CASES
, Dissenting:
CAYETANO vs. MONSOD
Cayetano vs. Monsod
Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman;
Practice of law defined.Practice of law means any activity, in active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of
the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill. (111 ALR 23) Interpreted in the
light of the various definitions of the term practice of law,
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construc-tion intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poorverily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirementthat he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
Same; Same; Judicial review of judgments rendered by the
Commission on Appointments.The Commission on the basis of
evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsods
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere
with the Commissions judgment. In the instant case, there is no
occasion for the exercise of the Courts corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
________________
* EN BANC.
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PADILLA, J., Dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman;
Definition of Practice of Law".What constitutes practice of law?
As commonly understood, practice refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from
mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,
repeated or customary action. To practice law, or any profession
for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily. Therefore,
a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing
the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the practice of
medicine. A certified public accountant who works as a clerk,
cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the
same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a
corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman;
Definition of Practice of Law".The Constitution uses the phrase
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is
incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be engaged in an
activity for ten years requires committed participation in something
which is the result of ones decisive choice. It means that one is
occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged
to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on
Appointments.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for
petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions.
While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Courts
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on
the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens
of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Italics
supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article
XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed
of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be naturalborn
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
mem-bers of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (Italics supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what
constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive
office.
Black defines practice of law as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients.
It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice
of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an
attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney,
counseling clients in legal matters. negotiating with opposing
counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for
services rendered by his associate. (Blacks Law Dictionary, 3rd
ed.)
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court
(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23,
193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of
law when he:
x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights
under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate
in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in
such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under
the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v, C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d
895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,
(105 Phil. 173, 176177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Italics
supplied)
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part
of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth
in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character; and acting at
all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
3 [1953 ed.], p. 665666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
[Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Italics ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting
orientation briefing for new lawyers (19741975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of
the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active
practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines
of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within
the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perfom those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill. (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show
that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term practice of
law.
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MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make
a very brief statement? , -. . ..
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of
the Commission on Audit Among others, the qualifications provided
for by Section 1 is that They must be Members of the Philippine
BarI am quoting from the provision'who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years/
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding
members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that
this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does
not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the
COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers
who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or
legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up
on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of
the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten
years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set
forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in
COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance
with the provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore. the answer is yes,
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this
is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
x x (Italics supplied)
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides,
among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (italics supplied)
Corollary to this is the term private practitioner'' and which is in
many ways synonymous with the word lawyer. Today, although
many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke,
Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois),
1986], p. 15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The
term, as commonly understood, means an individual or
organization engaged in the business of delivering legal
services. (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called sole
practitioners. Groups of lawyers are called firms. The firm is
usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners,
Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the
members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the
firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger
or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called associates. (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of
law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the
practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram,
Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any
acts . .. . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice
of law. (State Bar Assn v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v.
Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too
global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at
once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend
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little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire
practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many
lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyers role colors
much of both the public image and the selfperception of the legal
profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind
reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the
late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: Even
today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an
attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and
non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely describe[d]
as business counseling: than in trying cases. The business lawyer
has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial
lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can
be effective. (Business Star, Corporate Finance Law/' Jan.
11,1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will
engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and
other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice will usually perform at least some legal services
outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as
tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the
lawyer is one of the relatively rare typesa litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find
that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in
litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least
theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is
that of prosecutor. In some lawyers work the constraints are
imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which
the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The
most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, hereinbelow
quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure
from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other
professional groups, in particular those members participating in
various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is
indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today
requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of
the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating
rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for
such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly
modelmaking and contingency planning, has impressed upon
us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional
contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be
processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast
decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted
the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional
structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making
process, wherein a model, of the decisional context or a segment
thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in
predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of
corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
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formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal
education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by
those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early
introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and the various
approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with
either a masters or doctorate degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-
making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems
would require the services of an astute attorney because of the
complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary
step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised.
(Business Star, Corporate Finance Law, Jan. 11,1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously
referred to as the abogado de campanilla. He is the big-time
lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people
could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one,
the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary
with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some
large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law
firms, Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters.
Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal
problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who
handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or
jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax
laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange Commission). and in other
capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other
than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is
representing. These include such matters as determining policy and
becoming involved in management. (Italics supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being
isolated from the action, or not understanding how ones work
actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first
hand. In short,
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more
closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyers services may sometimes be engaged
by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide
one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter
the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in
a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because
working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous,
this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their international practice in law libraries.
(Business Star, Corporate Law Practice, May 25, 1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the
realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer
Bruce Wassertein, to wit: A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot
problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and
the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them. (Business Star,
Corporate Finance Law, Jan. 11,1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a shot in
the arm, so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional
law teaching method of confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well
into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three
(3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current
advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable
to a corporate counsels management responsibilities; and (3) a
devotion to the organization and management of the legal function
itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles,
with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as intersecting
managerial jurisprudence, it forms a unifying theme for the
corporate counsels total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the
counsels role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the
globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning
that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporations strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with
global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national
governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with
public entities but with each otheroften with those who are
competitors in other arenas.
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Also, the nature of the lawyers participation in decision-making
within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modern corporate
lawyer has gained anew role as a stakeholderin some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance
through participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. (Italics
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is with governmental policies toward
the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry
that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional
forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are
lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit,
Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japans MITI is world famous. (Italics
supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the
Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial
structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-
term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to
be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction
such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment, coordinating work with outsiders. promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external
activities are better predictors of team performance than internal
group processes,
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the
corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are
challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate
effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of
financial liability and insurance considerations, (Italics supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors
are apropos:
First System Dynamics, The field of systems dynamics has been
found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both
planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the
role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable
users to simulate all sorts of systematic problemsphysical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New
programming techniques now make the systems dynamics
principles more accessible to managersincluding corporate
counsels. (Italics supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better
decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a
law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation,
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk
involved in managing a portfolio of cases, (Italics supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management Computer-based
models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all kinds of
negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and
effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in
these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture
may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal
function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills
that comprise a major part of the general counsels responsibilities.
They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is
concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are
undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences
attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nations evolving
economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay
competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice
and theory of law is not adequate today to facilitate the
relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsels Office.
The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the
most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel
hear responsibility for key aspects of the firms strategic issues,
including structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees,
managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with
more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate
law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor
to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate
activities. And even if the corporate lawyers aim is not the
understand all of the laws effects on corporate activities, he must,
at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management
issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
constitution or makeup of the modern corporation. Business
Star, The Corporate Counsel, April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have
more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each
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aspect of their work, Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast
tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a
dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance
and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, Corporate Finance law, Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon
C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1901,' the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June
18,1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed
office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsods nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared
null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having
passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He
has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 197273. He has also been paying
his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p.
124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled
the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During
his stint in the World Bank Group (19631970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-
countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and
project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive
officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various
companies as a legal and
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL. Monsods work involved being knowledgeable In
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in
his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmens Conference for Human Development, has worked
with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action
for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill.
Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quasijudicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (19861987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for
innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128129 Rollo)
(Italics supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty.
Monsod used to be a member,
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team,
and which is adequately constituted to meet the various
contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials
of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the
legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such
as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise
the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers, Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Italics
supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a countrys Constitution;
it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned.
Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized
into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrowers
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5)
events of default. (Ibid., p. 13),
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development
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VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
policies as key factors in maintaining their countries sovereignty.
(Condensed from the work paper, entitled Wanted; Development
Lawyers for Developing Nations, submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International
Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored
by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 2631 , 1973).
1973). (Italics supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than
purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of
contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation.
Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international
business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model
loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain
such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support
personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate
School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (Italics supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract
construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the
contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements
of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the
responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open
to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a
compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle
which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreementsan adherence to the rule of law in domestic and
international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: They carry no banners, they
beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush
are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery. (See Ricardo
J. Romulo, The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments,
Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term
practice of law, particularly the modern concept of law practice,
and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by
the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsods past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
Iawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poorverily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirementthat he
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission,
143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess
the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide."(emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil
Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this
case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another
person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To
do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. (Italics supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at
bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues
the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October
14,1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent
to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for
a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Members for three years,
without reappointment, Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padillas separate opinion, suffice it to say
that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is
exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padillas definition would require
generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a
year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz
states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law
practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " ... is what people ordinar-ily mean by the practice of
law. True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as
evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers
almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or
in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing
law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact
that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who
has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the
acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify
an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he
lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For
one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he is
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is
the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the
public hearings on Monsods confirmation, implicitly determined
that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.
The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such
an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the Commissions judgment. In the instant case,
there is no occasion for the exercise of the Courts corrective power,
since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following;
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the
President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and
thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the
U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would
be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the
U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that
giveth life/'
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the
procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samsons beloved) for
help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
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VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the
procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samsons eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the
procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, J., See brief concurrence.
Melencio-Herrera, J., In the result, 011 the same basis as Justice
Narvasa.
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Padilla, JJ., see dissents.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition.
(Fernan, C.J.)
Bidin, J., I join in the dissent of Justice Gutierrez.
Sarmiento, J., On leave.
Regalado, J., No part due to intended personal association with
respondent Monsod.
Davide, Jr., J., No part, I was among those who issued a
testimonial in favor of Christian Monsod which was submitted by
him to CA.
CONCURRENCE
NERVASA, J.:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice
Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there
has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by
the Commission on Appointments -that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due
assessment thereof, be confirmedwas
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion
and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance
with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first
deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the
respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent
Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman,
while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for
the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned
were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsods
disqualification. Moreover. a reading of the Petition then in relation
to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is,
he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years
prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsods comment, I am
even more convinced that the constitutional requirement of
practice of law for at least ten (10) years has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant
consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in
this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision
requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including
the Chairman thereof to have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years. (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987
Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara
v, Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries.
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a
COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years. It is the
bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood,
practice refers to the actual performance or application of
knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge: it
connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To
practice law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise
or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually
performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the
practice of medicine. A certified public accountant who works as
a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant.
In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive
or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva.2
Practice Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law
to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan,
4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647.) x x x (italics supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on
Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several
factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
practice of law. It states:
________________
1 Websters 3rd New International Dictionary.
2 14 SCRA 109.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
1.Habituality. The term practice of law implies customarily or
habitually holding ones self out to the public as a lawyer (People
vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as, a
lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v, Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p; 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2.Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the
legal profession and that his professional services are available to
the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra).
Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents
involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
practice of law (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. Peoples Stockyards State
Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that
extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v.
Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is
expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood
Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94 A-L.R. 356359)
3.Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure which
calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term
practice of law. (Martin supra)
4.Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law
presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence,
where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of
law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching
law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal
Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3
________________
3 Commission on Appointments Memorandum dated 25 June 1991
RE: WHAT CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW, pp. 67.
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in
determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the
constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10)
years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are
peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he
do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to
his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as
appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform
any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do
so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities
which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the
practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the
rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions
or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as practice of
law; To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a
continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor
General in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must
have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are available
to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare
respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC
Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
________________
4 14 SCRA 109.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
CRUZ,. J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but
find I must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which
I must differ with him while of course respecting his viewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the
qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has
been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view,
this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointees credentials is made on the basis of
the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were,
the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the
discretion of the appointing authority to choose between two
claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not
be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be
ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no
reason why we cannot disqualify an appointee simply because he
has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by
this Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has
been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry.
The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom
of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in
the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear
that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of
the phrase practice of law as to render the qualification practically
toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the
term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have
to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his
activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally.
The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could
come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on
matters that are likely to become involved in litigation.
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VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his
main occupation is another business and he interprets and applies
some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every
company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by
the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the
modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by
some law or government regulation the businessman must know
about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer
does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered
a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a
house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his
knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions.
If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law
because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and
regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of
law as the performance of any acts, . , in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law, which tells us
absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial
and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too
global to be workable.
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider
virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if
he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is
enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely)
connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible
exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching
ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
pretensions.
The respondents credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do
not persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for
ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has
been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as
a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the
various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience
and prestige as a business-
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
man and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is
focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a
lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform,
served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission
(together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his
activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year
period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently
qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents
but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for
Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition;
DISSENTING OPINION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the
practice of law as a qualification for public office would be settled
one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this
was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr.
Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these
5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing
his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not
practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so
gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave
with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2
not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our
reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on
Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications
of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs,
we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave
abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our
belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of
executive ability, proficiency in manage-
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
ment, educational background, experience in international banking
and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us
is compliance with a specific requirement written into the
Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my
constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for
even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has
practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not
dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity
where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he
can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for
COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme
Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we
have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a
business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in
media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law,
whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar
examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. The deliberate choice of words shows that the
practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional,
accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To
be engaged in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of ones decisive
choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise:
one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention
during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by
respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter
has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In
fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for
an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when
he worked in his fathers law firm. Even then his law practice must
have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A.
and Ph. D. degrees in
238
238
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period.
How could he practice law in the United States while not a member
of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1 Respondent Monsods activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 19611963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of
Pennsylvania
2. 19631970: World Bank GroupEconomist, Industry
Department; Operations, Latin American Department; Division
Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation
3. 19701973: Meralco GroupExecutive of various companies,
i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum
Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 19731976: Yujuico GroupPresident, Fil-Capital Development
Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 19761978: Finaciera ManilaChief Executive Officer
6. 19781986: Guevent Group of CompaniesChief Executive
Officer
7. 19861987: Philippine Constitutional CommissionMember
8. 19891991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December
1989 Coup AttemptMember
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUN systems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
239
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
239
Cayetano vs. Monsod
1. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation
(Rollo, pp. 2122)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely
indicates that respondent Monsod has given the law enough
attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as
would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having
engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a
lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving legal
advice of legal services, he was the one receiving that advice and
those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an
effort to equate engaged in the practice of law? with the use of
legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce,
industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform,
etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term,
which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and
customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country
who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or
apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful
if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor,
barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market
vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people
honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. It is not satisfied with having been a
member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years.
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in
connection with litigation but also services rendered out of court,
and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services
requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a
will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under
the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined.
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Assn v. Tinkoff, 399 III. 282, 77 N.E.2d
693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Assn v. Peoples Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 III. 462, 176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
240
240
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or
definition of what constitutes the practice of law. Practicing law
has been defined as Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law
according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of
advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or
corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such
service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Assn v.
Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, 344 III. 462, 176 N.E.
901." (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For ones actions to come within the purview of practice of law they
should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they
should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to
wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondents answers to questions propounded to him were rather
evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for
the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the
procuring agent. He answered: Very seldom. In answer to the
question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the
parties during the twenty-nine years of his business, he said: I have
no idea. When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times
his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the
statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large
number of instances, he answered: I dont recall exactly what was
said. When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a
practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a
fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker
in the deal, he answered: Well, I dont believe so, that is not a
practice/ Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in
preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the
broker, he finally answered: I have done about everything that is on
the books as far as real estate is concerned.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker
he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-
estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts,
deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he
has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for
his services in that connection. x x x. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E.
2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
241
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
241
Cayetano vs. Monsod
x x x. An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person
designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an agent;
more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and
act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these
professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional
agents are properly styled attorneys in fact; but the single word is
much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an
attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb.
Law Dict. Attorney/ A public attorney, or attorney at law, says
Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to
prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients.
The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and
to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill,
and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. x x x His
rights are to be justly compensated for his services. Bouv. Law
Dict. tit. Attorney. The transitive verb practice, as defined by
Webster, means to door perform frequently, customarily, or
habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice
gaming; x x x to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as
a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as,
to practice law or medicine, etc. x x x. (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522,
523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes
frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of
People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
x x x Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily
or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. x x ." (at p. 1 12)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself
recognizes habituality as a a required component of the meaning of
practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
1. Habituality. The term practice of law implies customarily or
habitually holding ones self out to the public as a lawyer (People v.
242
242
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v, Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C.
644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a
lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil., 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo,
p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have
profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge
is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall
under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the
practice of law was not required for membership in the
Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on
the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may
have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened
to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines
which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business
in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also
should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the
context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam
Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member
of the Constitutional Commission may possess the background,
competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high
offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or
Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that
he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges
the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate,
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments
committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomina-
243
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
243
Cayetano vs. Monsod
tion of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Petition dismissed.
Note.View that the court should not impose its view on areas
within the competence of policy makers. (Garcia vs. Board of
lnvestmentsa, 191 SCRA 288.)
G.R. No. L-35469 October 9, 1987
ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and
DAVIDINA MUNOZ, petitioners,
vs.
MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO,
FRANCISCO ZERNA, and the HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA,
JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental
(Branch III).
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Degree of public distrust from lawyers
arise from the way they misinterpret the law; The Court must
express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading by
lawyers designed precisely to circumvent or violate itOne reason
why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some
of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning
effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends
of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in the legal
profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to
say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned,
as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must
express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading
designed precisely to circumvent or violate it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Responsibility of lawyers as officers of
the court; Admonition to lawyers not to commence litigations that
for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts but
merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets.As officers
of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing
pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary,
especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious
study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such
as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the
already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause
of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack
of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
PETITION for certiorari to review the orders of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental, Br. III. Vamenta, Jr. J.
CRUZ, J.:
It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was rendered by
the cadastral court way back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years
ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on March 6,
1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended
petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an
opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971,
or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed.
The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion
for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. 1 The
petitioners then came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the
respondent judge. 2
These dates are not typographical errors. What is involved here are
errors of law and lawyers.
The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the
decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had been filed out of
time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was held, had
operated against the petitioners. 3
The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become
final and executory because the land in dispute had not yet been
registered in favor of the private respondents. The said judgment
would become so only after one year from the issuance of the
decree of registration. If any one was guilty of laches, it was the
private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by
having the land registered in their the pursuant thereto. 4
For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of
February 9, 1926, became final and executory after 30 days, same
not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. They
slept on their rights for thirty one years before it occurred to them to
question the judgment of the cadastral court. In fact, their alleged
predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived for nineteen more
years after the 1926 decision and did not see fit to challenge it until
his death in 1945. The herein petitioners themselves waited
another twelve years, or until 195 7, to file their petition for
review. 5
While arguing that they were not guilty of laches because the 1926
decision had not yet become final and executory because the land
subject thereof had not yet been registered, the petitioners
rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed the remedy of re-
opening the case within one year after the issuance of the decree,
why should the same party be denied this remedy before the decree
is issued? 6
Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition earlier?
Why do they now pretend that they have all the time in the world
because the land has not yet been registered and the one-year
reglementary period has not yet expired?
Thinking to support their position, the petitioners cite Rivera v.
Moran 7 where it was held:
... It is conceded that no decree of registration has
been entered and section 38 of the Land
Registration Act provides that a petition for
review of such a decree on the grounds of fraud
must be filed "within one year after entry of the
decree." Giving this provision a literal
interpretation, it may first blush seem that the
petition for review cannot be presented until the
final decree has been entered. But on further
reflection, it is obvious that such could not have
been the intention of the Legislatureand that what
it meant would have been better expressed by
stating that such petitioners must be presented
before the expiration of one year from the entry of
the decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable
construction and there can be no possible reason
for requiring the complaining party to wait until
the final decree is entered before urging his claim
of fraud. We therefore hold that a petition for
review under section 38, supra, may be filed at
any time the rendition of the court's decision and
before the expiration of one year from the entry of
the final decree of registration.
(Emphasissupplied).
A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and
that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting
their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but
for thirty one years.Laches bars their petition now. Their position is
clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common
sense.
This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike:
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is assent essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice
that, once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge,
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must
therefore guard against any scheme calculated to
bring about that result. Constituted as they are to
put an end to controversies, courts should frown
upon any attempt to prolong them." 8
There should be a greater awareness on the part of
litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more
so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or
frittered away by efforts, far from commendable,
to evade the operation of a decision final and
executory, especially so, where, as shown in this
case, the clear and manifest absence of any right
calling for vindication, is quite obvious and
indisputable. 9
 This appeal moreover, should fail, predicated as it
is on an insubstantial objection bereft of any
persuasive force. Defendants had to display
ingenuity to conjure a technicality. From Alonso
v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have left no
doubt as to our disapproval of such a practice.
The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the
parties according to law. Procedural rules are
precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy
objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to
pervert the ends for which they are intended
deserves condemnation. We have done so before.
We do so again. 10
Regarding the argument that the private respondents took fourteen
years to move for the dismissal of the petition for review, it suffices
to point out that an opposition thereto had been made as early as
March 26, 1957, or nine days after the filing of the
petition. 11 Moreover, it was for the petitioners to move for the
hearing of the petition instead of waiting for the private respondents
to ask for its dismissal. After all, they were the parties asking for
relief, and it was the private respondents who were in possession of
the land in dispute.
One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is
the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion
in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they
frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular
faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law.
While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is
to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors,
this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional
misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the
proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by
filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the
judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A
judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a
case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely
clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance
the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for
sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. This
decision is immediately executory. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa and Paras, JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.
August 15, 1961
IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for
admission to the Philippine Bar without taking the examination.
ARTURO EFREN GARCIA, petitioner.
Philippine Bar; Requisites for Admission.A Filipino citizen who
had finished the law course in Spain and thereafter allowed to
practice the profession in said country, is not entitled to practice law
in the Philippines without passing the required bar examinations
provided for in Section 1 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court.
Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions;
Professionals governed by treaty.The Treaty on Academic
Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of
the Philippines and the Spanish State, is intended to govern Filipino
citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the
citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the
Philippines. A Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines, is not entitled to the privileges
extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.
Same; Treaty cannot modify regulations governing admission to
Philippine bar.The aforementioned Treaty could not have been
intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the
Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional
prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission
to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or
supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the
Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art. VIII, Philippine Constitution.)
RESOLUTION
BARRERA, J.:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino
citizen born in Bacolor City, Province of Negros Occidental, of
Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain, the
course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected
and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the
Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law
course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter
he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that
under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the
Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the
Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition on
the following grounds:
(1) the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the
Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Spanish State can not be invoked by applicant. Under Article 11
thereof;
The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have
obtained recognition of the validity of their academic
degrees by virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can
practice their professions within the territory of the
Other, . . .. (Emphasis supplied).
from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was
intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their
profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice
their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen
desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is
therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled
to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice
in the Philippines.
(2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides .
The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained
degree or diplomas to practice the liberal professions in
either of the Contracting States, issued by competent
national authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise
said professions in the territory of the Other, subject to the
laws and regulations of the latter. . . ..
It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty
invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and
regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to
exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in
connection with Sections 2,9, and 16 thereof, which have the force
of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession
in the Philippine he must first successfully pass the required bar
examinations; and
(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of
the Philippines and the Spanish State could not have been intended
to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive
Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative
of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, the lower to repeal, alter or
supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the
Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil. Constitution).
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, De
Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., on leave, took no part.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
IN RE: LANUEVO
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and
Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent. A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971
Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN,
ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and
ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for
disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang for
disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty.
Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. for disciplinary action
for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential
letter to the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer
to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho who
flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade
of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively invited the attention
of the Court to"The starling fact that the grade in one examination
(Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason
or another, before the bar results were released this
year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed,
according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon
C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He
further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that
the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also
underwent alternations to raise the grades prior to the release
of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or
request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If
the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal
motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when
proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary
todue process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates
got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to
be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this
not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these
matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of
admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the
records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in
five subjects Political Law and Public International Law, Civil
Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a
successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some
changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by
the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records
revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one
Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the
1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of
67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively.
He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%,
which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%,
which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar
examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination
Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the
five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements
on the matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant
admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon
E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners
for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances
under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement
admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook
involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by
Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that
the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or
was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a
formal investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated
March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause
within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34,
rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers
of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized,
and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar
examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to
requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why
his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm.
Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also
required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against
them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian,
Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38,
rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed
another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his
answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47,
rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by
the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not
respondent Bernardo Pardo who re- evaluated and/or re-checked
examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and
Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a
number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public
International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24,
Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo,
Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No.
1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was
also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public
International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned
by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg.
Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-
evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of
Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to
50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by
another successful candidate by the name
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's
father were summoned to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation
upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang
y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law
of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959,
charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal
Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student
of the same university. Confronted with this information at the
hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent
Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged
with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp.
45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar
examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is
required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973
and was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-
respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents
Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective
memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up
permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed to be
gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo,
who offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their
direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct
evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the
Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered
as their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the
Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under
which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination
notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian,
examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was
correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar
Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in
bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the
grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate
obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low
one in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner
concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he
brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-
evaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is on
the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really
the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further
belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-
evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for
such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the
notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the
answers were based on the same standard used in the correction and
evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of
7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7
with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his
allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional
statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not
reconsidered as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of these
answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos.
1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination
booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I
received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the
identities of the examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under
the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the
misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following
circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16,
1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had
developed to the point that with respect to the correction of the
examination booklets of bar candidates I have always followed him
and considered his instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of
the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have
no alternative but to take his words;
xxx xxx xxx
b) That considering this relationship and considering his
misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the
consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee.
Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the
Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee
for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in
return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to
consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid
because I was not the one who made the original correction of the
same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo,
examiner in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed
in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to
obtain from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing
examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my
record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about
7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with
at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him an
examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual
amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to review and
re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the examinee
obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the
said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the
highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-
examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and
he told me that I was authorized to do so because the same was still
within my control and authority as long as the particular examinee's
name had not been identified or that the code number decode and
the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that
the name of the examinee in the case present bearing code number
661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been
possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's
representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I might
have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the
same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with
the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire
notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an increased
grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my
authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the
code number of the examinee in question had not been decoded and
his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the
notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and properly
initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item
No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal
copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other
copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other
copy the grading
sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as
"Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced
therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement
and in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and
international
law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In
fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of
March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not
know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to the
present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to
make such review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant
whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so assured
of my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet been
decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was
apparently regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of
express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an
examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the
Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as possible from
frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as
an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30
o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to
verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that
his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar
Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was
usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar
Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same
condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the
said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I
committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass
the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31,
1971,considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant
that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly.
Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant
knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know and that
there was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by
the examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After
review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of
66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore
stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding
the representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners'
Committee consensus was that where an examinee failed in only
one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would
review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time
of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of
the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had
absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his
malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee concerned
nor had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review
and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his
affidavit dated April 12, 1972: 1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect
examination books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias,
Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of
the books in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of
some of the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought
back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular
examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few
points to 75%then he would make the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is,
giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the
revised mark and revised also the mark and revised also the mark in
the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee
concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated
that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and
without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in
question who up to now remains a total stranger and without
expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his
affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that: xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February
1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw
me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He
produced to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I
had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me that
he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said
notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and
possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He
explained that the examine concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had
given him in Remedial Law his general average was short of
passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper
were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being
admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly
called my attention to the fact in his answers the examinee
expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo
however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I
had previously given and submitted was entirely within my
discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar
Confidant to address such a request to me and that the said request
was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read
and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I
recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades
in some items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the
same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo
and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-
evaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still short
of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo
reiterated the contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in
increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial
Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith.
It may well be that he could be faulted for not having
verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the
legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent,
however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that
xxx xxx xxx
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not
aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within
the authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request
or suggest that the grade of a particular examination notebook be
revised or reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to
the highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that
the request was legitimate.
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the
Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of
Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular
subject that the said examine failed, herein respondent became
convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that
previously given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein
respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%.
It should also be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein
respondent downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by
the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39,
rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in
his affidavit dated April 17, 1972: xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners'
Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed
that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile
Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be
willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's
notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers
of this particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade
to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the
changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated
the contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state
that I re- evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No.
1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct
compliance with the agreement made during one of the
deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a
candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should
make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned,
which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the
aforementioned re- evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile
Law pertained to bar examine
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never
met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant
Lanuevo stated: xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the
grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I was
impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This
led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those
five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum
circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be
given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners
for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the
release of the results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed
with requests of the examinees that they be shown their notebooks.
Many of them would copy their answers and have them checked by
their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or
requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have
some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for
submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same
they have to be denied because the result of the examinations when
released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that
motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners
concerned in his hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation;
that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust
reposed in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to
the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous
manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was
inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his
knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged
misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the
attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning
another examinee who obtained a passing general average but with
a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to
remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said
subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the
Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the
said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee
concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act
would stir such serious charges as would tend to undermine his
integrity because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation,
respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to,
and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners
concerned into believing that the examinee involved failed only in
their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the
notebooks in question were submitted to the respective examiners
for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on
the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked
as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-
Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving
to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in
order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the
notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of
February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division) after
lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made
it a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number
from any object and the first number that comes into my sight
becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first
number that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical
contribance (evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a
post standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the
Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street and almost
adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo High
School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance on which it
is printed and a portion of the post to which it is attached is
identified and marked as Exhibit 4- Lanuevo and the number "954"
as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to
look for a ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, I
found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits
corresponded to "954". This number became doubly impressive to
me because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was
"27", a number that is so significant to me that everything I do I try
somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with said number
whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the
Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the
examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the
number "27" (or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List
is identified and marked as Exh. 5- Lanuevo and the figure "27" at
the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as
Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as
Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the
figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and
the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the
end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these
incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with
the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at
the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled,
the last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was
still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by
Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties.
From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a
new life for me having been saved from the possibility of being
among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get
out of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February
27,
1947, I got married and since then we begot children the youngest
of whom was born on February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I
resumed my work which at the time was on the checking of the
notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing
the office code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my
mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents
of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and
language and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby,
believing in all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned
Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-
Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later
on took them back to the respective examiners for possible review
recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving
absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have
reference to either of the two cases which I brought to the attention
of the committee during the meeting and which the Committee
agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but
with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of
this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked
as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to
50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average
of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at
the time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office
the data thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and
International Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo
(The notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622
identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in
Political and International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No.
661 with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-
evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and
International Law is precisely the same notebook mentioned in the
sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh.
------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-
evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only
Political and International Law in the latter, under the facts and
circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to
which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks
involved to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered
to review or re- check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but
that I told the Committee that there was very little time left and that
the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly
substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the
weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate
the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn
statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the
writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going
over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets
and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August
27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked
him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent
Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted,
among others;
I
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former
BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except
once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted certain
papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to
reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why
should it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation
where the respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other
and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official
business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly
manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's
resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of
former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are
stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never
knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized
anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo
as stated in the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show
as having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these
questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's
examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only
or especially for him and not done generally as regards the paper of
the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-
evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among those of others,
then it must have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee
to increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination and,
therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-
evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be
unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that
BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's
benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations
of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume
this could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming
all the members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of
integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their work
that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are
deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which
only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence,
or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would
make this Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar
Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between
them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is
contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of their
duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration
of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent
Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the
stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the
answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and
individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision
without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected
notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent
Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf
of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of
December, 1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo
approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in
the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there
made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review
of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he
finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one
subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the
examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of
grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp.
3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
brought back to respondent- examiner Pamatian an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the
examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of
passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to
75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-
examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the
belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court
and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's
grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook
belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and
with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the
identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet
(Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed
in seven subjects including Civil Law. After such revision,
examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the
passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of
February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street,
Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law,
which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded.
Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review
the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given,
explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said
notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said
examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general
average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent
Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought
that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet
find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of
respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee
expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore,
respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to
Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge
of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal
problems rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers,
substantial weight should be given to clarify of language and
soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent
Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration was entirely within his
(Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that
respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make
such request and further believing that such request was in order,
proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of
Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that
particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%.
Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes
made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said
notebook examiner's code number is 136,
instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and
belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 &
2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp.
50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang
could not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five
subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when
respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo,
Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in
Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected,
respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law
bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular
examinee who owns the said
notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in
Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said
notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at
least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After
satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible the
respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of
the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject
respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar
Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo
thereafter re- evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After
the re-evaluation, the grade was increased
to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then
made the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and
accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office
Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's
general average was still below the passing grade, because of his
failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks,
respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one
examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing
the latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in
Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already
finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned
subject Criminal Law that the examinee who owns that
particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction
of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a
few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing
grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the
justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the
failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from
64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also
revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same.
The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office
Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any
memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for
this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring
to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average
but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court,
leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the
failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of
the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-
evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was
received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's
general average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in
three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of
examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent
Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme
by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for
the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February
8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee
failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner
concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as
irregular and the Committee
adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee,
respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a
candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This
information was made during the meeting within hearing of the
order members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent
Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular
paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent
Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code
Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then
reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers,
decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not
however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for
consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the
information that the particular examinee failed only in his subject
and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the
re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent
Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he
remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he
had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his
report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and
with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo
went to the residence of respondent- examiner Pardo to obtain the
last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the
residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According
to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of
February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an
examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661.
Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested
respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said
notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine
who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After
clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the
grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine
concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said
notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to
examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo,
respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF
EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG,
IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his
own initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that
eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25%
to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8)
weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the
1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74%
the passing average for that year's examination without any grade
below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his
lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority
from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the
said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned
that respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/
or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to
justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph
4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo,
Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol.
VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination
Committee. He
maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that
the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as
BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee
concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner
because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was
left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the
said confidential memorandum was intended solely for the
examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination
papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners
the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol.
VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only
presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo,
Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian whose declarations on the matter
of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent
Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the
respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by
extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and
hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly
maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent
likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue
advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court
and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well
as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his
relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating
the answers
of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the
increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be
admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized
respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in
successively representing separately to each of the five examiners
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To
repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made,
Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor
subjects while his general average was only 66.25% which under
no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the
examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing.
In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the
examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing
mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor
subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of
Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as
follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
evaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the
answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances
already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was
increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the
great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations
and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor
only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees
Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook
was re-evaluated for each of the latter who Political Law and
Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty
dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely
nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of
examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected
notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function
is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects
taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he
will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of
passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted
to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the
Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73,
etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of
the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the
appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all
Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner.
Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and
the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly
act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes
himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well
as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to
Galang without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite
belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out
Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more
than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from
70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101,
rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases.
This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute
good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners
for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted
average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that
the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were
more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to
Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was
inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations,
especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the
unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or
the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-
evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of
grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension
of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law
and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in
Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the
case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over
ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang would
not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of
Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement
of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-
evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject.
Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects
respectively as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code
number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by
respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3-
Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of
Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man
desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support.
Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first
time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95)
months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-
Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was
just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ
NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE
OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO
AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN
POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR
RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS
GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred
back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law
respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the
Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the
notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the
Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two
cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee
during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter
decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-
evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the
disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39,
84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of
these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was
presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp.
39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting
of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28,
rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees
and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not
presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them
inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on
leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45,
rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials
of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did
not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that
there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was
officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal
file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this
notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is
owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears,
however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty
dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the
notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the
initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent
Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz
bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110
as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the
figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial
of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty.
Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in
evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he
remembers a case of an examinee presented to the Committee, who
obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the
Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the
notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp.
15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it
was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared
that he is not aware of any case of an
examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade
below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol.
V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with
Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was
referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to
the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which
the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up,
respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly
re- evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number
954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem
was Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not
certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp.
59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee
that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He
re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon
the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on
February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that where an
examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the
Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate
or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo,
allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-
Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and
Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with
a grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said
examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3% Taxation 69% Mercantile Law 68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-
evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows:
BA
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27 Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of
weighted points having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar
Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be
Civil Law 75% 75% = " disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be
Taxation 69% 69% = " disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is
believed that they should be required to show cause and the
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = " corresponding investigation conducted.
Criminal Law 78% 78% = " III
Remedial Law 85% 85% = " Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang, respondent. A
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
should likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a
Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5% necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. answers in five(5) major subjects Civil Law, Political and
1162, rec.) International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law Law.
was referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates
grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. to the legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of
These are: discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles;
Political Law 70% (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
Taxation 72% individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan Flunkers'
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade
Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The
was removed are as follows: BA
determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.). passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
Labor Laws 75% 75% = " In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar
Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who
Civil Law 89% 89% = " acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as
examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to
Taxation 72% 72% = " each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the
Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9 Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same
weighted points time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the
Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in
Remedial Law 88% 88% = " accordance with the established rules

Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is
Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and
the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the
consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971,
which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent
Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in
Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be
covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee
because even at the time of said referral, which was after the
unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects,
Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-
evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75%
under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the
record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re- evaluated
by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the
primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in
connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined
and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination
answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly
established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any
authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and
confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant.
Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to
pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a
complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion
with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He
is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an
examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re- evaluation or whether
the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or
not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is
immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents
that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance
with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in
connection, among others, with the character requirement of
candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant
for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the
old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before
the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character
(Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound
to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case,
pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully
ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as
to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to
determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the
Court of one's personal record whether he was criminally
indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still
pending becomes more compelling. The forms for application to
take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court
beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal
cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the
applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been
accused. It is of course true that the application form used by
respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962
did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal
records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show
satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his
obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal
case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and
determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the
applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better
position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not
be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case,
whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's
acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness
for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent
Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the
application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already
required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been
accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any
offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case
of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar
examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by
the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all
his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In
paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to
declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a
Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for
or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No.
1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally
withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight
physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the
City
Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention
of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967,
1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is
guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court
his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964,
1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no
pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court
that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang
was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7)
times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the
Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or
indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his
license to practice law is well settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS
741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the
respondent, in withholding from the board of law examiners and
from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for admission,
information respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a
felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the
judge to whom he applied for admission, been apprised of the true
situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge would
have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v.
Podell, 207 N W 709 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he
was required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to
him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the
discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the
discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of
matters tending to show the character of the applicant and his
standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of
indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the
time of his motion, were facts which should have been submitted to
the court, with such explanations as were available. Silence
respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court
(165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in
any criminal case despite his having been apprised by the
Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case
including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally
admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was
called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen
years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time,
indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and
good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of
the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal
resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his name
should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent
Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to
reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer
any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations
and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE
have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's
certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every
one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in
the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which
merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It
would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity
is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the
prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as
a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases) [52
Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang, in this present case is not without any precedent in this
jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the
admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the
Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or
false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's
educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the
Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the
Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court
Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb.
23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of
good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c)
fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez
-- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399
and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of
Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades
of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of
the crime of falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty.
Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz
and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the
re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the
misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All,
however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or
increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity
of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did
the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the
records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so
declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-
evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any
consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter
of admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners,
under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and
caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to
the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have
asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would
have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the
respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to
produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average of the
examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in
their respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline
of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned
was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and
the stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo
claimed and so declared under oath that the answers of respondent
Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with
respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto
Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents
Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades
of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the
misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of
respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said
that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my
subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact
average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a
passing average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the
one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also
allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69,
rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this
particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except
this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook
and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will
pass the bar examinations so I
believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the
practice used to be done before to help out examinees who are
failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and
said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it
with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as
lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which
were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers
was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a
total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading
sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-
evaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and
Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades
they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a
certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception
committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo
Pamatian
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of
the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the
absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that
time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4
& 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No.
2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought
back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation
because according to him the owner of the paper is on the
borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate
concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really
the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the
further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I
re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh.
2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under
the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of them is
representation of said Atty. Victorio
Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34,
rec.).
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned,
herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer
written in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down
by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt
in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that
particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent
became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade
than that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein
respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on December 31,1971,
considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that
the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other
Manalo
Pardo
subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
62, rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by
respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-
evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the
re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any
improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and
competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the
increased grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo
attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of
the respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that
their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers
of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the
imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations
satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein
respondents- examiners that their participation in the admission of
members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration
of public interest absolute purity of the proceedings and so
are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in
the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V mortgage P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on
November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian
"in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance
or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to
respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's)
alleged friend a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom
said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will
show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm.
Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor
and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away
on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's
insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out
during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his
defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the
investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the
filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also
against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia
"until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or
misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable
outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal",
does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of
the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee,
who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or
revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective
subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971
Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations,
went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the
purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar
Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the
Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner
Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination
booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of
the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such
information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official
release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly
expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint
in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of
delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the
bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal
machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the
1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo
immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations
in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as
Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired
from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square
meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale
was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972.
On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor
of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First
April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972: Second
mortgage P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument
April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4,
Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the
amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to
20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent
Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings
while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in
Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece
before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48;
Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and
P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully reflected and
accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a
bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972
statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of
P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank
deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount
of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00
receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not
realized because the transaction therein involved did not push
through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo
from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent
from his married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the
first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his
1971Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972.
Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his
sister at the time he received the $200 was not even presented by
respondent during the investigation. And according to Respondent
Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not
seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment
was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the
Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was
not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is no
showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is among the
top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him,
the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent
Lanuevo was either an ill- gotten or undeclared income is inevitable
under the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged
their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of
P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 date of
instrument; August 23, 1972 date of inscription). On February
28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently
cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on
March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter
cancelled
on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the
mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of
respondent's house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the
monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month,
but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his
1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in
connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13,
1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued
at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the
same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of
P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities
is a 1956 VW car valued atP5,200.00. That he acquired this car
sometime between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be
inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed in his
statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to
1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding
receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his
1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets,
excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said
1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the
1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned
properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the
illegal machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect
to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the
money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above
properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his
passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had
informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the
1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential
Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12,
1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court,
respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on
October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court.
His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5,
1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is
indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the
results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on
vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973,
obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of
P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a
part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot
(Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo
under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No.
1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to
perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection
with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be
presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or
offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or
removal of a public officer once it is determined that his property or
money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379;
Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's
aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not
presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were
examined as they are part of the records of this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts
between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar
Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of
Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from
his high school days 1951 to 1955 up to his pre-law studies at
the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) 1955 to
1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was
connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans
including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From
1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position
of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising
Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service
Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time,
therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants
and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's
educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive
as of the date of waiver July 31, 1951, which is also the date of
filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father
who all the time attended to the availment of the said educational
benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-
law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955,
respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to
1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of
Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during
the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of
Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears,
however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the
Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on
the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita
Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first
semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and
furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St.,
Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to
the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational
benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the
said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I.
Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the
Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings
(Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone
to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he
never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V,
pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans
Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the
City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the
Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several
benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability
benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course
of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the application
of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not
know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him
(Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to
the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later
he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion
especially while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol.
VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which
Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his
guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no
communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of
the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his
chapter in Samar only and does not remember having attended its
meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the
Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of
Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the
Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined
there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes
on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo
dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the
Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He
was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January
16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was
attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army,
43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva
Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor
in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May
1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947,
Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the
corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be
withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from
the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong
disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative
Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162,
RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY
DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM
THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE
CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias
Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND
HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS.
ALAWI VS. ALAUYA
Civil Service Law; Public Officers; Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees [RA 6713] inter alia
enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics
and utmost responsibility in the public service.The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
(RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.
Section 4 of the Code commands that (p)ublic officials and
employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain
from doing acts
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
629
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997
629
Alawi vs. Alauya
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, public safety and public interest. More than once has this
Court emphasized that the conduct and behavior of every official
and employee of an agency involved in the administration of
justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their
conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict
propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the
public for the judiciary.
Same; Same; As a man of the law, he may not use language which
is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals,
good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to
couch denunciations of acts believedhowever sincerelyto be
deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, Alauya is evidently convinced that he
has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he
exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness,
or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals,
good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise
stated, that he act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. Righteous indignation, or vindication of
right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright
name-calling. As a member of the Sharia Bar and an officer of a
Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than
for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may
not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial employee, it is
expected that his accord respect for the person and the rights of
others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical
deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but
cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been
grievously wronged.
Attorneys; Integrated Bar of the Philippines; The title of attorney
is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in
the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have
been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing, and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.As regards Alauyas
use of the title of Attorney, this Court has already had occasion to
630
630
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
declare that persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before
Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar,
and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered counsellors, in the sense that they give counsel or
advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney.
The title of attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is
they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or
coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a
real estate and housing company. Ashary M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia
District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be
friends.
It appears that through Alawis agency, a contract was executed for
the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units
belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa
& Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995,
Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He
wrote:
** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying
you of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into
between me and your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/
Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your companys branch office
here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent
631
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997
631
Alawi vs. Alauya
was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made
said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith
perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said
contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests.
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite
acerbic language on the grounds which could evidence the bad
faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent **; and closed with the
plea that Villarosa & Co. agree for the mutual rescission of our
contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record
that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort
to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract
against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales
agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract.
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa &
Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope
containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no
stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the
addressee, the words, Free Postage-PD 26, had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr.
Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at
Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his
contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his
housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from
salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other
things, he said:
** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby
annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the manipulated contract
entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.,
as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without any
authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to
be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my
consent was
632
632
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse
of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between
me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from
me.
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail
what he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC,
dated February 21,1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of
which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions
from his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18,
1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management
& Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this
Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in
question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was
allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by the scheming
sales agent.b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the
Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauyas UHLP
loan effective May 1996, and began negotiating with Villarosa &
Co. for the buy-back of ** (Alauyas) mortgage, and ** the refund
of ** (his) payments.c
On learning of Alauyas letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15,
1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated
January 25, 1996to which she appended a copy of the letter, and
of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words,
Free Postage-PD 26.1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
_______________
a Annexes B, B-1, B-3 of Alauyas Comment dated June 5, 1996.
b Annexes F and G, id.
c Annex C-2, id.
1 Annexes A and A-1 of complaint; Rollo at p. 14; copies of the
letter were also furnished the National Home Mortgage Finance
633
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997
633
Alawi vs. Alauya
1. Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid
grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;
2. Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and
established reputation;
3. Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;
and
4. Usurpation of the title of attorney, which only regular members
of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauyas references to her as unscrupulous, swindler,
forger, manipulator, etc. without even a bit of evidence to cloth
(sic) his allegations with the essence of truth, denouncing his
imputations as irresponsible, all concoctions, lies, baseless and
coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith, and
asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and
completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya be
dismissed from the service, or be appropriately desciplined (sic)
**.
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint.
Conformably with established usage that notices of resolutions
emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the
notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P.
Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.2
Alauya first submitted a Preliminary Comment3 in which he
questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an
explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to
a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk
of Court, but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or
the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was
the result of a strong link between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigans office. He also averred that the complaint had no
factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only the
Executive Clerk of
_______________
Corporation. The Finance Management and Budget Office and the
Financial Division of the Supreme Court.
2 Resolution dated March 25, 1996.
3 Dated April 19, 1996.
634
634
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar, but
also a scion of a Royal Family **.4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less
aggressive, even obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former to
give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment
thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good
faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as
sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature,
fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly
deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5,
1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered undue
injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering, considering that in six months, a total of
P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.7 He declared that
there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with
Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He
denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave
P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted
with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: Free Postage-PD
26, were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an
averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao,
Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and
attached to the comment as Annex J);8 and as far as he knew, his
subordinate mailed the letters with the
_______________
4 Rollo at p. 23.
5 Evidently, he had since become aware of the immemorial practice
that NOTICES (or communications informing) of Resolutions
adopted by the Court En Banc or any of its three (3) Divisions are
sent to the parties by and over the signature of the corresponding
Clerk of Court or his Assistant, the Courts Resolutions being
incorporated verbatim in said notices.
6 Dated April 22, 1996.
7 Rollo at p. 28.
8 Id. at p. 60.
635
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997
635
Alawi vs. Alauya
use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were
indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.9
Alauya justified his use of the title, attorney, by the assertion that
it is lexically synonymous with Counsellors-at-law, a title to
which Sharia lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers
the title of attorney because counsellor is often mistaken for
councilor, konsehal or the Maranao term consial, connoting a
local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Courts compassion, alleging that what he did is
expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured.10 He claims
he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and
friend.11 He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawis
assurance that she would show the completed document to him later
for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite numerous
letters and follow-ups he still does not know where the property
subject of his supposed agreement with Alawis principal, Villarosa
& Co.is situated;12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy
from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day,
she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in
connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his
signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down
payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary
deduction, none of which he ever saw.13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice,
Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it
consisting of fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations, and
complainant Alawi having come to the
_______________
9 Id. at p. 32.
10 Id. at p. 34.
11 Id. at p. 35, et seq.
12 Id. at p. 35.
13 Id.
636
636
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing
loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to
Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April
22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15,
1996all of which he signed as Atty. Ashary M. Alauyain his
Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to
himself as DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA.
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator
for evaluation, report and recommendation.14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he
made malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid
grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,
resulting in undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and
established reputation. In those letters, Alauya had written inter
alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and
unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;
3) Alawi was an unscrupulous (and swindling) sales agent who
had fooled him by deceit, fraud misrepresentation, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence; and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract
with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the
housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will,
and concealed the real facts **.
Alauyas defense essentially is that in making these statements, he
was merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what is
expected of any man unduly prejudiced
_______________
14 See Resolution of the Court en banc dated August 21, 1996;
Rollo at p. 61 et seq.
637
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997
637
Alawi vs. Alauya
and injured, who had suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and untold financial suffering, considering that
in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary.15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the
public service.16 Section 4 of the Code commands that (p)ublic
officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others,
and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest.17 More than once has this Court emphasized that the
conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency
involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to
the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as
to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary.18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals,
good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to
couch denunciations of acts believedhowever sincerelyto be
deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, Alauya is evidently convinced that he
has a right of action against So-
_______________
15 SEE footnote No. 7, supra.
16 Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.
17 R.A. No. 6713. Section 11 of the same law punishes any
violation of the Act with (1) a fine not exceeding the equivalent of
six (6) months salary, or (2) suspension not exceeding one (1) year,
or (3) removal, depending on the gravity of the offense, after due
notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency, and even if
no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
18 Apaga v. Ponce, 245 SCRA 233, 240, citing Callejo, Jr. v.
Garcia, etc., 206 SCRA 491; Angeles v. Bantug, et al., 209 SCRA
413; Icasiano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 209 SCRA 377; Medilo,
et al. v. Asodisen, etc., 233 SCRA 68; SEE also Policarpio v. Fortus,
248 SCRA 272, 275.
638
638
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
phia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with
propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to
anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot
justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling.
As a member of the Sharia Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is
subject to a standard of conduct more stringent tan for most other
government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language
which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper.20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that his accord
respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that
his every act and word should be characterized by prudence,
restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary
norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his
strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauyas use of the title of Attorney, this Court has
already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Sharia
Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may
only practice law before Sharia courts.21 While one who has been
admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered counsellors, in the sense
that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an attorney. The title of attorney is reserved to those
who,
_______________
19 ART. 19, Civil Code.
20 Rules 8.01 and 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which should apply by analogy to Members of the Sharia Bar. The
Code also proscribes behavior in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession (Rule 7.03).
21 Resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 5, 1993 in Bar
Matter No. 681, entitled Petition to allow Sharia lawyers to
exercise their profession at the regular courts;. SEE Rule 138
(secs. 1, 4), Rules of Court.
639
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997
639
Alawi vs. Alauya
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in
good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice
law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, counsellor or
counsellor-at-law, because in his region, there are pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to
local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment.
His disincilination to use the title of counsellor does not warrant
his use of the title of attorney. Finally, respecting Alauyas alleged
unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no
evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashary M. Alauya is hereby
REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting
or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer,
and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any
similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Respondent Ashari M. Alauya reprimanded.
Notes.Every employee of the judiciary should be an example of
integrity, honesty and uprightness and sheriffs, in particular, musts
show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of their
duties given the delicate task theyre reposed with. (Bora, Sr. vs.
Angeles, 244 SCRA 706 [1995])
The court has reiterated time and again the rule that the conduct of
every employee of the judiciary must be at all times characterized
with propriety and decorum and above all else,
640
640
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Caiza vs. Court of Appeals
it must be above and beyond suspicion. (Bilag-Rivera vs. Flora, 245
SCRA 603 [1995]).
LEDESMA VS CLIMACO
G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974
ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay
City, respondent.
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:p
What is assailed in thi s certiorari proceeding is an order of
respondent Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed
to withdraw as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the grounds for such a
motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election
Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position
to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by
respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of
the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this
case." 2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested
and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation
in the former category being precisely to protect him in his new
position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly
asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel
could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern
for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously
into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance.
This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious
reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities
incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the
assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is
likely to be very much less at present. There is not now the slightest
pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who
expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is
clearly without merit.
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964,
was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz,
Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to
discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the
accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a
motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny
such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the
two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner
filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to
require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of
work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling
adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order
of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for
reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted
this certiorari proceeding. 3
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent
motion of petitioner to withdraw as counsel de oficio speaks for
itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly
committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having
started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then
respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which
reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the
motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel
for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the
express authority of the Commission on Elections); and since
according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who are ready
to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion
for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed
office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since
October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today.
Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status of
counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de
oficio for the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May
17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963,
November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8,
1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then
made to another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty.
Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the
trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in
the morning. The defense is reminded that at its instance, this case
has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government
witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala." 5 After which,
it was noted in such order that there was no incompatibility between
the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the
performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission
on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by
allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de
oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case." 6
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than
duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to
have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the
neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an
irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a
surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an
opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a
profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It
is understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is
required of one so designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is
found in People v. Daban: 7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary
proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that
membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its
exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft.
Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance
of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of
justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an
indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de
oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration
should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary.
This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do
compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to.
That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a
lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his
paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel
de oficio must be fulfilled." 8
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles
Lahesa, 9 where respondent was de oficio counsel, the opinion
penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact
from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance
of their official duties, especially when negligence in the
performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the
prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10 Justice Sanchez in People v.
Estebia 11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is
a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de
oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and
paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he
must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of
the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance.
The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere
perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard
in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social
conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was
only due to the apprehension that considering the frame of mind of
a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of
the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect
be rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by
Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be
given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard
would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no
skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty
but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And
this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional
right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not
enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an
attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de
oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The present
Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating
that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence." 16
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the
Bar in the defense of an accused. Such a consideration could have
sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the
task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to
his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith,
no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present,
and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It
may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth
above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform
his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if
only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the
profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for
those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times,
and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes
precedence over the promptings of self-interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs
against petitioner.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.

CUI vs CUI
G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964
JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.
Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.
Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofilea for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu. The office in contention is that of
Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was
rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui,
and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the
intervenor, Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses
Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care
and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated
and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation
(Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November
1925) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses
through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation
executed on 2 January 1926.
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the
founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such
persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed
to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:
Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para
administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro legitime sobrino
Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad
se hallare residiendo en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro
sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho
sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en
la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro
sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos
administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN
JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos
administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE
SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera
el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de
cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui,
Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo
de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o
a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor
impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias,
sera preferida el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien
tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando
absolutamente faltare persona de estas cualificaciones, la
administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE
BARILI pasara al senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el
mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, apostolica,
Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta
Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial
de Cebu.
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer
the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration
passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8
May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr.
Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator.
Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court
litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator, to
which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case, reference
will be made later in this decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers,
being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses
Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the
then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of
Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between
them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28
February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui,
however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his
brother's assumption of the position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the
plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be
turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not
having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this
case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same
office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews
mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of
donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their
respective qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is the
older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be
preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However,
before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to
the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein
named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o
farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor
impuesto o contribucion."
The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de
abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws
from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a
member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify
him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the
Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957
(administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution
promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he
assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said
that the phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a
full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation and
considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should
not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore
means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is
assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor.
We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the
term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar
after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law.
In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o
instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o
profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Espaola, Real Academia
Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows:
"Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio,
por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y
tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se
le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law
school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not
entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English
equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has
a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of
persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is
under the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138
such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the
lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court,
this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with
admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the
requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully
completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university,
officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this
purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not
indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown
in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the
former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone
through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take
the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that
code required possession of "the necessary qualifications of
learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such
persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or
university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have
established the foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed of
donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or
a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these,
should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those
otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No.
3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicioshall "make
regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall
"prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and
incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute"
(Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and conditions promulgated
for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and
shall administer properties of considerable value for all of which
work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a
license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not
entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator. But
it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is
nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of
donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on
the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his
office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made
to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29
March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a
fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before
he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is a
recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that
required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a
great extent in the sound discretion of the court. The court
action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not
it decides that the public interest in the orderly and
impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the
applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an
attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he
is a person of good moral character a fit and proper
person to practice law. The court will take into
consideration the applicant's character and standing prior
to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge
for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5 Am.
Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is
entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has
received a pardon following his conviction, and the
requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the
same as for original admission to the bar, except that the
court may require a greater degree of proof than in an
original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41,
p. 815.)
The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement
are whether applicant is "of good moral character" in the
sense in which that phrase is used when applied to
attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be
entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney,
and whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable
him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the
moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and
distinct from his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney
& Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one
seeking reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less
exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as
a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the
defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and
disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by
lapse of time amounting the prescription or laches. Under Section
16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section 216 of
Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after
the right of plaintiff to hold the office arose.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in
question as long ago as 1932. On January 26 of that year he filed a
complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed
the administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the
plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The
case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer
by the defendant there to the complaint and complaint in
intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of
dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v.
Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the
case as indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an
arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as administrator, remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his
Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui acceptance instead of the position of assistant administrator,
accepted a position as assistant administrator. allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator and his
failure to file an action in quo warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of
July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu
extra-judicial maneuvers. First he informed the Social Welfare
Court was dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that the
Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the
conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an
previous 1 January he had "made clear" his intention of occupying
action all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's
the office of administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up
present claim in view of the rule that an action in quo
with another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken
warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the
over the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he
plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did
took his oath of office before a notary public only on 4 March 1950,
not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956
after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the
because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the
Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already
statutory period. And the fact that this action was filed within one
assumed the position as stated in his communication of 4 February
year of the defendant's assumption of office in September 1960
1950. The rather muddled situation was referred by the
does not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of the
Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated
action is his own right to the office and it is from the time such right
3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion
arose that the one-year limitation must be counted, not from the
previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer,
date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of said
was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio.
office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.
Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This
controversy. On 4 March 1950, the Hospiciocommenced an action
party is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews
against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First Instance
of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of
of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen
donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant
the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then filed a third-party
Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the
complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had,
said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o
as stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950,
incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed
having been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the Secretary
itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad,
of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the
que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos
ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the
legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y
administration of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order
que posea titulo de abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera
dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954 he was able to take
preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia
another oath of office as administrator before President Magsaysay,
ultimamente la administration." Besides being a nearer descendant
and soon afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil case
than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is
No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a
preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The
case was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive
intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer
Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard
the administration by line and successively to the descendants of the
the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted
nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he
nevertheless and the other parties in the case filed their notice of
argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who
appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-
belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must
parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trial
come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs.
Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954.
This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the
Appellants thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in the
deed of donation.
Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided on 28 May
1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside, and the complaint
dismiss upon motion of the parties, who agreed that "the office of as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs
administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ... should be ventilated equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.
in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes
by whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he has a and Regala, JJ., concur.
right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was
issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was
Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo warranto was filed against
him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid motion
for dismissal. IN RE: CUNANAN
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of
this Court as member of the Bar, and on the following 27 February Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor, pursuant to
the "convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio
The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Court decided the first case of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much
public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly
known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court
governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for
admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average
of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in
any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless,
considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations
held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the
examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to
the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72
per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74
per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75
per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of
having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A.
No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few
percentage lower than those
admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951
the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the
passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective
since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the
bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court
subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and
shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override
the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the
members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the
matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21,
1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted
in an election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR
EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-
SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen,
Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court,
any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per
cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and
forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar
examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three
per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations;
seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per
cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar:
Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-
half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included
as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per
cent in any subject in any bar examination after July fourth,
nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in
such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included
in computing the passing general average that said candidate may
obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates
filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions,
while others whose motions for the revision of their examination
papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an
additional ground for admission. There are also others who have
sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however,
invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration,
irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No.
972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their
grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to
Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied
equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A
complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this
decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of
Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I
and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the
following statistical data are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by
section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:
1946 (August) 206 121 18
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent
examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for admission
to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be
benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had
each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to
obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however,
their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations,
with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing
average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic
Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of
these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had
individually presented motions for reconsideration which were
denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953,
had presented similar motions, which are still pending because they
could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, although
as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons
to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on
the practice of the legal profession and the administration of justice,
and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the
court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission
on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is
constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the
brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who have amply
argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the
question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E.
Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and
Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of
the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs.
Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos,
Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor,
Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the
memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego,
M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of
petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly
helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have
exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the
matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for
a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the
preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member
in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of
prejudice or partiality.
(November) 477 749 899 1,218 1,316 2,068 2,738
228 43 340 0 409 11 532 164 893 26 879 196
1,03 426 3
968 284
2,555
TOTAL
5,42 1,16
12,23 018
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to
admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency
of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion
of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable
Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately
after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the
preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to
1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in addition 604
candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they
suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of
"inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest
because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had
inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was
exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The
public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation
and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the
times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one
of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession
is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties.
To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to
dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious
social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an
insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated.
There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in
mimeographed copies were made available to the public during
those years and private enterprises had also published them in
monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had
been published continuously. Books and magazines published
abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law
books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been
printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine
Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be
supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of
public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be
enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point
of view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the question
would have been easier had an identical case of similar background
been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there
any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which
has been directly derived the judicial system established here with
its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we
have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our
contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From
the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in
which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those
against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day,
54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR
1061), of Guaria (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the
President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and
which the postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other
countries had been promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared
them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully
the case that has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law
that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New
York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State,
denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law
under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of
Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was
declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the
Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust.
All votes for either of them for any elective office except that of the
Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be
void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public
office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good
moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of
learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all
the courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional
precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of
appointing them had previously rested with the judges, and this was
the principal appointing power which they possessed. The
convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this
power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the
judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them. The
prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this
power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission
of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution, evidently
arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory clause.
There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject,
unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the
use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that
the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means
to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies
the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining
whether the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle
him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity
of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to
indicate that it provided that the possession of a diploma of the
school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of
Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the
constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The
decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we
cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the
Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of
the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia
College being an institution of established reputation, and having a
law department under the charge of able professors, the students in
which department were not only subjected to a formal examination
by the law committee of the institution, but to a certain definite
period of study before being entitled to a diploma of being
graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered
this examination, together with the preliminary study required by
the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the
ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was
essential, unnecessary and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and
ability of the applicant, and for the mere purpose of substituting the
examination by the law committee of the college for that of the
court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope
should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the
Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit
requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing
whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college
should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before
granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act
admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and
nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification of
pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in
order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject.
(p.89)
xxx xxx xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the
question of admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be
competent evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of
Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the
following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of
Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations be admitted
to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper,
has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of
admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the
Philippines are entirely different on the matter of admission of the
practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at
law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this
attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the
judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six
centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even
considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to
repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court
regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and
proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function,
properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function
requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete
facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and
(3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it
becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous
judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are
attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been
derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter
had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240
NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment providing
that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was
discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following
paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without
parallel in the history of the English speaking people so far as we
have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to
the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to
the courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded as a
judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an
attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of
legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate
and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of
qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character,
the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it
sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which
in its judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate legislative
solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further
exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are
distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of the government.
Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly
belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to
embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That
was the scheme and thought of the people setting upon the form of
government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525;
Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane
upon which the administration of justice is maintained. Its
responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion
of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it
immune from embarrassment or interference by any other
department of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility
fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed
to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate
relationship. The bar is an attache of the courts. The quality of
justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the
integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and
reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts
themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe
supervision over their bars, at least in the English speaking
countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six
centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of
England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the
Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who
should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in
Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235,
"constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial
power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should
be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It
may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that
it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential
element of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a
power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a
sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and
coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution
along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should
constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the
Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of
the judicial department should in any manner be subject to
legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of
our constitution was to make the three great departments of
government separate and independent of one another. The idea that
the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by
prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is
inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial
independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose
should not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional
provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the
qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general
and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it does
legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at
law in order that public interests may be protected, such
qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit
the class from which the court must make its selection. Such
legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate
qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional
qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the proper
administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to
compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit
to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of
appointment. It is quite likely true that the legislature may exercise
the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh
unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law
is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re
Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals,
attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their
admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur.
572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parteGarland,
4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L.
Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A.
519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St.
Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been
perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held
that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the
judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the
Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most
exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter
where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p.
451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in
answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725,
said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to
interpretation of the laws that there be members of the bar of
sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This
arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and
restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly
important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and
vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide.
It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242
N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851:
"Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One
is admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He
becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation
with the court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if
cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the
judicial department of government would be hampered in the
performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys
under the common law, both in this country and England.
Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without
exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is
filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action.
Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by
a decision of the court entered upon its records. The establishment
by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority
necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department
of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of
government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be
admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to
protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in
sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral character.
Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte
Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by
the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests
exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become
one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause
he ought to be removed." (p. 727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to
secure license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of
state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the
court, holding the test oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional,
explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are
officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of
their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character.
It has always been the general practice in this country to obtain this
evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of
the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to
which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their
application, is regarded as sufficient
evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the
statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence
that their private and professional character is fair. The order of
admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the
requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled
to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the
parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for
professional misconduct. They hold their office during good
behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be
heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their
exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the
exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases.
It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of
the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81.
"Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers
of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to
proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment may,
with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in
performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the
exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded
everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function, and this
opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission
to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the
inherent powers of the court. Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac.
906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial
function, and is an inherent power of the court. A.C. Brydonjack,
vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on
Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the
functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the
government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the
judicial departments is that it is the province of the legislature to
establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the
judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to
transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the
exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not
subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by
judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by
either of the other departments of the government. 16 C.J.S.,
Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the
courts by requiring of them construction of the law according to its
own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside
their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the
discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be
taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar
examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in
mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is
a judgment a judgment revoking those promulgated by this
Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these
judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that
only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department,
that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments
would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the
law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to
repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal,
concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid
argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared
Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter
and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines. Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress
and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to
the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had
Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the
matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power
granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme
Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not
signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this
Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The
Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit,
suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a
determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is
limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the
matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of
the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this
Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate
attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to
promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of
law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them
may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the
other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the
nature of each department requires. These powers have existed
together for centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and
should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar
respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar
endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The
legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental
rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power,
which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient
administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the
legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum
standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with
these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its
traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within
their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather
complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar
that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the
administration of justice.
The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion.
Guaria took examination and failed by a few points to obtain the
general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had
been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the
practice of law without a previous examination. The Government
appointed Guaria and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a
remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without
previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the
applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the
prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of
provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as
follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One
Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the
Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of
the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States
and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this
act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of
the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court,
judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of
the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the
position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney
General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General,
prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila,
assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the
Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be
licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands
without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and
establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this
appellant took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The
report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he
received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of
legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points
short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in
the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the
face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant
in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when
he presented his former application for admission to the bar, we
should grant him license to practice law in the courts of these
Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to
pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited
statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar
without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the
Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held
and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of
Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the
legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited
amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context
generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted
as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically
provides for the admission of certain candidates without
examination. It is contented that this mandatory construction is
imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent
intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to
have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of
the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles
13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the
commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be
limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration
wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above
citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of
Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon
the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its
rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed
to the positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the
case of Guaria, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the
bar under the provisions of this statute have been considered
heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had
been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the
applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the
applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their
appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears
that the applicant was not and never had been practicing attorney in
this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as
provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was
deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last
applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that
occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the office of
provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude
therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of
the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he
fell only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a
license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time
he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of
Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in
the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive,
with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission,
sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him
to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified
under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his
case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided
he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special
examination which will be given him by a committee of the court
upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he
desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary
examinations prescribed by general rule. (In re Guaria, pp.
48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for
the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as
other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the
license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has
been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class
legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is
arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of
the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant license
for the practice of law to those students who began studying before
November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a
diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a
law office and would pass an examination, or to those who had
studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the
aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was
unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court
said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this
state by virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the
applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under
which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section
1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys
and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874."
The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists
in the addition to the section of the following: "And every
application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the
supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time
such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office
or a law school or college, shall be granted a license under this act
notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". In re Day
et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of
which is that up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a
license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma
regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the
laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years,
and requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in
each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of
law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual
proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is
that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office,
or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law
school," and whose course of study began prior to November 4,
1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the
examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this
court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the
proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and
privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of
legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a
special legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as
such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in
the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could
prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the
court as conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to
practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons or
classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law
is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an
officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for
litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates
certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil
process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges
must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in
framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long
as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable
relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which
furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just
relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs.
People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40
N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired
by experience, may furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs.
People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician
has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis,
and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon
it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the
legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for
the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have
some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such
practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who
began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is
subdivided into two classes First, those presenting diplomas
issued by any law school of this state before December 31, 1899;
and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a
law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law
office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects
specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter
subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making
application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the
rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different
conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is
prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the
completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is
made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the
qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the
mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of
classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law
November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as
well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the
proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who
commenced the next day must spend three years, although they
would complete two years before the time limit. The one who
commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted
without examination before December 31, 1899, and without any
prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed
course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such
classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just
relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is
for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined
persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441,
where the legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the
practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of
being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the
legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and definitely the
qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those
applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the
manner here attempted. That power must be exercised through
general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal
opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact
qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr.
Justice Field in the case
of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32
L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the
United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he
may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon
all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right may in many
respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican
institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like
conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some
requiring years of study and great learning for their successful
prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate"
acquired in them that is, the right to continue their prosecution
is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily
taken from them, any more than their real or personal property can
be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government
that all similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall
enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of
medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the
part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be
licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have
seriously considered whether the exemption from such
examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of the
enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of
infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call,
121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs.
Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122
Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him
the right to practice law and to constitute him an officer of this
Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not
material that he had once established his right to practice law and
that one time he possessed the requisite learning and other
qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter
affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of
the public an individual upon whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded
the Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law without
examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of
the United States during the World War and received a honorable
discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby
within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924,
known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is
rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of
this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it
clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state.
In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227
N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is
explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a
classification to be valid must rest upon material differences
between the person included in it and those excluded and,
furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the
rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be
founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from
irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made
applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some
substantial difference
between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it
does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be
defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between
the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and
the situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in
relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents
a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities
and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general
because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a
substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and
not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below
50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5
per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in
1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in
1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar,
notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average
of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is
there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned
authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has
been given, then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years
before, with the general average indicated, were not included
because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates
of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained
classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951,
1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who
failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact
that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not
signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his
right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on
account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in
such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to
cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the
Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not
obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who
obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per
cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in
1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was
considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed
by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently
justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those
years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is
desired to undo what had been done cancel the license that was
issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ?
Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so.
Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What
Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent
obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as
sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of
will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to
complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed
law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955,
increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the
order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose,
manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts
to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or
judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is
doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those
years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the
power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules,
which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend
them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has
granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the
rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty
been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of
examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system
is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence
are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his
certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence
are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his
usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the
first bar examinations of this country, but was
abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however,
the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will
have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is
contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which
vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is
inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the
entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because
they are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or
Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the
Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that
Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and
without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who
failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are
certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly
found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission
to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the
opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to
become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform
something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a
manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this
Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having
examined their respective examination papers, and although it is
admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any
time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise
and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972
violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power
to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar.
Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be,
intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should
tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal
shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to
the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy
administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent
prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on
who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of
candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of
general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of
law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is
arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of
the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being
inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article
1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article
1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall
continue in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing
of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law
by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among
the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious
observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the
beginning have announced their decision not to take part in
voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this
decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court,
and under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring
to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said
law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and
effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of
article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the
approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and
shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article
VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the
candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive
are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953
obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having
a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having
passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After
this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on
the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
IN RE: ARGOSINO
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND
OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
FELICIANO, J.:
RESOLUTION
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr.
A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the
crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul
Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan
stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in
the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity
initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into
plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such
bargaining, pleaded
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless
imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a
judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused
individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period
ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an
application for probation with the lower court. The application for
probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by
Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of
probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's
initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a
Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this
Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his
then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations in this Court's En
Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar
Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's
oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to
allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to
the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had
terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April
1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than
ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago
granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr.
Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his
Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right
to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high
personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2
The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be
lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with
approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition
precedent to the applicant's right to receive a license to practice law
in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other
requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to
make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of
bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired,
or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It
means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright
character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character
expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least
resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it
is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is
eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought
as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to
every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is
the recipient ofunbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is
client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a
sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid
the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of
1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359,
210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater
temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the
multiplicity of circumstances that arise
in the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of
requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high
moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of
bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute
examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for
admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to
arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be
exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents
himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be
successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a
lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and
has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is
presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for
disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every
citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is
a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not
all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test
applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the
unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed
to remain in it.
Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and
a fair private and professional character is one of them; to refuse
admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past
offense: an examination into character, like the examination into
learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that
they may not only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but
be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to
clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are
required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and
officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon
the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible
consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the
first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall
not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of
justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral
character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general
public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than
the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10
L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to
the practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral
character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important,
if anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice
than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years,
but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral
character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that
he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great
calling a curse instead of a benefit to his community a Quirk,
a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in
respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such
inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the
moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding
for his admission to
practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for
admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject him for want
of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of
acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could
not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in
a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to
show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and
general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs
that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be
causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those
who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more
stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the
general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general
perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals
with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a
perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's
confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we
know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities
certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral
character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately
led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly
indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted
such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to
discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a
"neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity
involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the
very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless
stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless
physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident
rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior,
which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then
possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court
has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question
of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the
obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress
that good moral character is a requirement possession of which
must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for
permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and
to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its
examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His
evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from
responsible members of the community who have a good reputation
for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge
Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up
for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the
deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must,
in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a
different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission
to the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court,
by appropriate written manifestation, of the names and addresses of
the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any,
of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a
copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and
sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
Abella vs Cruzabra
FELIPE E. ABELLA, Complainant,
- versus
ATTY. ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 5688
Promulgated:
June 4, 2009
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
Felipe E. Abella (complainant) filed a complaint for violation of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section
7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713[1] (RA 6713) or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
against Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra (respondent). In his affidavit-
complaint[2] dated 8 May 2002, complainant charged respondent
with engaging in private practice while employed in the government
service.
Complainant alleged that respondent was admitted to the Philippine
Bar on 30 May 1986 and was appointed as Deputy Register of
Deeds of General Santos City on 11 August 1987.[3] Complainant
asserted that as Deputy Register of Deeds, respondent filed a
petition for commission as a notary public and was commissioned
on 29 February 1988 without obtaining prior authority from the
Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ).[4] Complainant
claimed that respondent has notarized some 3,000 documents.
[5]Complainant pointed out that respondent only stopped notarizing
documents when she was reprimanded by the Chief of the
Investigation Division of the Land Registration Authority.[6]
Complainant contended that respondent could not justify her act by
pretending to be in good faith because even non-lawyers are not
excused from ignorance of the law. Complainant branded as
incredible respondents claim that she was merely motivated by
public service in notarizing 3,000 documents. Complainant pointed
out that respondent spent money to buy the Notarial Register Books
and spent hours going over the documents subscribed before her,
thereby prejudicing her efficiency and performance as Deputy
Register of Deeds. Complainant believed that even if
respondent had obtained authority from the DOJ, respondent would
still be guilty of violating Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 because her
practice as a notary public conflicts with her official functions.[7]
In her Comment, respondent admitted that she was a notary public
from 29 February 1988 to 31 December 1989.[8] Respondent stated
that she was authorized by her superior, the Register of Deeds, to
act as a notary public. Respondent pointed out that the Register of
Deeds, Atty. Pelagio T. Tolosa, also subscribed petitions and
documents that were required to be registered.[9] Respondent
explained that the Register of Deeds imposed the following
conditions for her application as a notary public:
xxx
4. That the application for commission was on the
condition that respondent cannot charge fees for
documents required by the Office to be presented
and under oath.[10]
Respondent contended that when she filed her petition for
commission as a notary public, the requirement of approval from
the DOJ Secretary was still the subject of a pending query by one of
the Registrars and this fact was not known to respondent.
[11] Respondent maintained that she had no intention to violate any
rule of law. Respondent, as a new lawyer relying on the competence
of her superior, admitted that an honest mistake may have been
committed but such mistake was committed without willfulness,
malice or corruption.[12]
Respondent argued that she was not engaged in illegal practice as
a notary public because she was duly commissioned by the court.
[13] Respondent denied that she violated Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713
because she was authorized by her superior to act as a notary public.
Respondent reasoned that her being a notary public complemented
her functions as Deputy Register of Deeds because respondent
could immediately have documents notarized instead of the
registrants going out of the office to look for a notary public.
Respondent added that she did not charge fees for the documents Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In
addition to acts and omissions of public officials
required by the office to be presented under oath.[14] and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following shall constitute
Respondent insisted that contrary to complainants claims, she only prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to
notarized 135 documents as certified by the Clerk of Court of the
be unlawful:
11th Judicial Region, General Santos City.[15] xxx
(b) Outside employment and other
In her Report and Recommendation (Report) dated 25 January activities related thereto. - Public
officials and employees during their
2005, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended incumbency shall not:
to the IBP Board of Governors the dismissal of the complaint xxx
against respondent for lack of merit. The Report reads in part: (2) Engage in the private
practice of their profession
However, the fact that she applied for commission unless authorized by the
as Notary Public without securing the approval of Constitution or law, provided,
the proper authority although she was allowed to that such practice will not
do so by her superior officer, was not her own conflict or tend to conflict with
undoing for having relied on the ample authority their official functions; or
of her superior officer, respondent being a
neophyte in the law profession for having newly xxx
passed the bar a year after at that time.
Records further showed that after having been
reprimanded by Atty. Flestado for said mistake Memorandum Circular No. 17[18] of the Executive Department
which was done in good faith respondent ceased
and desisted to perform notarial work since then allows government employees to engage directly in the private
up to the present as could be gleaned from the practice of their profession provided there is a written permission
Certification issued by Clerk of Court VI Atty.
Elmer D. Lastimosa of the 11th Judicial Region from the Department head. It provides:
General Santos City; dated December 23, 2004
that 135 documents have been notarized by the
respondent from February 29, 1988 to December The authority to grant permission to any official
31 1989 and there was no record of any notarized or employee shall be granted by the head of the
documents from January 19, 1990 to December ministry or agency in accordance with Section 12,
21, 1991.[16] Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules,
which provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee
shall engage directly in any
In a Resolution dated 12 March 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, private business, vocation, or
in adopting and approving the Report, dismissed the case for lack of profession or be connected with
any commercial, credit,
merit. agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written
Complainant claims that in dismissing the complaint for lack of permission from the head of
Department; Provided, That
merit despite respondents admission that she acted as a notary this prohibition will be absolute
public for two years, the IBP Board of Governors committed a in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and
serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction or authority.[17] responsibilities require that
their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government:
Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission
to engage in outside activities,
the time so devoted outside of
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 provides: office hours should be fixed by
the chief of the agency to the
end that it will not impair in
any way the efficiency of the
 other officer or employee: And
provided, finally, That no
permission is necessary in the
case of investments, made by
an officer or employee, which
do not involve any real or
apparent conflict between his
private interests and public
duties, or in any way influence
him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take
part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer
or member of the board of
directors,
Subject to any additional conditions which the
head of the office deems necessary in each
particular case in the interest of the service, as
expressed in the various issuances of the Civil
Service Commission. (Boldfacing supplied)
It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as
a notary public, she did not obtain a written permission from the
Secretary of the DOJ. Respondents superior, the Register of Deeds,
cannot issue any authorization because he is not the head of the
Department. And even assuming that the Register of Deeds
authorized her, respondent failed to present any proof of that written
permission. Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith
because respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary
public after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued in 1986.
Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr., on 01
December 2000. However, the CHR authorized
respondent to act as notary public only on 29
October 2001. Considering the acts of
notarization are within the ambit of the term
practice of law, for which a prior written request
and approval by the CHR to engage into it are
required, the crucial period to be considered is the
approval of the CHR on 29 October 2001 and not
the approval of the RTC on 04 December 2000.[20]
In Muring, Jr. v. Gatcho,[21] we suspended a lawyer for having filed
petitions for commission as a notary public while employed as a
court attorney. We held:
Atty. Gatcho should have known that as a
government lawyer, he was prohibited from
engaging in notarial practice, or in any form of
private legal practice for that matter. Atty. Gatcho
cannot now feign ignorance or good faith, as he
did not seek to exculpate himself by providing an
explanation for his error. Atty. Gatchos filing of
the petition for commission, while not an actual
engagement in the practice of law, appears as a
furtive attempt to evade the prohibition.[22]
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, engaging in the private practice of profession, when
unauthorized, is classified as a light offense punishable by
reprimand.[23]

WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra guilty of

In Yumol, Jr. v. Ferrer Sr.,[19] we suspended a lawyer employed in
engaging in notarial practice without the written authority from the
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) for failing to obtain a
Secretary of the Department of Justice, and accordingly
written authority and approval with a duly approved leave of
we REPRIMAND her. She is warned that a repetition of the same
absence from the CHR. We explained:
or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.

Crystal clear from the foregoing is the fact that

private practice of law by CHR lawyers is not a SO ORDERED.
matter of right. Although the Commission allows
CHR lawyers to engage in private practice, a
written request and approval thereof, with a duly
approved leave of absence for that matter are
indispensable. In the case at bar, the record is
bereft of any such written request or duly
approved leave of absence. No written authority
nor approval of the practice and approved leave of
absence by the CHR was ever presented by
respondent. Thus, he cannot engage in private
practice.
As to respondents act of notarizing documents,
records show that he applied for commission as
notary public on 14 November 2000, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando,
Pampanga, Branch 42. This was granted by RTC