Republic

of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT,
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only
legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a
profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of
law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of

legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice
to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law
by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,

firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending
or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
 the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work

performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts.
No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can
be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666,
citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is.
Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the

profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual
for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is
to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a
liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a

manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of

the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications
provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of

the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would
like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers
who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in
their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission
on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions

and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a

lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is
set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in
COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance
 with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this
is equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be
certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous
with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it
is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering
legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners."
Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the
firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the
members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced
attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled
"associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do.
(Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593).
The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust
Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn.
325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in
the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to
be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly
familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers
spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without
litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the
litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the
legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not
reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once
articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today,
there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries
cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such
as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal
work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who
do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling
than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as
in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of
legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers
in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their
specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from
one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much
else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional
lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective
for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is
constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of
the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is
that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature
of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform
that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging
trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of
law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary

transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an

accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning,"
has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the

sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure
must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein
a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting

and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has
received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-
disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those

trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction
to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling
such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate
degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts
and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged
in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would

require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to
as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type
of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel
only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from
the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of
the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a

multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived
by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein,
to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so
to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code
but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types
of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a

shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a
corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is
being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often with
those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the

corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies

toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate

Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders,
promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal
group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer

vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors

are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics
principles more accessible to managers including corporate counsels.
(Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used
to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and
minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases.
(Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be

used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
 Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such
legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are

undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It
needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not
adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general

counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of
the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key
aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure,
creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge
of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more
than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work.
Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the
lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding
and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the

position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of

Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for
certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment
of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-
1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating
loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the
Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered
services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work
involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has
worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in
initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and
lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of
the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990)
and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and

which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts)
who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays

down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental
parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development
of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely

renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation
and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the

set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a
failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by

the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative
but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so
would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance
of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments
of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October
14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-
Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President

with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
 years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members
for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law."
True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that
the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous"
or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are
actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that
Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for
over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first
becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of
the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I
greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as
required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion
for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President,

may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth
life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked
Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron
rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This
blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on
his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow
from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-35469 October 9, 1987

ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and DAVIDINA MUNOZ, petitioners,

vs.
MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA, and the HON.
CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental
(Branch III).

CRUZ, J.:

It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way
back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on
March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended petition for review
of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. On
October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. The
petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was
denied on February 14, 1972. 1 The petitioners then came to us on certiorari to question
the orders of the respondent judge. 2

These dates are not typographical errors. What is involved here are errors of law and
lawyers.

The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on
the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was
held, had operated against the petitioners. 3

The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory
because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents.
The said judgment would become so only after one year from the issuance of the decree of
registration. If any one was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed
to enforce the judgment by having the land registered in their the pursuant thereto. 4

For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became
final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners during
that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one years before it occurred to them to
question the judgment of the cadastral court. In fact, their alleged predecessor-in-interest,
Filomeno Banogon, lived for nineteen more years after the 1926 decision and did not see fit
to challenge it until his death in 1945. The herein petitioners themselves waited
another twelve years, or until 195 7, to file their petition for review. 5

While arguing that they were not guilty of laches because the 1926 decision had not yet
become final and executory because the land subject thereof had not yet been registered,
the petitioners rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed the remedy of re-opening the
case within one year after the issuance of the decree, why should the same party be denied
this remedy before the decree is issued? 6

Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition earlier? Why do they now
pretend that they have all the time in the world because the land has not yet been
registered and the one-year reglementary period has not yet expired?

Thinking to support their position, the petitioners cite Rivera v. Moran 7 where it was held:

... It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section
38 of the Land Registration Act provides that a petition for review of such a
decree on the grounds of fraud must be filed "within one year after entry of
the decree." Giving this provision a literal interpretation, it may first blush
seem that the petition for review cannot be presented until the final decree has
been entered. But on further reflection, it is obvious that such could not have
been the intention of the Legislature and that what it meant would have been
better expressed by stating that such petitioners must be presented before
the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be
given a reasonable construction and there can be no possible reason for
requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before
urging his claim of fraud. We therefore hold that a petition for review under
section 38, supra, may be filed at any time the rendition of the court's
decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final
decree of registration. (Emphasissupplied).

A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine
they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for
thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition now. Their position is
clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.

This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike:

"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is

assent essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that,
once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they
are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to
prolong them." 8
 There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of
the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or
frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a
decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the
clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite
obvious and indisputable. 9

This appeal moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an insubstantial

objection bereft of any persuasive force. Defendants had to display ingenuity
to conjure a technicality. From Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have
left no doubt as to our disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is
to render justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are
precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective. Necessarily,
therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended
deserves condemnation. We have done so before. We do so again. 10

Regarding the argument that the private respondents took fourteen years to move for the
dismissal of the petition for review, it suffices to point out that an opposition thereto had
been made as early as March 26, 1957, or nine days after the filing of the
petition. 11 Moreover, it was for the petitioners to move for the hearing of the petition
instead of waiting for the private respondents to ask for its dismissal. After all, they were
the parties asking for relief, and it was the private respondents who were in possession of
the land in dispute.

One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them
misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes.
By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in
the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say that every
wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only
honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional
misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it.

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration
of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the
workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A
judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this,
should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets.
They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for
sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. This decision is immediately
executory. It is so ordered.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

August 15, 1961

IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for admission to the Philippine Bar
without taking the examination. ARTURO EFREN GARCIA, petitioner.

R E S O L U T I O N

BARRERA, J.:

Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without
submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among
others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolor City, Province of Negros Occidental, of
Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato
Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for
admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course
graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter he was allowed to practice the
law profession in Spain; and that under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees
and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish
state, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to
the required bar examinations.

After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition on the following grounds:

(1) the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions
between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State can not be invoked by
applicant. Under Article 11 thereof;

The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained recognition of the
validity of their academic degrees by virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can
practice their professions within the territory of the Other, . . .. (Emphasis supplied).

from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino
citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to
practice their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to
practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his
own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to
practice in the Philippines.

(2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides .

 The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or diplomas to
practice the liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by
competent national authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise said
professions in the territory of the Other, subject to the laws and regulations of the
latter. . . ..

It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are
made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose
territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in
connection with Sections 2,9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that
before anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippine he must first successfully
pass the required bar examinations; and

(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive
Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the lower to repeal,
alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines. (See
Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil. Constitution).

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of

Court, respondent.

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL

TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members,
1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for disbarment; Ramon E.

Galang, alias Roman E. Galang for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon
Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and
Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. for disciplinary action for their acts and omissions during
the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-
correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar
Landicho who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of
70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively invited the attention of the Court to "The
starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was
raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential
Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner
himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He
further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other
examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations to raise the grades
prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or
request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners
concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they
may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be
contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and
unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the
discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these
matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p.
2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects Political Law and Public
International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a
successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which,
however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned.
Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one
Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963,
and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and
57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which
was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as
the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their
sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought
the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances
under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-
evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the
representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same
and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the
Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to
show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and
therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court
likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days
from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No.
1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against
them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.).
while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March
19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the
hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition
to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-
47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince
came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).

In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo
who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in
Political Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was
asked to help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and
Public International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.).
Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent
in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it
was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law also
underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662
turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg.
Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking
of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4%
to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful
candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's
father were summoned to testify in the investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the

Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that
one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of
Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera,
another student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of
August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not
remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol.
VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make
mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to do.

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on
October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their
memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective
memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in
Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to
testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as
evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony,
submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to
the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct
testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners
recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the
examination notebooks in question.

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting
the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me
that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty.
Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds
that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a
rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner
concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to
me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to
him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his
grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-
evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered
'95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were
based on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all
others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered
to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to
10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11,
1972 affidavit with following additional statements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it
is no longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the
same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and
Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;

4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No.

951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of
the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other
subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief
that I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty.
Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16,

1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had
developed to the point that with respect to the correction of
the examination booklets of bar candidates I have always
followed him and considered his instructions as reflecting the
rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect
to the same; that I have no alternative but to take his words;

b) That considering this relationship and considering his

misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the
consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee.
Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members
of the Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar
Committee for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for

such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one
booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the
original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law
and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
 On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from
me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers
1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he
came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the
Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with
him an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual
amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine
the said notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57,
whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly,
in remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the

notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was
authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and authority
as long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified or that the
code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar
Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case present bearing
code number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have
been possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me,
and as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the
said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded
it in accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the grading
of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an
increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my
authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the code number
of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his name known, ... I
therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade card
attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the
itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading
sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him
the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other
copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis
supplied)

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent
Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier
sworn statement and in additional alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and

international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee.
In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March
5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him
personally, and that I have never met him even up to the present;

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make
such review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was
authorized to make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the
name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The
Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the
regular course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as
an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the
Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent
personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;

5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the
evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the
Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were unauthorized
or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of
the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions,
which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar
Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition
as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code
numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not
to make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly
possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31, 1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar
Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it
did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the
examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in
that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the

examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was
increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did
not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the
examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the
other subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee
consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed
the rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody
 objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we
still did not know the names of the candidates.

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no
knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office,
and did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract
with him before or rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12,
1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect
examination books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong,
Rizal.

3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the
books in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the
papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper
in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing
grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law
would be raised a few points to 75%then he would make the general passing
average.

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise
of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and
revised also the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word
of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the
examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of
nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972,
that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972,
Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house
at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's
 notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to
him. He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had
reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and
possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the
examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the
comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general
average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if
the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being
admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my
attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly
and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I
would reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely
within my discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to
address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the
presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every
item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I
increased the grades in some items, made deductions in other items, and
maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr.
Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-
evaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the
passing mark of 75% in my subject.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents
of his sworn statement, adding the following:

xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the

total grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to
74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be
faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar
Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein
respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he

was not aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it was
not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme
Court to request or suggest that the grade of a particular
examination notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had
every right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of
the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request was
legitimate.
 xxx xxx xxx

c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned,

herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer
written in the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria
laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit
of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only
in that particular subject that the said examine failed, herein
respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved
a higher grade than that previously given to him, but that he
did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be
given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned
that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent
downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the
examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39,
rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April
17, 1972:

xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after
the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee
passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;

That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-
evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's
notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this
particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;

That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the
grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his
sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-

evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile
Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made
 during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a
candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-
evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the
aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law
pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I
have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets
and the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the
answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks.
Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the
memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that

... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should

then be given to clarify of language and soundness of
reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-
evaluation and/or re-checking.

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of
the results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the
examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy
their answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of
them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation.
Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are
reading for submission to the Honorable Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have
to be denied because the result of the examinations when released is final
and irrevocable.

It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated

me to bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-
evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

 That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his
hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not
his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant
but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did
he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to
his knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged
misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the attention of
the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee
who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% in
Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by
way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought the notebook in
question to the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus
enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee
concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir
such serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did
it in all good faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed
another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into

believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects,
the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to
the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that
they so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and
marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-
Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them
entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order,

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in

question:

Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of
February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division)
after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have
always made it a point that the moment I think of so buying, I
pick a number from any object and the first number that comes
into my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that
moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed
on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging to the
MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the right sidewalk
of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building from
San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern
corner of the fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of
the number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed and a
portion of the post to which it is attached is identified and
marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-
a-Lanuevo).

With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz

to look for a ticket that would contain such number. Eventually,
I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits
corresponded to "954". This number became doubly
impressive to me because the sum of all the six digits of the
ticket number was "27", a number that is so significant to me
that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or
connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus even in
assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees from
1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar
Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or
"227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List is identified
and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the
beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as
Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list,
as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and
the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-
Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the
figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).

The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of

these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941
while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac,
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and
was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a
result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on
December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the hospital,
our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on
December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From then on,
I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life
for me having been saved from the possibility of being among
the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of
the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February
27, 1947, I got married and since then we begot children the
youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.
 Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the
ticket, I resumed my work which at the time was on the
checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon
the notebooks bearing the office code number "954". As the
number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity
prompting me to pry into the contents of the notebooks.
Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language and the
apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in
all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential
Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that
they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took
them back to the respective examiners for possible review
recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum but
leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to

either of the two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee
during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the
respective examines, namely:

(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general

average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile
Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No.
110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the
notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No.
951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-
evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and

(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general

average of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one
subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having
inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out
that the subject was Political and International Law under Asst.
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this
examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked
as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and
International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with
the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation,
as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and
International Law is precisely the same notebook mentioned in
the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo
Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph,
only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only
Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the
 latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee
and pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the
notebooks involved to the examiners concerned;

5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review

or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the
Committee that there was very little time left and that the increase in grade
after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome
since the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-
47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's
story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize
all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing
and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking
the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of
August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry
into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number
'954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant

Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required by
the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar
examinations.

xxx xxx xxx

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to
reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it
now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where the
respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met
only once in the ordinary course of official business?

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly

manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?

5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's

resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar
Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the
resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had
the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo
in his behalf.
 But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated
in the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having
redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First,
was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar
Examination Committee done only or especially for him and not done
generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed
to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among
those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of policy of the
Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination
and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-
evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be
unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant
Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per
se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be
done in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect because
that would be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination Committee
as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their
work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are
deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes
to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this

Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo
as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of
some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation
is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance
of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration
of this case.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically
and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or
recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually
the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior authority from the
Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the
respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the
Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just
before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while
the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made
the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all
subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high
grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner
concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation,
representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of
passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will
get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word
and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his
further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the
paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The
particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with
Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang.
Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-
evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects
including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and
could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972,
respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which
respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then
requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the
grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook
and that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the
comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the
general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made
the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed,
respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact
that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English.
Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph
4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal

fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a
test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be
given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo,
believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such
request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the
examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's
grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo
authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the
grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier
mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang
(Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the
passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo
went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of
examination papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected,
respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code
Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent
Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all
other subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said
notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee
will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible
the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help
out examinees who are failing in just one subject respondent Pablo acceded to the request
and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo
thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the
grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made
the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges
made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still
below the passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought
back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former
informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and
Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks
in his assigned subject Criminal Law that the examinee who owns that particular
notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade
in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the
passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and
because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent
Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark
and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The
examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This
examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent
Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he
remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing
average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in
reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was
provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-
evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the
examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a
passing grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law.
For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo
neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme by securing authorization from
the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said
notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the
examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the
Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was

informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except
Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order
members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his
willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed
to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613
with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-
evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not
however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs.
A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular
examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to
make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise
added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his
personal records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted
his report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35,
rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo
returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo,
this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar
Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's
notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual
amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said
notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular
notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial
Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the
grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in
an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code
number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG,

alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.

Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five
examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the
passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that
enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making
74% the passing average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent
(50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute
that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the
said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang
failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing,
Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted
paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos.
1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of
the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest
belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to
forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice
to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because
the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners'
decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential
memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction
of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the
re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such
suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian
whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by
respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case
No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation
and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing
of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is
patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust
and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as
BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his
relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were
thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang
in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him
to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's
well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of
the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-
evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor
subjects while his general average was only 66.25% which under no circumstances or
standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the
borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the
examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was in
Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and
individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:

B A I

1. Political Law Public

International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points

B A I

Labor Laws and Social

Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.
 2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.

Taxation 74% 74% = no re-

evaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.

or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or

22 weighted points.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =

11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and Practical

Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in
the five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of
66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great
damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of
the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible
addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook
was re-evaluated for each of the latter who Political Law and Public International Law
for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-
evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing
mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the
corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the
individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the
general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the
percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the
Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing
average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the
answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal
made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to
know better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the
examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act
thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and
thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any
intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar
Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out
Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90)
examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully
aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline
cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in
referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as
against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute
that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of
reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo,
grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations,
especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent
Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-
evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the
same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of
Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his
actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety
examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-
evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the
agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when
the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four
(4) and three (3) subjects respectively as hereinafter shown.

The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's
notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn
statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant
consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind
for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on
August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on
March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was
just an after-thought.

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW

TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF
EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER
BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE
IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid
notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and
Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela
Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo
claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee
during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to
the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to
remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.).
Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a
sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp.
39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was
made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of
the two examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not
presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his
desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results
(Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials
of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet
of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one
notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated
by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's
examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of
Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said
examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was
present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz
bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in
Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50
bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any
objection to their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an

examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in
one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the
subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject,
but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared
that he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but
who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp.
16-17, rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613
(belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to
return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an
examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said
notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code
Number 954 belongs to Galang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law
that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the
Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee
that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the
answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by respondent
Lanuevo to him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the
members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed
all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or
recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-
Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was
referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3)
subjects, as follows:

Labor Laws 3%

Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in
Political Law are as follows:

B A

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27

weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner
Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other
failing grades. These are:

Political Law 70%

Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as
follows:

B A

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela
Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in
February, 1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner
Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination
Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-
evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and
Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under
the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile
Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of having betrayed the

trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the
Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be
disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their
names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to
show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.

The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-
evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects Civil Law, Political and International
Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession,
which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established
rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles (In re: Cunanan Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534,
544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing
grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p.
13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee,
composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the
Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each.
Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and
the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the
same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in
connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of
the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be
subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position
is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the
conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be
strictly adhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent

Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent
Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence
reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled
respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a
complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the
matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine
whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the
Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee
benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether
the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in
accordance with the rules.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others,
with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every
applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed
or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of
Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is
duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or
otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral
character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme
Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's
personal record whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case
dismissed or is still pending becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take
the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the
disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the
applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course
true that the application form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first
time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if
any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of
good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any
criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination
of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the
Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could
not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or
terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his
character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang
took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by
the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he
has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense
involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By
1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form
prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal
cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant
is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a
Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any
court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case
against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to
intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries
which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter
repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar
examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently
concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries
in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in
court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court,
respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7)
times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the
fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for
revocation of his license to practice law is well settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741).
Thus:

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in

withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this
court, to whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a
matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases
cited).

[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to
whom he applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither
the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming
(State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N W 709 710).

The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to
surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from
the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of
the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be
informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of
the applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes.
The finding of indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at
the time of his motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the
court, with such explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was
reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis
supplied).

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case
despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the
criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when
he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his
continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the
present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good
demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.

While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court
requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys,
respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the
Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed
the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's
certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re
Felipe del Rosario:

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of
sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal
law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is
questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of
its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized
member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present
case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the
past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on
the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the
requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the
Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the
basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and
recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good
moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar
examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario,
52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez
(Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were
falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.

IV

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI
Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now
deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty.
Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or
re-correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent
BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or
increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who
owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or
expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and
WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-
correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of
members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have
exercised greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding
to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman
of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme
Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to
produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average of the examinee
represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the
examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the
stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.

Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared
under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased
grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto
Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it
would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely
because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of
respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this particular
examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot
remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V,
pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69,
rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee
seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate
this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee
will pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes,
that is the practice used to be done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one
subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to
re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as
lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was
to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the
grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet
accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by
respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations
that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a
certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by
respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:

Montecillo

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-

evaluation of the paper?

A Yeas, your Honor.

Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord

in the absence of such information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that

time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3,
4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation
No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).

Pamatian

3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to
me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according
to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider
his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief
that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper
and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 55, rec.); and

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief
that I am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty.
Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Manalo

(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein

respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and
giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that particular subject that said examinee
 failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved
a higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in
herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Pardo

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected

that particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial
Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to

induce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them
can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any
improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given
after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-
examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the
re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the
imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless,
WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that their participation in the
admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public
interest absolute purity of the proceedings and so are required to exercise the
greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.

Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973,
claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or
lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to
respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend a
participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho
and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo,
Adm. Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late
Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot
refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out
during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that
he did not make this charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive,
and deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against
Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been
terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a
favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not
invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the
1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-
evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations,
Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law
examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar
Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an
examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar
results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by respondent
Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly
expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations
demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to
undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme
Court.

VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of
respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed
for valuable consideration.

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the
official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of
proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF
Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less,
for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but
was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house
and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First
mortgage P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument April 5,
1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972: Second mortgage P8,411.40,
Entry No. 90914: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription
April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as
down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is
equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his
savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa
in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of
1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan
from his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971
Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank

deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank
deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows
therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement
under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The
amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his
1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein involved
did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent
Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his
married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said
amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971Statement of Assets
and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he
allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200 was not
even presented by respondent during the investigation. And according to
Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did
not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was
agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent
Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in
Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records.
Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her
own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give
to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo
was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the
foregoing circumstances.

On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF
Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No.
4992: August 14, 1972 date of instrument; August 23, 1972 date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes,
Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently
cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2,
1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also
redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled on March 20,
1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS
remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to
 respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is
P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same.
In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection
with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and
lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however,
as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real estate
loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956

VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between
January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no
such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971
or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total
assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in
his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding
the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth
P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends
to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed
by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination
papers or to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the
acquisition of the above properties came from respondent Galang in
consideration of his passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent
Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar
Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12,
1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo
surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of
retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5,
1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of
guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to
January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of
P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down
payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April
5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a &
e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
 (a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an
act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit
such violation or offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public
officer once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to
his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).

It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of

Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they
were examined as they are part of the records of this Court.

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon
E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become
the bar Confidant.

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational
program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days 1951 to 1955 up
to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) 1955 to
1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the
Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of
our veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to
1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans
Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator
(Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore,
respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans
Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as
of the date of waiver July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).

It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended
to the availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila
taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955,
respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a
technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently,
during the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in
1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated
June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the
approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ
Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly
addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo,
Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the
Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even
know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I.
Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every
semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he
had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to
take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing
Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City
Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he

investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and
disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties
as veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational
benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met
him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating
at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49,
rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with
the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged.
During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had
no communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and
does not remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was
employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of
Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed
at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was
hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there
when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941
(Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
46, rec.).

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces,
otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member
thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was
attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army,
stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army
stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May
1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose
Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to
the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without
prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong
disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as
above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO

IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E.
GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO
ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

 THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District
Court, Marawi City, respondent.

D E C I S I O N
NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.
B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi
City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter
to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the
company. He wrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to
terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as
represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch
office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales
agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith
perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous
Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that
Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I
categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to
resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest
be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the
controversial contract."
 Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post,
bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the
words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-
President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with
Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith,
which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other
things, he said:

" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and
voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract
itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent
was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and
that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who
concealed the real facts from me."

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996,
April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he
insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his
salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez,
Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of
this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again
asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the
contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it
to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with
Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his)
payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed
with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy
of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free
Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar
may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator,

etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth,"
denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya
had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be
dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with
established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the
Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan,
Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the authority
of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him,
not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to
the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that
the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's
office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for
being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District
Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family **."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even
obsequious tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order
that he might comment thereon.[6] He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good
faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa &
Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract
entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended
that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded
feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60
had been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that there was no basis for the complaint;
in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied
any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free
Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to
before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);[8] and as far as he knew,
his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if
those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.[9]
 Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful
claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken
for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man
unduly prejudiced and injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in
Alawi, a classmate and friend.[11] He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's
assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she
had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know
where the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa &
Co. -- is situated;[12] He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although
she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also
claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature
on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out,
receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless
allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her
complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court
Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both
dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his
Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY
M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious
and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and
established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation,
deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial
to ** (his) rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by
"deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co.,
and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and
against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in
defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service.[16] Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials
and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and
public interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and
behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice,
from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others,
strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary."[18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or
public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed --
however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate.
insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action
against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without
malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals,
good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."[19] Righteous
indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is
subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As
a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing,
or otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for
the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these
salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held
conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine
Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been admitted
to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in
this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law,"
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly
similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His
disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the
record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.





























 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.

Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.

Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p

What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a

motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the
grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election
Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to the
defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding
the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this
case." 2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner
was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category being precisely to
protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly
asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficiocounsel could ordinarily be
characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the
overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into
consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What
is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the
responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that
he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less at present.
There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar,
who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.

According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election
Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he
commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a
case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not
only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de
oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an
urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the
Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure
of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.
Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A
motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. 3

As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.

1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to
withdraw as counsel de oficiospeaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was
allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the
municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of
October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the
motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot
continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the Commission on
Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who are ready
to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for postponement is
denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13,
1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless,
in order not to prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby
designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May
17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11,
1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was
then made to another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H.
Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby
transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its
instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government
witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala." 5 After which, it was noted in such
order that there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and
to the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on
Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr.
Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its
case." 6

2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his
obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the
neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For
those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence
welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession
dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why a high
degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent statement of the
doctrine is found in People v. Daban: 7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding
to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a
craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the
basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof,
especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel
de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion
a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other
pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to.
That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly
he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon
him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled." 8

So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9 where respondent was de
oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact
from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties,
especially when negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays
in the prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia 11 reiterated
such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say
that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and
paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best
efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render
effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere
perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice
is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12

The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.

3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the
apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill
his obligation, the welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in
effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran
in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless
the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be
of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent
or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because
he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an
accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the
aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he
so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The present Constitution is even
more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained
in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an
accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to
withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the
task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an
election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is
not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may
likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would
exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not
with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in
good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal
practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client
takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.

Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.

Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofilea for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The
office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment
was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by
the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.

The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa
Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids,
and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act
No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with
extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed
of donation executed on 2 January 1926.

Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of
their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order
prescribed to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:

Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan

nuestro legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad
se hallare residiendo en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio
Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces
en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime
Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN
JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la
administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que
sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera de
nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y
que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de
 estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de
circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia
ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de estas
cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al
senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica,
apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y
en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her
death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio
Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr.
Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in
1932, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the position of
administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case, reference will be
made later in this decision.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of
Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui. On
27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of
Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a
notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus
Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's
assumption of the position.

Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter
to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September
1960, the demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this
case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson
of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in
their deed of donation.

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to
the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal
circumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However,
before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the
legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o
medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado
mayor impuesto o contribucion."

The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui
holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but
is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one.
Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this
Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution
promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of
administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo
de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed
of donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be
given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or
diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and
by the intervenor.

We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado"
means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in
the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the
word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo,
dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Espaola, Real Academia Espanola, 1947
ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se
dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los
litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan
(Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain
academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The
English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and
general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers
of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of
the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar
examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court,
this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor
of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance
with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed
all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary
of Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not
indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way.
Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where
persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to
take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required
possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be
incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack
the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test
advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator
should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these,
should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer,
first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make
regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions
subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the
institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission
are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of
considerable value for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of
the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the
defendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a
member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of
donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on the ground, among
others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character.
Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March
1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was
reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator. His
reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that
required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t

Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound
discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether
or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration
of justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of
an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission
to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character a fit and
proper person to practice law. The court will take into consideration the applicant's
character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and
the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement,

notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and
the requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original
admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof
than in an original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)

The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is

"of good moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to
attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of
the office of an attorney, and whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable
him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be
regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney
& Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement
to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the
deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the
defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from
his previous disbarment were wiped out.

This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting
the prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken
from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the
right of plaintiff to hold the office arose.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932.
On January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui,
who assumed the administration of the Hospicioon 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's
father and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of
First Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and complaint in
intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of dismissal, the case was
remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did
not prosecute the case as indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an
arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named
"legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant administrator.

Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers.
First he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that
as of the previous 1 January he had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office of
administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up with another letter dated 4 February,
announcing that he had taken over the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually,
however, he took his oath of office before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after
receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the Social Welfare
Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the position as stated in his
communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was referred by the
Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45,
S. 1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff, not
beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio.

Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950,
the Hospiciocommenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits
therein. The Bank then filed a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus
Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having
been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss
the third-party complaint on the ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim
to the administration of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October
1953. On 6 February 1954 he was able to take another oath of office as administrator
before President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil
case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was pending in
Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the
court may disregard the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless
and the other parties in the case filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. The
plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trial
Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereupon
instituted a mandamusproceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was
decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal.
That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of the parties,
who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ... should be
ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent by
whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103).
The resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent
administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo warranto was filed against him by
plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal.

On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member
of the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in
his favor, pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next
day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.

The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first
case of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further
proceedings; his acceptance instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr.
Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator and his failure to file an action in quo
warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216
of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that the conflicting
claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an action all these circumstances
militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of the rule that an action in quo
warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office
arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31
July 1956 because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory
period. And the fact that this action was filed within one year of the defendant's assumption
of office in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis
of the action is his own right to the office and it is from the time such right arose that the
one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the incumbent began to discharge
the duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.

Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer,
grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by
them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant
Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of
donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed
in the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que
descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui,
Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... En igualdad de
circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia
ultimamente la administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui,
Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are
otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer
the administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews named in
the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr.
Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come
from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however,
is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed

and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed,
with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF

SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

R E S O L U T I O N

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other
individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan
on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe
physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university
fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea
bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the
lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial
court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation
with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June
1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was
set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer
assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to
Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal
conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar
Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro
T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994.
We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time
of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr.
Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to
the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to

everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good
moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is
stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as
having persuasive effect:

In Re Farmer: 3

xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent

to the applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina,
and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court,
includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is
something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which
the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with
his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright
character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself,
not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in
the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the
pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as
counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's
fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the
Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx 4

In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926)

191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to
deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of
circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the
 wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high
moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar
examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination
to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice.
. . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion
that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character
of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if
possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a
lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has
established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the
court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling
and annulment of his license.

In Re Keenan: 6

The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in
the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege
granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in
intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been
set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from
the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession,
and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.

Re Rouss: 7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair

private and professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an
unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into
character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may
not only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist
court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to
courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good moral
character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not
bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest
possible consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the
first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be
permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are
concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
 . . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288,
10 Ann./Cas. 187):

The public policy of our state has always been to admit no

person to the practice of the law unless he covered an upright
moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more
important, if anything, to the public and to the proper
administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may
be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the
threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are
that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a
disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling a curse
instead of a benefit to his community a Quirk, a Gammon or a
Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those
seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly
broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:

Re Stepsay: 10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his

admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the

California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character
unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his
disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader
in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may
receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects
honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission
upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be
causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it. 12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of
the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely
accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the
death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the
part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to
discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by
seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them
that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog.
Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible
behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of
good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court
is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good
moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at
the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's
oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter
alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of
time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He
should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless
student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino
must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now,
that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the
law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let
a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 5688 June 4, 2009

FELIPE E. ABELLA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO, J.:

Felipe E. Abella (complainant) filed a complaint for violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 67131 (RA 6713) or the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees against Atty.
Asteria E. Cruzabra (respondent). In his affidavit-complaint2 dated 8 May 2002,
complainant charged respondent with engaging in private practice while employed in the
government service.

Complainant alleged that respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar on 30 May 1986
and was appointed as Deputy Register of Deeds of General Santos City on 11 August
1987.3 Complainant asserted that as Deputy Register of Deeds, respondent filed a petition
for commission as a notary public and was commissioned on 29 February 1988 without
obtaining prior authority from the Secretary of the Department of Justice
(DOJ).4Complainant claimed that respondent has notarized some 3,000
documents.5 Complainant pointed out that respondent only stopped notarizing documents
when she was reprimanded by the Chief of the Investigation Division of the Land
Registration Authority.6

Complainant contended that respondent could not justify her act by pretending to be in
good faith because even non-lawyers are not excused from ignorance of the law.
Complainant branded as incredible respondents claim that she was merely motivated by
public service in notarizing 3,000 documents. Complainant pointed out that respondent
spent money to buy the Notarial Register Books and spent hours going over the documents
subscribed before her, thereby prejudicing her efficiency and performance as Deputy
Register of Deeds. Complainant believed that even if respondent had obtained authority
from the DOJ, respondent would still be guilty of violating Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713
because her practice as a notary public conflicts with her official functions.7

In her Comment, respondent admitted that she was a notary public from 29 February 1988
to 31 December 1989.8Respondent stated that she was authorized by her superior, the
Register of Deeds, to act as a notary public. Respondent pointed out that the Register of
Deeds, Atty. Pelagio T. Tolosa, also subscribed petitions and documents that were required
to be registered.9 Respondent explained that the Register of Deeds imposed the following
conditions for her application as a notary public:

x x x

4. That the application for commission was on the condition that respondent cannot charge
fees for documents required by the Office to be presented and under oath.10

Respondent contended that when she filed her petition for commission as a notary public,
the requirement of approval from the DOJ Secretary was still the subject of a pending query
by one of the Registrars and this fact was not known to respondent.11 Respondent
maintained that she had no intention to violate any rule of law. Respondent, as a new
lawyer relying on the competence of her superior, admitted that an honest mistake may
have been committed but such mistake was committed without willfulness, malice or
corruption.12

Respondent argued that she was not engaged in illegal practice as a notary public because
she was duly commissioned by the court.13 Respondent denied that she violated Section
7(b)(2) of RA 6713 because she was authorized by her superior to act as a notary public.
Respondent reasoned that her being a notary public complemented her functions as
Deputy Register of Deeds because respondent could immediately have documents
notarized instead of the registrants going out of the office to look for a notary public.
Respondent added that she did not charge fees for the documents required by the office to
be presented under oath.14lawphi1

Respondent insisted that contrary to complainants claims, she only notarized 135
documents as certified by the Clerk of Court of the 11th Judicial Region, General Santos
City.15

In her Report and Recommendation (Report) dated 25 January 2005, Investigating

Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended to the IBP Board of Governors the dismissal
of the complaint against respondent for lack of merit. The Report reads in part:

However, the fact that she applied for commission as Notary Public without securing the
approval of the proper authority although she was allowed to do so by her superior officer,
was not her own undoing for having relied on the ample authority of her superior officer,
respondent being a neophyte in the law profession for having newly passed the bar a year
after at that time.

Records further showed that after having been reprimanded by Atty. Flestado for said
mistake which was done in good faith respondent ceased and desisted to perform notarial
work since then up to the present as could be gleaned from the Certification issued by Clerk
of Court VI Atty. Elmer D. Lastimosa of the 11th Judicial Region General Santos City; dated
December 23, 2004 that 135 documents have been notarized by the respondent from
February 29, 1988 to December 31 1989 and there was no record of any notarized
documents from January 19, 1990 to December 21, 1991.16

In a Resolution dated 12 March 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, in adopting and
approving the Report, dismissed the case for lack of merit.

Complainant claims that in dismissing the complaint for "lack of merit" despite
respondents admission that she acted as a notary public for two years, the IBP Board of
Governors committed a serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction or authority.17

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:

x x x

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; or

x x x

Memorandum Circular No. 1718 of the Executive Department allows government

employees to engage directly in the private practice of their profession provided there is a
written permission from the Department head. It provides:

The authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall be granted by the head
of the ministry or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules, which provides:

"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of Department; Provided,
That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose
duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in
outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the chief of
the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the other officer or
employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve any real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the
discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or
become an officer or member of the board of directors",

Subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office deems necessary in each
particular case in the interest of the service, as expressed in the various issuances of the
Civil Service Commission. (Boldfacing supplied)

It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public, she
did not obtain a written permission from the Secretary of the DOJ. Respondents superior,
the Register of Deeds, cannot issue any authorization because he is not the head of the
Department. And even assuming that the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent
failed to present any proof of that written permission. Respondent cannot feign ignorance
or good faith because respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public after
Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued in 1986.1avvphi1

In Yumol, Jr. v. Ferrer Sr.,19 we suspended a lawyer employed in the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) for failing to obtain a written authority and approval with a duly approved
leave of absence from the CHR. We explained:

Crystal clear from the foregoing is the fact that private practice of law by CHR lawyers is
not a matter of right. Although the Commission allows CHR lawyers to engage in private
practice, a written request and approval thereof, with a duly approved leave of absence for
that matter are indispensable. In the case at bar, the record is bereft of any such written
request or duly approved leave of absence. No written authority nor approval of the
practice and approved leave of absence by the CHR was ever presented by respondent.
Thus, he cannot engage in private practice.

As to respondents act of notarizing documents, records show that he applied for

commission as notary public on 14 November 2000, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42. This was granted by RTC Executive Judge Pedro M.
Sunga, Jr., on 01 December 2000. However, the CHR authorized respondent to act as notary
public only on 29 October 2001. Considering the acts of notarization are within the ambit
of the term "practice of law," for which a prior written request and approval by the CHR to
engage into it are required, the crucial period to be considered is the approval of the CHR
on 29 October 2001 and not the approval of the RTC on 04 December 2000.20

In Muring, Jr. v. Gatcho,21 we suspended a lawyer for having filed petitions for commission
as a notary public while employed as a court attorney. We held:

Atty. Gatcho should have known that as a government lawyer, he was prohibited from
engaging in notarial practice, or in any form of private legal practice for that matter. Atty.
Gatcho cannot now feign ignorance or good faith, as he did not seek to exculpate himself by
providing an explanation for his error. Atty. Gatchos filing of the petition for commission,
while not an actual engagement in the practice of law, appears as a furtive attempt to evade
the prohibition.22

Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, engaging in the
private practice of profession, when unauthorized, is classified as a light offense punishable
by reprimand.23

Wherefore, we find Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra guilty of engaging in notarial practice without
the written authority from the Secretary of the Department of Justice, and accordingly
we REPRIMAND her. She is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future
shall merit a more severe sanction.

SO ORDERED.