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Martin Neumann
Hochschule Koblenz
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Martin Neumann *
Universit
at Osnabruck
Fachbereich Sozialwissenschaften
Seminarstrae 33
49074 Osnabruck, Germany
E-mail: martneum@freenet.de
A brief look at this example shows that the behavior of the meteorite
can certainly be described by the laws of mechanics. But even though these
laws are perfectly deterministic, the range of starting conditions produces an
uncertainty in our knowledge of where exactly the meteorite will strike earth.
Notice that principally he was following the ideas of Ludwig Boltzmann. He
simply replaced the small atomic particles of the kinetic theory of gases by
the larger body of a meteorite. Of course, a meteorite striking earth does not
follow the laws of elastic collision. But like the collision of atomic particles it
is dependent on small variations of the starting conditions. Then von Kries
like Boltzmann argued that the source of probability cannot be found
in the mechanical laws. Instead, he claimed, that it has to be found in
the singular conditions of one special event. Therefore von Kries invented
a distinction between so-called nomological and the ontological aspects of
nature. (Cf. [vKr86, p.86]; [Hei01, p.177-178].)
Die Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit ist eine Aufgabe, an welcher wir zwei
wesentlich verschiedene Teile unterscheiden k
onnen. ... Die Kenntnis des
Gravitations-Gesetzes, um ein Beispiel anzufuhren, lehrt uns noch nichts
u
ber die wirklich Statt findende Bewegung der Planeten; sondern um sie
zu verwerten, m ussen wir noch wissen, welche Massen existieren und in
welchem Zustande der r aumlichen Verteilung und der Bewegung sie sich
irgendwann befunden haben. [vKr86, p.85]
This is a brief sketch of the general idea of what von Kries thought as
the source of probabilistic reasoning. He has drawn two consequences out
of this which have shown to be essential for the style of reasoning developed
out of this theory. First, probabilistic arguments can only be applied to
singular circumstances and second, he embedded this theory of probability
into a framework of a theory of reference.
The first point can be explained by the notion of ontological aspects of
the description of nature: They are only singular circumstances of a specific
event. For example, the factual distribution of masses at some time point
is just one singular event in the history of the universe. At another time
point, we find a different distribution. Thus, if probabilistic arguments have
to be applied to those ontological aspects, they also can only be applied to
singular events.
This seemed to him to be incorrect. Instead one should reduce the sta-
tistical argument to the range of possible behavior of one single molecule.
However, the question remains of how to apply probability theory to a single
case. This leads to the second point:
Following the psychologism of his day, von Kries defines reference as
a judgement. Applied to general terms, however, this judgement can be
ambiguous. For example, an object might be described by the word red.
You then have a continuous range of possibilities from the one case, that
this notion is clearly false, to the other, that it is clearly true:
Note, that von Kries is considering a single object in this example. Now
von Kries draws a link to probability theory: he sees a chance experiment
as an experiment that can only be described in general terms.
Following von Kries, this is the reason why a chance experiment leads
to probabilistic statements. In a chance experiment like tossing a coin,
an infinite range of rotation, velocity, etc., remains. The specific rotation,
velocity, etc., in one concrete toss of a coin are singular circumstances of
this event. They can vary from case to case. Thus, the ontological aspects
of a chance experiment can only be described in general terms. Because
all these cases are covered by the one instruction toss a coin, one can
say that this is not a precise but a fuzzy instruction. Nevertheless, we gain
exact knowledge of the size of the Spielraum left open by it. Following von
Kries this is the reason why probability theory can be applied to a chance
experiment:
A formal bridge between epistemic cultures 175
Denken wir uns z.B. beim W urfeln die Gesammtheit aller Gestaltungen der
bedingenden Umst ande zusammengefasst, welche den Wurf 1 herbeif uhren,
ebenso die Gesammtheit aller, welche die W urfe 2, 3, etc. bewirken w
urden:
so l
asst sich behaupten, dass diese sechs Complexe alle von gleicher Gr osse
sind. [vKr86, p.VII]
Note that we know this exactly because we do not know the starting
conditions in a concrete case. This is the kind of positive knowledge proba-
bilistic statements refer to. Therefore von Kries stresses the intersubjective
validity of this kind of analysis:
Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit einem W
urfel 6 zu werfen, setzten wir gleich
1/6, und haben damit etwas ausgesprochen, was f
ur Jeden und unter allen
Umstanden g
ultig ist. [vKr86, p.129]
of von Kries idea can be found in the framework of Alexius Meinongs theory of objects.
In 1890 he wrote a review of von Kries Principien der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung and
again in the preface of his book on M oglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit, he writes that
the origins of his ideas reach back to his reading of von Kries [Mei15, p.VI].
176 Martin Neumann
the fact, that even Max Webers qualitative sociology relied on a concept of
probability.
As a historian, Weber wanted to defend the idea of historical causality.
To achieve this goal he developed the concept of historical ideal types, which
have to be understood as the idea of a historical phenomena. Weber de-
scribed them as ein Komplex von Zusammenh angen in der geschichtlichen
Wirklichkeit, die wir unter dem Gesichtspunkt ihrer Kulturbedeutung be-
grifflich zu einem Ganzen zusammenschlieen [Web47a, p.30]. With an
ideal type the essentials out of the historical material are united into one
appropriate notion. Contrary to the statistical notion of the correlation of
mass phenomena, an ideal type is intended to cover one single instance of
a complex historical process:
think there had been no shots it is most probable that there would still have
been street fights.
This is the method Weber used to identify historical causality. Of course
he was not interested in the examples themselves but in historical ideal
types. Remember that the causal relevance is the criterion that they are
correctly composed. The most prominent example developed by Max Weber
is the so-called protestant ethics:
According to him, it is an adequate cause for the spirit of capitalism
because he was convinced to have identified an influence of Protestantism
in the spirit of capitalism. Thus, Weber regarded it as a correctly composed
ideal type.
5 Conclusion
Now the catalytic function of von Kries in the German way of taming chance
is obvious: Although his name is not very well known within this scientific
community, he contributed to the creation of the phenomenological tradi-
tion of the social sciences, also called verstehende Soziologie (as opposed
to statistical social research). The function of statistics was to extend the
style of reasoning in the natural sciences to the social sphere. Nowadays,
within some research communities, the terms Social Sciences and statis-
tical social research are seen as synonymous. On the other hand, the style
of reasoning developed out of his theory of Spielr aume serves as a tool for
the contrary: to defend the humanities as a style of reasoning in its own
right. Thus, this theory served as a tool for the transformation of a concept
of science into those of the humanities.
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182 Martin Neumann