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1. Cario v. CHR alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again
been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991 said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on
September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to
HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of
Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes,
Schools of Manila, petitioners, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc.
vs. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or
BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate
CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents. dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the
week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3

NARVASA, J.:p Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private
respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4
by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from
the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and 2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private
reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and
government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for
take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced
subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was
agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5
Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of
hearing and adjudication? 3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR
complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted
taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative
the present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for
recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for
set forth. suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating
Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout
teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually
(MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after
as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted

by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its
suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8 investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers
are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly,
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr.
Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon
Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the
attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any
teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the
supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on
G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher the basis of complainants' evidence.
associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous
similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to xxx xxx xxx
be impleaded."
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted
dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no
they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14
replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them. 10 8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments
affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated,
6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by viz.:
the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking Teachers
CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case
"dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the
his attendance therein. 11 suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and

On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and
Cario) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the
with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters
Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner
that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants,
and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17
grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with
which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter 9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec.
issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition: Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit
their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall
proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents

counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like
law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights
which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
"utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590,
supra). The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power
is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is
General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action of certiorari not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
and prohibition. even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes
and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues: of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have. 22
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause
exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers
superiors; and of the Commission on Human Rights.

2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23
MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on
justify their mass action or strike. Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers
and functions are the following 25
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with
character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon (1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the violations involving civil and political rights;
Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that
the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said (2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt
matters, if still timely. for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the (3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the

preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its
rights have been violated or need protection; findings. 26

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice,
or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and
enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; quite distinct meanings.

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or
to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families; probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe
or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of
obligations on human rights; course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or
intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority; The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step
by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the
performance of its functions; taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation,"
"investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry,
judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law. matter or matters." 29

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle
categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues
rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge"
initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . .
rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31
contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority.
person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge"
necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn.
any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground
means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy
the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the
particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.
(a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute
and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those
actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no
Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse the
by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service
what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it
concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service
Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Service Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman
of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking
taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."
itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary
of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ, concur.
having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of
Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political
rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for
reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an
adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the
Supreme Court.

2. Villaluz vs. Zaldivar contained in the letter of Congressman Roces; that on February 15, 1960, the then
Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo suspended petitioner as Administrator of the
G.R. No. L-22754 December 31, 1965 Motor Vehicles Office, having thereupon created an investigating committee with the
only purpose of investigating the charges against petitioner and his assistant Aurelio
RUBEN A. VILLALUZ, petitioner, de Leon, and to undertake the investigation a prosecution panel was created headed
vs. by Special Prosecutor Emilio A. Gancayco; that after the investigation said committee
CALIXTO ZALDIVAR, ET AL., respondents. submitted its report to the President of the Philippines who thereafter issued
Administrative Order No. 332 decreeing the removal from office of petitioner; that as
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo and Juan T. David for petitioner. a result of petitioner's removal Apolonio Ponio was appointed to take his place as
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents. acting administrator; and that, after having been officially notified of his removal,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and/or reinstatement, and when this was
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: denied, he filed the instant petition before this Court.

Petitioner seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office with Respondents in their answer denied the claim of petitioner that the charges contained
payment of back salaries in a petition filed before this Court on April 1, 1964. in the letter of Congressman Roces were not directed against him but against his office
in general for the truth is that he was, specifically charged with mismanagement, gross
He alleged that he was nominated as chief of said office on May 20, 1958 and two inefficiency and negligence in the performance of his duties as Chief of the Motor
days thereafter his nomination was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments; Vehicles Office, and as a result he was required to the same within 72 hours to explain
that on May 26, 1958 he took his oath of office as such after having been informed of why no disciplinary action should be taken against him. Respondents also denied that
his nomination by then Acting Assistant Executive Secretary Sofronio C. Quimson; petitioner was investigated without being accorded due process is required by law for
that in a letter dated January 28, 1960 addressed to the President of the Philippines in fact he was given every reasonable opportunity to present his defense, to secure
by Congressman Joaquin R. Roces as Chairman of the Committee on Good the attendance of witnesses, and to produce documents in his behalf in a manner
Government of the House of Representatives, the latter informed the former of the consistent with administrative due process. Respondent also averred that the
findings made by his Committee concerning alleged gross mismanagement and President of the Philippines, contrary to petitioner's claim, has jurisdiction to
inefficiency committed by petitioner in the Motor Vehicles Office which are summed investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the
up in the letter, as follows: (1) malpractice in office resulting in huge losses to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260.
government; (2) failure to correct inadequate controls or intentional toleration of the Respondents finally averred that the letter of Congressman Joaquin R. Roces is in
same, facilitating thereby the commission of graft and corruption; and (3) negligence effect a valid administrative complaint because it contained specific charges which
to remedy unsatisfactory accounting; that as a result of said findings. Congressman constitute just causes for his suspension and removal; that said charges need not be
Roces recommended the replacement of petitioner and of his assistant chief Aurelio sworn to for the Chief Executive, as administrative head of petitioner, is empowered
de Leon as well as the complete revamp of the offices coming under the Motor to commence administrative proceedings motu proprio pursuant to Executive Order
Vehicles Office by the new chief who may be appointed thereafter; that having been No. 370, series of 1941, without need of any previous verified complaint. And as
officially informed of the content of said letter, then Secretary of Public Works and special defense respondents averred that petitioner is guilty of laches for having
Communications furnished petitioner with a copy thereof requiring him to explain allowed almost four years before instituting the present action.
within 72 hours why no administrative action should be taken against him relative to
the charges contained in the letter; that petitioner answered the letter as required There is merit in the claim that petitioner, being a presidential appointee, belongs to
wherein he explained and refuted in detail each and everyone of the charges the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and is such he can only

be investigated and removed from office after due hearing the President of the This power of control is couched in general terms for it does not set in specific manner
Philippines under the principle that "the power to remove is inherent in the power to its extent and scope. Yes, this Court in the case of Hebron v. Reyes, supra, occasion
appoint" as can be clearly implied from Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260. Such is to interpret the extent of such power to mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify
what we ruled in the recent case of Ang-Angco wherein on this point we said: or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter," to distinguish
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may it from the power of general supervision over municipal government, but the decision
extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who does not go to the extent of including the power to remove an officer or employee in
belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong the executive department. Apparently, the power merely applies to the exercise of
to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the
remove is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson v. Romero, supra), but not with act. It only means that the President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a
regard to those officers or employees who belong, to the classified service for as to subordinate in the performance of his duties.
them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our
Constitution which says that the "Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior That meaning is also the meaning given to the word "control" as used in administrative
officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the head of departments" (Article law. Thus, the Department Head pursuant to Section 79 (c) is given direct control of
VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). (Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al., L-17169, November all bureaus and offices under his department by virtue of which he may "repeal or
30, 1963). modify decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or offices," and under Section 74 of the
same Code, the President's control over the executive department only refers to
Consequently, as a corollary to the foregoing ruling, we may state that the matters of general policy. The term "policy" means a settled or definite course or
Commissioner of Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the method adopted and followed by a government, body or individual, and it cannot be
administrative charges filed against petitioner because the authority of said said that the removal of an inferior officer comes within the meaning of control over a
Commissioner to pass upon questions of suspension, separation, or removal can only specific policy of government. (Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al., supra)
be exercised with reference to permanent officials and employees in the classified
service to which classification petitioner does not belong. This is also what we said in With regard to the claim that the administrative proceedings conducted against
the Ang-Angco case when, in interpreting Section 16 (i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we petitioner which led to his separation are illegal simply because the charges preferred
emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified against him by Congressman Roces were not sworn to as required by Section 72 of
service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service. Republic Act No. 2260, this much we can say: said proceedings having been
commenced against petitioner upon the authority of the Chief Executive who was his
There is, therefore, no error of procedure committed by respondents insofar as the immediate administrative head, the same may be commenced by him motu proprio
investigation and disciplinary action taken against petitioner is concerned, even if he without previous verified complaint pursuant to Executive Order No. 370, series of
is under the control and supervision of the Department of Public Works, in view of the 1941, the pertinent provisions of which are is follows:
reason we have already stated that he is a presidential appointee who comes
exclusively under the jurisdiction of the President. The following rationale supports this (1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced a government officer or employee
view: by the head or chief of the bureau or office concerned motu proprio or upon complaint
of any person which shall be subscribed under oath by the complainant: Provided,
Let us now take up the power of control given to the President by the Constitution over That if a complaint is not or cannot be sworn to by the complainant, the head or chief
all officers and employees in the executive departments which is now involved by of the bureau or office concerned may in his discretion, take action thereon if the public
respondent as justification to override the specific provisions of the Civil Service Act. interest or the special circumstances of the case, so warrant.1

Finally, on the theory that the instant petition partakes of the nature of quo warranto
which seeks petitioners reinstatement to his former position as Administrator of the
Motor Vehicles Office, we are of the opinion that it has now no legal raison d'etre for
having been filed more than one year after its cause of action had accrued. As this
Court has aptly said: "a delay of slightly over one (1) year was considered sufficient ...
to be an action for mandamus, by reason of laches or abandonment of office. We see
no reason to depart from said view in the present case, petitioner herein having
allowed about a year and a half to elapse before seeking reinstatement." (Jose V.
Lacson, et al., L-10177, May 17, 1957).

WHEREFORE, petition is denied. No costs.


3. Ruiz vs. Drilon with the comment required of the public respondents, considering that the pleadings
and other papers already filed by the other parties in this case are adequate to enable
G.R. No. 101666 June 9, 1992 the Court to act upon the present petition.

DR. ELISEO L. RUIZ, President of Central Luzon State University (CLSU), Muoz, II
Nueva Ecija, petitioner,
vs. On 6 May 1991, President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order ("AO") No.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. ISIDRO 218 dismissing petitioner Eliseo Ruiz for cause from his office as President of the
CARIO, in his capacity as DECS Secretary; ATTY. RENO CAPINPIN, Director III, Central Luzon State University ("CLSU"). 1
DECS, in his capacity as Chairman, Investigating Committee; DALMACIO CASISON,
in his capacity and as Member, Investigating Committee; EDUARDO PARAY, LUIS In two (2) orders dated 2 July 1991 and 3 September 1991, the Executive Secretary,
CASTRO, HIPOLITO MALAMUG, NEMESIO TORRES and NOLASCO HIPOLITO, acting by authority of the President, denied petitioner's first and second motions for
respondents. reconsideration therefrom, the first for lack of merit and the second for being pro forma.
Consequently, AO No. 218 became final and executory. 2
No. 103570 June 9, 1992
On 1 October 1991, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a temporary
DR. ELISEO L. RUIZ, President, Central Luzon State University (CLSU), Muoz, restraining order (TRO) with the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R.
Nueva Ecija, petitioner, No. SP-12656. 3 Petitioner there sought to annul, as products of grave abuse of
discretion, President Aquino's order dated 13 September 1991 appointing Dr.
vs. Fortunato Battad as the new CLSU President, as well as DECS Undersecretary
Marina Pangan's order dated 24 September 1991 directing petitioner to turn-over the
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as DECS CLSU Presidency to Dr. Battad. The Court of Appeals issued the TRO prayed for by
Secretary; MARINA S.J. PANGAN, in her capacity as Asst. Secretary of DECS and petitioner. 4
DR. FORTUNATO BATTAD, respondents.
Eight days later, on 9 October 1991, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the
RESOLUTION present petition (G.R. No. 101666) for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a TRO
for the purpose of annulling, for alleged grave abuse of discretion, the issuance of AO
No. 218 as well as of the orders of the Executive Secretary denying his motions for
reconsideration therefrom. 5 The Court did not issue the TRO prayed for by petitioner.
FELICIANO, J.:p 6 This petition made no mention of the petition for prohibition with prayer for TRO filed
8 days earlier with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP-21656).
On 9 January 1992, the Court's Circular No. 28-91 dated 3 September 1991 having
The Court NOTED the sixth motion for extension of time to submit a comment to the gone into effect on 1 January 1992, petitioner filed a manifestation and compliance
petition for certiorari and prohibition, (G.R. No. 101666) filed by the Solicitor General dated 6 January 1992, where for the first time, he disclosed to this Court the other
on behalf of the public respondents Executive Secretary and the Secretary of the judicial proceedings which he had commenced in connection with the issuance of AO
Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS"), and Resolved to DISPENSE No. 210. 7

of (1) AO 218 with the Court and at the same time (2) having the enforcement aspect
On 29 January 1992, after due proceedings, the Court of Appeals promulgated its of the President's action and the filling up of the resulting vacancy reviewed by the
decision in CA-G.R. No. SP-26165, dismissing the petition for lack of merit and finding Court of Appeals. It also appears to the Court that petitioner carried out these acts in
the same to be a case of forum shopping. 8 Petitioner sought review of this decision order to obtain a TRO (albeit with a limited twenty-day lifetime) from the Court of
by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court, which petition Appeals, issued as a matter of course, in order to stop the execution and
was docketed as G.R. No. 103570 and assigned to the Second Division. 9 This case implementation of AO No. 218, and afterwards, to try to get a TRO with an indefinite
was consolidated with G.R. No. 101666, by this time pending with the Court En Banc, lifetime from this Court for the same purpose, in case his petition in the main action of
by a resolution dated 2 April 1992. CA-G.R. No. SP-26165 would be dismissed on the merits by the Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, on 28 January 1992, the Court issued a resolution requiring petitioner to Moreover, during the period when the proceedings in G.R. No. 101666 and CA-G.R.
show cause why the petition in G.R. No. 101666 should not be dismissed as an No. SP-26165 were simultaneously pending action before two (2) different for a
apparent case of forum shopping, considering that the parties involved, issues raised petitioner created for himself a situation where he could hope to get (after the 20-day
and the reliefs sought therein are substantially identical with those in CA-G.R. No. SP- life of the Court of Appeals TRO) a judicial order from either forum which could stop
26165. 10 the execution of AO No. 218 with more permanency (i.e., either a TRO with an
indefinite lifetime from the Supreme Court or the grant of his petition for prohibition by
Petitioner submitted a manifestation and compliance dated 6 January 1992 obviously the Court of Appeals). Thus the Court of Appeals, aware of the institution of G.R. No.
in anticipation of the 29 January 1992 Resolution of the Court, as well as an undated 101666, 12 committed no reversible error in considering the action before it as
compliance filed on 2 March 1992 in response to the same resolution. He denies another, independent case and as an instance of forum shopping.
having engaged in forum shopping and contends: (1) his cause of action in CA-G.R.
No. SP-26156 consists of the illegality of the actions taken by the Office of the Petitioner sought to maintain the two (2) segments of his single causes of action again
President and by the DECS in implementing AO No. 218, which may render moot the by instituting G.R. No. 103570, in a bid to ensure that the decision on the merits in
Court's review of the intrinsic merits of AO No. 218, an entirely different cause of action CA-G.R. No. SP-26165 will not attain finality and enforceability, even though the
in itself; and (2) he never attempted to hide the fact, either before this Court or the matters involved therein are essentially the incidents of the case already pending
Court of Appeals, that he had instituted both actions "for separate reasons, apart review in G.R. No. 101666.
though related from each other," such candor being "an elementary consideration in
the determination of the issue whether he committed forum shopping or not." 11 Forum shopping effected by a party litigant through the deliberate splitting of causes
of actions and appeals in the hope that even as one case (in which a particular remedy
Deliberating on the present consolidated Petitions, the Court finds the explanations is sought) is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open,
proffered by petitioner and his counsel as justifications for the procedural maneuvers is a deplorable practice because it results in the unnecessary clogging of the already
undertaken in this case to be completely unsatisfactory and considers the Petitions to heavily burdened dockets of the courts. 13
be clear cases of deliberate forum shopping.
Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by the Court on 11 January
The Court views with considerable disfavor the legal maneuvers undertaken by 1983, relative to the implementation of section 9 of BP 129, granting the Intermediate
petitioner and his counsel of record, Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra, to defeat his removal Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals) equal original jurisdiction to issue the
from office. It is evident that petitioner, in violation of Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, etc., whether or not in aid of its appellate
Court, had split a single cause of action consisting of the alleged illegality of his jurisdiction, provides that if such a petition is filed before the Court of Appeals and is
removal from office by the President through AO No. 218, by seeking judicial review still pending therein, a similar petition cannot be filed in the Supreme Court. A violation

of this rule has also been considered a clear case of forum shopping, an act of company where he was holding a directorship; and (d) he collected financial
malpractice proscribed as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. The contributions from the faculty and students in disregard of the provisions of R.A. No.
Rule itself provides that a violation thereof constitutes: (1) cause for the summary 5546. 18 These acts constitute dishonesty and grave misconduct, and furnish legal
dismissal of both petitions; and (2) contempt of court for which the party or counsel basis for dismissal from the public service. 19
concerned may be held accountable. 14
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. No. 101666, as well
The pretended candor of petitioner and his counsel here does not persuade. Petitioner as the Petition for Review in G.R. No. 103570, are hereby DISMISSED as clear cases
never informed the Court of the existence of CA-G.R. No. SP-26165 when he filed his of forum shopping and for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A,-
petition in G.R. No. 101666, the first opportunity available to him to be completely G.R, No. SP-26165 dated 29 January 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
candid with the Court. It was the private respondents in their comment to the petition
filed on 16 November 1991, who gave the Court first notice of the other proceeding. Petitioner's counsel, Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra. is hereby ADMONISHED and
15 It is obvious that petitioner filed his subsequent manifestation because he was no WARNED that repetition of the same or similar acts of forum shopping will be more
longer able to deny the existence of the proceeding before the Court of Appeals. severely punished. A copy of this Resolution shall be attached to the personal record
Petitioner's attempt to trifle with the highest court of the land in this manner renders of Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra in the office of the Bar Confidant. Costs against petitioner.
him liable for forum shopping. 16


In addition to the foregoing, the Court deliberated upon the merits of the consolidated
Petitions and considers that petitioner has failed to show any grave abuse of discretion
or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondents in
rendering the assailed administrative orders.

Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any

investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled
only to an administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence made of record
and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence
presented against him during the hearings of the investigating committees. 17 There
is no doubt that he has been accorded his rights.

AO No. 218 made certain findings of fact on the basis of which petitioner was removed
from office. Those findings included the facts that (a) petitioner terminated the CLSU's
Executive Vice-President, offered new academic courses, undertook unprogrammed
projects resulting in wastage of university property, all without the necessary approval
of the Board of Regents; (b) he directed the purchase at uncanvassed prices of
chemicals unsuitable for the required school purposes from a firm owned by him; (c)
he executed, on behalf of CLSU, a crop harvest sales agreement in favor of a

4. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents
accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or
[G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000] consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State). Kycalr

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private
respondents. Esmso respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the
Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern
DECISION District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the
papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with
MELO, J.: violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):

The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and A)......18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two
overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times
of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizens basic due B)......26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty
process rights, or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds 5 years on each count);
and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental writ.
C)......18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop: Penalty 5 years on each count);

On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree D)......18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5
No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have years on each count);
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of
incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime E)......2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts;
both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have Maximum Penalty less than one year).
escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the
Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need (p. 14, Rollo.)
for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper
implementation of said treaties. On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents
Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of some
the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other
Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo). Calrky
ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes

Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, 2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury
through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict
copies of the official extradition request from the U. S. Government, as well as all secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to secure orders from
documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. jury information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the
Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is
abeyance in the meantime. not authorized by the United States District Courts. In this particular extradition request
the United States Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent
Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily, he be given at least a copy of, unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. This Departments denial of your
or access to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that
of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request. the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department of Justice under
In response to private respondents July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests.
July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the
foregoing requests for the following reasons: 3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection
with an extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties
supporting documents from the United States Government, pending evaluation by this to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law
Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or
with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the
documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the (pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
documents submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary
requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069. Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private
determine whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him
have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to
guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein
available. petitioners letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from
considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing
extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an
extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
ample time to evaluate said documents. Mesm injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo). Scslx

The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter
raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided I.
over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I. E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE
appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS,
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of II.
Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by
refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL
proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government for the DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE
extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial EXTRADITION LAW;
court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the
United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this III.
Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as FACE, FORMALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
agreed upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00
oclock in the morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their written IV.
comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that: issued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO) providing: slx mis

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE: any person or persons acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE
Slxs c

and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of
respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684. an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed
the Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999. on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The
portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.) convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:

The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as The Extradition Request
directed, filed their respective memoranda.
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
are patent. However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of
both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the 1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the issued by the authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or
two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would some other instruments having equivalent legal force;
necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues
of which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative 2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as
resolution would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated to the name and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known,
August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and place of the commission of
of the extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event these acts; Sda adsc
that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a 3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the
breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under designation or description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the
the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, request; and
is there any conflict between private respondents basic due process rights and the
provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty? 4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.

The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into (Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
the substantive merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which
concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the Section 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of
filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides:
trial court. Missdaa
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US meet the requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall
Extradition Treaty which was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force forward the request together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice,
the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the

who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge
of the case. (Paragraph 3, ibid.)

The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the
of evaluating the sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the accompanying documents received in support of the request had been certified by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task? principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in the
Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No.
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the 951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).
executive authority must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the
and probable location of the person sought; request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation."
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;
The Extradition Petition
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the
offense for which extradition is requested; Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request
and its supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense; Rtc shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate
spped and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1],
Section 5, P. D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take
or the execution of punishment for the offense; the extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.). Korte

6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for
paragraph 4 of said Article, as applicable. extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective
extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.) The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1],
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.
probable cause for his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committed
there; The Extradition Hearing

8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding
authority; and is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9
thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the
9. A copy of the charging document. Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of

the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. The
the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State, statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his
represent the latter throughout the proceedings. Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he simply
forwarded the request to the Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities.
extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine the completeness
facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with the
the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
(Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of Justice had
cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the no obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had to go
required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.). over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999,
pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private respondent insisted on the
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is following: (1) the right to be furnished the request and the supporting papers; (2) the
extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the
mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines request, and to present evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that the
whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's
(Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). opposition to the request. Kyle

With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority,
query presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings? Sclaw Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that
it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that if it
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to
of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting participate in the process of evaluation.
papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official
who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the
under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and
is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request
under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice,
[1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all by himself.
of filing the extradition papers. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary
or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there determination?
was failure to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is
true that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class
June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to
received the request, apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs discharging say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive

authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion
sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and and judgment. Mse sm
on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and
(c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to
the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal evaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the
legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its
RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the
investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition.
exercise of an administrative bodys quasi-judicial power. Ex sm Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine
whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation bodys power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can
of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) be filed in court.
rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative
Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation
Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the
of the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty
exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the
This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request.
investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party
27), or to require disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports, may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the
testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be
64). automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4).
Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which the
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the
which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agencys performance of its rule- Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request
making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously
prosecution. detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US
Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically,
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the Requested State.
rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the
does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining
whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as
functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon during the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very
the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for imminent one. Sc lex
investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final

Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the
akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the proceeding is civil in nature. x law
consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets
off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of ones
prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us,
law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy
of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys
make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the
constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights
formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier stage in By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to
the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal
(tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436). investigation since both procedures may have the same result the arrest and
imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation stage
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of
right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the
which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative deprivation of his liberty.
proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative
investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which could result Petitioners reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8,
in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing the Petitioners Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal
earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority
revocation of ones license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation for petitioners conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary
than forfeiture of property. investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the
applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
against a respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft
Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding
property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised
forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda, in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good,
Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be
laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due
proceeding is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.
be included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may
be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression
to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States
accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. Sc

respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only complainant. Scmis
worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are
alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such
the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their as:
dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of meeting every modern
problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to meet the 1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the
exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due process summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive
are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local
the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid Government Code, B. P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters
the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to public
the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal
exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New prosecution;
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of
fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owners Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent
20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without
in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366). prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the
property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires
the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, 3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them
liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights had not been claimed.
of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and
competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106). Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing situations mentioned above?
pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings
as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are
entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, quite noteworthy considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.
they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the Mis sc
position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, is based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondents basic due international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the
process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding
affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal
and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly
as possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime

(31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the 2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the
requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the elements or Department of Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a
jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face of the papers, declaration confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is in full
such as the allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal
time the offense charged was committed, and that the person demanded is charged representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as
with the commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the demanding extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been
state before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that ensures admissibility at any
are then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such papers subsequent extradition hearing.
and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the
instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an 3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold
charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order a hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the extradition request (Ibid.)
to confer jurisdiction on the governor of the asylum state to effect the extradition (35
C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment, 4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable
information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments to the foreign country. The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over
accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought
or his attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there is
to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person sought and that he
103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853). Mis spped committed the offenses charged (Ibid.) Spped

In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation 5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after
to the executive authority of the Requested State of a requisition or demand for the having received a "complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his
return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular officer having jurisdiction" with having committed any of the crimes provided for by the governing
authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815). treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long
line of American decisions pronounce that international extradition proceedings
In petitioners memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate,
dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are
basically governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US 6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it
Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit: incorporates its determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies
the persons extraditability. The court then forwards this certification of extraditability
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate
cases, requests for the provisional arrest of an individual may be made directly by the decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C.
Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In 3186).
the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is transmitted
subsequently through the diplomatic channel. 7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the
motives of the requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a person

facing extradition may present whatever information he deems relevant to the

Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether to surrender an (pp. 40-41, Private Respondents Memorandum.) Spped jo
individual to the foreign government concerned.
In the Philippine context, this Courts ruling is invoked:
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins
and ends with one entity the Department of State which has the power to evaluate the One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the
request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that
Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the courts determination of there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it
extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional
should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the
points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the
of Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, bypassing of an individuals rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking
the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as
request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right (Association of Small
request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343,
petition for extradition. Jo spped 375-376 [1989]).

Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should There can be no dispute over petitioners argument that extradition is a tool of criminal
the person sought to be extradited be given due process rights by the Philippines in law enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused
the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioners primary concern is the possible or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or
delay in the evaluation process. fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always
incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary does not mean
We agree with private respondents citation of an American Supreme Court ruling: precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent in
"ordered liberty." Miso
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends
is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might point, there is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may
fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular, not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, in the
that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since
overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that federal and
government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones. statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31
Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656) requested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state.
Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the Secretary
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of the law and
that no right that of liberty secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing
Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency.

of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will
not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition. The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the
Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2)
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable the corollary right of access to official records and documents. The general right
efforts in assuring compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since it guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern.
even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition papers In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise conferred. These
(such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law"
those that are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely
consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in his on the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone
Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due
to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently necessitates Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondents letter-request dated
immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be dispensed with? July 1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the
matters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On the other
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative hand, private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with
action. Is private respondent precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing public interest and matters which are of purely private interest only becomes material
at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes the
characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand, there is yet no extraditee, but right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly
ironically on the other, it results in an administrative determination which, if adverse to affected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.
the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request
shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section The concept of matters of public concern escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking,
2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after every act of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of
the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996
by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public
The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest. may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives or simply because
such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people
dispensed with and shelved aside. and any citizen has "standing".Mani kx

Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said
invokes Section 7 of Article III which reads: Nex old action has a direct bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind of
deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
control of the government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations."
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official records, Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of
and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions. the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in
the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official
government action from the U. S. Government. No official action from our country has The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts)
yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreign are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule
relations with the U. S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it
concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally
balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in
the proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no official the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p.
governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be
invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates
hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez,
by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2
The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming. SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or
controversy: Would private respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes
in the Constitution? effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where
the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines,
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the (Ibid.). Manikan
Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the
grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or
relations. Maniks national law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pitted
against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process
good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings.
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and

hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the
law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a
manifests this silence. preliminary investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the
respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US
describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioners
sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents. theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a period
of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15,
We disagree. Article III of the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An safety requires it"? Petitioners theory would also infer that bail is not available during
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition petition has already been
the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor,
precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended " Can
C.J.S. 410). petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and
hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to thus be subservient thereto? Ncm
prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy
surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process
confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioners revelation that in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity
everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial. to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270
The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276
the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs.
the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In
even during trial. Oldmis o essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is
enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises. [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in
the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioners fears that the Requesting State may
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as have valid objections to the Requested States non-performance of its commitments
American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount
conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the consideration.
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations
in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.

How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondents liberty is
the four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069? easily comprehensible.

Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly
Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and
SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs.
Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA
Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice
and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal outside legality," since private respondents due process rights, although not
Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We
Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over
National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as amended guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the
by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be effected principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due
process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals: Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of
liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger
... [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.
employee may be removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain
instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee must be informed of the charges WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby
preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies
is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable
requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil
constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the
employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable same is hereby ordered dismissed.
opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the
charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses. SO ORDERED. 6/2/00 2:12 PM

(at p. 671)

Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld
the due process rights of the respondent.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger
of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to
his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioners favorable

5. Pefianco vs. Moral dismissed from the government service with prejudice to reinstatement and forfeiture
of all her retirement benefits and other remunerations.
[G.R. No. 132248. January 19, 2000]
On 30 September 1996 respondent received a copy of the resolution. Thereafter, or
HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of on 1 October 1996, she received another resolution correcting the typographical errors
Education, Culture and Sports, petitioner, vs. MARIA LUISA C. MORAL, respondent. found on the first resolution. Respondent did not appeal the judgment.
On 2 October 1996 respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS
DECISION Investigation Committee Report purportedly to "guide [her] on whatever action would
be most appropriate to take under the circumstances."[2] Her petition was, however,
BELLOSILLO, J.: denied. Man-ikx

SECRETARY ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO of the Department of Education, Culture and Unfazed, she filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS Resolution
Sports (DECS) seeks to nullify through this petition for review the Decision of the Court dated September 25, 1996, which Secretary Gloria similarly denied in his Order of 23
of Appeals[1] dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by then DECS Secretary October 1996. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the motion was merely
Ricardo T. Gloria for lack of merit, as well as its Resolution dated 13 January 1998 "noted" in view of the warning in the 23 October 1996 Order that the denial of the
denying reconsideration thereof. request for the production of the Investigation Committee Report was final.[3] As
earlier stated, respondent did not appeal the Resolution dated 30 September 1996
On 26 July 1994 former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against dismissing her from the service. Instead, she instituted an action for mandamus and
respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the injunction before the regular courts against Secretary Gloria praying that she be
National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS
interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy
some historical documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian Division (FAD) of the said report.[4]
of the National Library which were under her control and supervision as Division Chief
and keeping in her possession, without legal authority and justification, some forty- Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of
one (41) items of historical documents which were missing from the FAD vaults of the action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court
National Library. of Appeals on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court. In its
assailed Decision of 24 November 1997 the appellate court sustained the trial court
The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on the complaint. and dismissed Secretary Glorias petition for lack of merit holding that -
Atty. Jose M. Diaz, Special Prosecutor from the Department of Justice, represented
the DECS Secretary in the administrative case while respondent was represented by FIRST. Petitioner Gloria acted prematurely, not having filed any motion for
her own private counsel. On 25 September 1996 Secretary Gloria issued a resolution reconsideration of the assailed order with the respondent judge before filing the instant
finding respondent "guilty of the administrative offenses of dishonesty, grave petition to this Court. This constitutes a procedural infirmity x x x x SECOND. Even if
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for the the aforesaid procedural defect were to be disregarded, the petition at hand,
commission of pilferage of historical documents of the national library, to the prejudice nevertheless, must fail. The denial of the motion to dismiss is an option available to
of the national library in particular, and the country in general." She was ordered the respondent judge. Such order is interlocutory and thus not appealable. The proper
recourse of the aggrieved party is to file an answer and interpose, as defenses, the

objection(s) raised by him in said motion to dismiss, then proceed with the trial and, in The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground
case of adverse decision, to elevate the entire case on appeal in due course. relied upon is not indubitable.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals on 13 In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor
January 1998, Secretary Gloria filed the instant petition for review. (underscoring supplied).

Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco who was Clearly, the above rule proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily denying
thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria. motions to dismiss "for lack of merit." Such cavalier disposition often creates difficulty
and misunderstanding on the part of the aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom
The issues before us are: whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition and likewise on the higher court called upon to resolve the issue, usually on certiorari.
for certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the motion to dismiss, and in holding that the trial court did not commit grave The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of the
abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. requirements prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the general concept
of mandamus and the trial courts jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of
Petitioner contends that there is no need to file a motion for reconsideration as the administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitioners motion to dismiss
trial courts order denying the motion to dismiss is a patent nullity, and a motion for was being denied. We are reproducing hereunder for reference the assailed Order -
reconsideration would practically be a useless ceremony as the trial court virtually
decided the case, and that there is no law requiring the DECS to furnish respondent This treats of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Gloria on 14 March 1997 to
with a copy of the Report of the DECS Investigation Committee so that the petition for which petitioner filed their (sic) opposition on April 8, 1997.
mandamus has no leg to stand on hence should have been dismissed for lack of cause
of action. Manik-s Respondent premised his motion on the following grounds: (a) Mandamus does not
lie to compel respondent DECS Secretary to release the Report of the DECS
Excepting thereto respondent argues that the denial of the motion to dismiss is Investigating Committee because the Petition does not state a cause of action; (b)
interlocutory in nature as it did not dispose of the case on the merits, and petitioner The DECS Resolution dismissing petitioner is legal and valid, and therefore, the writ
still has a residual remedy, i.e., to file an answer, thus her substantive rights have not of preliminary injunction cannot be granted to enjoin its execution; while petitioner
been violated as she contends; that respondent is clearly entitled to the remedy of alleged among others that she has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
mandamus to protect her rights; and, that petitioner has not shown any law, DECS ordinary course of law.
order or regulation prohibiting the release of the petitioned documents for reasons of
confidentiality or national security. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty, this being its main objective. "Purely ministerial" are acts to be performed in a
We grant the petition. Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure given state of facts, in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal
mandatorily requires that the resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and authority without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
distinctly state the reasons therefor - impropriety of the act done. While the discretion of a Constitutional Commission
cannot be controlled by mandamus x x x x the court can decide whether the duty is
After hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion or order the discretionary or ministerial x x x xMan-ikan
amendment of the pleading.

Generally, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the reconsideration may be dispensed with and the aggrieved party may assail the act or
administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to order of the lower court directly on certiorari.[5] Ol-dmiso
acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and finding of fact. Findings of
fact by an administrative board or official, following a hearing, are binding upon the On the second issue, the nature of the remedy of mandamus has been the subject of
courts and will not be disturbed except where the board or official has gone beyond discussions in several cases. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the
his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does
and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion or as when there is not lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
passion, prejudice or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law x be absolutely expressed, it must nevertheless be clear. The writ will not issue to
xxx compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to
do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither
WHEREFORE, in regard to the foregoing, the motion to dismiss by herein respondent confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power
is hereby denied for lack of merit and is hereby ordered to file its (sic) responsive already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.[6]
pleadings within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order. Copy furnished petitioner
who is likewise given ten (10) days to submit his (sic) comment or opposition. In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has
a clear legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the
Indeed, we cannot even discern the bearing or relevance of the discussion therein on ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof.
mandamus, vis-a-vis the ground relied upon by petitioner in her motion to dismiss, i.e., Consequently, she is not entitled to the writ prayed for.
lack of cause of action, and the dispositive portion of the order. The order only
confused petitioner and left her unable to determine the errors which would be the Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS
proper subject of her motion for reconsideration. Judges should take pains in crafting resolution dismissing her from the service.[7] By her failure to do so, nothing prevented
their orders, stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons for their the DECS resolution from becoming final and executory. Obviously, it will serve no
issuance, which are necessary for the full understanding of the action taken. Where useful purpose now to compel petitioner to furnish her with a copy of the investigation
the court itself has not stated any basis for its order, to be very strict in requiring a prior report.
motion for reconsideration before resort to higher courts on certiorari may be had,
would be to expect too much. Since the judge himself was not precise and specific in Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish
his order, a certain degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally
the rules was justified. held in Ruiz v. Drilon[8] that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to
be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee
Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court, through a motion for created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the
reconsideration, has been given an opportunity to correct the imputed errors on its act administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a
or order. However, this rule is not absolute and is subject to well-recognized reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her
exceptions. Thus, when the act or order of the lower court is a patent nullity for failure during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been
to comply with a mandatory provision of the Rules, as in this case, a motion for accorded these rights.

Respondents assertion that the investigation report would be used "to guide [her] on which imposes a ministerial duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the
what action would be appropriate to take under the circumstances,"[9] hardly merits investigation report, hence her petition clearly lacked a cause of action. In such
consideration. It must be stressed that the disputed investigation report is an internal instance, while the trial courts order is merely interlocutory and non-appealable,
communication between the DECS Secretary and the Investigation Committee, and it certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same since it is rendered with grave abuse
is not generally intended for the perusal of respondent or any other person for that of discretion.
matter, except the DECS Secretary. As correctly ruled by Secretary Gloria in his Order
of 2 October 1996 - WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 24
November 1997 sustaining the trial courts denial of petitioners motion to dismiss, as
Respondents (Moral) counsel is reminded that the Report of the DECS Investigating well as its Resolution dated 13 January 1998 denying reconsideration, is REVERSED
Committee is not an integral part of the Decision itself x x x x [t]he report is an internal and SET ASIDE. The petition for mandamus filed by respondent before the court a
communication between the Investigating Committee and the DECS Secretary, and, quo to compel petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee
therefore, confidential until the latter had already read and used the same in making Report is DISMISSED for want of cause of action.
his own determination of the facts and applicable law of the case, to be expressed in
the Decision he may make. Nc-m SO ORDERED.

The Report remains an internal and confidential matter to be used as part - - although
not controlling - - of the basis for the decision. Only when the party adversely affected
by the decision has filed and perfected an appeal to the Civil Service Commission may
all the records of the case, including the aforesaid Report be forwarded to the CSC.
In the latter appellate tribunal, the respondents counsel may be allowed to read and/or
be given a copy of the Report to enable the appellant to file an intelligent and
exhaustive appellants Brief Memorandum.

More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to
the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and
conclusion of law upon which respondents removal from office was grounded. This
resolution, and not the investigation report, should be the basis of any further remedies
respondent might wish to pursue, and we cannot see how she would be prejudiced by
denying her access to the investigation report.

In fine, the trial courts Order of 23 April 1997 denying petitioners motion to dismiss is
not a mere error of judgment as the Court of Appeals held, but a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because, to capsulize, the Order
is a patent nullity for failure to comply with the provisions of the rules requiring that a
resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons
therefor; and, respondent is clearly not entitled to the writ of mandamus as she did not
appeal the DECS resolution dismissing her from service, and there is no law or rule

6. Camara vs. Municipal Court 1. The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a
warrantless code enforcement inspection of his personal residence. Frank v.
U.S. Supreme Court Maryland, supra, pro tanto overruled. Pp. 387 U. S. 528-534.

Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (a) The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is enforceable against the
States through the Fourteenth, through its prohibition of "unreasonable" searches and
Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco seizures is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by governmental officials. P. 387 U. S. 528.
No. 92
(b) With certain carefully defined exceptions, an unconsented warrantless search of
Argued February 15, 1967 private property is "unreasonable." Pp. 387 U. S. 528-529.

Decided June 5, 1967 (c) Contrary to the assumption of Frank v. Maryland, supra, Fourth Amendment
interests are not merely "peripheral" where municipal fire, health, and housing
387 U.S. 523 inspection programs are involved whose purpose is to determine the existence of
physical conditions not complying with local ordinances. Those programs, moreover,
are enforceable by criminal process, as is refusal to allow an inspection. Pp. 387 U.

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT (d) Warrantless administrative searches cannot be justified on the grounds that they
make minimal demands on occupants;
Page 387 U. S. 524
Appellant was charged with violating the San Francisco Housing Code for refusing,
after three efforts by city housing inspectors to secure his consent, to allow a that warrant in such cases are unfeasible; or that area inspection programs could not
warrantless inspection of the ground-floor quarters which he leased and residential function under reasonable search warrant requirements. Pp. 387 U. S. 531-533.
use of which allegedly violated the apartment building's occupancy permit. Claiming
the inspection ordinance unconstitutional for failure to require a warrant for 2. Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are to be issued for area code
inspections, appellant while awaiting trial, sued in a State Superior Court for a writ of enforcement inspections is not dependent on the inspector's belief that a particular
prohibition, which the court denied. Relying on Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, and dwelling violates the code, but on the reasonableness of the enforcement agency's
similar cases, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the ordinance did not appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole. The standards to guide the magistrate
violate the Fourth Amendment. The State Supreme Court denied a petition for hearing. in the issuance of such search warrants will necessarily vary with the municipal
program being enforced. Pp. 387 U. S. 534-539.
3. Search warrants which are required in nonemergency situations should normally
be sought only after entry is refused. Pp. 387 U. S. 539-540.

4. In the nonemergency situation here, appellant had a right to insist that the of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health
inspectors obtain a search warrant. P. 387 U. S. 540. entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible
violations of the city's Housing Code. [Footnote 1] The building's manager informed
237 Cal.App.2d 128, 46 Cal.Rptr. 585, vacated and remanded. the inspector that appellant, lessee of the ground floor, was using the rear of his
leasehold as a personal residence. Claiming that the building's occupancy permit did
Page 387 U. S. 525 not allow residential use of the ground floor, the inspector confronted appellant and
demanded that he permit an inspection of the premises. Appellant refused to allow the
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. inspection because the inspector lacked a search warrant.

In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, this Court upheld, by a five-to-four vote, a state The inspector returned on November 8, again without a warrant, and appellant again
court conviction of a homeowner who refused to permit a municipal health inspector refused to allow an inspection. A citation was then mailed ordering appellant to appear
to enter and inspect his premises without a search warrant. In Eaton v. Price, 364 U. at the district attorney's office. When appellant failed to appear, two inspectors
S. 263, a similar conviction was affirmed by an equally divided Court. Since those returned to his apartment on November 22. They informed appellant that he was
closely divided decisions, more intensive efforts at all levels of government to contain required by law to permit an inspection under 503 of the Housing Code:
and eliminate urban blight have led to increasing use of such inspection techniques,
while numerous decisions of this Court have more fully defined the Fourth "Sec. 503 RIGHT TO ENTER BUILDING. Authorized employees of the City
Amendment's effect on state and municipal action. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643; departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the performance of their
Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23. In view of the growing nationwide importance of the duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the right to enter, at
problem, we noted probable jurisdiction in this case and in See v. City of Seattle, post, reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty
p. 387 U. S. 541, to reexamine whether administrative inspection programs, as imposed upon them by the Municipal Code. "
presently authorized and conducted, violate Fourth Amendment rights as those rights
are enforced against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 385 U.S. 808. Page 387 U. S. 527

Appellant brought this action in a California Superior Court alleging that he was Appellant nevertheless refused the inspectors access to his apartment without a
awaiting trial on a criminal charge of violating the San Francisco Housing Code by search warrant. Thereafter, a complaint was filed charging him with refusing to permit
refusing to permit a warrantless inspection of his residence, and that a writ of a lawful inspection in violation of 507 of the Code. [Footnote 2] Appellant was
prohibition should issue to the criminal court because the ordinance authorizing such arrested on December 2 and released on bail. When his demurrer to the criminal
inspections is unconstitutional on its face. The Superior Court denied the writ, the complaint was denied, appellant filed this petition for a writ of prohibition.
District Court of Appeal affirmed, and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition
for hearing. Appellant properly raised and had considered by the California courts the Appellant has argued throughout this litigation that 503 is contrary to the Fourth and
federal constitutional questions he now presents to this Court. Fourteenth Amendments in that it authorizes municipal officials to enter a private
dwelling without a search warrant and without probable cause to believe that a
Though there were no judicial findings of fact in this prohibition proceeding, we shall violation of the Housing Code exists therein. Consequently, appellant contends, he
set forth the parties' factual allegations. On November 6, 1963, an inspector may not be prosecuted under 507 for refusing to permit an inspection
unconstitutionally authorized by 503. Relying on Frank v. Maryland, Eaton v. Price,
Page 387 U. S. 526 and decisions in other States, [Footnote 3] the District

Page 387 U. S. 528

is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant. See, e.g.,
Court of Appeal held that 503 does not violate Fourth Amendment rights because it Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48; McDonald
v. United States, 335 U. S. 451; Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20. As the Court
"is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil, rather than criminal in nature, explained in Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 333 U. S. 14:
inasmuch as that section creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and
may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions." "The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern not only
to the individual, but to a society, which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and
Having concluded that Frank v. Maryland, to the extent that it sanctioned such freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right
warrantless inspections, must be overruled, we reverse. of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or
government enforcement agent."
In Frank v. Maryland, this Court upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit a
The Fourth Amendment provides that, warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating a
suspected public nuisance. Although Frank can arguably be distinguished from this
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, case on its facts, [Footnote 4] the Frank opinion has generally been interpreted as
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants carving out an additional exception to the rule that warrantless searches are
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Eaton v. Price, supra. The District
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be Court of Appeal so interpreted Frank in this case, and that ruling is the core of
seized." appellant's challenge here. We proceed to a reexamination of the factors which

The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Page 387 U. S. 530
Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions
by governmental officials. The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to persuaded the Frank majority to adopt this construction of the Fourth Amendment's
a right of the people which "is basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, prohibition against unreasonable searches.
338 U. S. 27. As such, the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 374 U. S. 30. To the Frank majority, municipal fire, health, and housing inspection programs

Though there has been general agreement as to the fundamental purpose of the "touch at most upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the
Fourth Amendment, translation of the abstract prohibition against "unreasonable Fourteenth Amendment's protection against official intrusion,"
searches and seizures" into workable guidelines for the decision of particular cases is
a difficult task which has for many years divided the members of this Court. 359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 367, because the inspections are merely to determine whether
Nevertheless, one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, physical conditions exist which do not comply with minimum standards prescribed in
has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a local regulatory ordinances. Since the inspector does not ask that the property owner
search of private property without proper consent open his doors to a search for "evidence of criminal action" which may be used to
secure the owner's criminal conviction, historic interests of "self-protection" jointly
Page 387 U. S. 529 protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments [Footnote 5] are said not to be

involved, but only the less intense "right to be secure from intrusion into personal
privacy." Id. at 359 U. S. 365. proceeds, the warrant process could not function effectively in this field. The decision
to inspect an entire municipal area is based upon legislative or administrative
We may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is assessment of broad factors such as the area's age and condition. Unless the
a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and magistrate is to review such policy matters, he must issue a "rubber stamp" warrant
instrumentalities of crime. For this reason alone, Frank differed from the great bulk of which provides no protection at all to the property owner.
Fourth Amendment cases which have been considered by this Court. But we cannot
agree that the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these inspection cases are In our opinion, these arguments unduly discount the purposes behind the warrant
merely "peripheral." It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private machinery contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. Under the present system, when
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is the inspector demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing whether
suspected of criminal behavior. [Footnote 6] For instance, even the most law-abiding enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no
citizen way of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power to search, and no way of
knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization. These are
Page 387 U. S. 531 questions which may be reviewed by a neutral magistrate without any reassessment
of the basic agency decision to canvass an area. Yet only by refusing entry and risking
has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of a criminal conviction can the occupant at present challenge the inspector's decision
his home may be broken by official authority, for the possibility of criminal entry under to search. And even if the occupant possesses sufficient fortitude to take this risk, as
the guise of official sanction is a serious threat to personal and family security. And appellant did here, he may never learn any more about the reason for the inspection
even accepting Frank's rather remarkable premise, inspections of the kind we are here than that the law generally allows housing inspectors to gain entry. The practical effect
considering do, in fact, jeopardize "self-protection" interests of the property owner. of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the
Like most regulatory laws, fire, health, and housing codes are enforced by criminal field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private property which we have
processes. In some cities, discovery of a violation by the inspector leads to a criminal consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the
complaint. [Footnote 7] Even in cities where discovery of a violation produces only an need to
administrative compliance order, [Footnote 8] refusal to comply is a criminal offense,
and the fact of compliance is verified by a second inspection, again without a warrant. Page 387 U. S. 533
[Footnote 9] Finally, as this case demonstrates, refusal to permit an inspection is itself
a crime, punishable by fine or even by jail sentence. search. See cases cited p. 387 U. S. 529 supra. We simply cannot say that the
protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this context; broad
The Frank majority suggested, and appellee reasserts, two other justifications for statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review, particularly when
permitting administrative health and safety inspections without a warrant. First, it is those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.
argued that these inspections are "designed to make the least possible demand on
the individual occupant." 359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 367. The ordinances authorizing The final justification suggested for warrantless administrative searches is that the
inspections are hedged with safeguards, and at any rate the inspector's particular public interest demands such a rule: it is vigorously argued that the health and safety
decision to enter must comply with the constitutional standard of reasonableness even of entire urban populations is dependent upon enforcement of minimum fire, housing,
if he may enter without a warrant. [Footnote 10] In addition, the argument and sanitation standards, and that the only effective means of enforcing such codes
is by routine systematized inspection of all physical structures. Of course, in applying
Page 387 U. S. 532 any reasonableness standard, including one of constitutional dimension, an argument

that the public interest demands a particular rule must receive careful consideration. probable cause to believe that a particular dwelling contains violations of the minimum
But we think this argument misses the mark. The question is not, at this stage, at least, standards prescribed by the code being enforced. We disagree.
whether these inspections may be made, but whether they may be made without a
warrant. For example, to say that gambling raids may not be made at the discretion of In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be
the police without a warrant is not necessarily to say that gambling raids may never obtained, "probable cause" is the standard by which a particular decision to search is
be made. In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. To apply this standard,
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not it is obviously necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly
whether the public interest justifies the type of search in question, but whether the justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part
upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental Page 387 U. S. 535
purpose behind the search. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 384 U. S.
770-771. It has nowhere been urged that fire, health, and housing code inspection interests of the private citizen. For example, in a criminal investigation, the police may
programs could not achieve their goals within the confines of a reasonable search undertake to recover specific stolen or contraband goods. But that public interest
warrant requirement. Thus, we do not find the public need argument dispositive. would hardly justify a sweeping search of an entire city conducted in the hope that
these goods might be found. Consequently, a search for these goods, even with a
Page 387 U. S. 534 warrant, is "reasonable" only when there is "probable cause" to believe that they will
be uncovered in a particular dwelling.
In summary, we hold that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are
significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation, the inspection programs at issue
searches, when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure, lack the here are aimed at securing city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards for
traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and private property. The primary governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the
that the reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for upholding these unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and
warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth safety. Because fires and epidemics may ravage large urban areas, because unsightly
Amendment's protections. Because of the nature of the municipal programs under conditions adversely affect the economic values of neighboring structures, numerous
consideration, however, these conclusions must be the beginning, not the end, of our courts have upheld the police power of municipalities to impose and enforce such
inquiry. The Frank majority gave recognition to the unique character of these minimum standards even upon existing structures. [Footnote 11] In determining
inspection programs by refusing to require search warrants; to reject that disposition whether a particular inspection is reasonable -- and thus in determining whether there
does not justify ignoring the question whether some other accommodation between is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection -- the need for the inspection
public need and individual rights is essential. must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement.

II There is unanimous agreement among those most familiar with this field that the only
effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards required by
The Fourth Amendment provides that, "no Warrants shall issue but upon probable municipal codes is through routine periodic
cause." Borrowing from more typical Fourth Amendment cases, appellant argues not
only that code enforcement inspection programs must be circumscribed by a warrant Page 387 U. S. 536
procedure, but also that warrants should issue only when the inspector possesses

inspections of all structures. [Footnote 12] It is here that the probable cause debate is great, and city after city has seen this need and granted the power of inspection to its
focused, for the agency's decision to conduct an area inspection is unavoidably based health officials, and these inspections are apparently welcomed by all but an
on its appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole, not on its knowledge of conditions insignificant few. Certainly the nature of our society has not vitiated the need for
in each particular building. Appellee contends that, if the probable cause standard inspections first thought necessary 158 years ago, nor has experience revealed any
urged by appellant is adopted, the area inspection will be eliminated as a means of abuse or inroad on freedom in meeting this need by means that history and dominant
seeking compliance with code standards, and the reasonable goals of code public opinion have sanctioned."
enforcement will be dealt a crushing blow.
359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 372.
In meeting this contention, appellant argues, first, that his probable cause standard
would not jeopardize area inspection programs because only a minute portion of the Page 387 U. S. 538
population will refuse to consent to such inspections, and second, that individual
privacy, in any event, should be given preference to the public interest in conducting ". . . This is not to suggest that a health official need show the same kind of proof to a
such inspections. The first argument, even if true, is irrelevant to the question whether magistrate to obtain a warrant as one must who would search for the fruits or
the area inspection is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The instrumentalities of crime. Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the
second argument is, in effect, an assertion that the area inspection is an unreasonable facts that would justify an inference of 'probable cause' to make an inspection are
search. Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness clearly different from those that would justify such an inference where a criminal
investigation has been undertaken. Experience may show the need for periodic
Page 387 U. S. 537 inspections of certain facilities without a further showing of cause to believe that
substandard conditions dangerous to the public are being maintained. The passage
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search of a certain period without inspection might of itself be sufficient in a given situation to
entails. But we think that a number of persuasive factors combine to support the justify the issuance of a warrant. The test of 'probable cause' required by the Fourth
reasonableness of area code enforcement inspections. First, such programs have a Amendment can take into account the nature of the search that is being sought. 359
long history of judicial and public acceptance. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. at 359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 383 (MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting)."
U. S. 367-371. Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be
prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would Having concluded that the area inspection is a "reasonable" search of private property
achieve acceptable results. Many such conditions -- faulty wiring is an obvious within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it is obvious that "probable cause" to
example -- are not observable from outside the building, and indeed may not be issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative
apparent to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally, because the inspections are neither standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular
personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a dwelling. Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program being enforced,
relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy. Both the majority and the may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family
dissent in Frank emphatically supported this conclusion: apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily
depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. It has been
"Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to inspect dwelling places, suggested that so to vary the probable cause test from the standard applied in criminal
either as a matter of systematic area-by-area search or, as here, to treat a specific cases would be to authorize a "synthetic search warrant," and thereby to lessen the
problem, is of indispensable importance to the maintenance of community health; a overall protections of the Fourth Amendment. Frank v. Maryland, 359
power that would be greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safeguards
necessary for a search of evidence of criminal acts. The need for preventive action is Page 387 U. S. 539

U.S. at 359 U. S. 373. But we do not agree. The warrant procedure is designed to
guarantee that a decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable In this case, appellant has been charged with a crime for his refusal to permit housing
governmental interest. But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid inspectors to enter his leasehold without a warrant. There was no emergency
public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to demanding immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three trips to the building
issue a suitably restricted search warrant. Cf. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, in an attempt to obtain appellant's consent to search. Yet no warrant was obtained,
327 U. S. 186. Such an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines and thus appellant was unable to verify either the need for or the appropriate limits of
applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the probable cause the inspection. No doubt, the inspectors entered the public portion of the building with
requirement in this area. It merely gives full recognition to the competing public and the consent of the landlord, through the building's manager, but appellee does not
private interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic purpose behind contend that such consent was sufficient to authorize inspection of appellant's
the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable government invasions of privacy. premises. Cf. Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483; Chapman v. United States, 365 U.
See Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 273-274 (opinion of MR. JUSTICE S. 610; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451. Assuming the facts to be as the
BRENNAN). parties have alleged, we therefore conclude that appellant had a constitutional right to
insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not
III constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. It appears from
the opinion of the District Court of Appeal that, under these circumstances, a writ of
Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard of reasonableness, nothing we prohibition will issue to the criminal court under California law.
say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the
law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations. See North American Cold The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (seizure of unwholesome food); inconsistent with this opinion.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (compulsory smallpox vaccination);
Compagnie Francaise v. Board of Health, 186 U. S. 380 (health quarantine); Kroplin It is so ordered.
v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 610, 165 N.E. 498 (summary destruction of tubercular cattle).
On the other hand, in the case of most routine area inspections, there is no compelling
urgency to inspect at a particular time or on a particular day. Moreover, most citizens
allow inspections of their property without a warrant. Thus, as a practical matter, and
in light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant specify the property to
be searched, it seems likely that warrants should normally be sought only after entry
is refused unless

Page 387 U. S. 540

there has been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing
immediate entry. Similarly, the requirement of a warrant procedure does not suggest
any change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy, in most situations, of
authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to inspect.

7. Salazar vs. Achacoso

06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990
S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng
vs. booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang
Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents. company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.
2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom
said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:

This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE
arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment. FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.

The facts are as follows: 4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to
operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso
xxx xxx xxx issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:

1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay HORTY SALAZAR
City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz: Mandaluyong, Metro Manila

04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and
nagbibigay ng salaysay. Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency
being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the
ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. Horty means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have
Salazar 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to
05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor
S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar. Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.

effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. purpose."

Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987. 3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including
2 policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without her
B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave
Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under
Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.
policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of
News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00)
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie in all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-
Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil
order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the and criminal, to protect our client's interests.
premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was
accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters.
credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon
twelve talent performers practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more 7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the
waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the
for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar. Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836. 1

6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter: On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts
sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we
Gentlemen: consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.

On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas
respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of
26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue
and against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following: squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's resolution.

1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure Under the new Constitution, which states:
and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law"
guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution. . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2

it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an
declared that mayors may not exercise this power: amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President
Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative
xxx xxx xxx powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then
Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers:
But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the
state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No (c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power
longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment.
investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government 6
Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus
officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the
ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The
pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and (b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper
The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security
function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall
arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being order the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the
evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or
responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of authorized to do so. 7
said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary
investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4 On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018,
giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-
to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a
and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-
arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of
success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment
necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be
the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been
indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when licensed or authorized to do so. 8
he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No.
1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5 The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.

The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian
rule in its twilight moments. Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and
Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the
To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have
unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;
involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised
Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor
deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.
duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is
valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. 13
in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it
xxx xxx xxx is null and void, thus:

The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. xxx xxx xxx
Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be
exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
peace and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law,
deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re 1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters,
McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41). cabinets, tables, communications/ recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone
and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is and any and all documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to
detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12
2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as
exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and
like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.
3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:

1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892; 2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom
the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final
2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969; order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542; WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED
4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure
Order No. 1205.
5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong
Silang." No costs.

In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for SO ORDERED.
"books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings
and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the
operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme
Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in
connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too
general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any
"paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General
Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general
warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under
the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English
history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press,
when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they
pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and
Puritan." Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not
the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks
with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state
security. 14

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no
other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:

8. Catura vs. CIR by the prosecution division of the respondent Court, the principal complainants being
now respondent Celestino Tabaniag as well as other employees constituting more
G.R. No. L-27392 January 30, 1971 than ten percent of the entire membership of such labor organization. In the complaint,
it was charged that during the tenure of office of petitioners before us as such
PABLO CATURA and LUZ SALVADOR, petitioners, President and Treasurer, they were responsible for "unauthorized disbursement of
vs. union funds" with complainants on various occasions during the latter part of 1966
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and CELESTINO TABANIAG, et al., demanding from them "a full and detailed report of all financial transaction of the union
respondents. and to make the book of accounts and other records of the financial activities of the
union open to inspection by the members," only to be met with a refusal on their part
Joselito J. de la Rosa for petitioners. to comply. It was further asserted that the executive board of such labor organization
passed a resolution calling for a general membership meeting so that petitioners could
Ernesto Estrella for respondents. be confronted about the status of union funds, but then, Pablo Catura, as President,
cancelled such meeting.lwph1.t There was thereafter a general membership
resolution reiterating previous demands "for a full and detailed report of all financial
transactions of the union," but again there was no response, thus compelling the
FERNANDO, J.: members to refer the matter to the Department of Labor which duly issued subpoenas
for the presentation of such book of accounts to petitioners without any success. After
It is a novel question that presents itself before this Court in this petition for the review setting forth that complainants had exhausted all remedies provided in the union's
of a resolution of respondent Court of Industrial Relations. Specifically, it is whether constitution and by-laws, which were all unavailing, the complaint sought, after due
respondent Court, in the exercise of its power of investigation to assure compliance hearing and judgement, to declare present petitioners, as respondents, guilty of unfair
with the internal labor organization procedures under Section 17 of the Industrial labor practice under the above provision of the Industrial Peace Act, for them to cease
Peace Act,1 can require a labor organization's "books of accounts, bank accounts, and desist from further committing such unfair labor practice complained of, and to
pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to [its] render a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union as well as to
finances" be delivered and deposited with it at the hearing to conduct such make the book of accounts and other records of these financial activities open to
investigation in accordance with a complaint duly filed without the officials of such inspection by the members.2
labor organization, therein named as respondents and petitioners before us, being
heard prior to the issuance of such order. The respondent Court, first acting through Thereafter, on December 28, 1966, respondent Celestino Tabaniag and the other
Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador and thereafter en banc, upheld its power to do members, as petitioners in the above complaint before respondents Court, sought an
so. The challenge to such competence sought to be fortified by the allegation of the injunction to prevent now petitioners Pablo Catura who, it turned out, was again
absence of procedural due process was rejected. After a careful study of the matter, elected as President in an election on November 15, 1966, from taking his oath of
we cannot say that thereby respondents Court was in error. We have no reason to office in view of his alleged persistence in the abuse of his authority in the
reverse. disbursement of union funds as well as his refusal to make a full and detailed report
of all financial transactions of the union.3
As set forth in the brief for the petitioners, Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, the
President and Treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Then came the order of December 29, 1966, by Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador
Administration Employees Association, a legitimate labor organization duly registered, which, instead of granting the injunction sought, limited itself to requiring and directing
there was, on December 27, 1966, a complaint against them under Section 17 filed "personally the respondents Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, president and treasurer,

respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees' a resolution of the majority of the member." 6 ... "The books of accounts and other
Association, to deliver and deposit to this Court all the said Association's book of records of the financial activities of a legitimate labor organization shall be open to
accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other inspection by any officer or member thereof."7
documents related to the finances of the said labor union at the hearing of this petition
on January 3, 1967 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. Said respondents are hereby To repeat, the complaint before respondent Court against petitioners as President and
required to comply strictly with this Order."4 There was a motion for reconsideration Treasurer of the union, specifically recited an unauthorized disbursement of union
on January 2, 1967 by now petitioners Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador on the ground funds as well as the failure to make a full and detailed report of financial transactions
that they were not heard before such order was issued, which moreover in their of the union and to make the book of accounts and other records of its financial
opinion was beyond the power of respondent Court. With Associate Judge Ansberto activities open to inspection by the members. Clearly, the matter was deemed serious
P. Paredes dissenting, the order was sustained in a resolution by the Court en banc enough by the prosecutor of respondent Court to call for the exercise of the statutory
on February 28, 1967. Hence the present petition filed on April 3, 1967. power of investigation to substantiate the alleged violation so as to assure that the
rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization as specifically set forth in
The petition was given due course by this Court in a resolution of April 13, 1967 with Section 17 be respected. All that the challenged order did was to require petitioners,
a preliminary injunction issued upon petitioners' posting a bond of P2,000.00. as President and Treasurer of the labor organization, to "deliver and deposit" with
Respondents did not take the trouble of filing an answer within the period expired on respondent Court all of its book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds,
June 17, 1967 and petitioners were required to submit their brief within thirty days receipts, vouchers and other documents related to its finances at the hearing of the
under this Court's resolution of July 14, 1967. Such a brief was duly filed on September petition before it on January 3, 1967.
19 of that year. There was no brief for respondents. The case was thus deemed
submitted for decision on October 4, 1968. On its face, it cannot be said that such a requirement is beyond the statutory power
conferred. If it were otherwise, the specific provisions of law allegedly violated may
In the light of the interpretation to be accorded the applicable legal provisions and after not be effectively complied with. The authority to investigate might be rendered futile
a careful consideration of the contention that such a power to issue the challenged if respondent Court could be held as having acted contrary to law. To paraphrase
order cannot be deemed as possessed by respondent Court which moreover did not Justice Laurel, the power to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the very
accord petitioners procedural due process, we have reached the conclusion, as set least, requires an inquiry into existing facts and conditions. The documents required
forth at the opening of this opinion, that petitioners cannot prevail. The order as issued to be produced constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether or not
first by Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador and thereafter by respondent Court en there was a failure to comply with the mandates of the law. It is not for this Court to
banc must be sustained. whittle down the authority conferred on administrative agencies to assure the effective
administration of a statute, in this case intended to protect the rights of union members
1. The controlling provisions of law to the specific situation before this Court against its officers. The matter was properly within its cognizance and the means
concerning the power of investigation of respondent Court to assure compliance with necessary to give it force and effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the
internal labor organization procedures with the corresponding authority to investigate power sought to be exercised is so arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of
to substantiate alleged violations may be found in paragraphs (b), (h), and (l) of the petitioners entitled to priority. No such showing has been made; no such showing can
aforecited Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act. Thus: "The members shall be be made. To repeat, there should be no question about the correctness of the order
entitled to full and detailed reports from their officers and representatives of all financial herein challenged.
transactions as provided in the constitution and by-laws of the organization."5 ... "The
funds of the organization shall not be applied for any purpose or object other than 2. Nor is the validity of the order in question to be impugned by the allegation that
those expressly stated in its constitution or by-laws or those expressly authorized by there was a denial of procedural due process. If the books and records sought to be

delivered and deposited in court for examination were the private property of
petitioners, perhaps the allegation of the absence of due process would not be entirely
lacking in plausibility. Such is not the case however. The pertinent section of the
Industrial Peace Act makes clear that such books of accounts and other records of
the financial activities are open to inspection by any member of a labor organization.
For the court to require their submission at the hearing of the petition is, as above
noted, beyond question, and no useful purpose would be served by first hearing
petitioners before an order to that effect can be issued. Moreover, since as was shown
in the very brief of petitioners, there was a motion for reconsideration, the absence of
any hearing, even if on the assumption purely for argument's sake that there was such
a requirement, has no cured. So it was held by this Court in a recent decision. Thus:
"As far back as 1935, it has already been a settled doctrine that a plea of denial of
procedural due process does not lie where a defect consisting of an absence of notice
of hearing was thereafter cured by the alleged aggrieved party having had the
opportunity to be heard on a motion for reconsideration. 'What the law prohibits is not
the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of
opportunity to be heard.' There is then no occasion to impute deprivation of property
without due process where the adverse party was heard on a motion for
reconsideration constituting as it does 'sufficient opportunity' for him to inform the
Tribunal concerned of his side of the controversy. As was stated in a recent decision,
what 'due process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness and what it requires is
fairness or justice, the substance rather than the form being paramount,' the
conclusion being that the hearing on a motion for reconsideration meets the strict
requirement of due process."8

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied. The writ of preliminary injunction
issued under the resolution of April 13, 1967 is dissolved and declared to be without
any further force or effect.

9. Evangelista vs. Jarencio Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential
G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975 Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order
No. 4 of January 7, 1966. 2 Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following
SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential functions and responsibilities: 3
Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY
ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner, b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and
vs. corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to
Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines.
SITUATED, respondents. c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts
Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Ist. Assistant Solicitor General graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .
Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.
h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn
Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents. complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and
to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all
MARTIN, J.: the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or
This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent investigation. 4
Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the
Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as follows: Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service
Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear
IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND
of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain
restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys investigation pending therein."
and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in
connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25,
and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] 1968 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition,
under Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied). certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality.

On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order: as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena power
operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted
IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as
of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-
restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h)
and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very
connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious
and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the
under Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied). Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore
imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under
Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive
reconsideration first filed on the fundamental submission that the Order is a patent Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the
nullity. 6 subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the
established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.
As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its
officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena
investigations. issued under the Rules of Court 13 to abridge its application. The seeming proviso in
Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses
It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, and the authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces
the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. 7 Investigations are tecum or otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the same restrictions and
useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly
licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining seized upon to require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the
general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than Rules, a specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the
illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court's judicial or
administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena can be issued by an
proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized, however, that
purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what
nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a
of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for competent court, and not an administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the
correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations "restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative
for actions. 10 Code could mean the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when
the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books,
We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power documents or things does not appear. 15
from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to
"summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of
11 with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable
tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications cause is shown 16 and even before the issuance of a complaint. 17 It is not necessary,

as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing any administrative charge. 28
pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of
be for a lawfully authorized purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of
evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the
evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony corresponding charges. 29 Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts
sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be
purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might unwise. 30 Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any
shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-
evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that incrimination.
an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have
and exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power
inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, of the President of the Philippines to issue subpoena. 31 More tersely stated,
but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just respondents would now challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic
because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties authority, Executive Order No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88.
are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders,
itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. 21 In sum, it may be stated which are commonly said to have the force and effect of statutes 32 cannot be
that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the collaterally impeached. 33 Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the
authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now. 34 The settled rule is that the
reasonably relevant. 22 Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it. 35
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency
upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner
Manila in anomalous transactions 23 fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal
that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of competence of the Agency to issue.
which he is claimed to be in possession, 24 is reasonably relevant to the
investigations. WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is
hereby set aside and declared of no force and effect.
We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative
investigations, generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings. 25 In Cabal v. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Kapunan, Jr., 26 the Court ruled that since the administrative charge of unexplained
wealth against the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under SO ORDERED.
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the
complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon
his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 27 the same approach was followed in the administrative
proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his
privilege to practice the medical profession. Nevertheless, in the present case, We

10. Office Court Admin vs. Canque asked from her the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos in exchange for
the release of the formers common-law husband, Jovencio Patoc, and the dismissal
OFFICE OF THE COURT A.M. No. P-04-1830 of his criminal cases in court. Patoc was charged with violation of Republic Act No.
ADMINISTRATOR, [Formerly A.M. No. 04-6-151-MCTC] 9165 before the sala of Judge Victor R. Teves of the said court.
Present: The NBI operatives conducted an entrapment operation on June 3, 2004 at about 9:30
A.M. in the sala of Judge Teves. They arrested Canque after she received the amount
PUNO, C.J., of P40,000.00, previously marked with invisible ink and dusted with fluorescent
QUISUMBING, powder, from Ypanto in the presence of NBI Investigator Jedidah S. Hife. Canque was
YNARES-SANTIAGO, brought to the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI for laboratory examination.
CARPIO, Forensic Chemist Rommel D. Paglinawan, in his Physics Report,[1] found that the
- versus - CORONA, right and left hands of Canque were positive for the presence of fluorescent powder.
CARPIO MORALES,* The NBI report further stated that prior to the entrapment, Patocs mother had already
CHICO-NAZARIO,* given the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos to Canque in the presence
VELASCO, JR., of Ypanto for the dismissal of Patocs first case for possession of shabu on November
NACHURA, 30, 2003. The case remains pending to date.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, In a letter dated June 3, 2004, Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda, Acting Regional Director,
BRION, NBI-Region VII, endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas the case of
PERALTA, and Canque for immediate inquest. Thereafter, Informations for direct bribery and violation
SYLVIA CANQUE, Clerk of Court, BERSAMIN, JJ. of Sec. 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, were filed in the Regional Trial
12th MCTC, Moalboal-Badian- Court (RTC) of Barili, Cebu and were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. CEB-BRL-1058
Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu, Promulgated: and CEB-BRL-1057, respectively.
Respondent. In November 2003, Auditors from Region VII, Cebu City, conducted the periodic audit
June 4, 2009 on the cash and accounts of accountable officers of the provinces of Cebu, Bohol and
x-------------------------------------------------x Negros Oriental. After the audit of the cash and accounts of Canque, the Auditors
found that she had a cash shortage of P304,985.00. A letter of demand[2] was sent
DECISION to her to produce the missing funds and to submit a written explanation within seventy-
two (72) hours why the shortage occurred.
Per Curiam: On August 3, 2004, the office of the Cluster Director, Commission on Audit, Quezon
City received the initial report on the result of the examination of the cash and accounts
of Canque.[3] Attached to said report were the chronological statements on the events
The instant case stemmed from the Investigation Report of the National Bureau of that transpired in the course of the audit submitted by Ma. Violeta Lucila T. Luta, State
Investigation (NBI)-Region VII on the entrapment operation on Sylvia R. Canque, Auditor II, Team Leader. On August 6, 2004, the Supervising Auditor forwarded to the
Clerk of Court, 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Moalboal-Badian-Alcantara- Office of the Chief Justice the initial report on the results of the investigation conducted
Alegria, Cebu. on the cash and accounts of Canque. The initial report stated that Canque had a
The Investigation Report showed that on June 1, 2004, Marissa Y. Ypanto of Barangay shortage in her cash collection amounting to P304,985.00 and recommended her
Polo, Alcantara, Cebu filed a letter-complaint before the NBI alleging that Canque

immediate relief from her position and any other position involving money or property Executive Judge Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr. conducted a hearing on October 18, 2005,
accountability.[4] attended by Canque, NBI agents Gregorio Algoso, Jr., Reynaldo Villordon and
In a Resolution dated June 29, 2004, the Court treated the NBI entrapment on Canque Jedidah Hife. The notice sent to Ypanto was returned with the information that she
as an administrative complaint for grave misconduct and directed her to comment had died.
thereon. She was immediately placed under suspension until further orders by the
Court. The case was referred to a Consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator The Investigation Report[6] states, viz.:
(OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation. Jedidah S. Hife, a special investigator of the National Bureau of Investigation Central
Visayas Regional Office, identified her Affidavit, dated June 3, 2004.
In her Comment,[5] Canque claimed that sometime in November 2003, Rebecca
Patoc came to her office to inquire about the bail for her son, Jovencio. When she In that Affidavit, Hife declared that on June 3, 2004, at about 9 oclock in the morning
learned from the judge that the bail was P200,000.00, but that it could be reduced to of June 3, 2004, at the office of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Moalboal-Badian-
P100,000.00 if there was no objection from the Chief of Police, Rebecca came back Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu, she and other NBI agents arrested Sylvia Canque in an
two (2) days later with a Motion for Reduction of Bail. After two weeks, Rebecca came entrapment operation.
with Ypanto. Canque instructed them to proceed to a bonding company in Barili. She
alleged that at Shamrock Restaurant, Rebecca gave P20,000.00 as premium payment She had been instructed to accompany Marissa Ypanto, pretending to be her friend,
for the bail bond to a certain Ote Erojo, who in turn delivered to Rebecca a copy of the and to give a pre-arranged signal to other NBI agents at the proper time.
Release Order, promising to send her the bond undertaking by mail. On December 8,
2003, Jovencio and Ypanto brought the surety bond to Canque at the latters office. Thus, she and Marissa Ypanto had entered a room inside the courtroom, and there
In May 2004, another case for drug pushing was filed against Jovencio. Canque Marissa introduced her to Sylvia Canque as her friend. Marissa had brought with her
admits to seeing Ypanto only on two (2) occasions: during the preliminary investigation marked money in the amount of P40,000.00, for which Sylvia had asked from her in
on May 24 and on May 31 when Ypanto asked her when the ten-day period for the exchange for the dismissal of a case for violation of RA 9165 against Jovencio Patoc,
filing of Jovencios Counter-Affidavit would expire. and eventually the release of the latter.
Canque further averred that on June 3, 2004, the last day for the filing of the Counter-
Affidavit, Ypanto came with a woman who introduced herself as Jovencios sister who Sylvia Canque and Marissa went outside. Hife followed and overheard Sylvia tell
had just arrived from Holland. The woman got an envelope from her bag and handed Marissa that the money was for the fiscal. Sylvia showed them a Joint Affidavit
it to Ypanto. Ypanto tried to give it to Canque, but the latter did not touch it when she executed by PO1 Jeremias Geromo and PO3 Estanislao Avenido, the police officers
saw that it was not the Counter-Affidavit. The woman allegedly got the envelope from who had arrested Jovencio.
Ypanto and tried to place it at the back of the palm of Canque where it lightly touched
her skin. The woman then showed her ID and told Canque that she was an NBI agent. They returned inside the courtroom. Sylvia Canque asked Marissa how much money
Other NBI agents rushed in and arrested Canque. she had. Marissa said that she was carrying P50,000.00, and gave the envelope to
Canque, who wrote P50,000.00 on it. The latter put the envelope inside her bag, and
got it out, and put it in again she seemed undecided, and then she again asked
In a Resolution dated November 9, 2004, the Court, upon the recommendation of the Marissa how much the envelope contained. Marissa suggested that she count the
OCA, reassigned the case to the Executive Judge, RTC, Cebu City for investigation, money.
report and recommendation, considering that all the persons concerned were While Sylvia was counting the money, Hife gave the pre-arranged signal. NBI agents
residents of Cebu City. Reynaldo Villordon and Michael Angelo Abarico entered the courtroom followed by
other agents, accosted Sylvia Canque and recovered from her the marked money

amounting to P40,000.00. Thereupon, they put Canque under arrest and informed her For her part, Sylvia Canque identified and confirmed the allegations she made in her
of her Constitutional rights. Comment, dated July 21, 2004, adding nothing to the same.

At the NBI office, laboratory examination found Sylvia Canque positive for fluorescent Still and all, Canque insisted that it was Jedidah who put the envelope on her forearm,
powder. She was then booked and fingerprinted. and that she did not count the money inside it. In fact, it was NBI Director Esmeralda
NBI agents Gregorio Y. Algoso, Jr. and Reynaldo C. Villordon identified and confirmed who counted the money in his office. Until then the envelope was unopened. She
the allegations in the Joint Affidavit which they executed on June 3, 2004. denied having written P50,000.00 on the envelope.

On June 1, 2004, their office received a letter from a Jonald Ungab, concerning a Findings
certain Marissa Ypanto of Brgy. Polo, Alcantara, Cebu, who had complained about
Sylvia R. Canque, Clerk of Court of the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Moalboal- Canque admitted that an entrapment operation was conducted on her. Laboratory
Basian-Alcantara-Alegria, who had asked from her the amount of P40,000.00 in tests found her hands positive for the presence of fluorescent powder. But Canque
exchange for the release of her common-law husband, Jovencio Patoc, and the denied touching the money herself, claiming that it was Jedidah Hife who put the
dismissal of the case filed against him, which was then being heard in the sala of envelope on the back of her palm. But if the envelope were (sic) just put on her
Judge Victor R. Teves. forearm, and what was dusted with fluorescent powder was the money, which was
In accordance with their plan to entrap Sylvia Canque, Jedidah accompanied Marissa inside the envelope, why were Canques hands found positive for the presence of the
Ypanto, who introduced Jedidah to Sylvia Canque as a friend. Marked money powder?
prepared by the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI, consisting of six five-hundred- The undersigned gives credence to the testimony of the NBI agents, which was
peso bills, in the total amount of P40,000.00, had been given to Ypanto, who was to coherent, and given in a forthright manner. No ulterior motive to lie could be ascribed
hand it to Sylvia Canque. When the transaction was done, and Jedidah had given the to the agents. Thus, the undersigned finds the facts to be as narrated by the agents.[7]
pre-arranged signal indicating that the money had been received by Sylvia Canque,
they immediately went inside the office of Sylvia Canque, introduced themselves and The Investigating Judge found respondent Canque guilty of grave misconduct and
arrested her. They brought Sylvia Canque to the NBI office to be examined for the recommended the penalty of dismissal, with forfeiture of all her benefits and
presence of fluorescent powder on her hands, booked, photographed and disqualification from re-employment in the government service.
fingerprinted. In a Resolution dated February 7, 2006, the Court referred the Investigation Report to
the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
Villordon added that, being just nearby, he saw Marissa give the money to Sylvia In its Report dated June 13, 2006, the OCA recommended that the Investigation
Canque, who counted it. At this point, Jedidah gave the pre-arranged signal, and the Report of Investigating Judge Dumdum be set aside and the complaint be investigated
agents went inside. His co-agent Michael Albarico announced that they were NBI anew upon finding that Canque was not informed of her right to be heard by herself
agents. All of which took Sylvia Canque by surprise. and counsel during the investigation which allegedly amounted to a denial of her right
to due process; and for the Audit Report of Shortage in the amount of P304,985.00
Physics Report No. 04-P-3306, dated June 3, 2004, of the Forensic Chemistry Section and other actuations and deficiencies of respondent Canque to be set in the next En
of the National Bureau of Investigation states that the examination conducted on June Banc Agenda.
3, 2004, at 12:30 p.m. revealed that the left and right hands of Sylvia Canque bore the On September 5, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to file a
presence of yellow fluorescent powder. Comment, within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice, on the Audit Report
of the COA finding a shortage in her cash collection amounting to P304,985.00.
Respondent failed to comment. Thus, in an En Banc Resolution dated December 4,

2007, the Court considered respondent to have waived her right to file Comment and to ultraviolet light examination. These results of the entrapment operation clearly
referred, for the second time, the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for establish the guilt of respondent who has merely denied, without support, the
evaluation, report and recommendation. allegations against her.

In a Memorandum dated July 23, 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator found This is not all.
Canque liable for gross neglect of duty, gross dishonesty and grave misconduct and Respondent likewise failed to observe the standard of behavior required of clerks of
recommended her dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other court as the chief administrative officers of their respective courts as shown by the
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any initial audit report of the COA finding her remiss in the performance of her
government office or instrumentality, including government-owned and controlled administrative duties as clerk of court. These infractions consist of her failure to update
corporations. It further recommended that she be ordered to restitute the amount of the court cashbook, as well as her failure to explain the missing collection records[11]
P304,985.00 representing the shortage in the collection of court funds. for the Fiduciary Fund (FF) and the shortage in her cash collection amounting to
P304,985.00. These acts of respondent are in violation of her duties and
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court responsibilities as clerk of court in the collection and custody of legal funds and fees.
Administrator. Clerks of court are responsible for court records and physical facilities of their
respective courts and are accountable for the courts money and property deposits
Grave misconduct is a malevolent transgression of some established and definite rule under Section B, Chapter 1 of the 1991 Manual for Clerks of Court and the 2002
of action more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, viz.:
or employee which threatens the very existence of the system of administration of The Clerk of Court has general administrative supervision over all the personnel of the
justice.[8] It manifests itself in corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant Court. As regards the Courts funds and revenues, records, properties and premises,
disregard of established rules.[9] It is considered as a grave offense under the Civil said officer is the custodian. Thus, the Clerk of Court is generally also the treasurer,
Service Law[10] with the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the service with accountant, guard and physical plant manager thereof.
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in government service. Thus, as custodians of the courts funds, revenues, records, properties and premises,
clerks of court are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of the same.

In the case at bar, respondent violated Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for The cited acts of respondent clearly show her failure to discharge her functions as
Court Personnel which states that [c]ourt personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, clerk of court constituting gross neglect of duty, gross dishonesty and grave
favor or benefit on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift shall influence misconduct. Each offense is punishable with dismissal even for the first time of
their official actions. This is sufficiently established by the evidence on record. First, commission under Section 22 (a), (b) and (c) of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
respondent was caught red-handed, in a legitimate entrapment operation, demanding Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service
and receiving money from complainant Ypanto in connection with the immediate Laws.
release of the latters common-law husband Jovencio from police custody; and the
dismissal of the criminal charges against him which were pending before the MCTC, We have held time and again that the Court will not hesitate to impose the stiffest
Moalboal-Badian-Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu her official station. While respondent was penalty on those who atrociously display serious lack of integrity, uprightness and
in the act of counting the marked money, she was validly placed under arrest and honesty demanded of an employee in the judiciary. Neither shall we tolerate or
apprised of her constitutional rights. Second, her hands were found to have smudges condone any conduct that would violate the norms of public accountability and
of the yellow fluorescent powder used to mark the bills when her hands were subjected

diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system,[12] as
in the case at bar.

Lastly, the Court does not agree with the finding of the Office of the Court Administrator
in its first Report dated June 13, 2006 recommending that the Investigation Report of
Investigating Judge Dumdum be set aside and that the complaint be investigated
anew since Canque was not informed of her right to be heard by herself and counsel
during the investigation an omission allegedly amounting to a denial of her right to due
process. The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may have in support of his
defense. Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to
administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense.[13] A formal or trial-type hearing is not

In the case at bar, despite respondents protestations, the records readily show that
she was afforded the opportunity to present her side as she was directed to file her
comment on the complaint. She was notified of the hearing and was in fact present
during the entire proceedings. As to the issue on the legality of her arrest, respondent
has failed to submit evidence in support of her bare claims.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Sylvia R. Canque, Clerk of Court, 12th MCTC,
Moalboal-Badian-Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu is found GUILTY of GRAVE
hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued
leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of
the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and financial
institutions. She is further ordered to RETURN to the Court the amount of P304,985.00
to cover the shortage in the collection of court funds. In case of her failure to restitute
the said amount, in full or in part, the Employees Leave Division of the Office of
Administrative ServicesOCA is directed to compute the balance of respondents
accrued leave credits and forward such computation to the Finance Division of the
Fiscal Management OfficeOCA for the determination of its monetary value. The said
amount plus other benefits that respondent may be entitled to shall be applied to the
above shortage incurred.

G.R. No. L-17778 November 30, 1962


CARMELO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Probe Committee, Office of the Mayor
of Manila, petitioner-appellant,
ARMANDO RAMOS, respondent-appellee.

City Fiscal Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.

Armando Ramos for and in his own behalf as respondent-appellee.


On February 3, 1960, the Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a

committee "to investigate the anomalies involving the license inspectors and other
personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of
the License and Permits Division of this Office (of the Mayor)." He named Mr. Jesus
L. Carmelo as chairman of said committee.

It appears that the committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen
working as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear before it on
June 3, 8, 9, 15 and 16 and August 4 and 11, 1960, in connection with an
administrative case against Crisanta Estanislao but that Ramos, on whom the
subpoenas were duly served, refused to appear.

Claiming that Ramos' refusal tended "to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administrative proceedings," petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition to declare Armando Ramos in contempt. After hearing, during which petitioner
was required to show a prima facie case, the trial court dismissed the petition. The
lower court held that there is no law empowering committees created by municipal
mayors to issue subpoenas and demand that witnesses testify under oath. It also held
that to compel Ramos to testify would be to violate his right against self-incrimination.

It appears that in a statement given to investigators of the Office of the Mayor, Ramos
admitted having misappropriated on several occasions, sums of money given to him
11. Carmelo vs. Ramos by the owner of Casa de Alba for the payment of the latter's taxes for 1956-1959 and
that this fact had not been discovered earlier because Ramos used to entertain

employees in the City Treasurer's office at Casa de Alba where Ramos was a
bookkeeper as stated above. The trial court held that to compel Ramos to confirm this One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has "authority to take
statement in the administrative case against certain employees in the Office of the testimony or evidence" before he can apply to the courts for the punishment of hostile
City Treasurer would be to compel him to give testimony that could be used against witnesses. (Francia v. Pecson, et al., 87 Phil. 100.)
him in a criminal case for estafa of which the owner of Casa de Alba was the offended
party. From that decision, petitioner appealed to this Court. Now, what authority to take testimony does petitioner's committee have from which
the power to cite witnesses may be implied, pursuant to section 580?
The main issue in this ease is the power, if any, of committee, like the committee of
which petitioner is the chairman, to subpoena witnesses to appear before it and to ask To be sure, there is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the
for their punishment in case of refusal. committee about such a grant of power. All that the order gives to this body is the
power to investigate anomalies involving certain city employees.
The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt)1 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and
superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative Petitioner contends that the Mayor of Manila has the implied power to investigate city
officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered officials and employees appointed by him to the end that the power expressly vested
and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 in him to suspend and remove such officials of employees (Sec. 22, Republic Act No.
of the Revised Administrative Code. (People v. Mendoza; People v. Dizon, 49 O. G. 409) may be justly and fairly exercised. We agree with this proposition and We held
No. 2, 541.) so in the case of Pagkanlungan v. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. No. 10, p. 4332. But We do
not agree with the petitioner that a delegation of such power to investigation implies
Petitioner invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as also a delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose
follows: appearance may be require by the compulsory process of subpoena. Thus, in denying
this power to an investigating body in the Office of the Mayor of Manila, We said in
Powers incidental to taking of testimony. When authority to take testimony or Francia v. Pecson, et al., supra: "Were do not think the mayor (of Manila) can delegate
evidence is conferred upon an administrative officer or upon any nonjudicial person, or confer the powers to administer oaths, to take testimony, and to issue subpoenas."
committee, or other body, such authority shall be understood to comprehend the right
to administer oaths and summons witnesses and shall include authority to require the Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the provisions of section 580 of the Administrative
production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all Code are applicable to the City of Manila as these pertain to national bureaus or offices
respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of of the government.
a similar character.
Citing 50 Am. Jur. 449, petitioner contends that "the power of the investigation
Saving the provisions of section one hundred and two of this Act, any one who, without committee to issue compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
lawful excuse, fails to appear upon summons issued under the authority of the undoubtedly exists since only complimentary to the power of the mayor to investigate,
preceding paragraph or who, appearing before any individual or body exercising the suspend and remove city officers and employees, supra, is the recognized rule that
power therein defined, refuses to make oath, give testimony, or produce documents where the statute grants a right, it also confers by implication every particular power
for inspection, when thereunto lawfully required, shall be subject to discipline as in necessary for the exercise thereof." There is no merit in the argument. In the first
case of contempt of court and upon application of the individual or body exercising the place, the authority cited speaks of statutory, grant of power to a body. Here, We have
power in question shall be dealt with by the judge of first instance having jurisdiction seen that whatever power may be claimed by petitioner's committee may only be
of the case in the manner provided by law. traced to the power of the Mayor to investigate as implied from his power to suspend

or remove certain city employees. There is no statutory grant of power to investigate

to petitioner's committee.

In the second place, even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to require
the appearance of witnesses before him, the rule, as noted earlier, is that the Mayor
can not delegate this power to a body like the committee of the petitioner. (Francia v.
Pecson, et al., supra.)

Lastly, 50 Am. Jur. Sec. 428, p. 450 itself admits an exception to the rule invoked by
the petitioner. Thus, it is stated that "where the liberty and property of persons are
sought to be brought within the operation of a power claimed to be impliedly granted
by an act because necessary to its due execution, the case must be clearly seen to
be within those intended to be reached." Here, no less than the liberty of Armando
Ramos is involved in the claim of the committee to the right to cite witnesses.

We hold, therefore, that petitioner's committee has no power to cite witnesses to

appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal. This conclusion
makes it unnecessary for Us to pass upon the other error assigned by petitioner as
having been allegedly committed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is hereby affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.

12. Masangcay vs. COMELEC served in the provincial jail of Aklan. The other respondents were exonerated for lack
of evidence.
G.R. No. L-13827 September 28, 1962
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the
BENJAMIN MASANGCAY, petitioner, constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the
vs. Commission on Elections as well as its members the power to punish acts of contempt
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. against said body under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided for
in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that the portion of said section which grants to the
Godofredo A. Ramos and Ruby Salazar-Alberto for petitioner. Commission and members the power to punish for contempt is unconstitutional for it
Office of the Solicitor General and Dominador D. Dayot for respondent. infringes the principle underlying the separation of powers that exists among the three
departments of our constitutional form of government. In other words, it is contended
that, even if petitioner can be held guilty of the act of contempt charged, the decision
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: is null and void for lack of valid power on the part of the Commission to impose such
disciplinary penalty under the principle of separation of powers. There is merit in the
Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was on October 14, 1957 charged before contention that the Commission on Elections lacks power to impose the disciplinary
the Commission on Election with contempt for having opened three boxes bearing penalty meted out to petitioner in the decision subject of review. We had occasion to
serial numbers l-8071, l-8072 and l-8073 containing official and sample ballots for the stress in the case of Guevara v. The Commission on Elections 1 that under the law
municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said and the constitution, the Commission on Elections has only the duty to enforce and
Commission embodied in its resolution promulgated September 2, 1957, and its administer all laws to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and
unnumbered resolution date March 5, 1957, inasmuch as he opened said boxes not decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. In
the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, this sense, said, the Commission, although it cannot be classified a court of justice
and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an
Citizens' Party, as required in the aforesaid resolutions, which are punishable under administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as
Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Masangcay controversies that by express provision law come under its jurisdiction. The difficulty
was then the provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by the Commission in its lies in drawing the demarcation line between the duty which inherently is
resolution in Case CE-No. 270, part II 2 (b) thereof, to take charge of the receipt and administrative in character and a function which calls for the exercise of the quasi-
custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their judicial function of the Commission. In the same case, we also expressed the view
distribution, among the different municipalities of the province. that when the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the
power to punish contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature, as can
In compliance with the summons issued to Masangcay and his co-respondents to be clearly gleaned from the following doctrine we laid down therein:
appear and show cause why they should not be punished for contempt on the basis
of the aforementioned charge, they all appeared before the Commission on October . . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise
21, 1957 and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereupon, evidence was presented by both any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish
the prosecution and the defense, and on December 16, 1957 the Commission for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.
rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as As this Court has aptly said: 'The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts;
charged and sentencing each of them to suffer three months imprisonment and pay a its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to
fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency, to be the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates courts, and, consequently, in the

administration of justice (Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U.S. v.

Lee Hoc, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 O.G., 2570; In Re Kelly, Phil., 944). The
exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute
of courts (Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative
bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony
(People v. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power by an administrative
body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg v.
Lecker, 31 N.E., 190; In Re Sims, 37 P., 135; Roberts v. Hacney, 58 SW.,

In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for
whose violation the charge for contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay
merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merely
concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election
paraphernalia among the different municipalities. In fact, Masangcay, who as
provincial treasurer of Aklan was the one designated to take charge of the receipt,
custody and distribution of election supplies in that province, was charged with having
opened three boxes containing official ballots for distribution among several
municipalities in violation of the instructions of the Commission which enjoin that the
same cannot be opened except in the presence of the division superintendent of
schools, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista
Party, the Liberal Party, and the Citizens' Party, for he ordered their opening and
distribution not in accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in said
resolutions. And because of such violation he was dealt as for contempt of the
Commission and was sentenced accordingly. In this sense, the Commission has
exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is null and

Having reached the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to pass on the

question of constitutionality raised by petitioner with regard to the portion of Section 5
of the Revised Election Code which confers upon the Commission on Elections the
power to punish for contempt for acts provided for in Rule 64 of our rules of court.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from insofar as petitioner Benjamin Masangcay

is concerned, as well as the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
insofar as it concerns him, are hereby reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.

13. Bedol vs. COMELEC Respondent [petitioner] Bedol failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the
Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the
G.R. No. 179830 December 3, 2009 Provincial Election Supervisor which was slated on May 22, 2007.

LINTANG BEDOL, Petitioner, On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission, en banc sitting as
vs. the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) for the election of senators to submit the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. provincial certificate of canvass for Maguindanao, pursuant to his functions as
Provincial Elections Supervisor and chair of the PBOC for Maguindanao. Due to
DECISION certain observations on the provincial certificates of canvass by certain parties,
canvassing of the certificate was held in abeyance and respondent was queried on
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: the alleged fraud which attended the conduct of elections in his area.

Challenged in this petition for certiorari are the twin Resolutions issued by the He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May 30, 2007, but failed
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in the case entitled "In to appear despite prior knowledge.
the Matter of the Charge of Contempt of the Commission Against Election Supervisor
Lintang Bedol." The first Resolution1 dated August 7, 2007, held petitioner guilty of On June 4, 2007, Celia B. Romero, Director II, ERSD & Concurrent Chief of the
contempt of the COMELEC and meted out to him the penalty of six (6) months Records and Statistics Division of the COMELEC issued a certification that as of even
imprisonment and a fine of P1,000.00. The second Resolution2 dated August 31, date, the canvassing documents for all municipalities of the province of Maguindanao
2007, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections were not transmitted by the Provincial
Election Supervisor of said province nor the respective Board of Canvassers.
The facts as stated by the COMELEC follow:
The Commission and not just the NBOC, in the exercise of its investigatory powers to
On May 14, 2007, the National and Local elections were held under the auspices of determine existing controversies created the Task Force Maguindanao, headed by
this Commission. Commissioner Nicodemo Ferrer, which was tasked to conduct a fact-finding
investigation on the conduct of elections and certificates of canvass from the city and
As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province of municipalities in Maguindanao.
Maguindanao, the respondent [petitioner] discharged his official functions and was
able to ensure the PBOCs performance of its ministerial duty to canvass the Respondent [petitioner] appeared before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007 fact
Certificates of Canvass coming from the twenty two (22) city and municipalities in the finding activity and responded to the queries from the chair. It was during this hearing
province. that respondent [petitioner] Bedol explained that, while in his custody and possession,
the election paraphernalia were stolen sometime on May 29, 2007, or some fifteen
At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the burdensome and (15) days after the elections. This was the first time such an excuse was given by the
gargantuan duty of being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor for the respondent [petitioner] and no written report was ever filed with the Commission
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring province of Maguindanao. regarding the alleged loss.1avvphi1

Respondent [petitioner] Bedol was duly informed to be present in the next scheduled
investigative proceedings set for June 14, 2007 as the Task Force wanted to delve

deeper into the alleged loss by propounding additional questions to Atty. Bedol during held on June 11, 2007, and personal service to you of a subpoena which you duly
the next scheduled proceedings, such as why he still had in his possession said signed on the same date; and your failure/refusal to submit your written explanation
documents which should have already been turned over to the Commission, why he of your said absences which you undertook to submit on June 13, 2007 all of these
did not report to the COMELEC or to the police authorities the purported theft, and failures on your part are violations of paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of
other pertinent questions. However, despite actual notice in open session, Atty. Bedol COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
failed to appear, giving the impression that respondent [petitioner] Bedol does not give
importance to this whole exercise and ignores the negative impact his attitude has on 2. Your unlawful assumption of custody in your office in Maguinadanao of the
this Commission. municipal certificates of canvass (MCOC) and other accountable election documents
of all the municipalities of Maguinadanao used in the last elections of 2007, but which
Also respondent [petitioner] failed and refused to submit a written explanation of his should have been delivered to the Commission on Elections in its main office in
absences which he undertook to submit on June 13, 2007, but was only received by Intramuros, Manila, and your admission that said accountable documents were lost
this Commission belatedly on July 03, 2007. from your said custody these constitute violations of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d),
section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.
On June 26, 2007, [petitioner] came out on national newspapers, in an exclusive
interview with the Inquirer and GMA-7, with a gleaming 45 caliber pistol strapped to 3. Your pronouncements in the media flaunting [disrespect to] the authority of the
his side, and in clear defiance of the Commission posted the challenge by saying that COMELEC over you, challenging the institution to file a case against you in court as
those that are saying that there was cheating in Maguindanao, file a case against me it is only in court that you are ready to face your accuser are violations of paragraphs
tomorrow, the next day. They should file a case now and I will answer their (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.
accusations.(Words in brackets ours)
4. Your regaling the media (interviews in national television channels, newspapers
On June 27, 2007, the COMELEC through Task Force Maguindanao head, and radios) with your boast of possession of an armory of long firearms and side arms,
Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer, issued a Contempt Charge and Show Cause displaying in public for all to see in your front-page colored portrait in a national
Order3 against petitioner citing various violations of the COMELEC Rules of broadsheet and during a television interview a shiny pistol tucked in a holster at your
Procedure, viz: waist in a combative mode (sic) these are clear violations of paragraphs (a) and
(d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules. (Words in brackets ours)
You are hereby formally charged of contempt of this Commission for having committed
during the period between May 14, 2007, and June 26, 2007, acts in violation of Through the foregoing June 27, 2007 Order, petitioner was directed to appear before
specific paragraphs of Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as the COMELEC En Banc on July 3, 2007 at 10:00 oclock in the morning to personally
follows: explain why he should not be held in contempt for the above-mentioned offenses.

1. (a) Your (PES Bedols) failure to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial On July 2, 2007, petitioner was arrested by members of the Philippine National Police
Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he (sic) is (sic) the on the basis of an Order of Arrest4 issued on June 29, 2007 by the COMELEC after
Provincial Election Supervisor on May 22, 2007; (b) your failure to attend the reset petitioner repeatedly failed to appear during the fact-finding proceedings before Task
schedule of the canvassing on May 30, 2007, despite knowledge thereof when you Force Maguindanao.
attended the previously scheduled but again reset canvassing of said PCOCs on May
25, 2007; (c) your failure to attend the continuation of hearing of the Task Force During the July 3, 2007 hearing, petitioner questioned the COMELECs legal basis for
Maguindanao on June 14, 2007, despite notice to him in open session in the hearing issuing the warrant of arrest and its assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt

charges. Upon petitioners motion, he was granted a period of ten (10) days within On August 7, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc rendered the first assailed Resolution,
which to file the necessary pleading adducing his arguments and supporting the dispositive part of which reads:
authorities. The continuation of the hearing was set on July 17, 2007.
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, respondent Atty. Lintang Bedol is hereby
On July 17, 2007, which was beyond the ten-day period he requested, petitioner found guilty of Contempt of the Commission for the following acts and omissions:
submitted an Explanation Ad Cautelam with Urgent Manifestation, containing the
following averments: 1. (a) The failure to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of
Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election Supervisor
1. Respondent [petitioner] urgently manifests that he is making a special appearance on May 22, 2007 (b) failure to attend the reset schedule of the canvassing on May 30,
as he assails the jurisdiction of the Honorable Commission and its capacity to 2007, despite knowledge thereof when Respondent Bedol attended the previously
prosecute the present case in an impartial and fair manner. scheduled but again reset canvassing on May 25, 2007 (c) failure to attend the
continuation of hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao on June 14, 2007, despite
2. Respondent [petitioner] questions the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him. notice to Respondent in open session in the hearing held on June 11, 2007, and
He can not be validly arrested or re-arrested as a witness who is being compelled to personal service to him of the subpoena which he duly signed on the same date; the
testify in a hearing before the Honorable Commission. failure/refusal to submit written explanation of respondents absences which he
undertook to submit on June 13, 2007 --- all of these failures are violations of
3. Respondent [petitioner] has not committed any contemptuous acts against the paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Commission. He has not committed those acts charged against him by the
Commission motu proprio. (Words in brackets ours.) 2. The unlawful assumption of custody in the Respondents office in Maguindanao of
the Municipal Certificates of Canvass (MCOC) and other accountable election
During the hearing on July 17, 2007, petitioner reiterated his objection to the documents of all the municipalities of Maguindanao used in the last elections of 2007,
jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the contempt charges due to the absence of a but which should have been delivered to the Commission on Elections in its main
complaint lodged with the COMELEC by any private party. Petitioners objection was office in Intramuros, Manila, and Respondents plain admission that said accountable
treated as a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which was denied forthwith by documents were lost from his said custody --- these constitute violations of paragraphs
the COMELEC. Petitioner was then required to present evidence which he refused to (a), (c) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.lavvphil
do. Various exhibits were then marked and presented to the COMELEC. However,
the latter allowed petitioner to file a Memorandum within a period of ten (10) days and 3. The respondents pronouncements in media flaunting disrespect to the authority of
gave him the opportunity to attach thereto his documentary and other evidence. the COMELEC over him, challenging the institution to file a case against him in court
as it is supposedly only in court that Respondent Bedol was ready to face his accuser
On July 31, 2007, petitioner again belatedly filed his Memorandum5 maintaining his are violations of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.
objection to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to initiate the contempt proceedings on
ground that the COMELEC, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for 4. Regaling the public through the media (interviews in national television channels,
the election of senators, was performing its administrative and not its quasi-judicial newspapers and radios) with boast of possession of an armory of long firearms and
functions. Petitioner argued that the COMELEC, in that capacity, could not punish him side arms, displaying in public, for all to see in his front-page colored portrait in a
for contempt. national broadsheet and during a television interview, a shiny pistol tucked in a holster
at your waist in a combative mode (sic) --- these are clear violations of paragraphs
(a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.

We dismiss the petition.

All the foregoing constitute an exhibition of contumacious acts showing disrespect for
the institution, of which respondent is even a ranking official, which is clearly The main thrust of petitioners argument is that the COMELEC exceeded its
contemptuous of this Commission, for which Respondent Lintang Bedol is hereby jurisdiction in initiating the contempt proceedings when it was performing its
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions as the National Board of Canvassers
One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00). for the election of senators. According to petitioner, the COMELEC may only punish
contemptuous acts while exercising its quasi-judicial functions.
The Legal Department of the Comelec is hereby directed to investigate and determine
whether or not any election offense or crime under the Revised Penal Code has been The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its
committed by respondent Lintang Bedol and to initiate the filing of the necessary constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit
charge/s therefor. provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

SO ORDERED. Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the (6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
COMELEC in the other assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2007. laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
Hence, petitioner filed before the Court the instant petition for certiorari raising the
following issues: The above-quoted provision should be construed broadly to give effect to the
COMELECs constitutional mandate as enunciated in Loong v. Commission on
I Elections,6 which held:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS HAS JURISDICTION TO xxx. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad
INITIATE OR PROSECUTE THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE power "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
PETITIONER. election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent
of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
II achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987
III Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative,
quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC
WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election
ASSUMING IT HAS JURISDICTION TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT, ARE laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, CREDIBLE AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE. relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers
to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise

such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its an election offense had possibly been committed could by no means be classified
administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws. as a purely ministerial or administrative function.
In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the
Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-
regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the
Election Code.7 elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted
hearings and required the attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to
The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and give them the opportunity to argue and support their respective positions.
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and The effectiveness of the quasijudicial power vested by law on a government
administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva,8 described institution hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their
quasi-judicial power in the following manner, viz: witnesses at the hearings or proceedings. As enunciated in Arnault v. Nazareno9

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing,
the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who
when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or to attend, would render nugatory the COMELECs investigative power, which is an
reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest and
entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers credible elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was however derailed
or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold when petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official questions regarding the various election documents which, he claimed, were stolen
action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons while they were in his possession and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could
are affected, it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force hearings.
process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings. [Emphasis ours.]
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassers at
The Creation of Task Force Maguindanao was impelled by the allegations of fraud that time it required petitioner to appear before it, the Court had the occasion to rule
and irregularities attending the conduct of elections in the province of Maguindanao that the powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board
and the non-transmittal of the canvassing documents for all municipalities of said exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the function and duty to determine whether
province. the papers transmitted to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper
officers.10 When the results of the elections in the province of Maguindanao were
Task Force Maguindanaos fact-finding investigation to probe into the veracity of the being canvassed, counsels for various candidates posited numerous questions on the
alleged fraud that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to certificates of canvass brought before the COMELEC. The COMELEC asked
determine whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on the issue of whether the election
documents coming from Maguindanao were spurious or not. When petitioner

unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC undeniably acted within the bounds of its
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions. (a) Misbehavior of the responsible officer of the Commission in the performance of his
official duties or in his official transactions;
In Santiago, Jr. v. Bautista,11 the Court held:
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or
xxx. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or command of the Commission or any of its Divisions, or injunction or restraining order
administrative duties, and the performance of and administrative or ministerial duties, granted by it;
may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally
that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the (c) Any abuse of or any inlawful interference with the process or proceedings of the
legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an Commission or any of its Divisions not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of
officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he this Rules;
acts judicially.
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
On the procedure adopted by the COMELEC in proceeding with the indirect contempt the administration of justice by the Commission or any of its Divisions;
charges against petitioner, Section 52 (e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code
pertinently provides: (e) Assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority; and

Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served.

xxx SEC. 3 Penalty for Indirect Contempt. If adjudged guilty, the accused may be
punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or imprisonment
(e) Punish contempts provided for in the Rules of Court in the same procedure and for not more than six (6) months, or both, at the discretion of the Commission or
with the same penalties provided therin. Any violation of any final and executory Division.
decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall constitute contempt thereof.
[Emphasis ours.] The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
is broad enough to allow the initiation of indirect contempt proceedings by the
The aforecited provision of law is implemented by Rule 29 of COMELECs Rules of COMELEC motu proprio. Furthermore, the above-quoted provision of Section 52(e),
Procedure, Section 2 of which states: Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly adopts the procedure and penalties
provided by the Rules of Court. Under Section 4, Rule 71, said proceedings may be
Rule 29 Contempt initiated motu proprio by the COMELEC, viz:

Sec. 1. xxx SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an
Sec. 2. Indirect Contempt. After charge in writing has been filed with the Commission order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he
or Division, as the case may be, and an opportunity given to the respondent to be should not be punished for contempt.
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers We are not persuaded.
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of Petitioner was found guilty of contempt on four (4) grounds. First, he repeatedly failed
or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall to attend, despite notice of the scheduled12 canvassing of the Provincial Certificates
allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, of Canvass, the hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao; and refused to submit his
unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and explanation for such absences, which he had undertaken to submit, in violation of
the principal action for joint hearing and decision. paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Hence, the COMELEC properly assumed jurisdiction over the indirect contempt Petitioner was duly notified of the scheduled hearings. It was his official responsibility
proceedings which were initiated by its Task Force Maguindanao, through a Contempt to be present during the scheduled hearing to shed light on the allegedly stolen
Charge and Show Cause Order, notwithstanding the absence of any complaint filed election documents but he failed to do so without offering any valid justification for his
by a private party. non-appearance.

We turn now to petitioners claim that the COMELEC pre-judged the case against him, Second, he unlawfully assumed custody of accountable election documents, which
and that its findings were not supported by evidence. His claim deserves scant were lost while in his possession, and consequently failed to deliver the same, in
consideration. violation of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.

The fact that the indirect contempt charges against petitioner were initiated motu Petitioner admitted that the subject certificate of canvass and other election
proprio by the COMELEC did not by itself prove that it had already prejudged the case documents were lost while in his custody. Petitioner himself admitted during the
against him. As borne out by the records, the COMELEC gave petitioner several hearing held on June 11, 2007 that the documents were stolen sometime on May 29,
opportunities to explain his side and to present evidence to defend himself. All of 2007. Apart from the said loss of the vital election documents, his liability stemmed
petitioners belatedly filed pleadings were admitted and taken into consideration from the fact that he illegally retained custody and possession of said documents more
before the COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution finding petitioner guilty of than two weeks after the elections. The COMELEC viewed such act as a
indirect contempt. contemptuous interference with its normal functions.

The COMELEC complied with the aforementioned Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Third and fourth, he publicly displayed disrespect for the authority of the COMELEC
Court and with the requirements set by Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, through the media (interviews on national television channels, and in newspapers and
when it issued the Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order against petitioner radios) by flaunting an armory of long firearms and side arms in public, and posing for
directing him to appear before it and explain why he should not be held in contempt. the front page of a national broadsheet, with a shiny pistol tucked in a holster, in
violation of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.
Petitioner claims that the challenged Resolution finding him guilty of indirect contempt
was based merely on hearsay, surmises, speculations and conjectures, and not on Petitioner questions the probative value of the newspaper clippings published in the
competent and substantial evidence. He contends that there is no convincing Philippine Daily Inquirer on June 26, 2007 which showed a photo of him with a firearm
evidence that he deliberately refused to heed the summonses of the COMELEC or tucked to his side and his supposed exclusive interview. He claims that said
that he was sufficiently notified of the investigative hearings. He further argues that newspaper clippings are mere hearsay, which are of no evidentiary value.
the loss of the election documents should not even be automatically ascribed to him.

True, there were instances when the Court rejected newspaper articles as hearsay,
when such articles are offered to prove their contents without any other competent WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary
and credible evidence to corroborate them. However, in Estrada v. Desierto, et al.,13 Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
the Court held that not all hearsay evidence is inadmissible and how over time,
exceptions to the hearsay rule have emerged. Hearsay evidence may be admitted by SO ORDERED.
the courts on grounds of "relevance, trustworthiness and necessity."14 When certain
facts are within judicial notice of the Court, newspaper accounts "only buttressed these
facts as facts."15

Another exception to the hearsay rule is the doctrine of independently relevant

statements, where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the
truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply; hence, the
statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement
is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or
be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.16

Here, the newspaper clippings were introduced to prove that petitioner deliberately
defied or challenged the authority of the COMELEC. As ratiocinated by the COMELEC
in the challenged Resolution of August 7, 2007, it was not the mere content of the
articles that was in issue, but petitioners conduct when he allowed himself to be
interviewed in the manner and circumstances, adverted to in the COMELEC
Resolution, on a pending controversy which was still brewing in the COMELEC. While
petitioner claimed that he was misquoted, he denied neither the said interview nor his
picture splashed on the newspaper with a firearm holstered at his side but simply relied
on his objection to the hearsay nature of the newspaper clippings. It should be
stressed that petitioner was no ordinary witness or respondent. He was under the
administrative supervision of the COMELEC17 and it was incumbent upon him to
demonstrate to the COMELEC that he had faithfully discharged his duties as dictated
by law. His evasiveness and refusal to present his evidence as well as his reliance on
technicalities to justify such refusal in the face of the allegations of fraud or anomalies
and newspaper publication mentioned to the Contempt Charge and Show Cause
Order amounted to an implied admission of the charges leveled against him.

All told, petitioner brought this predicament upon himself when he opted to dispense
with the presentation of his evidence during the scheduled hearings and to explain his
non-appearance at the hearings of Task Force Maguindanao and the loss of the
certificates of canvass and other election documents.

14. Gaoiran vs. Alcala The letter-complaint was referred to the Legal Affairs Service of the CHED. Thereafter,
Atty. Felina S. Dasig, then Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Director III, Legal
[G.R. No. 150178. November 26, 2004] Affairs Service, conducted a fact-finding investigation on the mauling incident to
determine the existence of a prima facie case against the petitioner.
FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA, Retired Chairman,
Commission on Higher Education, ESTER ALBANO GARCIA, now Chairman, During the fact-finding investigation, respondent Castillejo averred that at 2:30 p.m.
Commission on Higher Education, FELIPE S. AMMUGAUAN, SR., Vocation School on August 15, 1997, while he was performing his usual duties as Administrative Officer
Superintendent I, Angadanan Agro-Industrial College, EDMOND M. CASTILLEJO, II, the petitioner suddenly barged into his (Castillejos) office and, then and there,
Administrative Officer I, Angadanan Agro-Industrial College, and DIOSDADO TELAN, assaulted and boxed him. The petitioner delivered blows on respondent Castillejos
Instructor I & Head Teacher III, OIC Designate, Angadanan Agro-Industrial College, head, left eye, left eyebrow and lower lip. Not content with the injuries he inflicted on
Angadanan, Isabela, respondents. respondent Castillejo, the petitioner tried to throw him down the stairs but was
DECISION prevented by the timely intervention of Mr. Ismael Bautista, Accountant I of the same
CALLEJO, SR., J.: school. Bautista and other employees of the AAIC corroborated respondent Castillejos
statements. Moreover, the medical certificate issued by Dr. Belinda L. Miguel showed
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of that on August 15, 1997, she treated respondent Castillejo for the wounds he
Court filed by Florian R. Gaoiran, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] of sustained on his left eye, left eyebrow and lower lip.
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61477. In the assailed decision, the appellate
court reversed the Decision dated February 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) For his part, the petitioner averred that at around 2:30 p.m. of August 15, 1997, he
of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, nullifying the Resolution dated June 3, 1999 of Hon. was about to leave the school premises. Suddenly, respondent Castillejo shouted to
Angel C. Alcala, then Chairman of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), the security guard to punch out the petitioners attendance card. This irked the
dismissing petitioner Gaoiran from the service for grave misconduct and conduct petitioner because there were students and other teachers in the vicinity. The
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. petitioner confronted respondent Castillejo and asked the latter why he had to
embarrass him (petitioner) in front of the students. Respondent Castillejo just turned
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows: his back and proceeded to his office. The petitioner followed him and later saw that
respondent Castillejo was already holding a wrench. Inside respondent Castillejos
On October 29, 1997, a letter-complaint was filed with the CHED against petitioner office, the petitioner made a side step and just then, respondent Castillejo slipped and
Gaoiran, Head Teacher III in the High School Department of the Angadanan Agro- fell flat on the floor. The petitioner noticed that respondent Castillejos left eyebrow was
Industrial College (AAIC),[2] a state-supervised school in Angadanan, Isabela. In his bleeding and he was putting up a struggle (nagpupumiglas), so the petitioner held his
letter-complaint, respondent Edmond M. Castillejo, Administrative Officer II, also of feet. While going down the stairs, the petitioner met Bautista and Henry Rupac,
the same school, charged the petitioner with mauling him while he was performing his Watchman I of the school.
duties therein. The incident allegedly took place on August 15, 1997 at 2:30 p.m. inside
the school premises. Appended to the letter-complaint were the verified criminal After the fact-finding investigation was terminated, and upon finding of a prima facie
complaint filed by respondent Castillejo against the petitioner and the sworn case against the petitioner for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
statements of his witnesses. The criminal complaint for assault to a person in authority interest of the service, Atty. Dasig issued the Formal Charge and Order of Preventive
was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Angadanan-San Guillermo and Suspension dated July 27, 1998 stating in part:
docketed as Criminal Case No. 97-42.

WHEREFORE, you are hereby directed to answer in writing and under oath the above without prejudice to the complainants right to institute the proper criminal and civil
charges against you within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, submitting therewith actions against the respondent relative thereto.
sworn statements of your witnesses and other pertinent documents, if any. In your
answer, you are directed to state whether or not you elect a formal hearing of the The Vocational Schools Superintendent of Angadanan Agro-Industrial College,
charges against you or you waive your rights to such hearing. You are, likewise, Angadanan, Isabela, is hereby directed to effectively implement this Order and to
advised of your right to counsel. submit a report thereon within three (3) days upon implementation.

Considering the gravity of the instant charge against you, pursuant to the provisions SO ORDERED.[4]
of P.D. 807, as amended, you are hereby PREVENTIVELY SUSPENDED FOR
NINETY (90) DAYS WITHOUT PAY effective upon receipt thereof.[3] The petitioner received a copy of the above resolution on July 12, 1999, which was
served on him by respondent Felipe P. Ammugauan, Sr., School Superintendent I of
The petitioner did not submit his written counter-affidavit or answer to the charges AAIC.
against him. Instead, he filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition
for certiorari and prohibition to restrain the enforcement of the said preventive The petitioner then filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for
suspension order. However, considering that the petitioner had already served the certiorari, prohibition and injunction. He alleged that respondent Alcala committed
suspension, the case was dismissed for being moot and academic. grave abuse of discretion when, in the Resolution dated June 3, 1999, he dismissed
the petitioner from the service despite the fact that the administrative complaint against
The petitioner sought reconsideration of the formal charge and preventive suspension him had already been dismissed per the Resolution of February 20, 1999 of Director
order, contending that the letter-complaint was not under oath and that he was not Mayo of the Legal Affairs Service.
informed nor apprised of the complaint against him before, during and after the
preliminary fact-finding investigation. In its Decision dated February 15, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner as it declared the June 3, 1999 Resolution of respondent Alcala null and
Thereafter, Joel Voltaire V. Mayo, who was later appointed Director of the Legal Affairs void. The RTC found that after the formal charge was filed against the petitioner and
Service of the CHED, issued the Resolution dated February 20, 1999, dismissing the he chose not to file an answer thereto, a formal investigation was still required to be
administrative complaint against the petitioner on the ground that the letter-complaint conducted under the Civil Service Rules. When Director Mayo of the Legal Affairs
of respondent Castillejo was not under oath. Service, in his February 20, 1999 Resolution, dismissed the administrative complaint
against the petitioner on the ground that the letter-complaint was not under oath, the
However, respondent Hon. Angel C. Alcala, then Chairman of the CHED, apparently formal investigation had not, as yet, been terminated. Such dismissal, according to
unaware of the existence of Director Mayos resolution, issued another Resolution the RTC, put an end to the litigation. Thus, respondent Alcala acted with grave abuse
dated June 3, 1999, finding the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct of discretion in issuing his June 3, 1999 Resolution, dismissing the petitioner from the
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing him therefrom. The service, for the reason that the administrative complaint against him had already been
dispositive portion of respondent Alcalas resolution states: dismissed.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, respondent FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN is On appeal by the respondents, the Court of Appeals (CA), in the assailed Decision of
hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE for unlawfully September 10, 2001, reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. The CA
attacking a person in authority while in the active performance of his duties and declared as valid respondent Alcalas June 3, 1999 Resolution, dismissing the
responsibilities and, then and there, inflicted physical injuries on his person. This is petitioner from the service. On the other hand, it declared as without legal effect

Director Mayos February 20, 1999 Resolution, dismissing the administrative complaint of CHED, Angel C. Alcala is hereby declared valid while the Resolution dated February
against the petitioner. 20, 1999 of Director Joel Voltaire Mayo is hereby declared to be without legal effect.

In so ruling, the CA noted an apparent irregularity in Director Mayos February 20, 1999 SO ORDERED.[7]
Resolution. The CA pointed out that while the said resolution was ostensibly dated
February 20, 1999, a copy thereof was mailed to respondent Castillejo only on July 6, Aggrieved, the petitioner now comes to this Court alleging as follows:
1999 and received by the latter only on July 14, 1999. The petitioner, for his part,
received a copy thereof only on July 1, 1999. Prior to these dates, the existence of the 1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
said resolution had not been established; hence, the date of its actual issuance OF LAW FOR NOT UPHOLDING THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL
remained doubtful. The CA ruled that between the two conflicting resolutions, Director SERVICE LAW ESPECIALLY RULE XIV, SECTION 2 OF THE OMNIBUS RULES
Mayos February 20, 1999 Resolution and respondent Alcalas June 3, 1999 IMPLEMENTING BOOK 5 OF EXECUTIVE [ORDER] NO. 292 AND OTHER
Resolution, the latter was entitled to the presumption of regularity. Moreover, PERTINENT CIVIL SERVICE LAWS, SECTION 2, SECTION 4 AND PARAGRAPH D
respondent Alcala, as then Chairman of the CHED, had the authority to reverse and OF SECTION 4;
set aside the acts or issuances of his subordinates, including that of Director Mayo.
The CA further ratiocinated that, even granting that the February 20, 1999 Resolution OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT A VOID COMPLAINT IS DEEMED INEXISTENT;
was regularly issued, Director Mayo nonetheless overstepped his authority because
Atty. Dasig, then OIC of the Legal Affairs Service, had filed the formal charge and 3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
order of preventive suspension against the petitioner as early as July 27, 1998. The OF LAW IN NOT ORDERING A FORMAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CHARGES
CA also held that, contrary to Director Mayos ruling, the fact that the letter-complaint PROFFERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER THERE BEING NO FORMAL
was not under oath was not fatal. Even an anonymous complaint may be acted upon INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE COMMISSION;
by the authority concerned provided that the same is verifiable, since under Section
48[5] of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292,[6] administrative proceedings may be 4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the Secretary or head of OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTER ALBANO GARCIA WAS
office of equivalent rank, or head of local government or chiefs of agencies, or regional DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW KNOWING THAT THE LATTER, BEING A
The CA, likewise, opined that in administrative proceedings, a formal or trial-type
hearing is not, at all times, necessary. In this case, the petitioner was not denied 5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
procedural due process as he was afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to IN HOLDING THAT THE FORMAL CHARGE AND ORDER OF PREVENTIVE
explain his side. On the other hand, the CA declared that respondent Ester Albano SUSPENSION IS LEGAL.[8]
Garcia, who replaced respondent Alcala as Chairman of the CHED, was denied
procedural due process by the RTC when it rendered its decision without awaiting her As the petitioner himself submits, the foregoing issues are interrelated; hence, they
answer to the petition. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads: shall be resolved jointly.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED The petitioner vigorously contends that the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo
AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Resolution dated June 3, 1999 of then Chairman should be deemed inexistent as it was not made under oath. Consequently, the formal

charge and order of preventive suspension filed against him, which stemmed from the documentary evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not
said letter-complaint, was, likewise, null and void. The petitioner cites Section 2,[9] to exist, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima facie case exists,
Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, which requires he shall notify the respondent in writing, of the charges against the latter, to which
that an administrative complaint against a civil service official or employee be in writing shall be attached copies of the complaint, sworn statements and other documents
and under oath. Moreover, the letter-complaint did not allegedly comply with Section submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed not less than seventy-two hours after
4(d)[10] of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 94-0521,[11] also known receipt of the complaint to answer the charges in writing under oath together with
as the Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigation, and supporting sworn statements and documents, in which he shall indicate whether or
the law then in force at the time, because it did not contain a certification of non-forum not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. If the
shopping. answer is found satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case.

Since respondent Castillejos letter-complaint failed to comply with the formal On the other hand, Section 2, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
requirements of the law, the petitioner maintains that Director Mayo rightfully of E.O. No. 292, cited by the petitioner, reads:
dismissed the same and that respondent Alcala abused his discretion when he
dismissed the petitioner from the service. Sec. 2. Any person may file an administrative complaint with the Commission or any
of its proper office. Said complaint shall be in writing and under oath, otherwise, the
The Court is not persuaded. same shall not be given due course.

The pertinent provisions governing the initiation of administrative complaints against Further, Section 4(d) of CSC Resolution No. 94-0521, likewise, invoked by the
civil service officials or employees are provided in Book V of E.O. No. 292. Sections petitioner, states:
46(c) and 48(1) and (2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A thereof read:
Sec. 4. Complaint in Writing and Under Oath. No complaint against a civil servant shall
Sec. 46. Discipline: General provisions. be given due course, unless the same is in writing and under oath.

(c) Except when initiated by the disciplining authority, no complaint against a civil The complaint should be written in a clear manner, simple and concise language and
service official or employee shall be given due course unless the same is in writing in a systematic manner as to apprise the civil servant concerned of the nature and
and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. cause of the accusation against him and to enable him to intelligently prepare his
defense or answer.
The complaint shall also contain the following:
Sec. 48. Procedures in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees.
(1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or ...
employee by the Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head of local
government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written (d) a statement that no other administrative action or complaint against the same party
complaint of any other persons. involving the same acts or omissions and issues has been filed before another agency
or administrative tribunal.
(2) In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant shall submit
sworn statements covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together with his

In the absence of any one of the above-mentioned requirements, the complaints shall suspended or probably removed from the service to avoid him from threatening the
be dismissed. witnesses.

It must be pointed out that, while the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo was not Your preferential attention and favorable action in this request are earnestly requested
concededly verified, appended thereto were the verified criminal complaint that he and will be highly appreciated.[16]
filed against the petitioner, as well as the sworn statements of his witnesses. These
documents could very well be considered as constituting the complaint against the Acting thereon, the CHED referred the matter to its Office of Legal Affairs Service and
petitioner. In fact, this Court, through the Court Administrator, investigates and takes Atty. Dasig, as OIC Director thereof, conducted a fact-finding investigation on the
cognizance of, not only unverified, but also even anonymous complaints filed against incident. The said letter-complaint did not, by itself, commence the administrative
court employees or officials for violations of the Code of Ethical Conduct.[12] Indeed, proceedings against the petitioner, requiring an answer from him, but, as already
it is not totally uncommon that a government agency is given a wide latitude in the mentioned, merely triggered a fact-finding investigation by the CHED.
scope and exercise of its investigative powers.[13] After all, in administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.[14] The Court cannot, therefore, uphold the petitioners contention that respondent
Castillejos letter-complaint was inexistent and could not be acted upon by the CHED
In any case, contrary to the petitioners assertion, the letter-complaint of respondent for to do so, would result in an absurd and restrictive interpretation of E.O. No. 292
Castillejo is not a complaint within the purview of the provisions mentioned above. In and effectively deprive the Government of its disciplining power over people who hold
the fairly recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals,[15] this Court a public trust.[17]
held that the complaint under E.O. No. 292 and CSC rules on administrative cases
both refer to the actual charge to which the person complained of is required to answer In this case, it was the formal charge and order of preventive suspension filed by Atty.
and indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation should his answer be Dasig against the petitioner charging him with grave misconduct and conduct
deemed not satisfactory. prejudicial to the best interest of the service and directing him to submit his answer in
writing and under oath that constituted the complaint.[18] Notably, Atty. Dasig signed
In this case, respondent Castillejos letter-complaint contained the following the formal charge and order of preventive suspension for the Commission in her
averments: capacity as then OIC of the CHEDs Legal Affairs Service. As the complaint against
the petitioner was initiated by the appropriate disciplining authority, under Sections
The undersigned wish to file his complaint against Mr. Florian R. Gaoiran, Head 46(c)[19] and 48(1),[20] Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292, the same need
Teacher III of Angadanan Agro-Industrial College for mauling him last August 15, 1997 not be subscribed and sworn to. Neither is it required that the same contain a
at around 2:30 in the afternoon for the accused to be disciplined. The case is now filed verification of non-forum shopping.
in the Court of Justice docketed under Criminal Case No. 97-42 for Assault to Person
in Authority. Section 47(2), Chapter 7 of E.O. No. 292 provides, in part, that the Secretaries and
heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall
I am Mr. Edmond M. Castillejo, Administrative Officer II of Angadanan Agro-Industrial have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against
College, Angadanan, Isabela, furnishing you a copy of my complaint filed in court, all officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Since it was the CHED,[21] as the
under oath, for you to determine the gravity of the case administratively. Mr. Florian disciplining authority, through Atty. Dasig, which filed the formal charge or complaint
R. Gaoiran is now intimidating two of the witnesses against him thats why may I against the petitioner, jurisdiction was properly acquired over the case.
request for an immediate investigation of the case, by the commission, for him to be

Anent the issue on which of the two conflicting resolutions is valid, the Court agrees
with the CA that respondent Alcalas June 3, 1999 Resolution dismissing the petitioner Nevertheless, during the formal investigation of the case, respondent [referring to the
from the service prevails over that of Director Mayos February 20, 1999 Resolution petitioner] failed to submit his written counter-affidavit/answer to the charges filed
dismissing the administrative complaint. against him by the complainant so he was declared in default. This notwithstanding,
the oral testimony given during the fact-finding investigation was considered in his
First, the basis for the dismissal of the administrative complaint stated in Director (respondents) favor to enable this office to determine the veracity of the allegations
Mayos resolution, i.e., that the letter-complaint was not verified, is, as earlier imputed against the respondent.
discussed, patently erroneous. Second, it was issued by Director Mayo in excess of
his authority. It is borne by the records that Atty. Dasig already filed the formal charge After weighing all the evidences [sic] submitted and the testimonies given by the
against the petitioner after a fact-finding investigation had been conducted on the witnesses for both complainant and the respondent, this office finds substantial
mauling incident and a prima facie case had been established against him. The formal evidence to hold the respondent administratively liable for violation of subparagraphs
charge was filed as early as July 27, 1998 and, on September 21, 1998, Atty. Dasig (2) and (27) of Section 46(b), Chapter 7, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292
submitted her memorandum to respondent Alcala recommending the petitioners otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987.[22]
dismissal. It was, thus, highly irregular for Director Mayo to dismiss the administrative
complaint against the petitioner long after the formal charge had already been filed Significantly, the petitioner cannot rightfully claim that he was denied procedural due
against him and the matter was already for respondent Alcalas resolution. Third, process. What is repugnant to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be
respondent Alcala, by reason of his position as then Chairman of the CHED, had the heard.[23] The petitioner was undoubtedly afforded the opportunity to present his side
authority to reverse and set aside the acts or issuances of his subordinates. His June as he was directed to file his written answer to the formal charge against him. He opted
3, 1999 Resolution dismissing the petitioner from the service, in effect, reversed and not to do so. He cannot now feign denial of due process.
set aside the Resolution dated February 20, 1999 of Director Mayo, his subordinate.
Under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No.
Finally, the petitioner insists that no formal investigation was conducted after the 292, grave misconduct on first offense is punishable by dismissal. On the other hand,
formal charge had been filed against him in violation of Section 22 of CSC Resolution conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service on first offense is
No. 94-0521 which reads: punishable by suspension for six months and one day to one year.

Section 22. Conduct of Formal Investigation. A formal investigation shall be held after In fine, the appellate court committed no reversible error in upholding respondent
the respondent has filed his answer or after the period for filing an answer has expired. Alcalas Resolution of June 3, 1999 finding the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct
It shall be completed within thirty (30) days from the date of the service of the formal and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing him
charge, unless the period is extended by the Commission in meritorious cases. therefrom.

Although the respondent did not elect a formal investigation, one shall nevertheless WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
be conducted if upon evaluation of the complaint, the answer, and the documents in September 10, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61477 is AFFIRMED
support thereof, the merits of the case cannot be judiciously resolved without in toto.
conducting such formal investigation.
The petitioners allegation is, however, belied by respondent Alcalas statement in his
resolution, to wit:

15. Ang Tibay vs. CIR 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a
que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940 ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, of the judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case
vs. to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
respondents. 1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the
of Industrial Relations. records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon. leather.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood. 2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
LAUREL, J.: CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the 3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re
above-entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically
reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
majority opinion of this Court: Philippine Army.

1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de 4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer
duracion o que no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.
cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual rule and elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2
ya colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan
de ser empleados u obreros de la misma; 6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source
of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor
sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.
se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro
forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo

7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of
discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
National Workers' Brotherhood. affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far
with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute
arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of
the judgment rendered herein. prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or
reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the
number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty,
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary
the motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the
opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing
Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4,
respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor
interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement.
cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it
of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which shall investigate and study all industries established in a designated locality, with a
should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such
entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum
case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners.
here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of
what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to
conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order
their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in
counsel have no evidentiary value. agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which
is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically
stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673,
administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had
which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained

by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by
any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of
deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G.
restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland
or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650,
determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor
13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v.
especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National
promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the
fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the
cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative
There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563,
character: 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville
R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders
In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated
82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co.
rudimentary requirements of fair play. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate
the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed.
Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the
Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against
of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing
consideration." evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards
of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9,
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local

board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in any petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would
part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We
to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and
Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest
exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.) of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the
hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected
volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby
coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may
decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth
such statutory authority. hereinabove. So ordered.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that,
except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's
Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a
factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for
the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of
material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this
avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National
Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated
by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial
avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the