Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao

Ho (1978)
February 15, 2013 markerwins Tax Law

Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537

requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and
consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance
programs of the government and another country, and members of
religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayors
permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila.
The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of the
ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or
both.
Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.
Held: The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the
guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared
for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it
fails to consider difference in situation among aliens required to pay it,
i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or executive.
[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and
unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus deprived of
their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the
ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the
Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the
mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]
Buck v. Bell Case Brief
Relevant Facts: Carrie Buck, a resident of the State of Virginia, was a feeble-minded" eighteen
year old woman, whose mother was similarly feeble-minded. Ms. Buck, who was not married, was
also the mother of a child likewise described by the State of Virginia as feeble-minded. In 1924,
Virginia passed a statute authorizing the superintendents of institutions for certain classes of persons
afflicted with hereditary conditions causing insanity of imbecility to order the sterilization of such
persons. In order for the sterilization procedure to proceed, superintendents were required to present
a petition to the board of directors for their institutions, notify the inmate and their guardian, and
convene a hearing to present evidence for and against conducting the procedure. In this case, Dr.
John Hendren Bell conducted the proceedings against Ms. Buck after her first physician passed
away during the pendency of her case. Dr. Bell similarly pushed for sterilization under the statute,
based on the same justification.

Issue: May a State, consistent with due process and equal protection, order the sterilization of a
woman deemed mentally deficient by a state agency and review board?
Holding: Yes, states can require the sterilization of certain citizens without breaching constitutional
rights. The statute in question provided adequate safeguards, and appropriate opportunity for
notification and review, to comport with due process requirements.
Reasoning: Justice Holmes delivered a short majority opinion on behalf of the Court. He pointed out
that the challenge to the law before the Court was properly considered a challenge to the law itself,
not to compliance with the safeguards contained therein. He then argued that as the State can
require sacrifices from citizens, up to and including their very lives, it is not unusual to require
something less than the sacrifice of their life on behalf of the public good. Making a policy case,
Justice Holmes opined that society would be better served by preventing reproduction by members
of society most likely to produce progeny dependent on the government. The Court also made clear
that the process for review of a sterilization order properly considered the rights of those whom the
State targeted for such procedures. Finally, Justice Holmes dismissed concerns regarding equal
protection. Here he reasoned that while not all citizens were equally subject to the potential to have
their reproductive capacity forfeited, the State could reasonably direct its attention to those deemed
unfit to reproduce and thereby conserve necessary resources for other prerogatives. Comparing
forced sterilization to mandatory vaccination, Justice Holmes argued that both were for the overall
benefit of society. Noting the sad history of Ms. Buck, her mother, and her child, Justice Holmes
suggested that [t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough."
 Imbong vs Ochoa
Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free
Speech; Privacy; Due Process Clause; Equal
Protection Clause
Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus
Standi; Declaratory Relief; One Subject One Title
Rule
Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products.

3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.

5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

7. The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the

Constitution.

8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family protected by the Constitution
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Power of Judicial Review

2. Actual Case or Controversy

3. Facial Challenge

4. Locus Standi

5. Declaratory Relief

6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating
the:

1. Right to life

2. Right to health

3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech

4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom

6. Due process clause

7. Equal protection clause

8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:

Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1. Actual Case or Controversy

2. Facial Challenge

3. Locus Standi

4. Declaratory Relief

5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:

PROCEDURAL

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical
question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would
be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy
is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he
has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other
rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right
of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are
but component rights of the right to ones freedom of expression, as they are modes which ones
thoughts are externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

One Subject-One Title: The one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to employ in
the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where,
as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical
construction of the rule so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The one subject/one title rule
expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be so uncertain that the average person
reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act.

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers

no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the
court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds
it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the
parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its
declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1)
The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a
separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.

Ruling/s:

SUBSTANTIAL

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this
matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at
fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment of
fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not
intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this
otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word
or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that
prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside
the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the
State has a bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR)
would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the
same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term
primarily, must be struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the
Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made
available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep
in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory only after
these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective.

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in
support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong
according to ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether
or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any
one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article
III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere
to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its
population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent
of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial
privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic
social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to
defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions
and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH
Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage
and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent
or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section
12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of
minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising
parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures is invalid as it
denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is non-surgical procedures.

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning
services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this
situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In
addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of parents in upbringing
their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement
(rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups

in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line
with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of
several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the
RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The private health care institution cited
under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health care service provider.

The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of information and
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH
Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the
terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick
elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to
paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH
Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to
have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have
and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to
provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under
Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards
the teaching of reproductive health education

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care
service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary
servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-
 government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not
allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules
have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier,
when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture
of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.
The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this
Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers
of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional
human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these
petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this
Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It
has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material
interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental
importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the
Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs,
such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit
they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects
and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein
have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the
youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the
well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed.

4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the
case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them
as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of
the various provisions of the law shows that both reproductive health and responsible
parenthood are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population
growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

Considering the close intimacy between reproductive health and responsible parenthood which
bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving sustainable human development as stated under its
terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public
as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect
to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or
minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious
beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or
shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of
his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier primarily in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for
contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

Nebbia v. New York

Brief Fact Summary. New Yorks Milk Control Boards price control regulation survived a
Constitutional attack because it was not found to be arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably
irrelevant to the policy adopted by the legislature.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Price controls that are arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably
irrelevant to the policies of the legislature, are unconstitutional because they are unnecessary
and unwarranted interferences with individual liberty.

Facts. The New York legislature established a Milk Control Board that was vested with the
power to fix minimum and maximum retail prices for milk sold within the state. Appellant, Mr.
Nebbia, an owner of a New York grocery store, was convicted of selling milk for prices in excess
of the price set by the Board.

Issue. Whether the Constitution prohibits a state from fixing the selling price of milk?

Held. No. Judgment affirmed. The production and distribution of milk is a paramount industry of
the state and largely affects the health and prosperity of its people. Property rights and contract
rights are not absolute in nature and may be subject to limitations. Since the price controls were
not arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy adopted by the legislature
to promote the general welfare, it was consistent with the Constitution.

Dissent. This statute not only interferes arbitrarily with the rights of the little grocer to conduct
his business, but it also takes away the liberty of twelve million consumers to buy a necessity of
life in an open market.

Discussion. This decision marked a significant shift from the Lochner era by reducing the
judicial role in scrutinizing the means employed in economic regulations both in its announced
standard that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought
to be attained and in its examination of the background of the legislation.
KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA [41 Phil 103; G.R. No.
15972; 11 Oct 1920]
Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese
laundrymen who has general and the same interest, filed a complaint
for a preliminaryinjunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of
enforcing OrdinanceNo. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532
requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly
signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered
by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. The
permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. The appellants
claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting in
mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between
persons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary
infringement of property rights. They also contest that the enforcement
of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In
view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act
beyond the scope of police power

(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation

that infringes property rights.

Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are

permissible under the police power. The police power of the City of
Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444,
paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act
No. 2744, authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the
approval of the mayor of the city:

(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following:
xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx.

(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to
avoid disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect
customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese
characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s,
people of Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)

In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that

theordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no
personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is
not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither
discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all
public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans,
Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and
each every one of them without distinction, must comply with
the ordinance. The obvious objection for the implementation of
the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code.
Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and
occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of theappellant by
learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but
mostlyArabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that
the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of
person or property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will
result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not
sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body.
The very foundation of the police power is the control of private
interests for the public welfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the

petition for a preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against the
appellants.
 Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad

Yu Cong Eng et al vs. Trinidad

GR No. L-20479 | Feb. 6, 1925

History:

The sales tax has been in force in the Philippines for a number of years. Our law provides for privilege taxes to be
levied on certain businesses and occupations. These percentage taxes on business are payable at the end of each
calendar quarter in the amount lawfully due on the business transacted during the past quarter. It is made the duty
of every person conducting a business subject to such tax, within the same period as is allowed for the payment of
the quarterly installments of the fixed taxes without penalty, to make a true and complete return of the amount of
the receipts or earnings of his business during the preceding quarter and pay the tax due thereon. All merchants
not specifically exempted must pay a tax of one and one-half per cent on the gross value in money of the
commodities, goods, wares, merchandise sold, bartered, exchanged, or consigned abroad by them, such tax to be
based on the actual selling price or value of the things in question at the time they are disposed of or consigned

The income tax has also been established here for sometime, first pursuant to an Act of Congress and later
pursuant to an Act of the Philippine Legislature (Act No. 2833, as amended by Act No. 2926). The customary
returns are required from individuals and corporations. The tax is computed and the assessments are made by the
Collector of Internal Revenue and his agents.

The Spanish Code of Commerce, which was in force at that time, requires that merchants shall keep: A book of
inventories and balances; (2) a daybook; (3) a ledger; (4) a copying book for letters and telegrams; and (5) the
other books required by special laws. However, it was silent as to the language which the books must be kept

CIR issued a Circular Letter requiring that the record of sales of merchants subject to the merchants tax must
either be in English or Spanish

- Challenged in the case of Young vs. Rafferty

- SC: CIR is not empowered to designate the language which the entries in the books should be made. Such
initiative should not be taken by the CIR, arguing that it is to protect the govt against evasion

Facts:

On 1921, Act No. 2972 or the Chinese Bookkeeping Law was passed, regulating that the account books should not
be in any other language exc. English, Spanish or any dialect, otherwise a penalty of fine of not more than 10K or
imprisonment for not more than 2 years will be imposed

- fiscal measure intended to facilitate the work of the government agents and to prevent fraud in the returns of
merchants, in conformity with the sales tax and the income tax

On March 1923, BIR inspected the books of account of Yu Cong Eng where it was found out that it is not in
accordance with Act 2972

A criminal case was filed against Yu Cong Eng before the CFI Manila for keeping his books of account in Chinese
 Yus defense:

Yu Cong Eng et al are Chinese merchants, claiming that they represent the other 12K filed a petition for
prohibition and injunction against the CIR, questioning the constitutionality of Act No. 2972 or the Chinese
Bookkeeping Law

Issue: W/N Act No. 2972 is constitutional?

Ruling:

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised in the lower court and that court must be
given an opportunity to pass upon the question before it may be presented to the appellate court for resolution

Power of taxation

- strongest of all the powers of government, practically absolute and unlimited

- It is a legislative power. All its incidents are within the control of the legislature. It is the Legislature which must
questions of state necessarily involved in ordering a tax, which must make all the necessary rules and regulations
which are to be observed in order to produce the desired results, and which must decide upon the agencies by
means of which collections shall be made

The power to tax is not judicial power and that a strong case is required for the judiciary to declare a law
relating to taxation invalid. If, of course, so great an abuse is manifest as to destroy natural and fundamental
rights, it is the duty of the judiciary to hold such an Act unconstitutional

The Chinese petitioners are accorded treaty rights of the most favored nation

Their constitutional rights are those accorded all aliens, which means that the life, liberty, or property of these
persons cannot be taken without due process of law, and that they are entitled to the equal protection of the
laws, without regard to their race

Act No. 2972 is a fiscal measure which seeks to prohibit not only the Chinese but all merchants of whatever
nationality from making entries in the books of account or forms subject to inspection for taxation purposes in any
other language than either the English or Spanish language or a local dialect

the law only intended to require the keeping of such books as were necessary in order to facilitate governmental
inspection for tax purposes

The Chinese will not be singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation since there are
other aliens doing business in the Phils. There will be no arbitrary deprivation of liberty or arbitrary spoliation of
property. There will be no unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in similar circumstances. The law will
prove oppressive to the extent that all tax laws are oppressive, but not oppressive to the extent of confiscation

Act No. 2972 as meaning that any person, company, partnership, or corporation, engaged in commerce, industry,
or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, shall keep its account books, consisting of
sales books and other records and returns required for taxation purposes by regulations of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, in effect when this action was begun, in English, Spanish, or a local dialect, thus valid and constitutional
Ichong v. Hernandez

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Fundamental Principles and State Policies. Article II, Section 2.
Incorporation Clause.

ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ
101 PHIL 115

FACTS:
Petitioner, also in behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships, brought this action to
obtain a judicial declaration that RA 1180 is unconstitutional. Petitioner contends, among others, that said
act violate the equal protection of laws and that it violates the treaty of the Philippines with China. Solicitor
General contends that the act was a valid exercise of the police power and that not a single treaty was
infringed by said act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 1180 violates the equal protection of laws

HELD:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination on oppression of inequality. The real question at hand is whether or not the
exclusion in the future aliens for the retail trade unreasonable. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by a specified class if it applies to all persons within such class and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. Aliens are under no
special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the
limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. The difference in status between citizens and
aliens constitute a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
 Espina vs. Zamora, Jr. Digest

FACTS:

On March 7, 2000, President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.)
8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly
repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in
the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four categories.

R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship
and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the
same rights as Filipino citizens.

On October 11, 2000, petitioners, all members of the House of Representatives, filed
the present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the following
grounds:

The law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which
enjoins the State to place the national economy under the control of Filipinos to
achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization and full
employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade
policies.

The implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which
taken together with alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in the
loss of effective Filipino control of the economy.

Foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari
store vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring about more unemployment.

The World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage
of R.A. 8762 on the government as a condition for the release of certain loans.

There is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or
combinations in restraint of trade.

Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry

Secretary Mar Roxas, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)
Secretary Felipe Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael Buenaventura,
and Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that:

Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact
that they are taxpayers since R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public
funds.

The petition does not involve any justiciable controversy.

Petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. 8762.

Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing
provisions that are judicially demandable.

The Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign
investments. It directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of
investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest
so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or
not to make such reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws
allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the
Constitution to Filipino citizens.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762

Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional

POLITICAL LAW: Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to
come to a court of justice and make such a challenge.

HELD:

Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of
justice and make such a challenge. More particularly, standing refers to his personal
and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of
the passage of that law.
Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as
taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will resolve the question they raise since
the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs when the public
interest so requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

POLITICAL LAW: The declarations of principles and state policies in the

Constitution are not self-executing.

As the Court explained in Tanada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the 1987
Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing.
Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the
courts.

Furthermore, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly
of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or
interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are
given preference in all areas of development.

More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the
discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the
recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus,
Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the
economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain
industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress
has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments
instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not
opposed such policy.

Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of R.A.
8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said,
there is no showing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate. The
Court is not convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to
alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete
and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict
safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Thus -
First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories
above-enumerated; Second, only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or
incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed to
engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be
allowed to engage in certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores
through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives,
door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing
activities.
 ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND
MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC.
GR No. 167614 - March 24, 2009
En banc

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as
Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7
days paid vacation leave per month.

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000 upon
the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of
April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano
refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998,
serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of
nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive
dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73 (based on
the computation of $2590/month from June 1998 to February 199, $413.90 for March 1998, and
$1640 for March 1999) as well as moral and exemplary damages.

The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770, representing his
salaray for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment,
plus $45 for salary differential and for attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount;
however, no compensation for damages as prayed was awarded.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50, representing
three (3) months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and 10% for attorney's fees.
This decision was based on the provision of RA 8042, which was made into law on July 15,
1995.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which reads:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment
without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers
shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.

The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. The CA
affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate, but skirted the
constitutional issue raised by herein petitioner Serrano.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
law.

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without
distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate
to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of
similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none
should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed
on, others in like circumstances.

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when
it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification
must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane
to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally
to all members of the class.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a
classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the
challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate
state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show
that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is
at least substantially related to serving that interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a
legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right
or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and
the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve
a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all
OFWs.However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent
against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs
with employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were
illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they
were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But
with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally
dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract
have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap,
whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in
the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally
discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of
one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local
workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of
OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution,
the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it
serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.

What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of the
state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in
safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards, or in maintaining access to information
on matters of public concern.

In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest
that the subject clause may possibly serve.

In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a
compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs
under the subject clause.

Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the
employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous and
cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of
government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on
another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as
placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no
less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated to
the level of a compelling state interest is odious.

Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of
placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in place
that can be
employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs.

The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based
Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on
erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or
their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from temporary disqualification to
preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and
Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary
measures against erring foreign employers.
Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding
local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the
right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less
in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042
is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Note:

When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of theacts of its
co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that there is
an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination;
(2) that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party and at the earliest opportunity; and
(3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case, otherwise the Court will
dismiss the case or decide the same on some other ground.
----
As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary
awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to
local workers with fixed-term employment.

Article 605 of the Code of Commerce provides:

Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the
agent should be for a definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged until
the fulfillment of their contracts, except for reasons of insubordination in serious
matters, robbery, theft, habitual drunkenness, and damage caused to the vessel
or to its cargo by malice or manifest or proven negligence.

Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie, in which the Court held
the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance of its illegally dismissed
employees for the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.

While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present, Article 299 of the Code of
Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for a
certain time and for a certain work cannot leave or be dismissed without
sufficient cause, before the fulfillment of the contract.
Yap vs. Thenamaris Ships Management (GR 179532) Date: May 30, 2011
Petitioner: Claudio S. Yap Respondent: Thenamaris Ships Management,
Intermare Maritime Agencies

Ponente: Nachura

Petition: Certiorari under Rule 45

Doctrine: Equal Protection; No law should single out one classification of OFWs and
burden it with a peculiar disadvantage

Facts Petitioner entered a one-year contract of employment with Intermare

Maritime Agencies as an electrician of M/T SEASCOUT (one of many vessels owned
by Thenamaris Ships) and started working on August 23, 2001 On November 08,
2001, the M/T SEASCOUT was sold to be scrapped. All crewmembers were informed
with an advisory stating, Please ask yr officers and ratings if they wish to be
transferred to other vessels after vessel s delivery..x x x.. For crew not wish transfer
to declare their prospected time for reembarkation in order to schedule them accly
Only working for about 3 months, Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus,
extra bonus, and scrapping bonus. He however refused to accept payment of a
onemonth basic wage. Petitioner Yap insisted that he was entitled to 9 months
worth of wage, representing the unexpired portion of his contract with the company,
because he was illegally dismissed. Why does Yap think he was illegally dismissed?
Well because the management, upon knowing Petitioners request for transfer, gave
assurance to the latter that they will transfer him to another vessel, even asked him
to produce his electrician certificate for this purpose, but nevertheless didnt despite
having numerous other vessels. So there. Yap sued. All decisions from the Labor
Arbiter, to the NLRC, to the CA - found that respondents acted in bad faith when
they willfully failed to have Petitioner transferred to another vessel, thus amounting
Illegal Dismissal of Yap. Dispositive portions were similar where moral, exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees are concerned EXCEPT for the lump-sum basic wage
receivables (number of months) petitioner was entitled to by reason of his illegal
dismissal. Labor Arbiter 9 months of basic wage NLRC 3 months, but later reversed
to 9 months after an MR Court of Appeals 3 months Why do the courts differ in
computations? Sec 10 of RA 8042, says, to wit: In case of termination of overseas
employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract,
the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with
interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.

Issue/Holding

1. W/N Sec 10 of RA 8042 is unconstitutional? YES

2. W/N Respondents can challenge the computation of the basic salary ONLY on
appeal (in this case, the SC)? NO
Ratio

1. The decision didnt actually say much about this issue because while this case
was pending, the Supreme Court declared in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services,
Inc. that Sec 10 of RA 8042 really was unconstitutional. They found that by virtue of
that provision, fixed term OFW employees are made to waive 9 months for every
year of collectible backwages every time they have a year of unexpired term of
contract to reckon with AS COMPARED to other illegally dismissed workers, i.e., local
workers, other types of OFWs (not fixed term), who are guaranteed of reinstatement
and FULL backwages under the Labor Code. On Serrano, the Court held that the
subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; hence,
the same violates not just therein petitioners right to equal protection, but also his
right to substantive due process under the Constitution. On the aspect of the
Doctrine of Operative Fact, where when the declaration of a statute or part of it as
unconstitutional imposes an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid
law, the Court ruled that this will not apply to the case at bar. After all, it was not
the fault of petitioner that he lost his job due to an act of illegal dismissal
committed by respondents.

2. No. Matters not taken up below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
They must be seasonably in the proceedings before the lower tribunals. Questions
raised on appeal must be within the issues framed by the parties; consequently,
issues not raised before the lower tribunals cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.
Evelio Javier vs COMELEC & Arturo
Pacificador

Due Process impartial and competent court

Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of
the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of massive
terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election
returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the
armed men of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same
complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of
canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the
winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the
board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome
of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by
the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of
the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that
the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further,
Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of
Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2 ndDivision but the Constitute
requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency,
Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it
being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has
repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the
judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less
than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge
who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at
all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they
expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be
equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and
with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are
not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the
denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The
judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are
filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

CRISELDA C. GACAD, Complainant, vs. JUDGE HILARION P. CLAPIS, JR.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a Verified Complaint against Judge Clapis for Grave

Misconduct and Corrupt Practices, Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the
Law, and violations of Canon 1 (Rule 1.01, 1.02), Canon 2 (Rule 2.01), and Canon 3
(Rule 3.05) of the Code of Judicial Conduct relative to a criminal case.

Petitioner alleged that she met Judge Clapis at the Golden Palace Hotel in
Tagum City to talk about the case of her brother. The prosecutor of the said case,
Graciano Arafol, informed the petitioner that the Judge will do everything for her
favor but on the pretext that in return she has to give P50,000.00 to the Judge.
During the meeting, the Judge, after being satisfied of the promise of the petitioner
for that amount, told her "Sige, kay ako na bahala, gamuson nato ni sila." (Okay,
leave it all to me, we shall crush them.)

When the case was set on hearing, the Notices of Hearings were mailed to
the petitioner only after the date of hearing. Judge Clapis started conducting the bail
hearings without an application for bail and granting the same without affording the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. He set a
preliminary conference seven months from the date it was set, patently contrary to
his declaration of speedy trial for the case. However, the judge claimed that notices
were made verbally because of time constraints. Nevertheless, he stressed that
both sides were given the opportunity to be heard since in almost all proceedings,
petitioner was in court and the orders were done in open court. He admitted that his
personnel inadvertently scheduled the preliminary conference of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of the charges.

HELD: YES.
 Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of
law or standard of behavior in connection with ones performance of official
functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act
complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a
persistent disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment.

The acts of Judge Clapis in meeting the petitioner, a litigant in a case pending
before his sala and telling those words, constitute gross misconduct. Judge Clapis
wrongful intention and lack of judicial reasoning are made overt by the
circumstances on record. Judge Clapis cannot escape liability by shifting the blame
to his court personnel. He ought to know that judges are ultimately responsible for
order and efficiency in their courts, and the subordinates are not the guardians of
the judges responsibility.

The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together, give doubt as to his
impartiality, integrity and propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct
constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly: Canon 2,
Section 1 and 2; Canon 3, Section 2 and 4; and Canon 4, Section 1.

We also find Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the law for conducting
bail hearings without a petition for bail being filed by the accused and without
affording the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is
strong. Here, the act of Judge Clapis is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion
and judgment but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross
and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable
for gross ignorance of the law. If judges are allowed to wantonly misuse the powers
vested in them by the law, there will not only be confusion in the administration of
justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process.
Mayor Miguel Paderanga vs
Judge Cesar Azura
Due Process Hostility Between the Judge and the Parties Inhibition

Paderanga was the mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental. He petitioned that J Azura
inhibits himself from deciding on pending cases brought before him on the grounds that they
have lost confidence in him, that he entertained tax suits against the city and had issued
TROs on the sales of properties when it is clearly provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464) that
the remedy to stop auction is to pay tax, that J Azura is bias, oppressive and is abusive in
his power.

ISSUE: Whether or not J Azura should inhibit himself from the trial.

HELD: The SC ruled that Azura must. As decided in the Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160), All
the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all
judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide fairly
and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge
may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation But when suggestion is made of
record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against
a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind,
he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way
that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. . .

The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous
judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and
integrity of the judge . . .

FACTS:

The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint
committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary
investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the
2004 and 2007 elections.

The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007
National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of officials from
the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that
manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces
of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-
Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.

After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution

ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA,
et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint
Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid?

II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection
clause?

HELD: Petitions are DISMISSED.

FIRST ISSUE: The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid.

POLITICAL LAW: powers of COMELEC

Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and
functions of the Comelec. The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and
prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of
all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to the people
the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The constitutional grant of
prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.

Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is
vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same
provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting
arms of the government. Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the
exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had been lodged with the
Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant
to the continuing delegated authority given by the Comelec.

Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint Committee
and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional
bodys independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt
investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of
ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
SECOND ISSUE: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal
protection clause.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection

Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is
in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because its sole
purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They
insist that the Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as
well as public officials linked to the Arroyo Administration.

While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary
investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public
officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance
of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by
the Joint Committee.

The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is

intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does not demand
absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and
conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.

DISMISSED.

FACTS
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued
Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed
before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct against
petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent
members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana
Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which
arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five
Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of
Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to
submit their respective written explanations under oath. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam
manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of grave
misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and
docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman

EMERITA MUOZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. VICTORIANO R. YABUT, JR. AND SAMUEL

GO CHAN, Respondent

FACTS:

The subject property is a house and lot at No. 48 Scout Madrian St., Diliman,
Quezon City, formerly owned by Yee L. Ching.Yee L. Ching is married to Emilia M.
Ching (spouses Ching), Muoz's sister.Muoz' lived at the subject property with the
spouses Ching.As consideration for the valuable services rendered by Muoz' to the
spouses Ching's family, Yee L. Ching agreed to have the subject property
transferred to Muoz.By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, seemingly executed by
Yee L. Ching in favor of Muoz, the latter acquired a Transfer Certificate of Title.
However, in a Deed of Absolute Sale Muoz' purportedly sold the subject property to
her sister, Emilia M. Ching.As a result, TCT No. 186306 was cancelled and TCT No.
186366 was issued in Emilia M. Ching's name.Emilia M. Ching, in a Deed of
Absolute Sale sold the subject property to spouses Go Song and Tan Sio Kien
(spouses Go), hence, TCT No. 186366 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No.
258977 in the spouses Go's names.
Muoz registered her adverse claim to the subject property on TCT No. 258977 of the
spouses Go.uoz filed a complaint for the annulment of the deeds of absolute sale
and the cancellation of TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Go's names, and the
restoration and revival of TCT No. 186306 in Muoz's name. Muoz caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go.

The spouses Go obtained a loan of P500,000.00 from BPI Family Savings Bank
When the spouses Go defaulted on the payment of their loan, BPI Family foreclosed
the mortgage. BPI Family executed in favor of the spouses Samuel Go Chan and
Aida C. Chan (spouses Chan) a Deed of Absolute Sale. Consequently, TCT No. RT-
54376 (370364) in the name of BPI Family was cancelled and TCT No. 53297 was
issued in the spouses Chan's names on January 28, 1991.

G.R. No. 142676

Muoz' instituted before the MeTC a Complaint for Forcible Entry with Prayer for
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut.Muoz'
alleged in her complaint that she had been in actual and physical possession of the
subject property since January 10, 1994.Muoz prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction directing Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut and all
persons claiming right under them to vacate the subject property.

The MeTC adjudged that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was already
executed against the spouses Chan and there was, indeed, a turn-over of
possession of the subject property to Muoz'. Accordingly, the MeTC granted Muoz's
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, restoring
possession of the subject property to Muoz.

According to the RTC-Branch 88, the MeTC failed to distinguish the issue of finality
of the judgment of the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 from the
assertions of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut that the spouses Chan are not
covered by said final judgment because they are not successors-in-interest, assigns,
or privies of the spouses Go and they are purchasers of the subject property in good
faith.

The Court of Appeals held that the MeTC should have dismissed the forcible entry
case on the ground of "lis pendens"; that the spouses Chan were not parties in Civil
Case No. Q-28580, and impleading them only in the execution stage of said case
vitiated their right to due process; that the order of the RTC-Branch 95 involving the
spouses Chan in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was null and void, considering that they
are strangers to the case, and they are innocent purchasers for value of the subject
property; that the notice of lis pendens was already cancelled from the spouses Go's
certificate of title at the time they mortgaged the subject property to BPI Family; and
that the title to the subject property was already free of any and all liens and
encumbrances when the spouses Chan purchased the said property from BPI
Family.

G.R. No. 146718

Meanwhile, Muoz' filed before the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 a
Motion to Cite the Register of Deeds in Contempt of Court for the failure of the
Register of Deeds to restore Muoz's TCT. The Register of Deeds could not cancel
the spouses Chan's TCT No. 53297, the subsisting certificate of title over the subject
property, absent any authority or directive for him to do so.

The RTC-Branch 95 denied all of Muoz's motions.The RTC-Branch 95 was of the

view that Samuel Go Chan's title should be litigated in another forum, not in Civil
Case No. Q-28580 where the judgment had already become final and executory.The
RTC-Branch 95 also stressed that since the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580
had long become final and executory, it could no longer be changed or amended
except for clerical error or mistake.

Attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC-Branch 95 in issuing its
Orders Muoz' filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which
was remanded to the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC-
Branch 95 that the spouses Chan could not be covered by the alias writ of execution
considering that they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-28580.The
cancellation of TCT No. 53297 in the spouses Chan's names could not be done
apart from a separate action exclusively for that matter.The spouses Chan are
deemed buyers in good faith and for value as the certificate of title delivered to them
by BPI Family was free from any liens or encumbrances or any mark that would
have raised the spouses Chan's suspicions.

ISSUE: Whether Muoz is the rightful owner of the subject property?

HELD: YES.
CIVIL LAW: Action for reconveyance of property, Forcible entry

G.R. No. 146718

Civil Case No. Q-28580 is an action for reconveyance of real property. An action for
declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-
conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular
individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.Any judgment therein
is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.

Since they were not impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to participate in
Civil Case No. Q-28580, the final judgment in said case cannot bind BPI Family and
the spouses Chan.The effect of the said judgment cannot be extended to BPI Family
and the spouses Chan by simply issuing an alias writ of execution against them.No
man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to
a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court.In the same manner, a
writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not
have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the
judgment therein and by writs of execution issued pursuant thereto.

Although the RTC-Branch 95 had declared with finality in Civil Case No. Q-28580
that the titles of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go were null and void, there is yet
no similar determination on the titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan.The
question of whether or not the titles to the subject property of BPI Family and the
spouses Chan are null and void, since they are merely the successors-in-interest,
assigns, or privies of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, ultimately depends on
the issue of whether or not BPI Family and the spouses Chan obtained their titles to
the subject property in bad faith, i.e., with notice of Muoz's adverse claim and
knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-28580.The latter is a factual issue
on which we cannot rule in the present petition, not only because we are not a trier
of facts, but more importantly, because it was not among the issues raised and tried
in Civil Case No. Q-28580.

Muoz's legal remedy is to directly assail in a separate action the validity of the
certificates of title of BPI Family and the spouses Chan.

G.R. No. 142676

There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of
land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such
cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on
who has the prior possession de facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us
that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction:
first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property, and second,
he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means
provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, i.e., by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution thereof, what is
important is determining who is entitled to the physical possession of the property.
Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may recover
such possession even from the owner himself since such cases proceed
independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior
possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the RTC-Branch 88 erred in ordering the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 even before completion of the proceedings before
the MeTC.At the time said case was ordered dismissed by RTC-Branch 88, the
MeTC had only gone so far as holding a hearing on and eventually granting Muoz's
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

Nonetheless, even though the peculiar circumstances extant herein do not justify the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286, they do require limiting pro hac vice the reliefs the
MeTC may accord to Muoz' in the event that she is able to successfully prove
forcible entry by Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut into the subject property (i.e., that
the sheriff actually turned-over to Muoz' the possession of the subject property on
January 10, 1994, and that she was deprived of such possession by Samuel Go
Chan and Atty. Yabut on February 2, 1994 by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, and stealth). Taking into account our ruling in G.R. No. 146718 - that the
final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 does not extend to the spouses Chan, who
were not impleaded as parties to the said case - the MeTC is precluded from
granting to Muoz' relief, whether preliminary or final, that will give her possession of
the subject property.Otherwise, we will be perpetuating the wrongful execution of the
final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580.Based on the same reason, Muoz' can no
longer insist on the reinstatement of the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994 granting a
preliminary mandatory injunction that puts her in possession of the subject property
during the course of the trial. Muoz' though may recover damages if she is able to
prove wrongful deprivation of possession of the subject property from February 2,
1994 until the finality of this decision in G.R. No. 146718.
Filemon David vs Judge
Gregorio Aquilizan et al
Due Process Hearing

David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato. He let Felomeno Jugar and
Ricardo Jugar tend and caretake separate portions of his land in 1971. The land is
estimated to be yielding 60-70 cavans of corn cobs an dthe share agreed upon is 50-50. In
1973, David withdrew the land from the brothers and has not allowed them to go back there.
The brothers prayed for reinstatement but David refused to do so. David denied that the
borthers were his tenants. He said that Ricardo was his tractor driver before but he resigned
to take care of his dad and to work for DOLE. Fewlomeno on the other hand surrendered
the portion of the land he was tending to continue his faith healing. J Aquilizan handled the
case filed by the brothers against David and after three months he rendered a decision in
favor of the brothers without any hearing. David averred he was denied due process. J
Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no hearing conducted but he said the decision has
already become final and executory as the period for appeal has already lapsed.

ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and
void and may be attacked directly or collaterally. The decision is null and void for want of
due process. And it has been held that a final and executory judgment may be set aside
with a view to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment is void for lack of due process
of law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no judgment has been rendered at all.

Anita Lorenzana vs Polly

Cayetano
Due Process Hearing
Lorenzana was renting a parcel of land from the Manila Railroad Company (later from the
Bureau of Lands). She later purchased the land (San Lazaro Estate). She had the property
be rented to tenants occupying stalls. Due to nonpayment of rents, she filed 12 ejectment
cases against her tenant. On the other hand, Cayetano was an occupant of a parcel of land
adjacent to that of Lorenzanas land. Cayetano was renting the same from the Bureau of
Lands. The lower court granted Lorenzanas ejectment cases. Lorenzana then secured a
writ of execution to forcibly eject her tenants but she included to eject Cayetanos property.
Cayetano was not a party to the ejectment cases so she prayed for the lower court that her
property be not touched. The lower court denied Cayetanos petition. The CA, upon appeal,
favored Cayetano. Lorenzana averred that Cayetano is now a party to the ejectment cases
as she already brought herself to the Courts jurisdiction by virtue of her appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cayetanos right to due process has been violated.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Cayetano and has affirmed the CA. It must be noted that
respondent was not a party to any of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition
had been issued; she did not make her appearance in and during the pendency of these
ejectment cases. Cayetano only went to court to protect her property from demolition after
the judgment in the ejectment cases had become final and executory. Hence, with respect
to the judgment in said ejectment cases, Cayetano remains a third person to such
judgment, which does not bind her; nor can its writ of execution be informed against her
since she was not afforded her day in court in said ejectment cases.

Caoile vs Vivo
This case is an offshoot of G.R. No. L-22354, decided by this Court on March 31, 1965.
It will be recalled that the herein private respondents are Chinese citizens who, on various
dates, arrived in the Philippines as temporary visitors, and succeeded in securing several
extensions of their stay in this country.
On or about February, 1962, allegedly upon solicitation of the then Macapagal
administration for foreign capital, five of these respondents requested the President of the
Philippines to be allowed to invest some money in the Philippines. The request was
indorsed by the then Acting Commissioner of Immigration who suggested favorable action
thereon, in line with the socio-economic policy of the Government. While their requests
were pending, the said aliens sought further extensions of their stay as temporary visitors
but these were denied by the President; portion of the letter of denial reads thus:
As to your request for presidential sanction on the desire of said aliens to make investments
in the Philippines and for guidance on the procedure to be followed in the implementation of
their investment projects, it is suggested that the matter be taken up directly with the
Chairman of the National Economic Council and the Secretary of Commerce and Industry
who may thereafter make the necessary recommendation to this Office.
On August 29, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration issued Circular No. 101 providing
that the authorized stay of all "bonded alien temporary visitors who arrived in the Philippines
in 1961 and prior years are hereby terminated, and requests for extension of such periods
will not be entertained and that all said aliens should leave not later than September 19,
1962, if their prior authorized stay expires later than September 19, 1962, and those having
dates of expiry before said date should leave on the corresponding expiry dates."
Alleging that the Commissioner of Immigration acted with abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of and/or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the said circular, the aliens filed with the Court
of First Instance of Manila a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of said circular. The lower court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction against the Commissioner and granted the prayer to allow the said
aliens to deposit with the court their extension fees.
After a protracted trial, the lower court rendered judgment, thus:
... This court is of the opinion that the public interest that is warranted in the exercise of the
provisions of this Section 47 (a) 2 is clearly the official government invitation of foreign
capital mentioned prominently in the said presidential directive of July 31st and August 17th
as the basis of the authority granted the herein petitioners allowing them to invest in the
Philippines. And the covering law of their immigration status is Section 47 (a) 2 already
aforestated legally vesting the petitioners with the status of special non-immigrant under the
said covering law. The Immigration Circular No. V-101 is inapplicable to the instant case of
the petitioners inasmuch as said circular seeks application on temporary visitors and aliens
other than those covered by the exercise of the provisions of Section 47 of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 and Petitioners are held by this Court to be under the provisions of
Section 47.
The Commissioner of Immigration was by that decision ordered to register the aliens as
special non-immigrants under Section 47(a) 2 of the Immigration Act of 1940, in lieu of their
recorded non-immigrant status; to authorize them to continue operating their business
establishment until December 31, 1967, and to liquidate their business investments,
repatriate their capital and depart for their country of origin on or before said date; and
making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction theretofore issued.
Upon appeal here (said G.R. No. L-22354) the CFI decision was reversed, this Court
declaring:
... the appellees without right to stay in the Philippines and/or to be considered special non-
immigrants; the respondent Commissioner of Immigration with power and authority to order
their departure. It is further ordered that appellees return the amount of P1,700.00 to the
government and of P10.00 per month extension fees, from the time they began staying in
the Philippines, over and beyond the period authorized by the Commissioner of Immigration
until they leave. The injunction by the lower court having been issued illegally and
improvidently, should be as it is hereby, dissolved. Costs against appellees.
The aliens failed to leave the country upon finality of the decision. Instead, on October 11,
1965, they wrote the Commissioner of Immigration requesting that they be allowed the "use
and enjoyment of their rights to a valid and lawful extended stay decreed in their favor by
the Supreme Court of the Philippines in its decision in Case No. G.R. L-22354, at least
temporarily until they leave and depart for their country of origin not earlier than the
termination of President Macapagal's Socio Economic Program."
This request was denied by the Commissioner of Immigration and so the aliens filed again
with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a petition for mandamus with preliminary
injunction praying for judgment ordering the respondent to accept and receipt for all monthly
payments of P10.00 per person extension fees; and ordering the respondent Commissioner
to schedule the departure of the aliens not earlier than the period contemplated in the socio-
economic program of the President (Civil Case No. 63135).
On October 29, 1965, the herein respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance gave due
course to the petition and issued an order directing the Commissioner of Immigration "to
desist from executing the acts complained of."
This petition seeks to annul the said order of October 29, 1965.
Requiring the herein respondents to answer the petition, this Court, at the commencement
of these proceedings on December 23, 1965, issued a writ of preliminary injunction,
restraining the respondent Judge, in the meanwhile, from enforcing the order dated October
29, 1965, and from otherwise taking cognizance of and assuming jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. 63135.
On January 3, 1966, counsel for herein private respondents filed with this Court a
manifestation praying that the case be dismissed for lack of cause of action, attaching
thereto a true copy of a "Motion to Withdraw Petition" in Civil Case No. 63135, filed by said
respondents in the Court below, pertinent portions of which read:
1) That by virtue of a Supreme Court resolution dated December 14, 1965, copy attached
as ANNEX "A" hereof received by petitioners on December 24, 1965, thru ordinary mail,
and issued in Case No. G. R. L-22354 (Kwok Kam Lien, et al. vs. The Hon. M. P. Vivo, etc.)
the Supreme Court has just remanded to this very court the said Case No. G. R. L-22354;
2) That meanwhile, when this case was filed with this Honorable Court on October 28,
1965; it was after respondent Commissioner of Immigration sought to arrest your petitioners
on October 22, 1965, two (2) days after the reglementary period expired since petitioners
received the denial of their last motion to reconsider the Supreme Court decision in said
Case No. L-22354 which denial was received by petitioners on September 25, 1965, such
that the cause of action of your petitioners in this case was based primarily on the Supreme
court decision having become final and executory on October 20, 1965;
3) That the aforestated resolution of the Supreme Court dated December 14, 1965, was in
virtue of a separate motion for reconsideration NG HUI CHING, which in effect further
extended the reglementary period without the knowledge of herein petitioners;
4) That in view of the said resolution of the Supreme Court dated December 14, 1965, the
instant petition with this Honorable Court in the above-entitled case is now left without
support on its cause of action and therefore your petitioners has no other alternative than to
withdraw their petition in this case.
In the meanwhile, this Court denied the prayer for dismissal of the petition. The Solicitor
General then filed his memorandum for the petitioner. In their reply memorandum,
respondents reiterate their prayer for dismissal of the case, calling our attention to the fact
that the Solicitor General, while having discussed the issues raised, has forgotten to make
mention of the above-quoted manifestation filed by respondents.
The respondent judge was served with the writ of preliminary injunction, issued by this
Court, a day before respondents' withdrawal motion in Civil Case No. 63135. Said injunction
having restrained him from further taking cognizance of the case, the Judge could not issue
any order of dismissal pursuant to the motion, although from the facts above narrated, the
discontinuance of Civil Case No. 63135 will not possibly yield any disadvantage or prejudice
upon the Government. The respondent Judge should thus grant the respondent's motion to
withdraw and thereby dissolve the restraining order issued therein on October 29, 1965.
Upon the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the withdrawal of said Civil Case No.
63135 in the court below, this case has become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed, without costs, with the pronouncement,
however, that the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-22354 be immediately and fully
implemented. Costs against private respondents.
GREGORIO LOBETE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CARLOS SUNDIAM, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXVIII, THE CHAIRMAN
AND BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

Ceferino A. Baquizal for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

For failure of petitioner to perfect his appeal within the reglementary period, the present petition for
certiorari was filed seeking nullification of respondent court's Order dated December 14, 1973
disapproving the record on appeal as well as the Order dated February 21, 1973 dismissing the
complaint for recovery of a sum of money on ground of prescription.

Herein petitioner, Gregorio Lobete, a bona fide USAFFE Veteran of World War II filed a complaint
with the former Court of First Instance of Manila seeking the payment to him by the Philippine
Veterans Administration, of salary differential pursuant to Republic Act No. 65. On June 30, 1972, the
respondent court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Upon a motion for reconsideration filed
by private respondents, respondent court reconsidered and reversed its decision and dismissed the
case. It held that the cause of action over the claim of the petitioner for his monthly pension of P
100.00 from July, 1957 and the additional monthly pension at the rate of P 10.00 for each of his
seven unmarried minor children had legally and factually accrued as of the approval of the last
amendment of RA 65 on July 22, 1957; and that it appearing that this instant action was filed before
this Court on December 24, 1971, the ten (10) year period within which to file an action upon an
obligation claimed under the law, pursuant to Article 144 of the New Civil Code has long prescribed.

On March 29, 1973 petitioner filed a notice of appeal and a record on appeal. Private respondents
filed an opposition to the record on appeal on grounds that it was not afforded at least five (5) days
from receipt within which to oppose the same in accordance with Section 7, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, and that said record on appeal failed to include material parts of a pleading and orders of the
court.

On March 31, 1973 respondent court issued an order approving the record on appeal prompting
private respondents to file a motion for reconsideration. On May 5, 1973 respondent court
reconsidered and set aside its previous order of March 31, 1973 and set the case for hearing on May
26, 1973. After hearing, the lower court issued an order dated May 26, 1973 requiring petitioner to
amend the record on appeal and to incorporate therein certain pleadings and orders. Petitioner
received the order on May 30, 1973.

On November 14, 1973 or five and a half (5 1/2) months later, petitioner filed a supplemental record
on appeal to which private respondents filed an opposition. On December 14, 1973, respondent
court, after hearing, disapproved the record on appeal as well as the supplemental record on appeal
for having been filed out of time and for non-compliance with the court's order.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, the present case was instituted claiming
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion:

1. ... in giving due course to, instead of denying, respondents' motion for
reconsideration of the decision in the case in favor of the petitioner, which motion
was fatally defective but later surreptitiously corrected under dubious circumstances;

2. ... in reversing its well-reasoned decision of June 20, 1972, and ordering the
dismissal of the case on a different and surprising ground of prescription which issue
was never seriously raised at the start, but as a matter of fact was deemed excluded
or waived at the pre-trial;

3. ... in disapproving plaintiff-appellant's record on appeal on ground of sheer form

and technicality at the expense of substantive justice;

4. ... in not upholding its decision of June 20, 1972, in the case which is in conformity
with law and the evidence, and in accord with the applicable rulings of the Supreme
Court in the similar veterans cases of Begosa vs. PVA, 32 SCRA 466 and Teoxon vs.
PVA, 33 SCRA 585.

At the outset, it should be underscored that petitioner failed seasonably to perfect his appeal. In an
order dated May 26, 1973, the court a quo required petitioner to amend the record on appeal which
order was received by petitioner on May 30, 1973. No period was set by the lower court for the
submission of an amended record on appeal. However, Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is
explicit on the period within which a party should submit an amended record on appeal. Thus, said
section provides:

... If the trial judge orders the amendment of the record, the appellant, within the time
limited in the order, or such extension thereof as may be granted, or if no time is fixed
by the order within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, shall redraft the record by
including therein, in their proper chronological sequence, such additional matters as
the court may have directed him to incorporate, and shall thereupon submits the
redraft record for approval, upon notice to the appellee, in like manner as the original
draft. "

Pursuant to the above provision, petitioner had only ten (10) days, or until June 9, 1973, to file an
amended record on appeal. However, he filed a supplemental record on appeal only on November 4,
1973 or five and a half (5 1/2) months thereafter. Hence, the lower court properly disapproved the
same in its order dated December 14, 1973, because petitioner's failure to take the necessary steps
for the amendment of the record on appeal within the time prescribed by the rules is one of the
grounds for the dismissal of an appeal. 1

In the present petition, petitioner has dwelt at length into the merits of the case which is not in issue
as this is a petition for certiorari and not an appeal, for which reason the same cannot be
entertained. Settled is the rule that the writ of certiorari may not be availed of to make up for the loss,
through omission or oversight, of the right to appeal. 2 Petitioner was not denied or deprived of the right
to appeal as he was ordered by the court a quo to file an amended record on appeal. However, he
complied with said order after a lapse of five and one half (5 1/2) months, hence he lost his right to appeal
due to his own fault for which he alone is to blame. Time and again We have dismissed petitions for
certiorari to annul decisions or orders which could have, but have not, been appealed. 3

In view of the foregoing, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Valladolid vs Inciong
FACTS:
Ricardo Valladolid, petitioner, in was employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephoneswitchboa
rd operator. He was subsequently transferred to the position of clerk-collectorby the
president of JRM. The transfer was motivated by the interception of business
andconfidential matters to a competitor hotel by (allegedly) Villadolid who was then
workingas a switchboard operator and while serving in his capacity as clerk/collector,
copies
of Accounts Receivables reached the competitor hotel (Tropicana Apartment- Hotel)altho
ugh said copies were not referred to them. That to finally and fully confirmedsuspicions
that Ricardo Valladolid was the person responsible for the aforementioneddisclosures, a
plan for the entrapment was conceived by the Copacabana Apartment-Hotel. After the
entrapment scheme had been effected, Valladolid filed a written requestfor a 5 day
vacation leave which was extended to 30 days. When he went back to work, JRM
refused to admit him and instead asked him to resign. RM maintains that Valladolidleft
the office that same day and never returned, because he was reprimanded for
hisunauthorized absences. Valladolid later on filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal
withvacation and sick leave pay. The Ministry ruled that the application for clearance
with preventive suspension is
deniedand respondent (JRM) is hereby ordered to reinstate complainant (Valladolid) to hi
sformer position without backwages and without loss of seniority rights. Valladolidappeal
ed the foregoing order to the Minister of Labor seeking modification of the same,praying
for the award of backwages from the time he was illegally dismissed but theDeputy
Minister of Labor (Inciong) dismissed both appeals after finding "no
sufficient justification or valid reason to alter, modify, much less reverse the Order
appealed from.
ISSUE:
1.WON the non-award of backwages raised by Valladolid claiming that the Orders
of Deputy Minister of Labor are contrary to law and evidence.2.WON JRM was deprived
of due process when the Deputy Minister of Laborsustained the finding of respondent
Regional Director that there is no evidence tosupport the dismissal of private respondent.
HELD:
Petitions for certiorari are DENIED.

ANGLO-FIL TRADING CORPORATION VS.

LAZARO, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011

GR # L-54958 September 2, 1983 (Constitutional Law Police Power, Stevedoring)

FACTS: Respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) implemented a policy of integrating contractors engaged in
stevedoring services and have only one stevedoring contractor to engage in cargo-handling services in Manila South
Harbor to insure efficiency and economy in cargo-handling operation and provide better service to port users and to
amply protect the interest of labor and the government as well. The evaluation of performance of existing contractors
made by a special committee created by PPA resulted to an award in favor of Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI).

Petitioners with hold-over permits, contends that the award is invalid because contracts entered into with local and
foreign clients or customers would be impaired.

ISSUE: Whether or not PPA have the power and authority to award an exclusive stevedoring contract in favor of
respondent OTSI.

HELD: Yes. Manila South Harbor is a public property owned by the State, wherein operations of the port including
stevedoring services are subject to regulation and control for the public good and interest of the general welfare. In
addition, the contract clause cannot override the police power enacting public regulations intended for the general
welfare.

Petition Denied.

UP VS DIZON
FACTS:

University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction

Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for
the construction and renovation of the buildings in the campus of the UP
in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing. However, the
third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by
the Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to
collect the unpaid balance.

On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay
Stern Builders. Then on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for
reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said motion
was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal
Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of
record of the UP but the OLS inDiliman, Quezon City.

Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the

RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of
time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued
the writ of execution.

On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The
denial became final and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC
its motion for execution despite their previous motion having already
been granted and despite the writ of execution having already issued. On
June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May
9, 2003 (although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on
October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment
to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release of the funds.

Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the

RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the UPs funds can be validly garnished?

HELD: The petition for review is meritorious.

FIRST ISSUE: UPs funds, being government funds, are not subject to
garnishment.

POLITICAL LAW: garnishment of public funds; suability vs. liability of the

State

Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a

"chartered institution" performing a legitimate government function.
Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the
States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible
education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special
funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870
and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly
appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act
1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the
possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of
such funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the
disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UPs mission and
purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds
of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include
the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that
may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives.

A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its

liability. As the Court succinctly stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union v. Firme: A distinction should first be made between suability and
liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability
on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a
state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other
hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.
Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself
to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only
giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable.

The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The
execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the
primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final
and executory decision already validated the claim against the UP.

People vs Beriales

Facts: A case of three men who were charged for the murder of Saturnina on Sept.
13, 1974. During the hearing on Nov. 26, 1974, upon motion of the defense the
Court ordered the re-investigation of the case pending submission of the Fiscal of its
reports. Couple of postponements was made until Dec. 13, 1974 hearing when the
Court proceeded with the arraignment and trial in the absence of the Fiscal and its
report on re-investigation, and over the disagreement of the defense. The CFI of
Leyte relied on the private prosecutor being authorized by the Fiscal to present
evidence and the defense presumed to have waived its right over its disagreement.
Trial then proceeded and the 3 found guilty of he offense. Thus, this appeal on the
constitutional requirement of due process.

Issue: Whether or not due process of law had been observed.

Held: Constitutional due process was violated, thus, case remanded to CFI for
arraignment and trial. Court should have held in abeyance the trial while the report
on e-investigation was still pending. Consistent disregard of the defense objection
on the arraignment, trial, presentation of private prosecutors evidence, and
rendition of judgment violates due process. Prosecutor or Fiscal entrusted with the
investigation is duty bound to take charge until final termination. They shall have
direction and control of the criminal prosecution over private prosecutors.

Imelda Marcos vs
Sandiganbayan
Due Process

Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious
transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light
Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1 st Division of the Sandiganbayan. The division
was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as associate justices.
No decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienzas dissent in favor of Imeldas
innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the SB to include JJ Amores
and Cipriano as additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days
to send in his manifestation. On the date of Amores request, Garchitorena received
manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with
J Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the special
division and have the issue be raised to the SB en banc for it would already be pointless to
wait for Amores manifestation granted that a majority has already decided on Imeldas
favor. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.

HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no strong
showing of Imeldas guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of due
process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amores manifestation. Such procedural
flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its decision
convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5)
justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that
stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new
justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view of
the cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia
may change their mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the
turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores
and del Rosario. It may be true that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion
during an informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that
opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was denied the
opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice Garchitorena
dissolved the Special Division.

MALIKSI VS COMELEC

During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for
the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite
alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts.
Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision,
declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist
from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the
meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksis motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was
then installed as Mayor. In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice
to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images
from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit
the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images.
Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit. On
August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTCs decision and
declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor. Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging
that he had been denied his right to due process because he had not been notified of the decryption
proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary
evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots
had not been preserved. On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny
Maliksis motion for reconsideration. Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari,
reiterating his objections to the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images without
prior notice to him, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings
conducted by the First Division. In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Court, by a vote
of 8-7, dismissed Maliksis petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been
denied due process because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images by the First Division referring to the orders of the First Division
directing Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the decryption and printing of the
ballot images; and (b) he had been able to raise his objections to the decryption in his motion for
reconsideration. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in
deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the
ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same
evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First
Divisions finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully
established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the revision. Hence,
Maliksi filed the petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: W/O Maliksi was deprived of due process when the COMELEC First Division ordered on
appeal the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images in the CF cards.
 HELD: The petition was dismissed. Maliksi alleged that he was denied due process when the
COMELEC First Division directed the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images in
the CF cards for the first time on appeal without notice to him, thus depriving him of his right to be
present and observe the decryption proceedings. The records also showed that Maliksi was aware
of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division. The
COMELEC First Division issued an Order dated 28 March 2012 directing Saquilayan to deposit the
required amount for expenses for the supplies, honoraria, and fee for the decryption of the CF cards,
and a copy of the Order was personally delivered to Maliksis counsel. Maliksis counsel
was likewise given a copy of Saquilayans Manifestation of Compliance with the 28 March 2012
Order. In an Order dated 17 April 2012, the COMELEC First Division directed Saquilayan to deposit
an additional amount for expenses for the printing of additional ballot images from four clustered
precincts, and a copy of the Order was again personally delivered to Maliksi s counsel. The
decryption took weeks to finish. Clearly, Maliksi was not denied due process. He received notices of
the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division. In
addition, Maliksi raised his objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc. The Court has ruled: x x x. The essence of due process, we have consistently
held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is
the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential.
The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. x x x. There is no denial of due process where there is
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings. It is settled that opportunity
to be heard does not only mean oral arguments in court but also written arguments through
pleadings. Thus, the fact that a party was heard on his motion for reconsideration negates any
violation of the right to due process. The Court has ruled that denial of due process cannot be
invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. Maliksi
vs. COMELEC April 11, 2013 In Maliksis Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration he
argued that the Supreme Court en banc gravely erred in dismissing the instant petition despite a
clear violation of petitioners constitutional right to due process of law considering that
decryption, printing and examination of the digital images of the ballots, which is the basis for the
assailed 14 September 2012 resolution of the public respondent, which in turn affirmed the 15
August 2012 resolution of the COMELEC First Division, were done inconspicuously upon a motu
proprio directive of the COMELEC First Division sans any notice to the petitioner, and for the first
time on appeal. HELD: The Court grants Maliksis Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,
and reverses the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First Division of
the COMELEC denied to him the right to due process by failing to give due notice on the decryption
and printing of the ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount proceedings
conducted by the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot images. It bears stressing at
the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the assailed recount proceedings
because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of procedure
allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount proceedings authorized under
Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the
COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election
protests involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city officials. As we see
it, the First Division arbitrarily arrogated unto itself the conduct of the recount proceedings, contrary
to the regular procedure of remanding the protest to the RTC and directing the reconstitution of the
Revision Committee for the decryption and printing of the picture images and the revision of the
ballots on the basis thereof. Quite unexpectedly, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the First
Divisions unwarranted deviation from the standard procedures by invoking the
COMELECs power to take such measures as [the Presiding Commissioner] may deem
proper, and even citing the Courts minute resolution in Alliance of Barangay Concerns
(ABC) Party-List v. Commission on Elections5 to the effect that the COMELEC has the power to
adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases. The Court will not interfere with
its exercise of this prerogative so long as the parties are amply heard on their opposing claims.
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on Elections,
the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases
should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties the opportunity to be heard on their
opposing claims. The parties right to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to
be waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of the possibility of the substantial
prejudice to be thereby caused to the parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc
should not have upheld the First Divisions deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of
speedily resolving the election protest, in view of its failure to provide the parties with notice of its
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of due process.

PEDRO CALANO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PEDRO CRUZ, respondent-appellee.

J. R. Nuguid for appellant.

Emilio A. Gangcayco for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

For purposes of the present appeal the following facts, not disputed, may be briefly stated. As a
result of the 1951 elections respondent Pedro Cruz was proclaimed a councilor-elect in the
municipality of Orion, Bataan, by the Municipal Board of Canvasser. Petitioner Pedro Calano filed a
complaint or petition for quo warranto under section 173 of the Revised election code (Republic Act
No. 180), contesting the right of Cruz to the office on the ground that Cruz was not eligible for the
office of municipal councilor. In his prayer petitioner besides asking for other remedies which in law
and equity he is entitled to, asked that after declaring null and void the proclamation made by the
Municipal Board of Canvasser in November, 1951, to the effect that Cruz was councilor-elect, he
(Calano) be declared the councilor elected in respondent's place.

Acting upon a motion to dismiss the petition, the Court of First Instance of Bataan issued the order of
December 27, 1951, dismissing the petition for quo warranto on the ground that it was filed out of
time, and also because petitioner had no legal capacity to sue as contended by respondent. On
appeal to this Court by petitioner from the order of dismissal, in a decision promulgated on may 7,
1952, we held that the petition was filed within the period prescribed by law; and that although the
petition might be regarded as somewhat defective for failure to state a sufficient cause of action, said
question was not raised in the motion to dismiss because the ground relied upon, namely, that
petitioner had no legal capacity to sue, did not refer to the failure to state a sufficient cause of action
but rather to minority, insanity, coverture, lack of juridical personality, or nay other disqualification of a
party. As a result, the order of dismissal was reversed and the case was remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings.

Upon the return of the case to the trial court, respondent again moved for dismissal on the ground
that the petition failed to state a sufficient cause of action, presumably relying upon the observation
made by us in our decision. Further elaborating on our observation that the petition did not state a
sufficient cause of action, we said that paragraphs 3 and 8 of the petition which reads thus

8. Que el recurrente tenia y tiene derecho a ocupar el cargo de concejal de Orion, Bataan, si
no habia sido proclamado electo concejal de Orion, Bataan, al aqui recurrido.

3. Que el recurrente era candidato a concejal del municipio de Orion, Bataan con el
certificado de candidatura dedidamente presentado, y registrado asi como tambien fue
votado y elegido para dicho cargo, en la eleccion del 13 de noviembre de 1951. (Emphasis
supplied)

were conclusions of law and not statement of facts.

The trial court sustained the second motion to dismiss in its order of September 30, 1952, on the
ground that the petition failed to state a sufficient cause of action. Again petitioner has appealed from
that order to this court.

Appellant urges that the trial court erred not only in not holding that the motion to dismiss was filed
out of time but also in declaring that the complaint failed to state a sufficient cause of action. In
answer respondent-appellee contends that the appeal should not have been given due course by
the trial court because under the law there is no appeal from a decision of a court of First Instance in
protests against the eligibility or election of a municipal councilor, the appeal being limited to election
contests involving the offices of Provincial governor, Members of the Provincial Board, City
Councilors and City Mayors, this under section 178 of the Revised Election Code.

In the past we had occasion to rule upon a similar point of law. In the case of Marquez vs.
Prodigalidad, 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 11, p. 204, we held that section 178 of the Revised election
code limiting appeals from decisions of Courts of First Instance in election contests over the offices
of Provincial Governor, members of the Provincial Board, City Councilors and City Mayors, did not
intend to prohibit or prevent the appeal to the Supreme Court in protests involving purely questions
of law, that is to say, that protests involving other officers such as municipal councilor may be
appealed provided that only legal questions are involved in the appeal. Consequently, the appeal in
the present case involving as it does purely questions of law is proper.

Going to the question of sufficiency of cause of action, it should be stated that our observation when
the case came up for the first time on appeal was neither meant nor intended as a rule or doctrine.
We were merely considering the main prayer contained in appellant's petition, namely, that he be
declared councilor-elect in the place of the respondent-appellee. In other words, we only observed
that petitioner could not properly ask for his proclamation as councilor-elect without alleging and
stating not mere conclusions of law but facts showing that he had the right and was entitled to the
granting of his main prayer.
Considering the subject of cause of action in its entirety, it will be noticed that section 173 of the
Revised Election Code provides that when a person who is not eligible is elected, any registered
candidate for the same office like the petitioner-appellant in this case, may contest his right to the
office by filing a petition for quo warranto. To legalize the contest this section just mentioned does not
require that the contestant prove that he is entitled to the office. In the case Llamoso vs. Ferrer, 47
Off. Gaz., No. 2, p. 727, wherein petitioner Llamoso who claimed to have received the next highest
number of votes for the post of Mayor, contested the right of respondent Ferrer to the office for which
he was proclaimed elected, on the ground of ineligibility, we held that section 173 of the Revised
election Code while providing that any registered candidate may contest the right of one elected to
any provincial or municipal office on the ground of ineligibility, it does not provide that if the contestee
is later declared ineligible, the contestant will be proclaimed elected. In other words, in that case, we
practically declared that under section 173, any registered candidate may file a petition for quo
warranto on the ground of ineligibility, and that would constitute a sufficient cause of action. It is not
necessary for the contestant to claim that if the contestee is declared ineligible, he (contestant) be
declared entitled to the office. As a matter of fact, in case of Llamoso vs. Ferrer, we declared the
office vacant.

In view of the foregoing, the failure of Calano to allege that he is entitled to the office of councilor
now occupied by the respondent Cruz does not effect the sufficiency of his cause of action.
Reversing the order of dismissal, the case is hereby remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. No costs.

Emilio Gancayco
vs City Government of Quezon City and MMDA
Ponente: Sereno

Facts:

In 1950s, retired justice Emilio Gancayco bought a parcel of land

located in EDSA. Then on March 1956, Quezon City Council issued
Ordinance No. 2904 requiring the construction of arcades for
commercial buildings to be constructed. At the outset, it bears
emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city
council, there was yet no building code passed by the national
legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings
was left to the discretion of local government units. Under this
particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is
to be created by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing
the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the
building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge
of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the
first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the
space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for
their own purposes.

The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco.

Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the
exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his
property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be
exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice
Gancaycos request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66, subject
to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner
shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said
arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands.

Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to clear

obstructions along EDSA, in consequence, they sent a notice of
demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his
building violated the National Building Code.

Gancayco did not comply with the notice and filed a petition for
TRO with the RTC Quezon City to prohibit the MMDA from demolishing
his property. The RTC rendered its Decision on 30 September 2003 in
favor of Justice Gancayco. It held that the questioned ordinance
was unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. The RTC said
that because 67.5 square meters out of Justice Gancaycos 375
square meters of property were being taken without compensation for
the publics benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and
oppressive. It likewise held that the ordinance violated owners
right to equal protection of laws.

MMDA appealed with the CA. CA held that the MMDA went beyond its
powers when it demolished the subject property. It further found
that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets,
avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro
Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancaycos private property. Lastly,
the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to
declare, prevent or abate nuisances.

Issues: (1) WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM

ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 2904. (2) WHETHER OR NOT
ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.(3) WHETHER OR NOT THE WING
WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCOS BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE. (4)
WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE
GANCAYCO.

Ruling:

(1) We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it

made the undertaking to comply with all issuances of the BIR, which
at that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any
false misrepresentation or misleading act.
(2) Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground
of equal protection when he also benefited from the exemption. It
bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an
exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was
eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the
exemption at the time of the demolition as there was yet no valid
notice from the city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be
attacked with regard to its different treatment of properties that
appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the
proper person to do so.
(3) The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an
exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication that the
wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing
walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of
persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a
structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a
nuisance. Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to
construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did
not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a
threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone
should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the
structure.

Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance

per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to
find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such
thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the
extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance
which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things
must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.

MMDA illegally demolished Gancayco's property.

Zambales Chromite Mining

et al vs Court of Appeals
Due Process Administrative Due Process

ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them be
declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz,
Zambales. They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and Pabiloa.
Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the case before the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned as the Sec of
Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit himself from deciding on the appeal but he
instead affirmed his earlier decision when he was still the director of mines. ZCM then
appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that
the disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules
of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining
Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an
appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a
ground for disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from
deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily and with
bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA
reversed Gozons finding and declared that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to Martinez
et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that the factual basis found by Gozon as
Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA reconsidered after realizing that Gozon
cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded the case to the Minister of Natural
Resources. Now both parties appealed urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CAs
earlier decision to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that Gozons finding be
reinstated. The CA denied both petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due
process.

HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had
acted with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a
subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be
other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different
view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer
would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would
not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC affirmed the 2 nd decision
of the CA.

Felicidad Anzaldo vs Jacobo

Clave
Due Process Administrative Due Process

Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for 28
years. She was holding the position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was
appointed as Science Research Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved by the CSC
in 1978. The position was previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to
his position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo,
averred that Anzaldos appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee which
gave 88 points to Anzalado and 66 points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office
of the president by Venzon. Clave was then the Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant
to PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was also
holding the chairmanship of the CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the
contested position. After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution,
or on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines.
Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just affirmed his decision as the CSC
chairman.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was
inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, what he meant
was that he was concurring with Chairman Claves recommendation: he was concurring
with himself. It is evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave
of the Civil Service Commission. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not
fair to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as
Chairman of the CSC, as to who between Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed
Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.

Naseco guards vs naseco

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assails the

Decision[1] dated May 27, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
76667. The appellate court set aside the January 15, 2003[2] and March 11,
2003[3] Orders of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and ordered
the latter to allow the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective
positions.

The facts follow.

Respondent National Service Corporation (NASECO) is a wholly-owned

subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) organized under the Corporation
Code in 1975.It supplies security and manpower services to different clients such
as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Food Terminal Incorporated, Forex Corporation and PNB. Petitioner
NASECO Guards Association-PEMA (NAGA-PEMA) is the collective bargaining
representative of the regular rank and file security guards of respondent. NASECO
Employees Union-PEMA (NEMU-PEMA) is the collective bargaining
representative of the regular rank and file (non-security) employees of respondent
such as messengers, janitors, typists, clerks and radio-telephone operators.[4]

On December 2, 1993, respondent entered into a memorandum of

agreement[5] with petitioner. The terms of the agreement covered the monetary
claims of the petitioner such as salary adjustments, conversion of salary scheme
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758[6] to R.A. No. 6727,[7] signing bonus, leaves
and other benefits. A year after, petitioner demanded full negotiation for a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the respondent and submitted its
proposals thereto.

On June 8, 1995, petitioner and respondent agreed to sign a CBA on non-

economic terms.[8]

On September 24, 1996, petitioner filed a notice of strike because of

respondents refusal to bargain for economic benefits in the CBA. Following
conciliation hearings, the parties again commenced CBA negotiations and started to
resolve the issues on wage increase, productivity bonus, incentive bonus,
allowances, and other benefits but failed to reach an agreement.

Meanwhile, respondent and NEMU-PEMA entered into a CBA on non-

economic terms.[9] Unfortunately, a dispute among the leaders of NEMU-PEMA
arose and at a certain point, leadership of the organization was unclear. Hence, the
negotiations concerning the economic terms of the CBA were put on hold until the
internal dispute could be resolved.

On April 29, 1997, petitioner filed a notice of strike before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) against respondent and PNB due to a
bargaining deadlock. The following day, NEMU-PEMA likewise filed a notice of
strike against respondent and PNB on the ground of unfair labor practices.
[10]
Efforts by the NCMB to conciliate failed and pursuant to Article 263(g) of
the Labor Code,[11] as amended, then DOLE Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano
assumed jurisdiction over the strike notices on June 25, 1998.[12]

On November 19, 1999, then DOLE Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma

issued a Resolution[13] directing petitioner and respondent to execute a new CBA
incorporating therein his dispositions regarding benefits of the employees as to
wage increase, productivity bonus, vacation and sick leave, medical allowances
and signing bonus. Respondent was further ordered to negotiate, for purposes of
collective bargaining agreement, with NEMU-PEMA led by its president,
Ligaya Valencia. The charge of unfair labor practice against respondent and PNB
was dismissed.[14]

Respondent promptly filed a petition for certiorari before the CA

questioning the DOLE Secretarys order and arguing that the ruling of the DOLE
Secretary in favor of the unions and awarding them monetary benefits totaling five
hundred thirty-one million four hundred forty-six thousand six hundred sixty-six
and 67/100 (P531,446,666.67) was inimical and deleterious to its financial
standing and will result in closure and cessation of business for the company.

By Decision[15] dated March 19, 2001 (first CA Decision), the CA partly

granted the petition and ruled that a recomputation and reevaluation of the benefits
awarded was in order.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED in that
the case is remanded to the Secretary of Labor for purposes of
recomputation and reevaluation of the CBA benefits.

SO ORDERED.[16]

In compliance with the CA directive, then DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto.

Tomas conducted several clarificatory hearings. On January 15, 2003, Secretary
Sto. Tomas issued an Order which provides:
From the above, it is indubitable that the total cost to NASECO of our
questioned award would amount to only P322,725,000,
not P531,446,666.67 as claimed by the company. Thus, our November
19, 1999 Order is hereby affirmed en toto.
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. [D]irecting NAGA-PEMA and NASECO to execute a new

collective bargaining agreement effective November 1, 1993,
incorporating therein the dispositions contained in our
November 19, 1999 Order as well as all other items agreed
upon by the parties.

2. Ordering NASECO to negotiate with NEMA-PEMA for a new

collective bargaining agreement.

The charges of unfair labor practice against NASECO and PNB are
dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[17]

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration with the DOLE Secretary

which was denied on March 11, 2003.

Respondent thus filed a petition for certiorari with the CA arguing that the
DOLE Secretary, in issuing the January 15, 2003 Order deprived respondent of due
process of law for there was no reevaluation that took place in the DOLE. It also
argued that the order merely recomputed the DOLE Secretarys initial award
of P531,446,666.67 and reduced it to P322,725,000.00, contrary to the ruling of the
CA to recompute and reevaluate. Respondent claimed that what the DOLE
Secretary should have done was to let the parties introduce evidence to show the
proper computation of the monetary awards under the approved CBA.

In its second Decision dated May 27, 2004, the CA granted the petition,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the orders dated 15 January 2003 and 11 March
2003 are hereby SET ASIDE and the case remanded to the public
respondent to allow the parties to adduce evidence in support of their
respective positions.

SO ORDERED.[18]
 A motion for reconsideration was filed by herein petitioner but the same was
denied by the CA on September 22, 2004[19] finding no reason to reverse and set
aside its earlier decision.

Petitioner now comes to this Court for relief by way of a petition for review
on certiorari seeking to set aside and reverse the May 27, 2004 Decision and
the September 22, 2004 Resolution of the CA.

The main issue in this case is whether or not the respondents right to due process was
violated. A side issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not PNB, being the
undisputed owner of and exercising control over respondent, should be made liable to
pay the CBA benefits awarded to the petitioner.

Petitioner argues first that there was no violation of due process because
respondent was never prohibited by the DOLE Secretary to submit supporting
documents when the instant case was pending on remand. Petitioner contends that
due process is properly observed when there is an opportunity to be heard, to
present evidence and to file pleadings, which was never denied to respondent.

Second, petitioner argues that the CA erred in stating that respondent was a
company operating at a loss and therefore cannot be expected to act generously and
confer upon its employees additional benefits exceeding what is mandated by
law. It is the petitioners position that based on the no loss, no profit policy of
respondent with PNB, respondent in truth has no pocket of its own and is, in effect,
one (1) and the same with PNB with regard to financial gains and/or
liabilities. Thus, petitioners contend that the CBA benefits should be shouldered by
PNB considering the poor financial condition of respondent. To support such
claim, petitioner submitted evidence[20] to show that PNB is in superb financial
condition and is very much capable of shouldering the CBA award.[21]

Respondent on the other hand maintains that the DOLE Secretary violated its
right to due process when she merely recomputed the CBA award instead
of reevaluating the entire case and allowing it to present supporting documents in
accordance with the first CA decision.[22] It claims that the order of the CA to
reevaluate included and required a full assessment of the case together with
reception of evidence such as financial statements, and the omission of such is a
violation of its right to due process.

As to the petitioners argument that respondent and PNB are essentially the
same when it comes to financial condition, respondent contends that although a
subsidiary, it has a separate and distinct personality from PNB with its own
charter. Hence, the issue of PNBs financial well-being is immaterial in this case.

The petition is partly meritorious.

In simple terms, the constitutional guarantee of due process requires that a

litigant be given a day in court. It is the availability of the opportunity to be heard
that determines whether or not due process was violated. A litigant may or may not
avail of the opportunity to be heard but as long as such was made available to
him/her, there is no violation of the due process clause. In the case
of Lumiqued v. Exevea,[23] this Court declared that [a]s long as a party was given
the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have
been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence
of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a
person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.

The respondents right to due process in this case has not been denied. The
order in the first CA decision to recompute and reevaluate was satisfied when the
DOLE Secretary reexamined their initial findings and adjusted the awarded
benefits. A reevaluation, contrary to what the respondent claims, is a process by
which a person or office (in this case the DOLE secretary) revisits its own initial
pronouncement and makes another assessment of its findings. In simple terms, to
reevaluate is to take another look at a previous matter in issue. A reevaluation does
not necessitate the introduction of new materials for review nor does it require a
full hearing for new arguments.

From a procedural standpoint, a reevaluation is a continuation of the original

case and not a new proceeding. Hence, the evidence, financial reports and other
documents submitted by the parties in the course of the original proceeding are to
be visited and reviewed again. In this light, the respondent has been given the
opportunity to be heard by the DOLE Secretary.

Also, contrary to the claim of the respondent that it was barred by the DOLE
Secretary to introduce supporting documents during the recomputation and
reevaluation, the records show that an Order by then Secretary of Labor Patricia A.
Sto. Tomas dated July 11, 2002 specifically allowed both parties to submit their
respective computations as regards the awarded benefits. To wit:

WHEREFORE, the Bureau of Working Conditions is hereby

directed to submit to this Office a detailed computation of the CBA
benefits indicated in the resolution of November 19, 2001 within twenty
(20) days from receipt of this Order. The parties may submit their own
computations to the Bureau for validation.

SO ORDERED.[24] (Italics supplied.)

It is thus inaccurate for the respondent to claim that it was denied due process
because it had all the opportunity to introduce any supporting document in the
course of the recomputation and reevaluation of the DOLE Secretary. Respondent
admits that it did attach the financial statements and other documents in support of
its alleged financial incapacity to pay the CBA awarded benefits, the same evidence
it had earlier submitted before the CA (Memorandum in the first CA decision) in the
motion for reconsideration of the DOLE Secretarys January 15, 2003 Order.[25] There
is thus no showing that the DOLE Secretary denied respondent this basic
constitutional right.

On the issue of liability, petitioner contends that PNB should be held liable
to shoulder the CBA benefits awarded to them by virtue of it being a company
having full financial, managerial and functional control over respondent as its
subsidiary, and by reason of the unique no loss, no profit scheme implemented
between respondent and PNB.

We are not persuaded.

 Verily, what the petitioner is asking this Court to do is to pierce the veil of
corporate fiction of respondent and hold PNB (being the mother company) liable
for the CBA benefits.

In Concept Builders, Inc. v. NLRC,[26] we explained the doctrine of piercing

the corporate veil, as follows:
It is a fundamental principle of corporation law that a corporation is
an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders and from other
corporations to which it may be connected. But, this separate and distinct
personality of a corporation is merely a fiction created by law for
convenience and to promote justice. So, when the notion of separate
juridical personality is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud or defend crime, or is used as a device to defeat the labor
laws, this separate personality of the corporation may be disregarded or
the veil of corporate fiction pierced. This is true likewise when the
corporation is merely an adjunct, a business conduit or an alter ego of
another corporation.

Also in Pantranco Employees Association (PEA-PTGWO) v. National Labor

Relations Commission,[27] this Court ruled:
Whether the separate personality of the corporation should be pierced
hinges on obtaining facts appropriately pleaded or proved. However, any
piercing of the corporate veil has to be done with caution, albeit the
Court will not hesitate to disregard the corporate veil when it is misused
or when necessary in the interest of justice. After all, the concept of
corporate entity was not meant to promote unfair objectives.

Applying the doctrine to the case at bar, we find no reason to pierce the
corporate veil of respondent and go beyond its legal personality. Control, by itself,
does not mean that the controlled corporation is a mere instrumentality or a
business conduit of the mother company. Even control over the financial and
operational concerns of a subsidiary company does not by itself call for
disregarding its corporate fiction. There must be a perpetuation of fraud behind the
control or at least a fraudulent or illegal purpose behind the control in order to
justify piercing the veil of corporate fiction. Such fraudulent intent is lacking in
this case.
 Petitioner argues that the appreciation, analysis and inquiry of this case may
go beyond the presentation of respondent, and therefore must include the PNB, the
bank being the undisputed whole owner of respondent and the sole provider of funds
for the companys operations and for the payment of wages and benefits of the
employees, under the no loss, no profit scheme.[28]

We disagree. There is no showing that such no loss, no profit scheme

between respondent and PNB was implemented to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, or is used as a device to defeat the
labor laws, nor does the scheme show that respondent is a mere business conduit or
alter ego of PNB. Absent proof of these circumstances, respondents corporate
personality cannot be pierced.

It is apparent that petitioner wants the Court to disregard the corporate

personality of respondent and directly go after PNB in order for it to collect the
CBA benefits. On the same breath, however, petitioner argues that ultimately it is
PNB, by virtue of the no loss, no profit scheme, which shoulders and provides the
funds for financial liabilities of respondent including wages and benefits of
employees. If such scheme was indeed true as the petitioner presents it, then there
was absolutely no need to pierce the veil of corporate fiction of
respondent. Moreover, the Court notes the pendency of a separate suit for
absorption or regularization of NASECO employees filed by petitioner and
NEMU-PEMA against PNB and respondent, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
06-03944-96), which is still on appeal with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), as per manifestation by respondent. In the said case,
petitioner submitted for resolution by the labor tribunal the issues of whether PNB
is the employer of NASECOs work force and whether NASECO is a labor-only
contractor.[29]

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The

Decision dated May 27, 2004 and Resolution dated September 22, 2004 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 76667 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE as to the order to
remand the case to the Secretary of Labor for introduction of supporting
evidence. Accordingly, the Orders of the Secretary of Labor dated January 15,
2003 and March 11, 2003 are REINSTATED and UPHELD.
 No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Plessy v. Ferguson

Brief Fact Summary. A Louisiana statute required railroad companies to provide separate, but
equal accommodations for its Black and White passengers. The Plaintiff, Plessy (Plaintiff), was
prosecuted under the statute after he refused to leave the section of a train reserved for whites.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A law, which authorizes or requires the separation of the two races
on public conveyances, is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution) unless the law is unreasonable.

Facts. A Louisiana statute required railroad companies to provide separate, but equal
accommodations for its Black and White passengers. An exception was made for nurses
attending to the children of the other race. Plaintiff, who was seven-eighths white, was
prosecuted under the statute after he refused to leave the section of a train reserved for whites.
The alleged purpose of the statute was to preserve public peace and good order and to promote
the comfort of the people.

Issue. Was the statute requiring separate, but equal accommodations on railroad transportation
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution?

Held. Yes. The State Supreme Court is affirmed.

Justice Henry Brown (J. Brown) stated that although the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution was designed to enforce the equality between the races, it was not intended to
abolish distinctions based on color, or to enforce a commingling of the races in a way
unsatisfactory to either. Laws requiring the separation of the races do not imply the inferiority of
either. If the law stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority, it is because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it. Therefore, the statute constitutes a valid exercise
of the States police powers.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution does, however, require that the exercise of a
States police powers be reasonable. Laws enacted in good faith, for the promotion of the public
good and not for the annoyance or oppression of another race are reasonable. As such, the
statute was reasonable.
Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka

Brief Fact Summary. Black children were denied admission to schools attended by white
children under laws that permitted or required segregation by race. The children sued.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Separate but equal educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Facts. The Plaintiffs, various black children (Plaintiffs), were denied admission to schools
attended by white children under laws that permitted or required segregation by race. Plaintiffs
sued, seeking admission to public schools in their communities on a nonsegregated basis.

Issue. Do separate but equal laws in the area of public education deprive black children of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution)?

Held. Yes.
Chief Justice Earl Warren (J. Warren) stated that even if the tangible factors of segregated
schools are equal, to separate black children from others of similar age and qualifications solely
on the basis of race, generates a feeling of inferiority with respect to their status in the
community and may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever be undone.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins
FACTS

The city of San Francisco passed an ordinance that required Laundromats located in wooden buildings to
have a permit. The ordinance established a board which would decide who would and would not get the
permit. The facts suggest that not a single Chinese applicant was ever granted a permit, despite the fact
that Chinese operated Laundromats constituted nearly 90% of the citys laundry business at the time.
The Plaintiffs were held in violation of the ordinance and issued a fine. Plaintiffs then sued under the 14th
amendment, citing a violation of equal protection.

ISSUE

Does an ordinance that gives absolute discretion to a permit board that discriminates on the basis of race
in their eventual decision making violate the equal protection clause of the United States?

HOLDING/ANALYSIS

Yes, the ordinance is invalidated and the appeal ruling is overturned. The court noted that the ordinance
did not have any discrimination detectable within its text. However, its enforcement did violate the equal
protection clause because its execution was racially unequal. The court held that the new rule should be
that the Supreme Court may shoot down state or local laws that are neutral in their text, but discriminatory
in their execution.

The court wrote that the enforcement of the law was a practical denial by the state of that equal
protection of the law, and, as such, was a violation of the constitution. Moreover, the court also noted
that equal protection is afforded to non-citizens within US borders, as many of the Chinese Laundromat
operators were non-citizens.

People of the Philippines vs

Jose Vera
65 Phil. 56 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection
Probation Law

Separation of Powers Undue Delegation of Powers Power to Pardon

Constitutionality of Laws May the State Question Its Own Laws

In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The
matter was referred to the Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu
Unjiengs petition for probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the
petition for probation. The Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the
hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that
courts like the Court of First Instance of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have
no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act
No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with
probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila, even if
construed as a province, has no designated probation officer hence, a Manila court
cannot grant probation.

Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221 is
unconstitutional for it violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws.
HSBC averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of provinces whether or nor to
apply the probation law if a province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will
appoint a probation officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed
hence, that makes it violative of the equal protection clause.

Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power because it
gave the option to the provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law
however, the legislature did not provide guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.

Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the executives
power to grant pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in
effect encroached upon the executives power to grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution
agreed with the issues raised by HSBC ironic because their main stance was the non-
applicability of the probation law only in Manila while recognizing its application in
provinces).

For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing
the State as well as the People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like
Act 4221, which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of
Manila who himself had used the Probation Law in the past without question but is now
questioning the validity of the said law (estoppel).

ISSUE:

1. May the State question its own laws?

2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?

HELD:

1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from
questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had
been using an invalid law.

2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is violation of
the equal protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to apply the
law by simply providing for a probation officer. So if a province decides not to install a
probation officer, then the accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the
provisions of the Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to
provinces where the respective provincial boards have provided for a probation officer. But
nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard (sufficient standard test) should
provincial boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation law in their
province. This only creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily according to its
whims.

Encroachment of Executive Power

Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress
to provide for probation. Probation does not encroach upon the Presidents power to grant
pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress to fix penalties
while pardon is a power of the president to commute penalties.

ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight

steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight
standards of the airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to
166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and
Crew Administration Manual of PAL.

In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an
extended vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work
once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again went on
leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight,
petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the
PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily
complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two
weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to
report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another
set of weight check dates, which he did not report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of
Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight
requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those
similarly situated were not treated the same.

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his
inability to attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost leniency
extended to him which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5)
years, his services were considered terminated effective immediately.

LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in
view of the nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need
not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper
the performance of his duties.

NLRC affirmed.

CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally
dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight
standards. It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by
petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being
overweight.

ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.

HELD: YES

A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion

than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to
keep the job. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article
282(e) of the Labor Code.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims
that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to
1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper
attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory
hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that [t]he issue is
could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is
yes. I can do it now.

Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the
assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL.

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of
his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e)
of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may
not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it,
[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the
employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions.
This element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be
in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a
recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of
intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).

NOTES:

The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational

qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to
persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can
show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for
performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of the company
policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid provided it
reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance.

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to

safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely
on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on
board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing
strict norms of discipline upon its employees.

The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for
cabin crew is flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act
of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for
serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.
 CENIZA VS COMELEC

Equal Protection Gerrymandering

**Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative

districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. **

Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421
which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter),
highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters
prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is
a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC
added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in
behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed)
questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the
regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage.
Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the
passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that
the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of
the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire
province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of
Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza
likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as
highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial
officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on
substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and
regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable
classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local
government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that The
State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of
gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional
requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a
province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that
came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore
cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June
1969.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of
their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city
would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively
independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has
sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province
where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of
the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the
election of provincial officials in some instances.

The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of
the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials.
The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to
vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component
city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voters
right of suffrage.

League of Cities v. Comelec

Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of
Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood
Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took
effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009
the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities
filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June
2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the Presidents signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective,
not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became
law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a
city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair
and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort
to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage
of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government
Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause.

Rufino Nuez vs
Sandiganbayan & the
People of the Philippines
Equal Protection Creation of the Sandiganbayan

Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD
1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public
and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public
officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of
the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims
that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because
appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal
likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and
trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC,
instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal
as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the
CA and thereafter to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as
appeals would be concerned.

HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of
a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials
charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the
creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the
urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that
those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as
January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure
for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not
necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the
classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of
the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
member of the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a
unanimous decision from 3 justices a showing that decisions therein are more
conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.

Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting)

Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the
government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to
two appellate courts first, to the CA, and thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of
private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by public officers,
who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal to the
SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial
court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination.
Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that
meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the
intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two
appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to
the people.

Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the SC through certiorari, likewise limits the
reviewing power of the SC only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and
not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases
involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are
reviewed, first by the CA, and then by the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of
justice in criminal cases when the trial courts judgment is subject to review by two appellate
tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment
and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered
during the trial.
Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption
of innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond
reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).

PASEI vs. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386

Post under case digests, labor law at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service

Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitmentof Filipino workers,
male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the
Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series
of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in
the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF
FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in
this petition for certiorari and prohibition. The measure is
assailed for "discrimination against males or females," that
it 'does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills," and that
it is violative of the right to travel. It was likewise held to be
an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power
being legislative, and not executive, in character.

In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3,

of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation "in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law." In addition, it was contended that Department Order
No. 1 was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It
was claimed to be in violation of the Charter's non-
impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable
injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be
further enforced.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent

Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, invokes the police
power of the Philippine State.

Issue: Whether or not deployment ban for female

domestic helpers is valid under our Constitution.

Held: Yes. It is a valid exercise of police power. The

concept of police power is well-established in this
jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to
enact legislation that may interferewith personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare." As
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon
liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good.
It is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
comprehensive embrace.

"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the

times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring
the greatest benefits."

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.

According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that
men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights
did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a
group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment
of such salutary measures calculated to
ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare."
Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be
an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties
"Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not
unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is
subject to the far more overriding demands
and requirements of the greater number.

ISAE vs. QUISUMBING

FACTS:

Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is

a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of
foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree
authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel
selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities,
such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations
attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for
the protection of employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as
members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2)
local-hires.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.

Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.

When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a
legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all
faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates
between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether
foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually
caused a deadlock between the parties.

ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the
NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local-

hires.

RULING:

NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is
entitled to humane conditions of work. These conditions are not restricted to
the physical workplace the factory, the office or the field but include as
well the manner by which employers treat their employees.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor

Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.

The Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates
to afford labor full protection. The State has the right and duty to regulate
the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely
contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts,
collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.

However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-
hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of
all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to
the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1)
the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the
employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or
similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of
employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining units
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will
best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.

In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their
intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective
bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that
these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited
tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform
similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires,
foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-
hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include
foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either
group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby

GRANTED IN PART.
 Atty. Salumbides, Jr. & Ara v. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al.
FACTS:

Salumbides and Glenda were appointed as Municipal Legal Officer/Administrator

and Municipal Budget Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan, Quezon. On May 13,
2002, herein respondentsRicardo Agon, Ramon Villasanta, Elmer Dizon, Salvador
Adul and Agnes Fabian,all members of theSangguniang Bayanof Tagkawayan, filed
withthe Office of the Ombudsman a complaintagainst Salumbides and Glenda
(hereafter petitioners), the mayor, Coleta, Jason and Aquino. The administrative
aspect of the case charged petitionerset al. with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and
violation of the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and the Local Government Code.
The Office of the Ombudsman denied the prayer to place petitionerset al. under
preventive suspension pending investigation. By Order datedFebruary 1, 2005,
approved onApril 11, 2005, it denied the motion for reconsideration butdropped the
mayor and Coleta, both elective officials, as respondents in the administrative case,
the 2004 elections having mooted the case. The Office of the Ombudsman approved
the September 9, 2005 Memorandumabsolving Jason and Aquino, and finding
petitioners guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of condonation is applicable in this case.

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.

POLITICAL LAW: doctrine of condonation

Thereelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous

misconductto the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.The Court
should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office.To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers.When the people elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did
this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave
his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.It is not for the court, by reason
of such faults or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.Contrary to
petitioners asseveration, the non-application of the condonation doctrine
toappointiveofficials does not violate the right to equal protection of the law.The
electorates condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the reelected
official cannot be extended to that of the reappointed coterminous employees, the
underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the people expressed through
the ballot.In other words, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor
disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed
coterminous employees.It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person
who happens to be the appointing authority, that could extinguish an administrative
liability.Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate of
the electorate.The people cannot be charged with the presumption of full knowledge
of the life and character of each and every probable appointee of the elective official
ahead of the latters actual reelection.

Moreover, as correctly observed by respondents, the lack of conspiracy cannot be

appreciated in favor of petitioners who were found guilty of simple neglect of duty,
for if they conspired to act negligently, their infraction becomes intentional. There
can hardly be conspiracy to commit negligence. Petitioners fell short of the
reasonable diligence required of them, for failing to exercise due care and prudence
in ascertaining the legal requirements and fiscal soundness of the projects before
stamping their imprimatur and giving their advice to their superior.

The appellate court correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer, petitioner
Salumbides failed to uphold the law and provide a sound legal assistance and
support to the mayor in carrying out the delivery of basic services and provisions of
adequate facilities when he advised the mayor to proceed with the construction of
the subject projects without prior competitive bidding. As pointed out by the Office of
the Solicitor General, to absolve Salumbides is tantamount to allowing with impunity
the giving of erroneous or illegal advice, when by law he is precisely tasked to
advise the mayor on matters related to upholding the rule of law. Indeed, a legal
officer who renders a legal opinion on a course of action without any legal basis
becomes no different from a lay person who may approve the same because it
appears justified.

As regards petitioner Glenda, the appellate court held that the improper use of
government funds upon the direction of the mayor and prior advice by the municipal
legal officer did not relieve her of liability for willingly cooperating rather than
registering her written objection as municipal budget officer. Aside from the lack of
competitive bidding, the appellate court, pointing to the improper itemization of the
expense, held that the funding for the projects should have been taken from the
capital outlays that refer to the appropriations for the purchase of goods and
services, the benefits of which extend beyond the fiscal year and which add to the
assets of the local government unit.It added that current operating expenditures like
MOOE/RMF refer to appropriations for the purchase of goods and services for the
conduct of normal local government operations within the fiscal year.

Soriano vs. La Guardia

G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after,
before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by
Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent
Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a
minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part
of the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the
adverse effect of petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well as
petitioners clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly
suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it
cannot be properly asserted that petitioners suspension was an undue curtailment of his
right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from
the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship
character of a broadcasters role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media),
a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather
than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be
expressed by the use of less offensive language.

GOLDENWAY MERCHANDISING CORPORATION VS EQUITABLE PCI BANK

Nature:

Redemption of Mortgage

DOCTRINE: Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their
foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by
reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new
redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon
registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is
earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period
because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to
its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No.
3135.

FACTS:

On November 29, 1985, petitioner Goldenway Merchandising Corporation executed

a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank over three parcels of land as
security for a Php2,000,000 loan granted to the petitioner. Petitioner eventually
failed to settles its loan obligation, leading respondent to extrajudicially foreclose
the mortgage on December 13, 2000. Subsequently, a Certificate of Sale was issued
to respondent on January 26, 2001. In a letter dated March 7, 2001, petitioner
offered to redeem the foreclosed properties by tendering a check. Petitioner and
respondent met on March 12, 2001. However, petitioner was told that redemption
was no longer possible since the certificate of sale had already been registered; the
title to the foreclosed properties were consolidated in favor of the respondent on
March 9, 2001. Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
contending that the 1-year period of redemption under Act 3135 should apply, and
not the shorter redemption period under RA 8791 as applying RA 8791 would result
in the impairment of obligations of contracts and would violate the equal protection
clause under the constitution. The RTC dismissed the action of the petitioner ruling
that redemption was made belatedly and that there was no redemption made at all.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.

GARCIA VS DRILON

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An
Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures
for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a
victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set
forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO
ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner
failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance
to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an
axercise in futility.

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of
an invalid law.

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory,
unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to
protect the family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it
allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not
be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers
Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not
limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class.
Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection
clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate
extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have
in support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative
of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention that by

not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of
the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator.
This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power

includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any
branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the
laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a
judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy.
Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

Philippine Judges
Association vs Pete Prado
227 SCRA 703 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection
Franking Privilege of the Judiciary

Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to
withdraw franking privileges from certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a
privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of
charge.

In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the
postal service comes from the judiciarys use of the postal service (issuance of court
processes). Hence, the postal service recommended that the franking privilege be
withdrawn from the judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said
franking privilege.

The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of
Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal
protection clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause.
The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to
that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster
cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the
judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend
to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have
removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem is
the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from
all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not
solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no
substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the
Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all
persons or things without distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking
privileges from other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is different because
its operation largely relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes
result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all
persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of
adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong.
If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress
for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact
greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

Francisco Tatad et al vs
Secretary of Energy
Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law

Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has
always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws
accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil
Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import
or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic
source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market
such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the
Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among
others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7%
tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against
prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries
and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on
unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art
12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which
is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is
operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex
stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the
lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing
refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense
benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep
in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New
players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building
refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build
refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their
product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4%
tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries
puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be
attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the
league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle
dream.

RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new
players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil
companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the
latter.

Spouses Augusto G. Dacudao and Ofelia R. Dacudao, Petitioners, vs. Secretary of

Justice Raul M. Gonzales of the Department of Justice, Respondent
G.R. No. 188056; January 8, 2013

Facts: The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles and his
associates after the petitioners were defrauded in a business venture. Thereafter, the DOJ
Secretary issued Department Order 182 which directs all prosecutors in the country to
forward all cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the
secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate action. However, in a separate order which is
Memorandum dated March 2009, it was said that cases already filed against Celso Delos
Angeles et. al of the Legacy Group of Companies in Cagayan De Oro City need not be sent
anymore to the Secretariat of DOJ in Manila. Because of such DOJ orders, the complaint of
petitioners was forwarded to the secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in Manila.
Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
assailing to the respondent Secretary of justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
department Order and the Memorandum, which according to the violated their right to due
process, right to equal protection of the law and right to speedy disposition of the cases. The
petitioners opined that orders were unconstitutional or exempting from coverage cases
already filed and pending at the Prosecutors Office of Cagayan De Oro City. They contended
that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al,
not those already being investigated. They maintained that DO 182 was issued in violation
of the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given retroactive effect.

Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions
exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that
a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create
new rights or take away vested rights but operates only in furtherance of the remedy or the
confirmation already existing rights. The retroactive application is not violative of any right
of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, no vested right generally attaches to or
arises from procedural law.

ALMARIO VS EXEC. SEC.

FACTS:

On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1001and, upon recommendation of the Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of
the Philippines (CCP), created the category of Award and Decoration of National
Artist to be awarded to Filipinos who have made distinct contributions to arts and
letters. In the same issuance, Fernando Amorsolo was declared as the first National
Artist.

On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law Creating the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts, was signed into law. It established the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and gave it an extensive
mandate over the development, promotion and preservation of the Filipino national
culture and arts and the Filipino cultural heritage.

CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been mandated by law to promote,
develop and protect the Philippine national culture and the arts, and authorized to
give awards to deserving Filipino artists, the two bodies decided to team up and
jointly administer the National Artists Award.

On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met. A total of 87 nominees were
considered during the deliberation and a preliminary shortlist of 32 names was
compiled.

On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel shortlisted 13 out of the 32 names
in the preliminary shortlist.On May 6, 2009, the final deliberation was conducted by
the 30-member Final Deliberation Panel comprised of the CCP Board of Trustees
and the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the living National Artists.From the 13
names in the second shortlist, a final list of four names was agreed upon namely:
Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.

CCP and NCCA submitted this recommendation to the President. According to

respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to
the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received
nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing
private respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco
Masa and Jose Moreno. The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these
nominations and invited resource persons to validate the qualifications and
credentials of the nominees.
Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde a
National Artist was issued on June 30, 2009. Subsequently, on July 6, 2009,
Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico
AguilarAlcuaz and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno, respectively, as National Artists. This was subsequently announced to the
public by then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita on July 29, 2009.

Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of

Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will be
conferred the Order of National Artists and to set the standard for entry into that
select group, petitioners instituted this petition for prohibition, certiorari and
injunction (with prayer for restraining order) praying that the Order of National Artists
be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the Order of National Artists
on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno be enjoined and
declared to have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.

All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused
her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection
process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those
of the Deliberation Panels. According to petitioners, the Presidents discretion to
name National Artists is not absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion on the
matter cannot be exercised in the absence of or against the recommendation of the
NCCA and the CCP.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by former
President Arroyo

HELD: Yes.

Political Law- Legal Standing

The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality of a statute or an official act
must have a direct and personal interest. They must show not only that the law or
any governmental act is invalid, but also that they sustained or are in immediate
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that they suffer thereby in some indefinite way.

In this case, the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right or privilege to
which they are entitled as members of the Order of National Artists as a result of the
conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno. In particular, they will be denied the privilege of exclusive membership in
the Order of National Artists.

Political Law- equal protection

It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-Alvarez was disqualified to be
nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while
respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and
respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of them
were treated differently and considered favorably when they were exempted from
the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order
of National Artists.

The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa

and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny.No real and substantial distinction between
respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from
the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an
exceptional position. The undue classification was not germane to the purpose of
the law. Instead, it contradicted the law and well-established guidelines, rules and
regulations meant to carry the law into effect. While petitioner Abad cannot claim
entitlement to the Order of National Artists, he is entitled to be given an equal
opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of
petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to
confer him standing in this case.

Political Law- Limits of the Presidents Discretion

The "power to recommend" includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or

indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the party
to whom it is made."

Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists, the President
may or may not adopt the recommendation or advice of the NCCA and the CCP
Boards. In other words, the advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject to the
Presidents discretion.

Nevertheless, the Presidents discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered, nor
the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless. The Presidents power must
be exercised in accordance with existing laws. Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution prescribes faithful execution of the laws by the President

The Presidents discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should
be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The
faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the
President, not a separate grant of power.

In this connection, the powers granted to the NCCA and the CCP Boards in
connection with the conferment of the Order of National Artists by executive
issuances were institutionalized by two laws, namely, Presidential Decree No. 208
dated June 7, 1973 and Republic Act No. 7356. In particular, Proclamation No. 1144
dated May 15, 1973 constituted the CCP Board as the National Artists Awards
Committee and tasked it to "administer the conferment of the category of National
Artist" upon deserving Filipino artists with the mandate to "draft the rules to guide its
deliberations in the choice of National Artists".

By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection with the conferment of

the National Artist Award, the NCCA and the CCP decided to work together and
jointly administer the National Artist Award. They reviewed the guidelines for the
nomination, selection and administration of the National Artist Award. An
administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of law.
Thus, the rules, guidelines and policies regarding the Order of National Artists jointly
issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA pursuant to their respective
statutory mandates have the force and effect of law. Until set aside, they are binding
upon executive and administrative agencies,including the President himself/herself
as chief executor of laws.

In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and as a

consequence of his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of
the President in the matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to the names
submitted to him/her by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. This means that the
President could not have considered conferment of the Order of National Artists on
any person not considered and recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards.
That is the proper import of the provision of Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, that
the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the President on the conferment of the Order
of National Artists." Applying this to the instant case, the former President could not
have properly considered respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno, as their names were not recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards.
Otherwise, not only will the stringent selection and meticulous screening process be
rendered futile, the respective mandates of the NCCA and the CCP Board of
Trustees under relevant laws to administer the conferment of Order of National
Artists, draft the rules and regulations to guide its deliberations, formulate and
implement policies and plans, and undertake any and all necessary measures in that
regard will also become meaningless.

Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009 proclaiming respondents

Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Masa, and Jose
Moreno, respectively, as National Artists are declared INVALID and SET ASIDE
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

PAGCOR VS BIR

645 SCRA 338 Taxation Law Income Taxation Corporate Taxpayers PAGCOR is not
exempt from income taxation
 Political Law Equal Protection Clause

The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by P.D. No.
1067-A in 1977. Obviously, it is a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC).

In 1998, R.A. 8424 or the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC) became
effective. Section 27 thereof provides that GOCCs are NOT EXEMPT from paying income
taxation but it exempted the following GOCCs:

1. GSIS

2. SSS

3. PHILHEALTH

4. PCSO

5. PAGCOR

But in May 2005, R.A. 9337, a law amending certain provisions of R.A. 8424, was passed.
Section 1 thereof excluded PAGCOR from the exempt GOCCs hence PAGCOR was
subjected to pay income taxation. In September 2005, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
issued the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) for R.A. 9337. In the said IRR, it
identified PAGCOR as subject to a 10% value added tax (VAT) upon items covered by
Section 108 of the NIRC (Sale of Services and Use or Lease of Properties).

PAGCOR questions the constitutionality of Section 1 of R.A. 9337 as well as the IRR.
PAGCOR avers that the said provision violates the equal protection clause. PAGCOR
argues that it is similarly situated with SSS, GSIS, PCSO, and PHILHEALTH, hence it
should not be excluded from the exemption.

ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCOR should be subjected to income taxation.

HELD: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 9337 is constitutional. It was the express intent of Congress
to exclude PAGCOR from the exempt GOCCs hence PAGCOR is now subject to income
taxation.

PAGCORs contention that the law violated the constitution is not tenable. The equal
protection clause provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
The general rule is, ALL GOCCs are subject to income taxation. However, certain classes
of GOCCs may be exempt from income taxation based on the following requisites for a
valid classification under the principle of equal protection:

1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.

2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.

3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

When the Supreme Court looked into the records of the deliberations of the lawmakers
when R.A. 8424 was being drafted, the SC found out that PAGCORs exemption was not
really based on substantial distinctions. In fact, the lawmakers merely exempted PAGCOR
from income taxation upon the request of PAGCOR itself. This was changed however
when R.A. 9337 was passed and now PAGCOR is already subject to income taxation.

Anent the issue of the imposition of the 10% VAT against PAGCOR, the BIR had
overstepped its authority. Nowhere in R.A. 9337 does it state that PAGCOR is subject to
VAT. Therefore, that portion of the IRR issued by the BIR is void. In fact, Section 109 of R.A.
9337 expressly exempts PAGCOR from VAT. Further, PAGCORs charter exempts it from
VAT.

To recapitulate, PAGCOR is subject to income taxation but not to VAT.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,

bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter
denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain
biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their
ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered
nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal
Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant

Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of
the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the
first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification
reports by COMELECs field personnel.

Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.

Held:

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands
for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law
or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As
we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,
or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-
list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.

We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal

and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely
moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
 Bureau of Customs Employees Association v.
Teves, et al.

FACTS:

Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335. RA [No.]
9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law
intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least
six months of service, regardless of employment status.

Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with
constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its members,
petitioners directly filed the present petition before this Court against respondents.

BOCEA asserted that in view of the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR,
and their adverse effects on the constitutional rights of BOC officials and employees,
direct resort to this Court is justified. BOCEA argued, among others, that its
members and other BOC employees are in great danger of losing their jobs should
they fail to meet the required quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their
constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and their respective families
prejudice.

Respondents countered that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not violate the right to
due process and right to security of tenure of BIR and BOC employees. The OSG
stressed that the guarantee of security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution is not a
guarantee of perpetual employment. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided a
reasonable and valid ground for the dismissal of an employee which is germane to
the purpose of the law. Likewise, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided that an
employee may only be separated from the service upon compliance with substantive
and procedural due process. The OSG added that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR must
enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.

In Abakada, the Court declared Section 12of R.A. No. 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the IRR as unconstitutional and
violative of the principle of separation of powers. However, the constitutionality of the
remaining provisions of R.A. No. 9335 was upheld pursuant to Section 13of R.A. No.
9335. The Court also held that until the contrary is shown, the IRR of R.A. No. 9335
is presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEAs
members to: (a) equal protection of laws, (b) security of tenure and (c) due process?

HELD: Ruling in Abakada is adopted.

REMEDIAL LAW: actions; parties

Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that BOCEA has locus
standi. BOCEA impugns the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR because
its members, who are rank-and-file employees of the BOC, are actually covered by
the law and its IRR. BOCEAs members have a personal and substantial interest in
the case, such that they have sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: administrative agencies

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches
of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within
its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is the
principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas
delegata non delegari potest, which means "what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated." This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.
However, this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous exceptions,
one of which is the delegation of legislative power to various specialized
administrative agencies like the Board in this case.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection clause

Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person
within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through
the states duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice
under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: due process

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to

administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side.
BOCEAs apprehension of deprivation of due process finds its answer in Section 7
(b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335. The concerned BIR or BOC official or employee is not
simply given a target revenue collection and capriciously left without any quarter.
R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due consideration to all relevant factors that
may affect the level of collection.

As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on the veracity of, and the proper
action on these anomalies are in the hands of the Executive branch. Correlatively,
the wisdom for the enactment of this law remains within the domain of the
Legislative branch. We merely interpret the law as it is. The Court has no discretion
to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language
thereof. Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or
argumentative. We have so declared in Abakada, and we now reiterate that R.A. No.
9335 and its IRR are constitutional.

DISMISSED.
People of the Philippines vs
Cayat
68 Phil. 12 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid
Classification Bar from Drinking Gin

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or
any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera,
was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to
pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he
challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his
right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them
with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet
with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians
from Christians.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable
classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have
the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an
indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or
parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or
less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the
public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the
enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be
no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government
has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure
for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with
their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

Ormoc Sugar Company Inc.

vs Ormoc City et al
Equal Protection

In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on
any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company
Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export
sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries. Though referred to as a
production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar
produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the
only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax
(P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to
impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the
municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon
such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or
otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled
out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in the
city.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the
RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively
authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of
Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes
only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none
other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is
true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be
reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance
should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar
central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later
a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly
points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Central Bank Employees

Association vs BSP

Facts: The New Central Bank Act abolished the old Central Bank and created the new BSP
on 1993 through RA No 7653. Central Bank Employees Association assailed the provision of
RA No 7653, Art II Sec 15(c). They contend that it makes an unconstitutional cut between
two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers as exempt class of Salary
Standardization Law (RA 6758) and (2) the rank-and-file non-exempt class. BSP contends
that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the
BSPs lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It
was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file.

Issue: Whether or not Section 15(c) violates equal protection right of the BSP r&f
employees?

Decision: Sec 15(c) unconstitutional. Judicial notice that other Govt Financial Institution
undertook amendment of their charters from 1995 to 2004 a blanket provision for all
employees to be covered by SSL. The said subsequent enactments constitute significant
changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation
of the last proviso of Section 15(c). Legal history shows that GFIs have long been
recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other governmental entities.
There is no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the
other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. The equal protection clause does not demand
absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Those
that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group is equally binding on the rest. It is clear that the enactment of the seven
subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the challenged proviso
anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw.

RUTTER vs. ESTEBAN

G.R. No. L-3708; May 18, 1953; 93 Phil. 68
Ponente: Bautista Angelo

Doctrine: Inherent powers of the State; Police Power; The national

economy

FACTS:
In August 20, 1941, Rutter sold to Esteban 2 parcels of land in
Manila. Esteban paid 3/4ths of the purchase price and they
constituted a mortgage over one of the parcels to secure the
payment of the balance.

However, the war broke out and somehow, Esteban was not able to
pay the balance of the purchase price on the due date and so, on
August 2, 1949, Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance
with the CFI.

Esteban admitted the averments of the complaint but as a defense,

he claimed that his obligation was a pre-war obligation covered by
the moratorium embodied in R.A. No. 342.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 342 provides that all debts and other
monetary obligations contracted before December 8, 1941, any
provision in the contract creating the same or any subsequent
aggreement affecting such obligation to the contrary
notwithstanding, shall not due and demandable for a period of eight
(8) years from and after settlement of the war damage claim of the
debtor by the Philippine War Damage Commission.

The CFI ruled in favor of the debtor Esteban. This brings us to the
sole issue raised by petitioner on appeal

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 342, which declared a moratorium on
certain pre-war obligations, is unconstitutional for violation of the
Constitutional provision prohibiting the impairment of the obligation
of contracts.

HELD:
Yes. R.A. No. 342 is unconstitutional.

Statutes declaring a moratorium on obligations are generally

constitutional
Statutes declaring a moratorium on obligations are not new: For
some 1,400 years western civilization has made use of
extraordinary devices for saving the credit structure, devices
generally known as moratoria. The moratorium is postponement of
fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the medium
of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of the
sovereign power.

Such laws were often passed during or after times of financial

distress such as wars and disasters. Similar laws were passed in
some US states after the civil war and they have been declared
constitutional. Some laws however, were declared unconstitutional
where the period of moratorium prescribed is indefinite or
unreasonable.

The argument that moratorium laws impair the obligation of

contracts does not hold water. It is justified as a valid exercise of
the state of it's police power.

In the US case, Home Building and Loan Association vs. Blaisdell, it

was held that:

The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and
dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. . . .

xxx

Similarly, where the protective power of the State is exercised in a manner

otherwise appropriate in the regulation of a business it is no objection that the
performance of existing contracts may be frustrated by the prohibition of injurious
practices. . . .

. . . . The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts

incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a
legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.

Thus the true test of constitutionality of a moratorium

statute lies in the determination of the period of a
suspension of the remedy. It is required that such
suspension be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be
violative of the constitution.

R.A. No. 342 is unconstitutional for being unreasonable

The moratorium law, enacted in 1948, came on the heels of
executive orders likewise declaring moratoriums. With its 8 year
moratorium period, it is clearly unreasonable for creditors who have
to observe a vigil of 12 years to collect on debts which have
become demandable as early as 1941. And the injustice is more
patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay
interest during the operation of the relief.

The court also noted that the reconstruction is paying off and that
the Philippines is headed to better times. Hence the Supreme Court
declared R.A. No. 342 unreasonable and oppressive and hence, null
and void and without effect.

Disposition:
Esteban was ordered to pay the balance with interest at the rate of
7% per annum with 12% attorneys fees.