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CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of
Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery.
Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for
demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier
decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over
"all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.
ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal. YES
RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion
to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A
party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways
and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by
deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a
cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for
the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
adverse.
: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should
have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same
was issued without the summary hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended
to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are
prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is
resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to
ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is
essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is
given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a
defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties - In
the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for
execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for
consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the
motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him
a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that
period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now,
therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
Issues:
Held
1. NO. The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It
cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the
parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Consequently,
questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on
appeal.
TIJAM DOCTRINE IS NOT APPLICABLE. The facts are starkly different in
this case, making the exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner
Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the
records were still with the RTC. At that point, petitioner could not have
questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the case
was not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to the MTC,
petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that
court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional question in
its Brief. Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is
inapplicable to the instant appeal.
LACHES has been defined as the "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it."
In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17 July
1997. On 18 July 1997, or a day after the filing of the application, the RTC
immediately issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22
October 1997, which was 96 days from the Order. While the date set by the
RTC was beyond the 90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact did
not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court.
The RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing within five days from the filing of the application for registration, as
provided in the Property Registration Decree, did not affect the courts its
jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was merely directory,
and failure to issue the Order within that period did not deprive the
RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance with the
five-day period is mandatory would make jurisdiction over the subject matter
dependent upon the trial court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be contingent upon
the action or inaction of the court.
WON lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application,
because the value of the land does not fall under MTC - NO
Petitioner contended that since the selling price of the property based
on the Deed of Sale was 160,000,the MTC did not have jurisdiction
over the case. Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as
amended,the MTCs delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral and land
registration cases is limited to lands, the value of which should not
exceed 100,000.
The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because petitioner
opposed respondent Corporations application for registration on 8 January
1998. However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance, because
the value of the lot in this case does not exceed 100,000.
WON the value of the land should be determined from its selling
price NO
In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using the first
method, because the records are bereft of any affidavit executed by
respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise, valuation cannot be
done through the second method, because this method finds application only
where there are multiple claimants who agree on and make a joint
submission as to the value of the property. Here, only respondent Bantigue
Point Development Corporation claims the property.
DOCTRINES:
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Since petitioners complaint asserted a total
demand, exclusive of interest of over P10,000 (and sought recovery of
damages of close to P30,000) the case clearly falls within the original
jurisdiction of respondent court of first instance as provided by Section 44 of
the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296 as amended.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTUAL DAMAGES CANNOT BE ISOLATED FROM MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. Respondent court could not arbitrarily isolate
petitioners lesser claim for actual damages and without hearing and proofs
rule out their other claims for moral and exemplary damages as "bloated"
and summarily dismiss motu propio the case as not falling within its
jurisdiction.
FLORES V MALLARE-PHILLIPS
Facts:
Flores sued the respondents for refusing to pay him certain amount of money
as alleged in the complaint:
The trial court by Judge Mallare (one of the respondents) dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: WON the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the
permissive joinder of parties under the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as
defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now
furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or
being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the
parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the
jurisdictional test.
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test
is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of
Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a
careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of
parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and
Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its
jurisdiction.
OTHERS:
Brillo vs. Buklatan (former rule):
Separate claims against several defendants of different amounts
each of which is not more than P2,000 and falls under the jurisdiction of
the justice of the peace court. The several claims do not arise from the
same transaction or series of transactions and there seem to be no
questions of law or of fact common to all the defendants as may
warrant their joinder under Rule 3, section 6.
The difference between the former and present rules in cases of permissive
joinder of parties may be illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the
case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace as exceptions to the
totality rule.
Soriano y Cia vs. Jose 29 dismissed employees joined in a complaint
against the defendant to collect their respective claims, each of which was
within the jurisdiction of the municipal court although the total exceeded
the jurisdictional amount, this Court held that under the law then
the municipal court had jurisdiction. Although the plaintiffs' demands
were separate, distinct and independent of one another, their joint suit was
authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate claim
furnished the jurisdictional test.
International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza, 25 dismissed teachers jointly
sued for unpaid salaries, the MC had jurisdiction because the amount
of each claim was within, although the total exceeded, its
jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff
under Section 6 of Rule 3.
Under the present law, the two cases would be under the jurisdiction of
the RTC. Similarly, Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez, if the
separate claims against the several defendants arose out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and there is a common question of law
or fact, they would now be under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
COMPARISON OF RULES
PRESENT FORMER
Where a plaintiff sues a Totality of the claims in all Totality of the claims in all
defendant on two or more the causes of action the causes of action
separate causes of action irrespective of whether the irrespective of whether the
COA arose out of the same COA arose out of the same
or diff transactions. If the or diff transactions. If the
total demand exceeds P20K total demand exceeds P20K
RTC has jurisdiction RTC has jurisdiction