United States Supreme Court The grounds upon which the jurisdiction of this court is invoked may be
said to be three, though from the briefs and arguments of counsel it is
KER v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF ILLINOIS, (1886)
Argued: Decided: December 6, 1886
MILLER, J.
This case is brought here by a writ of error to the supreme court of the
tate of Illinois. The plaintiff in error, Frederick M. Ker, was indicted, tried,
and convicted in the criminal court of Cook county, in that state, for
larceny. The indictment also included charges of embezzlement. During
the proceedings connected with the trial the defendant presented a plea
in abatement, which, on demurrer, was overruled; and, the defendant
refusing to plead further, a plea of not guilty was entered for him,
according to the statute of that state, by [119 U.S. 436, 438] order of
the court, on which the trial and conviction took place.
The substance of the plea in abatement, which is a very long one, is that
the defendant, being in the city of Lima, in Peru, after the offenses were
charged to have been committed, was in fact kidnaped and brought to
this country against his will. His statement is that, application having
been made by the parties who were injured, Gov. Hamilton, of Illinois,
made his requisition, in writing, to the secretary of state of the United
States for a warrant requesting the extradition of the defendant, by the
executive of the republic of Peru, from that country to Cook county; that
on the first day of March, 1883, the president of the United States issued
his warrant, in due form, directed to Henry G. Julian, as messenger, to
receive the defendant from the authorities of Peru, upon a charge of
larceny, in compliance with the treaty between the United States and
Peru on that subject; that the said Julian, having the necessary papers
with him, arrived in Lima, but, without presenting them to any officer of
the Peruvian government, or making any demand on that government for
the surrender of Ker, forcibly and with violence arrested him, placed him
on board the United States vessel Essex, in the harbor of Callao, kept him
a close prisoner until the arrival of that vessel at Honolulu, where, after
some detention, he was transferred, in the same forcible manner, on
board another vessel, to-wit, the City of Sydney, in which he was carried
a prisoner to San Francisco, in the state of California. The plea then
states, that, before his arrival in that city, Gov. Hamilton had made a
requisition on the governor of California, under the laws and constitution
of the United States, for the delivery up of the defendant as a fugitive
from justice, who had escaped to that state on account of the same
offenses charged in the requisition on Peru and in the indictment in this
case. This requisition arrived, as the plea states, and was presented to
the governor of California, who made his order for the surrender of the
defendant to the person appointed by the governor of Illinois, namely,
one Frank Warner, on the twenty-fifth day of June, 1883. The defendant
arrived in the city of San [119 U.S. 436, 439] Francisco on the ninth day
of July thereafter, and was immediately placed in the custody of Warner,
under the order of the governor of California, and, still a prisoner, was
transferred by him to Cook county, where the process of the criminal
count was served upon him, and he was held to answer the indictment
already mentioned.
The plea is very full of averments that the defendant protested, and was
refused any opportunity whatever, from the time of his arrest in Lima
until he was delivered over to the authorities of Cook county, of
communicating with any person, or seeking any advice or assistance in
regard to procuring his release by legal process or otherwise; and he
alleges that this proceeding is a violation of the provisions of the treaty
between the United States and Peru, negotiated in 1870, which was
finally ratified by the two governments, and proclaimed by the president
of the United States, July 27, 1874. 18 U. S. St. at Large, pt. 3, p. 35.
The judgment of the criminal court of Cook county, Illinois, was carried by
writ of error to the supreme court of that state, and there affirmed, to
which judgment the present writ of error is directed. The assignments of
error made here are as follows: 'First, that said supreme court of Illinois
erred in aff rming the judgment of said criminal court of Cook county,
sustaining the demurrer to plaintiff in error's plea to the jurisdiction of
said criminal court; second, that said supreme court of Illinois erred in its
judgment aforesaid, in failing to enforce the full faith and credit of the
federal treaty with the republic of Peru, invoked by plaintiff in error in his
said plea to the jurisdiction of said criminal court.
doubtful whether, in point of fact, more than one is relied upon. It is
contended, in several places in the brief, that the proceedings in the
arrest in Peru, and the extradition and delivery to the authorities of Cook
county, were not 'due process of law;' and we may suppose,
although [119 U.S. 436, 440] it is not so alleged, that this reference is to
that clause of article 14 of the amendments to the constitution of the
United States which declares that no state shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property 'without due process of law.' The 'due process of
law' here guarantied is complied with when the party is regularly indicted
by the proper grand jury in the state court, has a trial according to the
forms and modes prescribed for such trials, and when, in that trial and
proceedings, he is deprived of no rights to which he is lawfully entitled.
We do not intend to say that there may not be proceedings previous to
the trial, in regard to which the prisoner could invoke in some manner the
provisions of this clause of the constitution; but, for mere irregularities in
the manner in which he may be brought into custody of the law, we do
not think he is entitled to say that he should not be tried at all for the
crime with which he is charged in a regular indictment. He may be
arrested for a very heinous offense by persons without any warrant, or
without any previous complaint, and brought before a proper officer; and
this may be, in some sense, said to be 'without due process of law.' But it
would hardly be claimed that, after the case had been investigated and
the defendant held by the proper authorities to answer for the crime, he
could plead that he was first arrested 'without due process of law.' So
here, when found within the jurisdiction of the state of Illinois, and liable
to answer for a crime against the laws of that state, unless there was
some positive provision of the constitution or of the laws of this country
violated in bringing him into court, it is not easy to see how he can say
that he is there 'without due process of law,' within the meaning of the
constitutional provision.
So, also, the objection is made that the proceedings between the
authorities of the state of Illinois and those of the the state of California,
and was not with the act of congress on that subject; and especially that,
at the time the papers and warrants were issued from the governors of
California and Illinois, the defendant was not within thestate of California,
and was not there a fugitive from justice. This argument is not much
pressed by counsel, and was scarcely noticed in the supreme [119 U.S.
436, 441] court of Illinois, but the effort here is to connect it as a part of
the continued trespass and violation of law which accompanied the
transfer from Peru to Illinois. It is sufficient to say, in regard to that part of
this case, that, when the governor of one state voluntarily surrenders a
fugitive from the justice of another state to answer for his alleged
offenses, it is hardly a proper subject of inquiry on the trial of the case to
examine into the details of the proceedings by which the demand was
made by the one state, and the manner in which it was responded to by
the other. The case does not stand, when a party is in court and required
to plead to an indictment, as it would have stood upon a writ of habeas
corpus in California, or in any of the states through which he was carried
in the progress of his extradition, t test the authority by which he was
held; and we can see, in the mere fact that the papers under which he
was taken into custody in California were prepared and ready for him on
his arrival from Peru, no sufficient reason for an abatement of the
indictment against him in Cook county, or why he should be discharged
from custody without, a trial.
But the main proposition insisted on by counsel for plaintiff in error in this
court is that, by virtue of the treaty of extradition with Peru, the
defendant acquired by his residence in that country a right of asylum,-a
right to be free from molestation for the crime committed in Illinois, a
positive right in him that he should only be forcibly removed from Peru to
the state of Illinois in accordance with the provisions of the treaty,-and
that this right is one which he can assert in the courts of the United
States in all cases, whether the removal took place under proceedings
sanctioned by the treaty, or under proceedings which were in total
disregard of that treaty, amounting to an unlawful and unauthorized
kidnaping. This view of the subject is presented in various forms, and
repeated in various shapes, in the argument of counsel. The fact that this
question was raised in the supreme court of Illinois may be said to confer
jurisdiction on this court, because, in making this claim, the defendant
asserted a right under a treaty of the United States, and, whether the
assertion was [119 U.S. 436, 442] well founded or not, this court has
jurisdiction to decide it; and we proceed to inquire into it.
PIL/STATE IMMUNITY/1
There is no language in this treaty, or in any other treaty made by this
country on the subject of extradition, of which we are aware, which says
in terms that a party fleeing from the United States to escape
punishment for crime becomes thereby entitled to an asylum in the
country to which he has fled. Indeed, the absurdity of such a proposition
would at once prevent the making of a treaty of that kind. It will not be
for a moment contended that the government of Peru could not have
ordered Ker out of the country on his arrival, or at any period of his
residence there. If this could be done, what becomes of his right of
asylum?
Cas. 525; State v. Smith, 1 Bailey, 283, (1829;) State v. Brewster, 7 Vt.
118, (1835;) Dow's Case, 18 Pa. St. 37, (1851;) State v. Ross, 21 Iowa,
467, (1866;) The Richmond v. U. S., 9 Cranch, 102. However this may be,
the decision of that question is as much within the province of the state
court as a question of common law, or of the law of nations, of which that
court is bound to take notice,
It must be remembered that And, though we might or might not differ
with the Illinois court on that subject, it is one in which we have no right
to review their decision.

Nor can it be doubted that the government of Peru could, of its own
It must be remembered that this view of the subject does not leave the
accord, without any demand from the United States, have surrendered
prisoner, or the government of Peru, without remedy for his unauthorized
Ker to an agent of the state of Illinois, and that such surrender would
seizure within its territory. Even this treaty with that country provides for
have been valid within the dominions of Peru. It is idle, therefore, to claim
the extradition of persons charged with kidnaping, and, on demand from
that, either by express terms or by implication, there is given to a fugitive
Peru, Julian, the party who is guilty of it, could be surrendered, and tried
from justice in one of these countries any right to remain and reside in
in its courts for this violation of its laws. The party himself would probably
the other; and, if the right of asylum means anything, it must mean this.
not be without redress, for he could sue Julian in an action of trespass
The right of the government of Peru voluntarily to give a party in Ker's
and false imprisonment, and the facts set out in the plea would without
condition an asylum in that country is quite a different thing from the
doubt sustain the action. Whether h could recover a sum sufficient to
right in him to demand and insist upon security in such an asylum. The
justify the action would probably depend upon moral aspects of the case,
treaty, so far as it regulates the right of asylum at all, is intended to limit
which we cannot here consider. [119 U.S. 436, 445] We must therefore
this right in the case of one who is proved to be a criminal fleeing from
hold that, so far as any question in which this court can revise the
justice; so that, on proper demand and proceedings had therein, the
judgment of the supreme court of the state of Illinois is presented to us,
government of the country of the asylum shall deliver him up to the
the judgment must be affirmed.
country where the crime was committed. And to this extent, and to this
alone, the treaty does regulate or impose a restriction upon the right of
the government of the country of the asylum to protect the criminal from Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
removal therefrom.
Citation. 542 U.S. 692 (2004)
In the case before us, the plea shows that, although Julian went to Peru
with the necessary papers to procure the extradition of Ker under the Brief Fact Summary. Alvarez-Machain (P) argued he was detained
treaty, those papers remained in his pocket, and were never brought to against his will by bounty hunter and brought to the United States.
light in Peru; that no steps [119 U.S. 436, 443] were taken under them;
and that Julian, in seizing upon the person of Ker, and carrying him out of
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The abduction of a foreign national does not
the territory of Peru into the United States, did not act, nor profess to act,
amount to an arbitrary arrest within the meaning of the Universal
under the treaty. In fact, that treaty was not called into operation, was
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
not relied upon, was not made the pretext of arrest, and the facts show
Political Rights.
that it was clear case of kidnaping within the dominions of Peru, without
any pretense of authority under the treaty or from the government of the
United States. Facts. Alvarez-Machain (P) argued he was detained against his will by
bounty hunter and brought to the United States.
In the case of U. S. v. Rauscher, post, 234, (just decided, and considered
with this,) the effect of extradition proceedings under a treaty was very Issue. Does the abduction of a foreign national amount to an arbitrary
fully considered; and it was there held that when a party was duly arrest within the meaning of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
surrendered, by proper proceedings, under the treaty of 1842 with Great and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights?
Britain, he came to this country clothed with the protection which the
nature of such proceedings and the true construction of the treaty gave Held. No. The abduction of a foreign national does not amount to an
him. One of the rights with which he was thus clothed, both in regard to arbitrary arrest within the meaning of the Universal Declaration of
himself and in good faith to the county which had sent him here, was that Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
he should be tried for no other offense than the one for which he was Rights. Obligations as a matter of international law is not imposed by the
delivered under the extradition proceedings. If Ker had been brought to Declaration and while the Covenant binds the United States as a matter
this country by proceedings under the treaty of 1870-74 with Peru, it of international law, the U.S. ratified it on the express understanding that
seems probable, from the statement of the case in the record, that he it was not self-executing, and therefore did not itself create obligations
might have successfully pleaded that he was extradited for larceny, and that were enforceable in the federal courts.
convicted by the verdict of a jury of embezzlement; for the statement in
the plea is that the demand made by the president of the United States, Discussion. This case shows the concept of self-determination under
if it had been put in operation, was for an extradition for larceny, international law. No document can give rise to obligations as a matter of
although some forms of embezzlement are mentioned in the treaty as international law that does not expressly purport to do so, and there no
subjects of extradition. But it is quite a different case when the plaintiff in state which can be bound to any international pact without its consent.
error comes to this country in the manner in which he was brought here,
clothed with no rights which a proceeding under the treaty could have United States v. Alvarez-Machain
given him, and no duty which this country owes to Peru or to him under
the treaty. We think it very clear, therefore, that, in invoking the
jurisdiction of this court upon the ground that the prisoner was denied a Citation. 504 U.S. 655 (1992)
right conferred upon him by a treaty of the United States, he has failed to
establish the existence of any such right.[119 U.S. 436, 444] The Brief Fact Summary. Alvarez-Machain (D) abducted from Mexico for
question of how far his forcible seizure in another country, and transfer trial in the U.S. (P) by Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents, contended
by violence, force, or fraud to this country, could be made available to that his abduction was illegal because of an extradition treaty between
resist trial in the state court for the offense now charged upon him, is one the United States (P) and Mexico.
which we do not feel called upon to decide; for in that transaction we do
not see that the constitution or laws or treaties of the United States
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The presence of an extradition treaty
guaranty him any protection. There are authorities of the highest
between the United States and another country does not necessarily
respectability which hold that such forcible abduction is no sufficient
preclude obtaining a citizen of that nation through abduction.
reason why the party should not answer when brought within the
jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him for such an offense,
and presents no valid objection to his trial in such court. Among the Facts. Agents of the DEA abducted Alvarez-Machain (D) from his office in
authorities which support the proposition are the following: Ex parte Mexico because he was wanted in the U.S. (P) for alleged complicity in
Scott, 9 Barn. & C. 446, (1829;) Lopez & Sattler's Case, 1 Dearsl. & B. Cr. the torture-murder of a DEA agent. But by contending that his abduction
PIL/STATE IMMUNITY/2
violated a U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty, Alvarez (D) sought to dismiss
the indictment. His prayer was granted by the district court and the
indictment was dismissed. The court of appeals affirmed while the U.S.
Supreme Court granted review.
Issue. Does the presence of an extradition treaty between the United
States and another country does not necessarily preclude obtaining a
citizen of that nation through abduction?
Held. (Rehnquist, C.J.) No. The presence of an extradition treaty between
the United States and another country does not necessarily preclude
obtaining a citizen of that nation through abduction. It has been
established that abduction, in and of itself, does not invalidate
prosecution against a foreign national. The only question to be answered
is whether the abduction violates any extradition treaty that may be in
effect between the U.S. (P) and the nation in which the abductee was to
be found. The international law applies only to situations where no
extradition treaty exists, so it is irrelevant here. Since the extradition
treaty does not prohibit an abduction as it occurred in this case, then it is
not illegal. Reversed.
Dissent. (Stevens, J.). the majority opinion fails to distinguish between
acts of private citizens, which do not violate any treaty obligations and
conduct expressly authorized by the executive branch, which
undoubtedly constitutes a fragrant violation of international law and a
breach of the U.S. (P) treaty obligations.
Discussion. Alvarez (D) lost this battle but won the war. In 1993, he was
tried in Los Angeles. The trial judge Edward Rafeedie dismissed the case
for lack of evidence at the close of the prosecution case. The judge used
some harsh language in his order, apparently believing the case should
never have been brought.
STATE v. EBRAHIM ..(wala)
Arrest Warrant of 11 april 2000 (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Belgium) case brief
Intl. Court of Justice
2002 I.C.J. 3, 24-26 (Feb 14)
FACTS
-In 2000, Belgian investing magistrate issued an arrest warrant against
minister of Foreign Affairs of Congo (DROC), seeking his extradition to
Belgium for prosecution of violations of intl criminal law.
-DROC claimed that arrest warrant violated absolute inviolability and
immunity from criminal process of incumbent foreign ministers.
-ICJ concluded that, under customary international law, foreign ministers
while in office generally enjoy full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and
inviolability.
Belgium argues: Immunity from criminal jurisdiction does not apply with
respect to the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity
under international law.
Court holds: Immunity from criminal jurisdiction does apply, rejects
Belgiums argument.
REASONING
-Court looks at State Practice, unable to deduce that there exists under
customary intl law any form of exception to the rule according immunity
from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent ministers where
they are suspected of having committed war crimes/crimes against
humanity.
-Court also looks to legal instruments creating international criminal
tribunals.
Rules do not enable conclusion that an exception exists in customary intl
law in regard to national courts.
APPLICATION
-The court states immunity from jurisdiction does not mean that they
enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they may have committed,
irrespective of the gravity of those crimes.
-Individual criminal responsibility is a separate concept than jurisdictional
immunity.
-Jurisdictional immunity = procedural.
-Criminal responsibility = substantive law.
-No immunity under international law in their own country, can be tried in
DROC court in accordance with the relevant rules of DROC law.
-D will case to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the State which
they represent waives immunity.
-After individual ceases to hold position, they will no longer enjoy all the
immunities granted by international law in other States.
-Incumbent or former Minister may be subject to criminal proceedings
before certain international criminal courts where they have jurisdiction.
Government of USA vs Purganan
G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002
Facts:
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of
Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion where the court held that Jimenez was
bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of
America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on 18 May
2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as
Extradition Case 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez
was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida on 15 April 1999.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Jimenez filed before it an
Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that Jimenezs
application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. In its 23 May 2001
Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for
hearing on 5 June 2001. In that hearing, Jimenez manifested its
reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the
accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an
alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to
post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on 15 June
2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its 3 July 2001 Order, directing
the issuance of warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary
liberty at P1 million in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and
posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty
via the challenged Order dated 4 July 2001. Hence, this petition.
Issues: 1.Whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a
warrant for his arrest can be issued
2. Whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the
extradition proceedings are pending
Held:
1. No.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the
Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or
affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may
produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before
the issuance of warrants of arrest.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges
merely further examine complainants and their witnesses. In the present
case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice
of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be
discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were
allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during
the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at
this stage if he so desires in his effort to negate a prima facie
finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima
facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly
make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema
to the summary nature of extraditions.
***Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible,
a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and
substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law,
and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge
may require the submission of further documentation or may personally
examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this
study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition
may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined,
then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of
the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition
and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of
the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee
of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to
escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing
procedure will best serve the ends of justice in extradition cases.***
2. No.
Extradition cases are different from ordinary criminal proceedings. The
constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt
be proved beyond reasonable doubt.It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
PIL/STATE IMMUNITY/3
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Parettiin arguing that,
constitutionally, [n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x
without due process of law.
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the
extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due
process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process
is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the
doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where
the circumstances such as those present in an extradition case call
for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present
case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently,
when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence,
there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs PURGANAN
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice
and hearing before warrantsfor their arrest can be issued? Equally
important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisionalliberty
while the extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to
these two novel questions is No. The explanation of and the reasons
for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision. The
Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest
warrant issued by the UnitedStates District Court for the Southern District
of Florida on April 15, 1999 : (1) conspiracy to defraudthe United States
371; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud,; (4) false statements, in violation of
Title 18 USCode Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign
contributions,
II.The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to goon provisional
liberty because:
ISSUE: Is Respondent Entitled to Bail? Article III, Section 13 of the
Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or bereleased on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision
secures the right to bail of allpersons, including those sought to be
extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the onescharged with
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong. He alsoalleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4[59]
of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which,insofar as practicable and
consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall
alsoapply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition
cases. However, the judiciary hasthe constitutional duty to curb grave
abuse of discretion[68] and tyranny, as well as the power topromulgate
rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights.[69] Furthermore, we
believe that the rightto due process is broad enough to include the grant
of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right
to due process extends to the life, liberty or property of every person. It
is dynamic and resilient,adaptable to every situation calling for its
application.[70]
HELD: 3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a
criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined. Consequently, an
extradition case is not one in which the constitutionalrights of the
accused are necessarily available. It
is more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police
authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped
detention or jumped bail.Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the
requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumptionis that the
person would escape again if given the opportunity.
PIL/STATE IMMUNITY/4