1.

The RTC of Sindangan appointed X as guardian of minor Y, in a special

proceeding. Y is allegedly the son of a U.S. Veteran. X received the arrears of
beneficiary Y. Later on, the U.S. Veterans Administration filed a case in Washington
D.C. for the refund of the benefits received by Y, on the ground of wrong payment
since it was found that the U.S. Veteran was a fake. Question: Does the court in
Washington D.C. have jurisdiction concerning the case of refund? Explain.

No, the point of contact here is the Philippines. (see p. 316)

It was ruled: The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the appellant, make the
decisions of the U.S. Veteran Administrator final and conclusive when made on
claims properly submitted to him for resolution; but they are not applicable to the
present case, where the Administrator is not acting as a judge but as a litigant.
There is a great difference between actions against the Administrator (which must
be filed strictly in accordance with the conditions that are imposed by the Veterans'
Act, including the exclusive review by United States courts), and those actions
where the veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to
their jurisdiction by filing actions therein. Our attention has not been called to any
law or treaty that would make the findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in actions
where he is a party, conclusive on our courts. That in effect, would deprive our
tribunals or judicial discretion and render them mere subordinate instrumentalities
of the veterans' Administrator.

(In Re Guardianship of the Minor Roy Reginald Lelina. SEVERO VILORIA, guardian
and oppositor-appellee, vs.ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, G.R. No. L-9620
June 28, 1957petitioner-appellant.)
In an analogous case, we have ruled:

By filing this action of partition in the court a quo, the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator has submitted to its jurisdiction and put in issue the legality of his
vesting order. He can not therefore now dispute this power. (Brownell vs. Bautista,
50 Off. Gaz., 4772.)

From the time the amounts now sought to be recovered where paid to the appellee
guardian, for the ward's benefit, the latter became their lawful possessor and he
can not be deprived thereof on the sole allegation of the Veterans' Administrator
that the money was erroneously paid. The burden lies upon him to satisfy the court
that the alleged mistake was really committed; and the Philippine courts'
determination of the question is as binding upon the Veterans' Administrator as
upon any other litigant.
Concerning the claim itself, we agree with the court below that it was not properly
filed in the guardianship proceedings, since the latter are solely concerned with the
ward's care a custody and the proper administration or management of his
properties. Conflicts regarding ownership or title to the property in the hands of the
guardian, in his capacity as such, should be litigated in a separate proceeding.

2.Can Philippine courts recognize a foreign decree of adoption? Explain your answer.

See p. 313 of the book

Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign adoption. This

rests on the principle that the status of adoption, created by the law of a State
having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect in another state as is
given by the latter state to the status of adoption when created by its own law.4It is
quite obvious then that the status of adoption, once created under the proper
foreign law, will be recognized in this country, except where public policy or the
interests of its inhabitants forbid its enforcement and demand the substitution of
the lex fori. Indeed, implicit in Article 15 of our Civil Code just quoted, is that the
exercise of incidents to foreign adoption "remains subject to local law."5

(JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAIDA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila,
respondent-appellee. G.R. No. L-24006 November 25, 1967)
It is high time for this Court to formulate a rule on the registration of foreign
adoptions. We hold that an adoption created under the law of a foreign country is
entitled to registration in the corresponding civil register of the Philippines. It is to
be understood, however, that the effects of such adoption shall be governed by the
laws of this country.6

3.Ching Leng , a Chinese man was granted Philippine citizenship upon his marriage
to a Filipina in 1950. His wife filed an adoption to Ching's five illegitimate minor
childen. The adoption was granted. Ching then filed a petition to cancel the alien
certificates of registration of said minors on the theory that they have become
Filipino citizens by virtue of the adoption. Is Ching Leng correct? Explain.

Cheng Leng is wrong. The Alien certificates of registration will not be cancelled
because the adopted children have not become Filipinos (see p. 312). Minor children
refer to legitimate children only and not the illegitimates.
4.Alvin, a natural born U.S. citizen and his wife Evelyn, a natural born filipina who in
1988 became a naturalized citizen, jointly filed in 1990 a petition for adoption of
Solomon, Evelyn's 12 year old brother. Are Alvin and Evelyn qualified to adopt?
Explain.

NO, an alien who may adopt a Filipino is one who is a former Filipino citizen seeking
to adopt a relative by consanguinity, or one seeking to adopt the legitimate child of
his or her Filipino spouse, or one who is married to a Filipino seeking to adopt jointly
with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. None of these
requisites are present in the case at bar. (p. 308)

Section 4. Who may adopt. The following may adopt:

(1) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude; who is emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for
children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position
to support and care for his children in keeping with the means of the family. The
requirement of a 16-year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee
may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee or is the
spouse of the adoptees parent;
(2) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above-stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of
the Philippines, that he has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he has been certified by his
diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency to have the
legal capacity to adopt in his country, and that his government allows the adoptee
to enter his country as his adopted child. Provided, further, That the requirements
on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his country may
be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his spouse
a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino
spouse.
(3) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship
and clearance of his financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of one spouse by the other
spouse; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child: Provided, however, That
the other spouse has signified his consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the illegitimate child of
the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
Section 5. Who may be adopted. The following may be adopted:
(1) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been voluntarily
committed to the Department under Articles 154, 155 and 156 of P.D. No. 603 or
judicially declared available for adoption;
(2) The legitimate child of one spouse, by the other spouse;
(3) An illegitimate child, by a qualified adopter to raise the status of the former to
that of legitimacy;
(4) A person of legal age regardless of civil status, if, prior to the adoption, said
person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopters as their own
child since minority;
(5) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or
(6) A child whose biological or adoptive parents have died: Provided, That no
proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said
parents.
(7) A child not otherwise disqualified by law or these rules.

5.In State X, all children whether born inside or outside wedlock are considered
legitimate. In State Y, all children born outside wedlock are illegitimate. Now then, a
child is born outside wedlock of a father, who is a citizen of State Y, and a mother,
who is a citizen of State X. Questions: (a) Should the Philippine courts consider the
child legitimate or illegitimate? (b) What country's law shall govern the relationship
of parents and child?

(p. 304) The child shall be considered illegitimate since that is the characterization
under the fathers law. Inasmuch as the child is illegitimate, the relationship shall be
governed by the mothers law.
6.Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in
Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and
allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas
and Orlando divorced in April 1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent
Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior
subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.

Question: Does petitioner have the personality to file a petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy? Why?

A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based
on a cause of action. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Petitioners personality to file the
petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the
absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After all, she may
have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after
the divorce decree becomes absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who
alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that
respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is settled rule that one
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree
and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage.
If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow
respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.

7. Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they
got married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a son in
1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias
parent as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to,
among other things, when should they start living independently from Julias
parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels
opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return
home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be
in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate
his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home,
filed a case to nullify their marriage due to Julias psychological incapacity. Leouel
asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or at least communicate with him
even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Question: As judge will
you grant the nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity?
Explain.

Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the
term psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But
basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision
adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some
resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law. The term psychological incapacity defies
any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must
be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed
because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings
presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to
decree a nullity of marriage.
8. IN 1948, Pastor and Vicenta were married before the catholic church in Cebu City.
On Oct. 22, 1950 Vicenta obtained an absolute divorce in Nevada U.S.A., after which
she married John Nichols, an American.They resided in Nevada since then, when she
finally acquired her American citizenship in 1958.
Meanwhile, Pastor filed legal separation proceedings in the Philippines plus
damages.
Questions:(a) Will the petition for legal separation and the claim for damages
prosper?(b) State the "doctrines" laid in this case.
The petition for legal separation will not prosper.
THERE WAS A VALID MARRIAGE between Vicenta and Tenchaves:
With regard to jurisdiction over Escano, the court states that when against the non-
resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an
action for separation or for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly
try and decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the matter , and
in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not
essential. The point is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the
Philippines. Divorce, although successfully obtained in another country, cannot be
applied in the Philippines since it is contrary to public policy. The principle is well-
established, in private international law, that foreign decrees cannot be enforced or
recognized if they contravene public policy. Furthermore, Vicentas refusal to
perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of
husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband
is entitled to damages (2176). When, however, the action against the non-resident
defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for
separation or for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and
decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the res, and in that
event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not
essential. The res is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines,
45,000 damages awarded to parents deemed excessive: filing of suit nay have
wounded their feelings and caused anxiety but this has not seriously injured their
reputation or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common
occurrence in present society.

9. Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May
16, 1968. The marriage produced four children. Several years later, the couple
encountered marital problems that they decided to obtain a divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special
Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal,
Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action
under its laws.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in
the United States and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their
union produced one offspring.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the
court in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and
Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was
deemed void under Philippine law. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the RTC of Quezon City.

Question: Does Perez have a legal interest in the matter of litigation required of a
would-be-intervenor in Tristans petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
with his wife? Why?

No, Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14,
1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and
Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond
between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of where a citizen of the
Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to
his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal
capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or
abroad initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and
eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the
Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce. Petitioners claim that she is
the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus,
petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for
intervention is based.

10. October 1986, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano started a
common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month.
Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On
November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married in Bacoor, Cavite. One month
after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas
to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two
months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he
never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that
Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
Questions: (1) Is the abandonment by the husband of his family and his insensitivity
to them automatically constitute psychological incapacity? (2) Do the requirements
of psychological incapacity apply to mixed marriages? Explain.

1. No. the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact
that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage.
In Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.

2. The husband being a Japanese national is immaterial in proving psychological

incapacity, no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. Hence, the
norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.