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Scott Abel
To maximize profit for planters and revenue for the government, Great Britain
threatened thousands of American jobs in the rubber and automotive industries during the
1920s and 30s through price control schemes that raised prices and threatened occasional
shortages. During the years between the world wars, the United States depended on
rubber production from the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, and elsewhere in southern Asia for
its burgeoning automobile and tire industries. The United States State Department, at the
request of the American rubber lobby, fought for open trade with the British colonies of
Malaya and in Borneo against British attempts at forming cartels. The interwar years
marked an important turning point in American trade history with Malaya as the United
States advocated for greater trade with it for economically and strategically critical rubber
and therefore made Malaya a critical trading partner for the United States during that
time.
Malaya linked both British and American interests in the years after World War I
as a British colony and important exporter to the United States. Great Britain employed
financial gains from Malayas trade with the United States as a means for paying off its
$4.7 billion debt with the over $1 billion from imperial government revenues from
Malaya. However, the collapse of the price of rubber from 1920 with $1.05 a pound to
$0.16 a pound by 1922 threatened the entire industry. In response, the British Colonial
Office and the Rubber Growers Association formed the Stevenson Plan as a means for
1
increasing the price of rubber.1 Great Britain used Malaya as leverage with the United
States but found that the dramatic fall in the price of rubber threatened its clout and
The growth of the American automobile industry among others resulted in an increased
demand for rubber goods during the early 20th century. The climate of the United States
was not conducive for the growth of rubber, which meant the United States required the
importation of the good from overseas. The Rubber Association of America complained
to the United States State Department in 1925 regarding the British Stevenson Scheme
that restricted the sale of rubber to American consumers through legislation designed for
the increase in rubbers price on the global market. Great Britain controlled 70 percent of
worlds four million acres of rubber plantations with its colonies of Ceylon (Sri Lanka),
the Malay States, and the Straits Settlements. The United States accounted for three-
quarters of global rubber consumption and therefore possessed a sizeable stake in the
status of the rubber industry.2 The production and export of rubber in the Malay States
and the Straits Settlements, or what became Malaysia and Singapore, became a key
economic interest in the United States because of its domestic demand for the product.
As a means for the increase of profits and preservation of plantations, Great Britain
rubber. Shortly after World War I, in 1919 the demand for rubber increased too slowly to
meet with production and by 1921 the price for crude rubber fell to 14 cents a pound.
The Stevenson Committee, named for British Secretary of State for the Colonies Sir
1 Jim Baker, The Eagle in the Lion City: America, Americans, and Singapore (Singapore:
Landmark, 2005), 126-128.
2 Rubber Association of America to the State Department, July 17, 1925, in US State
Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1925, Vol. II, 245-246.
2
James Stevenson, proposed the Stevenson Scheme as a temporary measure for the
reduction of the excessive production and oversupply of rubber in 1922. The Dutch
government refused any part in the scheme, but the scheme proceeded anyway with the
proposal sent to Ceylon, the Malay States, and the Straits Settlements as a means of
intervention by the British State.3 In response to a fall in rubber prices after World War I,
the British government sought the amelioration of the rubber price situation for the sake
The Stevenson Scheme helped increase the profitability of the rubber trade for the
colonies in Malaya but at the expense of American consumers. The implementers of the
Stevenson Scheme hoped the increased price of rubber of around 36 cents a pound would
give a profit for the producer and leave enough capital for the expansion of plantations.
The British government allowed the planters exportation of only 60 percent of his crop
and any crop sold in excess of that cap received a prohibitive tax depending on rubbers
current price at the time. The Stevenson Scheme came into effect on November 1, 1922
and eventually tripled the price of rubber while also threatening a shortage according to
the Rubber Association of America. From February 1, 1925 to April 30 of the same year,
the scheme permitted planters exportation of 55 percent of their rubber crop with a price
of around 38 cents a pound. But by July 16, 1925, the price of rubber skyrocketed to
America, restricted the supply of rubber on the world market as a means for the increase
of profit, but excessive restrictions caused the dramatic increase in prices and the
3 Ibid., 246-247.
4 Ibid., 247-248.
3
The American rubber manufacturers and general public became at risk for a shortage of
rubber that might temporarily cripple various American industries. The American market
demanded more rubber because of a growth in population and of the automobile industry
that needed rubber for tires. The increase in demand from the market in the United States
threatened a shortage unless the British government and producers took action, but
negotiations between the Rubber Association of America and the Rubber Growers
Association, which proposed the Stevenson Scheme to the British government, faltered
despite their agents visits to rubber manufacturing plants in New Jersey, Ohio, and New
England. Despite such efforts from American manufacturers, the British government
maintained the restriction scheme for the health of its own planter industry.5 Finding no
recourse through the British government or directly through the growers, the rubber
The United States government responded as did the British government for the aversion a
global rubber shortage under the leadership of Secretary Kellogg. The United States
Secretary of State Frank Billings Kellogg took an activist policy during his tenure with
the negotiation or signing of more treaties than any of his predecessors, along with the
formation of the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1929.6 The House of Commons took up the
issue of the pending rubber shortage on July 13, 1925. Regardless, Kellogg instructed
Ambassador to Great Britain Alanson Houghton to informally deal with the impending
situation and remind the British Foreign Office of the lack of U.S. export duties.
5 Ibid., 249-253.
6 Biographies of the Secretaries of State: Frank Billings Kellogg, Office of the
Historian, US State Department,
http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/kellogg-frank-billings.
4
According to intelligence provided by the U.S. consulate in Penang, the planters in the
there.7 The United States government saw the drastic increase in the rubber price and the
potential shortage as an important issue within its economic interests, which revealed the
importance of the Malay Peninsula a half a world away from the manufacturing centers in
The United States government requested that the British government allow the planters in
its colonies to export their goods without excessive or preferably no duties. The British
Foreign Minister at the time was the Francophile and conservative Austen Chamberlain
who dismissed the United States generally as less significant than European nations.8 In
an American Aide-Mmoire to the British Foreign Office, the United States decried the
Stevenson Schemes restrictions of rubber from the Federated Malay States and Ceylon
the United States as a one billion dollar industry with its consumers purchasing 70% of
the worlds rubber. Furthermore, the rubber industry employed, directly and indirectly,
one million people. The rapid increase of prices from 1 schilling sixpence to 4 schilling
sixpence partially resulted from speculation and a lack of stocks in Great Britain and the
United States. Without some price stabilization, the rubber industry might partially close
and therefore harm both producers and consumers.9 The United States saw the
7 Frank Kellogg to Alanson Houghton, July 18, 1925, tel. 232, in FRUS 1925 Vol. II, 253,
254; Alanson Bigelow Houghton, Office of the Historian, US State Department,
http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/houghton-alanson-bigelow.
8 Austen Chamberlain, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/our-history/a-brief-history-fco/foreign-
secretaries/austen-chamberlain.
9 Houghton to Austen Chamberlain, British Foreign Office, April 23, 1925, tel. 213, in
FRUS 1925 Vol. II, 254-256.
5
production of rubber in Malaya as enough of an economic interest to pressure the British
The British response increased the allowance of exports of rubber as Great Britain
recognized the possible impact of a global shortage of rubber. Chamberlain noted the
unusually high price of rubber, and the Federated Malay States responded with the export
of 6,000 tons of rubber while increasing the maximum assessment rate from 400 pounds
to 500 pounds per acre. Furthermore, regulators sought the increase of export allowances
from 60 percent in October 1922 to 80 percent. Chamberlain blamed the fall of available
goods on a labor shortage that required two months before hiring new laborers while
many cultivation companies lacked the necessary capital for additional cultivation. The
British government assured the United States that any risk of global shortages passed and
the Stevenson Scheme had no intention of hurting American consumers as prices would
soon drop.10 British actions in 1925 kept the scheme in place but employed a lessening of
The United States government objected to the whole concept of a government body
regulating prices as contrary to the principles of free trade. Kellogg, on behalf of the
and that participation in such action was contrary to the spirit or possibly even letter of
price fixing on international commerce and relations as both the United States and Great
Britain stood to lose from such policies. The employment of such policies threatened the
consumption and the likely replacement of rubber with inferior products, which all
contradicted the spirit of the time in America regarding imports and damaged the
The British government adjusted its policy again after pressure from the US government
in regard to rubber export duties for the prevention of a shortage. His Majestys
Government found the rubber situation severe enough for the temporary elimination of
the standard production rules by permitting planters to sell their rubber at will without
additional fees for excessive export. The new rate of 100 percent took effect on February
1, 1926 while the government attempted a modification of the Stevenson Scheme. The
government at the time offered little hope of a change in policy as it deemed control over
contributed to a panic regarding the sale of rubber to the United States and elsewhere.
The United States pressured Great Britain on its colonial policy regarding Malaya as a
means for the American consumer to buy goods at a cheaper and more stable price by
The trade dispute continued between the United States and Great Britain over Malayas
rubber exports because of its significance to both economies. Great Britain failed in
bringing in other rubber producers into the scheme such as the Dutch East Indies, Siam,
and French Indochina. The scheme brought initial success and great profits to British
planters and exporters. Some American firms that invested in plantations in Malaya and
Sumatra, such as Goodyear and U.S. Rubber, also prospered. However, as politics
in a significant loss of market share for British firms and colonies. Malayas market
share dropped to roughly half the global output and ultimately the scheme collapsed by
1928.13 The United States relied on Malayas rubber significantly less as a result of the
The Great Depression of the 1930s brought about a renewed need for control over the
rubber supply with the fall in rubbers price. Great Britain and the Netherlands desired
the preservation of their plantations in their colonies, such as Malaya, as a means for their
reported that the major Southeast Asian colonial powers, Great Britain, the Netherlands,
and France, convened in London on October 26 regarding negotiations for the restriction
of rubber exports. The Commission for Rubber Restriction from the International
Acting Secretary William Phillips expressed very great interest in any plan regarding
the restriction of rubber on behalf of the United States government because of Americas
status as the largest consumer of the product. The interest of the American consumer
required safeguards regarding the supply of rubber at as low as the industry could allow
Britain that they by no means consent to such plans.15 Contrary to Great Britains and the
Netherlands interest in high rubber prices, the United States desired low prices and such
restriction plan by stating its importance to the colonial economies. In response to the
rubber exporting sector strong desire for a restriction of rubbers export, the British
undermining such restrictions. However, problems within the Dutch East Indies stalled
controls on their production. If, the Dutch government satisfied the other countries on
that issue, the various other governments planned legislation regarding the restrictions.
The three European countries required either a few months for its enforcement while the
agreement would likely last for a few years as means for dealing with price fluctuations
that favored consumers according to the British Office of Trade.16 Unlike the Stevenson
Scheme, a new cartel forged, likely because of the depths of economic depression,
The United States government strongly disagreed with such a policy by the countries who
sought an international cartel. The Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, advocated for
international trade without excessive regulation and taxation during his lengthy tenure.17
Although Hull and the United States government knew of the large fluctuations of
rubbers price and the potential benefits of price stability, the establishment of a
great moment. Hull expressed his concern about the impending restrictions as a threat
16 Ray Atherton to Williams, January 16, 1934, tel. 11, in ibid., 619, 659.
17 Biographies of the Secretaries of State: Cordell Hull, Office of the Historian, US
State Department, http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/hull-cordell.
9
drawing the operations.18 The establishment of an international cartel restricting rubber
exports challenged popular ideas regarding international trade in the United States at the
time, along with the interests of the American consumer if restrictions were excessive.
The United States government recognized the interests of the planters and their
governments that required a form of market protection but desired a degree of price
fairness from such regulations. Hull requested that the prices not reflect maximum profit
for the planters in a monopoly as his government regarded [such prices] with anxiety in
this country [the United States]. As safeguards against such instances, he requested
adequate representation on the International Committee for consumers, full reports for the
public sent periodically, and an adequate rubber supply in the global marketplace.19 Hull
recognized that the United States was nearly incapable in stopping the great powers from
implementing a restriction scheme that impacted US trading relations with Malaya, but
The rather difficult goal of setting up a cartel meant colonial powers needed secrecy for
its establishment. Despite the lack of agreement between Great Britain and the
Netherlands regarding supply regulation, Sir Robert Gilbert Vansittart, Permanent Under-
Secretary for Foreign Affairs ensured the United States that a final measure would result
program required passing in various colonial legislatures such as Burma and Ceylon. 21
The United States government received intelligence from the United States Rubber
Company that suggested Great Britain and the Netherlands planned the signing of a
18 Cordell Hull to Swenson, January 23, 1934, tel. 5, in FRUS 1934, 620-621.
19 Ibid., 621-622.
20 Atherton to Hull, February 15, 1934, tel. 59, in ibid., 623.
21 Hull to Swenson, February 23, 1934, tel. 10, in ibid., 263-264.
10
restriction agreement on March 7, 1934 and the commencement of their agreement on
May 1. However, according to Atherton, the British government informed him that they
industry worked with the US government for their mutual interest in keeping rubber
prices low. The colonial powers and rubber producers held the rubber restriction meeting
in secret because they likely believed the United States, the largest consumer of rubber,
strongly disagreed with such measures and would apply pressure regarding the issue.
The new restriction scheme ran into some difficulties with disagreements between
the participants while the United States government pressured Great Britain and the
Netherlands for assurances regarding adequate supply and representation. With the
alleged signing day of March 7, the United States sought special consideration for US
rubber manufacturers, realizing that the agreement only came into effect once all parties
signed it. The manufacturers required special types of rubber compounds not sold in
normal markets, but through private contracts and wanted an exemption for that
compound from the restriction.23 The Dutch rejected the proposal for special
considerations, but also found themselves in disagreement regarding the maximum price
with Great Britain and had a questionable ability to control Indonesian planters.24 The
implementation of such policies proved difficult given the varied situations in various
colonies in South and Southeast Asia, while the United States unsuccessfully sought
22 Hull to Robert Worth Bingham, March 5, 1934, in ibid., 631; Robert Worth
Bingham, Office of the Historian, US State Department,
http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/bingham-robert-worth.
23 Hull to Bingham, March 6, 1934, tel. 86, ibid., 632-633.
24 Warden Wilson to Hull, March 15, 1934, tel. 17, ibid., 634, 662.
11
The British government assured the Americans that their new plan would become
successful despite their past failures. The Foreign Office recognized there was no
resolution of disagreements as of March 23, 1934 and the agreement conformed to the
Monetary and Economic Conferences section D. The British government also assured
the US government that it learned from the failure and elimination of the Stevenson
Scheme in April 1928. The demand for rubber absorbed the large quantities of rubber on
the market in 1929 to save the industry, but rubbers fall in demand in 1930 and 1931
required action by the British government in coordination with the Dutch Royal
government. Government officials spoke off the record to industry representatives on the
issue of rubber restrictions. With the failure of price controls, the governments moved
toward reducing the rubber in stock as a means for the reduction of losses. The new
restriction plan hoped for price stability, representation of the major producing countries,
and general acceptance by producers governments.25 The British government hoped that
new restrictions on rubber exports might increase profitability of the rubber plantations
The US government and rubber industry accepted the formation of such restrictions but
sought greater consumer representation and lower prices. The US government accepted
the plans objectives but desired more safeguards for American industry. For example,
Hull expressed his concern regarding adequate supplies of rubber at reasonable prices and
the lack of consultation between the consuming and producing interests. Furthermore, he
feared large price fluctuations in rubber given Americans experiences under the
Stevenson Scheme and therefore desired some form of price protection. American rubber
manufacturers wanted to participate in the meetings even if they lacked the right to vote
scheme adhered to concepts of free trade as government restrictions were contrary to its
principles.26 The United States recognized the importance of price stability and hoped the
restriction plans might keep supply and price levels steady in contrast to the Stevenson
In avoidance of the Stevenson Scheme problem, the new cartel organized a relatively
British Colonial Office explained the new restriction plan to the U.S. State Department.
The plan allowed the holding by planters of six to eight weeks of rubber production in
their stock and dealers one-eighth of the worlds annual production. The Control
planned for roughly once a month. The committee lacked a regular statistical service but
offered figures on exports and production for those interested.27 The British government
wrote to the US government that its concerns regarding the price of rubber were unduly
enhanced. The governments controlled the power of the committee and producers
desired enough rubber for the market. The Rubber Regulation Committee determined the
export quotas for the maintenance of a stable price ultimately by the adjustment of supply
of rubber in reaction to market demand. The agreement lacked a price ceiling arguing
that it would likely become the floor and invite speculation.28 The British government
The British government sought the ease of such fears and to persuade the US government
and rubber manufacturers that the new scheme was not entirely contrary to American
interests. Sir John Simon, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, sent assurances
that the new plan lacked the necessary machinery for the establishment of a maximum
price and that reducing stocks of rubber beyond the point of a shortage as such was not in
the interest of the planters because a reduction of demand would accompany it. Unlike
the Stevenson Scheme, the new plan operated based on the demand within the market
rather than the price.29 According to George Mounsey, a British official, the new plan
Regulation Committee, which would possess a member from the United States. Great
Britain reminded the United States that it consumed 80,000 tons of rubber in 1933 and
the industry required no substantial increase in price.30 Great Britain sought a more
balanced approach than previous attempts with consuming interests receiving as avenue
The cartel came into existence once negotiations finished with a group of producer
nations restricting the export of rubber. The overall signatories of the restrictions
included on rubber and latex included Siam and France with its colonies in Indochina.
Great Britain had eleven representatives with one from North Borneo and another from
Sarawak. The new legislation gave complete government control over planting from
June 1, 1934 to December 1938 with the hope of offering a fair and equitable price and
29 John Simon to Bingham, April 26, 1934, Tel. W3750/89/29, in ibid., 653-656, 660.
30 Bingham to Hull, April 30, 1934, Tel. 665, in ibid, 659-661.
14
a safeguard against extreme price movements through supply reserves.31 The main
players, Great Britain and the Netherlands finally made progress in the agreement with
the Dutch dealing with Indonesian planters. Furthermore, the negotiations between the
Dutch and British agents agreed to restrictions of 25 percent effective until January 1,
1935. The Dutch officials recognized the importance of recycled rubber technology and
synthetic rubber in the United States.32 The new international cartel included not just the
British territories in Southeast Asia such as Malaya, but also the Dutch East Indies and
French Indochina.
On the eve of World War II, the United States began a calculation of the strategic natural
resources it required for war and gained more power with the rubber cartel. By January
1939, the price of rubber in New York remained around 16 cents a pound with the onset
percent, despite complaints from producers that the committee kept the price of rubber
too low.33 According to research by the US Army and Navy, the United States required
strategic resources found in Malaya such as rubber and tin for potential the outbreak of a
war. Sales of private rubber stocks reaching 10,000 tons overseas and of considerable tin
amounts since September 1st threatened the United States warfare capabilities.34 The
resulted in the addition of another American representative on its committee.35 With the
31 Grenville Emmet to Hull, April 28, 1934, Tel. 30, in ibid, 624, 657-658.
32 Wilson to Hull, December 3, 1934, Tel. 120, in ibid, 662-663.
33 Roy Veatch, January 17, 1934, in FRUS 1939 Vol. I, 858-859.
34 Army and Navy Joint Munitions Board, October 11, 1939, in ibid, 855.
35 Herschel Johnson to Hull, March 10, 1939, Tel. 2254, in ibid, 861-862.
15
outbreak of World War II, the United States required a strategic stockpile but restrictions
The United States pressured Great Britain for greater access to rubber during the early
war years as a means of increasing its stockpile in case it lost its supply access or prices
rose too high. The United States requested an increase in allowances from the cartel
between at least 60 and 65 percent for the avoidance of shortages particularly during a
long war that threatened both commercial and government stocks.36 The United States
also requested the colonial officials in Malaya and officials elsewhere deal with
speculators as Singapore reported shortages of rubber.37 All producers, save the Dutch at
first, agreed for an increase of export allowances to 70 percent as means of dealing with
war shortages, which came into effect for the last three months of 1939.38 On September
21, the committee agreed for the release of 5 percent of the stocks under war emergency
article of the treaty, despite the loss of Germany, Poland, and other countries with the
wars start.39 Secretary Hull desired the export rate at least 75 percent, which also was
the production rate for Malaya at the time according to the US consulate in Singapore,
but implied an interest in a 10 percent increase to the rate of 85 percent for the quarter.40
The United States pressured Great Britain for greater access to Malayas rubber with the
The pressure on rubber producing and exporting nations likely worked as the rubber
cartel increased export allowances for 1940. The International Rubber Regulation
projected increase demand in the United States. However, for the whole of 1940, the
transit at sea because it expected an eventual sudden drop in demand.41 Despite such
assurances, the United States remained displeased at rubber allowance trading levels
because they only reached sufficient levels as the producers exported in excess of
requirements from Malaya in particular and because of Malayas advanced releases. The
rest of the year seemed bleak for Hull as Malaya seemed poised for a downturn in exports
despite its 70,000 tons of rubber in stock. Furthermore, a lack of shipping tonnage and
rubber meant less rubber headed to the United States because many hulls would depart
unfilled unless the committee took more action.42 Hull expressed his deep concern for the
issue of a lack of sufficient trade with Malaya and its rubber exports as a threat to the
United States strategic and economic interests. He sought the alleviation of potential
shortages through pressuring various rubber producing countries and the cartel into
With the formation of an international rubber cartel, the United States applied immense
pressure for assurances from Great Britain and the Netherlands for a sufficient supply of
rubber. The economic importance of rubber to the United States meant the necessity of it
advocating its own trade interest through the concept of free trade as a means of
maintaining its economically and strategically important trade relationship with Malaya.
The United States depended on Malaya for much of its rubber trade, but such dependence
18