G.R. No. 112099 February 21, 1995 (2) Administrative Case No.

(2) Administrative Case No. 05-92 for dishonesty and (2) Administrative Case No. 05-92

abuse of authority for installing a water pipeline which is

ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner, WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent
being operated, maintained and paid for by the
vs. Mayor NAOMI C. CORRAL of Tiwi, Albay, is hereby
municipality to service respondent's private residence
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. sentenced to suffer the penalty of SUSPENSION from
and medical clinic.
GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL office as Municipal Mayor thereof for a period of

COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C. On July 1, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disposed THREE (3) MONTHS beginning after her service of the

CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, respondents. the two Administrative cases in the following manner: first penalty of suspension ordered in Administrative

Case No. 02-92. She is likewise ordered to reimburse

(1) Administrative Case No. 02-92
the Municipality of Tiwi One-half of the amount the latter

have paid for electric and water bills from July to

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory
preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of
the President as having been issued with grave abuses of
discretion. Said Orders directed the stay of execution of the
decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan suspending the
Mayor of Tiwi, Albay from office.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Mayor Naomi C. Corral of
December 1992, inclusive (Rollo, p. 16).
Tiwi, Albay, is hereby ordered to pay Achilles Costo
Berces, Sr. the sum of THIRTY-SIX THOUSAND AND
Consequently, respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of
SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE PESOS and TWO
the President questioning the decision and at the same time
CENTAVOS (P36,779.02) per Voucher No. 352, plus
prayed for the stay of execution thereof in accordance with
legal interest due thereon from the time it was approved
Section 67(b) of the Local Government Code, which
in audit up to final payment, it being legally due the
provides:
Complainant representing the money value of his leave
credits accruing for services rendered in the Administrative Appeals. Decision in administrative

municipality from 1988 to 1992 as a duly elected cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof,
I
Municipal Councilor. IN ADDITION, respondent Mayor be appealed to the following:

NAOMI C. CORRAL is hereby ordered SUSPENDED

Petitioner filed two administrative cases against respondent
Naomi C. Corral, the incumbent Mayor of Tiwi, Albay with the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay, to wit:
(1) Administrative Case No. 02-92 for abuse of authority
and/or oppression for non-payment of accrued leave
benefits due the petitioner amounting to P36,779.02.
xxx xxx xxx
from office as Municipal Mayor of Tiwi, Albay, for a
period of two (2) months, effective upon receipt hereof
(b) The Office of the President, in the case of
for her blatant abuse of authority coupled with
decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
oppression as a public example to deter others similarly
the sangguniang panglungsod of highly urbanized
inclined from using public office as a tool for personal
cities and independent component cities.
vengeance, vindictiveness and oppression at the

expense of the Taxpayer (Rollo, p. 14).

Acting on the prayer to stay execution during the pendency it may deem just and reasonable (Adm. Order No. Hence, this petition.

of the appeal, the Office of the President issued an Order on 18).

July 28, 1993, the pertinent portions of which read as

xxx xxx xxx
follows:

After due consideration, and in the light of the

xxx xxx xxx
II
Petition for Review filed before this Office, we find

The stay of the execution is governed by Section 68 of
R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order
No. 18 dated 12 February 1987, quoted below:
that a stay of execution pending appeal would be
Petitioner claims that the governing law in the instant case is
just and reasonable to prevent undue prejudice to
R.A. No. 7160, which contains a mandatory provision that an
public interest.
appeal "shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and

executory." He argues that administrative Order No. 18

Sec. 68. Execution Pending Appeal. An appeal
shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or
executory. The respondent shall be considered as
having been placed under preventive suspension
during the pendency of an appeal in the events he
wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results
in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby
orders the suspension/stay of execution of:
a) the Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Albay in Administrative Case No. 02-92 dated 1 July
1993 suspending Mayor Naomi C. Corral from office for
a period of two (2) months, and
dated February 12, 1987, (entitle "Prescribing the Rules and
Regulations Governing Appeals to Office the President")
authorizing the President to stay the execution of the
appealed decision at any time during the pendency of the
appeal, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160, which took effect on
January 1, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 5-6).

such other emoluments during the pendency of

b) the Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of The petition is devoid of merit.
the appeal (R.A. No. 7160).
Albay in Administrative Case. No. 05-92 dated 5 July
Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of Section 530 (f),
1993 suspending Mayor Naomi C. Corral from office for
Sec. 6 Except as otherwise provided by special
R.A. No. 7160, which provides:
a period of three (3) months (Rollo, pp. 55-56).
laws, the execution of the decision/resolution/order

appealed from is stayed upon filing of the appeal

All general and special laws, acts, city charters,
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
within the period prescribed herein. However, in all
decrees, executive orders, administrative regulations,
questioning the aforesaid Order of the Office of the
cases, at any time during the pendency of the
part or parts thereof, which are incosistent with any of
President.
appeal, the Office of the President may direct or
the provisions of this Code, are hereby repealed or
stay the execution of the decision/resolution/order
On September 13, 1990, the Motion for Reconsideration was modified accordingly.
appealed from upon such terms and conditions as
denied.
The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an service by the mayor to the public, a stay of the execution of

Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 because it failed to "appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or the decision is in order.

identify or designate the laws or executive orders that are executory." As worded, there is room to construe said
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
intended to be repealed (cf. I Sutherland, Statutory provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay

Construction 467 [1943]). the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to
SO ORDERED.
infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the
If there is any repeal of Administrative Order No. 18 by R.A.
authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the
No. 7160, it is through implication though such kind of repeal
intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of
is not favored (The Philippine American Management Co.,
Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct
Inc. v. The Philippine American Management Employees
language expressive of such intention.
Association, 49 SCRA 194 [1973]). There is even a

presumption against implied repeal. The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and

in the absence of a clear legislative intent to remove from the

An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the
reviewing officials the authority to order a stay of execution,
condition that a substantial conflict must be found between
such authority can provided in the rules and regulations
the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal,
governing the appeals of elective officials in administrative
a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior
cases.
law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy

exists in the terms of the new and old laws (Iloilo Palay and The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or

Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 directory depending upon a consideration of the entire

[1965]). The two laws must be absolutely incompatible provisions in which it is found, its object and the

(Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 consequences that would follow from construing it one way

Phil. 8 [1924]). There must be such a repugnancy between or the other (cf. De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 [1966]).

the laws that they cannot be made to stand together In the case at bench, there is no basis to justify the

(Crawford, Construction of Statutes 631 [1940]). construction of the word as mandatory.

We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 The Office of the President made a finding that the execution

and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not of the decision of the Sagguniang Panlalawigan suspending

irreconcillably inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws respondent Mayor from office might be prejudicial to the

must in fact be read together. public interest. Thus, in order not to disrupt the rendition of
G.R. No. L-54718 December 4, 1985 candidacy in the January 30, 1980 local elections, his sworn

certificate of candidacy as independent for the office of vice-

CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA Y PARDES, petitioner, mayor of the municipality of Dolores, Quezon. But later on
vs. the very same day, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy "for
CANVASSERS OF DOLORES, QUEZON, VIVENCIO G. personal reasons." Later on January 25, 1980, petitioner
LIRIO respondents. Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his companion Mendoza's

withdrawal, filed his own sworn "Certificate of Candidacy in

RESOLUTION
substitution" of Mendoza's for the said office of vice mayor as a

one-man independent ticket. ... The results showed petitioner to

be the clear winner over respondent with a margin of 452 votes

(3,112 votes as against his opponent respondent Lirio's 2,660

TEEHANKEE, J.:
votes). But the Municipal Board of Canvassers disregarded all

Upon consideration of petitioner's motion for reconsideration of votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on the basis of the

1
the decision of May 3, 1983 (which dismissed his petition to set Provincial Election Officer's erroneous opinion that since

aside respondent Comelec's resolutions of February 21, 1980 petitioner's name does not appear in the Comelec's certified list

and July 31, 1980 denying his petition for annulment of the of candidates for that municipality, it could be presumed that his

proclamation of respondent Vivencio Lirio as the elected vice- candidacy was not duly approved by the Comelec so that his

mayor of Dolores, Quezon and for his proclamation instead as votes could not be "legally counted. " ... The canvassers

such elected vice-mayor for having received the clear majority of accordingly proclaimed respondent Vivencio G. Lirio as the only

the votes cast), the comments of public and private respondents unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice mayor of the

and petitioner's consolidated reply and manifestation and motion municipality of Dolores.

of June 25, 1985 (stating that respondent abandoned his claim

Respondent Comelec issued its questioned resolution on
to the office and accepted and assumed on June 10, 1985, the
February 21, 1980 denying the petition on two grounds after
position of municipal trial judge of Lucban and Sampaloc,
citing the pertinent legal provisions, as follows:
Quezon, as verified from the records of the Office of the Court

Administrator), the Court Resolved to RECONSIDER and SET

The 1978 Election Code provides:
ASIDE its aforesaid decision and to GRANT the petition at bar.

The undisputed facts show that one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. had

filed on January 4, 1980, the last day for filing of certificates of

 SEC. 27. ... No certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be The Court holds that the Comelec's first ground for denying due likewise ruled by this Court in Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil.

considered withdraw ... unless the candidate files with the course to petitioner's substitute certificate of candidacy, i.e. that 607, the legal requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will

office which received the certificate ... or with the Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy was not be held to be merely directory and Mendoza's failure to observe

Commission a sworn statement of withdrawal ... "under oath," should be rejected. It is not seriously contended by the requirement should be "considered a harmless irregularity."

respondent nor by the Comelec that Mendoza's withdrawal was

SEC. 28. ... If, after last day for filing certificates of not an actual fact and a reality, so much so that no votes were As to the second ground, Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate

candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly cast for him at all, In fact, Mendoza's name, even though his of candidacy right on the very same day that he filed his

filed should ... withdraw ... any voter qualified for the office candidacy was filed on the last day within the deadline, was not certificate of candidacy on January 4, 1980 which was the very

may file his certificate of candidacy for the office for in the Comelec's certified list of candidates. His unsworn last day for filing of certificates of candidacy shows that he was

which ... the candidate who has withdrawn ... was a withdrawal filed later on the same day had been accepted by the not serious about his certificate of candidacy. But this could not

candidate on or before midday of election ... election registrar without protest nor objection, On the other be done to would be bonafide candidates, like petitioner who had

hand, since there was no time to include petitioner's name in the not filed his candidacy in deference to Mendoza's candidacy who
Clearly, Petitioner Villanueva could not have substituted for was one of his " co-planners " with "some concerned citizens ...
Comelec list of registered candidates, because the election was
Candidate Mendoza on the strength of Section 28 of the (who) held causes to put up a slate that will run against the
only four days away, petitioner as substitute candidate
1978 Election Code which he invokes, For one thing, erstwhile unopposed KBL slate."
circularized formal notices of his candidacy to all chairmen and
Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate is not under oath,
members of the citizens election committees in compliance with
as required under Section 27 of the Code; hence it The Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's substitute
the suggestion of the Comelec Law Manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez.
produces no legal effect. For another, said withdrawal was candidacy certainly does not seem to be in consonance with the

made not after the last day (January 4, 1980) for filing The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a substance and spirit of the law. Section 28 of the 1978 Election

certificates of candidacy, as contemplated under Sec. 28 of technicality which should not be used to frustrate the people's Code provides for such substitute candidates in case of death.

the Code, but on that very same day. (Emphasis copies) will in favor of petitioner as the substitute candidate. In Guzman withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the

us, Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211, clearly elections. Mendoza's withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the
Upon a restudy of the case, the Court finds merit in the last day for regular filing of candidacies on January 4, 1980,
applicable, mutatis mutandis this Court held that "(T)he will of the
reconsideration prayed for, which would respect the will of the which he had filed earlier that same day. For all intents and
people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate
electorate instead of defeating the same through the invocation purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be considered as
of candidacy had not been properly sworn to, This legal provision
of formal or technical defects. (De Guzman vs. Board of having been made substantially and in truth after the last day,
is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election
Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211 [1925], citing Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, even going by the literal reading of the provision by the Comelec.
would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the
39 Phil. 208 (1918) Badelles vs. Cabili 27 SCRA 121 [1969]; Yra Indeed, the statement of former Chief Justice Enrique M.
electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the
vs. Abano 52 Phil. 380 [1928]; Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. Fernando in his dissent that "the bona fides of petitioner
result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the
607 (1960) Corocoro vs. Bascara, 9 SCRA 522 [1963], Pungutan Crisologo Villanueva y Paredes as a substitute candidate cannot,
candidate has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy." (See
vs. Abubakar, 43 SCRA 11 [19721; and Lacson, Jr. vs. Posadas (in his opinion), be successfully assailed. It follows that the votes
also Gundan vs. Court of First Instance, 66 Phil. 125). As
72 SCRA 170 [19761). cast in his favor must be counted. Such being the case, there is
more than sufficient justification for his proclamation as Vice of respondent Lirio as elected discharge its functions. This resolution is IMMEDIATELY

Mayor... vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares petitioner EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED.

as the duly elected vice-mayor of said municipality and entitled

ACCORDINGLY, the Court SETS ASIDE the questioned forthwith to assume said office, take the oath of office and
Resolutions of respondent Comelec and annuls the proclamation