Article

Philosophy and Social Criticism

18
Lifestyle and rights: The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0191453716682373
journals.sagepub.com/home/psc
of human dignity

Ahmet Murat Aytac

Ankara University, Turkey

Abstract
The challenges facing the life-worlds of political societies in the Islamic world require a radical
shift of perspective that can improve our understanding of the contemporary situation of
human rights politics. Not only the classical formulation of secularism, which aims at liberating
the public sphere from domination of the sacred, but also the political-theological approach,
which addresses the problems of modernity within the context of a disguised and refurbished
dominance of the transcendence, suffer from and share a basic insufficiency in handling
human rights issues. According to these approaches, the basic issue stems from a realignment
in relations between logics of the sovereign and the sacred or a redefinition of the position of
state against religion. In this article, my object is shifting the scope of discussion concerning
the rights beyond this logic of sovereignty by adopting an approach which provides a political
ground for discussing the intermingling of religion in the life-world. From my point of view,
the first step that should be taken to deepen our understanding of the argument of freedom
is to unveil the nature of the sacred within the framework of a power network that longs for
control over the whole lives of individuals constituting the society. In this regard, by going
beyond the concepts such as fanaticism, fundamentalism or terrorism provided by state
mentality, the significance of lifestyle politics for rights talk will become more evident. From
this point of view, the detection and critique of a zone of weak citizenship constructed
through restrictions stemming from the values and norms arising from the perceptions of
particular communities organized through family, tradition and justice are essential. Such a
critique will pave the way for a radical politicization of lifestyles by way of criteria of the
demands for equal respect and dignity.

Keywords
dignity, human rights, Islam, lifestyle, secularism

Corresponding author:
Ahmet Murat Aytac, Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi, Cemal Gursel Bulvari, Ankara 06590, Turkey.
Email: aytac@politics.ankara.edu.tr
2 Philosophy and Social Criticism

The human being always exists in a world, which presents itself in a constant state of
flux. Within this undifferentiated and highly intense environment of integration, there is
no room for a recognition of that persons self as a distinct being. In a well-known
correspondence with Freud, the French poet Romain Rolland named this feeling of being
a drop in an infinite and abysmal ocean, as le sentiment oceanique (Freud, 2001: 65).
Actually, there is nothing wrong in taking this nebulous experience also as a sort of pure
immanence. However, whenever the human being attempts to distinguish himself or
herself from the rest, the continuum of this state of being-in-the-world is necessarily
interrupted. Although we can consider this as a primal disruption, it is not the once-and-
for-all act of deducing oneself from an all-embracing environment. In order to survive,
one needs not to lose the connection with other residents of this world. So, there is
nothing surprising about our encountering all other beings as objects of desires flowing
from our needs. Briefly, objects we encounter in the world always appear to us as
equipment (Heidegger, 2010: 6672), that is, as tools assigned to certain sorts of tasks.
Hence, we, as the beings-in-the-world, regard all other elements of this environment as
beings-for-us.
From this point of view, all the surrounding world seems to be a constellation of tools
assigned to certain jobs. In this regard, every tool is evaluated in terms of, first, the
importance of the ends it is specified for, and then its compliance with the jobs it is
intended for. Thus, the primordial state of an unbounded and liquid world gives way to a
hierarchically structured world of equipment. In this world, all beings are either ready at
hand or standing in reserve for satisfaction of prospective needs of human beings. Within
the framework of this mode of existence, the only possible way of being connected to the
world takes the form of an exteriority (Bataille, 1989: 2730). That means to say that the
underlying principle of any meaningful connection to those other objects depends strictly
on the utility they yield. However, a connection which is based on utilization of the outer
world presupposes, by some way or other, a producing or creating subject for whom this
utility matters. In this way, the modus operandi of this world of objects as defined in
terms of their usefulness for us is predetermined by an activity of production or creation.
However, this idea of production is always under a risk of infinite regress. Since the
thing by means of which another thing is produced is also a thing, it also needs to be
produced by means of another thing, which surely is another thing. So, the metaphysics
of production requires us to construct an endless series of production, unless we
assume a thing that is not produced but from which everything else is produced.
Assuming an ultimate source of production is the only accessible solution for problems
posed by this mode of exteriority. The integrity and coherence of all creatures are
secured by positioning a special kind of being which is able to create everlastingly on
this ultimate ground. The locus of this being is the home where the sacred dwells.
Nevertheless, in order not to end up in the above-mentioned limitless ocean, a
separation of the domain of the sacred from the not sacred is required. Through
accompanying the primal disruption by a second disruption in the chain of beings, this
act of separation leaves the door wide open for transcendence. From now on, it is
impossible to experience the world as an area in need of nothing other than its own
sources to sustain it; rather it is a transient environment constituted through influences
emanating from a transcendent power.
Aytac 3

Now, the fundamental question confronting various constructions of sacredness

becomes more evident: What is the proper way of limiting the domain of the sacred
that will secure the transcendence and exteriority of the ultimate source of all beings?
This domain is defined by distinguishing objects connected to transcendence by way of
differentiation and sublimation from objects of a worldly life. Religion takes its share
from transcendent power to the extent that it performs well in separating the domain of
sacredness; it is said to be a bond between human beings and gods. This bond ties us to
each other, and thus forms the basis of social life. This understanding is also supported
by an argument from the meaning of the etymological root of the term, the verb religo
which in Latin means to bind back, fasten up (Lewis and Short, 1956). However, this
argument has its merit to the extent that it highlights an experience of transcendence
which is possible only by means of participating in collective beliefs and rituals of a
community. Nevertheless, the more the sacred integrates human beings in a whole, the
more it discriminates between the objects of worship and worldly use. The sacred is
possible only via a simultaneous and double use of integration and discrimination. To put
it in other words, the sacred is the result of an ambivalent act of discriminating by means
of integration and integrating by means of discrimination.
In a nutshell, religion determines the province of the sacred by way of delimiting and
excluding the domain of objects defined through their material utility or value. What is at
issue is to radicalize the primal disruption which qualifies human beings as singular and
distinct entities through reproducing the discontinuity at the level of transcendence.
Therefore, not only the classical formulation of secularism, which aims at liberating the
public sphere from the domination of the sacred, but also the political-theological
approach, which addresses the problems of modernity within the context of a disguised
and refurbished dominance of the transcendence,1 suffer from the same insufficiency in
regard to the basic problem of contemporary secular politics. According to these
approaches, the basic issue stems from a realignment in relations between logics of the
sovereign and the sacred or a redefinition of the position of state against religion.
However, secularism is, at the deepest level, a reaction to the experience of transcen-
dence that constitutes and redirects the collective life of human beings. Disregarding the
limits imposed in favor of the transcendental dimension, and regaining the objects
excluded from the daily life of citizens, constitutes the core of a neo-secular approach
to the problems of politics. Unlike the classical formulations of secularism, the point is
not to build boundaries between the profane and the divine, but to transgress these
boundaries and reclaim the whole of life.2
So, a really secular approach to the issue of human dignity could hardly be acquired
by following the way outlined by Roland Dworkin (1993: 8994) when he suggested a
new understanding for the secular sacredness. To secularize the sacredness of human
life means nothing more than refurbishing the other-worldliness by means of new con-
ceptions. Since being secular means always being in contact with the material world, it is
better to take a stroll outdoors for a breath of fresh air than serving a life sentence in the
prison of sacredness. What is to be done is to give the dignity back to the common use of
human beings and to invent new uses for the concept. This means to say that we have to
pursue the ensemble of material traits constituting the value of being a human in the
continuum of the everyday life of individuals. Thus, the issue of lifestyle comes to light
4 Philosophy and Social Criticism

as the central question of the argument. Actually, unlike its Western counterpart
religion, the etymological interpretations of the Arabic word din lead us directly to
reconsider the relations between religion and lifestyles. Eliminating various rival inter-
pretations, Fazlur Rahman (1979: 100) eventually suggests that we understand this word
as the following of [the right] way and its subject is man. In this regard, a full com-
pliance with the obligatory rules which regulate our whole life in order to be a faithful
person constitutes the essence of the word din. This is not a reflection of the holistic and
repressive character of Islam, as most of the specialists of Islam believe. But it is a
specific realization of a general property of the sacred in the context of Islam. A religious
way of life is possible only on the grounds of stripping things in contact with the
sacredness from their material utility.
Therefore, a radical conception of the secular requires us to inquire about the possi-
bilities of leading a dignified life within a power network which longs for a control over
the whole lives of individuals and legitimizes itself with a reference to transcendental
dimension. Lifestyle is the sum product of human relations with the world created
through the above-mentioned disruptions. One is obliged to interrupt the continuity of
the immanent world and to draw thick limits in order to delineate ones bodily existence
and to make room for oneself. Those limits constitute the formal conditions of individ-
uals presenting themselves as distinct beings in social life. I named the ensemble of those
conditions as lifestyle. Lifestyle, from this view, seems to be the domain of distinctive
subjectivities and irreducible singularities. For instance, the statements like He is a man
of style or This is not her style are referring not only to aesthetic dimensions of self-
presentation, but also to someones uniqueness and originality by way of underlining that
persons style. At this stage, we are apparently dealing with qualities that set individuals
apart from the collectivity.
Perhaps some help from aesthetic theory may serve to highlight another feature of the
concept of style. As it is widely known, the process of interpreting a work of art, mostly if
not always, starts by determining the style of the artist. What is at issue here when we
declare that a painting was painted in a classical style or that the architecture of a
building has a Gothic style? Obviously, beside other factors, our opinions get their
strength mostly from our knowledge of a common feature which goes beyond the
individuality of those works and beyond what they share with other works of the same
nature. Whenever the style of the work is at issue, a reference to an aesthetic partnership
which eliminates the distinct and unique character of it is also in place. Hence, the work
is subsumed under a law of universality which goes beyond its individuality.
Evidently, style is a means of placing a part in a greater whole (Simmel, 1991: 65), or
rather representing singularity by means of the whole. Therefore, style finds its essential
meaning in a relation of representation which operates by way of separation, on one
hand; and by way of integration, on the other. It seems plausible to define lifestyle as one
way of complying with this general law of representation. All activities of individuals
concerning their affective and sexual orientations, habits of eating and drinking, domes-
tic life, choice of vacationing, etc., are closely related to their lifestyle. Tastes and
preferences which determine those activities are supposed to be a manifestation of the
individuality of persons. Lifestyle designates how a person gets recognized by others
through a presentation of the self by means of tastes and preferences; that is, it is an
Aytac 5

aestheticized form of ones self-consciousness. From this point of view, it simultaneously

connects a person to greater social groups and separates that person from others. By way
of integrating people to identity groups, style subordinates all individuals to the laws of
universality.
Now, it seems clearer why any definition of the sacred cannot remain indifferent to
the lifestyle of human beings. To bring all humans together in accordance with the
requirements of the sacred depends on extracting some properties that assure the specific
qualities unique to the sacred from the routine of our daily life. The safest way of
subjugating the immanence of life to the rule of transcendence is to determine the
conditions of their preferences by way of lifestyles. The context within which the style
acquires its political character is essentially related to this determination. In this regard,
factors shaping the attitudes and behaviors of political actors are conditioned by pro-
duction of styles, not by the style or mode of production. Because of this, there is nothing
surprising about finding that in countries like Turkey, the political tensions stemming
from the process of modernization are essentially consequences of conflicts between
lifestyles of different social groups.
The experience of Turkey is very much worth examining from this perspective. The
subjectivities that determine individuals life-choices are also oriented through these
structural agents of political modernization. In this context, the sense of personal belong-
ing is determined by the choices of individuals who construct their selves and organize
their lives on the basis of the limits of a politically defined ideal of citizenship. Changing
fashions and dislocations in consumption culture caused by society and economy per-
form their effects only through engaging that citizenship ideal. In other words, state-
specific rationalities and the states controlling eye govern its impact on the market and
the lifestyles of social classes by engaging these with it. In line with this, it is obvious that
the imperatives or standards of apparatuses such as schools, hospitals, workshops or
quarters are quite decisive in forming lifestyles.3
That these orienting institutions are organized by the law demands that one attach
specific importance to the relations between law, politics and individuals. In this regard,
legal moralism is the primary object of our discussion. I use the term legal moralism to
refer to the general tendency of political powers to aim to organize interpersonal rela-
tionships just as much as the relationship between the state and the individuals. Here, the
notion of political power addresses the ideal of creating a better and more reliable society
and being a stronger state. Legal moralism is utilized to determine the norms of law in
terms of moral values and to define the political point of view that aims ultimately at the
correspondence of morality and law. The immediate problem emerging in this regard is
that the norms of morality, which are always controversial and are based on partially
valid values, are enforced on the public via law. The basic form of that enforcements
legitimization can be referred to as legal paternalism. Legal paternalism, without
considering individuals consent, embraces the whole body of methods and tools that
are utilized to realize the general good of a specific value system.
The zone of intersection between legal moralism and legal paternalism is the exact
ground of the problem: the very emergence of the politics of lifestyle in Turkey as a
human rights issue. It would not be a mistake to say that this kind of legal paternalism has
a historical background corresponding with the history of modernization in Turkey. Both
6 Philosophy and Social Criticism

the state-oriented nature of modernization and the role of the state as the driving agent of
modernization lead to the subordination of human rights and freedoms in this process.
However, these rights and freedoms are still seen as the ultimate and mediated acquisi-
tions of the process of modernization. The ultimate aim of such a modernization
process has become the creation of citizens equipped with the western values treated
as the reference point of modernity. The focus of state policies, often enforced by legal
sanctions, has become the dissemination of the cultural symbols representing these
values and the diffusion of a system of pleasure and choices in the social field. In line
with this, the values and lifestyles of individuals have been one of the main areas of
intervention for state policies since the early republic.
This intervention process has operated via a complex mechanism that includes
economic, political and ideological powers of the state as much as other apparatuses
of force. The most striking effect of this mechanism emerges in relation to the use
of rights allocated to citizens. Although citizenship is supposed to be defined on the
basis of equal constitutional and legal rights, the disadvantaged position of some
citizens relative to others necessitates a conceptualization specific to this issue.
Since a right is supposed to be an authority recognized in an individual, it emerges
as an indispensable condition of rights that individuals be equipped with the capac-
ity to make the rights use possible. Another necessity emerges: that there exists
confidence that the use of a right will not force individuals into situations of dis-
advantage. We can conceive of the limits on the capacity seen as necessary to
exercise a right, the domain of individuals excluded from the definition of accep-
table citizen, as the weak citizenship zone.
Weak citizenship can be described in terms of the limitation of freedoms by way of de
facto restrictions, invisible barriers and specific legal regulations, despite formal citizen-
ship rights. Accordingly, individuals who utilize the freedom to organize their lifestyles
in line with their own values and beliefs are directly or indirectly dislocated to this weak
citizenship zone as they resist hegemonic value systems and legal paternalism. This is
due to the fact that the power of legal paternalism in Turkey owes so much to sanctions of
citizenship positions that de facto restrict the utilization of rights and freedoms. As an
example, conservative and religious elements of society have been forced to reside in
this weak citizenship zone throughout the long history of modernization in Turkey. This
period can also be understood in terms of the struggle for the right to survive against the
status of weak citizenship by those who have traditional values and are targeted by
modernization practices.
Another facet of this period, however, is the emergence of social groups responsive to
the aims of the modernization process. These social groups, which define themselves
with reference to modernity and which have relatively internalized a western lifestyle
and are mostly urban, have been privileged in terms of the utilization of citizenship rights
in comparison with groups with traditional values. However, the social and political
transformations that began in the early 1980s and have recently accelerated have caused
a reversal of the equilibrium in favor of groups with traditional values. It is obvious that
this transformation is influenced by various agents across various complex processes. Of
these agents, one of the most significant is the elimination of socialism, once seen in
many quarters as an ideal form of society, as a practicable alternative. This is because it
Aytac 7

has become possible for a dislocation to take place from the ground of material antag-
onisms defined in terms of divisions of relations in the political field to an axis centered
on antagonisms of moral values.
This new axis paves the way for the definition of Islam as the belief system that
determines the values of social groups that have long been in the weak citizenship zone.
Islamic values thus gained a determinant position in the establishing of the renewed bond
between conservative political actors and these social groups, and in the constitution of
the framework of the communication between these agents. Initially, the effects of this
transformation drew attention to the empowerment of the freedom of expression for
groups once oppressed and excluded from the public sphere and citizenship rights. In
other words, the addition of a spiritual intervention to politics was seen as involving a
relatively modest political agenda. In fact, a legal moralism has emerged that can now
demand the power of enforcement for its own moral values in the name of general
interest and the common good.
Several repercussions of this legal moralism can be traced across the polarizations
around alcohol prohibition, abortion, obscenity, womens rights, LGBTI rights, smoking
and drug regulations, freedom of belief and freedom of expression. In these polariza-
tions, the reference points for the new conservative gaze are the family, religion and
communities formed by belief groups, all of which are supposed to hold society together.
These reference points also indicate the existence of a transition towards seeing anything
injuring these three institutions in the value system of legal moralism as against
the general interest and the requirements of common life. In line with this transition,
different lifestyles are evaluated through new polarizations that redefine positions and
values across political divisions.
I propose that lifestyles are colonized by two different approaches, one of which
refers to modernity and defines itself through westernization, while the other refers
to religion and defines itself through tradition and community. Yet current dynamics
suggests that social groups who define themselves through modernity and westernization
have become the new residents of the weak citizenship zone now determined by legal
moralism. Legal moralism leads to difficulties in utilizing rights and freedoms for
citizens simply because their values are condemned by the majority or their lifestyles
are found immoral. This profoundly contradicts the belief in equal respect and value for
each human being.
Here emerges the first aspect of legal paternalism that is of significance for the issue
of human rights in Turkey. At this point, there emerges a different domain of concerns,
related to the inviolability of private life; personal rights; freedom of expression; and
freedoms of family, religion and conscience. If we consider these concerns in relation to
the idea of de facto weak citizenship in Turkey, we move beyond the values of an
individual alone, towards a new aspect of the problem that is important for political
participation and the management of democratic mechanisms. The Gezi protests of 2013,
with their main motif of political discontent, are the most significant indication of this
dimension. Insofar as the paternalistic framing that has come to pervade the legal system
and processes of political participation lacks institutional solutions for the opposition
against moralism, this framing led to the emergence of widespread, continuous and
determined street protests and to the violation of many human rights, including the right
8 Philosophy and Social Criticism

to life, in the course of their suppression. This is likely one of the reasons this period was
referred to as a revolt of dignity.

Notes
1. Although Charles Taylor (2007), opposes mainstream understandings of secularism as the
inevitable decline of the belief in God or the sweeping-out of the religion from the public
sphere, in my opinion the solution he proposes in response to the problems posed by those
subtractive accounts of secularism also suffers from same deficiencies that are mentioned
above. Since his presenting the secular society as the one in which belief in God is not the
unchallenged way of life, but one of contested options, still depends mainly on separating the
sacred from the profane in order to secure religion as a distinct option, his understanding is also
on the same page with the approaches he criticizes in regard to the transcendental dimension
of the sacred and the secular.
2. For a detailed discussion of this formulation of secularism within a different theoretical frame-
work, see Agamben (2007: 7393).
3. The changing patterns of lifestyle in Turkey are well-documented in a book written by Rifat N.
Bali, an independent researcher and journalist, with a focus on the impact of globalization and
neo-liberal economic policies on the consumption culture. For detailed information, see Bali
(2015).

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