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V.

Delegation of Power

1. Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237

FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012.

Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace
activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law
merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful
attacks on the system.

ISSUES: Whether or not the following provisions are valid and constitutional.

a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access; Data;


b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference; n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting; o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft; p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; of Computer Data;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography; q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
g.Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to
Communications; Computer Data;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel; s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and
the Commission of Cybercrimes; Coordinating Center (CICC); and
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher; u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175; of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the
l. Section 8 on Penalties; RPC on the crime of libel
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic
.

HELD:

a. Section 4(a)(1) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(1) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under
this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:

(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.

Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that
interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down.

The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since
no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act
accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct.

Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to the extent
of the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. Since the ethical hacker does his job
with prior permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section 4(a)
(1).

Hence, valid and constitutional.

b. Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law


Section 4(a)(3) provides:

(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of
computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction
or transmission of viruses.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data
interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent
effect on these guaranteed freedoms.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state
regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading
the area of protected freedoms.But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply
punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism,the act of willfully destroying without right the things that
belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such
act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other peoples computer
systems and private documents.

Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under no set of
circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid.Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(6) provides:

(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead,
destroy the reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:

(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate
government agency at the time of the domain name registration;

(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a personal
name; and

(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clausein that, not
being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use
aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device.

The law is reasonable in penalizing the offender for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit,
mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of
registering the same.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(b)(3) provides:

b) Computer-related Offenses:

xxxx

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession,
alteration, or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without
right: Provided: that if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree
lower.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and
correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.

In Morfe v. Mutuc,it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it is
in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.

Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy."

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous
regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a
"constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks." In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v.
Senator Gordon, 535 Phil. 687, 714-715 (2006).

Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable
searchesand seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of
communication and correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded
into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government
intrusion.

Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the
right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.

Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal
identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire anothers personal data.

Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists would be
hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure information about
him that could be published.

The Court held, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear
since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(1) provides:

(c) Content-related Offenses:

(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any
lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or
consideration.

Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause.They express fear that private
communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not
regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in
cyberspace. In common usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right
granted or conceded," or "a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously."This meaning given to
the term "favor" embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement
agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals.

The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and
consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.

Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived by some as a right, has
to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of women.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(c)(2) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(2) provides:

(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or
the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty
to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.

The above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009(ACPA) to cover identical
activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when
prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPAs definition of
child pornography already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any
other means."

Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace.
But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is
rational basis for such higher penalty.The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of
child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(3) provides:

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of commercial electronic communication


with the use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are
prohibited unless:

(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or

(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from the
sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or

(iii) The following conditions are present:

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient
to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source;

(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic
message; and

(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information in any
part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.

The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as "spam."
The term "spam" surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats
the same sentence or comment was said to be making a "spam."

The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial
communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of internet
service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with the owners
peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the
person sending out spams enters the recipients domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that
commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.

These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters
is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their
recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them.

To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even
unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.

Hence, void for being unconstitutional.

Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code

Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law

Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4)
of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.

The RPC provisions on libel read:

Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real
or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative
or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.

Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing, printing,
lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or
any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine
ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party.

The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to form part of it the
provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the
future.

Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal codeand, in effect, the libel provisions of the
cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence
already replaces it with the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction.Petitioners argue
that inferring "presumed malice" from the accuseds defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the
penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect
private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in
relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms
that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.

But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous
statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions
on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.

The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. In a sense, they
are a world apart in terms of quickness of the readers reaction to defamatory statements posted in
cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the networking site as well as by the speed
with which such reactions are disseminated down the line to other internet users.

Hence, Section 4(c)(4) penalizing online libel is valid and constitutional with respect to the original author
of the post; but void and unconstitutional with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to
it; and

Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 5 provides:

Sec. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an offense:

(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully
abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It
suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.

The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and
abetting sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail themselves
of the services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the
meaning of "aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor General argues that plain,
ordinary, and common usage is at times sufficient to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing the law.

Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous
statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes
hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to
disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace
communication technology to protect a persons reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that
will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms. Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).

If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users
will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all
liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of
facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. (Adonis) G.R. No. 203378The terms "aiding or
abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through
cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.

Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a
nullity.

As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It is inevitable


that any government threat of punishment regarding certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect
on the constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the great masses that use it. In this case, the
particularly complex web of interaction on social media websites would give law enforcers such latitude
that they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.

Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part
of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the
crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way.In the absence of
legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries,
Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to
apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data
Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6)
on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related
Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these
offenses borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.

Section 6 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 6 provides:

Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if
committed by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies shall be covered
by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree
higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may
be.

Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. As
the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through
the use of information and communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means.
In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more
victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for
cybercrimes.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 7 provides:

Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.

Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be
libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate
libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation
of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same
offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one
already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another
means of publication. Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the
proscription against double jeopardy.

The Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes
prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases,
WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:

1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as
well as

2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of
Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a
violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is void and unconstitutional.

Section 8 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 8 provides:

Sec. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and
4(b) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred
thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or
both.

Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment
of prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.

If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion
temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount
commensurate to the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be
punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos
(PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos (PhP1,000,000.00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be
punished with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of
2009:" Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in
Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a computer system.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with
imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding
Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP250,000.00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with
imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least
One hundred thousand pesos (PhP100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos
(PhP500,000.00) or both.

The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the
legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. Judges
and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range
as determined by the legislative department.

The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 12 provides:

Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be
authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with
specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.

Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of
underlying service, but not content, nor identities.

All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.

Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or
recording of the above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written application and
the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the
showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove
has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to
the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily
available for obtaining such evidence.

Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic data in real
time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data
showing where digital messages come from, what kind they are, and where they are destined need not be
incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of
every individual to privacy and to be protected from government snooping into the messages or
information that they send to one another.

Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a need to put
order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good. To do this, it is within the realm of reason
that the government should be able to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of
cybercrimes.

Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to
live freely without surveillance and intrusion.In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right
to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the
right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an
objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as
objectively reasonable. 429 U.S. 589 (1977)

Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its application to a particular
person or group, petitioners challenge to Section 12 applies to all information and communications
technology (ICT) users, meaning the large segment of the population who use all sorts of electronic
devices to communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be measured
from the general publics point of view. Without reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would
have no basis in fact.

In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)the United States Supreme Court classified privacy into two
categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to
independence in making certain important decisions, while informational privacy refers to the interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter rightthe right to informational privacythat those who
oppose government collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.

Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the messages and
uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.

Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified
communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law
enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually limitless,
enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified
communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy.

The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies be written with
specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.

Hence, void for being unconstitutional

Section 13 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 13 provides:

Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information relating to
communication services provided by a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6)
months from the date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months from
the date of receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its preservation.

Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That
once computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case,
the mere furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor
shall be deemed a notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the case.

The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its
compliance.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 203391 (Palatino v. Ochoa)claim that Section 13 constitutes an undue deprivation of
the right to property. They liken the data preservation order that law enforcement authorities are to issue
as a form of garnishment of personal property in civil forfeiture proceedings. Such order prevents internet
users from accessing and disposing of traffic data that essentially belong to them.

No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors or
recipients and are to be considered private communications. But it is not clear that a service provider has
an obligation to indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass its system for the benefit of users. By
virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires service providers to keep traffic data and subscriber
information relating to communication services for at least six months from the date of the transaction and
those relating to content data for at least six months from receipt of the order for their preservation.

At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service providers preserve on orders
of law enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such
orders. The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.

Hence, valid and constitutional

Section 14 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 14 provides:

Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall
issue an order requiring any person or service provider to disclose or submit subscribers information,
traffic data or relevant data in his/its possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of
the order in relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation and the
disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of investigation.

The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena.

Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function
usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The
prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate
the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial
intervention.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 15 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 15 provides:

Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. Where a search and seizure warrant is
properly issued, the law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.

Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act, and:

(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;

(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;


(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;

(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and

(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and
communications network.

Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge about the
functioning of the computer system and the measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein
to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the search, seizure
and examination.

Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the examination of the
computer data storage medium and to make a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty
(30) days from date of approval by the court.

Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established search and seizure
procedures.

The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were
taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements
them.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 17 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 17 provides:

Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15,
service providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely
destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and examination.

Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous preservation or examination
violates the users right against deprivation of property without due process of law. But, as already stated,
it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of the
data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved
them in his computer when he generated the data or received it. He could also request the service
provider for a copy before it is deleted.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 19 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to computer data:

Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a computer data is prima facie found to be
in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such
computer data.

Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes that this provision may be
unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself that
Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right mentioned.

Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines
established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are generally
evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of
interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to
be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into
2. Umali Vs Comelec 723 SCRA 170

FACTS:
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-2011,
requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the
province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to
"ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local
Government Code of 1991."

Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No. 12-0797, for
purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized
city, only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.

In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for
Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly affect
the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be
interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the conversion in
question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the
Constitutional provision calls for the people of the local government unit (LGU) directly affected to vote in a
plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. The phrase "qualified
voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of
the units directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be
upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the various adverse effects of the
Cabanatuan Citys conversion and how it will cause material change not only in the political and economic
rights of the city and its residents but also of the province as a whole.

To the Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius Cesar Vergara, city mayor of
Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to conversions,
which is the meat of the matter. He likewise argues that a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, as
couched, allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite. Lastly, private
respondent pointed out that when Santiago City was converted in 1994 from a municipality to an
independent component city pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7720, the plebiscite held was limited to the
registered voters of the then municipality of Santiago.

COMELEC rule against petitioner maintaining that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted from a
component city into an HUC and that the political unit directly affected by the conversion will only be the
city itself. It argues that in this instance, no political unit will be created, merged with another, or will be
removed from another LGU, and that no boundaries will be altered. The conversion would merely reinforce
the powers and prerogatives already being exercised by the city, with the political units probable elevation
to that of an HUC as demanded by its compliance with the criteria established under the LGC. Thus, the
participation of the voters of the entire province in the plebiscite will not be necessary.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nueva Ecija should be included in the plebicit not only those in Cabanatuan City.

RULING: Yes.

"Political units directly affected" defined


In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should primarily
be determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire to participate will be "directly affected" by the
change.
Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should be the basis for determining the
qualified voters who will participate in the plebiscite to resolve the issue. Sec. 10, Art. X reads:

Section 10, Article X. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units directly affected" necessarily encompasses not
only Cabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in the
province are qualified to cast their votes in resolving the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan City.

On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to support their claim that only the City of
Cabanatuan should be allowed to take part in the voting. Sec. 453 states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. It shall be the duty of the President to declare a
city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements
prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a
plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.
Respondents take the phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 as referring only to the registered
voters in the city being converted, excluding in the process the voters in the remaining towns and cities of
Nueva Ecija.

In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a determination on whether
or not the requirements under Sec. 4521 of the LGC are complied with. The provision makes it
ministerial for the President, upon proper application, to declare a component city as highly
urbanized once the minimum requirements, which are based on certifiable and measurable
indices under Sec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatory language "shall" used in the provision
leaves the President with no room for discretion.

In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of a plebiscite for purposes of
conversions once the requirements are met. No further legislation is necessary before the city proposed to
be converted becomes eligible to become an HUC through ratification, as the basis for the delegation of
the legislative authority is the very LGC.
The plebiscite requirement under the constitutional provision should equally apply to conversions as well.
While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution we nevertheless
observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries.

3. City of Manila vs. Colet 744 SCRA 265

FACTS:
The case involves 10 consolidated petitions involving several corporations operating as transportation
contractors, persons who transport passenger or freight for hire, and common carriers by land, air or
water with principal offices in Metro Manila, and City of Manilas Ordinance No. 7807 which amended Sec.
21 (B) of the Manila Revenue Code. Sec.21 (B) imposed business tax on transportation contractors,
persons who transport passenger or freight for hire, and common carriers by land, air or water; while the
subject ordinance amended such by lowering the tax rate from 3% per annum to .5% per annum. The City
of Manila, through its City Treasurer, began imposing and collecting the business tax under Section 21(B)
of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, beginning January 1994.

Because they were assessed and/or compelled to pay business taxes pursuant to Section 21(B) of the
Manila Revenue Code before they were issued their business permits for 1994, several corporations
questioned the constitutionality of Sec. 21 (B) for being contrary to the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, and asked for the refund of what they had paid as business tax.

The City of Manila, argued that it was constitutional and valid; and such position was adopted by the RTC
and the CA when the case reached the respective fora. The City argued that the enactment of Sec. 21 (B)
is based on the exempting clause found at the beginning of Sec. 133, in conjunction with Section 143(h), of
the LGC.

SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units.
Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
xxxx
(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation of
passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Code;
SEC. 143. Tax on Business. The municipality may impose taxes on the following businesses:
xxxx
(h) On any business, not otherwise specified in the preceding paragraphs, which the sanggunian
concerned may deem proper to tax: Provided, That on any business subject to the excise, value-added or
percentage tax under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, the rate of tax shall not exceed
two percent (2%) of gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year

The sanggunian concerned may prescribe a schedule of graduated tax rates but in no case to exceed the
rates prescribed herein. (Emphases supplied by the Supreme Court)

ISSUE:
Is Sec. 21 (B) of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes. The power to tax is not inherent in LGUs to whom the power must be delegated by Congress and must
be exercised within the guidelines and limitations that Congress may provide.

Sec. 5 of Article X of the Constitution granted LGUs the power to create its own sources of revenues and
to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide...
In conformity with said constitutional provision, the Local Govt Code was enacted by Congress.

Sec. 130 of the LGC provides for the fundamental principles governing the taxing powers of LGUs. Sec. 133
provides for the common limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs. Among the common limitations on the
taxing power of LGUs is Section 133(j) of the LGC, which states that unless otherwise provided herein,
the taxing power of LGUs shall not extend to taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and
persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or
water, except as provided in this Code.
Section 133(j) of the LGC clearly and unambiguously proscribes LGUs from imposing any tax on the gross
receipts of transportation contractors, persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by
hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water. Yet, confusion arose from the phrase unless otherwise
provided herein, found at the beginning of the said provision, and the City of Manila anchors the validity
of Sec. 21 (B) on said phrase.
However, the Court is not convinced with the Citys contention. Sec. 133(j) of the LGC prevails over Sec.
143(h) of the same Code, and Sec. 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, was manifestly in
contravention of the former.

Sec. 133(j) of the LGC is a specific provision that explicitly withholds from any LGU the power to tax the
gross receipts of transportation contractors, common carriers, persons engaged in the transportation of
passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water. In contrast, Sec. 143 of the LGC
defines the general power of the municipality (as well as the city, if read in relation to Section 151 of the
same Code) to tax businesses within its jurisdiction.

The succeeding proviso of Section 143(h) of the LGC, viz., Provided, That on any business subject to the
excise, value-added or percentage tax under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, the rate of
tax shall not exceed two percent (2%) of gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year, is not a
specific grant of power to the municipality or city to impose business tax on the gross sales or receipts of
such a business. Rather, the proviso only fixes a maximum rate of imposable business tax in case the
business taxed under Section 143(h) of the LGC happens to be subject to excise, value added, or
percentage tax under the NIRC.

The omnibus grant of power to municipalities and cities under Section 143(h) of the LGC cannot overcome
the specific exception/exemption in Section 133(j) of the same Code.

In the case at bar, the sanggunian of the municipality or city cannot enact an ordinance imposing business
tax on the gross receipts of transportation contractors, persons engaged in the transportation of
passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water, when said sanggunian was
already specifically prohibited from doing so.

Such construction gives effect to both Sections 133(j) and 143(h) of the LGC. Also, Sec. 5(b) of the LGC
itself, on Rules of Interpretation, provides that in case of doubt, any tax ordinance shall be construed
strictly against the LGU enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Furthermore, such a construction
is pursuant to the legislative intent to exclude from the taxing power of the LGU the imposition of business
tax against common carriers to prevent a duplication of the so-called common carriers tax.

4. Eastern Shipping Lines, inc vs. POEA, 160 SCRA 533


[Undue delegation of legislative authority]

FACTS:
Vitaliano Saco, Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for
charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by
the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the
validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It
contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such
authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is
not subject to delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers.

RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. ...
"The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What
can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be.
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be
abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems,
the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling
in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected
by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of
law.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

5. Tatad vs. Secretary of Dept. of Energy (G.R. No. 124360, Nov. 5, 1997)
Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law

FACTS: Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always
been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these
innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180.
This law allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum
products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil
facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring
by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that
the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products
violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the
three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry
who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is
to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.


HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the
Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free
competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the
oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and
Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their
immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in
the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend
to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to
spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge
disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The
argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in
refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be
attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of
Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.

RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new players insofar
as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies by requiring them
to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.

6. Pelaez vs. The Auditor general, G. R. No. L-23825, December 24,1965


[Sufficiency of standards]
Political Law Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test

FACTS: In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this was
purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may change the
seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor
general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs
were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA
2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law, cannot even
create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are
units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being
created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created
without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated
such power to create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of
Sec. 68 of the RAC.

HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such
policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require which would
mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require is present, still, such
will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase
as the public welfare may require qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper
interpretation is the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of government may be changed by the President
when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative
in character not administrative (not executive).

VI. Quasi legislative power or Rule Making Power

7. Abella, Jr.,v. Civil Service Commission, 442 SCRA 507


Facts:
Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), now
the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), on July 1, 1996 as Department Manager of the Legal
Services Department. He held a civil service eligibility for the position of Department Manager, having
completed the training program for Executive Leadership and Management in 1982 under the Civil Service
Academy, pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 850 dated April 16, 1979, which was then the required eligibility
for said position.

On May 31, 1994, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, series of 1994 with
Section 4 enumerating the positions covered by the Career Executive Service (CES). These positions
require Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement for permanent appointment. But, this
provides that incumbents to CES shall retain their permanent appointment but upon promotion or transfer
to other CES positions, they shall be under temporary status until they qualify.

Two years after his retirement, petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on a
contractual basis. On January 1, 1999, petitioner was issued by SBMA a permanent employment as
Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center. However, when said appointment was submitted
to respondent Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. III, it was disapproved on the ground that
petitioners eligibility was not appropriate. Petitioner was advised by SBMA of the disapproval of his
appointment. In view thereof, petitioner was issued a temporary appointment as Department Manager III,
Labor and Employment Center, SBMA on July 9, 1999. Petitioner appealed the disapproval of his permanent
appointment by respondent to the Civil Service Commission, which issued Resolution No. 000059, dated
January 10, 2000, affirming the action taken by respondent. Petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof
was denied by the CSC in Resolution No. 001143 dated May 11, 2000.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but it ruled that he did not have legal standing to question the
disapproval and was not the real party in interest.

Issue/s:
A. Whether the petitioner has the personality and the real party in interest to question the disapproval
of his appointment.
B. Whether the issuance of Section 4 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, s. 1994, which deprived
petitioner his property right without due process of law, is constitutional.
C. Whether the CSC correctly denied his appointment.

Ruling:
A. Personality and real party in interest.
The CSCs disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the appointing authoritys
discretion. The appointing authority must have the right to contest the disapproval. While there is
justification to allow the appointing authority to challenge the CSC disapproval, there is none to preclude
the appointee from taking the same course of action. Aggrieved parties, including the CSC, should be
given the right to file motions for reconsideration or to appeal. On this point, the concepts of legal
standing and real party in interest become relevant.

The question in legal standing is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. If legal standing is
granted to challenge the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act despite the lack of
personal injury on the challengers part, then more so should petitioner be allowed to contest the CSC
Order disapproving his appointment. Clearly, the petitioner was prejudiced by the disapproval, since he
could not continue his office. Although petitioner had no vested right to the position, it was his eligibility
that was being questioned. Corollary to this point, he should be granted the opportunity to prove his
eligibility. He had a personal stake in the outcome of the case, which justifies his challenge to the CSC act
that denied his permanent appointment.

A real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one entitled to the
avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue
and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere
incidental interest. Otherwise stated, the rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as
distinguished from a mere expectancy; or from a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
As a general rule, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
a party-plaintiff in an action.

Although the earlier discussion demonstrates that the appointing authority is adversely affected by the
CSCs Order and is a real party in interest, the appointee is rightly a real party in interest too. He is also
injured by the CSC disapproval, because he is prevented from assuming the office in a permanent capacity.
Moreover, he would necessarily benefit if a favorable judgment is obtained, as an approved appointment
would confer on him all the rights and privileges of a permanent appointee.

B. Due Process
Civil Service laws have expressly empowered the CSC to issue and enforce rules and regulations to carry
out its mandate. In the exercise of its authority, the CSC deemed it appropriate to clearly define and
identify positions covered by the Career Executive Service. Logically, the CSC had to issue guidelines to
meet this objective, specifically through the issuance of the challenged Circular.

The challenged Circular did not revoke petitioners ELM eligibility. He was appointed to a CES position;
however, his eligibility was inadequate. Eligibility must necessarily conform to the requirements of the
position, which in petitioners case was a Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE). The challenged
Circular protects the rights of incumbents as long as they remain in the positions to which they were
previously appointed. They are allowed to retain their positions in a permanent capacity, notwithstanding
the lack of CSEE. Clearly, the Circular recognizes the rule of prospectivity of regulations; hence, it is not an
post facto law or a bill of attainder.

In the present case, the government service of petitioner ended when he retired in 1996; thus, his right to
remain in a CES position, notwithstanding his lack of eligibility, also ceased. Upon his reemployment years
later as department manager III at SBMA in 2001, it was necessary for him to comply with the eligibility
prescribed at the time for that position.

On petitioners averment that he was not afforded due process for CSCs alleged failure to notify him of a
hearing relating to the issuance of the challenged Circular, is not convincing. The issuance of the circular
was an exercise of a quasi-legislative function as such, prior notice to and hearing of every affected party,
as elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that
have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the
validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.

C. Whether CSC correctly denied his appointment


Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his permanent appointment. The appointee
need not have been previously heard, because the nature of the action did not involve the imposition of an
administrative disciplinary measure. The CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment, merely
examines the conformity of the appointment with the law and the appointees possession of all the
minimum qualifications and none of the disqualification. In sum, while petitioner was able to demonstrate
his standing to appeal the CSC Resolutions to the courts, he failed to prove his eligibility to the position he
was appointed to.

The Petition was GRANTED insofar as it seeks legal standing for petitioner, but DENIED insofar as it prays
for the reversal of the CSC Resolutions disapproving his appointment as department manager III of the
Labor and Employment Center, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.

8. Smart Communications v. NTC 408 SCRA 678


[Quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers distinguished]
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE & QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS; RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION;WHEN APPLICABLE

Facts: The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 which promulgated rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services. Petitioners filed with the RTC a petition to declare the circular as
unconstitutional. A motion to dismiss was filed by the NTC on the ground of petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss but on certiorari, the CA reversed RTC.

FACTS: Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications Commission
issued a Memorandum Circulars on the billing of telecommunications services and on measures in
minimizing, if not eliminating, the incidence of stealing of cellular phone unit. Isla Communications Co.,
Inc. (IslaCom) and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PilTel) filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the
memorandum circulars, alleging that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods as
stated in the subject memorandum circulars. Such jurisdiction belongs to the DTI under the Consumer
Acts of the Philippines. Soon thereafter, Globe Telecom, Inc. and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint
motion for leave to intervene and to admit complaint-in-intervention. This was granted by the trial court.

The trial court issued a TRO enjoining NTC from implementing the MCs. NTC filed a Motion to Dismiss, on
the ground that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The defendant's MD is denied for
lack of merit. NTC filed a MR but was later on denied by the trial court. The CA, upon NTC's filing of a
special action for certiorari and prohibition, reversed the decision of the lower court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the private respondents failed to exhaust administrative
remedies?

Held: 1. Administrative bodies had (a) quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and (b) quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. To be valid, such rules and regulations must
conform to, and be consistent with, the provisions of enabling statute.

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial.

2. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative body
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the judicial power as defined by the Constitution which is
the duty of the Courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there haw been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. The NTC circular was issued pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. Hence,
the action must be filed directly with the regular courts without requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

3. Where the act of administrative agency was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function,
exhaustion of administrative remedy is required, before going to court.

4. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-
judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the same must be referred
to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This
doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. In such
case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its
view.

9. Eastern Shipping Lines, In. vs. CA G.R, No, 116356 June 29, 1998
[Nature of quasi-legislative power]
Constitutionality of E.O. No. 1088 providing for uniform & adjusted rates for foreign and coasteise vessels
in all Philippine Ports is assailed.

FACTS:
Davao Pilots Association (DPA) filed a compliant against ESL for non-payment of pilotage services. ESL
assailed the constitutionality of EO 1088, upon which DPA bases its claim,because (1) its interpretation &
application are left private respondent, and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of powers. It insists that
it should pay pilotage fees in accordance with and on the basis of the PPAs memorandum circulars. The
PPA is the administrative body vested with the power to regulate & prescribe pilotage fees.

ISSUES:
1. Whether EO 1088 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether the PPA circulars are valid.

HELD:
1.
EO 1088 was upheld as valid & constitutional in Philippine Inter-island Shipping Association vs CA (78
SCAD 197, 266 SCRA 489 [1997]). It was held that what determines whether an act is a law or an
administrative issuance is not its form but its natureThe power to fix the rates of charges for
serviceshas always been regarded as legislative in character.
EO 1088 is not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is the rationalization of
pilotage service charges through the imposition if uniform and adjusted rates for foreign & coastwise
vessels in all Philippine ports.
The PPA is duty-bound to comply with EO 1088. PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them
below those mandated by EO 1088.
2.
Since the PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void and ineffective.
Administrative/Executive acts, orders and regulations are only valid when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
As stated in LBP vs CA (64 SCAD 905, 249 SCRA 149 [1995]), the conclusive effect of administrative
construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed/set aside by the
judicial department if there is an Error of Law, a Grave Abuse of Power or Lack or Jurisdiction,
or Grave Abuse of Discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or spirit of the law.
An administrative agency has no discretion whether to implement a law or not. If there is any
conflict between the PPA circular and a law, the latter prevails.

1. Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil 328


[Administrative regulation must be reasonable]
FACTS:

The President issued EO 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the EO 66 and 80 as
amendments to EO 22, as a response for the general clamor among the majority of people living in the
coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the said resources of the area are in danger of major depletion
because of the effects of trawl fishing.

A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint for injunction and/or
declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil
Case No. 24867, praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive order; to
declare the same null and void, and for such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.

ISSUE: Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the
exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President.

RULING:

Yes. As already held by this Court, the true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the
conferring of authority or discretion as to the execution of law consists in that the former necessary
involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, while in the latter the authority or discretion as to its
execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no
valid objection can be made.

In the case of U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1, We also held, the power to delegate - the Legislature cannot
delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself, and it does nothing more
than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the
Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act
within itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to
make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, the act is delegation of
legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the
waters of the Philippines and b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide
regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Act was complete in itself and leaves it to the
Sec. to carry into effect its legislative intent. The President did nothing but show an anxious regard for the
welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict
conformity with law.

2. tayug Rural Bank vs. Central Bank of the Phils. 146 SCRA 120
[Administrative rule with penal sanction]

FACTS:
Tayug Rural is a bank in Pangasinan which took out 13 loans from Central Bank in 1962 and1963, all
covered by promissory notes, amounting to 813k. In late 1964, Central Bank released a circular;
Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8 thru the Director of Loans and Credit. This circular allinformed all rural
banks that an additional 10% per annum penalty interest would be assessed on all past due loans
beginning 1965.
This was enforced beginning July 1965.In 1969, the outstanding balance of Tayug was at 444k. Tayug Rural
filed a case in CFI Manila to recover the 10% penalty it paid up to 1968, amounting to about 16k, and to
restrain Central bank from further imposing the penalty. Central Bank filed a counterclaim for the
outstanding balance includingthe10% penalty, stating that it was legally imposed under the Rules and
Regulations Governing Rural Banks promulgated by the Monetary Board on 1958, under RA 720.Tayugs
defense was that the counterclaim should be dismissed since the unpaid obligation of Tayug was due to
Central Banks flexible and double standard policy of its rediscounting privileges to Tayug Rural and its
subsequent arbitrary and illegal imposition of the 10% penalty. Tayug Rural contends that no such 10%
penalty starting from 1965 was included in the promissory notes covering the loans. A judgment was
rendered by CFI Manila in favor of Central Bank ordering Tayug Rural Bank to pay10% penalty in the
amount of around 19k pesos for loans up to July 1969, and to pay nothing for the next remaining
loans.Tayugs claim in the case was however successful, and so Tayug was also ordered to pay 444k, with
interest to the Central Bank for the overdue accounts with respect to the promissory notes. Central Bank
appealed to the CA, but also lost on the ground that only a legal question had been raised in the pleadings.
The case was then raised to the SC, with each party arguing in the following manner:
CFI rules that the circulars retroactive effect on past due loans impairs the obligation of contracts
and deprives Tayug Rural of property without due process of law.

Central Bank reasons that Tayug Rural, despite the loans, should have known that rules and
regulations authorize the Central Bank to impose additional reasonable penalties.

ISSUE:
WON The Central Bank can validly impose the 10% penalty via Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8

HELD:
NO. A reading of the circular and pertinent provisions, including that of RA 720, shows that nowhere therein
is the authority given to the Monetary Board to mete out additional penalties to the rural banks on past
due accounts with the Central Bank.
As said by the CFI, while the Monetary Board possesses broad supervisory powers, nonetheless, the
retroactive imposition of administrative penalties cannot be taken as a measure SUPERVISORY in character.
Administrative rules have the force and effect of law. There are, however, limitations in the rulemaking
power of administrative agencies. All that is required of administrative rules and regulations is to
implement given legislation by not contradicting it and conform to the standards prescribed by law.
Rules and regulations cannot go beyond the basic law. Since compliance therewith can be enforced by a
penal sanction, an administrative agency cannot implement a penalty not provided in the law authorizing
it, much less one that is applied retroactively.
The new clause imposing an additional penalty was not part of the promissory notes when Tayug took out
its loans. The law cannot be given retroactive effect. More to the point, the Monetary Board revoked the
additional penalty later in 1970, which clearly shows an admission that it had no power to impose the
same. The Central bank hoped to rectify the defect by revising the DLC Form later. However, Tayug Rural
must pay the additional 10% in case of suit, since in the promissory notes, 10% should be paid in
attorneys fees and costs of suit and collection. Judgment AFFIRMED with modification

VII. Quasi-Judicial Power

3. Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva, 509 SCRA 332, 369-370


[Nature of quasi-judicial power]

Facts: Anent the first assignment of error, petitioner argues that judicial review under Rule 65 of the
revised Rules of Civil Procedure is limited only to issues concerning want or excess or jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion. The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment. It is the contention of petitioner that the NLRC properly
assumed jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of the instant case. The errors assigned by the
respondents in their Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals do not pertain to the jurisdiction of
the NLRC; they are rather errors of judgment supposedly committed by the the NLRC, in its Resolution,
dated 29 February 2000, and are thus not the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. Petitioner also
posits that the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals raised questions of fact
that would necessitate a review by the appellate court of the evidence presented by the parties before the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, and that questions of fact are not a fit subject for a special civil action for
certiorari.

Issue: WON questions of fact are not a fit subject for a special civil action for certiorari.

Held: There is no error on the CAs part when it made anew a factual determination of the matters. It has
long been settled in the landmark case of St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, that the mode for judicial
review over decisions of the NLRC is by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The different modes of appeal, namely, writ of error (Rule 41), petition for review (Rules 42 and
43), and petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45), cannot be availed of because there is no provision on
appellate review of NLRC decisions in the Labor Code, as amended.

Although the same case recognizes that both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have original
jurisdiction over such petitions, it has chosen to impose the strict observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Hence, a petition for certiorari of a decision or resolution of the NLRC should first be filed with the Court of
Appeals; direct resort to the Supreme Court shall not be allowed unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify an availment
of a remedy within and calling for the exercise by the Supreme Court of its primary jurisdiction. The rule is
settled that the original and exclusive jurisdiction of this Court to review a decision of respondent NLRC (or
Executive Labor Arbiter as in this case) in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not normally include
an inquiry into the correctness of its evaluation of the evidence. Errors of judgment, as distinguished from
errors of jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special civil action for certiorari, which is merely
confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. It is thus incumbent upon petitioner to
satisfactorily establish that respondent Commission or executive labor arbiter acted capriciously and
whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to or even decisive of the controversy, in order that the
extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was
exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical
exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil
law and common law traditions.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, can grant the Petition for Certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed
decision or resolution, committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily
disregarding evidence which is material or decisive of the controversy; and the Court of Appeals cannot
make this determination without looking into the evidence presented by the parties. Necessarily, the
appellate court can only evaluate the materiality or significance of the evidence, which is alleged to have
been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, in relation to all other evidence on
record.

As this Court elucidated in Garcia v. National Labor Relations Commission: In Ong v. People, we ruled that
certiorari can be properly resorted to where the factual findings complained of are not supported by the
evidence on record. Earlier, in Gutib v. Court of Appeals, we emphasized thus: It has been said that a wide
breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice in certiorari proceedings. The cases in which certiorari will
issue cannot be defined, because to do so would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So
wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary
than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control over inferior courts, we
are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case "as the ends of justice may require." So it
is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.
And in another case of recent vintage, we further held: In the review of an NLRC decision through a special
civil action for certiorari, resolution is confined only to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the labor tribunal. Hence, the Court refrains from reviewing factual assessments of lower
courts and agencies exercising adjudicative functions, such as the NLRC. Occasionally, however, the Court
is constrained to delve into factual matters where, as in the instant case, the findings of the NLRC
contradict those of the Labor Arbiter.

In this instance, the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may look into the records of the case and
re-examine the questioned findings. As a corollary, this Court is clothed with ample authority to review
matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case. The same principles are now necessarily adhered to and
are applied by the Court of Appeals in its expanded jurisdiction over labor cases elevated through a
petition for certiorari; thus, we see no error on its part when it made anew a factual determination of the
matters and on that basis reversed the ruling of the NLRC.

4. Cuenca vs. Atas, 535 SCRA 48


[Cardinal primary requirements of procedural due process]

Facts: Rodolfo Cuenca was President of the then Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines
(CDCP), now PNCC. Sometime in 1977, CDCP was granted a franchise under Presidential Decree No. 1113
to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities of the North and South Luzon Expressway. In the course
of its operations, it incurred substantial credit obligations from various GFIs, namely, the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), National Development Company (NDC),
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), and Philippine Export
and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (PEFLGC), now known as the Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines. Pres. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. (LOI) 1295,[4] directing the
creditor GFIs to convert into CDCPs shares of stock the following: (1) all of the direct obligations of CDCP
and those of its wholly-owned subsidiaries, including, but not limited to loans, credits, accrued interests,
fees and advances in any currency outstanding as of December 31, 1982; (2) the direct obligations of
CDCP maturing in 1983; and (3) obligations maturing in 1983 which were guaranteed by the GFIs. Thus,
the CDCP, pursuant to said letter, converted some of its obligations to GFIs into equity. Consequently,
CDCP issued common shares to DBP, NDC, GSIS, LBP, PEFLGC in consideration for the extinguishment of
some of CDCPs outstanding loan obligations to said GFIs, all of which were duly recorded in its corporate
books. With the implementation of LOI 1295, respondents-GFIs became the majority stockholders of CDCP
to the extent of 70% of the authorized capital stocks. Consequently, the various GFIs were given seats in
the Board of Directors of PNCC and participated in the management of the company. Meanwhile, sometime
in 1988, pursuant to Administrative Order Nos. 14 and 64, DBP, PNB, PEFLGC, and NDC transferred their
interests in PNCC to the Republic of the Philippines which in turn conveyed them to the Asset Privatization
Trust (APT), now the Privatization and Management Office, for disposition to the private sector pursuant to
the governments privatization program.

On May 31, 1996, petitioner Cuenca filed a complaint before the SEC SICD for the SEC to determine
whether the GFIs were registered stockholders of PNCC and the number of shares held by each of them.
Petitioner averred that while PNCC issued the above specified certificates of stock to the GFIs pursuant to
LOI 1295, the GFIs however refused to cancel and never did cancel the loans in their books as payment for
the shares issued in their names by PNCC as they considered it to be a diminution of the value of their
investments.
After PNCC and GFIs filed their respective answers to the amended complaint, on motion of PNCC, SEC
SICD, appointed a the three (3)-person Hearing Panel, instead of the customary one hearing officer.
Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration of said decision. During the hearings of the instant case,
PNCC filed an Amended Answer[18] raising a new matter, the April 14, 2000 Deed of Confirmation and
June 7, 2000 Supplement to Deed of Confirmation. The Hearing Panel admitted PNCCs Amended Answer.
Petitioner was barred from presenting additional evidence due to his failure to file a reply to PNCCs
Amended Answer and to file an amended preliminary conference brief together with the affidavits of
witnesses as required by the new SEC Rules. The case was submitted for decision on the merits based on
the pleadings, evidence, and other submissions of the parties.

The Hearing Panel rendered its Decision dismissing petitioners complaint. The SEC En Banc and the CA
affirmed the decision of Hearing Panel. Hence, the instant petition is now before the Court.

Issue: Whether or not the hearing Panel violated petitioners right to due process by railroading and
expeditiously resolving the case in favor of respondent PNCC.

Held : No. Procedural due process, in gist, is the necessity for notice and an opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered. Its essence is encapsulated in the immortal cry of Themistocles to
Alcibiades: Strikebut hear me first.[45] Thus, as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend
his/her interests in due course, the party would have no reason to complain, for it is this opportunity to be
heard that makes up the essence of due process.[46]
In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, the cardinal primary requirements of procedural due
process, were enumerated in Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, as follows:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. x x x
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. x x x
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. x x x
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.
R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O.G. 1335), but theevidence must be
substantial. x x x
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. x x x
(6) The [c]ourt x x x or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision. x x x
(7) [The court] should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The hearing panel observed all these requirements of due process. The Hearing panel allowed
the contending parties to present their respective evidence through position paper and the
affidavits appended thereto. The records show that the hearing panel conducted the trial in
accordance with the new SEC rules of procedure, which prescribed a summary procedure.
Petitioner had been accorded ample opportunity to ventilate his position. The circumstance that the
hearing panel adopt verbatim most of PNCCs arguments is not irregular as the new SEC rules allowed the
hearing officer to adopt, in whole or in part either of the parties draft decision or resolution.

5. Scenarios, Inc. vs. Vinluan, G.R. No. 173283 September 17, 2008
[Technical rules not applicable]

FACTS:
- On 8 August 2000, respondent, a former setman of Scenarios, Inc., filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, underpayment of salaries and nonpayment of benefits against petitioners Scenarios, Inc.

- Summons were issued and sent by registered mail to "Mr. Jess Jimenez" with address at "Scenario,
Inc./GMA Complex, EDSA, corner Timog Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City 1104."4 However, the
summons envelope bore the mark "RETURN TO SENDER" and "UNCLAIMED.
- On 20 August 2003, after finding no proof that petitioners received the summons, the notices of
hearing and the notice of the decision, the NLRC issued an order remanding the case to the labor
arbiter for proper service of summons and appropriate proceedings

- Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the aforesaid
orders of the NLRC. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and ruled that petitioners failed to
overcome the presumption that the notices and summons had been regularly sent and received in
the ordinary course of events
- Petitioners posit that they were denied due process when the labor arbiter decided the case even in
the absence of sufficient proof that the summons and notices were delivered to them.

ISSUE: Whether or not summons and notices were delivered to petitioners

HELD: YES
- Service by registered mail is complete after five (5) days from the date of first notice of the
postmaster in the event that the addressee fails to claim his registered mail from the post office.
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule that unless the contrary is proven, official duty is presumed to
have been performed regularly and judicial proceedings regularly conducted

- The envelope containing the summons addressed to Jess Jimenez, Scenarios, Inc./GMA Complex,
EDSA, corner Timog Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City 1104, is marked "RETURN TO SENDER" and
"UNCLAIMED" and has the notations "SECOND NOTICE DATE 8/14" and "LAST NOTICE DATE 9/6."
There is also an unsigned Registry Return Receipt attached to the said envelope. It appears that Jess
Jimenez has been notified at least twice. At the very least, petitioners had five (5) days from the 14
August 2000 notice within which to claim the summons. As petitioners failed to do so, the service
was deemed complete at the end of the said five-day period.

- The registry return receipt for the summons marked "UNCLAIMED" and the certifications from the
Quezon City Central Post Office that two of the notices and a copy of the decision had been
delivered to and received in the premises of petitioners, office are, under the prevailing rules,
enough to convince us that service of said processes and decision was completed.

6. Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation vs. NLRC, 344 Phil. 723, 736
[Procedural rule governing service of summons are not strictly construed]

Business Organization Corporation Law Suit Under a Corporate Name


FACTS: In 1988, a labor case for illegal dismissal was filed against Jose Edmundo Pison and Hacienda
Lanutan. The labor arbiter issued a favorable for the dismissed workers. Pison appealed and the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter. However, in the NLRC ruling, it ordered
Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation (PADC) as solidarily liable together with Pison and
the Hacienda, PADC being the owner of the Hacienda and in which Pison is a majority stockholder. PADC
assails the order of the NLRC on due process grounds as it averred that it was not issued summons hence
it was not able to defend itself in court and therefore the judgment against it is void.

ISSUE: Whether the contention of PADC is correct.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that in labor cases and other administrative cases, the Rule of
Civil Procedure are not strictly applied especially so in the interest of laborers. So long as there is a
substantial compliance, a party can be placed under the jurisdiction of the labor court. In the case at bar,
there is substantial compliance when summons was served to Jose Edmundo Pison who was also the
administrator of the Hacienda. PADC is therefore adequately represented by Pison in the proceedings in the
labor tribunal. If at all, the non-inclusion of the corporate name of PADC in the case before the executive
labor arbiter was a mere procedural error which did not at all affect the jurisdiction of the labor tribunals.

7. Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners 28SCRA345


[Right against self-incrimination]

Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners.
It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel
for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon,
petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt
from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand,
the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the
constitutional right against self-incrimination.

The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the
witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a
question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right
against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.

Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first
witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for
malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.

Issue: Whether compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the Self-
Incrimination Clause.

Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination
clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The Court
found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case
may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner
would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the
revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right
to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a
presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he
chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."

The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief
that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives
should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect
accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded
an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional
foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity
of its citizens.

8. United Pepsi-Cola supervisory Union vs. Laguesma 288 SCRA 15

FACTS: Petitioner union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-
Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees
and, therefore, ineligible for union membership pursuant to Art. 245 of the Labor Code.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Its petition was dismissed by the Third Division for lack of showing that respondent committed grave abuse
of discretion. But petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that
the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible
to form, assist or join unions, contravenes the constitution.
Citing the Courts ruling in Nasipit Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, petitioner argues
that previous administrative determinations of the NLRC do not have the effect of res judicata in this case,
because labor relations proceedings are non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal
technicalities.

ISSUES: W/N res judicata applies to administrative proceedings?

HELD: YES. The doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative proceedings. As
early as 1956, in Brillantes v. Castro, the Court sustained the dismissal of an action by a trial court on the
basis of a prior administrative determination of the same case by the Wage Administration Service,
applying the principle of res judicata. Recently, in Abad v. NLRC the Court applied the related doctrine
of stare decisis in holding that the prior determination that certain jobs at the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.
were project employments was binding in another case involving another group of employees of the same
company. Indeed, in Nasipit Lumber Co., this Court clarified toward the end of its opinion that the
doctrine of res judicata applies . . . to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings and not to the
exercise of administrative powers. Proceedings for certification election are quasi judicial in nature
and, therefore, decisions rendered in such proceedings can attain finality.

At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination compels respect for the finding of
the Secretary of Labor that route managers are managerial employees as defined by law in the absence of
anything to show that such determination is without substantial evidence to support it. Nonetheless, the
Court, concerned that employees who are otherwise supervisors may wittingly or unwittingly be classified
as managerial personnel and thus denied the right of self- organization, has decided to review the record
of this case.

9. Delfin vs. Inciong 192 SCRA 151


[Res Adjudicata]
FACTS: On February 11, 1964 Atlantic Container Corporation (Atlantic) and Federation of Democratic Labor
Unions (FEDLU) executed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which was amended on August 31,
1964, claiming that Atlantic and its General Manager, private respondent Roberto Jacinto, refused to
implement the CBA, and its amendment, petitioners and FEDLU struck on February 16, 1966 and filed a
case with the CIR charging Atlantic, Roberto Jacinto and Hedy Jacinto for unfair labor practices on
November 16, 1972. CIR rendered its decision on the case stating that Atlantic and Roberto Jacinto were
guilty of unfair labor practices, to cease and desist from committing the same and reinstate the striking
complainants without loss of seniority and privileges. Considering, however, that not all the complainants
evinced their desire to prosecute the case, the award is extended to only those who testified and
presented their respective manifestation of prosecuting their causes of action. Petitioners were ordered
reinstated on November 27, 1972 and December 6, 1972, the Atlantic Container Employees Organization
and FEDLU filed motions to reconsider aforesaid decisions for the reinstatement of all petitioners herein,
but the CIR denied the motions for being pro forma and for having been filed out of time. When the CIR
was abolished, their case was transferred to the NLRC where the NLRC Arbiter Jose T. Collado rendered a
decision that Atlantic, Roberto Jacinto, et al. were ordered jointly and severally to reinstate complainants
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, but again not all petitioners were included for
reinstatement. The respondents filed an appeal with the NLRC to set aside the decision of NLRC Arbiter
Jose Collado and dismiss the complaint for unfair labor practices which was gained by NLRC on September
15, 1976. The dismissal was based on the following grounds: (1) res judicata in which their case to as
barred by a prior judgment; (2) the petitioners cause of action has prescribed; and (3) that Atlantic and
Inland Industries, Inc. were distinct and separate entities. The petitioners then appealed to the Secretary of
Labor through respondent Deputy Minister Amado Inciong, but the respondent affirmed the decision of the
NLRC. On July 3, 1989, petitioners filed petition charging public respondents NLRC and Minister Amado
Inciong with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordering the
dismissal of the complaint for unfair labor practices.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC and respondent Minister Amado Inciong acted with grave abuse of
discretion in annulling the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordering the dismissal of the unfair labor
practice complaint.

HELD: Since the judgment has become final and executory the subsequent filing of another unfair labor
practices charged against Atlantic for the same violations committed during its existence, is barred by res
judicata, the bringing of the same action in the name of the individual members of the union will not take
out the case from ambit of the principle of res judicata.

VIII. Administrative Appeal and Review

10.Moran, Jr. vs Office of the President,


FACTS:

The late Emmanuel B. Moran, Jr. filed with the Consumer Arbitration Office (CAO) a verified
complaint against private respondent PGA Cars, Inc. pursuant to the relevant provisions of Republic
Act No. 7394 (RA 7394), otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines. The complaint
alleged that the private respondent should be held liable for the product imperfections of a BMW
car which it sold to complainant.
CAO rendered a decision in favor of complainant and ordered private respondent to refund the
purchase price of the BMW car in addition to the payment costs of litigation and administrative
fines.
Defendant appealed such decision to the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry
Sec. of DTC dismissed the appeal.
Appeal to the Office of the President was filed who then granted such and reversed the DTI
resolution and dismissed the complaint holding that private respondent cannot be held liable for
product defects which issue was never raised by the complainant and because the private
respondent was not the manufacturer, builder, producer or importer of the subject BMW car but
only its seller.
Complainant filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the OP for ruling on cases involving a violation of RA 7394.
CA dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that it was a wrong mode of appeal. However,
petitioner argues that the CA erred in denying the petition for certiorari which alleged error of
jurisdiction on the part of the OP. She contends that in cases alleging error of jurisdiction on the
part of the OP, the proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari with the CA because appeal is not
available to correct lack of jurisdiction. Further, the petitioner claims that the OP lacked appellate
jurisdiction to review decisions of the DTI in cases involving a violation of RA 7394 based on Article
16611 thereof, which expressly confers appellate jurisdiction to review such decisions of the DTI to
the proper court through a petition for certiorari . Hence, the OP cannot be deemed as the proper
court within the purview of Article 166.
The OP however contends that the Presidents power of control over the executive department
grants him the power to amend, modify, alter or repeal decisions of the department secretaries .

ISSUE:

Whether CA is correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that petitioner resorted to a
wrong mode of appeal as the OP having jurisdiction of the case in controversy.

RULING:

No. The CA is incorrect in dismissing the petition as the OPs executive control is not absolute.
The procedure for appeals to the OP is governed by Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987. Section 1
thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of the President shall be
taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order
complained of or appealed from (Emphasis supplied.)

In Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. The Board of Investments, 15 we interpreted the above
provision and declared that a decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed
to the Office of the President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal.
Such executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries laid down in Section 17 Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution is not absolute. It may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by
judicial decisions. All the more in the matter of appellate procedure as in the instant case .
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly recognizes an exception to the remedy of appeal to the Office
of the President from the decisions of executive departments and agencies. Under Section 1 thereof, a
decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the Office of the President
when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal.
In this case, a special law, RA 7394, likewise expressly provided for immediate judicial relief from decisions
of the DTI Secretary by filing a petition for certiorari with the proper court. Hence, should have elevated
the case directly to the CA through a petition for certiorari .

In filing a petition for certiorari before the CA raising the issue of the OPs lack of jurisdiction, complainant
Moran, Jr. thus availed of the proper remedy.

11.Office of Ombudsman vs. Delos Reyes, Jr. 738 SCRA 240

12.Suyat Jr. vs. Torres 441 SCRA 265


[Appeal to the president]
FACTS:
This case stemmed from a criminal case of robbery where herein Prosecutor Suyat Jr was the reviewing
prosecutor.
Imelda Torres, mother of suspects Randy and Nelson Torres following up with the case talked to Prosecutor
Suyat, Jr. who, initially, demanded her the sum of P20,000.00 for the dismissal of the case against the
latters two (2) sons and nephew Marlon Bonson. But after bargaining, Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. finally agreed
to the sum of P15,000.00 to be given in his office the following day.
Upon consultation with her lawyer Imelda Torres immediately sought the assistance Anti-Organized Crime
Division of the National Bureau of Investigation who set out to entrap Prosecutor Suyat Jr.
After the entrapment, an administrative complaint was filed with the Department of Justice accusing
Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal of grave misconduct and receiving for
personal use of a fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official duties.
Finding a prima facie case of grave misconduct and receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or any valuable
thing in the course of official duties against Prosecutor Suyat, Jr., Secretary Franklin M. Drilon of the
Department of Justice issued a formal charge against Prosecutor Suyat, Jr.
After several hearings, Secretary Drilon recommended to the then Executive Secretary Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. of the Office of the President the immediate dismissal of Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. from the
government service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law.
In response, the Executive Secretary issued a memorandum stating his concurrence with the
recommendation of Secretary Drilon, and recommended to President Fidel V. Ramos the approval of the
proposed Administrative Order dismissing Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. The Office of the President of the Philippines
thru then Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. issued the first questioned order dismissing
Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. from the government service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law as earlier
adverted to.
Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. filed his first motion for reconsideration which was denied, this time, by new Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres in his second questioned order dated February 16, 1996. His two subsequent
MRs were likewise denied.
The CA dismissed his petition for certiorari for being an inappropriate remedy.

ISSUE: W/N the Courts may validly take cognizance of a petition for certiorari of a decision by the OP that
has become final and executory?

HELD: NO. Administrative Order No. 95 of the President Had Become Final and Executory When the
Petitioner Filed His Petition For Certiorari in the Court of Appeals hence beyond the jurisdiction of the CA to
alter, modify or reverse.
Instead of filing an appeal, the petitioner opted to file a second MR which is a prohibited pleading hence
the reglementary period within which to file an appeal was not tolled. The petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the said
Rules because he realized that the period within which to file the said petition for review had lapsed, and
that AO No. 95 of the President had become final and executory. By filing a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner sought to nullify the said order via an independent action, in
lieu of his lost right of appeal. But case law is that the existence and the availability of the right to appeal
are antithetical to the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari. These two remedies are mutually
exclusive.

13.Tan vs. Director of Forestry 125 SCRA 302


[Appeal to the president]
FACTS:

Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public bidding a certain
tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares, within the former
U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the US
Government to the Philippine Government. Wenceslao Tan with nine others submitted their application in
due form.

The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of Agriculture and Natural
Resources issued a general memorandum order authorizing Dir. Of Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber
Licenses (OTL) subject to some conditions stated therein (not exceeding 3000 hectares for new OTL and
not exceeding 5000 hectares for extension)

Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Feliciano (replacing Gozon)
promulgated on December 19, 1963 a memorandum revoking the authority delegated to the Director of
Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses. On the same date, OTL in the name of Tan, was signed by then
Acting Director of Forestry, without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On
January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Director of Forestry .
Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR praying that the OTL of Tan be
revoked. On March 9, 1964, The Secretary of ANR declared Tans OTL null and void (but the same was not
granted to Ravago). Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion.

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not petitioners timber license is valid (No)
II. Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies available (No)

RULING:

I. Petitioners timber license was signed and released without authority and is therefore void
ab initio. In the first place, in the general memorandum dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was
authorized to grant a new ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more than
3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420 hectares In the second
place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to
grant any license. (The license was released to the petitioner on January 6, 1964 while on the other hand,
the authority of the Director of Forestry to issue license was revoked on December 19, 1963). In view
thereof, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964, and
said license is therefore void ab initio. What is of greatest importance is the date of the release or
issuance. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee.

Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees can
validly revoke his timber license. "A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor
is it taxation

The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the
proper exercise of police power.

II. Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedy in this case. He did not appeal the order of the
respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines. Considering
that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents, the failure of
the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.

14.Calo vs. Fuentes 5 SCRA 399


[Withdrawal of appeal]

Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action


15.Fortich vs. Corona, 289 SCRA 624
[Failure to file motion for reconsideration]
The Office of the President modified its decision which had already become final and executory.
FACTS:
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued a win-win Resolution which reopened case
O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424. The said Resolution substantially modified its March 29, 1996 Decision. The OP
had long declared the said Decision final & executory after the DARs Motion for Reconsideration was
denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
The SC then struck down as void the OPs act, it being in gross disregard of the rules & basic legal precept
that accord finality to administrative determinations.
The respondents contended in their instant motion that the win-win Resolution of November 7, 1997 is
not void since it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling, hence, the March 29, 1996 decisioncould not as
yet become final and executory as to be beyond modification. They further explained that the DARs
failure to file their Motion for Reconsideration on time was excusable.
ISSUE:
Was the OPs modification of the Decision void or a valid exercise of its powers and prerogatives?
1. Whether the DARs late filing of the Motion for Reconsideration is excusable.
2. Whether the respondents have shown a justifiable reason for the relaxation of rules.
3. Whether the issue is a question of technicality.
HELD:
1. No.
Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, mandates that
decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shallbecome final after the lapse
of 15 days from receipt of a copy therof xxx unless a Motion for Reconsideration thereof is filed
within such period.
The respondents explanation that the DARs office procedure made it impossibleto file its Motion for
Reconsideration on time since the said decision had to be referred to its different departments cannot be
considered a valid justification. While there is nothing wrong with such referral, the DAR must not
disregard the reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation.
The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made subservient to the internal office
procedure of an administrative body.

2. No. The final & executory character of the OP Decision can no longer be disturbed or substantially
modified. Res judicata has set in and the adjudicated affair should forever be put to rest.
Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since they are designed
to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution
of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The Constitution guarantees that all persons shall
have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies.
While a litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with
the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly & speedy administration of justice. The flexibility
in the relaxation of rules was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity.
A liberal interpretation & application of the rules of procedure can only be resorted to in
proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.

3. No. It is a question of substance & merit.


A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is declared void on the
ground that the same was rendered Without or in Excess of Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of Discretion,
is a mere technicality of law or procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and mandatory
requirement before a case or controversy can be acted on. Moreover, an act is still invalid if done in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
In the instant case, several fatal violations of law were committed. These grave breaches of law, rules &
settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical nature.
When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights were acquired by
the petitioners, and all others who should be benefited by the said Decision.
In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Videogram Regulatory Board vs CA, et al.,
just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.

16.Social Security System Employees Association vs. Bathan-Velasco


[Finality of factual determination by administrative body]
Facts:
The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unionsdemands concerning the
implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the courtaction for damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary
restrainingorder pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that
the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the
DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The Social Security
System contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Servicelaws, rules and
regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may
enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue: Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.

Ruling: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee
among workers with the right to organize and conduct peacefulconcerted activities such as strikes. On one
hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be
enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission
which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government
employees enjoinsunder pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employeesfrom
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing
government employees tostrike they are prohibited from doing so.

IX. Judicial Review


17.Imbong vs. Ochoa, jr. 721 SCRA 146
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1. Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue:

PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1. Actual Case or Controversy
2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:

PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or
issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a
result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched
to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental
right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the
right to ones freedom of expression, as they are modes which ones thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental
act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance,
of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
One Subject-One Title: The one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule so as not to cripple or
impede legislation. The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not
be so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating
one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon
the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the
Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute
had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may
be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the
valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion
can stand independently as law.

Ruling/s:

PROCEDURAL

1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe
for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken
effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that
the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right,
but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.
2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained,
albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but
also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction,
is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional
human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions
and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the
simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive
branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of
the Filipino people.
3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an as-applied challenge, still,
the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain
individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a
Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on
locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion,
waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters
or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance
of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their
proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-
reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both reproductive health and responsible parenthood are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in
the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between reproductive health and responsible parenthood which bears
to the attainment of the goal of achieving sustainable human development as stated under its terms, the
Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents
of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement
of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act
that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier primarily in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

18.Villafuerte, Jr. vs. ROBREDO, 744 SCRA 534

SUMMARY: Villafuerte filed a petition assailing the three memorandum circulars issued by Robredo. The
circulars pertain to full disclosure of local budget and finances and other guidelines regarding budget.
Villafuerte argues that the circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy of the LGU. The
Court ruled that the circulars merely reiterated what was already provided in the law and that the order on
public disclosure is consistent with the policy of promoting good governance through transparency,
accountability and participation.

DOCTRINE: The Constitution is now replete with numerous provisions directing the adoption of measures
to uphold transparency and accountability in government, with a view of protecting the nation from
repeating its atrocious past. It commands the strict adherence to full disclosure of information on all
matters relating to official transactions and those involving public interest.

FACTS:
On February 21, 2011, Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur, joined by the Provincial
Government of Camarines Sur, filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the three
issuances of Robredo for being unconstitutional and having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion:
o MC No. 2010-83 entitled Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids
and Public Offerings, which aims to promote good governance through enhanced
transparency and accountability of LGUs.
Legal and Administrative Authority: Section 352 of LGC of 1991 requires the posting
within 30 days from end of each fiscal year in at least 3 publicly accessible and
conspicuous places in the LGU a summary of all revenues collected and funds
including the appropriations and disbursements of such funds during the preceding
fiscal year. RA No 984 (Government Procurement Reform Act) calles for the posting of
the Invitation to Bid, Notice of Award, Notice to Proceed and Approved Contract in the
procuring entitys premises, in newspapers of general circulation, the Philippine Govt
Electronic Procurement System and the website of procuring entity.
Responsibility of Local Chief Executive: All Provincial Governors, City Mayors, and
Municipal Myors, are directed to faithfully comply with the abovecited provisions of
laws, and existing national policy, by posting in conspicuous places within public
buildings in the locality, or in print media of community or general circulation, and in
their websites1
o MC No 2010-138 reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall be utilized for desirable
social, economic, and environmental outcomes essential to the attainment of the
constitutional objective of life for all.2
o MC No 2011-08 directing for the strict adherence to Section 90 of RA No 10147 of the
General Appropriations Act of 2011.

1 CY 2010 Annual Budget, Quarterly Statement of Cash Flows, CY 2009 Statement of Receipts and Expenditures, CY
2010 Trust Fund (PDAF) Utilization, CY 2010 Special Education Fund Utilization, CY 2010 20% Component of the
IRA Utilization, CY 2010 Gender and Development Fund Utilization, CY 2010 Statement of Debt Service, CY 2010
Annual Procurement Plan or Procurement List, Items to Bid, Bid Results on Civil Works, and Goods and Services,
Abstract of Bids as Calculated
Legal and Administrative Authority: Section 90 stipulates that the amount
appropriated for the LGUs share in the IRA shall be used in accordance with Sections
17(g) and 287 of RA No 7160. The annual budgets of LGUs shall be prepared in
accordance with the forms, procedures, and schedules prescribed by the Department
of Budget and Management and those jointly issued with the Commission on Audit.
Sanctions: Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions - An elective local official may
be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on: (c) Dishonesty, oppression,
misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty

RULING: Petition denied.

Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal
autonomy enshired in the Constitution and the LGC? NO
Petitioners: assailed issuances interfere with the local and fiscal autonomy of LGUs embodied in the
Constitution and the LGC.
o MC 2010-138 transgressed these constitutionally-protected liberties when it restricted the
meaning of development and enumerated activities which the local government must
finance from the 20% development fund component of the IRA and provided sanctions for
local authorities who shall use the said component of the fund for the excluded purposes
stated therein.
o Robredo cannot substitute his own discretion with that of the local legislative council in
enacting its annual budget and specifying the development projects that the 20%
component of its IRA should fund.
Court: Petitioners arguments are untenable.
o The Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the autonomy of LGUs (Article
X of Constitution)
o It is also pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution that enhancing local autonomy that
the LGC was enacted.3
o Local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization.
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments more responsive
and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress. (Limbona v Mangelin)

2 Administrative expenses such as cash gifts, bonuses, food allowance, medical assistance, uniforms, supplies,
meetings, communication, water and light, petroleum products, and the like;Salaries, wages or overtime pay;

2. Travelling expenses, whether domestic or foreign;

3. Registration or participation fees in training, seminars, conferences or conventions;

4. Construction, repair or refinishing of administrative offices;

5. Purchase of administrative office furniture, fixtures, equipment or appliances; and Purchase, maintenance or
repair of motor vehicles or motorcycles, except ambulances.

3 Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the
local government units.
To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy, the Constitution confines the power
of the President over LGUs to mere supervision. The President exercises general
supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law. He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own. (Section 4, Article X of Constitution)
o It is petitioners contention that Robredo went beyond the confined of his supervisory
powers, as alter ego of the President, when he issued MC No 2010-138. They argue that the
mandatory nature of the circular, with the threat of imposition of sanctions for non-
compliance, evinces a clear desire to exercise control over LGUs. However, the Court
perceives otherwise.
o A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision in
the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in
Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. The
assailed circular was issued in response to the report of the COA that a substantial portion of
the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects
but was diverted to expenses more properly categorized as MOOE, in violation of Section
287 of the LGC.
o The issuance of MC No. 2010-138 was brought about by the report of the COA that the
development fund was not being utilized accordingly. To curb the alleged misuse of the
development fund, the respondent deemed it proper to remind LGUs of the nature and
purpose of the provision for the IRA through MC No. 2010-138.
o The enumeration in the circular was not meant to restrict the discretion of the LGUs in the
utilization of their funds. It was incorporated in the assailed circular in order to guide them in
the proper disposition of the IRA and avert further misuse of the fund by citing current
practices which seemed to be incompatible with the purpose of the fund. LGUs remain at
liberty to map out their development plans based on their own discretion and utilize their
IRAs accordingly, with the only restriction that 20% thereof be expended for development
projects.
The local autonomy granted LGU does not completely severe them from the national government or
turn them into impenetrable states. Thus, notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed
by LGUs, they are still under the supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for
malfeasance or violations of existing laws.
Answering petitioners claim that the requirement to post other documents in the issuances went
beyond the provisions in LGC and RA No 9184: It is well to remember that fiscal autonomy does not
leave LGUs with unbridled discretion in the disbursement of public funds. They remain accountable
to their constituency.
The assailed issuances of the respondent, MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08, are but implementation of
this avowed policy of the State to make public officials accountable to the people. They are
amalgamations of existing laws, rules and regulation designed to give teeth to the constitutional
mandate of transparency and accountability.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but
for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service
with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and
employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve.
(ABAKADA GURO Party List v Purisima)
The Constitution strongly summoned the State to adopt and implement a policy of full
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest and provide the people with the
right to access public information. Section 352 of the LGC and RA No 9184 are responses to
this call for transparency and both laws establish a system of transparency in procurement process
in government agencies.
The publication of budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans and procurement plans of LGUs
required in the assailed issuances could not have infringed on the local fiscal autonomy of LGUs.
o The issuances do not interfere with the discretion of the LGUs in the specification of their
priority projects and the allocation of their budgets. The posting requirements are mere
transparency measures.
o Section 352 of the LGC that is being invoked by the petitioners does not exclude the
requirement for the posting of the additional documents stated in MC Nos. 2010-83 and
2011-08. The additional requirement for the posting of budgets, expenditures, contracts and
loans, and procurement plans are well-within the contemplation of Section 352 of the LGC
considering they are documents necessary for an accurate presentation of a summary of
appropriations and disbursements that an LGU is required to publish.
o The supervisory powers of the President are broad enough to embrace the power to require
the publication of certain documents as a mechanism of transparency. The President, by
constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government,
primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and
integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country. (Pimentel
v Aguirre)
The Constitution, which was drafted after long years of dictatorship and abuse of power,
is now replete with numerous provisions directing the adoption of measures to uphold
transparency and accountability in government, with a view of protecting the nation
from repeating its atrocious past. It commands the strict adherence to full disclosure of
information on all matters relating to official transactions and those involving public
interest. (Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III)
The assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the policy of promoting good governance through
transparency, accountability and participation. The action of the respondent is certainly within the
constitutional bounds of his power as alter ego of the President.
The power to govern is a delegated authority from the people who hailed the public official to office
through the democratic process of election. He must not frown upon accountability checks which aim to
show how well he is performing his delegated power. For, it is through these mechanisms of transparency
and accountability that he is able to prove to his constituency that he is worthy of the continued privilege.

19.Macailing, et al vs. Andrada, et al January 30, 1970, G.R. No. L-21607


[Mere silence of a statute on availability of judicial review does not necessary imply that it is
unavailable]

1. MACAILING v ANDRADA

FACTS
Petitioners claim possession while petitioners claimed a sales application over a bigger parcel of land
including the 4 parcels of land occupied by the former. The District Land Officer of Cotabato decided in
plaintiffs favor but the Dir. of Lands reversed. The appeal to the Sec. Of Agri. & natural resources reversed
the DoLs decision. An MR was denied saying that it has become final and executory by the SANR and was
appealed to the Office of the Pres. The Office of the Pres. Reversed the decision granting it again to the
defendants. The petitioners instituted an ordinary civil action to have the decision of the SANR declared
final & executory.

ISSUES
W/N the decision of the Office of the President was valid despite the finality of the decision of the SANR.

HELD
In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially provide for such
judicial review; others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not necessarily imply that judicial review is
unavailable. Modes of judicial review vary according to the statutes; appeal, petition for review or a writ of
certiorari. No general rule applies to all the various administrative agencies. Where the law stands mute,
the accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are still available. Therefore, the
plaintiffs' appropriate remedy is certiorari, not an ordinary civil action.

Although in injunctive or prohibitory writs, courts must have jurisdiction over the Corporation, Board,
Officer or person whose acts are in question and not the jurisdiction over the SM of the case, the doctrines
invoked in support of the theory of non-jurisdiction are inapplicable. Here the sole point in issue is whether
the decision of the respondent public officers was legally correct or not, and, without going into the merits
of the case, we see no cogent reason why this power of judicial review should be confined to the courts of
first instance of the locality where the offices of respondents are maintained, to the exclusion of the courts
of first instance in those localities where the plaintiffs reside, and where the questioned decisions are being
enforced."

The provisions of Lands Administrative Order No. 6 are thus brought to the fore. Section 12 thereof
provides:
12. Finality of decision promulgated by the Secretary.The decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce (now Agriculture and Natural Resources) or the Under Secretary on an appealed case shall
become final, unless otherwise specifically stated therein, after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the date
of its receipt by the interested parties.

Section 13 following reads:


13. No reconsideration of final decision or order.After a decision or order of the Secretary of Agriculture
and [Natural Resources], the Under Secretary or the Director of Lands has become final, no motion or
petition for reconsideration of such decision or reinvestigation of the case shall be entertained by the
Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources] the Under Secretary or the Director of Lands, as the case
may be, except as provided in Section 14 hereof.

And Section 14 is to this effect:


"Upon such terms as may be considered just, the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources], the
Under Secretary or the Director of Lands may relieve a party or his legal representative from a decision,
order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, default or
excusable neglect: Provided, That application therefor be made within a reasonable timebut in no case
exceeding one (1) year after such decision, order or proceeding was taken."

Defendants did not move to reconsider or appeal from the Secretary's decision of October 27, 1956
within 30 days from their receipt thereof. Indeed, they attempted to appeal only on October 23, 1957. They
merely contend that their appeal was but 9 days after October 14, 1957, the date defendants received the
September 12, 1957 ruling of the Secretary denying their second motion for reconsideration. That ruling, it
must be remembered, drew attention to the fact that the Secretary's decision "had long become final and
executory." By reason of which, declaration was made that "this (Secretary's) Office had no more
jurisdiction to entertain the said motion."4

20.Office of the Court Administrator vs. Lopez (A.M. No. p-10-2788, 18 January 2011)
[Quantum required is substantial evidence]

X. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

21.Ejera vs. Merto, 714 SCRA 397

FACTS: The petitioner alleges that Office Order No. 008 and Office Order No. 005 were illegal for violating
the rule against indiscriminate and whimsical reassignment enunciated in the Administrative Code of 1987;
that the issuances were really intended for her (Agricultural Center Chief I siya sa Office of the Provincial
Agriculturist in Negros Oriental), who was based in Dumaguete City, manifestly in the guise of
assigning/reassigning her to the Barangay Agricultural Development Project to the far flung isolated
mountainous areas in Sandulot and Jumalon, Siaton, Negros Oriental; that the respondents could not issue
the office orders because the transfer of an employee without her consent is arbitrary for it is tantamount
to removal without cause and therefore invalid as it is violative of her security of tenure; that the transfer
done without her consent amounted to her removal from office; that the legal issue she raised could be
threshed out only by a court of justice, not by an administrative body; that her allegation that the office
orders were contrary to law and jurisprudence on the matter only meant that she was raising a question
of law, which ruled out administrative intervention; that in keeping with the broad discretion of courts in
urgent matters, she would suffer an irreparable damage or injury unless there was judicial intervention;
and that the fact that the office orders were intended for public service did not shield them from judicial
scrutiny.

The petitioner argues that the declaration of the respondents in default resulted in the waiver of their
defense of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; and that the court had then no legal justification to
dismiss the case on that ground inasmuch as the respondents did not file a motion to set aside the order of
default.

In their comment, the respondents counter that the arguments of the petitioner had been thoroughly
discussed and passed upon by the CA; and that she did not show that her appeal was one that the Court

4 In other words, public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every step. The rule of non quieta movere prescribes that
what was already terminated should not be disturbed (Espiritu vs. San Miguel Brewery, 63 Phil. 615). 10 We do not doubt that even the Office of the President
subscribes to the above rule. As aptly remarked by Justice Malcolm in Dy Cay vs. Crossfield & O'Brien, 38 Phil. 527: Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the
risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversy. To
fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. ...
could take cognizance of.

In her reply, the petitioner insisted that the decision of the CA was rendered with grave abuse of discretion
because the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was not absolute; that there were exceptions to
the rule, such as when the question litigated was a purely legal one, or when applying the rule would not
provide plain, speedy and adequate remedy, or when its application would cause great and irreparable
damage; that a ground for judicial review would exist when an administrative determination was made
without or in excess of authority; that Office Order No. 008 and Office Order No. 005 were issued without or
in excess of authority; and that the CA overlooked that her right to security of tenure and right to due
process of law would be violated unless she went to court.

ISSUE: Does this case fall under the exceptions on exhaustion of administrative remedies?

RULING: NO. It is true that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule,
but recognizes exceptions, specifically: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; ( e)
where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrines may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controversial acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where strong public interest is
involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.

(However) The exceptions did not cover the petitioners case. In her complaint, she assailed Office Order
No. 008 on three basic legal grounds, namely: (a) the re-assignment, being whimsical and indiscriminate,
violated the Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions; (b) Merto had no power to
investigate her, considering that the Provincial Governor was the proper disciplining authority; and (c)
whether the letter of Merto requiring her to explain her refusal to follow Office Order No. 008 should be
under oath. Still, her immediate resort to the RTC remained premature, because the legal issues she
seemingly raised were admittedly interlaced with factual issues, like whether or not Merto had issued
Office Order No. 008 because of her having attacked him in her protest against Kirit as the appointee to
the position of Supervising Agriculturist, and whether or not her reassignment constituted banishment
from her office in Dumaguete City. She further averred that the reassignment had been whimsical and
indiscriminate, an averment that surely called for factual basis. It ought to be beyond question that the
factual issues could only be settled by a higher policy-determining provincial official like the Provincial
Governor by virtue of his authority, experience and expertise to deal with the issues. The Provincial
Governor should have been given a very meaningful opportunity to resolve the matter and to exhaust all
opportunities for its resolution before bringing the action in court.

The rule is that judicial intervention should only be availed of after all administrative remedies had been
exhausted. The Judiciary must not intervene because Office Order No. 008 and Office Order No. 005 both
concerned the implementation of a provincial executive policy. According to Dimson (Manila), Inc. v. Local
Water Utilities Administration:

x x x. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a judicial recognition of certain


matters that are peculiarly within the competence of the administrative agency to address. It
operates as a shield that prevents the overarching use of judicial power and thus hinders
courts from intervening in matters of policy infused with administrative character.
The Court has always adhered to this precept, and it has no reason to depart from it now.

Moreover, the non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies resulted in the
complaint having no cause of action. Hence, the RTC and the CA correctly dismissed the case.

Fourthly, the non-exhaustion by the petitioner had jurisdictional implications.

Verily, had the petitioner followed the grievance procedure under the CSCs Omnibus Rules, her next step
would have been to elevate her case to the CSC itself, the constitutional body charged with the exclusive
jurisdiction not only over disciplinary actions against government officials and employees but also over
cases involving personnel actions.
22.Buena, jr. vs. Benito, 738 SCRA 278
FACTS: On August 27, 2004, Dr. Parouk S. Hussin (Regional Governor Hussin), then Regional Governor of
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, appointed Dr. Sangcad D. Benito (Dr. Benito) as Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of Education, Division of Lanao del Sur-I, ina temporary
capacity. On June 20, 2005, Regional Governor Hussin reappointed Dr. Benito as Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent, this time in a permanent capacity. To change the status of Dr. Benitos appointment from
temporary to permanent, Regional Governor Hussin requested the Civil Service Commission Regional
Office for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to attest to Dr. Benitos permanent appointment.
However, the Regional Office, through Regional Director Anacleto B. Buena, Jr. (Regional Director Buena),
returned the appointment to the Regional Governor. According to the Regional Office, Dr. Benito did not
possess the career executive service eligibility required for the position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent.

On August 24, 2005, Dr. Benito filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Lanao
del Sur, to compel the Regional Office to attest to his permanent appointment as Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent. He argued that the position does not belong to the Career Executive Service under Book
V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987. Consequently, the position
of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent does not require career executive service eligibility.

Dr. Benito claimed that it was the Regional Offices ministerial duty to attest to his appointment. Under
Article VII, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 9054, the Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao is the appointing authority for positions in the civil service in the region. Since the appointing
authority already exercised his discretion, the Regional Office allegedly had no choice but to attest to Dr.
Benitos appointment.

In his answer, Regional Director Buena claimed that the position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent meets the following criteria for positions in the Career Executive Service: The position is
career, ranks higher than Division Chief, has a salary grade of 25, and entails performance of executive
and managerial functions and supervisory responsibility over a division. The permanent appointee to the
position must, therefore, have career executive service eligibility.

According to Regional Director Buena, the Regional Office recognizes the autonomy of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao. However, until the region enacts its own regional civil service law, the
Regional Office shall carry on with the Civil Service Commissions mandate under the Constitution to
promote and enforce civil service laws and rules.

For Dr. Benitos failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a petition for mandamus, Regional
Director Buena prayed that the trial court dismiss the petition for mandamus.

The trial court noted that Dr. Benito did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission proper the Regional
Offices refusal to attest to his appointment. Nevertheless, the trial court found that the petition for
mandamus raised a purely legal question. The case, therefore, falls within the exceptions to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies.19

We are aware of our pronouncement in Buena, Jr. v. Benito8 that the issue of whether the position for which
the respondent therein was appointed required career service eligibility was a purely legal question. In that
case, We held that the direct recourse to the courts from the Decision of the CSCRO fell under an exception
to the doctrine. Nevertheless, We set aside the RTC order, because we found that the Assistant Schools
Division Superintendent is a position in the CES.

There are at least three material differences between this case and Buena.

First, in Buena, the question was whether the position is in the CES. In this case, the question is whether
petitioner was eligible for a permanent appointment to the PARO II position, which had already been
classified as a third-level position requiring CSEE or CES. 9 The issue is therefore not one of law, but of the
merit and fitness of the appointee, which is a question of fact.
Second, in Buena, no evidence was presented to the trial court that could have created doubt as to the
truth or falsity of the allegation. In this case, the qualification standards for the position were presented,
but were unacknowledged as a matter of fact by the trial court.

Third, in Buena, the petition for mandamus was filed after the appointment had been issued by the
regional governor. The element of a clear legal right was met in Buena because Section 19, Art. VII of
Republic Act No. 9054 (Organic Act for the ARMM) designated the regional governor as the appointing
authority in the ARMM. In this case, petitioner had no clear legal right to compel respondent to attest to his
appointment, because at the time of filing, he had no appointment to a permanent position. Hence, the
Petition should have been dismissed outright

23.Gonzales vs. CA, 357 SCRA 599

Facts:
1. Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private respondent) are the nieces of the deceased
Isabel Gabriel who died a widow. A will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said will was typewritten,
in Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in April 1961 or two months prior to the death of Isabel. It
consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and acknowledgment, with the signature of testatrix on page
4 and the left margin of all the pages.

2. Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and executor. The petitioner opposed the probate.

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the will was not executed and attested in
accordance with law on the issue of the competency and credibility of the witnesses.

Issue: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a will

RULING: No. The law requires only that witnesses posses the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC) and none
of the disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no requirement that they are of good standing or reputation in
the community, for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony is believed and
accepted in court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not mandatory that evidence be established on
record that the witnesses have good standing in the the community. Competency is distinguished from
credibility, the former being determined by Art. 820 while the latter does not require evidence of such
good standing. Credibility depends on the convincing weight of his testimony in court.

24.NFA vs. CA 311 SCRA 700 (1999)

Facts: National Food Authority (NFA), thru its officers, entered into a Letter of Agreement for
Vessel/Barge Hire with Hongfil for the shipment of 200,000 bags of corn grains from Cagayan de Oro City
to Manila.

The loading of bags of corn grains in the vessel commenced but it took a longer period of 21 days, 15
hours, and 18 minutes to finish than as was certified by the arrastre firm as there was a strike staged by
the arrastre workers in view of the refusal of the striking stevedores to attend to their work. The vessel
was allowed to depart for the port of Manila and arrived there, but unfortunately, it took a longer period of
20 days, 14 hours and 33 minutes to finish the unloading than the discharging rate certified by the Port of
Manila, due to the unavailability of a berthing space for the vessel M/V CHARLIE/DIANE. Only 166,798 bags
were unloaded at the Portof Manila.

After the discharging was completed, NFA paid Hongfil the amount of P1,006,972.11 covering the shipment
of corn grains. Thereafter, Hongfil sent its billing to NFA claiming payment for freight covering the shut-out
load or deadfreight as well as demurrage, allegedly sustained during the loading and unloading of subject
shipment of corn grains. When NFArefused to pay the amount reflected in the billing, Hongfil brought the
present action against NFA.
Issues:
1) Can petitioners be held liable for deadfreight?
2) Can petitioners be held liable for demurrage?

Held: 1) Yes. It bears stressing that subject Letter of Agreement is considered a Charter Party. A charter
party is classified into (1) bareboat or demise charter and (2) contract of affreightment. Subject
contract is one of affreightment, whereby the owner of the vessel leases part or all of its space to haul
goods for others. It is a contract for special service to be rendered by the owner of the vessel. Under such
contract, the ship retains possession, command, and navigation of the ship, the charterer
orfreighter merely having use of the space in the vessel in return for his payment of the charter hire.

Under the law, the cargo not loaded is considered a deadfreight. It is the amount paid by or recoverable
from a charterer of a ship for the portion of the ships capacity the latter contracted for but failed to
occupy. Explicit and succinct is the law that the liability for deadfreight is on the charterer. (Article 680 of
the Code of Commerce).

2) No. Demurrage is the sum fixed in a charter party as a remuneration to the owner of the ships for the
detention of his vessel beyond the number of days allowed by the charter party for loading or unloading or
for sailing. Liability for demurrage, using the word in its technical sense, exists only when expressly
stipulated in the contract.

Shipper or charterer is liable for the payment of demurrage claims when he exceeds the period for loading
and unloading as agreed upon or the agreed laydays. The period for such may or may not be stipulated
in the contract. A charter party may either provide for a fixed laydays or contain general or indefinite
words such as customary quick dispatch or as fast as the streamer can load. In the case at bar, the
charter party provides merely for a general or indefinite words of customary quick dispatch.
Such stipulation implies that loading and unloading of the cargo should be within a reasonable time.

The charterer NFA could not be held liable for demurrage for it appears that cause of delay was not
imputable to either of the parties. The cause of delay during the loading was the strike staged by the crew
of the arrastre operator, and the unavailability of a berthing space for the vessel during the unloading.
Here, the Court holds that the delay sued upon was still within the reasonable time embraced in
the stipulation of Customary Quick Dispatch.

Furthermore, considering the subject contract of affreightment contains an express provision


Demurrage/Dispatch: NONE, the same left the parties with no recourse but to apply the literal meaning
of such stipulation.

25.Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro 77 SCRA 264, 267

FACTS: The stress, and rightly so, by the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs in their
exhaustive and scholarly petition for certiorari was on the jurisdictional issue. It sought to nullify and set
aside in order of respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for
by private respondents Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic Incorporated the importers of 1,350 cartons of fresh
fruits, restraining petitioners from proceeding with the auction sale of such perishable goods. Classified as
non-essential consumer commodities, they were banned by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and 295
as prohibited importation or importation contrary to law and thus made subject to forfeiture proceedings
by petitioner Collector of Customs pursuant to the relevant sections of the Tariff and Customs Code.

Petitioners pointed out that seizure and forfeiture proceedings, which, as held in a number of decisions,
was a matter falling within the exclusive competence of the customs authorities.
SC required respondents to file an answer and at the same time issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as
prayed for by petitioners to prevent the challenged order of respondent Judge from being implemented.
Instead of preparing an answer, they just submitted a manifestation stating that after an intensive and
serious study of the merit of the case, the respondents have decided to abandon its interest in the case.
The rationale behind such a move was ostensibly the desire to avoid additional expenses, in view of the
fact that the shipments, being perishable, have already deteriorated.
ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the confiscated goods?

HELD: Customs. That such jurisdiction of the customs authorities is exclusive was made clear in Pacis v.
Averia. This Court, speaking through Justice J. P. Bengzon, realistically observed: This original jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance, when exercised in an action for recovery of personal property which is a
subject of a forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to render futile,
the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The court should yield
to the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. Such a ruling, as pointed out by Justice Zaldivar in Auyong
Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, promulgated less than a year later, could be traced to Government v. Gale, 26
a 1913 decision, where there was a recognition in the opinion of Justice Carson that a Collector of Customs
when sitting in forfeiture proceedings constitutes a tribunal upon which the law expressly confers
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching the forfeiture and further disposition of the
subject matter of such proceedings.

The controlling principle was set forth anew in Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya, 28 decided in 1971. Thus: The
prevailing doctrine is that the exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector
of Customs precludes a court of first instance from assuming cognizance over such a matter.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported
goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its
possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the
Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings.

In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966,
and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the
enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would
the CFI of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had issued the
warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend,
that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over
the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of
divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of First
Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.

Exceptions
26.Vda. De Tan vs. Veterans Backpay Commission 105 Phil 377

FACTS:
1. That the petitioner is of legal age, a widow and a resident of the Philippines and that the respondent is
a government instrumentality or agency, duly vested with authority to implement the provisions of
Backpay Law, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 897, further amending Republic Act No. 304;
2. That the petitioner is the widow of the late Lt. Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese national, and
bonafide member the 1st Regiment, United State-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines; died in a battle
at Rizal Province; and certified by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as having rendered aritorious
military services during the Japanese occupation;
3. That petitioner as widow of the said recognized deceased veteran, filed an application for back pay
4. The Secretary and Chief of Office Staff the Veterans Back Pay Commission sent a letter to General
Vicente Lopez of the United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines apprising the latter that the
Commission has reaffirmed its solution granting the back pay to alien members; the AFP certified
certified that deceased veteran has rendered service as a recognized guerrilla
5. That after due deliberation respondent revoked its previous stands and ruled that aliens are not
entitled to back pay;
6. That on February 13, 1957, the respondent Veterans Back Pay Commission, through its Secretary &
Chief of Office Staff, made a formal reply to the aforesaid claim of the herein petitioner denying her
request on the ground that aliens are not entitled to backpay;
7. That upon refusal of the Veterans Back Pay Commission the petitioner brought the case direct to this
Honorable Court by way of mandamus;
The trial court ordered respondent Commission to give due course to the claim of herein petitioner. Against
the decision, the respondent instituted this appeal and it further contended by the Commission that the
petitioner should have first exhausted her administrative remedies by appealing to the President of the
Philippines, and that her failure to do so is a bar to her action in court.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not a petition for mandamus is proper to correct the acts of the commission.

(2) Whether or not it is necessary in the case at bar that Natividad should have exhausted all
administrative remedies, i.e. before the president.

Held:
(1) Yes. The discretion of the Veterans Backpay Commission is limited to the facts of the case; that is, in
evaluating the evidence whether or not claimant is a member of a guerrilla force duly recognized by the
United States Army. It has no power to adjudicate or determine rights after such facts are established.
Having been satisfied that the deceased was an officer or a guerrilla outfit duly recognized by the United
States Army and forming part of the Philippine Army, it becomes the ministerial duty of the Commission to
give due course to his widow's application. For this reason, mandamus lies against the Commission.

(2) No. The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke the rule on the exhaustion of administrative
remedies, considering that in its resolution, it declared that the opinions of the Secretary of Justice were
"advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any
aggrieved party has the court for recourse", thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final
judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by the Commission.

27.Bordallo vs. Professional Regulations Commission 421 Phil 281

Doctrine: As a rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative
board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute but admits of exceptions.

Facts: President Fidel V. Ramos approved republic Act. 8544, entitled An Act Regulating the Practice of the
Merchant Marine Profession in the Philippines, otherwise known as the Philippine Merchant Marine
Officers Act of 1998. The said law imposes a licensure exam requirement on the Merchant marine
profession. R.A. 8544 also provides for the creation of the Board of Marine Desk Officers, which is tasked
and empowered to adopt and promulgate the laws implementing Rules and Regulations.

Pertinent provision:

Rating in the Board Examination. To be qualified as having passed the board examination for Marine
Deck/Engineer Officer, a candidate must obtain a weighted general average of seventy percent (70%), with
no grade lower than sixty percent (60%) in any given subject. An examinee who obtains a weighted
general average rating of seventy (70%) but obtains a rating below sixty percent in any given subject must
take the examination in the subject or subjects where he obtained a grade below sixty percent (60%).

Significantly, the passing rating prescribed by the above provision (70%) is lower than that prescribed by
Presidential Decree No. 97 (Regulating the Practice of the Marine Professions in the Philippines), otherwise
known as the Philippine Merchant Marine Officers law. Section 9 thereof sets a passing rate of seventy-five
percent (75%).

The petitioners, as examinees who failed the said licensure exam (with a grade of 70%) are adversely
affected by the conflict between the 2 laws regarding the passing rate. They filed an appeal to the Board of
Marine desk Officers, which was denied.

Upon appeal they petitioned for mandamus with the Court of appeals directly regarding the resolution.

The court of appeals denied such petition, stating that the appeal should have been applied with the PRC.

Issue/s: Is Court of Appeals correct in denying such petition?


Held: No. As a rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative
board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute but admits of exceptions. One of these
exceptions is when the question is purely legal; such as the one presented in the case at bar. The failure of
petitioners to appeal to the PRC, therefore, is not fatal to petitioners caused.

Dispositive: Wherefore, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE AND IS GRANTED. Petitioners are held to be
qualified as having passed the Board Examination for Marine Deck Offices conducted on April 25-27, 1998.

28.Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng


Muntinlupa, Iinc. Vs. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92, 113

Facts: Petitioners questopn the validity of the order of then Secretary of Agriculture Hon. Carlos G.
Dominguez which ordered: (1) the take-over by the Department of Agriculture of the management of the
petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntilupa,
Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant to the Departments regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D. No.
175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 13, (2) the creation of a Management Committee
which shall assume the management of KBMBPM upon receipt of the order, (3) the disbandment of the
Board of Directors, and (4) the turn over of all assets, properties and records of the KBMBPM the
Management Committee.

The exordium of said Order unerringly indicates that its basis is the alleged petition of the general
membership of the KBMBPM requesting the Department for assistance in the removal of the members of
the Board of Directors who were not elected by the general membership of the cooperative and that the
ongoing financial and management audit of the Department of Agriculture auditors shows that the
management of the KBMBPM is not operating that cooperative in accordance with P.D. 175, LOI 23, the
Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the provisions and by-laws of KBMBPM. It is also professed therein that
the Order was issued by the Department in the exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers under
Section 8 of P.D. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 113.

Issue: Whether or not the Order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture is illegal

Held: Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing P.D. No. 175) provides the
procedure for the removal of directors or officers of cooperatives, thus:

An elected officer, director or committee member may be removed by a vote of majority of the members
entitled to vote at an annual or special general assembly. The person involved shall have an opportunity to
be heard.

A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17, Article III of the KBMBPMs by-laws, reads:

Sec. 17. Removal of Directors and Committee Members. Any elected director or committee member
may be removed from office for cause by a majority vote of the members in good standing present at the
annual or special general assembly called for the purpose after having been given the opportunity to be
heard at the assembly.

Under the same article are found the requirements for the holding of both the annual general assembly
and a special general assembly.

Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of
cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express provision on
the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision, petitioners cannot be deprived of that right.

The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself
the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors
and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which grants him authority to supervise
and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give him that right.
An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may to
necessary for their just and reasonable execution.

Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a specific function
is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty; restrain
the commission of acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units; (d) determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs;
and (e) prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs. Specifically, administrative
supervision is limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to: (1) generally
oversee the operations of such agencies and insure that they are managed effectively,
efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day activities; (2) require the
submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit, performance evaluation
and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the
department; (3) take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance of official
functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of mal-administration;
(4) review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to
them.

The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not be inferred from any of the
foregoing as both P.D. No. 175 and the by-laws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by which
directors and officers are to be removed. The Secretary should have known better than to disregard these
procedures and rely on a mere petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM and an on-going audit
by Department of Agriculture auditors in exercising a power which he does not have, expressly or
impliedly. We cannot concede to the proposition of the Office of the Solicitor General that the Secretarys
power under paragraph (d), Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 above quoted to suspend the operation or cancel the
registration of any cooperative includes the milder authority of suspending officers and calling for the
election of new officers. Firstly, neither suspension nor cancellation includes the take-over and ouster of
incumbent directors and officers, otherwise the law itself would have expressly so stated. Secondly, even
granting that the law intended such as postulated, there is the requirement of a hearing. None was
conducted.

XI. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction


29.Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA 184 SCRA 426

Facts:
Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Bureau of Energy
Development (BED), for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. IEI asked the Ministry
of Energy for another to contract for the additional three coal blocks.
IEI was advised that there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation
(MMIC). IEI and MMIC signed a Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI will assign all its rights and
interests to MMIC.
IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus damages against the MMIC and the Ministry of
Energy Geronimo Velasco before the RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the coal
blocks prior to finalization of the memorandum. IEI prayed for that the rights for the operation be
granted back.
Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant because they have mortgages in favor of
MMIC. It was dismissed
Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus is President of both IEI and MMIC.
RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for the reinstatement of the contract in favor of
IEI.
CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue: W/ON RTC has jurisdiction?

Held: No. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil contract
cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is
derived from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing
lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal operating contract over the subject
coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the integrated national program for coal-development and with the
objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal-supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of action was not
merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. Thus
it was that in its Decision ordering the rescission of the Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the
continued efficacy of the coal-operating contract in IEI's favor and directed the BED to give due course to
IEI's application for three (3) IEI more coal blocks. These are matters properly falling within the domain of
the BED.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many
cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that
the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is
also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in
such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for
its view"

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal
areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over
said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the
specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters
concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral
resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand
aside even when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction
of an administrative agency.

30.Roxas and Company Inc. vs. CA, 321 SCRA 106

Facts: This case involves three haciendas in Nasugbu Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the
acquisition of these by the government under RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
9188. Petitioner Roxas and Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas,
namely Hacienda Palico, Banilad and Caylaway. The events of this case occurred during the incumbency of
then President Aquino, in the exercise of legislative power, the President signed on July 22, 1987,
Proclamation No. 131 instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and Executive Order No. 229
providing the mechanisms necessary to initially implement the program. Congress passed Republic Act No.
6657; the Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before the
laws effectivity, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant
to the provisions of EO No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory
acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.

Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land in Hacienda Palico were subject to immediate
acquisition and distribution by the government under the CARL. Meanwhile in a letter dated May 4, 1993,
petitioner applied with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to non-
agricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. Despite petitioners application for conversion,
respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two Haciendas. The Land Bank of the Philippines
trust accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR with cash and LBP
bonds. On October 22, 1993, from the title of the Hacienda, respondent DAR registered Certificate of Land
Ownership Award No. 6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOAs were distributed to farmer beneficiaries. On
December 18, 1991, the LBP certified certain amounts in cash and LBP bonds had been earmarked as
compensation for petitioners land in Hacienda Banilad. On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion
of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the
government on May 6, 1988 before the effectivity of the CARL. Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992,
petitioner, through its President, Eduardo Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of respondent DAR
withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly
authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result,
petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from
agricultural to other uses. Respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the land
would not exempt it from agrarian reform.
On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted a case with respondent DAR Adjudication Board praying for the
cancellation of the CLOAs issued by respondent DAR in the name of the farmers. Petitioner alleged that
the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the
land is not suitable for agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had
reclassified the land to non-agricultural. Respondent DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial
question of whether the property was subject to agrarian reform; hence, this question should be submitted
to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination.
Petitioner filed a petition with the CA. It questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and
the denial of due process in the acquisition of its landholdings. Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of
the three haciendas was denied. Petitioners petition was dismissed by the CA. Hence, this recourse.
Issue: Whether or not the acquisition proceedings over the haciendas were valid and in accordance with
the law.
Held: No, for a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required first the Notice of
Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of
the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties and second, the Notice of Acquisition
sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. The importance of the first notice, the Notice of
Coverage and the letter of invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be
understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due
process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the States police power and the power of
eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an
exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. In this case, respondent DAR
claims that it sent a letter of invitation to petitioner corporation, through Jaime Pimentel, the administrator
of Hacienda Palico but he was not authorized as such by the corporation. The SC stressed that the failure
of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not
give the SC the power to nullify the CLOAs already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. The Court said, to
assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular
course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition
proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993. Since then
until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their lands. It goes against the basic precepts of
justice, fairness and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till. The
petition is granted in part and the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas are nullified for
respondent DAR's failure to observe due process.

Inapplicability of the doctrine:


31.Aquilino Q. Pimentel., et al vs. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate
President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011

FACTS: On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the Senate
Ethics Committee to investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator Manny Villar into
the C5 Extension Project. After the election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the Ethics
Committee was reorganized, but the Minority failed to name its representatives to the Committee,
prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee.

In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and
not with the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved
that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the Whole,
which was approved by the majority. In the hearings of such Committee, petitioners objected to the
application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also
questioned the quorum, and proposed amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the
need to publish the rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an indispensable party in
this petition;

2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior
resort;

3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar's right to equal protection;

4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole is violative of Senator Villar's right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under
Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and

5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity.

HELD:

REMEDIAL LAW

First issue: An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that
a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. In this case,
Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it may be true that
she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this case
are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be
resolved without affecting Senator Madrigal's interest.

Second issue: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented here
do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the
contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the
Court.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Third issue: While ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or unethical
conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from
pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. The
referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by
the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate, and not violative of the
right to equal protection.

Fourth issue: The adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee
does not violate Senator Villar's right to due process. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate
its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court in Section 16(3), Article VI of
the Philippine Constitution, which states: "Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."

Fifth: The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules
of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules
need not be published,unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take
effect. Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that
the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required
under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because
the Rules expressly mandate their publication.

PARTIALLY GRANTED

XII. Administrative Procedure


*Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987
*Executive Order No. 26 Prescribing procedure and sanctions to ensure speedy disposition of
administrative cases
32.Gupilan Aguilar vs Office of Ombudsman, 717 SCRA 503

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