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[client name deleted]:
As you may know, a leaked draft Russian foreign policy document that was
published in Russian Newsweek in May mentions Russia's interest in Burma,
referring to an interest in increasing military cooperation and in broadening military
output, as well as interest in improving Burmese business activities in mining,
hydropower and telecommunications. It also refers to interest in improvement of
relations with Vietnam and refers to a number of other countries in the region.
I believe you've followed this issue, at least Russian arms exports to Vietnam. I'm
wondering if you might send along some of your thoughts ‐‐ related to Russian arms
to Vietnam or to broader Russian interest in involvement in Southeast Asia. I'm
trying to figure out whether Russia is really interested in reinserting itself into the
region, whether that is significant and whether there is enough here for a story.
ANSWER: The Soviet Union and now the Russian Federation do not have the
economic base or commercial competitiveness to make major inroads in Southeast
Asia. But Russia is in the arms business big time selling to China, India, Vietnam,
Malaysia and Indonesia. The Su‐30 is the main but not only item of military
equipment that Russia is selling. It is building Gepard‐class frigates for Vietnam and
reportedly provided Bastion land‐based anti‐shipping missiles.
The Russian sale of six Kilo‐class submarines included a provision for building
maintenance facilities. When this takes place the Russian Bear will have returned to
the tropics. This will not be the major presence at Cam Ranh bay during the Cold
War. But as noted below in an extract from a report I wrote in March, Russia has
expressed interest in setting up a regional maintenance centre for Sukhoi aircraft
which it has sold to Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam.
Russia has also entered the nuclear power market with a contract with Vietnam and
a contract with Myanmar for a nuclear research reactor. Neither of these projects is
remotely connected with nuclear weapons. All fall under IAEA safeguards etc.
Ever since the East Asia Summit was created in 2005 Russia has been pressing for
membership. It was only this year, however, that ASEAN encouraged Russia and the
United States to apply for membership. This is not a problem for Moscow as it has
been chafing at the bit for several years.
2
Finally, as Chinese naval modernization and transformation causes regional anxiety,
the political environment has improved for Russia to reintroduce itself in the region.
Many local states want the US to remain in place. This strategy is overtly anti‐China
so encouraging Russia to reintroduce itself in the region adds the weight of a
permanent member of the UN Security Council.
The bottom line is that Russia promotes military arms sales and investment in energy
projects as the main avenues of influence in the region.
Excerpt from consultancy report I wrote in March this year:
“The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in a hiatus in military relations as the new
Russian Federation reevaluated its defense ties with Vietnam. It was only in 1994
that Vietnam signed its first major arms procurement contract with Russia. This was
followed in October 1998 by a major arms sale and servicing agreement. Bilateral
relations were upgraded to a “strategic partnership” in 2003.
Between 1994 and 2003, Russia sold Vietnam four Tarantul‐class frigates, missile
patrol boats, twelve assorted Sukhoi jet fighters, long‐range radar and sophisticated
anti‐aircraft missile systems. Russia also refurbished Vietnam’s fleet of Su‐22 ground
attack aircraft and upgraded its Su‐27/30 fighters. In 2008‐09, Vietnam returned to
the Russian market with further orders of coastal patrol boats, frigates, Su‐30 jet
fighters, and six Kilo‐class conventional submarines. In sum, the Russian Federation
remains Vietnam’s main source of modern military equipment and platforms and
technical support but not a military ally.
Vietnam has moved from off‐the‐shelf purchases to co‐production and local
assembly of corvettes and missile patrol boats from kits provided by Russia. But the
technical capacity of Vietnam’s national defense industry is limited. Plans to
assemble a Russian‐designed Project 2100 corvette were abandoned because the
task was technically too ambitious. Similarly, a 2003 proposal to establish a regional
Sukhoi maintenance center in Vietnam was shelved.”