Alawi v Alauya

Facts:

Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao
City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive
clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, They were classmates,
and used to be friends.

Through Alawis agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent
was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of
Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.

On learning of Alauyas letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him.

One of her grounds was Alauyas usurpation of the title of attorney, which only
regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, attorney, by the assertion that it is lexically
synonymous with Counsellors-at-law. a title to which Sharia lawyers have a
rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of attorney because counsellor is
often mistaken for councilor, konsehal or the Maranao term consial,
connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a
lawyer.

Issue:

Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title of Attorney

Held:

He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.

As regards Alauyas use of the title of Attorney, this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members
of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Sharia courts. While one
who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered counsellors, in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title of
attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study
of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only
who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction
Cantiller v Potenciano
Facts: Humberto V. Potenciano is a practicing lawyer and a member of
the Philippine Bar under Roll No. 21862. He is charged with deceit,
fraud, and misrepresentation, and also with gross misconduct,
malpractice and of acts unbecoming of an officer of the court.
An action for ejectment was filed against Peregrina Cantiller. The
court issued a decision against the latter. A notice to vacate was then
issued against Cantiller.
Cantiller then asked the respondent to handle their case. The
complainant was made to sign by respondent what she described as a
[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly composed
petition for annulment of judgment.
The petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Manila.
Respondent demanded from the complainant P l,000.00 as attorneys fee.
However the judge of the said court asked the respondent to withdraw as
counsel by reason of their friendship.
Later, Cantiller paid Potenciano P2,000.00 as demanded by the latter
which was allegedly needed to be paid to another judge who will issue
the restraining order but eventually Potenciano did not succeed in
locating the judge.
Complainant paid P 10,000.00 to Potenciano by virtue of the demand of
the latter. The amount was allegedly to be deposited with the
Treasurers Office of Pasig as purchase price of the apartment and P
1,000.00 to cover the expenses of the suit needed in order for the
complainant to retain the possession of the property. But later on
Cantiller found out that the amounts were not necessary to be paid. A
demand was made against Potenciano but the latter did not answer and
the amounts were not returned.
Contrary to Potencianos promise that he would secure a restraining
order, he withdrew his appearance as counsel for complainant.
Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as replacement. Hence,
the order to vacate was eventually enforced and executed.
Issue: Whether or not Potenciano breached his duties as counsel of
Cantiller.
Held: When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he thereby covenants that
he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final
conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of
a clients cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the
client had reposed on him. The acts of respondent in this case violate
the most elementary principles of professional ethics.
The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in
protecting his clients interests. Respondent had knowledge beforehand
that he would be asked by the presiding judge to withdraw his
appearance as counsel by reason of their friendship. Despite such prior
knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a replacement nor did he
inform complainant of this fact.
Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond
reproach in dealing with their clients. The profession is not
synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of
public interest.

Villegas v Legaspi
Case 1
In September 1979, Raul Villegas filed a civil case against
spouses Vera Cruz et al before the Court of First Instance
(CFI) Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the
complaint and they were represented by Valentino Legaspi,
then a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then
challenged the representation made by Legaspi as counsel
for the spouses on the ground that it is unconstitutional;
as pointed out by Villegas no member of the Batasang
Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without
appellate jurisdiction. The presiding judge however
overruled Villegas challenged and proceeded with the
trial. The judge said that CFIs have appellate
jurisdiction.
Case 2
In July 1979, Edgardo Reyes filed a civil case against N. V.
Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas, a
corporation, before CFI Rizal. Estanisalo Fernandez
appeared as counsel for the corporation. Reyes questions
the appearance of Fernandez as counsel for the corporation
on the same ground invoked in Case 1 because Fernandez is
also a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said members, Estanislao Fernandez and
Valentino Legaspi, of the Batasang Pambansa may appear as
counsels before the said CFIs.
HELD: No. Members of Congress are prohibited to appear as counsel
berfore CFIs acting in their original
jurisdiction. CFIs have dual personalities. They can be
courts of general original jurisdiction (courts of origin)
or appellate courts depending on the case that they took
cognizance of. In the cases at bar, CFI Cebu and CFI Rizal
acted as a courts of general original jurisdiction. Both
cases were not elevated to the said CFIs from any lower
courts. Thus, the CFIs in the case at bar are courts
without appellate jurisdiction

Tejan v Cusi
In this original action of prohibition petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan challenges the authority
of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao to hear Administrative Case
No. 59 of said court involving a disciplinary action initiated against petitioner as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
In a letter dated December 5, 1967 addressed to petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan, he was
required by respondent Judge to explain within 72 hours why he should not be removed
or suspended from the practice of law for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition
in court containing factual averments which petitioner knew were false.

At the hearing on January 24, 1968, petitioner questioned, among others, the propriety of
the proceedings, contending that since the case was one for disbarment, respondent Judge
had no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner as well as the subject matter thereof.
Petitioner orally moved that respondent Judge inhibit himself from hearing the
administrative case in view of the latters conflicting positions as prosecutor and judge
at the same time. The oral motion was denied.

Petitioners thesis is that respondent Judge has no authority on his own motion to hear
and determine proceedings for disbarment or suspension of attorneys because jurisdiction
thereon is vested exclusively and originally in the Supreme Court and not in courts of
first instance. Petitioner also contends that assuming arguendo that courts of first instance
have such authority, the procedure outlined in Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court
should govern the filing and investigation of the complaint.

Petition is bereft of merit.

When it appears by acts of misconduct that he has become unfit to continue with the trust
reposed upon him, his right to continue in the enjoyment of that trust and for the
enjoyment of the professional privilege accorded to him may and ought to be forfeited.
The law accords to the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance the power to
investigate and suspend members of the bar.

Section 28, 29 and 30 of the Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court are applicable in the
case at bar.

Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention
of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. The court may therefore act upon its own motion and thus be
the initiator of the proceedings, because, obviously the court may investigate into the
conduct of its own officers.Indeed it is not only the right but the duty of the Court to
institute upon its own motion, proper proceedings for the suspension or the disbarment of
an attorney, when from information submitted to it or of its own knowledge it appears
that any attorney has so conducted himself in a case pending before said court as to show
that he is wanting in the proper measure of respect for the court of which he is an officer,
or is lacking in the good character essential to his continuance as an attorney.

The investigation by the Solicitor General in Section 8 of Rule 139 refers to complaints
referred to said office by this Court and not to investigations in suspension proceedings
before the Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance, because Sections 28 to 30 of Rule
138 authorize said courts and confer upon them the power to conduct the investigation
themselves, subject toanother and final investigation by the Supreme Court in the event
of suspension of the lawyer. On the basis of the certified copy of the order of suspension
and the statement of the facts upon which the same is based, required by Section 29 of
Rule 138, the Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the facts involved and
make such order revoking or extending the suspension or removing the attorney from his
office as such, as the facts warrant.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is denied, and the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court is ordered dissolved, with costs against petitioner.