SUBSTANTIALHOLISM

TheodoreScaltsas
SubstancesarethemostunifiedwholesinAristotle'smetaphysics,being
paradigmaticallysinglebutcomplexentities.Myconcerninthispaperistounderstand
thenatureoftheirunity,andthroughit,explicateanimportantaspectoftherelationofthe
potentialtotheactual,whichisfundamentalinAristotle'ssystem.Althoughthenatureof
thisrelationisilluminatedbyexamplesofferedbyAristotle,thisisnotsufficient,inview
oftheenormousexplanatoryweightthatisplacedbyAristotleonthisrelation.An
attemptmustbemadetounderstandwhyitisthatthisrelationcandeliversuch
fundamental,andratherspectaculardenigratedas'magical',byitscriticsmetaphysical
results.
IunderstandAristotle'ssolutiontobethattheunityofasubstanceisnotachieved
byrelatingitscomponentstooneanother;rather,unityisachievedbydissolvingthe
distinctnessofeachofthesubstance'scomponents.Oneofthethreatstotheunityofa
substanceisthemultitudeofthematerialcomponentsthatgointoitscreation,orresult
fromitsdestruction.Thepluralityofthesecomponentsisprimafacieincompatiblewith
theunityofthesubstance.Butitisnotjustthematteroutofwhichthesubstanceis
created,orthematterintowhichasubstanceisdissolved,thatmustbeshownnotto
'pluralize'asubstance.Itisalso,importantly,themanycomponentsofthesubstance,
whicharesynchronouswiththesubstance,namely,itsconstituentmatter,itsproperties,its
form,thatposejustasmuchofathreat,ifnotamoresignificantone,tothesubstance's
oneness.Aconcretesubstanceisacompositeofmatterandform,asAristotlerepeatedly
states.1Therealityofmatterandforminasubstanceisestablishedbyseparateexistential
argumentsthatAristotleoffers,whichthereforeattesttothecomplexnatureofa
substance.2Thus,theunityofasubstanceisputtothetest,notonlybecauseofwhatthere
wasbeforethesubstancewascomposed,andwhattherewillbeafteritdisintegrates,but
alsobecauseofwhatthereiswhilethesubstancelasts.
Thequestionthatconfrontsonethenis,howcanthecompositesubstance,whichis
composedofmatter,form,properties,beone,ratherthanapluralityofmany?Why
doesn'tthiscompositenessofthesubstancerenderitintoasortofaggregate,orclusterof
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copresententities?Itisthisquestionthatwilloccupymuchofourattentioninthispaper.
IwillarguethatAristotle'smetaphysicsoffersthesameanswerfortheunityofa
substance,whetheritscomponentsaretakentopredateit,postdateit,ortobe
synchronouswithit.Thesameansweralsoapplies,whetherthecomponentsareconcrete
orabstractones,sincewhetherthesubstanceisdividedphysicallyorbyabstraction,the
resultisdistinctcomponentsthatareincompatiblewiththeonenessofthesubstance.
Aristotle'ssolutionisthatallthesedistinctcomponentsthatarederivedbydividingthe
substanceeitherphysicallyorbyabstractionareonlyhomonymouslycomponentsofthe
substance.Theyareincorporatedintothesubstantialwholebybeingreidentified,in
accordancewiththeroletheyhaveinthewhole(dictatedbythesubstantialform). 3That
thecomponentsthatgotomakeupasubstanceareidentitydependentontheformis
expressedbyAristotlebyhisclaimthatthecomponentsarepotentiallywhatthesubstance
is.Thepotentialityofthecomponents,whethertheyareconcretebitsofmatterorabstract
entities,isfortheactuality,determinedbythesubstantialform.Thusthereisanidentity
dependencebetweenthecomponentsandwhatthesubstantialwholeis,sincethe
components'potentialityisdeterminedbywhatthesubstantialwholeis.Theresulting
wholeisthereforeunified,notbyinternalrelationsbetweendistinctcomponents,butby
theidentitydependenceofthe(concreteorabstract)componentsonwhatthesubstantial
wholeis.
Oneoftheconclusionsofthepresentanalysiswillbethatabstractingpartsfroma
wholeisasmuchofadivisionofthewholeasphysicaldivision.Abstractionisnotan
ontologicallyneutralwayofdescribingawhole,butitdissectsandpluralizesasmuchas
physicaldispersaldoes.Itisthereforenotopentoametaphysician,andcertainlynot
advocatedbyAristotle,toaccountfortheunityofasubstanceonthephysicallevel,while
treatingitasapluralityofabstractcomponents.MyclaimwillbethatforAristotlea
substanceiscomplex,notbecauseitisaconglomerationofdistinctabstractcomponents
likematter,form,orproperties;asubstanceiscomplexbecausesuchitemscanbe
separatedoutbyabstraction,whichisakindofdivisionoftheunifiedsubstance.
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TypesofUnity.Themaindifficultyintheunificationproblemisnotforthemanyto
makeupsomethingsingle;rather,itisforthemanytoceasebeingmany.BythatImean
thatanynumberofentitiescanbeunifiedintoagroupjustbyincludingtheminagroup.
Thus,thiscar,thattree,andthehousebehinditareone,justbybeingclassifiedas
belongingtothisgroupofthethreeofthem:theyareonegroupofthings.Classification
intoagroupneedsnomorejustificationthanlistingtheitemsofthegroup.Theground
forsuchunityisconvention,andtheresultingonenessisentirelycompatiblewiththe
pluralitythatthethingsinthegroupconstitute.Thistypeofunityisincidentaltothe
thingsthatareunified.Diametricallyopposedtoitissubstantialunity.Asweshallsee,
thegroundsforsubstantialunityaremetaphysical,andtheonenessofasubstanceis
incompatiblewiththepluralityofitscomponents.
Inbetweenthetwoextremesofunification,namelytheconventionalandthe
metaphysicalones,aredifferenttypesandlevelsofunitywhosegroundsarephysical,and
weakmetaphysicalones.Thus,Aristotledistinguishesbetweenbeingonebyjuxtaposition
(asinthecaseofthegrainsofsandinasandhill),beingonebyphysicalconnection(asin
thecaseofabundleofsticks),beingoneinthewaythatanartifactisone,andfinally
beingoneinthewaythatasubstanceisone.4Beforeturningourattentiontothe
metaphysicalunityoforganicsubstances,itshouldbeobservedthatnotanygroupingof
entities,groundedonmetaphysicalrelations,achievestheunityofsubstances.For
example,twodistinctsubstancescanbeonewithrespecttotheirmatter,ifthematterof
thefirstisthematteroutofwhichthesecondwasalsomade.5Buttheironenessis
compatiblewiththeirbeingdistinctandmany.Similarlyforsubstanceswhichareonein
form,orsimplyqualitativelysimilar.Theironenessiscompatiblewiththeirbeingmany.6
Itisdoubtfulwhetherthereisadifferenceofdegreeofunityinthecasesthatresult
fromthingswhichsharethesamematter(atdifferenttimes),orthesameproperty,orthe
samegenus,orspecies.Arethingsthathavebeenmadeoutofthesamematter,e.g.by
remouldingthesamequantityofbrass,moreofaunitythanthingswhicharethesamein
colour,oringenusorinspecies?Thingsthatsharethesamespeciesmaybemoresimilar
thanthingsthatshareapropertyortheirmatter,butaretheymoreofaunity?Generally,
beingoneinthesesensesisbeingsimilarwithrespecttoanaspectoracomponent.But
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thisdoesnotunitethemintoanythingmorethanagroupofdifferentsubstances.Their
beingone(inspecies,matter,quality,etc.)iscompatiblewiththeirbeingapluralityof
manysubstances.
So,thegroupofthecar,tree,andhouse,islessofasinglethingthanasandhill,or
abundleofsticks,andeachoftheseislessofaunitythanalivingorganism.Thereisa
senseinwhicheventhesandhillorthebundleofsticksareaggregatesofmany,orwholes
ofinterrelateddistinctthings.Theparadigmaticunity,namely,substantialunity,isnot
compatiblewithbeingapluralityofmany.Thenatureofsuchaunityisthequestionwith
whichAristotleisconcernedwithinthecentralbooksoftheMetaphysics.Itisnot
sufficientforhimtofindarespectinwhichthemanycomponentsofasubstanceareone,
ifthisleavesthesubstancebeingapluralityofmany.Rather,thecomponentsofa
substanceareoneinthesenseofbeingaunifiedwhole,notapluralityofmany.Whatis
requiredisanaccountofasubstancewhichwillshowittobecomplexwithoutbeing
plural,tobecomplexandatomic.DavidLewishasdescribedthetaskaccurately,although
heaimstoavoidit7inhissystem:'Onthemagicalconception[ofcomposition],a
structuraluniversal8hasnoproperparts.Itisthisconceptiononwhich"simple"mustbe
distinguishedfrom"atomic".Astructuraluniversalisneversimple;itinvolvesother,
simpler,universals....Butitismereologicallyatomic.9Theotheruniversalsitinvolves
arenotpresentinitasparts.'10Aristotledistinguishesbetweenthreetypesofunity
(regardlessofwhethertheunifieditemsareconcreteorabstractentities):aggregates,
relatedwholes,andsubstantialunities.InthispaperIwillconcentrateonthewaythat
unityisachievedinsubstantialwholes.

Aggregates,relatedwholes,andsubstances.Theleastunifieditemisanaggregateof
entities.Anaggregateisacollectionofentitieswhichstandunrelatedtooneanother.The
aggregatecanbedescribedonlybylistingitsmembers;thereisnothingthatunitesits
membersintoagroupofanykind.Inthatsense,thereisnothingthatcanprovideany
groundfortheonenessofanaggregate:itisaplurality,andonlyaplurality,ofits
members.TouseDavidArmstrong'sexample:'Theaggregateofallarmiesisidentical
withtheaggregateofallsoldiers,'11althoughanarmyisnotasoldier.
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Bycontrast,agroupofinterrelatedentitiesdoeshaveaclaimtooneness,because
itconstitutesarelatedwhole.Thus,thestudentsinaclassareoneinsofarastheyare
interrelatedandtogethertheyconstituteasingleentity,theclass.Here,itispossibleto
makedistinctionsbetweeninterrelatedwholes,dependingonthetypeofbondthatrelates
them;e.g.iftheyaremerelyjuxtaposedorunifiedbyglueornails,orbybeingtied
together.12Thereareborderlinecasesbetweenaggregatesandrelatedwholes,and
borderlinecasesbetweenrelatedwholesandsingleobjects.Thus,wemaywaverasto
whethertheobjectsonabeachareanaggregateorarelatedwhole.Wemayalsowaveras
towhetherthesticksinthefencearearelatedwhole,whentheyareincontactwithone
another,orjustanobject,thefence.(Whethersomethingsconstitutearelatedwholeor
notmaybeamatterofconvention,oroffunctionalefficacy,butmayalsobearesultof
scientificconsiderations,e.g.inpoliticalscience,zoology,etc.)
Thequestionthatfacesusfinallyis:ifthereisanythingthathasahigherdegreeof
unitythananinterrelatedwhole,howisthisunityachieved?Theanswertothisquestion
isgivenbyAristotleinhisaggregateargument,andinhisanalysisofthecomponentsofa
substanceintermsofthepotentialactualdistinction.
TheaggregateargumentisofferedinMet.Z.17.Ihaveanalysedthisargumentin
detailelsewhere,13soIwilllimitmydiscussionheretothebriefestmentionofitspremises
anditsconclusion.Aristotlegivestheexampleofasyllableandinvestigateswhetherthe
syllableisanythingotherthanthelettersthatconstituteit.14Heclaimsthatitis:'As
regardsthatwhichiscompoundedoutofsomethingsothatthewholeisonenotlikea
heap,however,butlikeasyllable,thesyllableisnotitselements,baisnotthesameasb
anda,norisfleshfireandearth'(1041b1214).Hisargumentisthefollowing.Givena
wholelikeasyllable,whentheelementsconstitutingthewholearedissolved,thewhole
doesnotexistanymore,buttheelementsdo.Hence,thewholemustbesomethingover
andabovethetotalityofitselements.Ifthedifferencebetweenthewholeanditselements
isafurtherelement,thenthesameargumentappliesagain:ifwedissolvethetotalityof
theelements,thewholewillbenomore,butalltheelementswillbe.Hence,thewhole
cannotdifferfromitselementsbyanelement,sincethisstillleavesthewholeidenticalto
atotalityofelements;buttheelementscansurvivedissolution,quaaggregate,whilethe
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wholecannot.(So,thehypothesisthatawholeisoverandaboveitsconstituentelements
bysomethingpresentinthewholeasanelementofitcannotexplainwhythewholeislost
whendissolved,eventhoughallitselementssurvive.)Therefore,Aristotleconcludes,the
wholemustbeoverandabovethetotalityofitselementsbysomethingwhichisnot
presentinthewholeasafurtherelementinit,butbysomethingthat'isthecausewhich
makesthisthingfleshandthatthingasyllable'(1041b2627).AndAristotlecontinues:
thisisthesubstanceofeachthing;forthisistheprimarycauseofitsbeing;and
since,...asmany[things]asaresubstancesareformednaturallyandbynature,
theirsubstancewouldseemtobethisnature,whichisnotanelementbuta
principle.(1041b2731)
Thisisacomplexconclusiontotheargument,withawealthofmetaphysicalconcepts
beinginterconnectedinit,whosesignificanceweneedtoanalyseinwhatfollows.
Theminimalconclusionthatweneedtodrawfromthisargumentisthattheitemby
whichthewholeisoverandabovethetotalityofitselementsisofadifferentontological
typefromtheseelements.Thisisrequiredforavoidingtheregressthatwouldensue,as
shownintheargument.Thisresult,significantasitisfortheontologyofthesystem,does
notenlightenusastowhatkindofentitythatitemwillbe,otherthanthatitwillnotbe
liketheelementsofthewhole.Aristotledoesdescribeitastheprimarycauseofthebeing
ofthewhole,asthesubstanceofthewhole,asitsnature,anditsprinciple.Althoughall
thesedescriptionsaresuggestive,pointingtoafundamentaldifferencebetweenthe
elementsofthewholeandthatextraitemthatmakesthemintoawhole,muchmoreneeds
tobeexplainedbeforeitisappreciatedpreciselywhatthisdifferenceconsistsin.
Istheaggregateargumenttellingusanythingmorethanthatawholeisoverand
aboveitselementsbyarelation,whichisnotanelementinthewhole,butanitemofa
differentontologicaltype?Initself,thiswouldbeinformative,insofarasitdifferentiates
betweenanaggregateofelements,andarelatedwhole.Namely,anaggregateisidentical
tothetotalityofitselements,whereasarelatedwholeconsistsoftheelementsplusan
entityofadifferentstatus,whichrelatestheelementsintoawhole.Butweknowthatthis
isnotwhatAristotleisdrivingathere.Thereasonisthatheidentifiesthatextraitemwith
thesubstanceoftheresultingwhole,andweknowthatforAristotle,substanceisnot
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relation.15Otherwise,thecategoryofsubstancewouldreducetothecategoryofrelation,
whichwouldmakenonsenseofthewholeofAristotle'smetaphysics.Itisessential,
therefore,thatthecauseofbeingofasubstance,whichunifiesthesubstanceintoawhole,
notbeconstruedasarelation;andthatasubstantialwholebedistinguishedfromarelated
whole.
IhavearguedelsewherethatitispossibletopayjusticetotheAristotelian
distinctionbetweensubstantialformsandrelations,whenwerealizethatwhatis
characteristicofAristotelianrelationsisthattheydonotaltertheidentityoftheirrelata.16
Thus,Callias'beinglargerthanSocrates,orthesun'smovingaroundtheearth,17are
relationswhichdonotdeterminewho,orwhat,Calliasorthesunare.Thisfeature
distinguishesrelationsfromsubstantialforms,asweshallseeinwhatfollows.
TheaggregateargumentofZ.17showsthattheunificationofanaggregateof
elementsintoasubstantialwholerequiresanentityoverandabovetheelementswhichare
unified.Thisnaturallygivesrisetoafurtherproblem:whatunifiestheelementsofthe
aggregateandthisnewentity?Morespecifically,howistheregressofunifiersthat
AristotlewarnsusaboutinMet.Z.17,1041b22,tobeavoided?Certainlytheunifier
cannotbeunifiedwiththeelementsinthewaythattheelementsareunifiedwithone
another(bytheunifier),forthenmoreunifierswouldhavetobepositedtodothatjob,and
theregresswouldensue.Aristotlerealizedthis,andfaceduptotheprobleminBookHof
hisMetaphysics.Hedidsobyintroducingthenotionsofthepotentialandtheactualto
explainhowitispossiblefortheunifiertounitetheelementsofasubstanceintoawhole,
withoutrequiringfurtherunifierstobondtheelementstotheirunifier.Thequestion
facingusis,howisthatpossible?
BeforeembarkingonananalysisofAristotle'ssolution,Iwishtoarguethat
althoughtheaggregateargumentinZ.17ispresentedintermsoftheunityoftheconcrete
componentsofasubstance,infact,italsoappliestotheproblemoftheunityofthe
abstractcomponentsofasubstance.Theargumentdoesnotpresupposetheconcreteness
oftheelementsintheaggregate;rather,itisageneralargumentthatinvestigatestheway
thatanyaggregateofelementscanbeunitedintoawhole.Aristotle'ssolutionappliesto
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anypartwholerelation,whetherthepartsareconcreteorabstract.ThusinH.6he
introducestheproblemoftheunityofwholesasfollows:
Toreturntothedifficultywhichhasbeenstatedwithrespecttodefinitionsand
numbers,whatisthecauseofeachofthem?Inthecaseofallthingswhichhave
severalpartsandinwhichthewholeisnot,asitwere,amereheap,butthetotality
issomethingbesidestheparts,thereisacauseofunity...Andadefinitionisa
formulawhichisonenotbybeingconnectedtogether,...butbydealingwithone
object.Whatthenisitthatmakesmanone;whyisheoneandnotmany,e.g.
animalbiped,especiallyifthereare,assomesay,anidealanimalandanideal
biped?WhyarenotthoseIdeastheIdealman,sothatmenwouldexistby
participationnotinman,norinoneIdea,butintwo,animalandbiped?Andin
generalmanwouldbenotonebutmorethanonething,animalandbiped.Clearly,
then,ifpeopleproceedthusintheirusualmannerofdefinitionandspeech,they
cannotexplainandsolvethedifficulty.Butif,aswesay,oneelementismatterand
anotherform,andoneispotentiallyandtheotheractually,thequestionwillno
longerbethoughtadifficulty.(1045a722,myemphasis)
Plato'saccountofparticipationinFormsrenderssensiblesubstancesintobundlesof
properties.ThepartakerpartakesofForms,andtheresultingsubstanceisanaggregateof
instantiatedForms.Afterconsideringanddismissingtheoptionthatawholeissomething
overandaboveitsparts(bythecauseofitsunity,forAristotle),Platoconcludesthata
substanceisidenticaltoitsparts.18ItisnotclearwhethertheinstancesofFormsina
substanceareuniversal,ortheyareparticular(i.e.tropes19).Butineithercase,theyrender
thesubstanceintoapluralityof(abstract)parts,whichpresentsasmuchofachallengeto
theunityofthesubstantialwholeasthematerialpartsofthesubstancedo.ThusinZ.12
Aristotlepuzzlesabouttheunityoftheformsmentionedinthedefinitionofasubstance:
whereinconsiststheunityofthat,theformulaofwhichwecalladefinition,asfor
instanceinthecaseofman,twofootedanimal;...Why,then,isthisone,andnot
many,namelyanimalandtwofooted?20(1037b1112)
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Andevenifthegenussharesinthem[thedifferentiae],thesameargumentapplies,
sincethedifferentiaepresentinmanaremany,e.g.endowedwithfeet,twofooted,
featherless.Whyaretheseoneandnotmany?(1037b2123)
ForAristotle,theproblemoftheunityofasubstanceisseenasbeingthesamewhether
theconstituentsofasubstanceareabstractorconcreteentities.
Finally,Aristotle'sconcernforthethreatthattheabstractcomponentsina
substanceposefortheunityofasubstanceisfurtherverifiedbythescopehegivestothe
unityquestioninZ.17.Thequestionrangesfromtheunityofamanandbeingmusical
(1041a1014),totheunityofamanandbeingananimalofsuchandsuchanature
(1041a2021),theunityofthesubjectandwhatispredicatedofit(1041a23),ofthesound
andtheclouds(whenitthunders,1041a2425),ofthebricksandthehousetheymakeup,
thebricksandbeingahouse(1041a2527,b56),ofabodyandthestateitisin(1041b7),
andgenerally,ofthemanypartsandthewholetheymakeup(1041b2).InH.3,while
presentingthesecondaggregateargument,21herejectsmerecopresenceasanexplanation
ofwholeness:'thesyllableisnotproducedbythelettersplusjuxtaposition,noristhe
housebricksplusjuxtaposition'(1043b56).
Letusthenaddressthequestionoftheunityoftheabstractcomponentsofa
substance.ForAristotlethiswouldincludeallitemswhichcannotbephysicallyseparated
fromthesubstance,butwhichcanbeseparatedbydescription.22Itdoesnotfollowthat
onlypropertieswouldbeincludedinthisaggregate.Anycomponentofthesubstancethat
isnotphysicallyseparablefromit,butisseparablebyabstractiononly,isabstract,
includingsuchitemsasthematterofthesubstance.Notthematterinthesenseinwhich
thelogisthematterfromwhichtheboxisconstituted,23orinthesenseinwhichwateris
thematterintowhichvinegardisintegrates,24butmatterinthesenseinwhichbreadisthe
matterofaloaf.Breadcannotbephysicallyseparatedfromtheloaf(inthewaythatthe
logisseparatefromtheboxconstructedfromthelog,orthewaterfromthewine);bread
canbeseparatedfromtheloafonlybyabstraction.
Wethereforefacetheproblemoftheunityofasubstance,eveniftheaggregateis
anaggregateofabstractcomponents.Inthecaseofthematterandtheformofthe
substance,theaggregateargumentwouldbeappliedasfollows:Letusassumethata
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substanceistheaggregateofitsmatterandform.Now,thematterofasubstance,e.g.the
woodinapinetree,cansurviveinanothersubstance,e.g.astatue.Theformofthepine
tree,i.e.beingapinetree,alsoexistsinotherpinetrees.25Buttheoriginalpinetreedoes
notexistafterwemakethestatueoutofit.Hence,itispossibleforthematterandthe
formofthepinetreetoexist,withoutthetreeexisting,whichmeansthatthepinetreeis
nottheaggregateofitsmatterandform.26Furthermore,thetreeisnotmatterplusform
plussomefurtherelement,sincethesameargumentwouldapplyagain.Whatisrequired
isthatoneoftheitemsinthetreenotbeanelementofanaggregate,butaprinciplewhich
unifiestherestintoasubstancethetree.
Butitmightbeobjectedthatifthereareindividualforms,theaggregateargument
doesnotgothrough,sincetheformofasubstancecannotexistifthesubstancedoesnot.
Tomaketheobjectionevenstronger,letusassumethat,notonlythesubstantialform,but
asubstance'sproperties,too,canneitherexistinothersubstances,norbedispersed.Iwill
offeranargument,whichIshallcallthetropeoverlapargument,toshowthatasubstance
isoverandabovetheaggregateofitscopresent,particular,properties;i.e.Aristotelian
substancesarenotbundlesoftropes.LetusconsidertheaggregateofSocrates'properties,
andassumethatallthesepropertiesareparticular,i.e.tropes.Notbeinguniversal,the
propertiesdonotexistinothersubstances,andthereforetheargumentpresentedinthe
previousparagraphwouldnotgothrough.27LetusfurtherincludeamongSocrates'
propertiessecondorderrelations,namelyrelationsbetweenfirstorderproperties;for
example,therelationofthenecessarycopresenceofcolourandweight.Itfollowsthatthe
secondorderrelationalpropertieswouldnotsurvivethedispersalofthefirstorder
properties(evenifsuchadispersalcouldbeachieved).Hence,theaggregateofSocrates'
propertieswouldnotsurvivethedispersalofitsmembers.Therefore,theaggregate
argumentcannotbeappliedtotheaggregateofSocrates'tropestoshowthatthataggregate
isdifferentfromSocrates.
ItisnotdispersalthatwillshowthedifferencebetweentheaggregateofSocrates'
copresent,particular,propertiesandSocrates,butoverlap.Withinthecontextof
Aristotelianphysics,letusconsidertheoverlapofasponge,whichissubmergedinwater,
andthewaterinthelocationofthesponge.Withincontemporaryphysics,wecan
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considertheoverlapofSocratesandthenutrinosthatshowerthroughhimallthetime.
Thepropertiesofthewaterandofthespongemakeupanaggregateofcopresent
properties.SimilarlywiththepropertiesofthenutrinosandSocrates.Thepropertiesin
eachaggregatearenotnecessarilycopresent.Butthen,eventhesponge'spropertiesare
notallnecessarilycopresentwitheachother,sincethespongecansurvivechange.
Considerthentheaggregateofthepropertiesofthespongeandofthewater.Whyisthat
aggregatetwothingsandnotone?SimilarlywiththeaggregateofpropertiesofSocrates
andofthenutrinos.Whyaretheynotjustonesubstance,butmany?Thatwecanseparate
thewaterfromthesponge,orSocratesfromthenutrinos,cannothelpusanswerthe
question.Itcouldbethattheinitialaggregateisasinglesubstancethatdividesintowater
andsponge,orSocratesandnutrinos,verymuchlikeanorangedividesintoslices,oran
amoebaintotwoamoebas.Thepossibilityofseparationofthepropertiesinanaggregate
iscompatible,equally,withtheinitialexistenceofonlyone,orofmorethanone,
substance.Hence,thepossibilityofseparationoftheaggregatecannothelpusanswerthe
questionofwhethertheaggregateisonesubstanceormany.
Ifasubstanceisanaggregateofproperties,thentwocopresentsubstanceswill
makeupasinglesubstance,sincetwoaggregatesmakeupasingleaggregate.Butthereis
nosinglesubstancethatthespongeandthewatermakeup,orthatSocratesandthe
nutrinosmakeup.Hence,thesponge,thewater,Socrates,thenutrinos,arenotaggregates
ofproperties.Moregenerally,asubstanceisnotanaggregateofcopresentproperties.A
substancemustdifferfromanaggregatebysomethingotherthanafurtherelement,since
thiswouldstillleavethesubstanceasanaggregate,onlywithmoreelementsinit.A
substancemustdifferfromanaggregatebysomethingthatwillunifythesubstanceina
waythatanaggregateisnotunified.Thewayasubstanceisunifiedmustexplainwhy
twosubstancesdonotmakeupasinglesubstance,whiletwoaggregatesmakeupasingle
aggregate.
Theabove(tropeoverlap)argumentshowsthatthedistinctionbetweenan
aggregateandasubstantialwholeremainsevenwhentheconstituentsofasubstanceare
takentobethesubstance'sparticularpropertiestropes.Itfollowsthattheunificationof
asubstantialwholecannotconsistinaddingafurtherproperty(e.g.aparticularrelational
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orastructuralproperty)totheaggregateofthesubstance'sparticularproperties.That
wouldsimplyaugmenttheaggregateofproperties,e.g.byaparticularrelationalproperty,
butnotunifyitintoawhole.
Fromtheaggregateargumentandthetropeoverlapargument,itfollowsthatthe
abstractcomponentsofasubstancecannotbeunifiedintoawholebyarelation.Aristotle
explicitlyrejectssuchanaccountofunificationinMet.H.6,whenherejectsalltypesof
relationsuchasparticipation,communion,composition,connexion,positedbyhis
predecessorstounitesuchabstractentitiesas:whitenessandsurface,knowingandsoul,
healthandsoul,bronzeandtriangle,bodyandsoul.28Hethereforeowesusanaccountof
theunityofthecomponentsofasubstancethatdoesnotrendertheunifierintoarelation
betweenthesecomponents.Butifnotrelated,howarethecomponentsofasubstance
unifiedintoawhole?IwillarguethataccordingtoAristotle,thecomponentsofa
substanceareunifiedintoawholebylosingtheirdistinctnessastheyareincorporatedinto
thewhole.Itisnotthattheyremaindistinctandrelatedtooneanother;rather,theyare
unifiedbylosingtheirboundaries,likeadropofwaterthatmergeswiththewaterinthe
glassatthecostofitsdistinctness.Whenacomponentlosesitsboundariesbymerging
intothewhole,thecomponentbecomesidentitydependentonwhatthewholeis,and
hence,notcausallyrelatedtothewhole(sinceathingcannotbecausallyrelatedtoitself).
ItisthisidentitydependenceofthesubstantialpartsonwhatthewholeisthatAristotle
aimstopresentbyintroducingthepotentialactualdistinctioninhisfinaldescriptionofthe
unityofasubstantialwhole,inH.6.Briefly,whatischaracteristicofthepotentialactual
relationisthatx'spotentialityisdefinedintermsofy,wherexisnoty(eitherinthe
predicativeorintheidentitysenseof'is').Whenthepotentialityissubstantial,i.e.yisa
substantialform,29theactualisationofthepotentialitychangestheidentityofthepotential.
Whatunitesthepartsofasubstanceintoawholeisthattheyrealizetheirpotentialitytobe
y,therebylosingtheirdistinctnessandbecoming(actually,notinpotentiality)identity
dependentontheform,y.30

SubstantialHolism.TheproblemAristotlewasfacingisdifficult.Ontheonehand,the
aggregateargumentrequireshimtopositanextraitemasaunifierofallthediverse
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elementsthatconstituteasubstance.ButAristotleknewonlytoowellwhatthe
consequencewouldbeofpositingacauseofbeingforasubstancewhichisotherthanthe
substanceitself.Whetherthecauseofbeingisaseparateentity(likethePlatonicForms)
orapartoftheconcretesubstancemakesnodifference;solongasitisdistinctfromthe
concretesubstanceanditispossibletorelatetheconcretesubstancetoitscauseofbeing
bysomekindofcausalrelation,aninfiniteregressensues.Thereasonisthatifthe
essenceofsomethingisadistinctentity,differentfromthatthing,thentheessencewill
itselfhaveadistinctessence,andsoonadinfinitum(1031b281032a4).Sopositinga
substantialform(asaunifierofthesubstance'scomponents)astheaggregateargument
requireswouldthreatentoopenthegatetoaninfiniteregress.Furthermore,thesubstance
wouldthenbearelatedwholeofdistinctcomponents,namelytheformandthematter.
Thisissobecausetheaggregateargumentrequiresthepositingoftheforminasubstance,
andphysicalcontinuityinchangerequiresasubstratumsurvivinginthesubstance.But
thenthesubstancewouldbeaplurality(asrelatedwholesare),notaunifiedwhole.Yet
Aristotlewantstoshowthatasubstanceenjoysafarhigherunitythanthatofarelated
wholeofdistinctcomponents.31Soitseemsthatontheonehandheneedsdifferent
componentstoperformdifferentfunctionsinthesubstance,butontheother,hedoesnot
wantthepluralityofthesecomponentstounderminetheunityofthesubstance.
TheresolutionofthedilemmaisameasureofAristotle'sgenius.Itrestsonthe
introductionofthenotionofpotentiality,whichallowsforsomethingtobepresent
withoutbeingpresent!Thepotentialityispresentalthoughthatwhichdeterminesthe
natureofthepotentiality,namelytheactuality,isnotpresent.Hence,whatisshared
betweenthepotentialandtheactualcannotbeacomponenttheypossessincommon.
TheinnovationthatAristotleisintroducinghereistoexplainsamenessbetweenthe
potentialandtheactualintermsoftwodifferentwaysofbeingf,ratherthanintermsofa
sharedentity.32Then,alongwithsimilarity,difference,andhence,change,canbe
explainedaccordingly.Similarityisnotthesharedpresenceofacomponent,noris
changethereplacementofacomponentinasubstance.Neithersamenessnorchange
requireasubstancetobeaclusterofdistinct,interrelatedcomponents.Rather,throughthe
potentialactualrelation,Aristotleisintroducingidentitydependenceinplaceof
 14

copresenceofcomponents:thecomponentsofasubstanceareidentitydependentonwhat
thewholeis,andthereforecannotexistseveredfromthewhole.Whatasubstance'shares
incommon'withotherthingsexistsonlypotentiallyinasubstance,andcanbederived
onlybydividingthesubstanceup(physicallyorbyabstraction).33Thusasubstance's
componentsare(only)potentiallyentitiesthatcanexistindependentlyofthewhole,and
conversely,entitiesexistingindependentlythewholeare(only)potentiallythesubstantial
whole.
Realisingthataparticularsubstancedependsonthesubstantialformforwhatitis,
withoutthatsubstantialformbeingadistinctconstituentofthatsubstance,isthekeyto
understandingAristotle'saccountoftheunityofasubstance.Insofarastheparticular
substanceisdependentonthe(abstractuniversal)substantialformforwhatitis,the
substanceisposteriortotheform,asassertedbyAristotleatMet.1029a30332.Insofaras
the(enmattered)substantialformistheparticularsubstanceitself,likethesubstance,the
(enmattered)formdependsonthe(abstractuniversal)formforwhatitis,andhenceis
posteriortoit.Butinsofarasthe(abstractuniversal)substantialformexistsonlyasan
abstractionfromparticularsubstances,itisexistentiallydependentonthesubstances.34
Thatitcanbeabstractedfromthemdoesnotmeanthatitexistsburiedwithinthemasa
constituent.Abstractiondivideswhatisunifiedinthewaythatsprinklingdividesthepool
ofwaterintodistinctdrops.Sincetheabstractedformisnotadistinctcomponentinthe
particularsubstance,itdoesnotthreatentheinternalunityofthesubstance.Overall,
Aristotle'spositionisthatthesubstantialformispriortotheparticularsubstancewith
respecttoidentitydependence,butposteriortoparticularsubstanceswithrespectto
existentialdependence,35withoutbeinganactualcomponentinthesubstance,butbeing
derivablefromitbyabstraction.36
Aristotle'srejectionofthePlatonicconceptionofasubstance,37i.e.asbeing
composedofcopresentdistinctcomponents,isexplicitinAristotle'sMetaphysics.InZ.
17heshowsthatasubstanceisoverandabovethetotalityofthedistinctmaterialparts
intowhichitcanbedivided,(1041b2533);inZ.16hearguesthatthepartsofanimalsare
notdistinctcomponentsinthesubstantialorganisms(1040b515);inZ.13heshowsthat
theuniversalscharacterisingasubstancecannotbedistinctcomponentsinthesubstance,
 15

onpainofaninfiniteregress(1038b1723);andinZ.6heshowsthatthesubstantialform
ofasubstancecannotbeadistinctcomponentinthatsubstance,onpainofaninfinite
regress,(1031b2830).ForAristotle,thecomponentsofasubstance,whetherconcreteor
abstract,emergewhenwedividethesubstanceup,eitherphysicallyorbyabstraction.
Whatthismeansisthattheentitiesthatemergefromthedivisionofthesubstancedonot
existinthesubstancebutonlypotentially.Similarlyforthecomponentsthatpredatethe
substanceandgointothemakeupofthesubstancebybeingincorporatedintothe
substantialwhole.Theyexistbeforemergingintothewhole,butnotinthewhole.Itis
notthatthesecomponentsvanishintothinairwhenincorporatedintothesubstance;
rather,itisthattheylosetheirboundariesandhencetheirdistinctness.Toreturntothe
dropofwaterexample,theboundariesthatdistinguishandindividuatethedropofwater
arelostwhenthedropbecomesanondistinctcomponentofthewaterintheglass.
Similarlywiththecomponentsthatconstituteasubstance;'alltheparts[oflivingthings
andthecorrespondingpartsofthesoul]mustexistonlypotentially,whentheyareoneand
continuousbynature,notbyforceorevenbygrowingtogether'(1040b1415).
Further,justaswecandividethewaterintodrops,whichdonotexistasdistinct
componentsintheglass,butonlypotentially,thuswecandivideasubstanceup,either
physicallyintoconcretecomponents,orbyabstractionintoabstractcomponents.The
entitiesthatemergefromthesedivisionsdonotexistinthesubstance,anymorethanthe
dropsexistintheglass.AccordingtoAristotle,dividingasubstanceupintoconcrete
componentsproducesitemsthatarenotpresentinthesubstance;hesays:'weshalldefine
eachpart,ifwedefineitwell,notwithoutreferencetoitsfunction....[thepartsofthe
body]cannotevenexistifseveredfromthewhole;foritisnotafingerinanystatethatis
thefingerofalivingthing,butthedeadfingerisafingeronlyhomonymously'(1035b16
25,myemphasis).Thedeadfingerisnotasubstantialcomponent,buthasdisintegrated
intomatter(1035b21).Itisafingerinnameonly,notintheaccountthatstateswhatitis.
Accordingtothehomonymyprinciple,then,separationfromasubstantialwholeinvolves
thereidentificationoftheemergingcomponents.Inconclusion,then,thesubstantial
componentsareneverdistinct;theyexistonlyboundtogetherseamlesslyinthesubstance,
likethewaterdropsinthewater.
 16

PotentialityEntailsHomonymy.Whatshouldbeemphasizedforourpresentpurposes
isthatpotentialityentailshomonymy.Ifxispotentiallyaythenxishomonymoulsyay.
Thereasonisthatalthoughwecansaythatxisay,e.g.thesebricksareahouse,38xisnot
actuallyay,butonlypotentiallyso.Inthatsense,anaccountofwhatxactuallyiswould
notbeanaccountofwhatayis.Soxisonlyhomonymouslyay.Thepotentialheremay
bealog,oralumpofbronze,oritmaybeanabstractentitylikebiologicalmatteroflow
organisation,orthematerialsubstratum,e.g.thewoodinthelogwhichispotentially
Hermes,orthebodyinahumanbeing.(Aristotledoesseeaparallelbetweentherelation
ofthebodytothehumanbeingitconstitutes,andthebrickstothehousetheyconstitute.39)
Moregenerally,anythingthatconstitutesasubstance(whetherpiecesofconcretematter,
bundlesofproperties,orclustersofopposites)ishomonymouslythesubstance.Forthe
substancetoexistinactuality,theseconstituentsmustmergebybecomingreidentifiedin
accordancewiththeprincipleofthesubstantialform.
Supposeitisobjectedthattherearealwaysentitiesinanactualsubstancewhichare
onlyhomonymouslythatsubstance;namelythatthereis,actuallyexistinginthe
substance,anaggregateofcomponentswhosenatureisindependentofwhatthesubstance
is.E.g.thefirstelementsearth,water,fire,andair.MyclaimisthatAristotlewould
thenconcludethattherewouldbenosubstance.Whattherewouldbeistheaggregateof
components(svrw,1040b810),having(perimpossibile)thesubstantialformastheir
accident.Ifitwerecounterclaimedthatboththeaggregateofcomponentsandthe
substanceareactualandcopresent,onlyatdifferentlevelsofinternalstructure,thenthese
twoactualitieswouldberelatedtooneanotherbyarelationotherthanfulfilmentof
potentiality.Thisisbecauseitcannotbethecasethatthelowerlevelisactuallyonething,
theupperlevelisactuallyanotherthing,andthattheupperlevelisalsotheactualityofthe
lowerlevel.Thelowerlevelthingcannotbetwoactualities.So,addinglevelsof
compositionbetweenwhatconstitutesandwhatitconstitutescannotallowfortwodistinct
actualitiesnamelywhatconstitutes,andwhatitconstitutestocompriseoneandthe
samesubstance.Rather,twosuchactualitieswouldhavetoberelatedbythekindof
relationthatAristotledismissedwhenherejectedparticipation,communion,composition,
 17

connection,andanyotherkindofmetaphysicalbridge,betweenwhatconstitutesandwhat
itconstitutes.40Herejectedthembecausethetotalitywouldbearelatedwholeofdistinct
actualities,notasubstance.
Wehavealreadyseenthattheunityofasubstanceisthreatened,notonlyby
distinctconcretecomponents,butequallybydistinctabstractcomponents.Toindividuate
acomponentbyabstractingitfromthesubstanceistodividethesubstance.Thisdivision
hasthesameeffectasphysicaldivision:theentitythatemergestheabstractentityis
notpresentinthesubstance.Theabstractentitythatemergesisnotanactualcomponent
ofthesubstanceanymorethanaseveredarmisanactualarm.Separationfromthe
substancedestroystheidentitydependenceonwhatthesubstantialwholeis.Thus,the
abstractedentityemergeswithanidentityofitsown,verymuchliketheseveredarm,or
thedropofwaterthatisseparatedfromthewaterintheglass.Generally,anyprocessby
whichwedividethesubstanceupintodistinctcomponentsisaprocessofgenerating
entitiesthatareindependentoftheformofthesubstance;hence,theyareentitiesthatdo
notexistinthesubstance.41
Inthewaterdropexample,wesawthatthedrop'smergingwiththewaterinthe
glassinvolvedthelossoftheboundariesthatseparateditintoadistinctentity.The'fate'
ofthedropwasdeterminedbythenatureoftheentityitmergedinto.Similarlywithany
entitythatbecomesaconstituentofasubstance.Itsincorporationintothesubstance
involvesthelossofthe'boundaries'thatseparateitintoadistinctentity,andits
reidentificationinaccordancewiththeroleithasinthewhole;e.g.inanimatematter
becomeslivefleshorbloodorbonewhenincorporatedintoanorganism.Withoutthis
reidentification,theincorporatedcomponentswouldremaindistinct,andthesubstantial
wholewouldbeidenticaltotheaggregateofthesecomponents.Thecaseisthesamewith
abstractentities.Socratesisnotanaggregateofdistinctpropertiessuchas'whitecolour',
'smallsize',etc.Itisnot'whitecolour'thatexistsinSocrates.Rather,theincorporationof
'whitecolour'intoSocratesresultsinwhiteSocrates.Properties,andotherkindsof
abstractentity,donotretaintheirdistinctnessascomponentsofasubstance.Otherwise
theywouldsimplybecopresent,aselementsinanaggregate.But,aswehaveseen,
substancesarenotaggregates.ThecolourwhiteisnotcopresentwithSocrates;itlosesits
 18

distinctnessandmergesintothewhole,resultinginawhitewholeratherthaninSocrates
plusthecolourwhite.
Thesubstantialformdictatestheprincipleofreidentificationforthecomponents
thatmergeintothesubstantialwhole.Sothewhole,alongwiththerestofthe
components,dependontheformforwhattheyare.Themergingofthevarious
componentsintermsoftheprincipleoftheformdoesnotalterwhattheformis,forthen
therewouldhavetobeafurtherprincipleofreidentificationforallofthem,andsoonad
infinitum.Nor,ontheotherhand,couldtheformretainitsdistinctnesswithinthe
substantialwhole,withoutunderminingtheunityofthesubstance.Thus,althoughthe
unificationofthecomponentsintermsoftheformpreservestheprincipletheformstands
for,itdoesnotpreservethedistinctnessoftheform:theunificationofthevarious
elementsintoawholebytheformgivestheformnumber.Theunifiedelementsarethe
enmatteredform,theparticularsubstance,whichdiffersfromtheuniversal,abstractform,
notinwhatitis,butinthatithasnumber(or,concreteness).Havingnumberisnothing
butbeinganactiveunityofthesortthatsubstantialformscan'holdtogether'.42The
distinctionbetweentheforminabstraction,whichistheprincipleofreidentificationofthe
substantialcomponents,andtheformactivelyunifyingthewholeiscapturedbyAristotle
inhisdistinctionbetweenbeinganactualityandbeinginactuality.43Inabstraction,the
formisanactuality,quaprincipleofunification;butwhenactivelyunifyingthevarious
substantialelements,theformisanactualityinactuality,namelytheconcretesubstance
itself.44

UnityandComplexity.Themetaphysicalpositionthathasemergedfromthisanalysisis
thatasubstancedoesnotcontainanydistinctcomponents.Itmakesnodifferencewhether
thecomponentswouldbeconcreteorabstract,particularoruniversal,substrataor
properties.Solongaswhattheyarewouldnotdependonthewhatthewholetheyjoined
is,theywoulddividethatwholeintoelementsandrenderitanaggregate.Hence,
integrationintoasubstantialwholerequiresthereidentificationofthemerging
components.Theidentitydependenceofthecomponentsonwhatthewholeisresultsina
seamlesslyunifiedwhole,ratherthanacomplexofinterrelatedbutdistinctelements.
 19

Itfollowsthattheonlygenuinepartsofasubstantialwholearetheonesthatare
dependentonwhatthewholeisforwhattheyare.Thereasonisthat,ifthepartsare
identitydependentonwhatthewholeis,theaggregateargumentparadoxdoesnotapply,
becauseasubstanceisshownnottobea(mereological)aggregateofparts.Forthe
aggregateargumenttoapply,itmustbethattheaggregateofthepartssurvivesthe
dispersal,whilethewholedoesnot.Butifthepartsareidentitydependentonwhatthe
wholeis,sincethewholedoesnotsurvivethedispersal,norwilltheparts,andhence,nor
theaggregateofthepartseither.
Identitydependenceonwhatthewholeisalsoblocksthetropeoverlapargument.
Thereasonisthatforpartstoconstituteasubstantialwhole,theymustbemorethan
merelycopresent.Theymustbeidentitydependentonwhatthesubstantialwholeis.
Hence,merecopresenceofpartsdoesnotconstituteasubstance,althoughitdoes
constituteanaggregateofparts.Thatiswhytheoverlapofsubstancesdoesnotgeneratea
newsubstance,whileanytwoaggregatesoftropesmakeupasingleaggregateoftropes.
Thatasubstanceisnotcomposedofdistinctelementsdoesnotentailnominalism.
Aristotleisarealistaboutuniversals,butthatdoesnotrequireuniversalstobedistinct
componentsinsubstances.Infact,hearguesexplicitlyagainstthispositioninMet.Z.13,
whereheshowsthatuniversalsdonotexistasdistinctentitiesevenascomponentsof
substance(1038b1723).Butuniversalscanbederived,anddefinedindependentlyofthe
substancestheyarein,byabstraction.Thisistheonlykindofseparatenessthattheycan
enjoyinAristotle'sontology.Thefactthatuniversalscannotexisteitherasphysically
separateentities,orasdistinctcomponentsofsuchentities,doesnotentailthattheyare
fictionsofthemind.Ifthatwerethecase,thenunrealizedpossibilitieswouldalsohaveto
beexistentiallydependentonthemindsthatconceivethem,whichiscertainlynotthecase;
unrealizedpossibilitieswouldhaveexistedeveniftherewerenomindstothinkofthem.
Abstractionisnotimagination.Itisawayofsinglingoutentitieswhichcannotexistas
physicalthings.Thattheycannotexistasphysicalthingssayssomethingabouttheir
nature,nottheirreality.
Similaritybetweensubstancescanbeexplainedinarealistveinintermsof
universals,eventhoughuniversalsarenotdistinctelementsinthesubstances,nor
 20

physicallyseparable;twosubstancesaresimilarifthesameuniversalcanbeabstracted
awayfromeachofthem.Thesameholdsforallabstractitemsofasubstance,e.g.
substantialform,materialsubstratum,qualitiesofanykind.Noneofthemexistsasa
distinctcomponentinthesubstance,butsimilaritybetweensubstancesisexplainedby
derivingbyabstractionthesamesubstantialform,ormaterialsubstratum,orquality,from
eachofthesubstances.
Theabstractcomponentsofasubstancecannotexistinthesubstance,anymore
thanwhatonedoescancoexistintheactualworldwithwhatonemighthavedone.The
abstractcomponentsexistpotentiallyinthesubstance,insofarastheycanbederivedfrom
itbyabstraction.Inthatsense,asubstanceiscomplex,notbecauseitisplural,consisting
ofdistinctelements,butbecauseitcanbedividedupintodistinctcomponents(concreteor
abstractones).ThecomplexityofasubstanceallowsAristotletoexplainsimilarityand
change.Itsunityallowshimtoexplainsubstancehood.
21
E.gMet.1029a3031,1033b2426,1035a1921,1037a79.
1

IthusagreewithFrede(thisvolume,pp.2324)thatmatterandformarerealforAristotle,
2

although,theyarenotinactualityinasubstance.Ourconcernwillbetoshow,first,the
differencebetweenbeingrealandbeinginactuality,andsecond,whyamultitudeofreal
componentsdoesnotresultinthesubstancebeingmany.
Inwhatfollows,Ishallspeakofthedependenceoftheconstituentsonthewhole,meaning
3

thattheydependonwhatthewholeis,notwhichwholeitis.
E.g.,Met.1052a1525.
4

Phys.190b2425,Met.1016a2728.
5

Met.1016b3617a3.AmorepeculiarlyAristotelianandratherfancifulcaseofunityisthe
6

unityofthewhiteentitywiththemusicalentity,whenithappensthatoneandthesame
substanceiswhiteandmusical(Met.1017a718).Here,theunityinvolvedismetaphysical,
notphysical.Thewhiteandthemusicalarenotgroupedtogetherbecausetheyoverlapinthe
samespaceatatime.Thatwouldbeverysimilartotherelationofaspongeandthewaterthat
permeatesitspores,whichisnomorethanakindofjuxtaposition,sinceitispossibleto
physicallyseparatethespongefromthewater.Butinthecaseofthewhiteandthemusicalwe
cannotseparatethetwoentitiesphysicallyfromoneanother.Theirrelationisnotphysical,but
metaphysical:theyarebothinstantiatedinthesamesubstance;belongingtothatsubstanceas
subjectiswhatgroupsthemtogetherintoaclass.
InScaltsas(1990),IhavearguedthatDavidLewiscannotavoidthiskindofunityeven
7

withinhisownontology.(Seeinparticularpp.595.)
Forourpresentpurposes,astructuraluniversalcanbethoughtofasasubstantialform.
8

I.e.,itdoesnothavedistinctelements,inthewaythat(forAristotle)theelementsofan
9

aggregatearedistinct.Seethediscussionoftheaggregateargumentbelow.
10
DavidLewis(1968:36),myemphasis.
11
Armstrong(1978:30)
12
Met.1052a1920.Aristotleintroducesfurthercriteriaofunity,e.g.dependingonthedegree
towhichathing'smovementisoneandindivisibleinplaceandtime.
 Scaltsas(1985).Thisisanexistentialargumentforthesubstantialforminasubstance,
13

whichoffersmetaphysicalreasonsforpositingsubstantialforms,ratherthanmerelylinguistic
oneswhichWilliamCharltonmentions(thisvolume:1617).
InScaltsas(1990)IshowedtheproximitybetweentheaggregateargumentandPlato's
14

discussionofthepartwholerelationintheTheaetetus,204205.
SeethedistinctionintheCategoriesbetweenthesubstancecategoryandthecategoryofthe
15

relativesrelations,andMet.1088a23,a30,b2,EN1096a21.
InScaltsas(1990:588589).
16

Met.1040a2931.
17

Theaetetus205a810.SeemydiscussionofthePlatonicaccountoftheunityofsubstances,
18

Scaltsas(1990:583585).
Tropesareinstancesofpropertieswhichareparticularnotuniversal;forexample,the
19

particularwisdomorwhitenessinstantiatedinSocrates.
ItshouldnotbethoughtthatAristotleisnotconcernedherewithontologicalunity.Thathe
20

isbecomesclearfromthefactthatheimmediatelycomparestheissueathandwiththeunityof
manandbeingwhiteinawhiteman:'Forinthecaseof"man"and"white"thereisaplurality
whenonetermdoesnotbelongtotheother,butaunitywhenitdoesbelongandthesubject,
man,hasacertainattribute;forthenaunityisproducedandwehavethewhiteman'
(1037b1418).Heretheunityisontological(thesubject,man,hastheattribute,white),not
definitional.
ForananalysisofthesecondaggregateargumentinH.3,seeScaltsas(1985:229230).
21

Met.1042a29.Singlingouttheformbydescriptiondividesthesubstanceintotwoabstract
22

components,matterandform.
Met.,1049a2324.
23

Met.,1045a12.
24

ThereissomeaffinitybetweentheargumentIamdevelopinghereandoneusedby
25

Armstrong(1991:189200).Armstrong'sargumenthastodowiththetruthmakerforthe
proposition'aisF',whichrequiresmorethantheexistenceofaandF.
 Asweshallsee,thesolutionAristotleoffersisthatasubstanceisnotanaggregateofmatter
26

andform.Rather,formisaprinciple,notanelementoftheaggregateofsubstantial
components,andthecomponentsthatgointothemakeupofthesubstancearepotentiallywhat
thatprinciplestandsfor.Iftheformwerenotitselfaprinciple,thensomesuchprinciplewould
berequiredfortheunificationofthematterwiththeforminasubstance.
Itwasthereassumedthattheformof'pinetree'ofthistreealsoexistsinotherpinetrees.
27

Met.1045b716.
28

E.g.ofthebrickstobecomeahouse,ratherthantheirpotentialitytobecomebleachedbythe
29

sunlight.
30
ItfollowsfromthisthatIdisagreewithoneoftheviewssketchedoutinDavidCharles'
contributioninthepresentvolume,the'nonexplanatoryview',accordingtowhich:'ifone
representsanimaltwofootedintheform:matter:shape::potentiality:actuality,nofurther
explanationoftheirunityisneeded.Thisisexplanatorybedrock.Nothingmorecanbesaidto
explaintheunityofacompositesubstance,becausethesenotionsareabstractionsfromthatofa
unifiedcompositesubstance'Charles(presentvolume,16).Butabstractionisnotontologically
neutral;rather,itinterfereswiththeidentityofthecomponentsofasubstance.Itistherefore
notclearwhytheextractedabstractentitieswouldexplainanythingabouttheunityofthe
componentsofasubstance.Evensayingthattheyareoneasthepotentialisonewiththeactual
isinneedofexplanation.Aristotleoffersthisexplanationthroughhishomonymyprinciple,as
weshallseebelow.
Theyaredistinctbecausetheformwouldbedefinableindependentlyofthematter,andthe
31

materialsubstratumwouldhaveanatureandlifespanindependentlyoftheformitenmatters.
SharingdistinctcomponentsincommonwasthePlatonicwayofexplainingsameness,e.g.
32

sharingapartoftheFormwiththeForm.
AlthoughIagreewithandSellarsandKosman,whosepositionsLewisquotes(thisvolume,
33

pp.89)thatmatterandformarenotindividualsintheworld,Idonotthinkthatthematterand
formofasubstancearealternativedescriptionsofthesubstance.Rather,theyareentitiesthat
arederivedbyabstraction,whereabstractioninvolvesthedivisionofthesubstanceintoabstract
entities.
SallyHaslangerdescribesmypositionaspresentingthe'formtobe"identitydependent"on
34

thesensiblesubstance'(Haslanger,thisvolume:55,note39).Infact,accordingtomyposition,
thesubstanceisidentitydependentontheabstract(universal)form.Againaccordingtomy
position,andunlikeHaslanger's,thereisnosuchentityastheenmatteredformwhichis
differentfrom,andacomponentof,theconcretesubstance.Theenmatteredformisthe
substanceitself.Thereforeneitherconstrualoftheform(abstractorenmattered)onmy
positiontreatstheformasbeingidentitydependentonsomethingmoreprimary,theconcrete
substance.Hence,Haslanger'sargumentsagainsttreatingtheformasdependentonthe
substancedonotapplytomypositionasshethinkstheydo.
Theuniversalformisofcoursenotexistentiallydependentontheparticularsubstancefrom
35

whichitisabstractedatleastinthecaseofthetheorganicsubstances,theparexcellence
Aristoteliansubstances.Rather,itisexistentiallydependentontheinfinitelymanymembersof
thespecies.
Onarelatedpoint,IdonotunderstandwhyCharlotteWitt(thisvolume:26,note14)
thinksthatonecannothaveanactualcausewhichdoesnotexistatthattime.Mygrandfatheris
anactualcauseofmine,althoughhedoesnotexist.ThisinfactresolvesthepuzzlethatWitt
addressesinhercontribution,althoughWittdoesnotembracetheposition.
36
Thisposition,whichIampropoundinginmypaper,isnotoneoftheones
entertained/criticisedinSallyHaslanger'spaperinthisvolume.
SeeScaltsas(1990:583588).
37

Met.1041b6.
38

'Thequestioniswhythematterissomeindividualthing,e.g.whyarethesematerialsa
39

house?Becausethatwhichwastheessenceofahouseispresent.Andwhyisthisindividual
thing,orthisbodyinthisstate,aman?Thereforewhatweseekisthecause,i.e.theform,by
reasonsofwhichthematterissomedefinitething;andthisisthesubstanceofthething.'Met.
1041b59.
Met.1045b716.
40
 FrankLewisandMaryLouiseGilldevelopanotionofconcurrentmatterwithinthe
41

substance,whichsurvivespotentiallyinthesubstance.SeeLewisforadiscussionofthe
contributionthattheingredientsinpotentialitymaketothesubstance(thisvolume:note51),
andMaryLouiseGill,whoattributesaconceptionoflowerconcurrentmattertoAristotle(this
volume:18),wheremattersurvivesonlypotentially(:4),asmaterialpropertiesinthesubstance
(:13).
ForadetailedanalysisoftheparticularityofAristoteliansubstances,andmyresponsetoKit
42

Fine'spuzzle(thisvolume),seeScaltsas(forthcoming,chp.7).
InScaltsas(1985:227,or1992:201202)IshowthatAristotleusestheterm'nrgeia' in
43

thedativetotalkofsomethingbeinginactuality,whileinthenominativethetermcanreferto
anactualitywhichisnotinactuality(e.g.asubstantialformwhichisnotenmattered).
44
SallyHaslanger'saccountdiffersfrommineinthatshedoesnotdistinguishbetweenthe
formbeinganactualityfromtheformbeinginactuality.AccordingtoherUBHprincipleof
substantialunity,theform'sbeinganactualityisitsbeinginactuality(presentvolume,pp.41
42).Importantly,forHaslangeritisnotthecompositesubstance,buttheform,thatisin
actuality,i.e.beingactivelytheform;thecompositesubstanceonlyhastheform.Thisimposes
adegreeofdistinctnessoftheformwithintheconcretesubstancewhichisincompatiblewith
thesubstance'sunity.Further,itshiftssubjecthoodfromtheconcretesubstancetotheformof
thesubstance,invitingtheproblemsthatfollowfromsuchadisplacement.(SeeScaltsas
(forthcoming:section7.2).)
Onmyaccount,theabstractformisnotanactivity,butaprincipleofwhataconcrete
substanceis.Theformisanactivityonlywheninactuality,i.e.whenenmattered.Butthe
enmatteredformisthesubstanceitself.Thereisnodistinctionbetweentheforminactuality
andtheconcretesubstance;hence,noontologicalgapbetweenthesubjectthathastheformand
thesubjectthatactivelyistheform.