Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
1
R. Esposito, A democracia, no sentido clssico, acabou entrevista a Antonio Guerreiro, in
Jornal Expresso, Suplemento Actual, 19 June 2010, p. 47.
2
Ibidem, p. 48. See also R. Esposito, Bos: biopolitica e filosofia, Einaudi, Torino 2004,
pp. 115-157 (English translation: Bios: biopolitics and philosophy, University of Minnesota
Press, Minneapolis 2008, pp. 110-145).
3
Ibidem, p. 25 (ET: pp. 31-32).
This means that the negation does not take the form of the violent subordi-
nation that power imposes on live from the outside, but rather is the intrinsically
antinomic mode by which life preserves itself through power. From this perspec-
tive, we can say that immunization is a negative [form] of the protection of life5.
4
Ibidem, p. XIII (ET: p. 9).
5
Ibidem, p. 42 (ET: p. 46).
The Normative Immanence of Life and Death 199
The two main texts where Foucault presents his analysis on biopower
and biopolitics are the latest chapter of La volont de savoir (1976), and
Lecture on March 17, 1976, which closes his course, Il faut dfendre la
socit. The circumstances under which both texts were written the first
as a book and the second as a class are virtually the same. He starts the
course delivered by him during the 1976 school year with the intention
of giving up his investigations, which had been focusing too much on
repression6, discipline, and what he called the how of power against
Surveiller et punir (1975)7. He intended to introduce a new approach that,
through a careful analysis of the war of races8, would culminate in the
presentation of another kind of power relations the birth of biopower9.
La volont de savoir, in turn, would only be published in December of that
year10 within that new framework of research.
It is starting from the lecture delivered on March 17, 1976, that
Foucault seeks to depict the concept of biopower in a more system-
atically way. Whereas one witnesses during the late seventeenth century
and until the eighteenth century the setting up of disciplinary power,
it is possible to spot during the second half of the eighteenth century,
among these disperse technologies that discipline the individuals body,
the establishment of another technology of power that does not exclude
6
M. Foucault, Il faut dfendre la socit. Cours au Collge de France. 1975-1976, Seuil/
Gallimard, Paris 1997, p. 36.
7
Ibidem, p. 21.
8
Ibidem, p. 51.
9
Ibidem, pp. 213-235.
10
D. Defert, Chronologie, in M. Foucault, Dits et crits, Gallimard, Paris 1994, t. I, p. 49.
200 Marcos Nalli
it is less and less the right to die and increasingly the right of interference to
make living, and in the way of living, in lifes manner of being, from the moment
that power therefore intervenes, above all at that level, so as to increase life, to
control its events, its contingencies, its shortcomings; from that point on, death,
as the end of life, is obviously the term, the limit, the edge of power14.
11
M. Foucault, Il faut dfendre la socit, p. 216.
12
Ibidem, p. 219; see also M. Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au Collge de
France. 1978-1979, Seuil/Gallimard, Paris 2004, p. 323.
13
M. Foucault, Il faut dfendre la socit, p. 218.
14
Ibidem, p. 221.
15
I am aware of the importance of the latest discussion about Foucaults
interpretation of liberalism and its relevance to understand some features of biopolitics.
However, the pertinence of this correspondence focus on the wider problem of liberal
governmental reason. My concern is to examine just the relation of immanence between
life and death in the practice and dynamics of biopolitics, what does not necessarily leads
The Normative Immanence of Life and Death 201
To say that power took possession of life in the nineteenth century is to say
that it has succeeded in covering the whole surface that lies between the organic
and the biological, between body and population, thanks to the play of technolo-
gies of discipline on the one hand and technologies of regulation on the other17.
body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as a basis
of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of
health, life expectancy and mortality, with all the conditions that can cause
these to vary19.
While since the beginning of the seventeenth century a new type of
power relationships through discipline begins to appear, it is the dawn of
the technologies of regulation in the eighteenth century that brings about
the climax of the historical event of biopower, whose discipline and regu-
lation shaped the two directions of the relations of force, one individual-
izing and other specifying, one anatomical and another biological, all of
them converging to the same purpose: life. Human life as a political pur-
pose, human life as a political fact: For millennia, man remained what he
was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political
existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as
a living being in question20.
Based on the central thesis according to which biopolitics is as an or-
ganized set of political, institutional, and governmental strategies devoted
to the preservation of human life, both texts follow separate paths, but
in mutual interconnection: Il faut dfendre la socit focuses on the establish-
ment of the modern State racism, while La volont de savoir turns its at-
tention towards the device of sexuality. In the first one, Foucault defines
racism as the means by which a rupture is inserted into the biological con-
tinuum of the human species, fragmenting it and introducing a counterbal-
ance regarding races. Additionally, derived from this fragmentation there
has been an introduction of a kind of relationship that internalizes war in
the social environment: a war between one race and another, so that it al-
lows a biopolitical assimilation of death, producing death as an assurance
of life, according to a strictly biological point of view:
The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that
his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race,
of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will
make life in general healthier: healthier and purer21.
19
Ibidem, p. 183.
20
Ibidem, p. 188.
21
M. Foucault, Il faut dfendre la socit, p. 228.
The Normative Immanence of Life and Death 203
22
G. Agamben, Homo sacer, Seuil, Paris 1997.
23
M. Foucault, Il faut dfendre la socit, p. 228. See also J. Bernauer, Par-del vie et mort:
Foucault et lthique aprs Auschwitz, in Michel Foucault philosophe, Seuil, Paris 1989, p. 320.
24
M. Foucault, Il faut dfendre la socit, pp. 229 and 233.
25
Ibidem, p. 223.
26
M. Foucault, La volont de savoir, pp. 99-173.
27
Ibidem, pp. 191ss. See also M. Foucault, Il faut dfendre la socit, p. 224.
204 Marcos Nalli
The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to
expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an
individuals continued existence. The principle: being able to kill in order to live
that supported the tactics of fighting has become a principle of strategy between
States; but the existence under consideration is no longer legal, regarding sover-
28
M. Foucault, La volont de savoir, p. 193.
29
Ibidem, p. 76.
30
Ibidem, p. 193.
31
Ibidem, p. 183.
32
Ibidem, p. 187.
33
Ibidem, p. 179.
The Normative Immanence of Life and Death 205
eignty, but biological, concerning a population. If genocide is, indeed, the dream
of the modern powers, this is not because of a return of the right to kill; it is
instead because power is now situated and exercised at the level of life, species,
race, and the large-scale phenomena of population34.
Here is certainly one of the main points of the analysis and critique
presented by Esposito against Foucault: he says that Foucaults is not
able to offer an analysis that could explain how biopolitics may produce
a thanatopolitics. However, in our point of view, it is not Foucault who is
attached to this political rupture between life and death, but it is Espositos
interpretation that intensifies this trait of contradiction. Esposito takes the
terms life and death as diametrically opposed so that he can only in-
terpret them antithetically. This idea is always tied to an antithesis between
the sovereign power and biopolitics through which, as said by Esposito,
Foucault could not determine the historical and genealogical terms of
that tension: whether they were in continuity a hypothesis according
to which Foucault would have to admit the genocide as constitutive of
the paradigm of modernity in the same terms of Agambens or they
required a break and a difference hence biopolitics would be continually
invalidated whenever death stood in the way of the life cycle35.
Esposito seems to be right about the difficulty of the historical ar-
ticulation between sovereign power and biopower proposed by Foucault.
However, we do not think that is he totally right when he calls upon it for
his criticism of the interpretation of Foucauldian biopolitics. At least in
his two most important books, Surveiller et punir (1975) and La volont de
savoir (1976), as well in the courses of this period of his theoretical work,
Foucault highlighted for several times how came to be the transition from
sovereign power to biopolitics. Sovereign power is characterized by a the-
atrical ritualization of torture that allows no possibilities of doubt about
how it deals with life and death. Biopolitics reveals other modalities of
action over the individuals and the population that are strategically more
effective and insidious. It works through disciplinarization and regulatory
34
M. Foucault, Il faut dfendre la socit, p. 180 (emphasis added).
35
R. Esposito, Bos: biopolitica e filosofia, p. 38.
206 Marcos Nalli
actions that have as focus and target the living body and the species life of
a populational group.
What is very hard to determine in the historical and genealogical nar-
ratives produced by Foucault at that time are the reasons that would have
led to this shift. However, in Naissance de la biopolitique Foucault reveals
the hypothesis that led him to this inversion: it happened because of the
necessity to create internal mechanisms that would limit the Police State in
its internal governmental politics. This is the Foucauldian analysis of the
rise of liberalism as a way to contend the government power of the State
and as a new form of governing. Therefore, it is possible to presume that
the inversion of the sovereignty principle took its course mainly because
of the limitation and contention of the sovereign power rooted in the
State and in its governmental reason.
At any rate, if we assume consistently with Foucaults ideas that biopol-
itics performs a reversal of political primacy between life and death, it
is necessary to think about how Foucault articulates these two terms; after
all, inversion does not necessarily imply replacement or removal, as Es-
positos interpretation seems to entail. Some clues have already been given
in the final chapter of La volont de savoir: life is the object and purpose of
a whole array of actions and strategies; also, life is in some respects one
of the effects of biopolitics, what is acknowledged by Esposito himself.
The answer to the challenge presented by this articulation can be found
in another notion, which is highly prized by Foucault; namely, that of
standardization, especially considering the utmost challenge that racism
inflicts upon the biopolitical governments of modern societies36.
But what is a normalizing society? Foucault defines it explicitly in Il
faut dfendre la socit37: it is a society where discipline and regulation are
organized around norms, making possible a set of planned actions that
aims to society as a whole from a fundamental unifying exponent, which
is life taken as its purpose, its object, and its effect. At any rate, it is clear
that norm prevails in the whole set of forces and technological relations
that regulates social life. A hegemony of the norm is not therein war-
ranted; rather, a situation of constant tension remains between the forces
of normalization and the events of resistance, questioning, and confron-
tation that disarticulate or at least prevent the full success of regulatory
36
M. Foucault, Il faut dfendre la socit, p. 228.
37
Ibidem, p. 225.
The Normative Immanence of Life and Death 207
38
E. Castro, El vocabulario de Michel Foucault, Universidad Nacional de Quilmes,
Bernal 2004, p. 250.
39
M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir, Gallimard, Paris 1975, p. 216.
40
See also M. Foucault, Scurit, territoire, population. Cours au Collge de France. 1977-
1978, Seuil/Gallimard, Paris 2004, p. 58.
41
M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir, pp. 259ss.
42
M. Foucault, Les anormaux. Cours au Collge de France. 1974-1975, Seuil/Gallimard,
Paris 1999, p. 46.
43
M. Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique, p. 22.
44
M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir, p. 227.
208 Marcos Nalli
45
P. Macherey, De Canguilhem Canguilhem en passant par Foucault, in Georges Canguilhem:
philosophe, historien des sciences, Albin Michel, Paris 1993, pp. 288 and 292-293.
46
M. Foucault, Les anormaux, p. 46.
47
P. Macherey, Pour une histoire naturelle des normes, in Michel Foucault philosophe, p. 203.
48
M. Foucault, Quest-ce que les Lumires?, in Dits et crits, t. IV, p. 680.
49
P. Macherey, Pour une histoire naturelle des normes, p. 215.
The Normative Immanence of Life and Death 209
and life, we can better understand its productive trait, since what deter-
mines and establishes norm is the regularity of its actions on life.
Therefore, norm is not equal to a rule or a law, but to a process which
is historically and socially situated; a process that is different from a mere
accident or deviation because of its steadiness and regularity. More than
that, norms are similar to the regularities of power relationships hence
implying even the possibility of exerting counterpowers and resistance.
Unlike law and its pretension to universality, norm is inherently change-
able, because it only occurs in the effectiveness of its action and only
grasps it through the regularity of the effects caused by it.
If the relationship between life and norm, i.e. between subjectivity
and norm, is a mutual relation of immanence, then the idea that norm as
a political force produces life and subjectivity implies that life and subjec-
tivity are as dynamic and flexible as norm. This dynamism and this flex-
ibility manifest themselves in the form of diversity and differentiations of
the subject and of the living beings that we all are. However, due to their
reciprocity, life and subjectivity compel normalization apparatus and the
statistically normal curves to modulate themselves, to adapt themselves
to the occurrences of differentiation and deviations from these curves.
Consequently, it is possible to assert that norms precede life and subjec-
tivity in its constraint over them, since the multiplicities of forms that life
and subjectivity take on as experiences can be arranged, classified, hierar-
chized, and eventually valued on the basis of a regulatory pattern previ-
ously established. This is what Foucault, referring to the disciplines, called
normation, where people, their behaviors, their gestures in a word,
their whole lives in their very little details are conformed to standards
taken as value, a value built up pursuing a determined result50.
Foucault probably used the above-mentioned expression to describe
the devices of normalization which perform the inversion of the rela-
tionship between normality and norm. By means of this inversion, the
standard norm is opposed to differentiations and variations in order to
enable a more detailed analysis of the phenomena; in this analysis, the dif-
ferential individualities are acknowledge and, at the same time, considered
along one and same line, without ruptures, while simultaneously dismem-
bering the different normalities in relation one to another51. As a result,
50
M. Foucault, Scurit, territoire, population, p. 59.
51
Ibidem, p. 64.
210 Marcos Nalli
52
Ibidem, p. 65.
53
See G. Le Blanc, Canguilhem et les normes, PUF, Paris 1998, pp. 52-56; see also
M. Muhle, Sobre la vitalidad del poder. Uma genealogia de la biopoltica a partir de Foucault y
Canguilhem, in Revista de Cincia Poltica, vol. 29 (2009), no. 1, p. 157.
The Normative Immanence of Life and Death 211
It is from the height of death that one can see and analyze organic depen-
dences and pathological sequences. [] The privilege of its intemporality, which
is no doubt as old as the consciousness of its imminence, is turned for the first
time into a technical instrument that provides a grasp on the truth of life and the
nature of illness54.
54
M. Foucault, Naissance de la clinique, PUF, Paris 1963, pp. 146-147.
55
Ibidem, p. 176. See also M. Nalli, Foucault: curar os outros e cuidar de si, in D.O. Perez
(ed.), Filsofos e terapeutas em torno da questo da cura, Escuta, So Paulo 2007, pp. 180-182.
212 Marcos Nalli
56
M. Foucault, Naissance de la clinique, p. 202.
57
M. Foucault, Il faut dfendre la socit, p. 221.
58
M. Foucault, Scurit, territoire, population, pp. 76-77.
The Normative Immanence of Life and Death 213
59
M. Foucault, Il faut dfendre la socit, p. 217.
60
Ibidem, p. 228.
61
Ministry of Health (Brazil), Manual de Vigilncia Epidemiolgica de Eventos Adversos
Ps-Vacinao, p. 15.
214 Marcos Nalli
tween 2002 and 2008 the immunization against the yellow fever is one of
the most critical of these situations: 19 occurrences of the disease were
registered in several countries, costing the life of 11 people (5 of them in
Brazil); all of them became sick after taking the first dose of the vaccine.
Governmental statistics reveals one death for every 450 thousand vac-
cine shots as the worst scenario62. Theoretically, these are acceptable losses
and, from a governmental point of view, it is a risk to take a viable and
even justifiable risk if we consider the number of lives saved every year
by means of immunization strategies, although we will never find this ex-
planation so evidently (or cynically) verbalized in any document or official
websites of any government.
Foucault shows how death so ceases to be an external limit, an out-
side of power relations, to become an important issue concerning the
maintenance of regulated and under control series of vital phenomena.
Death has become the vital phenomenon par excellence, since it is a threat to
be avoided; at the same time it is a threat that can also be imposed, lead-
ing to varied political strategies of management and control concerning
whether individuals or populations. It has been by scientifically scrutiniz-
ing population in extreme situations and pushing it towards the limits of
its existence as a biological species (endemics and epidemics, natural and
human-caused disasters, such as famine, scarcity or war) who forged bio-
political strategies of control and governmental measures whose aim was
to firmly avoid those extreme situations of annihilation and death, as well
as any reactions of rebellion and insurrection motivated by the unbearable
threat of death. Therefore, if life becomes a value and a political end, it
is because of its foundation on an entropic relationship with death; and
maybe that is the reason why, besides its intention to promote and protect
life, biopolitics ends up allowing the substance of life to escape, as said
by Didier Fassin63.
This is certainly the most controversial tone of the whole Foucaul-
dian interpretation of biopolitics. However, it is important to highlight
that the polemical tone of those pages in Il faut dfendre la socit is due to
the Foucauldian effort to offer an assertive interpretation of both State
62
Ibidem, p. 79. See I. Lwy, Vrus, Mosquito e Modernidade. A febre amarela no Brasil entre
cincia e poltica, Fiocruz, Rio de Janeiro 2006, pp. 317-379.
63
D. Fassin, La biopolitique nest pas une politique de la vie, in Sociologie et socits,
vol. 38 (2006), no. 2, p. 36.
The Normative Immanence of Life and Death 215
racism and, more particularly, of Nazism itself. Through the lens of his
interpretation of biopolitics, Foucault shows that Nazism is not a kind of
excrescence of the history of modern Western societies, which strive to
label themselves as democratic and advocate of human rights. Certainly, it
is by means of a similar strategy that Agamben was able to interpret Wal-
ter Benjamins famous saying, according to which the State of exception
is the rule: so as to exterminate bare life (liable to be killed, but not to be
sacrificed, in Agambens words), there is in modern capitalist societies a
sort of co-substantiality between the juridical-institutional model and the
biopolitical pattern, which allows one to take the state of exception as a
paradigm of the political structures of modern societies64. Or, following
Espositos interpretation, the biopolitical paroxysm produced by Nazism
culminates in a lack of distinction between sovereign power and biopoli-
tics itself, in such a way that in the biopolitical regime, sovereign law isnt
so much the capacity to put to death as it is to mollify life in advance65.
In turn, Foucault also refers to paroxysm. Above all, he declares that
Nazism revealed a complex type of relationship between sovereign power
and biopolitics, identified by him as coextensive or concurrent. But prob-
ably the play between the sovereignty principle and the biopolitical prin-
ciple also occurs in all other States, either socialist or capitalist66. Nazism
was not an extemporaneous incident; again according to Foucault, the
very possibility of the Nazi State to become an assassin State is not given
by its racist trait, which justifies and legitimizes it, but by its own biopo-
litical functioning67. Genocide are justified by racism, but their functional
and technological economy follow the pattern of biopower: it is the bio-
political strategies and relationships that determine how and under what
conditions life can become a normative value a desirable life and, at the
same time, how it settles which deviations and anomalies are undesirable
or even noxious an expendable life.
If all these approaches seem to present the paradoxical framework
of biopolitics whose purpose is to promote life, but ultimately also
produces death , it is because of the immanent relationship between
life and death that is evidenced in an undeniable way as a value for bio-
64
G. Agamben, Homo sacer, p. 14.
65
R. Esposito, Bos: biopolitica e filosofia, p. 157 (ET: p. 145), emphasis added.
66
M. Foucault, Il faut dfendre la socit, p. 232.
67
Ibidem, p. 228.
216 Marcos Nalli
68
See M. Nalli, Antropologia e racismo no discurso eugnico de Renato Kehl, in Teoria &
Pesquisa, no. 47 (2005), pp. 119-156, and Reflexes sobe o eugenismo francesa: Alexis Carrel,
in M.L. Boarini (ed.), Raa, higiene social e nao forte: mitos de uma poca, EDUEM, Maring
2011, pp. 21-48. See also D. Arbex, Holocausto Brasileiro, Gerao Editorial, So Paulo
2013; I. Michine, LExterminatio n douce en France, in Le Patriote Rsistant, September
1998 (<http://www.fndirp.asso.fr/septembre98.htm>); A. Pichot, La socit pure. De
Darwin Hitler, Flammarion, Paris 2000.
69
See R. Esposito, Immunitas. Protezione e negazione della vita, Einaudi, Torino 2002;
A. Brossat, La dmocratie immunitaire, La Dispute, Paris 2003; M. Nalli, Communitas/Immunitas:
a releitura de Roberto Esposito da biopoltica, in Aurora, vol. 25 (2013), no. 37, pp. 79-105.
70
R. Esposito, Immunitas, p. 44. See also D. Fassin, Humanitarian Reason. A Moral
History of the Present, University of California Press, Berkeley 2012.
71
See D. Fassin, When Bodies Remember. Experiences and Politics of AIDS in South Africa,
University of California Press, Berkeley 2007, p. 268: The affirmation that all lives have
the same value on which, taking off from very different premises, both the activists
seeking to save those who can be saved and the government trying to defend an ideal
of social justice may agree is belied by the biological evidence of premature deaths
(young adults and their children as AIDS victims, but also as victims of other illnesses,
homicides, and accidents); it is also contradicted by the political evidence of lives that
have never really counted (for a long time, even their deaths went unrecorded under the
apartheid regime). The inequality of lives, biological and political, local and global, is
perhaps the greatest violence with which anthropologists are confronted in the field, as
they daily prove the truly existential and vital distance that separates them from the men
and women whose histories and lives they encounter.
The Normative Immanence of Life and Death 217
Marcos Nalli
Universidade Estadual de Londrina
marcosnalli@yahoo.com
72
This article is the result of a Research Project supported by the National Council
for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq, Brazil) and the Foundation
Araucaria of the State of Paran, Brazil. My thanks to Gabriel Pinezi and Tiaraju Dal
Pozzo for their readings and suggestions. This essay was translated from Portuguese by
Simone Vlio and Gabriel Pinezi.
218 Marcos Nalli
.
The Normative Immanence of Life and Death in Foucauldian Analysis of Biopolitics