. We cannot sustain respondent Court of Appeals.

Private respondent Zobel, as the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Calatagan,
Batangas, known as Hacienda Bigaa, with an aggregate area of more than five hundred
hectares, sought to eject petitioners, his tenants tilling lands in a portion thereof, relying on
the provision of Republic Act No. 1199, which would justify such a move where the land is
suited for mechanization.5 Petitioners, as tenants, vigorously objected to such petition not
only on the ground that the small areas they are occupying were not suited for
mechanization, but likewise on the allegation that the true intention of respondent as
landholder was to utilize the same for pasture and for the raising of sorghum. The Court of
Agrarian Relations dismissed the petition for ejectment, doubting such an intent to
mechanize and at the same time holding that mechanization during the rainy season of the
year was not practicable. The matter was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals, which
reversed the Court of Agrarian Relations and granted such petition for ejectment. Hence this
petition for review.

There is no question as to the tenancy relationship as well as to the areas occupied by


petitioners as tenants. For the decision of the Court of Appeals now sought to be reviewed
did clearly specify: At the hearing of these cases on July 15, 1963, the litigants, through
their counsels, entered into the following stipulation of facts: 1. That the relation of
landholder and tenant between the petitioner and the respondents is admitted; 2. That the
respective area cultivated by each of the respondents is as indicated * * * as follows:
Bartolome Dimaala 1 lot with an approximate area of 1.1440 hectare; Rufo Garcia area
of lot is more or less one (1) hectare; Paulino Esguerra two (2) lots with an aggregate area
of about two (2) hectares; Fernando Veroya one (1) lot with an area of about 1/2 hectare;
Wilson Zapatero one (1) lot with an area of about less than 1-1/2 hectares; Rufino
Zapatero one (1) lot with an area of about one (1) hectare; Almario Alab three (3) lots
with an area of about 3 hectares; Roman Veroya one (1) lot of about 1/2 hectare; Romana
Vizconde one (1) lot with an area of about 1/2 hectare; and Zoila de Chavez four (4) lots
with an aggregate area of about 6 hectares.6 That is why, as set forth at the outset, the
applicability of Presidential Decree No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil and transferring to them the ownership of the land they till and providing
the instruments and mechanism therefor is unavoidable.7 Hence, again, as was made
mention of at the outset, the decision of the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained.

1. The tenancy problem in the Philippines is of ancient vintage. The opinion of Justice Tuason
in the leading case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration8 made reference to the concern
shown by our great patriot and hero, Jose Rizal, one arising from first-hand knowledge and
the bitter personal experience of his family. As was so vividly expressed by Justice Labrador,
speaking for this Court, in De Ramas v. Court of Agrarian Relations:9 The history of land
tenancy, especially in Central Luzon, is a dark spot in the social life and history of the
people. It was among the tenants of Central Luzon that the late Pedro Abad Santos, acting as
a saviour of the tenant class, which for generations has been relegated to a life of bondage,
without hope of salvation or improvement, enunciated a form of socialism as a remedy for
the pitiful condition of the tenants forming the PKM organization of tenants and, during the
war, the Hukbalahap, rose in arms against the constituted authority as their only salvation
from permanent thralldom. According to statistics, whereas at the beginning of the century
we had only 19% of the people belonging to the tenant class, after 60 years, the prevailing
percentage has reached 39%.10 Such situation calls to mind this apt observation of Laski,
of the normal life of the poor, their perpetual fear of the morrow, their haunting sense of
impending disaster, their fitful search for a beauty which perpetually eludes.11 The 1935
delegates to the Constitutional Convention were not unaware of the gravity of the problem.
Under the Commonwealth and under the Republic therefore, the appropriate legislation was
enacted.12 Progress in the solution of this serious social malady, while considerable, did not
supply the necessary corrective.

On this vital policy question, one of the utmost concern, the need for what for some is a
radical solution in its pristine sense, one that goes at the root, was apparent. Presidential
Decree No. 27 was thus conceived. It was issued in October of 1972. The very next month,
the 1971 Constitutional Convention voiced its overwhelming approval. There is no doubt
then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation.13 What is more, the
decree is now part and parcel of the law of the land according to the revised Constitution
itself.14 Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. That would be to set
at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our duty is clear;
obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so because of the cardinal postulate of
constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law. It is also because any other
approach would run the risk of setting at naught this basic aspiration to do away with all
remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise and the hope associated with an
open society. To deprive petitioners of the small landholdings in the face of a presidential
decree considered ratified by the new Constitution and precisely in accordance with its
avowed objective could indeed be contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had
spawned in the past as well as the grave social problems thereby created. There can be no
justification for any other decision then whether predicated on a juridical norm or on the
traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting fundamental
policy goals.
2. With the disposition of these petitions for review thus so clearly indicated by the
controlling constitutional provisions, a discussion of the errors assigned by petitioners would
be fruitless.

Facts: Private respondent Zobel, as the registered owner of a parcel of land located at
Calatagan, Batangas, known as Hacienda Bigaa, with an aggregate area of more than five
hundred hectares, sought to eject petitioners, his tenants tilling lands in a portion thereof,
relying on the provision of Republic Act No. 1199, which would justify such a move where the
land is suited for mechanization.

Petitioners, as tenants, vigorously objected to such petition not only on the ground that the
small areas they are occupying were not suited for mechanization, but likewise on the
allegation that the true intention of respondent as landholder was to utilize the same for
pasture and for the raising of sorghum.

The Court of Agrarian Relations dismissed the petition for ejectment, doubting such an intent
to mechanize and at the same time holding that mechanization during the rainy season of
the year was not practicable. The matter was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals,
which reversed the Court of Agrarian Relations and granted such petition for ejectment.
Hence this petition for review.

Held: Presidential Decree No. 27 was issued in October of 1972. The very next month, the
1971 Constitutional Convention voiced its overwhelming approval. There is no doubt then,
as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is more, the decree is now
part and parcel of the law of the land according to the revised Constitution itself. Ejectment
therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. That would be to set at naught an
express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is
unavoidable.

This is not only so because of the cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of
the fundamental law. It is also because any other approach would run the risk of setting at
naught this basic aspiration to do away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with
the promise and the hope associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners of the
small landholdings in the face of a presidential decree considered ratified by the new
Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could indeed be
contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy has spawned in the past as well as the
grave social problems thereby created.
The findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations, supported by substantial evidence, is
well-nigh conclusive on an appellate tribunal. Nonetheless, insofar as they would stress the
basic doctrine that the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations, supported by
substantial evidence, is well-nigh conclusive on an appellate tribunal, it is undeniable that
such a submission is supported and buttressed by a host of our decisions dating back to
1958.15

WHEREFORE, the joint decision in these two petitions of respondent Court of Appeals of
November 23, 1967 is reversed and set aside, and the joint decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations of October 1, 1964 dismissing the actions filed by respondent Enrique Zobel is
reinstated and given full force and effect. Costs against respondent Enrique Zobel