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PNOC
G.R. No. 167057 | April 11, 2012
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Topic: Mandatory of Prohibitory Laws
The said contract consisted of four (4) components, namely: PIA, PIB and PIC
or woodpoles and P3 or crossarms, necessary for NEAs projected allocation
for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. In response to the said invitation, bidders,
such as private respondent [Nerwin], were required to submit their
application for eligibility together with their technical proposals.
On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy
appeared to have filed a complaint, citing alleged false or falsified
documents submitted during the pre-qualification stage which led to the
award of the IBP-80 project to private respondent [Nerwin]. Thus, finding a
way to nullify the result of the previous bidding, NEA officials sought the
opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel who, among others, upheld
the eligibility and qualification of private respondent [Nerwin]. Dissatisfied,
the said officials attempted to seek a revision of the earlier opinion but the
Government Corporate Counsel declared anew that there was no legal
impediment to prevent the award of IPB-80 contract to private respondent
[Nerwin]. Notwithstanding, NEA allegedly held negotiations with other
bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting private respondent
[Nerwin] to file a complaint for specific performance with prayer for the
issuance of an injunction, which injunctive application was granted by Branch
36 of RTC-Manila in Civil Case No. 01102000.
Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW
Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila alleging that
Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a portion of the items
covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to
enjoin respondents proposed bidding for the wooden poles.
Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that
the complaint averred no cause of action, violated the rule that government
infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs, contravened the
mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the corporate
president had no authority to sign and file the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of
Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme Court, on
government projects.
HELD: NO. In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it
annulled and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC issued on July 20, 2003
and December 29, 2003, and why it altogether dismissed Civil Case No.
03106921, as follows:
Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even from the facts
of the case, that would justify respondent Judges blatant disregard of a
simple, comprehensible and unequivocal mandate (of PD 1818) prohibiting
the issuance of injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure
projects. Respondent Judge did not even endeavor, although expectedly, to
show that the instant case falls under the single exception where the said
proscription may not apply, i.e., when the matter is of extreme urgency
involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining
order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
TOPIC: WAIVER OF RIGHTS (Art. 6)
FACTS:
1. Vito Borromeo died on March 13, 1952, without forced heirs but leaving
properties in Cebu.
2. Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition
for the probate of a one page document as the last will and testament
left by the said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas,
Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided
shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof.
3. Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28, 1960,
after due trial, the probate court held that the document presented as
the will of the deceased was a forgery.
4. The trial court issued an order declaring several heirs, to the exclusion
of others, as the intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo. It also ordered that
the estate be divided in equal and proportionate shares among the 9
court-declared intestate heirs.
5. On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier
claimed as heir under the forged will, filed a motion before the trial
court praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased
Vito Borromeo. The court dismissed this claim.
6. Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the
memorandum he submitted to support his motion for reconsideration,
Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate.
ISSUE: Did the heirs execute a valid waiver of hereditary rights over
their respective inheritance to Fortunato Borromeo?
HELD: NO. The waiver was invalid because not all elements were
present.
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PONENTE: Sereno, J.
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the
country. Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths
emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu;
Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo
in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center;
Joselito Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito
Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in Baguio City.
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case
the general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to
observe a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system "[N]o act
constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law." Nullum crimen, nulla
poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace
as immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law
prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are called upon
to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and
to rule strictly based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in
evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258
(Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No.
155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v.
Escalona).
FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:
[2.] No. The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right of the
accused to speedy trial.
RATIO:
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over
from one judge or justice to another at the trial court, at the CA, and even
at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the reception of the evidence
of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case
has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue.
Since the key facts necessary to decide the case have already been
determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE CAS DISMISSAL OF THE
CASE AGAINST ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF THE VIOLATION OF THEIR
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
[2.] The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in
Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This right requires
that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays. The
right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified
postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive. In
determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more
than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case. The conduct of both the prosecution and the
defense must be weighed. Also to be considered are factors such as the
length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice
wrought upon the defendant.
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended
Information was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez,
Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera. On 29 November 1993, they
were all arraigned.Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not
commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have
been prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity
accused Dizon and Villareal restrained themselves from insisting on
reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the
reopened initiation rites having in mind the concept of "seniority" in
fraternities the implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a
point of review in future legislation. We further note that some of the
fraternity members were intoxicated during Lennys initiation rites. In this
light, the Court submits to Congress, for legislative consideration, the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
CASE 4
THORNTON VS THORNTON
GR NO 154598; CORONA,J:
Topic: Repeal (implied) of Laws
Facts:
2 Thorntons, petitioner is the father, respondent is the mother;
American and Filipina respectively. The two had a daughter and respondent
became a housewife. She got bored as a housewife and went back to
working as a GRO in night clubs. One night, she ran away, bringing their
daughter with them. Petitioner filed initially a case for Habeas Corpus in the
FAMILY COURT OF MAKATI but was dismissed because of an allegation
that the two were in Basilan. After some credit card bills returned that a
purchase was made in Cavite, petitioner filed for Habeas Corpus, this time in
the COURT OF APPEALS.
This was dismissed because according to the CA, RA 8369, the Family
Courts Act gave exclusive jurisdiction to the Family Courts for petitions of
Habeas Corpus pertaining to guardianship, and custody of children.
According to the CA this repealed the provision in BP 129 giving the Court of
Appeals exclusive jurisdiction on Habeas Corpus cases (Habeas Corpus writs
issued by the CA have National Application).
Issue:
Did the CA err in dismissing the case? Did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP
129s provision on allowing CA to issue Habeas Corpus, at least to cases
cognizable in the Family Court?
Held:
No. (ganito ipasok sa recit). The Courts will always look down on
implied repeal of laws. RA 8369 did not contain a provision that removed
the power of the CA in issuing Habeas Corpus Writs pertaining to cases
Cognizable by the Family Courts. Thing is, basic is it in Statutory Construction
that interpretare et concordare legibus et optimus interpretandi the
interpretation of laws , with laws, is the best mode of interpretation. It is not
the intent of RA 8369 to limit the CAs power. Besides, it would be better to
acquire a writ from the CA in cases like this where the whereabouts of the
child changes form tiem to time, or at least is uncertain.
Writ of Habeas Corpus issued by the Family Court only has application
as to the issuing Courts territorial jurisdiction whereas the one issued by the
CA has national application.
Case was remanded to the CA for the propriety of the issuance of a Habeas
Corpus writ.
FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010
occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to
Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section
15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to
start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for
the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of
the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice
Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters
dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had
the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that
the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations
on the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to
ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from
political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President
shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
ISSUE: :
WON the appointment of the Chief Justice falls under the bar on midnight
appointments as stated in Art. VII Sec 15 of the Constitution.
HELD: NO.
We reverse Valenzuela.
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15,
Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission
confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive
Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to
appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC
and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for
judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the
JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to
the Judiciary. If midnight appointments in the mold of Aytona were
made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief
Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to
subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship, [77] the
appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC
would not be suffering from such defects because of the JBCs prior
processing of candidates. Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory
construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is
a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the
enactment, because the reason for the enactment must necessarily
shed considerable light on the law of the statute, i.e., the intent;
hence, the enactment should be construed with reference to its
intended scope and purpose, and the court should seek to carry out
this purpose rather than to defeat it.[78]
4. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and
Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the President.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same
character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The
fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within
the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also
applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent
with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.[84] It is absurd to assume that the
framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and
Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to
the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within
Section 4 (1) thereof.
6. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need
for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period
the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1),
Article VIII, because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90
days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining.
The argument also rests on the fallacious assumption that there will
still be time remaining in the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article
VIII. The fallacy is easily demonstrable, as the OSG has shown in its
comment.
Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the
second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the
earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections
are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such
elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days.
Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-
day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that
there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the
difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109
days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the
outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the
constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe
to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended
such an absurdity. In fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory
period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices under Section 4
(1), Article VIII, the framers neither discussed, nor mentioned, nor
referred to the ban against midnight appointments under Section 15,
Article VII, or its effects on the 90-day period, or vice versa. They did
not need to, because they never intended Section 15, Article VII to
apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any of the lower courts.
xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
xxx
ISSUE: :
HELD: NO.
Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President
the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable
the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the
occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the
President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period
allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment. For
the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will
thereby effectively and illegally deprive the President of the ample time
granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the
nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the
Presidents mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its
selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to
the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions
for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President
the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to
constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in
performing that duty.[88] For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there
should be an unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the
Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
FACTS:
On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order finding the respondents
application for registration sufficient in form and substance and setting it for
initial hearing on February 21, 2002. The scheduled hearing was later reset
to May 30, 2002.
On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called an initial hearing, only the Laguna
Lake Development Authority appeared as the oppositor. They were given 15
days to submit their comment/opposition to the respondents application for
registration.
On June 4, 2002, LLDA filed its opposition to the respondents application for
registration, stating that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are not part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. Likewise, the petitioner, Republic
of the Philippines, filed its opposition and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject
parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
On the other hand, LLDA alleged that the respondents application for
registration should be denied because the said lots are not part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain as it pointed out Section
41 (11) of R.A. No. 4850 that lands surrounding the Laguna de Bay located at
and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which
form part of the bed of the said lake.
The RTC rendered a decision on May 16, 2007, which granted the
respondents application for registration of title to the subject properties as
they form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
The CA affirmed the RTCs decision dated May 16, 2007. The CA found that
the respondent was able to establish that the subject properties are part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and that the same
are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake.
Thus, the current appeal where the respondents claim that the Courts ruling
in Republic of the Philippines vs T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on
26 June 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting that the decisions of
the Court form part of the law of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the
Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. Respondent further points
out that its application for registration of title tot eh subject properties was
filed and was granted by the RTC prior to the Courts promulgation of its
ruling in T.A.N. Properties.
ISSUE:
Whether the application by the court of the doctrine of a previous case was
proper to render and justify their judgment.
HELD
Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in subsequent
cases notwithstanding that the applications for registration were filed and
granted by the lower courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the
respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
Case 7
Topic: Duty to render judgment (Arts. 9-10, cf RPC Art. 5)
Facts:
About midnight of Oct. 10, 1986:
- Accused brought a boy and girl namely Jessie Ramirez and Rosario
Baluyot in a hotel room at MGM Hotel in Olongapo
- Accused told them to take a bath; Jessie was the first to take a bath
and when he came out, Rosario went to do the same
- Accused placed on the table objects which he described as like a vicks
inhaler
- While Rosario was in the bathroom, accused to Jessie to lay down on
bed; he then started masturbating the young boy, and eventually gave
Jessie an erection
- When Rosario came out of the bathroom, she was told to do the same
- Accused tried to have sexual intercourse with Rosario
- The following morning, accused paid Jessie and Rosario 200 and 300,
respectively. He left them in the hotel.
- Rosario told Jessie that the accused inserted something in her vagina.
Sometime the ff day, Jessie saw Rosario and asked her whether the
object was already removed from her body and Rosario said yes.
However, Jessie claimed that on the evening of that same date, he saw
Rosario complaining of pain and said that it was not yet removed
One defense witness saw Rosario unconscious and foul smelling; he brought
her to the hospital
After she was examined, it was found out that there was a foreign object in
her vaginal canal; they attempted to remove but to no avail because it was
deeply embedded; she was operated, and the object was extracted. (took 7
months before operated)
It was successful; however, she died the following day
When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty; case was set for trial on the merits
RTC: accused as guilty
Issue: WON accused was responsible for the death of Rosario (his
alleged insertion of foreign object inside the vaginal canal of victim)
Ruling: NO; acquitted, but civilly liable since what he did was an act
contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy
abusing Filipino children
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of age at the
time of the alleged sexual violation, it was necessary to prove that the usual
elements of rape were present; i.e. that there was force of intimidation or
that she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious in accordance with
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On the
contrary, the evidence shows that Rosario submitted herself to the sexual
advances of the appellant. In fact, she appears to have consented to the act
as she was paid P300.00 the next morning while her companion, Jessie
Ramirez was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988). The environmental
circumstances coupled with the testimonies and evidence presented in court
clearly give the impression that Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child, was a
prostitute inspite of her tender age. Circumstances in life may have forced
her to submit to sex at such a young age but the circumstances do not come
under the purview of force or intimidation needed to convict for rape.
In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute, no rape
was committed. We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual
vibrator left inside Rosario's vagina which led to her death?
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks inhaler which the
appellant does not deny having possessed at that time. He was certain that
the object was white. Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said
that it was grayish in color with color blue (Medyo kulay abo na may kulay na
parang blue). The inconsistency of the witness' testimony casts doubt as to
the veracity of the statements made especially when he answered on
additional cross-examination that the reason why he concluded that Exhibit
"C-2" was the same object being held by Ritter was because it was the only
one shown to him by the prosecution. Jessie Ramirez was not all certain
about the sexual vibrator because he did not actually see it in the possession
of the appellant.
From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still conscious and
could still answer questions asked of her although she was complaining of
stomach pains. Unfortunately, the medical attention given to her failed to
halt the aggravation of her condition. The operation on May 19 was too late.
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario's activities
after the hotel incident. Considering Dr. Barcinal's testimony indicating that
she was "used" by a "Negro" three (3) months prior to admission in the
hospital and Rosario's unfortunate profession, there is always the possibility
that she could have allowed herself to be violated by this perverse kind of
sexual behavior where a vibrator or vibrators were inserted into her vagina
between October, 1986 and May, 1987.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in reporting
the alleged crime renders the evidence for the prosecution insufficient to
establish appellant's guilty connection with the requisite moral certainty.
The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the
appellant could have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. This
object may have caused her death. It is possible that the appellant could be
the guilty person. However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of
conviction upon mere possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not
evidence and therefore should not be taken against the accused.
Case No. 8
Ponente: Cruz, J
Facts: Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal a pro indiviso shares
of a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents. In 1963,
one of the heirs, Celestino Padua sold his undivided share to the petitioners
for the sum of P550 by way of absolute sale. And in 1964, another heir,
Eustaquia Padua sold her share to the petitioners for the sum of P440 in a
Con Pacto de Retro Sale. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners
occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said
lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently
enclosed the same with a fence & with their consent, their son and his wife
built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area. However, on
1977, another sister-heir, Tecla Padua filed a complaint invoking her right of
redemption to the said property. Trial court dismissed the case on the ground
that the right had lapsed not having been exercised within thirty days from
notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. IAlthough there was no written notice,
it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the
requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial
Court & declared that actual notice would not suffice as substitute, citing the
cases of De Conejero and Butte, both cases conformed to a similar
requirement under Art. 1623 of NCC which provides that the notice must be
in writing
Held & Rationale: Yes. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed
of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no
doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years
between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption
in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are
the justifications for this exception.
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion
of an alleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts
upon which he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should
have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily
available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be
chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the facts.
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses
Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited
lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not the
act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like
an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs
saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily
available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the
right of redemption, but then it was already too late.
SC realizes that in arriving at such conclusion, they are deviating from the
strict letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied
pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no
competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by SC in the above-cited
cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, SC itself is not abandoning
the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines, but merely adopting an exception to
the general rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant
and perpetual wish to render every one his due. That wish continues to
motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that
will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this
case.
Case 9
Topic: Arts. 11-12 Presumption and Applicability of Custom
FACTS:
1. On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a
carromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant
(used for the transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached),
came from the opposite direction, while their carromata went close to the
sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of
merely passing by, the horses ran into the carromata occupied by the
plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut upon the
plaintiffs head.
3. The defendant Van Buskirk contends that the cochero, who was driving his
delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a good servant and
was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also claims that the cochero
was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the
defendants employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of
the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered.
However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that frightened the
horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses since he
was thrown upon the ground. (Note: the defendant, Van Buskirk was not
present the incident happened)
4. From the stated facts, the Trial Court ruled that the defendant was
guilty of negligence. The court specifically cited a paragraph of Article
1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to reverse such decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and
tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable
for the negligence of such driver.
HELD:
NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in
the manner described by the evidence in this case. Acts the performance
of which, has not proved destructive or injurious and which have,
therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they
have ripened into custom, can not be held to be themselves
unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have
been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than
prejudicial. Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from
the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or
customary results.
One could not easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to
an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero
negligent because of such circumstances. Doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur
merely raises a prima facie case that is destroyed by the absence of proof of
the circumstances under which the act complained of was performed.
The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that
time to deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also
considered universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which
they were left during the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and
generally has not been the cause of accidents or injuries the judgment is
therefore reversed.
FACTS: This is a direct appeal on the Complaint for damages filed by Escano
against his wife and parent's in law.
In February 1948, Pastor Enchaves (32) and Vicenta Escano (27 years old)
married without the consent of the latter's parents and before a Catholic
Chaplain in a house of one Juan Alburo.
Vicenta's parents sought priestly advice and a Father Reynes suggested that
the marriage was invalid in the point of view of the Catholic Church because
it lacked the authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the
officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. He further suggested that a re-
celebration must take place but the same did not materialize.
Barely a little over a month into marriage, Pastor went back to Manila for
work and Vicenta continued living with her parents.
By June 1948, the newlyweds were already estranged. Vicenta had to move
to Misamis Occidental to escape the scandal that her marriage stirred in
Cebu. Shortly thereafter, a lawyer filed for a Petition to annul her marriage
but the same did not prosper because of her non-appearance.
In June 1950, she applied for a passport without informing her husband
indicating the following: that she was single; her purpose for obtaining the
same was to study; she domiciled in Cebu; and she intends to return after 2
years. This was approved and she left for the US by August.
In the US, she filed for a Complaint for divorce against Pastor in the State of
Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character". This
was approved and became "final and absolute" by October 1950.
Meanwhile, in 1951, Vicenta's parents filed for a Petition with the Archibishop
of Cebu to annul her daughter's marriage to Pastor. 3 years after, Vincenta
herself sought for papal dispensation of her marriage.
On September 13, 1954, Vicenta married an American named Russell Leo
Moran in Nevada. They established their residence in California where by
August 1958, she acquired her American Citizenship.
Unknown to Vicenta, on July 30, 1955 Pastor filed with CFI Cebu a Complaint
for legal separation and damages amounting to P1M against Vicenta and her
parents for allegedly "having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining
her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic
Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of
the marriage".
In the defense of Vicenta, she alleges that she was able to obtain a valid
divorce aaginst him and contracted a valid marriage with her husband.
Relatedly, her parents denied that they, in any way, influenced their
daughter's acts. They also filed for damages by way of a counterclaim.
RTC Ruling: no legal separation but judicially freed Pastor from supporting his
wife and to acquire properties to the exclusion of his wife. Damages in the
form of moral and exemplary damages were awarded to Vicenta's parents as
well as attorney's fees.
ISSUES:
RULING:
(I) YES. The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the
validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is
positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs.
Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at
bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only
after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes
and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in
abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently
suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff
was valid and binding.
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal
requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil
effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act,
which provided the following:
(II) II. NO. It is clear from the record that the valid marriage between
Pastor Tenchaez and Vicenta Escao remained subsisting and
undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October
1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County,
State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta
Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. 4 She was then
subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386) , already in force at the time,
expressly provided:
xxx
[I]n this jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second
marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous
union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and
undissolved.
13.1 Within thirty (30) days from the date of transmittal of this Award to the
Parties, pursuant to the terms of this award, the total sum to be paid by
RESPONDENT KINGFORD to CLAIMANT TPI, is the sum of ONE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX DOLLARS AND TEN
CENTS ($1,750,846.10).
(A) For breach of the MOA by not paying past due assessments,
RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of TWO
HUNDRED TWENTY NINE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY FIVE
DOLLARS AND NINETY CENTS ($229,355.90) which is 20% of MOA
assessments since September 1, 2005[;]
(B) For breach of the MOA in failing to cooperate with CLAIMANT TPI in
fulfilling the objectives of the MOA, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay
CLAIMANT the total sum of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED NINETY DOLLARS AND TWENTY CENTS ($271,490.20)[;] 14 and
(C) For violation of THE LANHAM ACT and infringement of the YAMAOKA 619
PATENT, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of ONE
MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS
($1,250,000.00). . . .
HELD: YES. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in this
case as the Act, as its title An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an
Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the
Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes would
suggest, is a law especially enacted "to actively promote party autonomy in
the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own
arrangements to resolve their disputes." It specifically provides exclusive
grounds available to the party opposing an application for recognition and
enforcement of the arbitral award. Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004, a municipal law, applies in the instant petition, we do
not see the need to discuss compliance with international obligations under
the New York Convention and the Model Law. After all, both already form part
of the law.
Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that "[a]ny party to a foreign
arbitration may petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral
award." The contents of such petition are enumerated in Rule 13.5. Capacity
to sue is not included. Oppositely, in the Rule on local arbitral awards or
arbitrations in instances where "the place of arbitration is in the Philippines,"
it is specifically required that a petition "to determine any question
concerning the existence, validity and enforceability of such arbitration
agreement" available to the parties before the commencement of arbitration
and/or a petition for "judicial relief from the ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a
preliminary question upholding or declining its jurisdiction" after arbitration
has already commenced should state "[t]he facts showing that the persons
named as petitioner or respondent have legal capacity to sue or be sued."
FACTS
Amos G. Bellis born in Texas and citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States.
During his first marriage to Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had
five legitimate children.
By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three
legitimate.
He had also three illegitimate children
Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed
that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are
paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his three illegitimate children or P40,000 each
and;
c. After the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first
and second wives in equal shares.
Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas and his will was
admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila.
The Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all
the bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and
filed its Executors Final Account, Report of Administration and Project
of Partition.
In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the Twelfth
clause of the testators Last Will and Testament divided the residuary
estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testators seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despote notice to him, proof of
service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted by the
executor.
The lower court, after the parties filed their respective memoranda and
other pertinent pleadings, issued an order overruling the oppositions
and approving the executors final account, report and administration
and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it
applied the national of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.
ISSUE: WON Texas law, which is the national law of the decedent, shall
apply.
HELD: YES. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that ART. 16. Real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil
Code, stating that
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted.
This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding
the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated
Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while
reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of
the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to
make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which
must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of
this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law
of the decedent.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one
to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from
this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming
that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine
will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.
FERNANDO, J.:
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Situs of Shares of Stock: domicile of the
corporation
SUCCESSION: Ancillary Administration: The ancillary administration is proper,
whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last
domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased
liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.
SUCCESSION: Probate: Probate court has authority to issue the order
enforcing the ancillary administrators right to the stock certificates when the
actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.
FACTS: Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City,
left among others, two stock certificates issued by Benguet Consolidated, a
corporation domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins
estate in the Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock
certificates but County Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary
administrator, refused to part with them. Thus, the probate court of the
Philippines was forced to issue an order declaring the stock certificates as
lost and ordering Benguet Consolidated to issue new stock certificates
representing Perkins shares. Benguet Consolidated appealed the order,
arguing that the stock certificates are not lost as they are in existence and
currently in the possession of County Trust Company of New York.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benguet Consolidated, Inc. can ignore a court order
because of its by-laws? NO (WON the order of the lower court is proper
YES)
HELD: YES. The appeal lacks merit. Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the
power to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent within the
jurisdiction of the Philippines
It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that
ancillary administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002
shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet
Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant
is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the
unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore
be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.
Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue
finds application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock
is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of
the above undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does
not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.
CASE NO 14
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEPH G. BRIMO, JUAN MICIANO,
ADMINISTRATOR, petitioner-appellee, v. ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-
appelant
G.R. No. L-22595 / November 1, 1927
J. ROMUALDEZ
TOPIC: ART. 16; INTESTATE, TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION; WHEN
REGULATED BY THE NATIONAL LAW OF THE DECEDENT
FACTS:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in
question. The judicial administrator of his estate filed a scheme of partition.
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The lower
court, however, approved it.
Andre Brimo opposed based on the fact that the partition is void as being in
violation of Art. 10 of the Civil Code which provides that legal and
testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to
the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the
country in which it may be situated because such partition puts into effect
the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the
laws of his Turkish nationality.
Such will of Joseph Brimo has an effect of excluding Alex Brimo as a legatee
inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in the will.
ISSUE: WON Philippine law as what the decedent desires in the will be the
basis of the distribution of Joseph Brimos estates.
HELD: NO. It is the Turkish Law that is the basis of the distribution of
decedents estates and not Philippine law as what he desires in his will.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that
the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his
property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines. If this condition as it is
expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as
the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not
respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving
his legacy.
The fact is that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for
Article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the
law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the
legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and
requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses
are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the
distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include Andre
Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the
judicial administrator is approved in all other respects.
Case No. 15
Facts
The problem was that under Philippine law, the national law of the decedent
shall govern. On the other hand, under California law, the law of the state
where the decedent has his domicile shall govern.
Issue
Should the Court accept the referral by California law and apply Philippine
law?
Held
Yes, Philippine law should apply. The Phil. court must apply its own law
as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent.
The conflict of laws rule in California precisely refers back the case to the
law of his domicile. As the domicile of the deceased was the Philippines,
the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural
child of the latters legacy, should be governed by the Philippine law,
pursuant to Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, or the conflict of law
rules, not by the internal law of California.
Case # 17: (G.R. No. 193902- June 1, 2011: Justice Nachura)
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.
Facts:
(3 consolidated petitions for Review on certiorari Under Rule 45 of Rules of
Court)
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As she had previously
done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr.
(Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked,
under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, in order to
strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their
marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC,
Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos first marriage to De Guzman, the
union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson,
Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
The relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and, in 1998,
the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and
Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children.
Eventually, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement
which vested primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter
retaining visitorial rights thereto.
The CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Annulment case and
the denial by the Supreme Court of Pacasums appeal became final and
executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
Issue: WON the RTC and the CAs separate factual findings that Zamoranos
is a Muslim are correct.
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
The RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have
taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan
City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De
Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court
further declared that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman validly severed
their marriage ties.
It must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the c harge of
Bigamy hinges on Pacasums claim that Zamoranos is not a Musl im, and her
marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far from
the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos Muslim status should have been
apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No.
1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to promote the
advancement and effective participation of the National Cultural
Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions,
beliefs and interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies.
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts
have jurisdiction over the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the
State on Muslim Filipinos.
The two experts namely we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazalis
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines
unequivocally state that one of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as
other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one
to remarry.
In its decision dated June 11, 2008, respondent Fifth Sharia District Court
ruled that Roldan, as registered owner, had the better right to possess the
parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate the property, turn it over to
Roldan, and pay damages as well as attorneys fees. A notice of writ of
execution was sent to Vivencio, giving him 30 days from receipt of the notice
to comply with the decision. Meanwhile, Vivencio filed a petition for relief
from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. He
cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines and argued that Sharia District Courts may only hear civil actions
and proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a
Christian, hence the respondent Fifth Sharia District Court had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of Roldans action for recovery of possession of a parcel
of land.
However, respondent Fifth Sharia District Court denied Vivencios petition for
relief from judgment for lack of merit. Hence this petition for certiorari with
prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order to enjoin the
implementation of the writ of execution issued against Vivencio. Roldan
argued that since respondent Fifth Sharia District Court had jurisdiction to
decide the action for recovery of possession, he argued that the proceedings
before it were valid. Respondent Fifth Sharia District Court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio upon service on him of summons.
When Vivencio failed to file his answer, he effectively waived his right to
participate in the proceedings [before the Fifth Sharia District Court] and he
cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced.
ISSUE: Whether a Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over a real action
where one of the parties is not a Muslim.
HELD: NO. In this case, the allegations in Roldans petition for recovery of
possession did not state that Vivencio is a Muslim. When Vivencio stated in
his petition for relief from judgment that he is not a Muslim, Roldan did not
dispute this claim.
Respondent Fifth Sharia District Court had no authority under the law to
decide Roldans action because not all of the parties involved in the action
are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over Roldans action for recovery of
possession. All its proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200
are void.
Roldan chose to file his action with the Sharia District Court, instead of filing
the action with the regular courts, to obtain "a more speedy disposition of
the case." This would have been a valid argument had all the parties involved
in this case been Muslims. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, the
jurisdiction of Sharia District Courts over real actions not arising from
customary contracts is concurrent with that of existing civil courts. However,
this concurrent jurisdiction over real actions "is applicable solely when both
parties are Muslims"49 as this court ruled in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong. When
one of the parties is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular
courts.
Nonetheless, this case does not involve any of the previously cited instances.
This case involves an action for recovery of possession of real property. As a
matter of law, Sharia District Courts may only take cognizance of a real
action "wherein the parties involved are Muslims." Considering that one of
the parties involved in this case is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Sharia
District Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the action for
recovery of possession of real property. The judgment against Vivencio is
void for respondent Fifth Sharia District Courts lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action.
That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
only after respondent Fifth Sharia District Court had rendered judgment is
immaterial. A party may assail the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over a
subject matter at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason
is that "jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very
authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the
action.
Case 19
Tinga, J.:
Facts
In 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, USA, and respondent
Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby
BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services
in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration
of 10% of the gross receipts.
Petitioner answered that the written contract between respondent and BMSI
included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the
presence of foreign elements in the dispute namely, the parties and
witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence
to be presented is located outside the Philippines that renders our local
courts inconvenient forums.
Thus, it theorizes that the foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the
immediate application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
RTC assumed jurisdiction over the case and held that the principle of forum
non conveniens was inapplicable because it could enforce judgment on
petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines. The the Court of Appeals affirmed TCs decision. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue
Held
No.
Ratio
Petitioners averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not
sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No.
1192-BG and the parties involved.
Ergo, the CA correctly affirmed the TCs conclusion that it can assume
jurisdiction over the dispute notwithstanding its foreign elements as the
doctrine of forum of non conveniens is inapplicable in this instant.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint.
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party
defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the
Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded
from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct
concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to
travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the
application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case
is fair to both parties. The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only
when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after
hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
FIRST DIVISION
Ponente: Quisumbing
FACTS:
ISSUE: Which country has jurisdiction to try the case; the Philippines or
Saudi Arabia?
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damages.
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article
21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, we agree with private
respondents assertion that violations of Articles 19 and 21 are
actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the
municipal forum.
Based on the allegations [46] in the Amended Complaint, read
in the light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction [47] we find that
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties,
also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming
jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the litigant.
Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious.
Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally
important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum,
vex, harass, or oppress the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him
needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly
in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed.ii[49]
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it
best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take
cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private
respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial
connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to
her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary
difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the
parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private
respondent) should be upheld.
PONENTE: Antonio, J.
TOPIC: Human Relations Article 19 and 21
FACTS:
1. It has been established during the trial that Mrs. Tapnio had an export
sugar quota of 1,000 piculs for the agricultural year 1956-1957 which
she did not need.
2. Mrs. Tapnio agreed to allow Mr. Jacobo C. Tuazon to use said quota for
the consideration of P2,500.00. This agreement was called a contract
of lease of sugar allotment.
3. At the time of the agreement, Mrs. Tapnio was indebted to the
Philippine National Bank at San Fernando, Pampanga. Her
indebtedness was known as a crop loan and was secured by a
mortgage on her standing crop including her sugar quota allocation for
the agricultural year corresponding to said standing crop.
4. This arrangement was necessary in order that when Mrs. Tapnio
harvests, the P.N.B., having a lien on the crop, may effectively enforce
collection against her. Her sugar cannot be exported without sugar
quota allotment Sometimes, however, a planter harvest less sugar
than her quota, so her excess quota is utilized by another who pays her
for its use. This is the arrangement entered into between Mrs. Tapnio
and Mr. Tuazon regarding the former's excess quota for 1956-1957.
5. Since the quota was mortgaged to the P.N.B., the contract of lease had
to be approved by said Bank, The same was submitted to the branch
manager at San Fernando, Pampanga. The latter required the parties to
raise the consideration of P2.80 per picul or a total of P2,800.00
informing them that "the minimum lease rental acceptable to the Bank,
is P2.80 per picul.
6. When the branch manager of the Philippine National Bank at San
Fernando recommended the approval of the contract of lease at the
price of P2.80 per picul (Exh. 1 1-Bank), whose recommendation was
concurred in by the Vice-president of said Bank, J. V. Buenaventura, the
board of directors required that the amount be raised to 13.00 per
picul. This act of the board of directors was communicated to Tuazon,
who in turn asked for a reconsideration thereof. On November 19,
1956, the branch manager submitted Tuazon's request for
reconsideration to the board of directors with another recommendation
for the approval of the lease at P2.80 per picul, but the board returned
the recommendation unacted upon, considering that the current price
prevailing at the time was P3.00 per picul.
7. The parties were notified of the refusal on the part of the board of
directors of the Bank to grant the motion for reconsideration. The
matter stood as it was until February 22, 1957, when Tuazon wrote a
letter to the Bank informing the Bank that he was no longer interested
to continue the deal, referring to the lease of sugar quota allotment in
favor of defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio. The result is that the latter lost
the sum of P2,800.00 which she should have received from Tuazon and
which she could have paid the Bank to cancel off her indebtedness.
8. Petitioner argued that as an assignee of the sugar quota of Tapnio, it
has the right, both under its own Charter and under the Corporation
Law, to safeguard and protect its rights and interests under the deed of
assignment, which include the right to approve or disapprove the said
lease of sugar quota and in the exercise of that authority, its Board of
Directors necessarily had authority to determine and fix the rental
price per picul of the sugar quota subject of the lease between private
respondents and Jacobo C. Tuazon.
9. The basic action is the complaint filed by Philamgen (Philippine
American General Insurance Co., Inc.) as surety against Rita Gueco
Tapnio and Cecilio Gueco, for the recovery of the sum of P2,379.71
paid by Philamgen to the Philippine National Bank on behalf of
respondents Tapnio and Gueco, pursuant to an indemnity agreement.
Petitioner Bank was made third-party defendant by Tapnio and Gueco
on the theory that their failure to pay the debt was due to the fault or
negligence of petitioner.
10. Hence, this Certiorari to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in Civil Case No. 34185, ordering petitioner, as third-party
defendant, to pay respondent Rita Gueco Tapnio, as third-party
plaintiff, the sum of P2,379.71, plus 12% interest per annum from
September 19, 1957 until the same is fully paid, P200.00 attorney's
fees and costs, the same amounts which Rita Gueco Tapnio was
ordered to pay the Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc., to
be paid directly to the Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc.
in full satisfaction of the judgment rendered against Rita Gueco Tapnio
in favor of the former; plus P500.00 attorney's fees for Rita Gueco
Tapnio and costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner Philippine National Bank is liable for
damages
RATIO: As observed by the trial court, time is of the essence in the approval
of the lease of sugar quota allotments, since the same must be utilized
during the milling season, because any allotment which is not filled during
such milling season may be reallocated by the Sugar Quota Administration to
other holders of allotments. There was no proof that there was any other
person at that time willing to lease the sugar quota allotment of private
respondents for a price higher than P2.80 per picul. "The fact that there were
isolated transactions wherein the consideration for the lease was P3.00 a
picul", according to the trial court, "does not necessarily mean that there are
always ready takers of said price. " The unreasonableness of the position
adopted by the petitioner's Board of Directors is shown by the fact that the
difference between the amount of P2.80 per picul offered by Tuazon and the
P3.00 per picul demanded by the Board amounted only to a total sum of
P200.00. Considering that all the accounts of Rita Gueco Tapnio with the
Bank were secured by chattel mortgage on standing crops, assignment of
leasehold rights and interests on her properties, and surety bonds and that
she had apparently "the means to pay her obligation to the Bank, as shown
by the fact that she has been granted several sugar crop loans of the total
value of almost P80,000.00 for the agricultural years from 1952 to 1956",
there was no reasonable basis for the Board of Directors of petitioner to have
rejected the lease agreement because of a measly sum of P200.00.
Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." The
afore-cited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the
concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically provide in the statutes.
CASE NO 21
ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP. VS CA, EUGENIO BALTAO
Facts:
This is a claim for damages against petitioner which stemmed from a
criminal action filed by it against respondent. In purchasing steel plates from
petitioner, Guaranteed Industries paid the former via a check. This check
bounce which prompted petitioner to trace the origin of the check. It was
discovered that Guaranteed Industries was a defunct corporation and, was
owned by respondent, Eugenio Baltao. Also, the address to which
Guaranteed Industries was said to be operating is actually from another
business owned by respondents son, Eugenio Baltao III, E.I. Woodworks Inc.
Because of these findings, petitioner filed a criminal case of BP22 against
respondent.
The case was dismissed for lack of notice. The Provincial Fiscal warned
the Trial Court Fiscal to exercise more care next time. Knowing this,
respondent Eugenio Baltao is now suing petitioner for damages arising from
malicious prosecution.
Issue:
Was the filing of the criminal case attempted with malice?
Held:
No. Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person who in the exercise of
his/her right must give act with justice and give everyone hiss due and
ovserve honesty and good faith. In the case, more of a finding of the fact, it
cannot be said that Albenson maliciously filed the criminal case. For one, a
check issued in their favor bounced, second, they went to the SEC to confirm
the existence of Guaranteed Industries, and lastly, it was found that
Guaranteed Industries information (existence and address) was untrue.
For an abuse of right to arise, there has to be the following: (1) a legal
duty, (2)exercised in bad faith, (3) for the sole purpose of prejudicing the
other party. That is not the case here.
Case No. 22 Arturo Sarte Flores v Sps. Enrico Lindo and Edna Lindo
G.R. No. 183984 | April 13, 2011
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Topic: Art 22-25 Human Relations
FACTS:
6. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may not institute more than one suit
for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the
basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one on a judgment upon
the merits in any one is available ground for the dismissal of the
others.
ISSUE: :
HELD: YES
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without the written
consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without
the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state
that the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
3. In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special Power of Attorney was
executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the SPA is the
acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as
a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
PONENTE:
TOPIC: Human Relations | Articles 22 to 25
FACTS:
After the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) had awarded on
July 22, 1997 the contract for the improvement of the Sadsadan-Maba-ay
Section of the Mountain Province-Benguet Road in the total amount of
P7,014,963.33 to his company, Gonzalo Construction,petitioner Domingo
Gonzalo (Gonzalo) subcontracted to respondent John Tarnate, Jr. (Tarnate) on
October 15, 1997, the supply of materials and labor for the project under the
latter's business known as JNT Aggregates. Their agreement stipulated,
among others, that Tarnate would pay to Gonzalo eight percent and four
percent of the contract price, respectively, upon Tarnate's first and second
billing in the project.
Tarnate demanded the payment of the retention fee from Gonzalo, but to no
avail. Thus, he brought this suit against Gonzalo on September 13, 1999 in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mountain Province to recover the retention
fee of P233,526.13, moral and exemplary damages for breach of contract,
and attorney fees. In his answer, Gonzalo admitted the deed of assignment
and the authority given therein to Tarnate, but averred that the project had
not been fully implemented because of its cancellation by the DPWH, and
that he had then revoked the deed of assignment. He insisted that the
assignment could not stand independently due to its being a mere product of
the subcontract that had been based on his contract with the DPWH; and
that Tarnate, having been fully aware of the illegality and ineffectuality of the
deed of assignment from the time of its execution, could not go to court with
unclean hands to invoke any right based on the invalid deed of assignment
or on the product of such deed of assignment.
The CA ruled in the affirmative the decision of the RTC that Gonzalo has
unjustly enriched Tarnate and that the principle of in pari delicto cannot be
applied in the case at bar for the violation of Section 6 P.DNo. 1594 because
it will only be applied if the fault of one party was more or less equivalent to
the fault of the other party.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the RTC
because both parties were in pari delicto.
HELD:
No, the doctrine of in pari delicto which stipulates that the guilty
parties to an illegal contract are not entitled to any relief, cannot
prevent a recovery if doing so violates the public policy against
unjust enrichment.
Under Article 1409 (1) of the Civil Code, contract whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law is a void or inexistent contract. As such, a void
contract cannot produce a valid one. To the same effect is Article 1422 of the
Civil Code, which declares that contract, which is the direct result of a
previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent.
According to Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code, the guilty parties to an illegal
contract cannot recover from one another and are not entitled to an
affirmative relief because they are in pari delicto or in equal fault. The
doctrine of in pari delicto is a universal doctrine that holds that no action
arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained
for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or
delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation; and
where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be
given to one against the other.
The letter and spirit of Article 22 of the Civil Code command Gonzalo
to make a full reparation or compensation to Tarnate. The illegality
of their contract should not be allowed to deprive Tarnate from
being fully compensated through the imposition of legal interest.
Case 24
Topic: Human Dignity (Arts. 26-31)
Blas Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998
Facts:
This is a petition field by Blas Ople praying that AO 308 be invalidated
entitled Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System on 2 important constitutional grounds: (a) usurpation of power of
Congress to legislate; and (b) it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenrys
protected zone of privacy
Respondents:
- Instant petition is not a justiciable case as would warrant a judicial
review
- AO 308 was issued within the executive and administrative powers of
President without encroaching on the legislative powers of Congress
- Funds necessary for the implementation of identification reference
system may be sourced from budgets of the concerned agencies
- AO 308 protects an individuals interest in privacy
Ruling: YES
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still
it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because
facially it violates the right to privacy.
The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." In the 1965 case
of Griswold v. Connecticut, the US Supreme Court gave more substance to
the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional
foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within
the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments.
FACTS:
3.) His wife, petitioner Carmen Madeja blamed the respondent for the death
of the husband and thus a criminal case of homicide through reckless
imprudence was filed against the said respondent
4.) The criminal case still pending, petitioner filed for damages in Civil Case
No. 141 of the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the
gross negligence of respondent.
5.) The judge Hon. Felix T. Caro, granted the motion of the respondent in
dismissing the civil case citing sec. 3(a) of Rule 111 of the RoC stating the
instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action.
HELD:
NO. Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the
Civil Code is the applicable provision.
*****Just in case itanong ni Atty: Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28
SCRA 1062, which states that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is
not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven
justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely
concurred in the result.
Case 27
vs.
Facts:
On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office
of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed
and certified that the commercial structure to be constructed conformed to
local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location is classified as a
commercial area. The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly
thereafter.
The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma
Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio
station. Due to the prvosion of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the
closure of radio station during the pendency of election period, COMELEC
issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004,
but was barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that
the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run
again until June 10, 2004 after elections.
Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayors
permit but both courts denied the petition.
In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as
commercial. Petitioners are also armed with several certifications stating that
the property is indeed a commercial area. Also, petitioners paid real property
taxes based on the classification of property as commercial without
objections raised by the respondents.
Issue:
Held:
No. While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by mistake or
error of its officials or agents, there is an exception.
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked
except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where
they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to
protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be
applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly
require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble
part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the doctrine of
equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as
against private individuals
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court
of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant petition for mandamus is
hereby GRANTED and respondents are directed to immediately issue
petitioners zoning clearances and mayors permits for 2004 to petitioners.
Case 28
CORPUS vs. PAJE
G.R. No. L-26737
July 31, 1969
TOPIC: Authority to file independent civil actions which include action for
damages for violation of civil and political rights, defamation, fraud, physical
injuries, and neglect of public officers
PONENTE: CAPISTRANO, J.
Information was filed against Paje in CFI Pampanga for homicide and double
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty.
The case went up to the CA for appeal.
Pending appeal, Laura Corpus (Corpus), Marcias widow, filed for a Complaint
for Damages based on the criminal act of reckless imprudence. In the
Complaint, she claims that the defendants be ordered to pay jointly and
separately the amounts of damages.
CA ruling: reversed judgment of the RTC on the ground that the reckless
imprudence charged against him did not exist and that the collision was a
case of pure accident.
A Motion to Dismiss was filed by PAJE & Victory Liner on the ground that their
action was barred by the acquittal by the CA. This was denied.
At the Pre-Trial of the civil case, the defendants asked the court to rule on
their special defense that the plaintiffs cause of action based upon a quasi-
delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought 4 years
and 11 months after the collision and based on Article 1144, NCC based upon
a quasi-delict must be instituted within 4 years. Lower court dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not court erred in ruling for the dismissal of the Civil
Code on the ground of prescription.
RULING: NO.
(I)
The acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals in the
criminal action on the ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence charged against him did not exist and that the collision was a
case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for damages for the death
of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same criminal
negligence of which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal
action.
Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the three
crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the
institution of an independent civil action, that is, of an entirely separate and
distinct civil action for damages, which shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of
evidence. Said article mentions only the crimes of defamation, fraud (estafa)
and physical injuries. Although in the case of Dyogi, et al. vs. Yatco, et
al., G.R. No. L-9623, January 22, 1957, this Court held that the term "physical
injuries" used in article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide, 1 it is to be
borne in mind that the charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, and not for homicide and physical injuries.
xxx
It is, therefore, clear that the charge against Felardo Paje was not for
homicide but for reckless imprudence, that is, criminal negligence resulting
in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and double physical injuries suffered
by two other persons.
In the language of the Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec. 3) the extinction of the
criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the criminal
act charged against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil
action for damages based upon the same act.
(II)
Assuming, arguendo, that the civil action for damages for the death of
Clemente Marcia was based upon a quasi-delict, the trial court's finding that
on that basis the action had prescribed is correct. An action upon a quasi-
delict must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). The
four-year prescriptive period began to run from the day the quasi-delict was
committed, or from December 23, 1956, and the running of the said period
was not interrupted by the institution of the criminal action for reckless
imprudence. (Paulan vs. Sarabia, G.R. No. L-10542, July 31, 1958.)
FACTS: Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were
used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from
Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority in
Loakan, Baguio City.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case
against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver. But
the trial court, in its order dated August 30, 1991, denied petitioner's motion
on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed
independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the
petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case. Petitioner took the
matter on certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals, maintaining that
the civil action could not proceed independently of the criminal case because
no reservation of the right to bring it separately had been made in the
criminal case.
Issue: W/N despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may
nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the Civil
Code
Held: No. Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, while
reiterating that a civil action under these provisions of the Civil Code may be
brought separately from the criminal action; provides that the right to bring it
must be reserved.
This Rule reads:
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be
made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.
Indeed, the requirement that the right to institute actions under the Civil
Code separately must be reserved is not incompatible with the independent
character of such actions. There is a difference between allowing the trial of
civil actions to proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and
requiring that, before they may be instituted at all, a reservation to bring
them separately must be made. Put in another way, it is the conduct of the
trial of the civil action not its institution through the filing of a complaint
which is allowed to proceed independently of the outcome of the criminal
case.