Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6339 April 20, 1954

MANUEL LARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, JR., defendant-appellee.

Manansala and Manansala for appellants.

Ramon L. Resurreccion for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

In 1950 defendant Petronilo del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi cabs or cars, operated
a taxi business under the name of "Waval Taxi." He employed among others three
mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked for periods ranging from 2
to 37 months. On September 4, 1950, without giving said mechanics and chauffeurs 30 days
advance notice, Del Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca, a transportation
company, as a result of which, according to the mechanics and chauffeurs above-mentioned
they lost their jobs because the La Mallorca failed to continue them in their employment.
They brought this action against Del Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work
rendered beyond eight hours and on Sundays and legal holidays, and one month salary
(mesada) provided for in article 302 of the Code of Commerce because the failure of their
former employer to give them one month notice. Subsequently, the three mechanics
unconditionally withdrew their claims. So only the 49 drivers remained as plaintiffs. The
defendant filed a motion for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it stated no cause
of action and the trial court for the time being denied the motion saying that it will be
considered when the case was heard on the merits. After trial the complaint was dismissed.
Plaintiffs appealed from the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals which Tribunal after
finding only questions of law are involved, certified the case to us.

The parties are agreed that the plaintiffs as chauffeurs received no fixed compensation
based on the hours or the period of time that they worked. Rather, they were paid on the
commission basis, that is to say, each driver received 20 per cent of the gross returns or
earnings from the operation of his taxi cab. Plaintiffs claim that as a rule, each drive operated
a taxi 12 hours a day with gross earnings ranging from P20 to P25, receiving therefrom the
corresponding 20 per cent share ranging from P4 to P5, and that in some cases, especially
during Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays when a driver worked 24 hours a day he grossed
from P40 to P50, thereby receiving a share of from P8 to P10 for the period of twenty-four
hours.

The reason given by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is that the defendant being
engaged in the taxi or transportation business which is a public utility, came under the
exception provided by the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act No. 444); and because
plaintiffs did not work on a salary basis, that is to say, they had no fixed or regular salary or
remuneration other than the 20 per cent of their gross earnings "their situation was therefore
practically similar to piece workers and hence, outside the ambit of article 302 of the Code of
Commerce."

For purposes of reference we are reproducing the pertinent provisions of the Eight-Hour
Labor Law, namely, sections 1 to 4.
 SECTION 1. The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be
more than eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during which
the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can rest completely
shall not be counted.

SEC. 2. This Act shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation,
whether public or private, with the exception of farm laborers, laborers who prefer to
be paid on piece work basis, domestic servants and persons in the personal service
of another and members of the family of the employer working for him.

SEC. 3. Work may be performed beyond eight hours a day in case of actual or
impending emergencies, caused by serious accidents, fire flood, typhoon,
earthquakes, epidemic, or other disaster or calamity in order to prevent loss of life
and property or imminent danger to public safety; or in case of urgent work to be
performed on the machines, equipment, or installations in order to avoid a serious
loss which the employer would otherwise suffer, or some other just cause of a similar
nature; but in all cases the laborers and the employees shall be entitled to receive
compensation for the overtime work performed at the same rate as their regular
wages or salary, plus at least twenty-five per centum additional.

In case of national emergency the Government is empowered to establish rules and

regulations for the operation of the plants and factories and to determine the wages
to be paid the laborers.

SEC. 4. No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place or center of

work shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal
holidays, unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of his
regular remuneration: Provided however, That this prohibition shall not apply to
public utilities performing some public service such as supplying gas, electricity,
power, water, or providing means of transportation or communication.

Under section 4, as a public utility, the defendant could have his chauffeurs work on Sundays
and legal holidays without paying them an additional sum of at least 25 per cent of their
regular remuneration: but that with reference only to work performed on Sundays and
holidays. If the work done on such days exceeds 8 hours a day, then the Eight-Hour Labor
Law would operate, provided of course that plaintiffs came under section 2 of the said law.
So that the question to be decided here is whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to extra
compensation for work performed in excess of 8 hours a day, Sundays and holidays
included.

It will be noticed that the last part of section 3 of Commonwealth Act 444 provides for extra
compensation for over-time work "at the same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at
least twenty-five per centum additional'" and that section 2 of the same act excludes
application thereof laborers who preferred to be on piece work basis.This connotes that a
laborer or employee with no fixed salary, wages or remuneration but receiving as
compensation from his employer uncertain and variable amount depending upon the work
done or the result of said work (piece work) irrespective of the amount of time employed, is
not covered by the Eight-Hour Labor Law and is not entitled to extra compensation should he
work in excess of 8 hours a day. And this seems to be the condition of employment of the
plaintiffs. A driver in the taxi business of the defendant, like the plaintiffs, in one day could
operate his taxi cab eight hours, or less than eight hours or in excess of 8 hours, or even 24
hours on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, with no limit or restriction other than his desire,
inclination and state of health and physical endurance. He could drive continuously or
intermittently, systematically or haphazardly, fast or slow, etc. depending upon his exclusive
wish or inclination. One day when he feels strong, active and enthusiastic he works long,
continuously, with diligence and industry and makes considerable gross returns and receives
as much as his 20 per cent commission. Another day when he feels despondent, run down,
weak or lazy and wants to rest between trips and works for less number of hours, his gross
returns are less and so is his commission. In other words, his compensation for the day
depends upon the result of his work, which in turn depends on the amount of industry,
intelligence and experience applied to it, rather than the period of time employed. In short, he
has no fixed salary or wages. In this we agree with the learned trial court presided by Judge
Felicisimo Ocampo which makes the following findings and observations of this point.

. . . As already stated, their earnings were in the form of commission based on the
gross receipts of the day. Their participation in most cases depended upon their own
industry. So much so that the more hours they stayed on the road, the greater the
gross returns and the higher their commissions. They have no fixed hours of labor.
They can retire at pleasure, they not being paid a fixed salary on the hourly, daily,
weekly or monthly basis.

It results that the working hours of the plaintiffs as taxi drivers were entirely
characterized by its irregularity, as distinguished from the specific regular
remuneration predicated on specific and regular hours of work of factories and
commercial employees.

In the case of the plaintiffs, it is the result of their labor, not the labor itself, which
determines their commissions. They worked under no compulsion of turning a fixed
income for each given day. . . ..

In an opinion dated June 1, 1939 (Opinion No. 115) modified by Opinion No. 22, series 1940,
dated June 11, 1940, the Secretary of Justice held that chauffeurs of the Manila Yellow
Taxicab Co. who "observed in a loose way certain working hours daily," and "the time they
report for work as well as the time they leave work was left to their discretion.," receiving no
fixed salary but only 20 per cent of their gross earnings, may be considered as piece workers
and therefore not covered by the provisions of the Eight-Hour Labor Law.

The Wage Administration Service of the Department of Labor in its Interpretative Bulletin No.
2 dated May 28, 1953, under "Overtime Compensation," in section 3 thereof entitled
Coverage, says:

The provisions of this bulletin on overtime compensation shall apply to all persons
employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private, with
the exception of farm laborers, non-agricultural laborers or employees who are paid
on piece work, contract, pakiao, task or commission basis, domestic servants and
persons in the personal service of another and members of the family of the
employer working for him.

From all this, to us it is clear that the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants for overtime
compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor Law has no valid support.

As to the month pay (mesada) under article 302 of the Code of Commerce, article 2270 of
the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386) appears to have repealed said Article 302 when it
repealed the provisions of the Code of Commerce governing Agency. This repeal took place
on August 30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went into effect, that is, one year after its
publication in the Official Gazette. The alleged termination of services of the plaintiffs by the
defendant took place according to the complaint on September 4, 1950, that is to say, after
the repeal of Article 302 which they invoke. Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of
Commerce, assuming that it were still in force speaks of "salary corresponding to said
month." commonly known as "mesada." If the plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary either by
the day, week or month, then computation of the month's salary payable would be
impossible. Article 302 refers to employees receiving a fixed salary. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino in
his book entitled "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the
Philippines," Vol. 1, 4th edition, p. 160, says that article 302 is not applicable to employees
without fixed salary. We quote

Employees not entitled to indemnity. This article refers only to those who are
engaged under salary basis, and not to those who only receive compensation
equivalent to whatever service they may render. (1 Malagarriga 314, citing decision
of Argentina Court of Appeals on Commercial Matters.)

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellants.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Diokno,
JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS

FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office,
and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to
be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197,
200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360,
361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521,
528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800,
802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143,
1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810,
1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141,
150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209,
211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269,
271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325,
327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405,
438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594,
599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726,
837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526,
1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595,
1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701,
1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762,
1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814,
1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844,
1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892,
1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028,
2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492,
494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553,
 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677,
679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76,
80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-
439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on
the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition.
The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and
directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or

person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be
done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained
by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a
public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show
any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs.
Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would
be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular
interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he
holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ
when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless,
"when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator
at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a
proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a
special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros
Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the
proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character
when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America
were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for
the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular
 case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the
particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself
is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon
by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case
are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not
a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have
seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental
law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be
difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor
General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered
his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is
not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil
Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for
then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth
day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into
effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity
of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the
issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of
its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed
by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such
documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published
by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of
the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability
and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of
laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the
President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept
abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand
for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies
the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no
means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As
the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published
in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials
an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself
makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded
from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not
be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As
Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all

form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule
of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository
promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions
so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific
contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have
not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in
reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of
invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication.
The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the
pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter
Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress,
 having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording
no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,
442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear,
however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and
acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the
statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions
are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an
all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot
be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a
party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was
declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in

the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be
justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have
not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the
government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that
"publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the
said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently
recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the
same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though
some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written
opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly
impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential
issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would
arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such
publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic
standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be
admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all
circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same
category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a
constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that
such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in
the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so
aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential
issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible
misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with
binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its
first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case.
Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the
guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be
bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The
due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph:
"In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed
be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is
the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not
dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts
not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have
conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach
due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous
transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed
settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated
by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though,
retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued
under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be
successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it
could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a
question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official
Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws
taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil
Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have
the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has
the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette
would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be
fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to
yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur
in this separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme.
Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed
that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be
informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be
punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier
cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of
said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code
and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the
corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of
the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly
published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws
which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their
effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the
law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the
basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code
itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15
days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees
specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's
indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple
expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed
by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of
effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition
is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective
only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the
decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself.
There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or
shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in
the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required
by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two
things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may
provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode
of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official
Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among
them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the
Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as
have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be
published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the
said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity
of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A
law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638,
cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own
as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can
assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary
fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by
publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public
nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written
opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly
impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential
issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would
arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such
publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic
standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be
admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all
circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same
category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a
constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that
such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in
the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so
aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential
issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible
misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with
binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its
first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case.
Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the
guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be
bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The
due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph:
"In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed
be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is
the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not
dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts
not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have
conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach
due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous
transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed
settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated
by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though,
retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued
under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be
successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it
could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a
question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official
Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws
taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil
Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have
the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has
the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette
would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be
fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to
yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur
in this separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme.
Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed
that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be
informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be
punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier
cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of
said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code
and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the
corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of
the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly
published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws
which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their
effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the
law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the
basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code
itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15
days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees
specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's
indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple
expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed
by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of
effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition
is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective
only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the
decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself.
There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or
shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in
the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required
by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two
things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may
provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode
of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official
Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among
them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the
Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as
have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be
published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the
said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity
of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A
law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638,
cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own
as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can
assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary
fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by
publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public
nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Footnotes

1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public

concern shag be recognized, access to official records, and to documents
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shag be
afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.
2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil.
345; Almario vs. City Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum,
18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392.

3 16 Phil. 366, 378.

4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong,
81 Phil. 486; Republic of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843;
Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 17 SCRA 1077;
Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.

5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.

6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of
Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.

7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.

8 308 U.S. 371, 374.

9 93 Phil.. 68,.

10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director
Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of the Government Printing Office, failed to respond to
her letter-request regarding the respective dates of publication in the Official
Gazette of the presidential issuances listed therein. No report has been
submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or non-publication of
other presidential issuances.

11 129 SCRA 174.

Fernando, CJ.:

1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills

connection Article 7, Sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel.
White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the Constitution of Indiana,
U.S.A

2 Ibid, closing paragraph.

3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).

4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).

5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982,

111 SCRA 433.

6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24

SCRA 172.

Teehankee, J.:

1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief
Justice Paras.

2 Notes in brackets supplied.

 3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.

Plana, J.:

* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall
provide publication of all statute laws ... and no general law shall be in force
until published." See also S ate ex rel. White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR
1354, citing Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 187654

WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Board of
Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision1promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 97925.

THE FACTS

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved
parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paraaque, Province of Rizal and
Pasay City for a military reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William
McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).

On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation

No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio
and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga
Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).

Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further
amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan
and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for
disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.

At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum,
which reads:

"P.S. This includes Western Bicutan

(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2

The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the
Official Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.

Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued
Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published,
but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation
No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and
730.

Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same
day.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio
including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista
issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent
further unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort
Bonifacio.

On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc.

(NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP),
where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following:
(1) the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of
Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation
No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land
Management Bureaus facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide
occupants.4

On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI)
filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for
by NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-
001302 in Western Bicutan.5

Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and
declaring the portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate
Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting.7

The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part
of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President
could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that
Proclamation

No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not
be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation
No. 172 could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the
latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquinos legislative power had
ceased.

In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that

pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise,
she held that when the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no
occasion for the court to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of
judicial addition or subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no authority
to supply the addendum originally omitted in the published version of Proclamation No. 2476,
as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature.

Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 which was denied by the
COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10

MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP
Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.

Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed
Decision granting MSS-PVAOs Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission on
the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are
DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed by
respondents are likewise
DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)

Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions
for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

THE ISSUES

Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:

I

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF
WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON
THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF
LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO
THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS
LAND CASES.14

On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY
VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF
PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15

Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on
the ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the
publication of the said law.

THE COURTS RULING

We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.

Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots),
their claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to
Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former President intended to include all Western
Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he
made a notation just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.

However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when
Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.

The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies
in the determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force
and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication.

Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to
the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided"
refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of
the laws publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of
publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of publication was already
settled in the landmark case Taada v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion to rule
thus:

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out
by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil
Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official
Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was
"otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the
legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and
they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not
know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which
must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

xxxx

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like
a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be
said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply
directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party,
even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid
as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To
be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.

xxxx

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to
only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place
after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The
circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to
interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.

xxxx

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the
mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not
1wphi1

even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and
interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold
rather than disclose information on this vital law.

xxxx

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is
drawn. (Emphases supplied)

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note
that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never
had any legal force and effect.

Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the
publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be
prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to
include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the
law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is none. In
Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code,
'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can create law.
The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be
violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts
is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where
ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The
remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that
would amend the law to include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April
2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is
hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED,
having been rendered moot. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

C E R TI F I C ATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Penned by Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Jose
C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court) and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring, rollo
(G.R. No. 187587). pp. 62-82.
2
CA rollo, p. 664.
3
Vol. 82, No. 5, pp. 801-805.
4
Supra note 2, at 68-69.
5
Id. at 72-76.
6
Id. at 205-212.
7
Id. at 213-218.
8
Insular Lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 192 Phil. 221, 231 (1981).
9
CA rollo, pp. 112-113.
10
Id. at pp. 219-222.
11
Id. at 1285.
12
Rollo (G.R. No. 187587), pp. 39-61.
13
Rollo (G.R. No. 187654), pp. 3-26.
14
Rollo (G.R. No. 187587), p. 47.
15
Rollo (G.R. No. 187654 ), pp. 15-16.
16
230 Phil. 528, 533-538 (1986).
17
Aparri v. CA, 212 Phil. 215.224 (1984).
18
369 Phil. 617. 626 ( 1999).