Garneades was no _probabilist HM Valees HF. Burnyeat By an irony of historiography, the article on Cammendea in she Encyclopaedia of .hilosophy 1s immediately adjacent to the article on Carnap.* the most powerful empiricist of the twentieth Gj evel etic article by Phillip Hallie, The reader who is led by ee aposition to form a picture of Carneades as a prorat tye As eduara celler, Die Philosophic de p Betwickdung Tui 1 (Leipzig 19907), 500 ff. f See Charles Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus: A Study of the influence of he-'Academica' in the ik ssance (Hague y an ‘or an account of ~ formative chapter in tHe Renaissance reading of Cicero, Lisa Jardine, ‘Lorenzo Valla and the Intellectual Origins of Humanist: ge « jas meant to philosophy, Hayle's influential Dictionary lays out much learning in support sxA Op. cit. z ——— ae en ncnistic Epistemology, ans ‘Aeadente WOsvev, and the TO ducs is 15 Te7Ow Sper, what &S F persuades us, a contemporary critic of the Academica the word mOdviv ae, Teeerss as in Aristotle, to the credibility of a proposition, tm ‘‘« | a pubjective credence it-grins with a person. It does not refer to 5 iy , y Oxveu he,objective reasons or grounds for a proposition, Te Baw stuff of probability, then at least in the xtme understanding of one more which is the It is worth calling attention here to Ian Hacking’ 's recent (% according to which our modern concept of probability dad not actually emerge until the 17th century.* It required 4he fusion Tan Hacking, The Emergence of Probability (Cambridge 1975), esp. haps 1-5, SOF @ conception of statistical frequency with a conception of inductive evidence, Specifically, when X te seen as evidence for ¥ © An virtue of the frequency with wh: andthegreater the frequency, f YX, only then, been formed, ich X's are associated with Y's, the greater the assurance or probability accdding to Hacking, has our concept of probability It rests ona dual combination of the epistemological (evidence) and the aleatory (frequency) which Carnap and other modern » Philosophers of probability hn a velin®, vain tried to senarnte. ReforeWeiser sees me »,Bdout 1660, however, in Kenaissance and mediaeval thought - so “Hacking reports ~ probabilis had nékther of these aspects. It vir ¢ jindicated that an opinion was acceptable to intelligent people.) In thetypical ease, no doubt, the opinion would bercceptable to such people because of the evidence for it, but that was not whnt the word signified. wttnt Lhe word signified wes the support of gaye authority, not that of evidence, and this usage, so reminiscent of the Aristotelian ks Sov » still survives in the striking t sentence which Hacking quotes from Gibboh: ‘Such a fact is probable I+ | | ® Baward givens becnine and Fallof the Koman Empire, chap. xxiv, ‘i fee =n Oxvov e apud Hacking, op*e a; we the came holds for the stoic use of WOW, (pace jin frenor tans Z| because the Carneadegn schowe was produced in the context of debi.te with the Stoic ojposition, Since that debate was conducted very largely in terms of Stoic concepts (it was onv of Couissin's contributions to male this clear), we need to know what WiOuvhw meant in stoic thought. if I shull produce evidence to show that the concept was nore central to Stoic epistemology tion is apparent from standard accounts of their philosophy. Dy ublce de )We find the Stoic|dcsinilion of the Ode at pL VIL 75, couched T/~M¥ with referenoe to propositions > proposition ic WiOsecy jus i cab, r it ‘leads towards! (hyov cs) assent, and the example ue ore given is the conditional proposition '1f some creature gave birth to something, it ‘gris thet thing's uother', Ihe exemple is well cilcul. ted to gain credenyce from/most of us ~ until it is poiuted out that the proposition is in x fact felse, since a bird is not lhe mother of its egg. Jo here, following Aristotle's crodible imposribvility, we have a credible trisehood, and x nothing whatever 19 said «boul the reasons or grounds someone wiht have for finding it credivle. Wor is anything said about « prob: oility connection within the conditional, a co. Bave birth to something’ urke ——— ection such that th. uutocedent ‘somebhing , robable the consequent ‘sho is that thing's ther'. It is the vhole proposition which is said to ov TWiOdvey , X so that, although Chrysip us wrove a work on TWibsvot conditionals (DL VII 190), £ do uot think there is «ny special co.ncetion between ¢ x the TiByvev and conditivnols." chrysippus also wrote on Wibywe tor eae p Léon Robin, Pichon et 1 nticisme Gree (leris 1944), + 300.tons (bu VIL 2.0 vis). Seo these tithes cuz ent that lie Stoic evaluation of tuo Te Ocvey Soawas not tlvcys or entirely :dverse. ‘the adjective qbdvds ond ite Ekeerivatives turn up in comection vith fellacies Con HL Pie SPy Aaa. sad sophisms (1lut.bo Rens 1LU36aqendde sve ti 27b) py; fad Ln tical’ contextg in conection wilh the cprrupting intluence of external things (bb VIE 89, SVF L11 223-236); uo surprise in thot. Bub the term as Solined would ppply equally to tho propouition which expreaces the content ~ i of the Stoic cataleptic émprer oe \ ton. the cataleptic impression is an) impression which, boing clurr end xtkimetx distinct (vb vin 46 ), 2) 2o0 7, afiords a curtain granp of its object. But it 16 also ILevle to grasp Ihe wal <4.¥ end compel ascent (I: 7. 757} ep. cic Acad. II 38, Epict. LL 26.7). Sune 80, its propositional coaient should fvl1 within the mba . OX Oyna 50 it cous according to a Stoio classification or impressions which i Sextus reports at H 7.241 ff. ay: The clansilication moceeds oy the wetuod of civision, Lupre. sions { Pore oxhoustively clanilies into Tsu! » AWOdvel , both TIOdve! Bend daOduel , cud neither WOd! nor dniOdvor, the TOcved ons make a sac. th wobtiou on the soul, snd the oxaapLus/.iven, {it is day" end ‘1 pa convernin,', sre propositions elsevhere cited as weeexamples of thins evident in themselves (EH 2.97, H 8.144), TOdva! PM inpressionshre then divided into the true, the falco, both true and false, Gina neither true nor t:1lse (243-4), and tho cataleptic impression finally | A § 4 Seemerges as a subclass of th. genus TibdvJ and truc(247): impre: sions a Bevel bevel Yoth ES ia \ Sy ats True Felse Bothtmue and false Neither true nor false je and G0. heither 0. nor £110. cataleptic tlon-cataleptic hema _§ 7 It is a noticerole ind, 1 think, revealing tecture of ychema S$ Xx) hat it makes no provision ior impressions which are truc out vi Exved * \ © Atience tho correction or rnaotation # At+Oduvvnich has ot into the tex. j= of ell N83 in the lnwt Line o: 143. Vou Arnim hi ving ebed thet | | obhese words should ve e:cised (SYP 11, p.18 nre brreketed in the I - texts of Kutscharnn snd er, ope the deeirion ke oreelek ie immlieihly zeccons for excision: (r) vith the words in, the ,onitive phrane is doubttul Greek; (b) the cxauples that Lollow in f4u-5 are cll of cmbuvad iuprersions; (c) inclusion of the words srecks Uhe suructure Sof th. division; (d)the mn otstor misses the philogovhicrl thought e bohind the division, for hich seo below. For a conpairble case of a » tidy-minded but impercipient onuototion erveping into the text (at ~ FH 2. 143), sec Jaceucs srunschwig, "Proof Vefined' in Jbudies in Hellenistic Epistemology, op.cit. Admittedly, there is no certnin indication of what falls unuer the heading YTibdvet , Since it is not divided. sut exnuples ere given, ~) ‘ end they are both perspicuously false: ‘If it is day, there is no sun “~ above the earth', ‘li it is dark, it is day' (242-3). the *wIGwir we is defined as the contrary, uot the contradictory, of the WiOWuy ; a _ it deters assent, is implrusivle (242). In logice » if and only if not-p is \ ee terms, pg is MnBkude tbevy —. A true impression which is merely din fw (208) would not count. And the question is, whether any true c oe impression, token ou its ow, could be such as to deter assent. Lasy “ taken on its own' because the euthor of Schema ¥ knows that not ali true sions acturlly gein ai true inprei nt: people in a morbid condition often have 2 sions which they are nob willing to ensent to (247). wut these ' i dupressions are clausitivd as Wibever , not AMiOWVvel , The implication ~ is that what deters the person's ossent is an additional factor, the Kmowledye that in hi present condition his impression ic not cataleptic (ep. Cic. Acad, 11,$2-3), fhe impression itselt wakes a smooth motion on athe soul. It is, so to epeck, convincing in itself, nud if it fails x Acvually to convince, thot is though no fault of its own but because other fr ctors operate to deter assent. oO Tuis line of thoyght is t:ken further by 2 development which “Sextus credits to more recent Stoics at 253 tf. sides impressions Which ere true but tail to jain assent, they :dmit » class of impressions 2 / which are catcleptic out fri to guin assent. The inherent convincinyness bu (cf. 257) of the cataleptic impression dées not have its uclural efiecs (2 “because on external factor incerferes to block it. guch was the a = impression tieuelaus hod of fielen at Pharoa: he would have been convinced, he would have had a certein grasp of her presence, but tor his belief sthet he hed loft the real tlelen on bocrd ship. (We shnll meet this impression ayoin, ) 2° it eprears; then, that on the stoic analysie the Tibéves is that a which will ecturlly convince uuless something inturferes to prevent it. x) That is whit the Store definition moans by the phreae ‘Legda towards = \—~ ae : q2 2Sthe probable end the improved: : but it io a probly oecuraty analysis of the concepts of Wie convineiny or bie ceedible on We one end, + and the incredible on tho obuer. : if Consider now the outlying categories, the inpressions which Pare both WOgve! nnd KiiiOwver (now one, now the over), and those which are neither. The first iv ilwustrated by tue impre jou made on us by Yivoeor Noyes! auch rs the Hoboly paradox or the JorLtes (243 with DL VEl 82), Yo far trom these being sometimes proveble and sometines nee improbable, ve do not kuow which they are because - cnd thin is what 0) _Reons to call thom both Wibvvdi ond “Gdvol = they strike us now as — - convincing, now as the o».osite, The categorization is on apt diagnosis [of our balilenent., Ao ror the Last category, ilaustrated by ‘tho mumver of the stars is even', "fie numer of the stars is old'(243), the aan examples are eyain chosen 1or their relation to tie subject who has the impression, They :re tie standard examples of things absolutely non- j evident, rltogethor ovyond humn pover to sscertain (PH 2.97, H 7.393, 8.147, 317), in the foco of which the nutural response is to suspend x Judgement (vic. Acad. LL 52, (Epict. 1.23.3). They are neither credible nor incredivle, since tie ee 5 ae vroduce no inclination to pass judgement either way. It is not likely that this total neutrality would be a Scom.on occurrence in our oxp.rience. The Vuelwt Aim inpretnne doit nik baling bare aber, © Lconclude thet tron the Ytoic point of view TiGAey is not, as some scholers hove implied, an essentially pejorative term." On the Athat is the impression oue yets trom Rovin, op. cit., LUO. Qoontrery, their epistemology .9 founded on the idea that impressions {taken in isolation are intrinsically credible or, on ocension, ineredibih ® (those tht are both and those that are neither vcin,s the exception . rather thon tho cule). ‘tho WExv7 — impression my indeed be folse, ‘end so liable to.wisloid the unwary, but assent to whit is fvlse © 4s to be blemed on the ansenter's rash precipiteucy (ReowcTed — )y ~ his lnck of care about the possibility oL being wrong, Lqually, the = Weds) — impreasion may vqtrue vithout being certainly oud evidently — true (cataleptic), out osain disuent trom the true is uot to oohaia ae et the dour of the impression: it is auc to interference by sowe mx extrinsic tector. In Stole epictenology, ae ix their mored doctrine of | 5. © gikeiosis, the processes of uoture vere perfectly in order as they SoS ss 1 \ etnias a ~ "We only go wrom; beerwe we ere led astray ey subside intlucncesfo #9 are uow equiv en wilh bie Sboic weberisd acco. ary for unverstan.ing the debites in which Carn des von his reputation is ¢ devaslaling Dene AY cantte : controversialist (by LV 6: Ovargue Uneb ceruerdes was 2% ). L propose, Acquainted with Schoma § cad produced hi own sciemo in Wialectical 5/ Opposition to it. Yextus begins hin eccount of Carneedes with a coutrest between Carne: des ond Arcecilaus in respect of theirscontriputions to the debate about the criterion of truth( 7. 159). the target of Arcesilaus' attack, we cre told, vas the vtoke criterion ~ newely, acueub to a etaleptic impression ~ rd only that. ‘sithin the clase ol true iuptessio tho Stoies distinguish the cateleptic impression tro: tne noncataleptic by saying that a cataleptic impression is one such thet it could not be false (152). Arcesilaus, however, advanced numerous od varied examples Mto sho. that no true ispression weets this vital differentiating condition; no true impression is such that it coulu not be frlse (154), 60 the Glass of cataleptic impressions is empty. that .stavlished, he simply rn »Spelis out what follows ou stoic premises for the wise man cataleptic impressi: bo essent to, he will suspend Jud cement about dpi ectiines mover toecneh opt abe Bee oe Be pment abOyE ee zm), [carnendes, by contrast, ‘aimed “to Give his “argumontd greater x. [ Ll f having no * everything ( Thiote esp. 155: Mothing beins; graspable, it will Loliow even actording to the Svoics that the vise mon will sugfend jusgement', 156: ALL bhings vy being uncrespoble, owinr, to_the non-existence of the tobe criterion’. Ad Seite pe CR etter: cw ‘gehorality. Ho arranged them so vs to confute 11 preceding philosophers, x jot just tie Stoics (159). The greater generality of rneedes' attack oppsore in the two Strotegies which are uext dvserived. First, Carneades (oes through az All the yossible candidates tor » criterion of truth end argues that none,X f them vill do: reagon, sense, impression, or whatever else be proposed, All ploy us fnlse (159), uscentially, it is Mexexrtext Une staatogy of XY Peserrtes' first arguments in the ,editations, ond it catches all other Philosophers in one net, The second ar,ument bey ins vith « dialectical concension, ‘even if thee ic this criterion se.this erlteriou of truta } that other philoophers (0 on cbout)', and proceeds tu develop curtain ee General recuirements ior uuythin, to ve a criterion, so 23 to show that f they cannot in the ond be met (160 £1). In view of th generality of the existence of : criterion 1s to ve understood ag o mere dit lectical thio second argument, aud the clenr indication (repeated 163 fin.) that | concession, it docs nol Lok nv thou:h the thest ar;umont ean heve (~~ |of truth. (A criterion of truth, oi course, do whol Uernendvan = Por ) ‘provability' Yas traiibionally been cupposed to bu.) i ue scholars — have insinted that in 159 the words 2ilv Gew dbAG, Wqbeves reste ey be translated tiione ic pnolutely/without qurlisteation » criterion of truth', rather then Jury's "here is absolutely no criterion of truth’, because they tuink Varuerden does go on bo propose iis oun criterion end must leave hincell the logical sprco in which ty vo wot Linguistically, frhus Stough, cp.cil., 53 n,53: ‘wury's translution.,.contradicts 7 Carneades' engtire doctrine’, rp;roved by Gisela Striker, 'Kewtypuy 177 Belas » Kochvichton der Akedemic der concchafton in Gottingen 1974 ir 2, 0 u.l, cumporing the use of dmes rt a 7.257. ~ no doubt, dury is vron;, bub logically a crituriou which can deaive is 4¢* no criterion at all, Cernenucs euphesizes this very point in the course FX the second argument (163-4), sud invoed it is couwon ground in the, © epistemological de sto vnrneades nllows hiuself to operate with the Fas Strikers mono ph wakes sdmirably cle.r. assumption that » criterion of truth oxists, nob vy wenkening the Ge concept of criterion, oub by mxkimxxtixehaxx indicetingbhat this is ~ “no more than dialécticnl concession on his prrt. ast us then look into the second arjuaent. Lb proceeds irom t we toa F considerations of tie utmost jcucrality, out “there igns of Stoic iuspiration even velore the cateleytic impression cowes in at 164. set bithecymere-shortig, Carn Rreatues at ell. Auswer: the feculty of percention - hence, if there des starts vy asking what makes us cognitive “is a criterion of tiuti, it must hove something to go with our perceptual experionce (160-1). and this experience, if it to supply a cxiterion of truth, must bé revealing both of itself rnd of the external thing, which produces it, vut experience so charecturized |X” is exactly what is mcent by the term ‘impression’ (161).Cerncades has | arrived by reasoning of great yeuerality at the first line of Schema 3. | y How fer he stends by the premises of the ressuuiny is auothor question, It wes Chrysippus who said that the impress.on reveals 4 both ik self and the external thing which produces it, “ud his too xX is the cowy:rison at 163 wieh the wey light displeys both il self and the things dnxik within it (SVP I1 54)% the whole deduction could be (dealt hl V26) pote? the eoteroft thin> ex feeder the iuprension is berues up Chrysia anstoic, or Carneades could he waning Uhat il, ueartiny srom the nout AY bevic considerstions root Hog A comstive crenture, you set out to determine whet» criterion o1 truth (sunposigg one) wust be, : Yuwils tind youvoelt setrecing paths already trodden vy “tole thought. I shall not xngxextxaxrkaimexax try to choose between these altemaatives until more evideuce is in, bub eithor way Carneades' vxjunent, though more Gener.1 than Arcesitaus', would be no less dialecticnl. Next, impressions evn dvccive, misreport 2 stave of alsairs like bed messengers (163). fais tekes us to lines 2 cud 3 of sdbma g, for to 1 talk of deception is to tilk of impre. sions which secw true but are not: in efiect, those that sre mbwvel but false. If such impr x ions occur, "it follows of uecesnity tint not evry improssion can stend as the criterion of truth, but, if ony canggt ell, Lt is ouly the true x impression '(163). The trouble is, wo eon have no vertainty about wifther x Na given impression is true or rise, io true impression ir such that it could not be false, out overy true-seeming improscion can be matched ~by @ false iuprension insistin wishable trom it (164)! (ilere carneades _— ‘fthie phese of the uryunent is well enalyzed by stowsh, oneekt., 42 if / fend [ will not dwell on it, { reise two sucll questions: (1)should ve Ssupply deel lux > or Cp ber ect) bulore HAz6a M Amportant that, being conditional, it 18 equivalent to a disjunction: ‘Either <> there 19 no criterion of truth or the 7/Osv7 —tmpresston is the criterion’. x7 And a disjunction can be used to set a dilemma, a dileuma which in Stoic terns amounts to the follewing: Either the wise man suspends judgement. about | unknown, 1» the two divisions of the WUdvy — impression which remain on Subtracting the cataleptic impression (Cic. Acad. II 59, 68, 77; cf. M7. 151 ; sense of the disjunctive definition of opinion, Now Carneades' {—~ i use of the dilemma in this second formulation is well attested by Cicero. | ae Where Arcesilaus argued straightforvardly 'If the wise man ever assenta to anything, he will sometimes also opine (sc: because the Stoic criterion fails KG and there ie no true impression which could not be false); but he will never : A opine (Stoic premise, marked as such in Sextus' paraléel version, M7. 157); _ therefore, he will assent to nothings’, Carneades used sometimes to suppose for the sake of argument chat the wise man will opine (Acad, 11 59, 67, 78). He supposed thia as a consequence of conceding that the wise man will jent (II 67), but it is only a consequence of that concession in comination with “a the sceptical claim thac there is no criterion by which things can be grasped, Gteero puts the dialectical position very clearly in the following terms f (Cicero himself 12 speaking, in the Academie ea ume on my own behal£. ( the premise that nothing can be grapped, and accept from you (Lucullus, the ‘\epponent of scepticism) that the wise man never opines, it results that the wise man will restrain all ) ent; consequently, you must decide whether you prefer to stand by the view that the wise man never opines or rather to say that he sometimes will - and neither will be to your Liking (paraphrased froa | Acad.II 68). Thus one arrives at the idea that the wise man opines in consequence of irer attempting to evade or deny Arcesilaus' conclusion that the wise man suspends fF “Judgement about eyything - given that nothing can be grapped, Ti-ptherwwords, What {s variously described as Carneades' withdrawing to the position that the wise man will opine (II 59), or his conceding that the wise man will “sonetines assent and tence opine (II 67), or his making argument with the © premise that the wi “eondition) he gv mao Bo, setae orien, Pres, yaa( ine, bves piasant, ps hothiny (XI778), )loeCarneades making dialectical play : "with the idea that_his opponent might withdray to or concede the other hald ©£ the disjunction ‘Either the wise man suspends judgement about everything 3 3 4 . g : ei 5 g E 5 ie 5 iy f e 5 3 F o * This toterpretation has behing it the authority of Clitomachus, pupil, Successor and voluminous expositor of Carneades, Clitomachus held, as against a a rival account put out by Philo of Larissa and Metrodorus, that the proposition 1 | _'Thé wise man will opine’ was not something Carneades himself endorsed but @ proposition he used for the purposes of argument (magis ab eo disputatun iam probatua, Acad.II 78). Cicero aides vith Clitomachus (Zbid.): vho taught y him to do so? Perhaps Antiochus, for another mention of the Philo-Metrodorus ‘ account comes at II 59 (Arceatlausodhered more consistently to suspension of Judgement if vhat some people say about Carneades 40 true), from which tt aol appears that Antiochus does not identify with it, If we follow up the reasons aie Wn Antiochuo,aight have for dissasoctating himself from the Philo-Metrodorus line, drawn from Stoie theory - already supply, out of the natural x endowment of the human being, sufficient to move him to act; the added extra of assent is not needed (Plut. 4bid.1122ba).* *For a valuable discussion of this reply in the context of Stoic theory of action, see Striker, 'Sceptical Strategies',op.cit. = But the objection implied by Sextus! redport 1s different: it concentrates less on individual actions and more on the continuing * The idea of an overall direction to one's life, implicit in Ted Gree Biche yuy pe » 1s spelled out by ky¥vevics 1s elelotar ket dhuye Kewer Tar Mee Tes, not so much that the two concerns (a) and (b) are entirely istinct as that (b) 4s the final aim and achievement of (a). ‘ &) The objection is that total CI would make life (not impossible | - but) aimless and incoherent. Not action as such (this was the — “ : first objection) but goal-directed behaviour is incampatible \/ with complete suspension of judgement. i It is at this point that we saw Carneades allowing his i opponent to think that the wise man will, after all, assent., f& We now have some sense of the congetext in which he did so. But Arcestiaus “concedes nothing, as indeed Cicero told us earlier (Acad. II 59). Even though a man suspends judgement about ewything,* he can still determine what to choose or x The emended text tte Vivicw Mtv 4s tnescapable. ‘The MSS «2 sees would have Arcesilaus talking about himself, which ¢ weccexev at the end of the paragraph (cp.b Gekit 157 fin.) shows to be incorrett. As before (n. above), we have a correction by a tidy-minded but @mpercipient reader who could not see how Arcesilaus could in logic fail to make the concession on total ‘Gixxq which we know that he, unlike Carneades, did not make. avoid, and in general decide what to do, by reference to the oyow It is again Couissin who saw most clearly how deeply this reply and its further developments are impregnated with Stoic notions.* " Couissin, ‘Le Stoicisme...', op. cit., 248-256, followed in this as in much else by dal Pra, op.cit. The point is : also recognized by Coutssin, howeyer, made the mistake of thinking that Arcesidlaus abandoned “CikXy when his dialectic moved on to the «Atyew (op.ctt., 253, 254). As we have seen, both Cicero and Sextus testify that he did not. First, the @Ayw. rt 4s, of course, a word in ordinary use and a common term of Aristotelian dialectic, but, as with the Wbivev , the Stoics seem to be the first to pin 1t down in a formal definition. A proposition is CUlys, they say (DL VIE 76), 4 and only if 4t has more tendencies ({¢pér ) fo be true than to be false. Example: 'I shall be alive tomorrow! .~ The example would do well as an example of a proposition which cannot be certain but which 1s nevertheless presupposed < by any long-term policy of action. It would be good to have the Stole view on that point. What we do have is that the Stoicsdefine what they call the appropriate act (i. v/Cuhes) as one KY which, when done, has a ¢~Acy Justification. ‘The case for the action has more tendencies to be true than to be false. E In Stoic theory,* such action 1s within the reach of the * For references, see Couissin, loc ordinary man, in contrast to right action in the strict sense . a (ie reCeeCupA ) which requires knowledge aadso 4s the prerogative of the sage. Further, right action and the Knowledge or wisdom (\évyeir ) which guides 1t are both _fecessary and sufficient for happiness, so that the wise man alone ean be and is happy - a notorious Stoic paradox. It is on these Stoic premises that Arcesilaus' original argument has 3 the further consequence that happiness is unattainable. < ~~ _ Arcesilaus in 158 takes these same premises but substitutes —\ for the Stoic definition of right action the Stoic definition ~ of appropriate action: right action, he says, is that which when done, has ma a judtification with more tendencies to be true than to be false. It now follows that the man who attends 4 to the «kyw will act rightly and lead a flourishing life. It would be natural to wonder here whether a greater than 90% chance of success is enough for happiness. But Arcesilaus has not cladmed that it is. All Arcesilaus has done is point out that the objector's despair about happiness and goal-directed behaviour was entirely based on premises of his own.If, as Aecesilaus has effectively shown, there is no content to = the distinction between right action and appropriate action,| right action might as well be defined in terms of the etAyev, and with that single modification those same Stoic premises entail that happiness can be attained. The reply is entirely dialectical.* Indeed that should have been obvious all along * Couissin, 'Le Stoicisme...', op. cit., 252, does not state the moral strongly enough when he points out that the arguaght in effect shows the Stoic sage to be in no way superior to any ordinary fool. It does, but the text puts the emphasis on %~ the even more damaging conclusion that the fool will achieve happiness. from the fact that the premises state theses about wisdom or Knowledge (\eeyes ), which Arcesilaus could not possibly adopt for his own. By the same token, it 1s likely to be misconceived _to worry how a man who suspends Judgement about everything "can at the same time be identifying which actions have a e®Myev justification. All that need be meant is that the Gialectical argument goes through without disturbing any of the premises Arcesilaus used earlier to reach the conclusion that the Stoic sage will suspend Judgement about ewything. That conclusion still stands, since the modification has taken place in angother area of Stoie thought. Not that one could not devise an answer, It might very well be that (\y was already, 20 > as in the later Pyrrhonist debates, thought of exclusively {x SX as a restraint on judgements to the effect that such and such ~ is true.* It would then remain open to the sage to entertain \ _* See 'Can the Sceptic live his Scepticism?', op. cit. x Judgements to the effect that such and such is (merely) cyey, :%and there may be support for this in the well-known anecdote about Sphaerus and the wax pomegranates. * Presented with an impression of pomegranates which was false and so a fortiori not cataleptic, Sphaerus should not have assented to its being & dish of pomegranates. Nor did he, but to its being edAryev that they were pomegranates. If the excuse is reputably based in Stoic doctrine, it 1s evidence that the Stoics themselves held that in a sttuataon where the wise man suspends judgement because his impression is not cataleptic, he may still judge that something has more tendencies to be true than to be false. One may be tempted - I confess that I am tempted ~ to recognize in the Stote definition of the «(\«v a glimmering of statistical probability. For what can it mean to say that "I shall be alive' tomorrow! has more tendencies to be true than to be false than this, that as the days go by and the morrow comes , the proposition turns out to have been true (as asserted yesterday) more often than it turns out false? What we must ask, however, before hailing the cirkycv as true probability, is whether the Past record of a proposition was clearly and explicitly regarded as a reason for thinking it true now that, eg, tomobrow I shall still be alive. Certainly, Aristotle, for one, uses the word to introduce feasons for a statement. My question is, Was that reason-giving function formally recognized in philosophy? For 4t 4s not entailed by the Stole definition. But whether the answer be Yes or No,Arcesilaus on thei \yv 4s the closest we are going to get to A a theory deserving the name probabilism. It should be a sobering thought that it was most likely intended, and on the Stoic side received, as an object of dialectical derision. To sum upon Arcesilaus: if we attend carefully to the Structure of the argument in the text, Arcesilaus' reply to x his objector can be seen to be no less a dialectical exercise ~ with Stoic premises than the original argument for Ging. Arcesilaus makes no concession on tiexy , nor does he offer Sete a criterion of his own.* Sextus had begun his report on Prabal, ogrh. 0, Cube beutye, * As suggested eg/Stough, op.cit., 51, n. 62. Arcesilaus by saying, 'First of all, the associates of arcesilaus (i.e.arcesiiaus] did not define any criterion, and those of them who are thought to have defined, one in fact proposed 1¢ alte en by way of ceunkerstmmt=tp the Stoics' (M7. 150).* It is a \ eacie 5 # does oi Swi Const, Sexedvier dnateate an alternative tradition about Arcesilaus having positive proposals of his on? Couissin, 'Le Stoicisme...', op.citt., 256, makes the second tradition compatible with the first by translating, ‘ceux qui pensent qu' il en a fixe’ un l'ont rapporté a une sortie... contre les Stoiciens', but this is just wrong. I suspect we have here another reproof by Antiochus to the rival Philo- om Metrodorus story. characterization of Arcesilaus' philosophizigg which 1s supported by all the evidence, including the evidence of Cicero. Contrast now the parallel passage where Carneades faces _- the same objection¢, (166). Nothing 1s said about. Carneades 4 mS defending himself by counter-attacking his Stoic opponent.*47) * Notice that whereas in 150 the word Wither $eyuyoy was. used of Arcesilaus' reply to the objection, in 166 HUT Fee Ley describes Carneades' critique of other philosophers on the existence of a criterion. Both verb and noun, incidentally, are a hapax legomena in Sextus: further evidence that Sextus is drawing throughout on a single source, viz. Antiochus. But that is only to be expected. Given that Carneades' attack is arrayed, as we have seen, not against the Stoics alone, but against all possible contenders for the role of criterion; given-that Carneades presses on Stoic notions in particular only against a background of independent argument - though it is argument strikingly parallel to the Stoics' own - designed to show that the Stole notions represent what a criterion would have to be if there was one; given all this that we have seen of the contrast between Carneades and Arces- jlaus, it 1s to be expected that Carneades' reply to the key objection should have a more general character than Arcesilaus'. We should expect an independent handling of Stoic notions, not a mere reshuffling of Stoic premises. But it would be rash to assume that when we find independent developments in Carmeades' reply, his ihontions are thexby shown to be more positive akd less dialectical than Arcesilaus', Just because his enterprise has a more general scope. Oy ty We left Carneades at the point where he had reached the (/i'! conclusion that there 1s no criterion at all. From this, as we know from Arcesilaus, it should follow that thé wise man will suspend Judgement about everything. But we also learned from Cicero that 4f the opposing side found that conclusion Antolerable and wanted to insist that the wise man cannotdo without assent, Grrncares was willing to roll back the argument to the point where the conclusion uns still conditinnal or disjunctive: Either the wise man suspends judgement about everything or (Af you cannot Y stomach that) he opines. Equivalently, aither there is no criterion of truth aaa or (if you insist on Uemanding @ criterion) the Ti)Jvy impression is the criterion, The objector insists (166), So Larnendes offers to develop the Y second alternative with the help of? the famous threefold scheme of the echt a Ravuy, for which three of the sanses listed in LJ seem potentielly relevent: (a) to take to onestkf as helper or partner, (b) the logical sensa ‘assume’ (cf. esp.tecsyfis , minor premise), (c) to borrow. impression which is tiQdvy —, the in ression which is tiDdu4 and “dete lteter, ond the impression uhich ts TOL) , Keep /orerras Bie ab. eS Sep ey. In fact, he mes a fresh start with a new division of impressions, having first made the point that there are tuo relations in which impressions have to be considered, their subjective relation to the person who has them and the objective relation (truth and falsity) to the external object (167-0), This has been hailed asp Wistinction between the conditions (objective) #h and eriterion (subjective) of truth, and as such fb telling criticiom of tho vtolc attempt to merge the tun.* Gut so far, {+ wstough, opecit, 53; cf, also 51: Carneades id ‘expanding the analysis of the concept of impression’, Carncades has said nnthing that was not familiar to the author(s) of uchema S, and he has said it in rechynizably “toic terms,* The innovations begin at Est for Ayvtdervas a stole (chrysippeon) term, seo above, WavidSrespatr 45 chrystppus' word also (i 7, 229, 231), and possibly hs coinage, All theexemales in Cud are lath, from time when the yenernl philosuphical vocabulory Contained many clowints derived fron stolcism, For roin examples of Pi TasioS4 in inlubitably tute contexts, see M0, 276, 397, 4OG, : ‘ the next step, when it emerges that in Carneades' scheme TuOdvos ' and “si bdves wil be contradictories, not controries so they were in Ta Schema Apoeerine true Not saresrk A COL Adan) Can Owes, uneioge sem Gufccu) et Vividly imly 4ppearing false True but not appearing true Schema C : cbucbying Several points call for comment. First, “arnrades argues for tebbeag TBuvss and Vai bles as contradictories, He takes 3 version of the Stoic Bharacterizetion of the Tic 95 that uhich is of a nature to persuade us (TeXbew Jp aevKev , 169) or to induce us ta assent (cls uyeerdcOcow isnisduy 7 172), where "of a nature to' coptures Micely the Stoic thought that the impression $s intrinsically convincing ond so will convince unless Something intervenes, find he says there are two ways in which an impression mey fails to match up to this specification, It may uppear intrihsically Catribev ) False or At mo ay be oe but simply not appear true (169), Necall that for Schema S only the firstpune illustrated and that we found no provision made For inpressions which are kniOduer but tnue (p. above). Carneades seems to have schema 4 in mind, and tha motive for his correction OF it 4s unlikely to be merely that of eliminating @ logical flaw. For from the point of view of logical exhaustiveness Carnesdes has missed sokething Out himself: tha imprevsion which is false, but not obvinusly alse, and which does not appearétrun, hather, his interest is in claiming thatoo Me Set aver cheuld in thy true neuntion of mOdy ds because munifest folschood io nit the only (perhaps not even the most eounon) way an impression may Fuil be convincing. It turnshut there is a third way in which on impression my fall to be A convinciny in the Stoic sense. At line 3 of ~chema La division is made within the true-seoming imiressions on the grounds that en impression may soem true and yet not br even of p nature to convince or induce assent (171-2). Such are the confused and indistinct impressions one has of tiny objécts or of objects Far away or when one's vision is weak. Hecall, again, the : ~ difficulty we had in locating # plece in Yxhema S for the true but dim © impression (p. ebova), Carneades'-trus-ceuming but dim impression does not “meet the Ytoic prenfeription for convincingness, a5 is confirmed by the fact that at one point (% 7, 242) a certain vivacity (Teeyaved ) wan said to be a feature of the Ytoic TOKv} impression, Wut it does muet Sdema C's 1 requirement for being Wtbwv7 which 4s simply that it appear true. } 77 $0 Cerneades corrects even the “toic definition of the W@dvw, It is ono ~ a thing, he maga thinks, to appear true and quite another to have the “kind of intrinsic credibility uhich the Stoica build into “chema S, B It would follow - thuugh the moral is not drewn = that dissent from the true could be sufficiently explained by the charactur of an impression end A need not be put voun to external factors (cp. p. above). : From all thin it 4s npparent that, 4f Cornondes is retracing a path already trodden by “tvic thinkers, he is doing so in an independent, x starting point (the objective vs, the subjective relations of the impression) Guuched in wtolc vecobulary, but he proceeds much in the manner we detected x Garlier, first drawing in Mls oun terms the iistinction betueen appearing true . a and not eppoaring true (line 2 of Ychoma C) and then appropriatingesa® a i for it the relevant ~toic notions, The impression which appears true a Vi Sereasis (a vtoie term for an Smprescion such that 4t taH SAF At comis from» rn ebject - DL VI 51)* nn can be iuentified with | * Missing tho stoic origin of tpchesy 1 Stough, op.cit., 52 n, 39, remarks, ‘This term sugyests that an impression reftects ito object! - on the contrary, At is coined to be neutral on whoyer the eppearance actually reflects anything at all, It may connect with Vevey Jrhawepivg at 173 and with Gate epdeviav An Chrystppus' Light comparigof, It 1s also, though obscurely, a term af Stoic logic: FH 2.112 and Hichael Freda, Dis “toische te Logik (GOttingen 1974), 90 Fr. impression,* In 170 (not before) it becomes clear that he f extus' report now takws the form 'The Academics coll it ‘om - f 169; similarly 174), This rather implies @ source syraking of the Hcademics _.© fron the outside, os it were, without identifying with them, Antiochus so | speaks at ncadII 29, went back to the Fundimentol relations of the impression in order to da over Sgain the viviston from which it had been hoped to fix, by the usual process Of elimination, a specification of the criterion, Accordinqly, un ora bidden to strike aut the whole category of 4mOyve, we ewe Ampressions (170)*, cnnkhen the true-sceming but vim impression. Mesaciiee There ore obscuritivn here, comounded by the evident lacuna after av 4 ~ [Tha example of Lrestan takinn Clectra to bye Fury was in the $toic account en example of an impression which is (a) WO), (h) both true (because Pugh * Fel abJect) ond false (because not matchinn tha object) (M7. Zuse5, 249), That samo Unocrintion (b) is given here, but not (a). This Ems Urestea? impressionshas to br en/béves . Ubviously, it is not an evidently false impression, to it remains for itmto be one that docu not appear true. Gut Pow? The best J can sucnest is that Crests! Lmression did not appear true to raat the Teppect in which it wes true, namely, in being from a real jurson, ~ _tlectra; it only apwarad true that it was From'a Fury, in uhich renpect oF _ Sourse it wes False, This would be an interesting cortection to the vtoic use of the example, but it 1s certainly not explained in the text as uc have Lt, Tt might well be ensiar to take the lacuna after td Teas a eign that incorporated into our text is! tharginal note which pa: : oF raphraced 249 complete - with the quoted line of turipides, The Tepepted Quotation is itselr suspicious, — and with div te. Cewdv out of the way Jey “veEcs Yewtgrerk. Finds its © Fesponding 74/8 duwepivgy dgewy at a more confortable vistas: \ Be ree tout asaclete or we can alr i to the cataleptic impression, which Earnnadon hen siewntichen, in wm pent hera, The peteae 7 %e inp ession which appears true with sufficient vivacity t@ have intrinsic credibility (173). Now rowember that this new division was undertaken to meet the objector's : Yee for a criterion to make it possible for life to have @ coherent direction, Carneades meets that demand, consistently with the result of the his first retracing of the Stoic division - the result, namely, that nothing oa Fequirenonte for a ordterion = af} pnd-oaiy- 42) va oan suppose, ¢ 2 Cicero's evidence encourages us to suppose, that the mxercise 4s strictly @dalectical. If the objector demands a criterion; all he can have ic the "ab4vj impression, co let us set that up for him, Caraeades does not ~ x himself identify with this criterion. Schema C chows how the objector aust argue if he insists on a criterion of truth for the direction of life. He will be 11 advised to make some improvements to the original Stoic scheme. in particular, he had better select, within the class of WOvu/ impressions, i that subset which has the cubjective features af (vividness, etc.) of the x cataleptic impression. But this simulacrum of the cataleptic impression x ‘ie the best he can have - given that the only concession allowed to hin is to go back to the point where it was established that either there ie no criterion at all or the Wdvy impression is the criterion. es There is sone danger that the modern reader will miss the paradoxical force of Carneades' conceseion. The word ‘criterion! has for us become \~” @ colourless token of Philosophical exchange. We have lost touch with the thought, which Carneades shares with his opponents, that a criterion which does not decide between the true and the false is no criterion at all (pe abdve). One can perhaps eavour the paradox better in the other veroion, "The wise man will opine'. But suppose you had just been given a proof __ that there can be no algorhythm for answering a certain type of mathematical problem, a type of problem which is constantly cropping up. Tb in your day to day work. You say, 'I can't run my business effectively without an algorhythm'. 'Very well', comes the reply, 'If you insist, here is the best I can offer you ~ only it will give you wrong answers e6 well as correct ones', A criterion 'comuon to both the true and the false! is no less paradoxical than an algorhythm which gives both right and wrong answers.* Even if the paradox wore off with time, the original sound of * This helps to explain the tactic mfx adopted by Sextus (A esidemus) in jthe passage(H 8, 51 ff) mentioned p. abov: where the Academic wbd ig wnder fire as an unsatisfactory ancver to the question ‘what x’) is true?!, If theTEd\ was a criterion in the proper sense, the true an only the true is what it would mgimzk pick out, and it is fair criticien’ 4) of any such suggestion that the cane thing does not convince all men nor the cane mon always, the concession would be markedly dialectical, not to say derisory. That the 'deduction' of the ‘criterion’ which we have just been through de dialectical is evidenced alco by this, that it is blatantly disregarded, in the renainder of Sextus! report. Wie hear no nore of the refinonent x , concerning vividness. The criterion is just the W\bv7 impression, the “impression which azpear: true (174)~ inconsistently with the results of Schema C, The émphasis is now on the point that convincingness comes in degrees (173), which suggests that it is hopeless to try to drawa demarcation line between the vivid and the dim. The criterion must include x all the degrees (173). This confirms that the only reason for drawing a line earlier was to devise on the objector's behalf a simulacrum of the cataleptic Ampreseion, In sum, Schema C is no standing doctrine of a Carneadean Philosophy, but a variation on a dialectical theme. 3 A different variation follows in 174, ile are treated to another fresh start, a distinction between three cases of which we max use the fern may use it of that which is true and appears true, of that * They are hardly three senses, as Eury's translation has it,Which is false and appears true, and of that which is common (sc. to the true and the fa’ Hence, by abstraction of the comuon feature,* we arrive ¢ * How else to explain sbtv 2 at tho true-seening ippression aa the criterion. (This time we travel from the WEA to 4m truc-scemingness, not the reverse.) Now, is the thitd case just nontioned - the kav) divide Te Wylrcs vA bev to give the full description from 175 - a epecific case on a por with the other two, or is it the generic caco which includes them both? It would he nice to keep the phrase for the generic case for which it was used before (p. above), equivalont toTitiv) impression, but that runs into the difficulty that ’ according to 175 it is only on occasion (WeTe ) that wo need use it. ~ Suppot »then, it 4s specific: there is still a difficulty, namely, that it can hardly be a consequence, as is argued in 175, of the fact that the true-seeming inpression is sometimos krue false (the second case) that wo fre on occasion compelled to use (not that but) one that 4s both true and fake (tho third case). le must adopt Sandbach's proposal* and read * Class. Rev. 1935 4m the second Line of 175 Zxew Kel (TTF KAI) TY] KoWup « Because the {iby impression is sometimes false, we inevitably find ourselves using both this (the falee)’axid the conzon (partially false) impression, If wo adopt the wibvwv as the criterion, wo let ourselves in for all three caces. That is the structure of the argument, * It ceens easiest to take Wis as picking upCmeT) = Wer lay (dure), The slight obscurity vas apparent to the author, hence his clarification XMyu Se. The com.on impression can be left to tag along without further e: icit mention, since it is understood to be a compound of the true and the false,oF But what is thic imvrescion com:on to the true and the false? Ko explanation or oxample is given. It is hardly to be understood except by reference to line 3 of Schema S, where tho category 'wibvv., impresaion - both true and false' is illustrated by Orests' impression of Electra as a Fury: as being from a real person, the impreseion was true, but as not representing her correctly it was false (2:4-5, 249).* Schema C 4s indeed out of the game, * Note that if we do not excise the Orestes example from 170 (n. above), At ds classified there as Wifwvew , here as tibwy : not a happy stance for a man trying to develop his own epistemological view, but perfectly Proper in a dialectician, a6 I suggested earliery we are back with Schema S. And it is in tho light of this fact that I would road the last sentence of 175. That the false inprossion:are (by conparison with the true) rare is, T take it, both an uncontroversial truth and one vhich a Stoic especially is bound to agree to. For Stoic epistemology is the philosophical expression of a deep and serious faith in the cognitive endowment of human nature, ~ It io against this background that Carneades argues that the occasional falsehood of ® true-ceeming impressions is no reason to eschew the use of the Tif} anpression, But who would think it was? The opponent, the seeker after a criterion, It 4s entirely fitting that, just as Arcesilaus Pointed out to his opponent that he hes no reason tot to allow that the \ EVNoyev suffices for a well-directed life, so Carneades should draw upon Schena $ and the philosophicel assumptions behind it to urge that there is Ro reason not to trust a type of inpression, viz. the WCkvs , which 4s true more often than it is false. Carneades pute it in his usual general. ra stylef ‘There is (no: , you have) no reason to distrust the TEbWvy 7 Ampression', but the double negative of... UméryioV is still revealing. This 1a no advocacy of @ firm epistemological doctrine but a reply to an x U objection. Removal of the criterion is not, as the objector claimed, grounds_ for despair about the possibility of directing one's life in a coherent way. X “4 ©* opine. The Wh¥v.) inpression is for the most part true, as any dogaatic If the wise man must assent, lot him assont to theUsv4 impression, Seer philosopher nust agree, so the wise man will get elong as well as tho rest ~ of us. For the rest of us do, as a matter of fact (ipiefqrey ), regulate both our judgements and our actions by ‘that which te for the most port(275)." Indeed, to add an extra turn of the screw from Cicero (Acad-II 108 fin.~ 7 109), even if the Stole eriterion stood firm there remain many important » affairs of life in-which nothing can be done to exclude the possibility of X __-Ristake ~ marriage, sowing a crop, going on a voyage. So if the wise man cannot make a judgement or decision without his eriterion,he will come unstuck X anyway. Conversely, if the TifvvcV will do in these cases, why not in all? Givero states* that it was Carncades' Herculean labour to rid our * Acad. II 108, transcribing Clitonachus. minds of that fierce wild beast, assent - that is (sc. given the arguuents against the existence of a criterion), opinion (fy) and precipitancy ~~ TEX ), Our labour - and I am afraid that, even if it has been of mythical dimensions, it has involved much effort with texts that need more careful reading than they have hitherto received ~ has been to vid our minds of the traditional idea that, on the contrary, Carneades x exhorted ub to adopt a fallible criterion and assent to the Tibdvey . : T have argued that he did no such thing. Assent to the Tibdva io at best @ palliative handed cut to the opponent who feels he must nourish the Deast within. Cicero (to cite a lust, suporerogatory piece of evidence) puts the point plainly enough when he makes the transition from the comparison with Nexrartex Hercules to the argument I cited in the previous paragraph, Ue indicates that the business of following the wlvv:W only arises when the first part of the defence is set aside or abgandoned (ut ea pars defonsionis34 Felinguatur), In other words, thewilvuy , Like arcestiaust LAyov s belongs to another port of thedefence of Hax(headawly Lay « But Hercules wes not alloved to rest, nor can we. Uaving cleared our : Binds of misconseptions of the purpose of the Carncadean Tibvw , there is still Ie question of ite content. Given that, as argued carlicr, Tibuvés does not mean ‘probable’, co that a TiOve4 inpression does not mean one that is probably true, does Carneades cugzest that it is Probably true, that it may be taken as evidence or a reasonable ground X for asserting a proposition sbout an observable state of affairs? i Can he be held responsible for a thesin euch as this: 'i/e are entitled to say that a stateuent is true if, and only if, it is supported by | x eredible experience of the cort specified by the criteria (se. the impression and the other two menbers of the threefold echome)!7* * Stough, op. cit, 62-3; cf. also 51, 54. Quite fairly, Stough presents the thesis as interprotat_ion: ‘Carneades doec not speak unaabiguously of "evidence" forthe truth of perceptual assertions, but there ie reason to interpret hia that way! (p. 62), and sone of her reasons have to do with aterial we have yet to exaiine, It willbe obvious that I do not think that Carneades can be hela. responsible for any thesis. iverything we know of him outside epistemology - and we know a good deal about his arguments in oral philosophy, in philosophical theology, and on questions of free will and X determinisn*- goes to show that he never stood by a eingle thesis.** + tho best authorites with whom to pursue Carneades into these areas are Brochard and dal Tra, : The whole ppint of tho story at Acad. II 139 about Carneades defending Calliphon's opinion on the suimium bonua with such zeal that he ceencd to approve it hinself is, of course, tit he did not approve it; his defence was strictly dialectical, Wotice here the imperfect defensitavat: Carneades made a habit if this defenco, no doubt with variations as the occasion : Puggested. We could think of hin discourcing mck i Tu BYe in ouch the came ctyle figememer conte: aby es38 ‘We was the consuasate diclectician to the end. No doubt he could still, compatibly with that, devise for dialectical purpoces a theory of evidence. But I do not think that he did. So far, the only part of the text that even hints at a notion of @ evidence is tho final sentence of 175. llere he says that occasional falo: Ut Bay that its being for the most pert true is a reason for trusting it. 4 He ood ie not a reason for distrusting the tev) Ampreseion, ile does not ays that people do au a matter of fact regulate their judgements su fotione by ‘what is for the nost part'. le does not say that they judge and act as they do because these judgements are such as to be for the most part true and these actions are such as to be for the most part succecsful _. in attaining their goal. le says that people's judgeuents and actions have ' i i the context of Carneades' argument the property of being for the most part “satisfactory is adduced to meet the objector's prejudiced despair, not to © characterize people's stele of mind when they judge and act as they do. Carnendes is pfointing to the ungroundedness of the objection, not to the _‘ groundedness of our judgements and actions. The gap I am emphasizing is not suall, In the very case where Carncades somes to talk about people who are in fact (for the most part) acting end Judging on reasons, he fails to formulate for philosophy the notion that being for the most part true/successful is, or is tcken to be, a reason for judging/acting. You cannot hail a maj ac the founding father of the theory of evidence xkx if the moment he gets close to probability he doce ‘nothing to remark on it. But of course, his not doing so is nfether surprising nor rogrettable if, as on my account of his st¥ategy, evidence or probability js not what he is looking to find. However, the credentials of the traditional interpretation improve ANUS @ramatically when we go on to the noxt level in the threefol{ schene,ot introduced by the nomorable sentenco (176), ‘An dmpreesion never occurs ali by iteelf,* but one is fastened to another like the Links of a chaint*!, spoveciS fs | the only one of its kind, as at Plat.?im. 59b. This is the sense required by the context, not Bury's ‘oinple in-form’ ** Again Bury is wrong with ‘hangs from another’. It is of course teapting, t Sivon the traditional understanding of Carneades, to introduce on inage of sat ee metréeal relation of dependence, but the chain image will be wocked crtoat ferme of sets of impressions which all ‘hang togetlier', not dn tenus of one impression depending on others. At last we move away from intrinsic credibilit¢eo to consider relations of inpreceions to oach other. tow we are on territory where concepts of x evidence, rdbon for belief, even probability, can find a Purchase. that does Carneados make of it? What he makes of it is a scheme comprising three levels of strength Of subjective conviction. Beware the traditionalist's phrase 'three girece of probability'* . we start off with an dmpression which ie convincing and iancat jeustiiesop. cft., 34, Cp, von Arnin, RE ev 'Karneades', 1970: taie Dreizahh Ger Frobabilititastufon' or the title of am article to which we shell have Siepeton to refer shortly,lleraann ‘iutschann, 'Die Stufen der iahrachcan, ; lichkeit bei farneades', ithe: + NB. 66 (1911). RO more (Tildwy wey, 18K, 185, BE 2.207; bMS FAL. 227, 229), * Bury's translation here wrongly takes judgements on the basis of reasons. \e believe, he says, that this man is : ce cotvetn Socrates from hie having Socrates’ customary features (178). Again, sone doctors conclude that a man ds truly in a fever not fron a single syapton X but from tho concurrence ng (t¢. cwlecpjy ) of a whole lot of symptoms. But the all consistently appear true, we are more convinced (177). Nothing about x) x thing about there being more or better reasons to believe as the links in the chain are ~ “tallied up. Mothing about one discrepant impreseion being stronger xxxaxx ground for doubt than another, as eg a graceful shape would be stronger Grounds for doubting it wae Socrates than a new cont. The ost cleuentary 7 noraative conyonents of a theory of evidence are abvent. Elina. 8127 1 elyGe No, the clue to what Carneades 1s up to is the example of Menelaus, which we met in the context of seéma S. It was the example used by more recent Stoics to illustrate the way in which even a cataleptic impression may fail to gain assent(p.'c above).* "The PH example of an unimpeded impression, Admetus' impression of Alcestis back from the dead, has the 1dentical provenance: PH 1.228 . with M7. 254, The p¥Wpose of the example was to arge a strengthening of the Stote eriterion, It is to be not the cataleptic impression tout court, but the cataleptic impression when 4t has no impediment ( Werqpo 257). They might as well have said ‘when it is wmegiencery ', and perhaps they did, for Chrysippus has the phrase TeeswGvtss Tv tectihy Yow (SVF II 270, used of dangerously :/v arguments per contra; cf. III 499 for Witeevdery in a Stoic context) and Sextus’ account of the younger Stoics' proposal uses both the 6a Wuviaevw terminology’ (254, 258) and the compound K«Tvendv (257). What 1s more,in another passage (M7, 424) this move to strengthen the Stoic criterion is connected - with the thesis that there must be a concurrence (suwvledpmerv ) of five things - sense-organ, object perceived, place, manner of perception, state of intel@ect, all must be in order - if an impression is to secure the grasp of something.If any one of these is discrepant, the impression will be impeded. Hence they conclude that the cataleptic impression will not serve as the criterion for every case (KowGs , 424),* For certain purposes the criterion must ** This makes it clear,thak as ody &OAUs ketTy ela (257) did not, that the proposal is not a revision of the older criterion but a strengthening of 1t for special occasions. With kowOs compare Carneades! TeSiw Kxl Howey Keiiyerev (17S).«Ss be strengthened. / So it turns out that at least some Stoics have their own second level criterion. Are these ‘more recent'Stoics before or after Carneades? Or are they perhaps contemporary with and so ‘more recent’ , to him? We do not know,* so we do not know who acts as cue to whom. E * The report at M7. 424-5, immediately following as it does the Cargneadean objections to the cataleptic impression, could have been located within a statement by Clitomachus of those obj ectsonsend some further developments, which Sextuskt least by 426 has abandorled forfa more Pyrrhonist line of objection. If we could reclaim for Carneades the argument at 425 for the conclusion that no impression is unimpeded, _ we would have the nice result (a) that the'more recent’ Stoics are = known to Carneades, whether it is he, Clitomachus or Sextus’ source at M 7. 253 who calls them that, (b) that, just as Carneades has arguments inconsistent with his endorsing on his own behalf the | eriterion of the W6uviv , so here is an react inconsistent with his endorsing the unimpeded impression, Chan. weclaineray ULT fu Corcendhs av (0) tee beck dG (G., Kabicree Avitepy AemeAcy o Buc, \i omeron, God ay pe ee AC, MRT I st aeetren Ceiberch, _ But we can ask which ordering makes the best logical sense. It is 2 not easy to see the strengthened Stoic criterion as protecting the | Stole position against Carneades' critique. Whereas Carneades! F second ‘criterion’ can very well be seen as a simulacrum of the strengthened J Stoic criterion, devised in the same spirit as he worked at level 1. If the objector thinks that for some cases a stronger criterion is needed, the unimpeded credible impression will serve as well aqne can reasonably expect to be served. The absence of impediment in the _ concurrence ,does not indeed secure a cataleptic grasp of a thing, oe as its Stoic sponsors had claimed, but both the ordinary man and the doctor get by with it, so the objector has no reason to despair or ~ complain. * * A mbnor problem arises here owing to the fact that in 179 Sextus! reprt takes the form 'The Academic makes his Judgement on the basis _ of the concurrence’. An apparent parallel in 185-6 exists only in Bury's mistranslation: the English should read ‘they say that we. with 'we' continuing from 184 as the subject of the infinitives. That being so, we may \be inclined to take the subsequent ¢wev7%cHe in 187 not as a change of reference (to unspecified Academics )but = Tepe ghange in the mode of reference to the ordinary man. Havecomes | jthey' rather than 'we! in a sentence flanked by two illustd@srions using 'someone' (vy ); after all, €h' Ev xedvir 87Se7L0 in 187 echoes pe RN Sy. oo Biluew ud Wied’ in 185; The report returns to Che wwes form dn 188 and 189. Finally, the unspecified ‘they’ in the last sentence ef 189 probably does refer to the Academics, but, as Mutechmenn saw (n, Sbove), that sentence must in any case bé considered an addition tacked on to the body of the report, Having delimited the scope of the probiem and seen that it really is;mutnar no more than a single minor discrepancy with the otherwise uniform tenor of the main body of the report, we may canvas some solutions. qhe reference to the Academic as the user of the sesond eoitecien could ~ be assigned (a) to Sextus, intruding with the Pyrrhonist assumption that the W&dvev represents that Academies’ own referred doctrine 227, 229 Sat said earlier’in Téa 1s presinees Sextu mse ¥ Zalso 'I mean' in Aioh} (oy te mnbtoennsy ATs ‘ochus, allowing melt tp be influsncalby tne fase tHe? thivy tos currently advocating the FiOdvev as Academic doctrine (see n. and )%3; this would imply Cea Antéochus’ Canontos, from which Sextus! report probably devive, j. (cf: 201), postdated Phiio's innovations; (c) $0 Clitomachus, who fe seems to have talked at tines tp terms of ‘our’ (Academic) wise man } (eg Acad. II 105), a phrase which could perfectly well vofee to a ~ dialectical construction. (b) attracts by the chronological bonus, Nbut the safest solution may be (a), Are a 2 The third level is marked out as the criterion to use in the Securing of happiness (184). Remember that the objection was concerned (a) with goal-directed behaviour as auch, (b) with the securing of » happiness. Carneades can and does in 184 claim to have met the / first part of the concern: in small matters we ordinarily use the ay impression, in more important ones the unimpeded ‘impression. Thus far, the objector's wise man will get on as well as the Fest of us, tho manage to live without a criterion capable of distinguishing “the true from the false. (The structure of the argument in 184 1s the Same as before: p.‘s above). But what of the vital matter of securing happiness? For this, as we saw when disaussing Arcesilaus, the , objector 1s inclined to think that nothing less than wisdom or (he évgeu) ¥ knowtedge wii Go. What can Carneades offer by way of substitute for tnad? What knowledge meant to the Stotes is best illustrated in terms‘ er of Zeno's famous immage of the hand (Acad.I 41, II 145). If having an _ impression is like having one's hand open to receive something, assenting _ to an impression is like closing the fingers somewhat, while grasping something (KxTé\y iy ) 4s like a clenched fist gripping the object. The image is completed by likening knowledge to grasping the clenched fist with the other hand. In other words, having knowledge is a matter , of having a grasp of your grasp of something. Your initial grasp . then becomes rock steady mad and cannot be removed by reasoning X ~ (Acad. I 41, M7, 151), In place of this grasping of your grasp of something, Carneades Suggests that the objector must and should be content with a careful scrutiny of each impression in the concurrence (182). The list of factors to be checked up on tallies closely with the five factors s enumerated by the 'more recent' Stoics (182 with 424). Is the object | Perceived too small to get a good impression of it? Is the Perceiver's sense of vision dimmed? Is the medium murky? And so on.* by Loy Meo Sexcrar —* One ohscure item is the aéeycié a, which perhaps has to do with whether the object is behaving or manifesting itself in a fashion uncharacteristic of, say, Socrates and hence unacceptable on the hypothesis that the man seen is Socrates. Moral unacceptability might have been relevant to the analogy of examining candidates for a magistracy (182), but at this stage of the argument what 1s relevant 4s epistemic unacceptability. The rare word+islertar is used of an unaccepfable conclusion at PH 2. 229 - in a Stoic definition of sophism. _ Nor is that the only Stoic conection. From a passage of Clement * we learn that the Stoics have a notion BMWs SIG: os. et ek Ren NEZFiy roerices MA Kec fe Oe pas THEE Mihiss Tiered pboy mee €or! L Sem werd Myov 5 M Tes Midg PeYFu Agyo wt! dy, pg SER ve GIehomeeg Ryle jy Ker? enisresy KeToeSoupevg,.,46 that only the wise man is capable of the kind of careful attention E (e(6tée.r) which ensures the rightness of a right action. Lacking this, the ordinary man 1s only capable of ‘intermediate’ (pély ) action, 1.e. appropriate action. Appropriate action becomes right action when it 1s eT Adyew €viTelcupevg ——«y_ made complete or perfect in accordance with reason, and Ket! €i/owew cteeOoupevy , made right through careful attention. The action is a complete and considered - expression of practical wisdom. We are back at the point where y Arcesilaus brought in the €/Atvyew . Where Arcesilaus took the Stoic definition of appropriate action and applied it to right action, _Garneades takes a feature of the Stole notion of right action and X ‘applies it to actions which are not guided by knowledge. Hits ‘| Suggestion 1s that careful scrutiny of a kind we are all capable of Casretvecde SovipeSqev, 182) 1s enough for the ordinary man - and here €ivstti Ks (cf, also pete Cmordeter KA BEF eSou, oa t 222 187; Cisrysu , 186) echoes the Stoic term,while Soka Soucy a lex poole Alludes to the democratic process of boKimuu, the scrutiny/of those who are to hold offices with the power to make authoriitive decisions (182), ' If this was Socrates at work in a Platonic dialogue, every reader would at once sense the(irony of an analogy in which the people take the measure of authdiby: it was a Stoic paradox that Bs “the wise man alone is king and ruler (SVF III 611-622), because he alone knows the right thing to do, and as king he 4s not to be X [called to account (SVF 112 617). Tt 1s no exaggeration to say that Socrates bestrides these debates like a Colossus: on the Stoic side ~ the paradoxes, on the Academic - the dialectic,* each element a * Neather point went unremarked: for the first, see Acad.II 136; for the second, I 17 et al.47 hardened and rigidiféed in consequence of being split off: from the E other.* So too the Academic has the irony, the Stoic the moral fervour (x * See Arcesilaus' dictum that he ‘residuum of knowledge which Socra Imowledge that he knows nothing ( (Rad Be). knows nothing, not even that tes left for himself, viz. the Acad.) 4S ). Carneades agreed So let the dialectic play on. If the objector depx despairs of the possibility of a complete and considered choice in matters ~ Sffecting happiness, the reply is that he need fare no worse that the X "ordinary man fares with a carefui scrutiny of each item in the concurrence, » If the wise man must assent and wants to Perform right actions, let him follow the democrat! 8 procedure for ensuring a complete and X x Considered judgement. Carneades' claim that the tested Ampression pss Judgement most complete or perfect CeAeroTdT9y Torco Ty Kefew FS | 181) does not mark the highest degree of probgbility in a theory of f ccvidence. It is rather the dialectics: simulacrum of the Stoic x 7 notion that the right action which secures happiness 1s KT2 Ady. ]TTeoume’vg » made complete or perfect in accordance with reason, _ thanks to the knowledge which is the unique Prerogative of the sage.* La Bury, "supremely perfect is (the [impression which creates Judgement', 7a 0180 Misunderstood by Stough*op.cit., 54" when une writes: _ ‘Tested experience ds the most convincing and issues in the most , final and authoritative Judgements Cerererétg keris 1, Kelous As not judgement in the modern Philosophical sense ‘Judgement that *p is true', but the Judgement or decision whether P or not-p 15 true. - This is plain from 7). teveiv Wt rr0car in 179 cr. kelees TOS Roy Rares, _ 287) and from the way the Kei, keiven, vocabulary 1s used all through 28,183, and it is in fact the sense one should expect both from ae grdinary Greek usage and from philosophical Precedent :see Theodor i Bvert, ‘Aristotle on Perception; JWdgement oF Discrimination?’ (forthcoming). But of course it 4s tne in the sense "Judgement that’ that one has evidence for a judgement, ‘Judgement whether! 1s rather made on the basis of evidence: in Greek €« such and such or by the use of (instrumental dative) such and such (178, 179). The 'most perfect _ Judgement’ is therefore not, as the unwary might think, the Judgement * The phrage TAG OTLTyy Tor Siw Wy Kelsi, fests mistranslated by |E : 4 for which there is the best evidence. With that I rest my case for the dialectical character of the “ famous threefold scheme. The remainder of Sextus' report 1s illustration and confirmation that the scheme does meet the original objection satisfactorily@. If ve had more than fragmentary evidence on the relevant areas of Stoic thought, the connections might not need such minute detective work. But I k submit that Couissin's long-neglected interpretation can be sustained all the way through Sextus' report, x which is by far the most extended account we have of the threefol{ scheme. Of course, the scrutiny or testing Carneades describes can properly be viewed as a matter of looking into reasons for and against ~ assenting to the original impression. They are reasons such that because of them (fi 7074, ) that impression is credible ( wIOT}Y, | 189). But this ‘because of' 4s within oratio obliqua. We think the _ scrutiny makes the impression more worthy of belief (cf. 282 ¢fin ). “What Carneades derives from this is als factual as before: we give ~ greatest or firmest credence where we have tested, the tested impression is more credible for us (181). Not: the most probable Be wer _ impression 1s the one with greatest support under testing. Moreover 5 rth fos Gystat2- = Garneades only describes testing which 1s actually carried out; whether it 1s well or badly carried out 1s not his concern. He makes ho normativé proposal, nor should we try to extract one from his descriptions. For 'p is probable’ dumx is not equivalent to "p is thoroughty tested by me', and it would be a very bad theory of probability or of evidence which said it was. It remains to note one last variation on these dialectical themes, recodrded in a passage of Cicero (Acad.II 103-4) which 1s Generally - but mistakenly - taken as evidence for a positive Academic doctrine.* In fact, however, we have ag&in to do with: Ue] 7 <0 Greberenes) Staylopch, 5¢ vale Sy cing. thy soures iy Jlitemechus, iL is import-nt thal this view b+ firmly Opposed, If my oun coding is Frund uipursuasive, thare a @ ilifferent account, which still preserves the yeneal spirit of the coulssin Anterpratation, in striker, ' ceptical vtrategias', upscit, a reply to an objection: the same objection as before, but this time BN grounded on the charge that the ncademic arguments against perceptual certainty rob us of our sens » The reply proceeds in tuo stages. First, @ clarification: an argument against a mark of certainty, such as was Supposed to distinguis the cataleptic impression fram the merely TiOxv4, is not to be confused uith an argunant against the possibility of any impression being trus, uhich alone would imply that colours, taste or soundg simply do not exist.* jecond,a distinction between tuo ways of sere 1 have filled in the reasoning by which the& objector must have thoupht he could derive the conclusion of non-oxistence take substantiates the chnroe sensus eripi. The reasoning is indeed invalid, alboark veer hi understanding the proposition that the wise mon suspends Judgemen ye acd (a) there is nothing to which the uise man assents, (b) there is nothing to which he responds in such a manner ws to approve or diepprave it, atall with the result that there is nothiny he affirms or dent ean that oscent involves definitely effirminy or denying that something is true. The su,yestion nou is that the isu wan miuht accept that \ he should not in thin vense assent to unythinn but could still, compatibly with that, hold in practice to a side of respondidg ‘Yes! or ‘Not in accordance with probebiiites, Tis would oe suvficiont to make Aurposive ection rossible for iim, us af course it would not be if ~ he wus literally rovia: of iis T suggest thet these sur ue Jocated in a diaactical situation uhere the first Limb of the dilemmatic disjunction '¢itherthe wise Suspends Judgement sbuut cvuryihing or he opines!’ has not Sc bean waived, The rely tu the objection rketches, «lung lines ilready Be mapped out by “reesilaus (p.--' ubove), the possibilities Saxnmetian ~ Of action for the man who continues to suspend judg nt aniaut evdything (eum guide omnibus rabus contineat se sb ausentidnda), There remain for Pim topresoions such thet he can sey "it is WiGud thet p', as Jphaerus x suid tit is e¢Aoyov that these ar Pomayenates', Thesa impressions © MALL be enaush far purposive action, i yuh wild meet the requirenent igi : Gum sine adseneu: when he says ox thinks soriething of the form ‘It is ilk, } E + this Jora not count as 2 urecch of tag. Arcasitzus wis Y eC these 18 no nzed tn wetve the inst intain the = Pousibilily of purposive action, ind the passzce cosclucas with an 4 © indicrtion tha’, second Invel, univnadedness, en oo obtained any 1 the sine tarms, Tf this r€edlog of tie persone ts cortest, it is proof positive that, es Carnes viewes the mettes, uleption of + Mib4v inns essten x oF, » 1.2, 28 2 basis for sssunt € @ requirevant of purnocive action. It is ths avranent who thinks that ection tr-uires assent, jus K re it 1 desasiring objection for which sarnentes develnos g scheme of 'eritaria'ts guide asuent, 9 The crouning blow coms when Erne: y turns Tpund god arcues that the benefits of the schema could heve vown unuwht 3b no cost at all to the wise man's “Ry, the dinlectician ie a man of definite resource, So, Fihally, how did it come obcut that bh. probebilisi in intersmatatlol x) sPS 60 compelling! That is » large historicnl qucotian, mart of which has ta do with invelopments in the Acadomy oftere’ha Jenth of varneades, % ond part with the bistory af the tronsmiacion of eceticiom ta mouern times, a pracess in « ich “tera Academica played a key roles X odpitt, op. cit,Sy Here 1 crn to no wore tho dadttecte tuo ores r furtoer study, (1) The later hy ory of the “cudemy does inclule « phase af mitted secotictom: thilo of Larissa found the Carnradean scheme J percussive enough to edapt it for hin oun doctrines* (Huch a8 someone See ni "above for the context in which thes Aobbecame Academic Goctring. It is then i'hilo's scodemy that “enesidemus is attacking BE MS. Slzcompare wenesidemus' clear allusion to Fhilo's distinctive position at Phot. Yibl.170a 21-2, Un Henesidemus' attack and its taraet, see further 'Can the ~ceptic Live his ~certicism7!, op. cit, might be seduced by the hedonistic position which ~ocrates constructs with consu mate dialecticel skill in | leta's Frotvrarsc - did something of that kind happen to iriutippus?) To arrive at a total picture this Foctrinc] version of the Tuy hee to be integrate with what io knoum of Fhilo's zhilosophical nebtytly in other arsq3 than gpixtemolocy. ety clini All 1 necd say here is thet) locks to be as doctrinal as @arnearies! Potivity cutsive epistenolayy is demanstral ly divlectical (p.3? nbnve) (2) beving wn to modern tim + A potent factor wes that Vicero's heterical Works cot here farst, ‘vithin the “cedemice itself cicero rues tha u fer the most part pn ce of WOsy —ccuretaly enouyh, Clemente 4y: 48 aGutvalent to ‘tiun-s.eming! Gvere vidwsntur, IT 192, 105), But Me tronslates it nrab st treats probebile fansider this definition from his egrly rhetorical trovtise Dé In. “Lagbabile ts that ubich happans for the mest port, er that which is held dn epinton, or thst which povsecs.s in iteslf voke simtlitude to these, whotier 1t be truc or flee! (ie I 1 46), and he-gaes un to Sey thet tho probebills used in orquments are wither signs or things credible or things sanctiorfed hy the judgement of authority or claims "Supported by comparison (analogy). This definition @lunyes us into x _ largely distinct from tha tradition of academic philosophy. The notions X the complex tradition of ancient rhetoric, a tradition which isin play yo back to the “ristotelan adofey and to Mrintotle's sccount GF AtkeLinood ( Aeds ) An terms which somehow combing both tha bhoSoy and that which is for the most t (air. 70a & ). Those ideas are wry x. Gifreront Crom thoge we ave been conc-ried with here. Jut of course for the Runaiusance Cicero's rhetories! works we: * prime sourc: of Ansp#¥etion, much better known then the Aewdemten end uoll known before the Acsdev ca was at all wide y read, Tt was pervectly natural for tie Aenoissance readers to construe the crite philoscphy us a philosophy *fotably, Lorenzo Vella: see daring, op. cit. Of rrobshilitas, tking probabili to be the sim concept as the one sé | he Gar olready Familiar with from thnx his study of classical rhetoric , find it wes this fuzzy concent which’ went under the name orobabils or Probable until the magic decade ‘Around 1660 which facking pinpoints fes the birth-time of our prusent day concept of probability, Mot that tha history of the concent becomes streightforwrd crom that p: riod eouurds; 4f anything, the opposite 4 tha cxse. Small vonder, then, that the older understanding of p obabile should continue, directly or our Andirectly, to influence edgegomiybe rending of the sendemica and of the vcademic philosophy in ceneral, jut it tim we stopped, :