JUAN F. VILLARROEL, vs.

BERNARDINO ESTRADA

G.R. No. L-47362 December 19, 1940

FACTS: On May 9 1912, Alejandra F. Callao mother of herein petitioner obtained from the Sps Mariano
Estrada and Severina a loan of 1000 pesos payable in 6 years. Alejandra died leaving petitioner as the sole
heir. The Sps Mariano Estrada and Severina died as well leaving the respondent as the sole heir. On Aug 9
1930, petitioner signed a document assuming the obligation to pay the respondent 1000 plus 12% per annum
interest. Hence the action filed to recover said amount.

The CFI ruled in favor of the respondent ordering the petitioner to pay 1000 plus interest of 12% per annum to
be counted from Aug 9 1930.

ISSUE: Whether or not the present action may prosper notwithstanding the prescription of the action to recover
the original debt?

HELD: Yes. The present action is not based on the original debt contracted by petitioners mother which has
already prescribed but on petitioners undertaking on Aug 9 1930 to assume the original obligation. For the
petitioner who is the sole heir of the original debtor with rights to the latters inheritance, the debt legally
contracted by his mother even if it has already lost enforceability due to prescription, has become a moral
obligation which is a sufficient consideration to make the obligation he voluntarily assumed on Aug 9 1930
enforceable and legally demandable.
RAMOS VS MANALAC

FACTS:

Petition for certiorari was filed seeking annulment of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
regarding a foreclosed parcel of land. Petitioners question the validity of the CFI ruling that they will be held in
contempt for refusing to vacate the land. The said property, being collateral for a loan to a Mr. Rivera, was
foreclosed due to non-payment of loan amount and its interest within the prescribed periods. Mr. Rivera later
sold the property to Ms. Lopez, who later filed petition that she be placed in possession of the land. The
petitioners question the ruling of the court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not:

(1) The decision of the lower court (CFI) is valid;

(2) Directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Felipa Lopez is valid; and,

(3) (Possible Legal Ethics Issue) the term appearance would include only presence in courts.

HELD:

YES on first two issues. NO on the third issue. Petition was dismissed. Cost against the petitioners.

RATIO:

Claim of the petitioners as to the validity of the decision cannot be sustained for the reason that it is in a nature
of collateral attack to judgment which on its face is valid and regular for a long time. It is a well known rule that
a judgment, which on its face is valid and regular, can only be attacked in separate action brought principally
for the purpose (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717).

The second issue was also not taken for the simple reason that the issuance of writ of possession in
foreclosure proceedings is not an execution of judgment within the purview of Section 6 Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, but is merely ministerial and complementary duty of the court.

In the third issue, the word or term appearance includes not only arguing a case before any such body but
also filing a pleading in behalf of a client as by simply filing a formal motion, plea or answer.

Respondent was suspended for bad practices in the exercise of his profession as a lawyer for a period of five
years from the November 9, 1949. The defendant admits this suspension in `his written report filed on March
17, 1951, yet he continued to exercise the profession within the period of suspension, November 9, 1949 to
November 8, 1954.
[Adm. Case No. 98. July 13, 1953.]
In Case of FELIX Attorney P. David.
D. Felix P. David in his own representation.
The Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and the Attorney General, Mr. Esmeraldo Umali in
representation of the government.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS; DEFINED THE TERM "EXERCISE THE PROFESSION." - To practice the profession of
lawyer is to practice the acts of that profession. The preparation and lodging of motions requesting the
execution of a sentence, the demolition of the defendants' houses in the case asking the court to order the
sheriff to deliver the amounts collected in the case are acts that form part of the exercise of the profession of
advocacy; The filing and memorandum before the Court of Appeal is to practice the profession of lawyer,
because an agent can not do it; Collecting rents from the more than one hundred defendants issuing receipts
and signing them as attorney of the plaintiff is to practice the profession.

2. ID .; ID .; - The fact that the lawyer had not put in his motion for execution that acted as a lawyer but as
agent and employee of the applicant does not alter the nature of his services which are certainly professional
services of lawyer. Concealing that he acted as a lawyer and pretending to be only an agent, his situation is
aggravated; It is more guilty that, covered with a mask, he fires at his enemy than he who does it with his face
uncovered and in public view.
3. ID .; ATTORNEY SUSPENDED THAT ENJOY THE PROFESSION. - The suspended lawyer practicing the
profession during the period of suspension must be completely disqualified to practice such profession in the
Philippines with the consequent cancellation of the certificate issued in his favor as such lawyer.

DECISION

PAUL M. :

In administrative case No. 35, the defendant was suspended for malpractice in the exercise of his profession of
lawyer for a period of five years from November 9, 1949. The defendant admits this suspension in his written
report filed on 17 Of March 1951; yet he continued exercising the profession within the period of the
suspension, November 9, 1949 November 8, 1954.

On February 28, 1950 the Respondent submitted a claim (Exhibit J) in the cause CA GR No. 4792 -R, Tan Tek
Sy v. Maliwanag, not as a lawyer for Tan Tek Sy, but with the following words: "for and on behalf of Tan Tek Sy";
On January 26, 1951, it was sent by certified mail notification of the decision in said case (Exhibit G),
confirming the decision of the Court of First Instance; on March 13, 1951 I filed a motion in this court - returned
and the record - calling the issuance of a warrant of execution, which motion is signed as follows: jgc:
chanrobles.com.ph

"TEK SO IF
" By (Sgd.) FELIX DAVID P.,
"c / o Atty. Felix P. David,
" Corner Dagupan and Azcarraga St.,
"Saw Mill & Construction Philippines,
" Manila "

the present resorted therefore written not as often practicing lawyers do, but as an agent Sy Tan Tek.

in the civil case No. 3658 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. against
Tolentino, the respondent filed a brief in September 25 1950, calling for an order to demolish the defendants'
homes (Exhibit A), and on October 10, 1950, I filed a motion requesting that the Sheriff of Manila be authorized
to pay "the amount or such other amount as may be collected by the Sheriff from time to time "(Exhibit B), on
November 13, 1950 filed another motion (Exhibit C) requesting another demolition order, signing the three
briefs, Exhibits A, B and C, as plaintiff's attorney; Exhibits B to B-34 show that he was receiving payments of
amounts from several defendants as plaintiff's attorney; the oldest receipt is dated February 12, 1950 and the
last on December 7, 1950.

In defense resorted appeared as attorney says Tan Tek Sy from the Municipal Court of Manila in 1948; That
when he was suspended he had advised his client to seek another lawyer to prepare the case to be presented
to the Court of Appeal; That when there were no more than two or three days and his client could not present
it, the same drafted and presented at the request of his client, That he prepared the plea with the intention of
his client signing it, but since he was in Dagupan and could not sign it and there was only one day left, then he
signed it as follows: "Felix P. David, For and on behalf of the appellee. " On September 25, 1950, I submitted to
the Court of Appeal a memorandum in reply to that of the appellant, signed as is the case.

"In order," says the respondent, "to show that I did not have the intention to disregard the suspension of the
Supreme Court, I did not have the knowledge of Tan Tek and even identified myself as the attorney for the
appellee but in good faith, I signed for and on behalf of the appellee without designating that I am practicing the
attorney-at-law. " cralaw virtua1aw library

do not think this justified the performance of the resorted to submit the claim and its memorandum on behalf of
his client being suspended in the exercise of their profession; Knowing that he was suspended, should not
have presented them neither as an agent nor as a lawyer; Was obliged not to continue serving his client before
the Court of Appeal; Had to warn his client that he was suspended in the exercise of his profession of lawyer
and should advise him to employ another in his place if he wanted to have representation; It should not
contravene the express order of this Court; He should have known that a non-practicing lawyer can not be
heard by a litigant before a court except before a court of law. In presenting his plea and memorandum with the
words "For and on behalf of the Appellee" he infringed Article 31 of Rule 127 which provides that "In other
courts, a party may conduct its own litigation either personally or with the assistance of An attorney, and his
appearance shall be made personally or through a duly authorized member of the Forum. " An agent or a
member of the suspended Forum can not appear for a litigant.

In order to explain the motions in case No. 3655, Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. v. Tolentino, the respondent states
that I am acting in good faith, that I present them not to disobey the decision of this Court but to be able to
collect its fees. As an officer of the Forum, the lawyer must comply with the decision of this Court over any
other consideration. We believe that it is not a work of good faith that, putting its interest in the collection of its
fees, exercises the profession knowing that it was forbidden to exercise it. Even if he had not filed his motions
on exhibits A, B and C and issued receipts B to B-34 for amounts collected from the defendants, the defendant
could have collected his fees, either claiming directly from his client, already claiming them according to the
article Rule 33 127.

the appeal says that if appeared before March 2, 1950 in case No. 7679 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Juan de la Torre against Philippine Trust Co., was by request of his brother John's Torre and also he
did not charge fees for his appearance because he knew that he was suspended in the exercise of the
profession. Even if this appearance were not taken into account, the respondent can not be saved because
he / she has lent the various professional services already reported.

To practice the profession of lawyer is to practice the acts of that profession. The preparation and filing of
motions requesting the execution of the sentence, the demolition of the defendants' houses, asking the court to
order the Sheriff to deliver the amounts collected, are acts that form part of the practice of the legal profession;
The filing and memorandum before the Court of Appeal is to practice the profession of lawyer, because an
agent can not do it; Collecting rents from the 109 defendants by issuing 35 receipts and signing them as
attorney for the plaintiff, is to practice the profession.

The fact that he had not put in motion his order of execution at Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. against Tolentino, who
acted as a lawyer but as agent and employee of the Philippines Sawmill and Construction, does not alter the
nature of his services which are certainly Professional lawyer services; But concealing that he acted as a
lawyer for Tan Tek Sy and pretending to be only an agent, his situation is aggravated: it is more guilty that,
covered with a mask, he shoots his enemy than he who does it with his face uncovered and in plain sight Of
the public; Hence the criminal law imposes more severe penalty in the first case.

The evidence of record shows that the Respondent Felix P. David practiced as a lawyer intentionally
disobeying the decision of the Court of September 30, 1949, Administrative Case No. 35.

Therefore, it disables to practice the profession of lawyer In the Philippines, the certificate issued in your favor
to exercise the profession is declared canceled and you are ordered to return it to the Clerk of this Court.
In Re DAVID (DIGEST)

Facts

On Feb 28 1950 the respondent file a claim in the case of Tan Tek vs Sy not as a lawyer but as an agent. (For
and in behalf of Tan Tek Sy) CFI decided in favor of Tan Tek, subsequently Atty Felix David filed a motion for
execution. In another civil case of the CFI called Malayan Saw Mill, Inc vs Tolentino, defendant filed a brief for
an order to demolish homes.

In order - says the appeal - to show That I did not Have the intention to disregard the suspension of the
Supreme Court, I did not With The Knowledge of Tan Tek Identified Sy Even myself as the attorney for the
Appelles But In Good Faith, I signed for and in Behalf of the appellee Without Designating That I am Practicing
as attorney-at-law.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of Atty Felix David is tantamount to practice of law.

HELD: Yes. Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or as part of firm name under
the signature of another qualified lawyer because the signature of an agent amounts to signing of a non-
qualified senator or congressman, the office of an attorney being originally an agency, and because he will, by
such act, be appearing in court or quasi-judicial or administrative body in violation of the constitutional
restriction. He cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits directly.

[A.M. No. P-99-1287. January 26, 2001]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:

In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority
to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled
People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga for Falsification of Public Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 40.[1] While respondents letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres,
the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated September
2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to respondents authority to appear as counsel for the accused
in the said criminal case.[2] On September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred the matter to
respondent for comment.[3]

In his Comment,[4] dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in Criminal Case
No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal
case compelled him to handle the defense of his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the
services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private complainant was a member of a powerful
family who was out to get even with his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal
case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage of his position. In
any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave application approved by the presiding judge.
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a resolution denying respondents request for authorization to appear
as counsel and directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing
in court without the required authorization from the Court.[5] On January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed
the instant administrative complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which
provides:

Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.- Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:

xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, Provided,
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;

In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the administrative
complaint.

In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are close blood cousins who belong to a
powerless family from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he finished
his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and guided him while he looked up to her as a mentor and
an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondents help and advice when she was
charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose
only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to seek vengeance on her cousin. He explained that his
cousins discord with Ms. Andres started when the latters husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home
to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three
(3) children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against Ms.
Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms.
Ladagas plea to be her counsel since she did not have enough funds to pay for the services of a lawyer.
Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted government service, initially with the
Commission on Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty and
integrity and that it was only in this particular case that he had been administratively charged for extending a
helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal assistance for humanitarian purpose. He never took
advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that during
the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications attached to his
comment.

In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondents comment and referred the administrative matter
to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for
investigation, report and recommendation.

In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and recommendation:

There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa
Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents before the
METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the
previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel
before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge
Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the respondent appeared as pro bono
counsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that the
respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only
lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.

It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his
family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably.
Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this,
during all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence.

RECOMMENDATION

In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin without first
securing permission from the court, and considering that this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact that
said appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully
recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt
with more severely.[6]

We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.

Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar
prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys
from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The said section reads:

SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice.- No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of
the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional
advise to clients.

However, it should be clarified that private practice of a profession, specifically the law profession in this case,
which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of
acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.

In the case of People vs. Villanueva,[7] we explained the meaning of the term private practice prohibited by the
said section, to wit:

We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768) Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active
and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate
superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.[8]
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono
counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the private practice of the law profession
contemplated by law.

Nonetheless, while respondents isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice of law, he
failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this Court as required
by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from
the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time
so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part
in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.[9]

Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15,
1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is true that he
filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior
permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned
is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a
stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.