PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST PART 2
PEOPLE VS LICERA
FACTS:
In 1961, accused was granted an appointment as secret agent
of Governor Leviste.
In 1965, accused was charged with illegal possession of
firearms. The SC held that where at the time of his
appointment, People v. Macarandang (1959) was applicable,
which held that secret agents were exempt from the license
requirement, and later People v. Mapa (1967) was decided,
the earlier case should be held applicable.
ISSUE: Which rule should be applied to the case at bar: that
enunciated in Macarandang or that in Mapa?
HELD: Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These
decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute
evidence of what the laws mean. The application or
interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law
as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the
Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law
purports to carry into effect.
At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and
at the time of his apprehension for possession of the
Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor
in 1965, the Macarandang rule the Courts interpretation of
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code - formed part
of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal
system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in
1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule,
the new doctrine should operate respectively only and should
not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially
those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This
holds more especially true in the application or interpretation of
statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in
any other, it is imperative that the punishability of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the
time of Licera's appointment as secret agent, which
appointment included a grant of authority to possess the
Winchester rifle, but as well at the time as of his apprehension,
Licera incurred no criminal liability for possession of the said
rifle, notwithstanding his non-compliance with the legal
requirements relating to firearm licenses.
DE ROY VS CA
FACTS:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioner De
Roy collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by
the family of private respondents, resulting to injuries to private
respondents and the death of private respondents daughter.
Petitioner had warned the private respondents to vacate their
shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the latter
failed to do so.
1
RTC rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents,
holding petitioner guilty of gross negligence and awarding
damages to private respondent.
Petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration on the last day of the fifteen-day period to
file an appeal, which was by the Court of Appeals.
RJP NOTES
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was also
denied by the CA.
Petitioner filed this instant petition for certiorari which seeks to
declare null and void two resolutions of CA.
ISSUES: W/N the CA was correct in applying the rule laid
down in the HABALUYAS case.
HELD: Court denied the petition for lack of merit.
Court held that CA correctly applied the rule laid down in
Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, that the fifteen-day
period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration
cannot be extended to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this
Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed
with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial
Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion
may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as
the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either
grant or deny the extension requested.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, stressed the
prospective application of said rule, and explained the
operation of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the
promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within
which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new
trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on
February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which
expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension
of time was filed on September 9,1987, more than a year after
the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it
is no longer within the coverage of the grace period.
Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace
period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of
Appeals on
August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the
ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to
file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas
case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to
the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official
Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of
Appeals was promulgated.
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the
publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active
law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently
reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme
Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
QUIQUI VS. BONCAROS
FACTS:
Respondent Judge Boncaros rendered a decision in favor of
the private respondents on the ground that it had no
jurisdiction over the case. Counsel for petitioner received a
copy of the
said order on July 17, 1979.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST PART 2
On August 17, 1979, Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order of RTC dismissing the complaint.
Private Respondents opposed the motion for reconsideration,
stating that it had been filed beyond the 30-day reglementary
period under the rules.
RTC denied the motion of the petitioners on the ground
asserted by the private respondent.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, seeking relief from the Court
of Appeals on the ground that the RTC denying their complaint
as well as their motion for reconsideration were contrary to law
and evidence submitted. The petition was also denied by the
CA.
RTC denied the Notice of Appeal, including the motion to
approve the Appeal Bond.
Petitioner filed the instant petition praying that the RTC be
ordered to approve their notice of appeal.
ISSUES:
HELD: Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Appeal may be taken within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or order of the trial court. In the event that the party
aggrieved by the judgment or order of the trial court files a
Motion to set aside the judgment or order, i. e a Motion for
Reconsideration, the time during which such Motion is pending
resolution shall, as a rule, be deducted from the 30-day period.
In relation thereto, the New Civil Code states that in computing
a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day
included.
Under these circumstances, the order of the trial court
dismissing the Complaint has become final and executory. As
such, it is beyond the reach of a Motion for consideration.
Failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the
effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. A strict
observance of the reglementary period within which to
exercise the statutory right of appeal has been considered as
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays.
For the petitioners to seek exception for their failure to comply
strictly with the requirements for perfecting their Appeal, strong
compelling reasons, like the prevention of a grave miscarriage
of justice, must be shown to exist in order to warrant this Court
to suspend the Rules. No such reasons have been shown to
exist in this case. In fact, the petitioners did not even offer any
reasonable explanation for their delay.
VAN DORN VS. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while
private respondent is a citizen of the United States; they were
married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their
residence in the Philippines and begot two children.
Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States,
and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
2
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that
petitioners business in Manila is their conjugal property; that
petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and
that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that
the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court. The denial now is the
subject of the certiorari proceeding.
RJP NOTES
ISSUE:Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is
binding only to the alien spouse.
HELD: Is it true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS VS. DELA ROSA
FACTS:
On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William
Gatchalian, was recognized by the BOI as a native born
Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has 5
children.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old
minor arrived in Manila and sought admission as Filipino
citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special
inquiry.
However, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum
setting aside all decisions and directed the Board of
Commissions to review all cases where entry was allowed
among which was that of William Gatchalian.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an
alien. In support of their position, petitioners point out that
Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as
well as the marriage of Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian
to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by
any evidence other than their own self-serving testimony nor
was there any showing what the laws of China were. It is the
postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages
to be valid in this country, it should have been shown that they
were valid by the laws of China wherein the same were
contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the
aforesaid marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence,
Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed the
citizenship of their mother, having been born outside of a valid
marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's marriage not
having been demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the
citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in China is
valid in accordance with Philippine law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the evidence to
the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed
to be the same as those of the Philippines. This is known as
Processual Presumption. In this case, there being no proof of
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST PART 2
Chinese law relating to marriage,there arises a presumption
that it is the same of that of Philippine law the said marriage
then is declared valid. Therefore, William Gatchalian following
the citizenship of his father is a Filipino citizen.Where it held
that, considering that in case of doubt, all presumptions favor
the solidarity of the family and every intendment of the law or
facts leans toward the validity of marriage, he who
asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the
burden of proof to present the foreign law.
This case, therefore, shifted the burden of proof from the one
who asserts the validity of a marriage to the one assailing the
validity of the marriage. Pertinently, the Supreme Court stated,
to wit: In Miciano v. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim v.
Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of
Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a
particular subject
are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating
to marriage, there arises a presumption that it is the same as
Philippine law.The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter
cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian, much more on
respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve year-old
minor. That fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not
pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the
laws of China relating to marriage, having been content with
the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost
or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Neither
was Francisco Gatchalians testimony subjected to the same
scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry.
Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Fran
cisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and
immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and
relationship to each other are not self-serving but are
admissible in evidence as statements or declarations
regarding family relation, reputation or tradition in matters of
pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130).Furthermore, this salutary rule of
evidence finds support in substantive law.Thus, Art. 267 of the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic
document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate
filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws. (See also Art. 172 of the Family
Code)
Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago
Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian aforementioned are not
self-serving but are competent proof of filiation (Art. 172 [2],
Family Code).
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to
the rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid
everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71
of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides
that "(a)ll marriages performed outside of the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the
matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of
such marriage may be extended to the consequences of the
coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this
3
manner: "In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity
of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans
toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their
children, and the validity of defense for any member of the
family in case of unlawful aggression." (Emphasis supplied).
Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated
RJP NOTES
in Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the marriage
is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present
the foreign law.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent
William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father
Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter.
Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate
child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a
Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by
the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.
DE TAVERA VS. PHIL. TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY
FACTS:
Plaintiff is a doctor of Medicine by profession and a recognized
specialist in the treatment of tuberculosis. She is a member of
the Board of Directors of the defendant Society, in
representation of the PCSO. She was duly appointed as
Executive Secretary of the Society.
On May 29, 1974, the past Board of Directors removed her
summarily from her position, the lawful cause of which she
was not informed, through the simple expedient of declaring
her position vacant.
Defendant Romulo was appointed to the position and
defendants Pardo, Nubla, Garcia and Adil, not being members
of defendant Society were elevated as members of the Board
of Directors.
Not being qualified, petitioner alleged said acts to be null and
void. The court a quo rendered a decision holding that the
present suit being one for quo warranto it should be filed within
one year from plaintiff's ouster from office; that nevertheless,
plaintiff was not illegally removed from her position as
Executive Secretary in The Society since plaintiff was holding
an appointment at the pleasure of the appointing power and
hence temporary.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner was illegally removed and thus entitled
to damages.
In the case at bar there has been, however, no removal from
office. Pursuant to the charter of Dagupan City, the Chief of
Police thereof holds office at the pleasure of the President.
Consequently, the term of office of the Chief of Police expires
at any time that the President may so declare. This is not
removal, inasmuch as the latter entails the ouster of an
incumbent before the expiration of his term. In the present
case, petitioner's term merely expired upon receipt by him of
the communication of respondent Assistant Executive
Secretary of the President, dated September 14, 1962.
Petitioner cannot likewise seek relief from the general
provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations nor from
the fundamental principles of the New Constitution on
preservation of human dignity. While these provisions present
some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and the stability of social
order, these are merely guides for human conduct in the
absence of specific legal provisions and definite contractual
stipulations. In the case at bar, the Code of By-Laws of the
Society contains a specific provision governing the term of
office of petitioner. The same necessarily limits her rights
under the New Civil Code and the New Constitution upon
acceptance of the appointment.
Moreover, the act of the Board in declaring her position as
vacant is not only in accordance with the Code of By-Laws of
the Society but also meets the exacting standards of honesty
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST PART 2
and good faith. The meeting of May 29, 1974, at which
petitioner ,petitioner's position was declared vacant, was
caged specifically to take up the unfinished business of the
Reorganizational Meeting of the Board of April 30, 1974.
Hence, and act cannot be said to impart a dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing to wrong but
rather emanates from the desire of the Board to reorganize
itself.
Finally, We find it unnecessary to resolve the third assignment
of error. The proscription against removal without just cause
and due process of law under the Civil Service Law does not
have a bearing on the case at bar for the reason, as We have
explained, that there was no removal in her case but merely an
expiration of term pursuant to Section 7.02 of the Code of By-
Laws. Hence, whether or not the petitioner falls within the
protective mantle of the Civil Service Law is immaterial and
definitely unnecessary to resolve this case.
LLORENTE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Atty. Llorente was employed in the PCA, a public corporation
(Sec. 1, PD 1468) from 1975 to August 31, 1986, when he
resigned. He occupied the positions of Assistant Corporate
Secretary for a year, then Corporate Legal Counsel until
November 2, 1981, and, finally, Deputy Administrator for
Administrative Services, Finance Services, Legal Affairs
Departments.
As a result of a massive reorganization in 1981, hundreds of
PCA employees resigned effective October 31, 1981. They
were all required to apply for PCA clearances in support of
their gratuity benefits Condition (a) of the clearance provided:
The clearance shall be signed by the PCA officers
concemed only when there is no item appearing under
"PENDING ACCOUNTABILITY" or after every item previously
entered thereunder is fully settled. Settlement thereof shall be
written in RED ink.
After the clearance was signed by the PCA officers concerned,
it was to be approved, first, by Atty. Llorente, in the case of a
rank-and-file employee, or by Col. Duefias, the acting
administrator, in the case of an officer, and then by Atty.
Rodriguez, the corporate auditor ...
Notwithstanding Condition (a) just quoted, the clearances of
Mrs Perez and Mr. Azucena both dated October 30, 1981,
were favorably acted upon by the CPA officers concerned,
including Mrs. Sotto, acting for the accounting division, even if
the clearances showed they had pending accountabilities to
the GSIS and the UCPB, and subsequently approved by Attys.
Llorente and Rodriguez (Exhs. M and N). Thereafter, the
vouchers for their gratuity benefits, also indicating their
outstanding obligations were approved, among others, by Atty
Llorente, and their gratuity benefits released to them after
deducting those accountabilities.
The clearance of Mr. Curio dated November 4,1981, (Exh. D or
D-1) likewise favorably passed all officers concerned, including
Mrs. Sotto, the latter signing despite the notation handwritten
on December 8, 1981, that Mr. Curio had pending
accountabilities, namely: GSIS loan 2,193.74, 201 accounts
receivable P3,897.75, and UCPB loan P3,623.49, or a
total
4 of P10,714.78. However, when the clearance was
submitted to Atty. Llorente for approval, he refused to approve
it. For this reason, the clearance was held up in his office and
did not reach Atty. Rodriguez,
The reason given by Atty. Llorente was that when the
clearance was presented to him on December 8, 1981, he was
already aware of the affidavit dated November 26, 1981, in
which Mr. Curio assumed to pay any residual liability for the
RJP NOTES
disallowed cash advances, which at the time, December 8,
1981, stood at P92,000.00 (Exhs. 2 and 2-A). Moreover, Mr.
Curio had other pending obligations noted on his clearance
totalling Pl0,714.98 (Exh. 1-a). To justify his stand, Atty.
Llorente invoked Condition (a) of the clearance (Exhs. D and I-
B), which, he said, was "very stringent" and could not be
interpreted in any other way
The Court is convinced that the petitioner had unjustly
discriminated against Mr. Curio.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is liable under Article 19 of the Civil
Code.
It is no defense that the petitioner was motivated by no ill-will
(a grudge, according to the Sandiganbayan), since the facts
speak for themselves. It is no defense either that he was, after
all, complying merely with legal procedures since, as we
indicated, he was not as strict with respect to the three retiring
other employees. There can be no other logical conclusion that
he was acting unfairly, no more, no less, to Mr. Curio.
It is the essence of Article 19 of the Civil Code, under which
the petitioner was made to pay damages, together with Article
27, that the performance of duty be done with justice and good
faith. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the
Philippines, we held the defendant liable under Article 19 for
disposing of its propertv a perfectly legal act in order to
escape the reach of a creditor. In two fairly more recent
cases, Sevilla vs. Court of Appeals and Valenzuela vs. Court of
Appeals, we held that a principal is liable under Article 19 in
terminating the agency again, a legal act when
terminating the agency would deprive the agent of his
legitimate business.
The Court finds the award of P90,000.00 to be justified bv
Article 2202 of the Civil Code, which holds the defendant liable
for all "natural and probable" damages. Hennenegildo Cunct
presented evidence that as a consequence of the petitioner's
refusal to clear him, he failed to land a job at the Philippine
Cotton Authority and Philippine First Marketing Authority. He
also testified that a job in either office would have earned him
salary of P2,500.00 a month, or P150,000.00 in five years.
Deducting his probable expenses of reasonably about
P1,000.00 a month or P60,000.00 in five years, the petitioner
owes him a total actual damages of P90,000.00
CIR VS. FIREMANS FUND INSURANCE CO.
FACTS:
From January, 1952 to December, 1958, herein private
respondent Fireman's Fund Insurance Company entered into
various insurance contracts involving casualty, fire and marine
risks, for which the corresponding insurance policies
were issued.
From January, 1952 to 1956, documentary stamps were
bought and affixed to the monthly statements
of policies issues; and from 1957 to 1958 documentary stamps
were bought and affixed to the corresponding pages of the
policy register, instead of on the insurance policies issued. On
July 3, 1959, respondent company discovered that its monthly
statements of business and policy register were lost. The loss
was reported to the Building Administration of Ayala Building
and the National Bureau of Investigation on July 6, 1959.
Herein petitioner was also informed of such loss by respondent
company, through the latter's auditors, Sycip, Gorres and
Velayo, in a letter dated July 14, 1959.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST PART 2
After conducting an investigation of said loss, petitioner's
examiner ascertained that respondent company failed to affix
the required documentary stamps to the insurance policies
issued by it and failed to preserve its accounting records within
the time prescribed by Section 337 of the Revenue Code by
using loose leaf forms as registers of documentary stamps
without written authority from the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue as required by Section 4 of Revenue Regulations No.
V-1.
As a consequence of these findings, petitioner, in a letter dated
December 7, 1962, assessed and demanded from petitioner
the payment of documentary stamp taxes for the years 1952to
1958 in the total amount of P 79,806.87 and plus compromise
penalties, a total of P 81,406.87.
ISSUE: WON respondent company may be required to pay
again the documentary stamps it has actually
purchased,affixed and cancelled
HELD: No, as correctly pointed out by respondent Court of Tax
Appeals, under the National Internal Revenue
Code,documentary tax is deemed paid by: (a) the purchase of
documentary stamps; (b) affixture of documentary stamps to
the document or instrument taxed or to such other paper as
may be indicated by law or regulations; and (c) cancellation of
the stamps as required by law.
It will be observed however, that the over-riding purpose of
these provisions of law is the collection of taxes. The three
steps above-mentioned are but the means to that end. Thus,
the purchase of the stamps is the form of payment made; the
RJP NOTES
affixture thereof on the document or instrument taxed is to
insure that the corresponding tax has been paid for such
document while the cancellation of the stamps is to obviate the
possibility that said stamps will be reused for similar
documents for similar purposes.
In the case at bar, there appears to be no dispute on the fact
that the documentary stamps corresponding to the various
policies were purchased and paid for by the respondent
Company. Neither is there any argument that the same were
cancelled as required bylaw.
It is a general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes
or duties, that in case of doubt, such statutes are to be
construed most strongly against the government and in favor
of the subjects or citizens, because burdens are not to be
imposed or presumed to be imposed beyond what statutes
expressly and clearly import. There is no justification for the
government which has already realized the revenue which is
the object of the imposition of subject stamp tax, to require the
payment of the same tax for the same documents.
Enshrined in our basic legal principles is the time honored
doctrine that no person shall unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another. It goes without saying that the government
is not exempted from the application of this doctrine.