DOC

2361

BURMA
AND

SOU'rHEAST ASIAN
REX;.IOJALISM

by Kathryn E. Ra.ffer;y

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OF THE
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C .,. PHILIPPlES

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B ur ma and ,h M .bers of ASEAN

Bu ma D ASEAN mcmbo 5

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DISTRIBUTION STATEMEl'IY
Tl,is document is subject to spo-c.iol eicport con
trolsond each tronsmittol t !o,oign governtr.enta o
forign notlonols moy be rT'Ocle only wit;, prior op
. STRATEGIC STUDIES DEPARTMENT p, OYol of !he Office of tho o.puty Ch,el of Stoll lo
Mili1<>,y Ope,otion1 (J. TTN OPS IA FI.IT). Heod
TECHNICAL PAPER RAC-TP-363 quorte, , Departmento! the Army, Wos.han;ton, O. C.
Published May 1969 20310.

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ur a antJ 0 t s sa e io ar

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.,,' Kathryn E. Raiferty

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Research Analysi Cor oratinn

McLeL Virginia

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FOREWORD

The development of viable Southeast Asi::i.n regional organizations was

significantly advanced when Indcnesia joined four ot:-:r nations in August 1967
to form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Neu ral Indo
n<:sia's decision to join an organization that included such US allies as Thai
\ land and the Philippines led many observers to speculate on the prospects fo:
the participation of nations such as Burr:1a and Cambodia in Soulheast Asian
regjomlism. Cons quently, and because RAC has an interest in analyzin

. Southeast Asian regional developme!,ts as they may impinge on US plannint

this study {similat to a companion analysis of Cambodia*) was undertaken to
examine the prospects for Burmese participation in forms of Soulheasl Asian
regional cooperation.
Dr. Bernard K. Gordon, Southeast Asia Project Chairma1 at RAC, has
f(iven general di ection to this study, which is one of a series to examine the
political forces at work in Asian regionalism and the foreign policy of selectC":.l
Southeast Asian nations. t This study is directly responsive to a specific Dep
uty Chief of 3taff for Military Operations request and is designed lo IJe used
by lhe Army in connection with he Basic Army Strategic Estimates, the Joint
Strategic Objectives Plans, and certain Special State Defense Studies Group
Senior Interdepartmental Group studies that concern the developm nt of re
gional arrangements in Asia and will of necessity inquire into the possible
relation of Burma (as well as other states) to such possible new rcglon.11
forma'. -
In preparing "Burma and S0uU1ast Asian Regionalism" Miss Rafferty
has drawn on her earlier analysis of security threats tc Burma and on l1er
analysis of Sino-Burmese relations. :!= A genuinely definitive examination oi

*BC'rnard K. Gordon and Anne V. Cyr. -c:imhodia and Soolhlasl Asian Hegional
ism, RAC-R-7:l, P.cscarch Anal sis Corporation, in preparation.
tScc Bernard K. Gordon, "Asian Rlgionalism: Implic:ltions for i.lS Easl Asian
Policy (U), RAC-'.l-43; Rcsca1ch Analysis Corpo1ation, Vol r. "Summary and Rtcom
mcncbtions. COKF1DENTTAL; Vol n, "Dasic Tl.L,r. UNCLASSfF'IED: Howard Fcd.:r

. spi<'I, "Indonesia and Its lntC'rnational Helations (U). HAC-H-4:l, FOR OFFCCIAL USE
0,'LY; and RobL'rt 0. Tilman, "!,falaysian Fc,1eign Policy, RAC-H-63, Research An:tly
sis Coiporation.
=Hioward M. Fcdcrspicl an Kathryn E. Rafferty. "ProsJ)('cts for Hcgional Militn1y
Cooperation in Southeasl Asia, RAC-TP-:H4 Research Analysis Corporation, JpJ\ 69,
UNCLASSIF1ED; Kathryn E. Rafferty. "C mmunist China s Policy to.vard Bunna: Tnnd,;
an' Prospects (U)," AC-TP-365, Research .\:i:tly!<iS Corporalinn, in press, ECRET.
Miss Rafferty is also !be author of "Forcin Policy Making in the Philippines . ., RAC
T -:121, ,Tul 68. FOP. OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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., the subject is not yet possible because of the special problems encountered in
gathering c!ata relevant to Burma and because this particular subject is so
new, but Miss Rafferty has had access to i;overnment officials and s holars
with considerable expertis on Burma. The main poi11ts made y the author
reflect w, at can be learned today of a little-understood Asian nation.
Research and uiting [0r the study were completed in late 1968, but a few
developments in Burma s relations with Communist China and India in arly
1969 have been taken into account. The p per was reviewed by two RAC asso
ciates: Dr. George S. Pettee, Chairman or the RAC Research C ouncil, and
COL Dean T. Vanderhoef, USA (Ret).
John P. Hardt
Head, Strategic Studies Department

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. .-; I CONTEl'JTS

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Foreword V

Summary 1
Purpose- Facts-Discussion-Conclusion
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Abbreviations 4

1. Introduction 5

2. Burma and the Formation of ASEAN. 1967-1968 7

Malik's Visit to Rangoon (7)-. e w:n's Visits to Singapore and
Malaysia (8)

3. Burma' Relations with the ASEAN Nations and Communist China 11

Relations with the fembers of ASEAN (12)-Relations wilb Communist
China (16)

4. Internal Constraints on Participation in Regior,al Organizations i9

Economic Deterioration (19)-Commun.ist an Ethnic Insurgency (22)

5. Burma, Communist Chine, and ASEI\N 24

Appendixes
A. Text of "Treaty of Friendship and Mutual N n-Aggression between the
Union of Burma and the People's R".?public of Cl:lina" 26
B. Burmese Trade Statistics 2
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References and Notes 31

e liography 33

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 Figure
Durma and the Member of ASEAN fronti!'piccc (ii)

Tabla
1. Table l 65-1966 and 1966-1967 Pcrccota e Dec.cases in Some
Types of rod1 ".on from Lhe 1964-1965 Level 21

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I Pur ose
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To examine Burma's reaction tc the formation of the Association of
, I Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), its relations wit.h the membere of ASEAN,
-1 and other foreign and domestic factors that might affect Burr,1ese pa1ticipa
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tion in ASEAN and/or other organizations for Southeast Asian regional cooper
ation.

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Facts

:n May 1967 Indor ,_ ,;i.1:. Fo:.-eign Minister Malik visited Rangoon to in

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\ I form the Burmese government of plans to create a new Asian regional organ

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I ization. Other anticipated members of thP. roposcd organization (except
Indonesia) were nat ons with Western-orented forehm policies-Thailand,

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Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Hereofore Burmese foreign policy
had not placed much emphasis on relations with ether Southeast Asian nations,
but the proposal came at a time ,vhen Burmese lea er Ne Win had indicatad
that Bu.r:na was interested in havin more contact with neighboring nations
than in the as,.

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I Discussion

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Because of a major objective of Burmese foreign policy-to remain

neutral in relations with all nati0ns and to maintain friendly relations with
Communi:.t Chin.>.-membus ip in an association such as ASEAN could raise
severe foreign policy problems. Moreover, the Burme:;e government is pre
occupied with !:<>rious economic and insurgency problems. The time, energy,
and risks involved in a foreign policy d parture that might jeopardiz the
major objectives of Burmese foreign policy must be consid.3red against this

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background. l
This study asi,esses the proEpects for such a departme. The principal
a1eas considered are (a) Burma's reaction to the forma.tion of ASEAN and Ne
Wii's state visits to Singapore and Malay!>'. ; (b) Burmese foreign policy,
especially in relation to the ASEAN' nations and Communist China; (c) the two
do, e.1tic factors that roul a f1::ct Burme:,. 1; :ticipation in Asian regional

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organiza ions-economic deterioration and domP.stic insurgency; and (d) as
pects of future Burmese attitudes toward ASEAN.

Conclu .. ions

1. Burma has not publicly stated its polic. toward ASEAN, but GEN Ne
Win's 1968 state visits to Singapore and Malaysia intliatcd his interest in
maintainin bilateral ssociations with t'le ASEAN nations, although maintain
ing Burmese neutrality and nonalign..-nent.
2. Apart from diplomatic reo,nition, border coopHation with Thailand,
som cooperation through United Nations (UN) agencies, Colombo Plan activi
ties, and some trade, Burma's associaons with the ASEA. nations ha been
confined largely to expressions of goodwill and hope for cooperation in un
specified ar'las.
3. Despite --s and downs in its relations with Communist China and
despite China's continuing aim to seek the replacement of the Ne Win govern
ment, Burma is li ely to continue to make an effort to improve relations with
Peking.
4. The present Communist r.!l:.nese policy toward Burma and <:conomic
and insurger..cy problems might in the long run interact to precipitate the over
throw of the Ne Win governme:1t.
5. Perhaps only a major shirt in Communist .China's f}Olicies and 3ttitudes
could alter Burma's views on ASEA membership. Few if any signs poiI,t to
such a Chinese shift. Barring sue eh nges, Burma must be discounted from
ASEAN considerations.

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urma and Sout east Asian egionalism

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 .BBREVIATIONS

ADB Asian Dcvelop:ncnt Bank

AFPFL Anti-Fascist People's r rccdom League
ASA Association of Southeast Asia
A SEAN Association ot Soulhea5t Asian Nations
CPR Chine-:::: :i'eoplc'3 Republic
KMT l<uomi::itang
United :Hions

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 Cho ter 1

INTRODUC ION

Burma's potential association with ASEAN must be considered !n lhe

context of that nation's domestic politics and its foreign policy. Since indnpen
dence the Union of Burma ha had two types of government. From 948 to 1958
a parliamentary gov rnment was headed by Prime Minister U u, leader of the
Anti-Fascist People's Freedom Le gue (AFPFL), a coalition of diverse politica
and ideologic l factior,s, mass organizations, ethnic groups, and individuals. t
Between September 1958 and Ap_ il 1960 the military CarAtaker Governmtnt was
l,eaded by Prime Minister (GEN) Ne Wi11. Prime inister U Nu returned to
power follmting elections in the spring of 196G. In March 1962 GEN N Wtn led
a bloodlesi? coup that overthrew the parliamP. tary government and replaced it
with the Revolutionary Council [compose of 1 civilian (Fon gn Minister U Thi
Han) and 12 military members]. The constitution was suspr,cted, politicians
were imprisoned, political activity was forbidden, and press l!ensorshi.p w:o.s
instituted. U Nu ar.d several other leaders were released fr m rri<> in late
.. 1967, and many additional prominent politicianE and ;ninority gr up le de.-s were
relea,;ed in Febi-uary 1968. 2 In September 1968 GEN Ne Win indicateci that some
of these lear rs might soon res . _ a limitcc! governmental role and tt.at a new
cc,,sutution might be drafted. 3 T 1roughout the independence period (:: t nic and
Burman*Communist insurgency has threatened national political unicy. Ot!rs
oi gave:. ment-11 amnesty and willingness to consi er some rebel political de
m:inds have not been successful in ending the insu gency.
1'his unstable political environ nent has not been c:>nducive to e cono:nic
development. Serious economic deterioratio iz intiniately connected with
Burmes political behavior. The Burmese political leaders are not eco omi te,
and ,he absence of leadership in e;;onomic matters is the ::iost SP.rious ob:,tacle
t0 ec')11omic development. 4 Over the years nearly all sectors of th(' econor y
have been nationalized, but nationalization l,as not. tJIodu<:ed econom> :;.c.;th.
10 turn to forei n policy: the Burme e ne.0tiaed :\ defense agreement
with GrE>at Britain in 1947 that rrentioned ht! possibility of. est;:ioli!=hing a mili
tary alli.ance with that nation. 5 Un a Septcmb : J.940 it wns Burmese policy lo

*In this paper the tcnn "Burman :>pplics specific;; lly to an ethnic gro ? that has
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I r sided in Central Burma .incc before t e ninth century; uBurmese le!ers to the gen-
/ eral p pulatic:1 of the Union f Durm'.' e discussion it> Chap. 4.

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 seek s curity agreements with Great Britain and the US. When these nations
failed to shoN an ir1terest in security arrangements and to suprly arm to co 1-
bat insurgency in .aurma, Prime Minister U Nu gradually developed a neutral
foreign policy. The principles of that ne tralist policy still guide fcreig policy.
They state that Burma will seek to (a) pursue "friendly relations with all na
tions (Ref 6, p 46); {b) refuse apy type of foreign assistance that might com
promise Bunn 's p0litical, ecoucmic, or strai.egic independence; and (c) a 01d
alignments wth any power bloc (Ref 6 pp 46-47\.
This foreign policy did not prevent Communist China from adoptinf; a
militant policy toward Burma (1949-1954), but it may have prevertcd Furmese
polcy from a ntagonizing China for rr.any years (1954-1966). Until the mid-
1960's Western observers characterized Bu1 mese policy :is neutr lity leaning
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toward Communist China. The long period of relatively amiable relations
ndE>d, how e::, in mid-1967.7" Since that time the Chinese People's R public
(CPR) has publicly -"0:.l aged the White Flag Communists to lead a war o{
national lberatic,n and called for the overthrow of the Ne Win government (Rt!f
8, pp 15-16).

Since the 1962 coup, GEN Ne Win has made all significant dome:,t c a:-i,
f oreign policy decisions. Despite occasional restlessness abLiut economic
mc<tters, the general is in f:.rm command of the Revolutionary Council, largely
because from 1949 until he became 1 ad of the government he .vas the leader
o f the Burmese army. The military, wh ich staffs most of the governmental
offices, is belie cd to be oyal to him and to have confidence in him. .fen who
might chal nge liis uthority have been discouraged by his removal of potential
challenge!s from rE:sponsible posit:on. Since detailed inform-Hon on his
policy-making procedJre is unavailable, 0 one can only specula e that he is not
seriously challenged when he makes policy decisions.
In any event, concern with seri0us domP..Jtic problems, a erence to the
eutrality policy, an re ations with Communist Cl'ir:a have taken priority over
the development of extensive political, economic, and social ties with any othe
Southeast Asi:.n n.tions. Before the rnid-1967 c :mge in Chini:s policy toward
Burma, GEN Ne Win had i.J<!gun to demor.strate an interest in incr asing contacts
ith other Asian nations. Since that date, relations with the CPR have probably
reinforced that decil-iion. It has been reflected in his willingness to exp1orP.
closer relations with some of the leaders of the n0,1-Comr.unist statez, 1., u ,ls
India and the ASEAN nations.*

"'Al ough this study does not deal with India, it should be noted that since J!l67
both India and Burma have aken steps to improve their muiual reh>tions. For xample,
i:i March 1968 GEN Ne Win made an informal visit to Jr:di , and 'Prime Hnistcr Indira
Gandhi recip1 ocated with a slate visit to Bill ma in arch 1969. Both nations arc
troubled by t,ibal unrest among the Mizo Naga peopl s wh inhabit nc-rthern Burma and
nort'1eastern india. In add.it.ion, serious economic probl ms arise from xlcn ivc
smuggling .:,perations on their common border. ln 1967 the two states s1gn0J a bound::.ry
:.gr emcnt an , arc now demarcating t' '. :.'Ound ry an r 1,aring a ho nd .. rr tre:i. y (,":.. fs
10, 12, 13; Ref 11, p 11 ).
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Chapter 2

BURMA AND THE FORMATION OF ASE..:, t967-1968

Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and th Philippines fo.:-med

ASEAN in August 1967 in D ngkok for the purposes of acceleratir.g conomic
progress and increasing Southeast Asian regional stat:Jility (Ref 14, pp 50-60
71-73). The association's organization consists of a ministerial conference
composed of the foreign ministers of tl e member states; a standing committee;
n s veral "subject-matter" committees. The first two ministerial confer-
nces were held in August 1967 in Bangkok and in August 1968 in Djal<arta. ln
its firs year ASEA adopted 23 propos"lls for joint action in such fields as
shipping and tourism. Implementation of the propos:ils will undoubtedly be
slc,w because of lack 'lf money, apprehension over politi 1.l complicati0ns! 5 and
inexperience with joint planning. However, some sL . .?S (partic'ularly T'1ailand)
ha,e great hopes that ASEA N will become the core of outheast Asian coopera
tion and unity for which their leaders ha\ wor!ced since the 1950's.
Some of these ASEA leaders have long hoped that Burma \'Ould join their
<.>f!orts to strengthen Asia:1-creatE>d regio al organizaons. 16 They .vould Ii! e
Burma to join ASEAN partly bcca1.:sc 3urnn's n utra foreign policy would uff
set the Vcstern ori ntation of most ASEAN me,nbe s. Thailand and the Philip
pines arc closely allied w ith th US. Malaysia a d Sing pore, which share
Burma's British colonial heritag", continue to have de ense agreements with
Great Britain as well as with two other former Br'"ish coloni s-A stralia and

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other ASE N nations to Burma in its n utrality and general foreig1 policy.

1'.!ALIK'S VISIT TO IlANGOO.'

Although the concepts fo1 a regional organization that would include the
Assochtion of Southeast Asia (ASA) nations and Indonesia and Singapore were
being developed in the summer of 196G, th possibility of B :mes membershp
in this organization was not discussed publicly until the si=ring of 1967. (See
discussion of Burmese relations wit:-i Thailand, Chap. 3, concerning Foreign
Minister Thanat Khoman's effo1ts to persuade Burma to join ASA.) in mid
April 1!)67 The Guardian (Rangoon) reported that Indonesian Foreign Minister
I Malik was l1opeful that a new r .\dona! organization to supersede ASA woulc, !, ,.
fnrmed before the end of 196"i. Malik stated that Indonesia and Thailand had

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 g1eed to invite Burma (as well as Cambodia and Jingapore, to join the proposf'
association. 17 On 24 and 25 May 1987 tne Indonesian Foreign Minister paid an
ofCidal visit to Rangoon.
Before flying there, he stated that the purpose of his sit was to trengt :n
Indonesian ties with Burma. He also said th t he would discuss the c-re::.tion of
"a new Southeast Asia al iance" with Burmese officials. 18 M'.alik !u.ther or .en ri
that these discussion would be prelimi:1ary ones and hat it was "prematLl""" to
Htate what nat'ons would joir I H? allia ce or .;rhen it would e formed. 16
On his arrival in Rangocn, Dr. Malik emphasized that Indonesia and Burma
had similar v:.ews on many subjects, specially on fighting colo1,ia lism and
impcrialism. 19 He said, "Although pro!Jlems exist between H:irma and lndor.esia,
I w1ll try to sttengthen relations between our two countries. '' 19 The Indonesian
Foreign Minister went first to th<:! Burmese Foreign Office and later pairi a co r
esy call on GEN Ne Win. The Rangoon visit was a cordial one. 19
This trip to Rangoon was the only effort made t soucd out Burmese leaders
or at least inform them about e ASE;: : roposal, to pre\ent poten ial Burmese
"irritation" at not having been informed about the organization. Arte!' t,,e for
mation of ASEAN, at 1 ast one other A"EAN member attempted to interest Burm-a
in participating in the organization. In December 1967 Philippine Foreign Sec
retary arci::io Ramos went to Rangoo to attend the 18ti1 Ministerial .. foeting of
the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee. At that time Ramos told the p1ess
that he hope to tal with GE c Win a out Burma's joining ASEAN. Secretary
Ramos said that even if l e Union of Burma did not become a full memer of tlle
organization, it might at least participate in various individ.ol ASEAN prcrams.! 0
On return.tng to Manila, however, Secretary Ramos said that Burma was not
ready to join ASEAN. 21 The orking Pcoole's Daily (Ran6oon) editorial of
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22 Ap il 1968 on regional cocperation and GEN Ne Win's statements in Sil i;a
pore and Malaysia are the clcsest ap : oximations to da e of a Burmese go,e1r!
ment position on ASEAN. (Quotations :rom Ute editorial and GEN Ne fi,1 's
statements are gi en in the next section.) Neither Malik's visit. nor the sub
ent formation of ASEAN, t1'1rR:tmos' inquiries, p1omted the Durrnesc
governmen to state formally its attitude toward AS :\N.2

NE WlN'S VISITS TO SINGAPORE AND MALAYSD

In March 1968 GEN Ne Win announc .d :it ne would ake hi::; fi st state
visits to Mal.aysia and Singapore, both ASEAN mem'Jers. 2" Thest' two visits
served Ne Win 's policy of incrcas:ng tie with Asian natios other than Com
munist Ch'na. The 4-day visit to Singapore tool< plac:e 20-2 4 April. GEK e
Win and his wife were accomp nied by COL Chit Khin, Secretary of the Defense
Ministry [also Director General of tile National Intelligence Bureau, Director
to the Military Intelligence S 0 ice (M), and Director of the Defense Services
Intelligerce ), who always traveled wi h Ne Win, and U Tuo Shei:1, the second-
anking man in t1' Foreign Ministry. ore gn Minister U Thi Han did not
::iccompany them. 25
 During U1e general's visit a Straits Times editoria appeared that was
sympathetic to Burma's problems with insurgency and Communist China. In
additio the paper exprcssert hope for greater Burmese association with other
SouJ1east Asian nations in variety of fields: "Tun Razak's visit to Burma i,1
1965 seemed to sho.v that despite vastly different politi al systems the oppor
tunities for dei:e ping shared in,!n'sts ir, commerce and sport and in J1e eco
nomic and cultural fields arc rit.:'1 rud v ried. " 20
o'n 22 Ap:-il the Wr,rlting People s Daily, the fficial Burmese government
newspaper, published an editorial entitled Regional Cooperation'' concerning
the general's speech at a Singapore banquet. In the spP<:ch GEN Ne Wit reaf
firmed Buma s intention "to maintain its nm,.rality in international affairs in
the principles of mutual r spect and pe:iceful co-existence. " 22 GEN l':e Win
further said, " ... we look forward to the !tind of Southeast Asia in which evei y
nation will be Cree to live its own life in its own way. We believe that in su'h
a community of nations it wil! be possible to live in peace and friendship with
its [sic) neighbours. "22 The edto:-ial commented:

.. it is time Southeast Asians pl:ly a mo e ar, i\ role in shaping their national and
regional destinies, for as General e Win has poi:lted out, only the force of the region
will prevail ultimately in determining the kind f Southeast .'\sia Soutbeast Asians will
have to lhe in.
Burma has ... been c:irefu not to attach her elf to an ar-,;ociation or bloc with
ven the leastdertonc ?t:._vst_l)Olitlc_l_andmflit_ari:h1ter,:. ts. Jh!E_i in a:rd-
ance wit!1 her rinci les of scl-r liance and non-interfercn.::e. But Bu ma h:is never
eenile-fiantln -herwhol-=iiearted-spoJtand co=o2"eration inafl r-- ion:lf and
international efforts that she feels is r si,tlmade in the interests of all nation1; and
povples.
n re ion;I effoE_tol!!I} Bui:_ma wf1 _!>ea p_arty v,'.!!Lha__to__l>d__gn_!i)J)
rinci l-- e_!!l,P_hi{S!_s added-

Althuuh the editorial acknowledged general Burmese support f0r cooperation

among Southeast Asian nations, it also expresed Burma's determi alion to
remain neutral and nonaligned. The Burmese government had not yet decided
that ASEAN was fr e from "the least undertone of v steel political and military
intere t . "
GEN Ne Win and Prime Ministc, Lee Kuan Yew discus.,;ed prO$pects for
Southeast Asian secu ity following th: 1971 British mi ita:ry withdrawal from
the region. , re Win appeared ::mxious about the future but mphasized Burma's
wish to avoid military alliances (Ref 11, p 114). At the c0nclusi.on of Ne Win's
Singapore visit, he and the Singapore Prf.me _ hnister did not issue a communi-
que. L e Kuan Yew said that the decision nas up to h general, and Ne Win
decided against issuing one. Later the Straits Budget reported that in Singa
pore Ne Win had had a "full exchange of views... frank and outspoken. "25
GE1 e Win then moved en to Malaysh! and spent 24-28 April on a state
visit there. He made a speech emphasizing that the visit was an oppoi-tunity
to learn more about .,falaysia... [in) the hope that we will be a le to benefit
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from the experience you have gained. ' He urther said:

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 The countries of this region ... have a firm dt:t ,min:uion to safeguard their na
t'onal independP.ncc and lo accclciate CC'onomie: dcvelo 1<.mt and "OCial progres3 with s.
iew to promoting a bcttC'r s andard of li[e for their ples. We In Burma believe that
tt,ls deter nation of the South-East Asian nati ,1rn wil prove to l>e an important fact.or
in determining the future of the rcgion.27

On his part, Prime Minister Tunku ,\ dul Rahman nc,ted the two nations'
similar developme,1t problems and "most or all a similar understanding, gr07<'
ing each year, that in So,.the'.lsl Asia we must strive to live together, think
together, work together, nd .1ct." He also said:

., / As cr:rr respective foreign policies show, Burn.:i:1 n Malavs!a thin very much
I Ike. We -ant our naions and peoples to stanr! on the!r own f et, e wish to er.sure
ace and security for generations to come, w desire to be left out :,f the struggies
between the ibig powers.. we subibe to the :il!!_e rinci les-pe:lce and coexisLence,
non-interference, f:-iendship with all, in hort we ,:ar.t o b left alone to pursue ou; ovn
way of lifeP (emphasis adtiedJ

The joint communique of 28 April 1968 ,,as vague about the substance of
the Rahm.au-Ne Win conversations. However, the two ll.adcrs:

, , reviewed lhe general political situation in !,outh Ea Asia an had a fret and frank
exchan3e oo 'Jiews con<-erning it. ...
. .(They J ere confiden that friendly rel3tions and cc;opcratton coulcl be eve oped
bet\vcen these count ies on the basis of mutual respe<:t for each e"(''S inoe;>endencc
and sovereiznty, the promotion of common good, and non-inter{ rcnce in each other's
internal affairs. They were also of the view that such relation :md cooperation would
help create- a sou h Eas Asian community of nation.; in whlc. eve r.atlon would r.e
; free t.o con;:ribute to tl:e orderl:v development and security ()f the region.
[They. al so agrC'ed that as developing nations, t eir two roun ries could derive
much benef't by mutual exchane;e of experiences :i.nd de. :; in the fie d of economic
deve opmcr. '.fhcy therefore decid to inter>s!t:_)_ _2':!_o,!s to this end particularly in the
techm-;:: 0 o:- development implementation. c [empha5is arl<lcar-

'fhe last sc ence held out the possibility of agric ltural coo eratio;i t,etwe
Malaysia and Burma. Malay&ia is proud of it!; rural development p:::-ogram,
and GEN e W n was undoubtedly impressed by w t he SJ .\ on his tour f the
rural development operations center.

During these two visits Ne wn eca 1e acqll3.inted with the Singapore and
Malaysian ead,rs. He invited the king and queen or Malaysa, w no do not have
govcrnmer.:al r:!sponsib ilities, to visit Burma.26 The genral probably xtend d
this invitaon to !: king a. d queen rather U-in to the prime minister in order
to mitigate Peking's anucip-ted criticism or t:w visit. In short, the vo stale
isils did not produce any change in urmese atti de toward participation in
ASEAN, but tley did give GEN Ne Win an opportunity to reiterate, in on of rls
infrequent ublic addresses, Burma's determinahon to maintain Hs n utra
foreign pol.i.:y principles. The visits did ir.dicat hat Burma wa ted to improve
!. cla ons with the ASEA naticns (with ,,;lucl t had had :ew associativns
in the past) without arandoning its neutrality.

I
10

.,'
/
./
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,,

Chapter 3

BURMA'S RELATIONS ; 1 1TH THE ASEAN NATIO 'S

.I A.:) CO.,'!:!UNlST CHINA

Over the years, !)reservation of strict n utra ity and mainten:rnce of

friendly r lations with Communist China have b en importanl ol>jediv :; of
Burmese foreign policy. The dev lopm nt of cxlensi e polilil'al and t1;..de
r 12. ions with Southeast Asian natior:s has not been m.!jot fo1 .:,i.;.,"T1 polic
' objective, and thPre is J;.ttlc p litica or eco omic interaction. (Thi is 1 -
fleeted in the ow intensity of rac. which i iliustratccl in Table B2.) The
five ASEAN nations do not share Burma's for<.'ign policy objectiH,s. (ndonesia

f
is the exception to this statement. It has a neutral foreitr,l pollcy, and, ur.tiJ
the 30 September 1965 coup, Indon sia di m intain friendly relations with
Communi t China.) This difference is r fleeted in the selectiYe nature of
Bur nese partic.:ipation in the internationa organizations that opx>rate in SouU1-
as Asi:i. For ex=:mple, Burma l>elons to U organizations suc-h a s the
Ec.:>non ic Commissic,n for Asia and the Far E?st (ECAFE), the Vo ld l"alli
Organization (Wl!O), and the Colomb Plan, which arP not associated wilh any
particular power b oc. Y t Burma is not a member of the sian l)velc:,pment
Bank (ADB)29 or of any r gional clef nse organiz tion, such as the SouU1east
Asia Treaty Or, mzation (SEA fO) or the Asian-created organi:;:.ations, su h
as .<iA, the now dormant MAPHII.I DO fo. loose associaticn f0rm d by Ma aya,
the Philippin s, and Indonesia), the A ian :md P... uic Council (ASPAC), or
/ ASEAN, which are genenlly supported IJy the Western nations. Burnif se
participation in selected ,: 'rnational organizations illustratf's its inte:e:..,t in
.. some forms of region.!;, J .. perati >n but underlines its reluctance t pa1 !icio?.te
'' in international organ\, ttions that s em to have political' overtones of align
me. t with one or anothvr of lh reat powers. (S e for ex::tmple. in the follc,wing
sec ions on Burma's relations w1th Thailand and 1\1 laysia, the ref renccs to
Burma's reluctance to join ASA I) <'ause.0f ASA's po itil'al" harac:ter.) Other
reasons for Burma's la k f ties with th ASEAN nations are (a) relative simi
larity of export and impor t needs, (b) lack of common :.iltural hcr.tage (except
Th -av.lda uddhlsr.., w 1 .H:, 1urma sh:ir", with Thailand) and (c) pre s:ng
domestic problems. I3ul !!>, :;:. ;,ornts will be seen more clearly as Bur.1ia's
rcl. ,ions ,ith the fi;e ASrA -J nations a;. x ll'l l,l indivi:ually.

11

---- - ------ - - -- - --
 ------ --- --

RELAT o.s WlTH THE ME '1BERS OF ASEA !

Thailand
Burma and Thai lane have h1.d a lor U slor of ant gonism, base<.: on the
desire f urme e a Siame e ru!ers to \..,lhrge their kingdoms. In the
sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centures tt.e Burmese king., frequently
invad d the Kingdom of Siam (Thailand). Fo !owing the Burmese invasion of
1766-1767, the defende s of Ayutth ya, th c:.:.pital or sam, succumbed o a
siege (Re( 30, pp 190-93, 263-64). The subsJquent destruction of Ayutthaya
produced a legacy of Thai hostlii:y toward the B1..rmese (Trger/ ;:> 261).
Subsequently the Yii.n"lan viceroy in acted Burma and halted the Burmese; .:0n
quest of Siamese ter-itory. King Bodawpaya revi\ed Burrr.a's plan to cvnquf:1
sam and invaded that kingdom four times between 1735 and 1802. In. r!y years
of the nineteenth c ntu1y, however, the Burme e people and larll: h,.ame ex
hausted by these effo ls, and Burma abandoned all its claims to Siamesr, terri
tory except T nass (Ref :lO, pp 292-93).
During the British colonia period in Burma {1824-1946j, Thail:l .. d was
fre from Burmese attack and t:oncentratcd on minimizing European colonial
influence in its territory. When t!ie BrUsh cokniai rul of Bur 1a was inter
rupted during World War 11, however, Thai attention returned to Burmese, as
well as to Malayan, Cambodian, and Laotian territory. In early December
1941 the Tha premier agreed to permit Japanese troops to move tl1rough the
kingdom. On 21 December 1941 Thai an and Japan. signed an a l! nee. In 1943
the Japanese gave Thailand cont.rol over two han states i:l Burma and four
states in falaya. Transfer of rn s territory to Thailand was confirmed in a
trea y signed 2 August 1943 (Ref 31, pp 235-37). Shortly :1fter the Japanese
surre,1dered in 1945, the regent of Thailand declared .hat Thailand had "no
desire fa:: t. c territories "' in Burma and Malaya tnat Japan had " ntrusted" to
it c...:1d w s ready to return them in British rule at Great Britain's convenience. 32
On 1 January H' - Thailand signed a peac af,rc..Jment with Great Britain and
dia in wh.ich its acquisition of Burmese and Malayan territory "was declared
null and oid." (quoted in Ref 31, p 238)
Burma and Thailand established diplomaic rehtions in 1948 (Trager/
p 216). n, ring the t950's and 1960's the two nation3 t,ave a tempted to cooperate
ir. two ge eral area : (a) the improvement of bilater.1 1 relations and (b) the
improvement of border security. The Tl:ais have tak,m the initiative in a third
area by attempting to i terest the Burmese in Asian-::.,..Pated regional organiza
ti:ms.
Fi:-st, in regard o bilateral relations, the Burmese made eiforts to mitigate
historic Thai ant:igomsm toward the:11. In Sep ember 1=154 plan" we e made to
open five points along tt.e frontier to improve t!ac! a :d .:ommunications. On
5 Oct r 1954 the Burmese government statt.d t!'"- " .ad "decided to waive
ll war claims against Thailand" because of r,ood rei '.'lS between the two
naon..; (quoted in Ref :n, P!'.I 248- 49). In March 1 5 c; . Tu made a gooJwill
visit o Th2"\and and< iscussed with Thai !c.:( -s lT' :!. t of im roving cultural
and conoc,ic relations. He visited yuttl ., a .md pi ese11ted 1e Thais with
about 20,CJ) toward rebuilding Ayutthaya as a na onal r,,emodal. Premier

12

-------- .--
 Pibul l'eturned to U Nu a check that Burma hd given the Thai gove nmen to
compensate fo1 having accidentally bomb'-'d Th territory during attacks on
the Kuomintang (KMT). Pr mier Pibul vis1 ed Burma in December 1955, more
than a year after Thailand had joined SEATO. Although Burmese of!icia s
eioJght that his regime was too closely aszociated with the West and was un
duly nf;uenced by the US, Pibul's visit did strengthen Burmese-Thai relations.
On 19 July 1956 U Nu stated that relations between Thailand and Burma h d
unever, in the course of our long histories, been as good as they are now."
On 15 October 1956 the Burmese a nd Thais signc :ta treaty of friendship that
de:> 't with consular and diplomatic representation; permitted the nationals
of c<tCh cou try to live work, and travel in t .. other'!> territory; and calied
for the pe:c-.ceful settlement of controversks. ."he two nations also planned to
::o.1clude exti adilion treaties, to broaden cultural and commercial relations,
and to conclude agreement dealing ith consular ano ;:1vigation rights (uotcd
in Ref 31, p 249).
econd. b0rder security was the most seriour; problem between the two
nations bee ... .: the ethnic inscrgents and KMT refugees w ere usin Thai terri
tory Cor sanctuary (Trager,1 pp 115, 262, and discussion of ethnic insurgency in
Chap. 4). In 1953 B urma and Thailand joined w:ih the US and Taiwan to form
a Four-Nation Joint Military Commission that supervised the withdrawal of r
about 7000 KMT troops and dependents to Ta\wan (Ref 6, pp 225-33, and
discussion oi .( T issue in the next section, "Relations with Comm nist Chin "),
roughly half the K!vIT refugees in Burma (Trager ,1 p 116). The remaining
troops decided to stay in Burma (Ref 6, p 231). In 1959 and 1961 the Thais
assisted t .e Burmese military attempb to end the insurgency by closing th
border. A second KMT evacuation in 1961 reportedly lt::ft .roughly 1000 KMTs
in Burma. In May 1963 Thailand and Burma si11ed a border agreement that
created a high gO\ernr :ntal committee with autl10rity to discuss proble c, of
border ecurity, S'JCh as the pursuit of bandits and rebels across he border,
\'lith preliminary noticP of pursu.i.t (Silverstein, L p 166). The agreement has not
ended rebel acthity, but the two nations do cooperate in attempting to stop it.
Thi rd, in regard to regional cooperation, from 1359 tn 1961 the Thais
played an important role in establishing ASA. Thai Foreign Minister Thanat
K:1oman hoped that Burnia would join the organization (Ref 11, p 42). He drew
up a "Preliminary Working Paper on Cooperation in Southeast Asia," which was
sent to Rangoon and other Southeazt Asian capitals (except Hanoi) in July 195' .
The participation of ncutr.il Burma was considered a m"'ans of broadening the
organ1"'. lion's political orientation to include neutral as well as Westt::rn
oriented nations. Adherence to neutrality and the desire to maintain friendly
relations with Communist Chrna (w;_th whom Burma had signed a friendship
and nonaggression treaty in January 1960) were undoubtecly Burma's major
reasons for not joining ASA. Nevertheless, in 1966-1967 Thai and Indonesian
leaders workir.g on preparatio!ls for the est'.lbi shm nt of SEAN hoped that
Burma would join. Indonesian Foreign MinistPr Malik was responsible for
informing Burma of the prop0sals for creatin' ASEAN foee Chap. 2). The
Th,.is 1 rob:>bly thought that an Indonesian, rc.;-i: esenting a natio with a long
hi tory of neutrality, ,.ou. be more succes:' 11: thar. a Thai in persuading
Bu,, ._ to jo. n SZAN.

1:;

___ -------
,....,._,.
 _____
I
..,... _
_..

I
I
Histor!cally, Thai a:1d is the only ASEAN r.ation with which Burma has
had extensive contact. Since World W r 11 ar>d Burmese independence from
Gre Britain, the two natioos have b:iried th ir historical animosity in favcr
of a general commitment to maintain friE:ndly, but not close, relations and to
cooperate on border security probicms. ' he otistence of cordia l relations anJ
some border <.o.peralion, however, has not er,couraged Burma to join such
regional organiz,...-ons as ASA or ASEAN.

Malaysia
Burma gradually de eloped amicable relations with the Fcdcratior. of
Malaya after it bec,.. me ,ndependent in 1957. (In 1963 the Federation \\rs
er.larged to incl d r rapore, Sarawak, and Sabal'I and then became he Federa-
tion of Ma!zysia.) ; Thailand, Malayct attempted to persnaJe Burma to join
ASA. Following ti1.: i.i proposal for regional organization in the summer of
1959, Malaya's Fri: iinistcr Tunku bdul Rahman sent a Jetter lo Burrr.a in
October 1959 errp .1.,1;1.mg the tech ical and economic cooper lion rather tha.1
the politlc2l aspects of the proposed organi2ation. Burma replied that it was
inadvisable for it to participate in such an organization at that time (Ref 16,
pp 167, 170-71). In December 1965 Malaysian Deputy Premier Tun R zak
mad an official visit to Rangoon. Nearly 3 years later GEN Ne Vin made a
state v'.sit to Malaysia (see Chap. 2). Malaysia a:1d Burma have ff'w economic
ties (see Tauie A2), a1t c:.igh Burma c!oes supply Malaysia with a small amount
of rice (see Table BI).

Singapore
From September 1963 to August 196. Singapo,e was part of the Federation
of Malaysia. Burma establ.tshed di.ploma ic relaiions with Singapore after the
latter be-::a.me a separate stat , and in 1S66 Burma elevated its diplomatic
mission in Sin..,apore to ambasis,.dorial level (Ref 33, p 125). :Jntil GE:- Ne Win
made an offi<.ial v it to Shgapoe in April 1968, the two nations had little
contact with each other {see dis,:ussion of this vis1t in Chap. 2). However,
Burmese xport figures sugge:,:: a s;nall export trade to Singapore (see Table
B2).

Indonesia
Burma established diplorratic relations with Indonesia in :..9 9. On 31
March 1951 Burma signed a t1eaty of friendship with Indonesia (Trager,1 p
221). T:lis was t e 'irst treaty Burna signed after becomi g inciependent of
British rule. For many year1, 6th nations have pursued a ne utral foreign
policy. Burma supported Indonesia in its di putes with the Netherlands, and
U Nu generally agreed with Indonesian leaders in Colombo power deliberations
in t:1e 1950's. Jn late pril 1954 Burrnest.. Prime Minister U u was one of the
group of Asian lea ers w:.th whom Indonesian Prime Minis er Ali Sastroamidjojo
spoke abcut holding the Asian-African Co,ifer .nee at Bandu g. Subsequ ntly
urma j ned the ether four Colombo P!::!n mfc'"1 "rs in :iking conference
a r,ngeir.ents in Dogo., Indon sia (Ref :-..1:, pp ... 13, 169-70).

14
 Jn tcrma of bilateral n:lalicns, during Prime M"nister Ali Sas roamidjojo's
Septer.. ber I:9 1 visit with U u i: Rangoon the t..o men advocated lose ties
between Indonesia and Burma . In November 1955 Indonesian VicP.-Pre ideni
Hatta visited Rangoon, and the followinl' October PresidP.nt Sukarno visited
Burma. In 1955 the Burmese gov rnment donated 100 tons 0f rice to Indonesia
to aid flocd victims. In ace pting the gift U1e Indonesikn Fureign r. ini::;ter spove
of the " 'close bonds of sympaty and mutual understanding' between the two
cou tri .- " (Ref 31, p 154) Over U1e years, Ir.donesia has been a steady ricf
customer .::,f Burma (see Table Bl l.
Burmese relations wit: Indonesia have genenlly been p;ood, but there
have been some differences. For cx.1mple, the Bur ncse press was very
critical of 1n,:onesia's use of force to pursue the Confrontation with .Malaysia
and criticizPrl Indonesia's '.l.ithdrawal from the U . Some neutralist news
papers stated that the UN could not solve very pro lem but that it was the
"only world body that can prevent an outbreak of fresh fire in ,.ie world."
(Quoted in Trager, 1 p 260 ) One newspaper :!dvised Indonesia to remain in the
UN and to fight '"for what sne belie ,es." (Quoted in Tra er/ p 260 )
However, the official end of Confrontation on 11 August 1966 and improvin.,
r lations among Indo,1esia, . falaysia, and the Ph...li pine!; \L;efore tile renewal r
of F hilippine-Malaysian tensions in 1068) see 1ed to increase the pro"pe< for
closer Bunr.ese-lndonesiar. elations. As rr.entioned earlie,, Indonesian
Foreign Ministi:r Malik visited Burma. in 1967 to sound out GEN Ne Win about
Burmese participation in ASEA . Since tha time, h0we er, there has been
little evi.dence of increased contact between the two nations.

Philippines
ln '.956 the Union of Burma accredited its ambassaJor in nangkok to the
Philippines, and the Philippines gave a reciprocal rcsj)onsibility to is ambas
sacior in Thailand (Ref 31, p 219). Burma was enc c..,f several nations that
Philippine Pr sidPnt Quirino (19 8-1953) c nsu!ted about forming an Asian
regrnnal organization, wh1ch he hop d the 3 wo d join c-r surport. 3s Alth::;ugh,
s menlioned in Chap. 1, rmese cabinet members sou ded out US officials
in the summer o( 1949 abot;t Bu;:-mese-US security arrangement&, the Burmese
ambassador was not interested in the proposals m' de to him in early 1 49 by
the Philippine ambassador to the US, Carlos Romulo. P erhaps this w:.s
because the US State Depar ment sePm d unrnthusiastic aboqt the Philippine
proposals (Ref 35, p 148). . oreover, Q irino was undecided wheth er lne
proposed organization should ha\re culti.ITal. political, economic, or military
goals. As Quirino'3 ideas changed between 1949 and 1952, his ideas about he
proposed memb rs changed. He did not consider neutral Burma a potential
member of a security organization (Ref 35, pp 156-58), and B11rm2, afte la.e
summer 1949, ,as no interested in Joining any association of Asia.11 states.
Wi . he t?: eption of this issu , neither n;-,' >:t paid ;nLch attention to the policies
of the other. Apart from som ,.ade and the exchange of a few high-lev l visit.;;.
_ut .. 1.s V1ce--Presid nl ,fa r apagal's visil t-.. .3'1i::oon in I ov..mber 1960, this
situ.,tion has not change.d sin._e 1956. (St,c T.:ble 132 ior statisti s n r ent
Phillppine-Bur!Uese tradE:. J

15

 - l

During official visits an I on the accre.iilatio. of ambassadors, Burmese

and Philippin( leaders have expressed hope for fr' endship and cooper tion
bet'wGen their nations. Whe the iirst resident Burm ,se ambassador was
accredited to the Ph:.lippines in 1962, Presiden Macapagal (1961-1965)
observed tbat "the coml!lon heritage of freedom shared by .he Union of Burma
and the Philippines... constitute(s J or.e> of the strongest bonds between our
two peoples. " 38 Tese sentiments were repeated in 1967 when President
Marcos received the credentials of muassador U Ba Sel.n. Preside.1t M, 'cos
said that increased Philippine-Burmes. cooperation was in the interest of tne
two nations and the region. Althogh the pr sident dhi nut specify any type of
1
cooperation, he said it would "challeng our goodwill and imab'inalion." These
expressions of goodwill have not been followed by proposals for cooperatio'l
and incrE>ased ties between th two nations.
To sum up, apart from dip omatic recognition, some cooperation !l'truu5
UN agmcie , C.:ilombo Plan ac-ti ities, and limited trade, Burma's association
with the ASEAN nations have been confined lar5ely to <!xpress'Jns of gooctw1ll
and hope for cooperation in unspecified areas. The on y e: ception to this
generality has been the common interest in border security with Thailand.
However, for fear of antagonizing Communist Chin<'., Burma cannot afford to
take the initiative in establishing closer relations with Tnai:and.

RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

tinc1.: recognizing the CPR on 16 De em er 1949, Burma bas attempted

to remain independent of Communist Chinese domination and to a,oid antag
onizing the CPR. Yet over the years the Burma-C. i.na b6rdcr dispute and the
Cultural Revolution have c.:.used crises in Burma's relations with Communist
China.38 For examrle, from 1949 to 1!'54 Pe! ing s1l)ported internal insurrec
tion in Burma. By late 1952, how:?ver, Burmt:.se government attempts to end
tht irisurgent activities began t) succeed, and Burmese fe;ir of CPR subversive
activity de reased, though it d not end (see Chap. 4, section "Communist arid
EUinic Insurgency"). Tcns,on betv;een Burma and China develope ove:" the
KMT issue after fr.e CPR for ed several thousand N tionalis.t Chi 1ese troops
into Burma in 1950. Buth nations feared that these troops might piay an

I
important part in the NationaJ..ist ChinE.-se efforts to regain control of ainland
Chi a {Ref 39, pp 312-13). In 1953, as mentioned earlier, Burma jo 1ed the
U.'.-, Thailand, and the Repub ic of China in fonning Joint Military Commission

I (un<!er UN auspices) that rranged th airlifting of some 7000, or roughly half,

I--'
of th KMT troops and their dependents to Tai.van t, July 1954. Although
Communist Chh:i told U Nu that it considend-the K.V1T issue an internal
Burmese prb: .m, the CPR dispatched tro ps to Du ma, ostensibly to rout tJie
K?. T units {Ref S, pp 225- 3), between 952 and 195'7 (Trager/ pp 240-4 ,
413; Hinton, 39 p 313).
The communi't 1.1 i signed by Chou En-!ai and U Nu in Rangoon in .Tune
?954 ushered n the Sino-Burmes er_ of peacef I coc. istence. (Ref 6,
pp 166-79. T!"le commw1ique's principles included mutual respect for each
other's soverf'Jf,nty and territorial in, grily, nonaggrE.;sion, n ninterfernc.!
1 in internal afLirs, mutual benefit and qua:Hv. and peaceful coexistnce.)

Hl

-._
 BeforP 1960 the Bmma-China border dispute was lhe only major issue that
thr at.:ned Burmc e scrurity. In Or .obe r 1954 U Nu (acting as ,1 private citiz n
and friend) met Chou En-lai in Pekhi to discuss the border dispute. In ,July
1957 Pre1 ier Cho En-lai made a speech outlining the CPR position on the
border settlement. [The Chinese agreed to accept the 'customary boundary
line" and r quest d sov reignty m0:r Kangfang, Gawlum, and Hpimaw (Kachin
settlements near the Hpimaw Pa1>::: :rnd i.'le rctu . 0f sovereignty over the
Namwan Assigned Tract (Ref 3f, p '314). The Namwan Assigned Tract is a
small area soulheast of hamo, Burma, that was ceded by China o Great
Britain in pe1petuity under the 1897 ,uiglo-Chinese Convention (Ref 39, p 30Sj.)
In late 1959, ,hen t.'!e it10-Indian bor er tension was inrl'easing, the CPR
became intere ted i:1 s ttling the Bu mese border di::riute. Interest was
apparently based, in part, on a desir? to aliPnate the neural Asian nations
from India. GEN Ne Win and Chou En-lai signed the Sino-Burmese Boundary
Agrtment 011 28 January 1960. In the final boundary settlement the CPR gc, ve
the Namwan Assigned Tract to Burma, and the CPn gained sovereignty over
Ll-te Panglung-Panglao tri al area (R f 39, J 315).} After a joint survey team
gan demarc, Ung the border, the Boundary Treaty betwee:1 the CPR and the
Union of Burma was signed in Pekini; on 1 October 1960 (Ref 40, pp 188-201).
Although the KMT troops remain d on the border, CPR forays followed by a
Burmese Army offen iv against hem in 1960 and 1961 seem to have Pliminated
their security threat (n f 39 p 316).
Ne Win and Chou En-1:li a!so sir;ned the Sino-Durmese Treaty of Fri ncJ
ship and Mutual Nori-Aggr ssion on 28 January 1S60 {Ref 40, pp 55--56; see
App A for text of treaty). This treaty was signed at the begin:1ing of the anti
Khrushchev period of CPR fo eign policy (1960-196 ) a11d was partly designed
to prevent inc eased Soviet influence in Burma (Ref 39, p 41). On 9 January
1961 the Sino-Burmese Economic anc TE::chnical Cooperation Agreemen and
the Sino-Burr.1ese P. ym nt Agreemer t werP s: gned, and on 27 January the
ino-Burmese Trade Agreement wa::. signed {Ref 40, pp 341-48). Burma en
joyed a longer period of peaceful coexistence (Hl54-1966) with Communis
China than some other Asian n lions did 1:-rgdy ecause Commu.'1ist China s
pecific differen es with Bu ma were less serious than those with olhe
nations.
In April 1966, just as the Cultural Revolu ion broke out in China, President
Liu Shao-Chi and Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited Burma. A few months later
U1e Burrr>ese neutralist policy began to lose its pro-Chinese orientation as GEN
e Win made stale visits to the US and to India ar,d Pakistan.
From Hl67 to U1e present, Burma' relations with the CPR have serioui-ly
deteriorated. In March 1967, after lengthy consua2tions in Peking, lhe CPR
charge d'affair s return d to Rangoon, accomp,mied by several Burmese 0v r
.. seas Chir.ese who had apparently been trained in the CPR as agita ors. In June
1967 serious CPR-Burmese tension dew!loped as a result of what became
J...11own as the Mao badge incidents. On 22 June some Chinese students in
/ Rangoon went to I ss wearing Mao badges despite the prohibition on political
propaganda in the schools. Burmese students attack d the Chinese, and a
moh broke .i.nto the CPR Embassy (P 7, p 754). Burmese students in Mand?. 1 -iy,

..,
I

\I It
I

- -- ---- -
 - Magwe, Bassein, and other communities held demonstrations to protest the
Red Guard attack on the Burmes(:l emb ssy in Peking. 41 In many communities
Overseas Chinest! marched in support of the Ne Win government.
42
Suppo1 t
for t he government, as probably greater than at any other time since ihe 1962
coup. The CPR sPr.t Burma a number of harsh diplomatic notes. On 3 July
. ,. 1967, for the firt time, Peking publicl supported the While Flag Burmese
Communists "as a 'true liberation movemen . '" (Ref 7, pp 754-55; Ref 8, pp
15-16)
On 14 August 1967 the CPR CommunLt Party Central Committee broadcast
a mes3age, calling for the overthrow of the :-Je Win gmernment, that it haJ
sent tu a White Flag leader. GE e in re<:allcd the ambassador and students
/ ' from the CPR.43 In October lhe Burmese broke the 1961 economic agreement
with China and ordered the Chinese technicians in CPR-financed economic
dev lopment projects and c ...R embassy dependents to be out of the COl'ntry by
the end of tliat moo th. Since that time the Ch nese have waged a prop::iganda
attacl< against the Ne Win government. The Burmese neutrality policy and
eU0rts to maintain cordial relations with Pel.ing did not revent U1e CPR from
calling for the o,erthrow of the Ne Win governm nt. AlthoJgh the main thrust
of Bur:na's policy is to avoid antagonizing Peking, Burma is willing to take some
positive steps to improve rel tions with P kin. Following th visit of the
Chines charged affaires to national hero Aung San's grave, Burmese govern
ment officials attended t:1e CP National Iny cele!lralion in October 1968.
During January 1969 GEN Ne Win discussed normalizing Si.no-Burmese rela
tions with Chinese iplomats in Pakistan. Unfortunately, subseque11t negotia
tions for amnesty fo Overseas Chinese in1..olvcd in Urn 1967 antigovernment
riots in Rangoon failed. This apparently incited Peking to renew its support
for the Communist ins.rgents.H However. eking's public su port for White
Flag Communist activities has not yet brought about llie reunification of llie
Burr.1ese Communist movem nt, greatly increased Communism's appeal to
Burman peasants, or resulted in the development of a viable White Flag
Communist coaliton with one or more of the ethnic insurgent groups. 4 $ How
ever, the CPR policy toward Burma combined with er.:onomic an<l insurgency
problems might in llie ong run precipitate &:e downfall of the Ne Win :,overn
ment

.!

.!

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18

-
"'
 I
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---

C apter 4

INTERNA" cc,NSTR 'TS 0. PARTICIPATION

l IN hEGIONAL ORGANIZATION!::>
I

ln ad ition to its policy of maintaininv cordial relations with China, two

domestic factors inhibit Burma fr m Joi.ii g ASEAN. Burmese capacity to
participate in such an organization is limited by economic deterioration and
Communist and ethnic insurgency. At this time, resolving domestic crises
clearly t kes p1eceden e over u1 dertaking new fo eign policy co unitmcnts,
such as participation in ASEAN, and no solution for these internal problems is
in sight.

ECONOMIC DETERIORATIO

Background
When it became independent, Burma was an agricultural nath.m and a
major world rice exporter. The A FPFL leaders held primarily socialit
ideas and were C".lmmittcd to creatin-; a we fre tate in a parliamenai.ry
48
dem0cracy. In the early years the Burmese had some success in implement
ing a long-ranee economic development program that they hope would result
in industrialization and Burmese control of the econcmy. Ho ever, the Burmese
politi al leader., were not economists, and the disinclination of the politi<-al
leadership to implement sound economic dvice was U1e most serious of -3everal
problems that hindered economic planning and development. 1hey !ailed to
delegate autho ity and respon-ibility for conomic activity. In addition, they
permitted the lower ranks of the AFPFL party to interfere with public adminis
tration. Mor over, the political leaders had a number or mis..:oncep ons about
economic planning that still plague the economy. Th se inciude the beliefs
that (a) administrative systems that have fu.'1ctioned under colonial government
can function adequately in an ostensibly welfo e-o iented society, (b) economic
development i easy, (c) governmental inefficiency and nepoti m are unrelated
to economic growth, and (d) d1scri ination a hst ethnic minorities will not
damag_ the economy.
The Burmese became impatient witll the lea<iership's exc1 ses for lack of
eronor ic de elopmcnt and ref se to ac ept its ,.ssurances I.hat past errors
in economic pl?1mi11g and implement 0:1 ,o'..! d be co rected 'Ref 4, p;: 56 ( 8).

l ()

Y- ,.__..,. _____

- --- ----------- .......... --- ----- ------

 ,-

.r
,'I
I
, .-

One of the m, ' n reasons !or the r.1ilita::-y s asuming po er in 958 was that it
sensed this mood in the nation. The Caretaker Government did bring some
efficiency and rational decision making o public problems and succeeded in
implementing a number of economic' projects that. the A PFL government had
en unable to implement. Although it 1.:rea ed an emirooment of achiev ment,
the government also created an envirc1rnent of fear. Oilicials prohibited
criticism and dissent anJ were v ry '.ll't gonislic toward non-Burmans, particu
larly the Indi:>ns. Minorities cng ged m trading and manufacturing were faced

/' I vith repressive government m asu1 cs tl:at inhibited pri ate investment and
limited the contri uticn of minorities to national economic devel pment (Ref
46, pp 314-1'/).
The B urmese public welcomed the return or civilian government unc'er
Premier U Nu. t.i ,fortunately U Nu did not fulfill his p omises to correct past
errors in economic policy implementation. His cabinet appointees were weak
and ineffetive ::nen, and the proposed Four-Year Deve opment Plan never go
off the grcund (Ref 4, pp 5'74-76). Economist Louis Walinsky, a hm-gtime
student of B1rmcse economic conditions, ccmcluded that:

It w as ... doubted ... whether their desire for devekpment had ever been strong
enough to met the pr(ce that dev :opment demanded in tough, determine<! effort an in
the deg-.ee to which conflicting desires for Burmanization, fo mtionalization and for
taklng the easier rather tltn th harder road would have to be accommodated to the
dev lo ment goal. [ Ref 4, p 577 J

The military watched the foundering civil government, w ting for circum
st;.;,-:es to d velop in which they could justifiably seize power and aboli h civil
government. After GEN e Win establistuid th Revolutionary Council in 1962,
h.: institutE:c\ the "Burmese Way to Socialism. {Rei 46, p 320) 1n order to
implement Burmese socialism, the government naticnalized nearly 11 privat
business and abo ;shed alie ownerhip of ban s. Only f rming and small
I
' indigenous trade a.,d manufacturing operations remained outside the publc
sector (Ref 4, p 321). As one Westem brver wrote. the basic cause of
Burma's eccnomic prob!ems now is the "Burmese Way to Socialism":
... which the citizens aren' permitted to oppos , [it. is b3sro on the highly dubious
assumption that enough rer,rulations and high-toned D"'oraliziog c:..n eliminate tht: more
Ignoble traits of uman nature, such as greed, selfi hness, anrl ,ulgar materialism."
This belief in the perfectibility of mankind has roots in both Buddhism and Marxism.
- :.: two philosophies favor d here (though internal government polic_, is stoutly anti
communist). owever one might wish the thcorv were valid, mos ouf.,ide.!S assert it
ls a fraile foundation up n whic to construct an economic vste::n. [\ 'all Street
Journal; emphasis added]

Like the civil government, the military government has failed to provicle
effective econo :.c lead rship, as the following brief examination of the eco
nomic situation helps to illustrate.

Facts and Figur s

From 1961-1962 to 1966-1967 the population of Eurma increased 13.3
percent but ag icultural Ol'tput increabt:d only 6 perc1::nt. During 'the same perioc:

20

----
 there was an 11.9 percent increase in the potcntia labor force. Per capita
income decreased from 315 kyats in 1965-1966 to 310 kyats in 1966-1967
(4.75 kyats =US$1).47'48 Government cor.trols had en removed from 32
ssenL1l trade commodities in SPpterr.ber 1966, and in 1967 the prices of those
terns we e still 4(10 to 500 percent abov the precontrol prices.H During the
1964-1966 period, Burmese trade dtc in . !n 164 exports totaled US220.185
million; in 1965 exports declined to U$203.973 million; and in 1966 export5
ven further, to USl75.350 million. In the same period, 1964 imports were
S$226.632 million; in 1965 imports declined to US!21C.615 million, and in
JQ/36 imports declined to US$135.933 million (see Table B2).
The budget for I 967-1968 had a surplus on paper, largely because of
foreign Joans. However, agricultural pr ductioa, !ndustnal output, per capita
.. production, trade, and total prod11ction decreased (see T::.blc 1). Agricultural
/ a d related industries account fo about r-c percent of Burma's gross do10es:ic
product.* In 19S7 the scarcity of rke caused food riots in at leas 20 town
that are normally "rice-rich. " 4 pparently the main reason for the rice
shortage is the lack of incentive f r the peasants to sell rice to the govtrnme!lt
a low fixed prices.49 The government is the rmly !egal purchaser of rice, but
this year the go,:ernment has been abl<' to obtain only about .iO percent of the
amount of rice it normally buys frc,m the farmers. AlUiough troops have been
dispatched to the vil!ages to locate the rice, they have not always fOWld it.
(;-Vall Street J ou.cnal ).

TABLE 1
1965-1966 and 1966-1967 Pt:!rcentage Decreases
in Som. Types of Production
frr-m the 1964-1965 level 0
Ty;.,e of product ion 1965-1966 1966-1967

Totul production 2 3
,\gricohural produ tion 9 1/
Trade 11 12
Industrial output 4 I
l'cr cs?ita production 5 8
8
11ascd 011 1%8 Fnr '. stern [conor.iic llc,ic" Yearbook"
p 12-1.

In short, a though the Ne Win government has succeeded in giving thl?

Burmese contro! over the economy, industrialization has not gr atly ad, anced

*Although gross nat;onal rO<luct and gross domcs:ic product arc occaslc.ially
used iotcrchangcably, thc.y do not have the same m0anin. O;i the one hand, gross
national product includes gross domestic product E_lus net mvestm nt income received
abroad less net investment income paid abroad. On the other hand, gross domestic
,. ocluct i., a more accurat:- int:cx of the markc. value of tr,e natl(,n's total production
(Ref 4 7, p 124).

21
 and the agricultural sector of the economy has deteriorated. Undoubtedly
/ some Revolutionary Council members may l:::e uneasy about co.,Unu l economic
deterioration, but to date there is no indication of planv to change economic
policy (Wall Street Joumal 9 ).

COMMUNIST AND ETHNIC INSURGENCY

Since independence, instrgency has t'"r atened Bu mese political

stability. From 1943 until the early 1950', the Red Flag and Wr.itc Flag Com
munists, the Peop e's Volunteer Organizafon (PVO), Karen and Mo. nationalists,
f and i,:ome army units were engaged in armed revolt against the government
/ (Silverstein,' p b8). The non-Communist Burmans, who ominate political life,
have been unable to work out satisfactory political relations with the minorities
and most of the Burmese Communists. Several etlu1ic groups have demanded
separate states and special governmental privil ges from the national govern
ment, and most of the Burman Communists tl:e Red Fl2zs and the White Flags)
are ccnductin insurgent activities to overthrow the unic:.. government.
Perennial obst?::les to pacification of the rebel. :ndude (a) rugged
terrain, which permits insurgents to seek safety in the jungles and remote
villages; (b) moosoons from June until Octobe , which ma.<e launching military
attacks very diffi-::ult; {c) lack of men and materiel; (d) ;neffe:tiver.ess of amnci,ty
offers and fai! ,.e to develop so ution to ethnic political demand; and (e) govern
mental inabilitv t<.J maintain law and order (Tr:iger/ pp 116-17). Howe er, the

- insurgents have not yet succeeded in overthrowing the government, chiefly be

cause (a) the minvrit'es have some differences among themselves, (b) Hi mi
nority and CommWlist groups ha e not coordinated their activities to a signifi
cant extent, (c) the Burn1an Communists h e bCi.en unsuccessful in obtaining the
mass support of Burman peasants, {d) none of the insurge.tcs has obtainl' sig
nificant foreign t;upport {Ref 8, p 15), nd (e) to some exttn tbe Burmese Army
has been increasingly successful in its anti-insurgent activitie . so Nevertl1elccs
the insurgency remains a sP.rious and complicated security probem.
For example, a loose alliance exists between the fni te Flag Communists
and some elements of the Karen National Dcfense Ori;anization ilie han National
Libt?ration Army, and the Kachin Indepen ence Army. Tnat allia ce apparently
has not been p Utically or militarily effective because of antagonism be wcen the
Burman Communists and the ethnic groups a-d because of differences in ideol
ogies and goals. 51
Moreover, ince the spring cf 1967 the White Flags, formerly led by Thakin
Than Tun, have emselves been internally divided over the issue of continuing
revolution. Senior pa..ty members accusd of "revisionism" Md even some
young militant members ha e been purged {Re! 7, p 753, Ref 52). During is
cl ar,tic r,e iod, on 3 July 19S7, the Chinese Communists made theiI fint public
?.nnouncement of suppoxt for the true liberation movement" of the White Flags
(Ref 7, p 754). Soon after, in early 1968, a new attempt at multiethnic insurgent
org- :i.zatio , called the Northeast Comm::n:'1, be . an operat gin the Kachin and
Shan :.tates contiguous to the Ylinnan border. The command is led by Naw Seng

22

----------------- -- ------
 (longtime Burmese Kachi'l rebel) and is re!)Ortedly composed cf Kachin.s,
Shans, and other ethnic group -incluling ir.ese. The objectives of this
group and its relation to the Chinese Communists and the Wnite Flag Com-
m nists are unclear. 'fhe command is fighting in the b order area, over which
Rangoon has never had firm military control and in which Rangoon is anxious
to avoid clashes with the Communist Chl11cse.2 Mean !tile, in September 1968,
the White Flag purges culminated ir, t,i:. murder of Th, kin Than Tun by one of
his young followers.' At tile time of 'tu.i.n Tun's deatJ1, ,1lite Flag terrorist
activities were alienating formerly loyal vi!lages.
By the end of 1968 the loss of the White Flag fo nd r and leader, the
White Flag tenorism, and the unpublicizeu government policy of pac ifyi11g the
border minorities had demoralized the strongest of Burma's insurr,ent groups
but had not dest oyed tl,em. 52' i Insurgency continues, and gencr, dissatisfac
tion w ith the Ne Win regime's failure to m,ti:ltain law and order and to reverse
economic deterioration mlght vitiate governmental appeals to national unity if
either the insurgency or the economic situa.tion should cause a national crisis.

I
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23
 Chap!er 5

BURMA, COMMUNIST CHINA, AND ASEAN

The examination of Burma's atti ude toward ASEAN has shown that the
nation has hd bood foreign and domestic policy r asons for not participating
in ASEAN. For nearly two decades, Burma's concern for the preGervation of
its neutrality and its desire to maintain cordial relations with Communist
China have gr a ly influenced its policy toward its Asian neighbors. Recent
deterioration of relations with Commist China has not yet convinced Ne
Win that Burma should abando:i its neutral foreign policy. China & "anti-Ne
Win" policy has been pursed larg::ly through propaganda. Since the spring of
1968 the Burme&e have refrained from accusinf; Peking of supporting Burmese
in urgency. 55 Froin the Burmese viewpoint this restraint is probably designed
!
to achieve three objectiv s: (a) to pr vent an increase n Chines antagonism,
(b) to prevent the CPR from abrogating he Burma-China bJrder treaty, and
(c) to prevent China from sending troops into Burmese territory to support
J
insurgents on the Burma-China border, possibly on the pre ext of quelling
alleged KMT activities (see previous discussion of this possibility in Chap. 3).
Peking is undoubtedly aware of Ne Win's severe econ mic problems and may I
I
think that the continuation of its present militant policy toward Burma will
eventually contribute to the overthrow of the 1 e Win government.
i
I
There are no likely circumstances under which the Union of Burma would
participate in ASEAN. Peking's interpretation of an attitude toward Burmese
policy is an important factor in all the following considerations: First, since
Communist China o;>poses the existence of ASEAN, it would oppose Burmese
participation in ASEAN. Second, none of the ASEAN nat:ons has good relations
with Communist China, and each, except Indonesia, has subst1.ntial economic
and political ties and past associaUons with the US and Gre.it Britain. Third,
some of the ASEAN leaders have spoken publicly about a future militar role
for ASEAN, which might convert the association into a -:ollcctive defense
alliance, and BurmP.se partici;1ation in such an al iance would violate its
nonaggr::?ssion treaty with Communist China. Fourth, Burma has never had
close economic or political relations vith any of rhe ASE/u'l' nations, and
nothing ha!3 occurred recently to persuade Burmese leaders that membership
in ASEAN would produce benefits substantial enough to offset the liabilities
inherent in membership. Perhaps ooly a major shift in China's policies and
attitur::?3 could a tcr Burma's views on ASEAN membership, and few if any
signs point to such a Chinese shift. In the foreseeable future, therefore, Burma
mu : 'p discot:nted from ASEAN consideraton..

24
 . .. . -----------------.

APPENDIXES

A. Text of "Tr" ty of Friends ip an Mutut.il Ncn-Aggrnasion betv..'tton

the Union of Burma rmd tho Peoplo's Re ublic of Chin " 26

B. Burmeso Trade Statstics 28

Tables
BI. Burmese Ric Exports: Percentage Distribution to
Selected Nations, 1960-1965 28
B2. Burmese Trade with ASEAN Mc berr and Other
Selooted ati.:>ns, 1964-1965 29

25

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 ," -

Appendix A

TEXT OF' TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL KON-AGGRESSION

BETWEEN THE UNION OF BURMA AND THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA"*

January 28, 1960

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the
Union of Burma,
Desiring to maintain everlasting peace a.'1d cordial friendship between
the Peopl's Republic of China ancl the Union of Burma,
Convinced tl1at t.'le Btre11gthening of gocxl neighbourly r lations and friendly
co-operation between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Burma is
in accordance with the vital in erests of both countries,
Have decided for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty in accordance
with t:l1e Fi e Principles of peacefu coexistence jointl:,r initiated by the two
countries, and have agreed as follows:
Article I
The Contracting Parties recognize and respect the independence, sover
ign rights and territorial integrity of each oilier.
Artie e II
There shall be everlasting peace and cordial friendship between fue
Contracting Parties who undertake to settle all disputes between them by
means of peaceful negotiatio without resorting to force.
Article liI
Each Contracting Party undertakes not to carry out acts of aggression
against tile otller and not to take part in any military alliance directed a inst
the 0ther Cootracting Party.
Article IV
The Con racting Pai ties declare that they will develop and strengthen the
econ , ic and cultural ties between the two sates in a spirit of friendship and
co-opPratio , in accordance with the principles of equality and mutual benefit
and o mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

From Dc"uments on China's Relations w1 h South and South-Ea.,t Asia (1919-1962).40

p 55-So.

I 26
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 Artic!e V
Any difference or dispute arising out f the interpretati0n or appllcation
of the present Treaty or one or more of ils articles sh 11 be settled t):.r n"go
tiations through the ordinary diplomatic channels.
Article VI
(1) The present Treaty is subject to ratification and the instrcments cf
ratification will be exchangPd in Rangoon as soon as possible.
(2) The present Treaty will come into force immediately on the exchruige
of the instruments of ratification and will remain in fore for a period of te
years.
(3) Unless either or t.he Contracting l rties giv s to the other rvtice in
writing to terminate it at least one year before t.'le expiration of this period,
it will remain in force without an? specified time limit, subjP.ct to the right of
either of the Contracting Parties l I terminate it by giving to the other i.
writing a year's notice of its intention to do so.
In witness whereof the Prmer of the Sate Collllcil of the People's
Republic of China and the Prime Minister of the Union of Burm }1ave signed
the pres.::nt Treaty.
Done in duplicate in P king on the 28th day of Jariuary 1960, i:1 the Chinese
and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.
I .
For the Government o the People's For Jte Government of the Union of
Republic of China: Bu.ma:
(Signed) Chou En-Lai (Signed) Ne Win

?.7
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BURMESE TRADE STATISTICS

-.
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-, TABLE BI
Burmese Rice Exports: Percentog e Distri\ution lo Sel cted Notions ,
1960-1965
Country 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
\ Mainland China 1.0 23.1 5.3
Indonesia 28.9 2.o 20.4 _0.2 22.8 5.4
V.est lalaysia (including
Singapore) 5.5 5.3 7A 6.9 3.9 7.3
Phili pints 0.9 7.2 6.7 21.0
ECAFE t tal 83.2 85.3 66.8 78.2 73.l 72.2
Non-ECAFE tot 16.8 14.7 33.2 '.ll .8 26.9 27.8
,,,-.,.,
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 )00.0 100.0

- . 8 8ased on Economic Survev of A!'ia nd the Far f...,st. 11)(,,,i, !d p 176.

brcrccnlagc d'strbu:ion \<88 d rived fror., quant:ty in.Jc, cathcr than .1 value index.

: -

:..

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I

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 --.._ :...

. .. :.. -

-: - ;'
1.
__... .._
TABLE 82
Burmei.e Trade with ASEM1 Members on1I l)tt,e-r Selected Notions,
1964-1966
(In thousands of US dollo 0)

Exp .ts Imports

.\:"
I I I I
Covntry
' 1965b l965l, 1966' 1964b 1965b 1966"
::_.. . .\.....
ASEAN Hmhttr&

,. - . Indonesia 3'.c.4'.?-l 8.022 8.799 _d _d _d

I "laysia 10.33 7, 18'.? 2,982 4.095 2.:is_
5.27!
-:---
, Philippines
Singapore
9.95-1
3, i59
:\0,933
5.040
3,<l.41
8,013
_d
_d
_d
_d
_d
_d
t0
Thllil"d _e _e _c _d _J _d
. " l
.-/
T ta! 56,-190 Sl.177 23.268 S.271 4,095 2,352
-- 1: /
Othu llotiona

Communist China '.6,758 18.732 15.750 31.79-1 27,594 10,437

India 18.35-1 23,037 ,l.l,982 15.-177 12,411 5,019
us _e _c _e _S."'. 16,!'.lR 1i;.aoo
USSR 16.800 13,503 399 "f. 7, l-10 5,M9
Total 51,912 5:i.272 61,131 : .871 63,693 37,905
Worldwidtt

Toto! 220.185 20.'l,973 175,:150 .632 216,61 135.933

"The ligurcs on Burmese lrJdc with S[ \;\ nation \\Crc d:eri,cd lrom the 1%,t and I 9 11 47

rcnrbools ol the Far Eoslrm :eononiic llt'\'iew. Tl,c ,Iulo of t"e rea,bool..s arc expressed i11
lo,al tut'1'ency, Burmese 1..)als, "hicl, lin\'C been I anslatrd h,,e iot<- dollar. The exchange
role used originalerl in the Finnnt'ial Thie,; (London).'7 The licial ml< ul exrhongc "')'
diverge from Lhe fr('mark l rate. Time limilations pr("vcntt'd <"a.lcul ... ti n or a mor 1 ul:sti
rnle of exchange. Hot, of cxrhunge u.. cd: l L )' al - \:SS0.21
bFigurrs obtainrd from 1968 Far :astrn Economic !!Hie" , earbook. 47 p 126.
cFigurE"s obtained from )Q.j9 F,ir r11. tern E,on mi< llevie" Y,nrbook.ll p 118
dN,gligiblc. not one ol t!\e 15 princi al sources of llurn1,,.,: imports.
p
:>iegli ible. nol one I the 19 principal recipients of Burm<-e export.

'

,_

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----

------........
--
': . --

---'
--.;::-.
.-..

--- L
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. ,
,'
.- .:'"
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 REFE f' 'CE ANO NOTES
..-
1. Josef Sil erstein, '"Burma," in George McTurnan Kahin (cd), Governr.,ent.s Q
Politics of Southeast Asia, 2d cd, C r ell ru,ersi y Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1964,
j' pp 75-179. U Nu I a Prine Mlll.ister of Burma from 19 July 1947 (beginning

---
during the Provisional Government .riod before independence, 4 .T.u:uary 1918)
until 28 Oct er 1958, except for iO days in 1948 when he resigned aDtl about 9
months in !956-1957. Frank N. Trager, Burma from Kinom to Rlic,
Frederick . Praeger, Inc., ew Yor 1966, p 107.
2. _3.:'>llgfQ _ros 28 Feb 68.
J. Ch:l_f!!.ian Scienfon.itor, 30 Sep 68.
4. Lou.is J. \\ nsk,', Econ?mic ent in Burma, l!.151-1960, Twentieth Century
Fund, !.nc., 'ew Y.:>rk, l 62, p 566.
5. This document, the Bo Letyn-Fre man Defense Agreem nt, was anne.,ced to the 17
October 17 Independence Treaty be pen tile Uu.ite<i Killlr,dom and th Provis"onal
Government of Burma.
6. William C. Johnstone, !3urmas Foreign Policy: A St!!::!Y_in Neutralism, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1963.
7. John H. Badgley, "Burma's China Cr.._sis: The Choices Ahead," Asian Sun,ey,
Vil (11): 753-61 (Nov 6 ).
73.. For one intferpretation of 1967 development!. in Sino-Burmese relations see Melvin
Gurtov's r ntly prl:>Jished 'tudy, "Tbe .foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in
:--- Ci:una's 'Cultural Revolu ;on,' RM-5 34-PR, the RAND Corporation, Santa Moaica,
Calif.. Mar 69, pp 37-49, 81-8 3.
.... .._--: 8 For more than io year tbe Burmese Coromt:llists have been divide<! into three
groups: Lbe insurgent Re<l Flags, the insurgent White Fiags, and those wi10 have
- -,
.- I
.. participated in legitimate political ac tie in various politic p:irties. Personal
ambition and rivalry rather than ideological differences have prob::bl accounted
for the failure of the Red ru:id \ 'bi FJ;,,..gs to coordinate their activities. The Hoo
Flags, a mu smaller group and ess ell orgru,ized than th White Flr-gs, are
divided from the other Burmese teflist groups. The Whi e Flap aJvocatc tltc r vo
!

::
the USSR=-
lutionary docrine of Mao Tse-lung nd the alignment of Burma with e CPR l'.gainst
the West. lloward l\I. Federspiel and Kathryn E. Rafferty, "Prospects
for Rcgio=l lilitary Cooperation in Southcast Asia, RAC-TP-3 4, R.-search An ysls
........
Cooperation.. Jau 69. NCLASSIFIED
9. Discussion t itl:t Mi. Carl Taylor, D.?pt o! State, Jul 68; Wall Street Jo 'l= 16 Sep 68.
10. 'ew York Ti'lles, 21 far 68 .
11. 1969 Far E s!ern Economi0 Re iew Ye boo Far Ean__Jn Economic Rvlew Ho.ig
- ong, Dec<>
12. Gia! Vung, on't Fence Ie In," Ft>X Eastern Economic Review, 1.XIIl (12): 5El3-85
(20 Mar 69}.
.._ --- 13 Delhi Info ti.:>n Service or Inrll. in E lish, 28 Mar 69.
1 See discussicn of the lmckgrl'und and form tiC>ll of ASEA, in Bt'rnard Gordon,
"Asian Regivualism: lmplic lions ior t;S Eas Asian Policy," RAC-R3.
... ., - R s arch AD ysis Corporation, Vol ll. *Basic Text, May 68. "CLASSIFIED
15. Wa hington Post, 11 Au 68.

31
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 16. Berna.-d K. Gor-don, The Dimeo ions of Contlict n Soutl1east Asia, Prentic1;-I!all,
Inc., Englewood Cliffs, .J., 1966, p l 5-73, for efforts of 'ibai, Malay, and Filipino
leaders that led to t e formatioo of the . ssociation of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961,
and particularly pp 167, 170-71 for efforts to interest Burma in joining AS.\.
17. I'.h!t.&uardiaq (Rangoon), 14 Apr 67.
18. Ageoce France Press. 23 May 67. Following his Rangoon visit, Dr. talik visited
Cambodia and the Pl i1ippines for the s:ixie eason.
19. ence France Presse, 24 May 67.
20. Melbourne Overseas Service, in English, 4 Dec 67.
21. M::utila Times, 11 Dec 67.
2. Working People's Daily (Rangooo), 22 Apr 68.
23. Dur1.11g 1967 and lS8, however, the government-controlled press gave a great deal
of coverage to ne s r ports on the formation of ASEA and subsequent meetings of
its conference committee. Discussion with Professor John Badgley, Aug 68.
24. Rangoon Domestic Scnice, iu Burmese, 16 Mar 68.
25. Rangoon Domestic Servic in Burmese, 20 Apr 68; S rai s Budget, 1 May 68.
26. The Straits Tim s, 22 Apr 68 editorial was reprinted in the ?traits Bu g t (Kua a
Lumpur), 24 Apr 68. Tun Razak is t..'lo Deputy P:rime Minister of Malaysia.
27. S!aran Akhbar, 24 Apr 68.
28. Join. co muo.ique of P1ime Minister 'iULku Abdul Rahman and His xcelleo.cy GEN
Ne Win, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, Unio11 of Burma, following talks in
KuaJa Lumpur, alaysia, 28 Apr 68.
29. The ADB is in a category by itself. The bank has Communist members (such as
the Soviet nion), :ieutral ian members ( uch as Lao.), and Western members
(such as L'le US). The Europa Year Book, Europa PubFcalicns Limited, Londo ,
1968, Vo! I, p 94.
30. John F. Cady, Southeast Asia: I Historical De elopracnt, 1cGraw-Hill Book Co.,
New York, 1964.
31. Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomacy of Soutbeast A ia: 1945-1958, Harper & Row,
Publishers, New Yok, 1958.
32, Ref 31, p 238. Under the tc?'ms of the 1946-1947 Washingto Conference, Thailand
returned to Frcnrb colonial con rol the two Cambodian provinces and the Laotian
territory west of . h Mekong River that it had annexec! with Japanese assistance in
1941. Roger M. Smith, Cambodia," pp 595-675, and "Lam,," pp 527-2, in Kahin.1
33. _1967 Far Eastern Economic neview Yearbook, F'ar Eastern Econon,ic Re i
I
I . Hong Kong, Dec tl6.
I
34. The four other Colombo Plan tions were Pakistan, India, Ceylon, and Indonesia.
G. H. Jansen, Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian State:;, New York, Frederick A
. Praegt>r, Inc., 1966.
35. Milto W:uter Meyer, A Diplomatic Historv of the Philippine Republic, University
of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1965, pp 141-58.
3F. Diosdado Macapagal, The Philippines Turns East, MAC Publishing House, Quczon
City, Philippines, 1966, pp 159-60.
37. Manila Chronicle 29 May 67.
3o This section is based on unclassified mater"al in the discussion of Communist
Chinese-Burme e relations in Kathryn Rafferty, "Com:n..inist China's Policy toward
Burma: Trends and Pr spects (U)." RAC-TP-365, Research An".lysis Corporati o,
in press, Chaps. 2 and 3. SECRET That study contains a detailed analysi:; of
Communist China's policy toward Burma. Sino-Burmese relations arc divided into
three periods: (1) from 19(9 to 1954 the Chine e supported insurr ction in Burma,
(2) from 1954 to 1966 '-ino-Burmese relations were generally ar..1iable, and (3) from
1967 to the present th.: Ch.lnese have called for the overthrow of the Ne Win gave n
enL
39. Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in Word Politics, Houghton Mifllin C:o.,
Boston, 1966.
40. G. V. Ambekar and V. - Div kar (eds), Documents on China's Relati()ns with South
and South-East Asia (194'-1962), Allied Publishers Private Ltd., Bombay, 1964.
41. The uardian, 1 Jul 67.

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42. The Guardian carried articles entitl.?d, Ve Wbo Are in Burma Must Obey the Laws
of Burma," "A Chi oesc Father Says," 6 J l 67; "Bo{,ryoke Aun San [Burmese
independence hero] Replaces Mao inChinell Homes, 7 Jul 68; "Chinese Community
Professes Loyalty, Friendship, 11 Jul 67.
43. Frank N. Trager, "Burma: 167-A B tter Ending than Begi!llling, sian Suney,
Vlll(2): 110-19 (Feb S).
44. Christian Science Monitor, 19 Oct 68; W;ishington Po 29 Mar 69.
45. New York Times, 6 Jul and 2:1 Oct 68; Vashington Star, 29 Sep 68. Although a multl
ethnic iusurr,ent group is actlve in the Northeast, adjacent to Yilonan Province, its
relation o Chinese and White Flag Communists is not yet clear. See Anthony PolP!::,
"Threatening Command," ,Ear Easterr; Ee nomic Review, LXI(39): 605-06 (26 Sn u8).
See discussion in Chap. 4.
46. Under the AFPFL government t e majo::- transportation and communications systems,
nearly all big manufacturing plants, elec ic pow r production, export or ri::e a:ul
teak, large sawmn operations, and iILpor.ation a!ld distributio.n of many consumer
items were: included in the public sector. 1n addit'on the government wa a full
partner in j:>int enterprises involving major mining operations, as well as the
extraction and refining of oil. Louis J. Wn.Jin ky, "The Role of the Milit.iry in
Development Planning: Burma, The Philippine Economi Journal, IV (2): 310-26
(No. 8, 2d semester, l 65).
47. 1968 Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook, Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong
Ko11g, Dec 67, pp 124-25.
48. Conversion of kyats to US clollars, The Europa Ye:u Boo ,1368, Europa Publications
Limited, London, 1968, Vol II, p 185.
49. New Yo-.:-k Times, 19 Jan 68.
50. Recent Burmese Army forays agail!st Commurust insurgents in lo, er 3urma have r
been particularly s ccessful. Ch istian Science Monitor, 24 Mar 69.
51. Josef Silverstein, "The Burma Socialist Program Party and Its Rivals: A one-Plus
Party System," ,Journal of Southeast Asian History, V1l1 (1): 8-18 (Mar 67).
52. New York Time:i, 23 Oct 68.
53. Cani>err"a:fimn a o 0ct 66.
54. Wash.1 gton Post, 15 Dec 68. It is probably too soon to judge whether internal
diRsension as "destroyed" the White F l.a.g movement. In early 1969 it coul be
said with certainty only that the movement was in considerable disarray.
55. New York Ti es, 6 Jul 68.

33

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 BIBLIOGRAPH

REFERS CE WORKS

Ambekar, G. V. and V. D. Divekar (ed:,), Documents on C ina's Relations with South and
South-East Asia (1949-1962), Allied Publishers Private Ltd., Bombay, 1964.
The Europa Year Book, Vols I, n. Europa Publications Limited, London, 1968.
19'>7 Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook, Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong
Kong, Dec 66.
1968 Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbo , Far Ea. tern Economic Review, Hong
Kong, Dec 67.
9 Far Eastern Economic H vie\11 Yearbook, Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong
ong, Dec 68.

BOOKS

Cady, John F., Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development, McGraw-Hill Boo Co.,
ew York, 1961.
Fifield, Russell H., The Diplomacy of Southea t Asa: 1945- 958, Harper & Row,
Publishers, New York, lS58.
Go don, Bernard ., The Dimensions of Conflict In Southeast sia, Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1960.
Hinton, Harold C., Communist China in Worl Polilics, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston,
1966.
Jansen, G. H., Nonal gnment and the Afro-Asian States, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,
New York, 1966.
John::;tone, William C., Burma's Foreign Policy: A Study in eutralism, Harvard
Universi'.y Press, Cambridge, 1963.
Kahin, George McTurnan (eel), Governments and Politics of Southeat Asia, 2d ed,
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1964.
acapagal, Diosdado, The Philippines Turns East, MAC Publishing House, Quezon
City, PhlHppines, 1966.
!eyer, Milt?n Walter, A Diplom:Hic History of the Philippine Republic, University of
Hawaii Pr ss, Honolulu, 1965.
Trager, Frank N., Burma from Kingdom to Republic, Frederick A. :rraeger, Inc.,
New Yo1k, i.966.
\Valinsky, Louis J., Economic Development in Burma, 1951-1960, Twentieth Century
Fund, Inc., New York, 1962.

PERIODICALS

Badgley, John H., Burma's China Crisis: The Choices Ahead, Asian Survey, VII (11):
753-61 (Nov 67).
Polek)', Anthony, "Threaening Command," Far Eastern Economic Review, LX1 (:39):
GO:;-OG (26 Sep 68).

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I
I
t. OftlOINATIN G ACThllTY CC- au-) ze. CPOflT SllCUfttTV C l..AII P'tCATtt.>r

Research Analysis Corporation UNCLASSIFIED

McLean, Virginia 22101 ZO. OMIUI'

J. na;,01n TITLI!

l
BUIUA.A AND SOUTHEAST ASIA REGIONALISM
. o&a IIUPTl\f NOTl!S ,,.,.,,,. o, ,.,,.,. m ,,,..,_, ..
Tech ical
11.,.., j
Kathryn E. Rafferty
'
1. AKltO OATa
May 1969
1 'fOTAL NO. Of' PA.&
35 I " NO. 0
1' llltl'

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la. CONTRACT OR OftAMT NO.
DAHC 19-69-C-0017
a. 11'110.lltCT-. RAC-TP-363

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d.
10. DISYRIIJUTION S ATEMENT Thi document is subject to sp.ecial export conlrols nd euch transmittal
to foreign governments or foreign nationals may b made nly with pri'.>r approval of the Office of
I
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (A T , : OPS lA FMT}, Headquarters, Department
of the Army, Washin ton, 0. C., 20310.
IJ. tPOllS IIIG MIUTll1' ACTIVITV
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military
Operations
11. Alt T
' ,-
CT

is study examines Burmese reaction to the format of the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), its relations with the members of ASEAN, and
other foreign and domestic factors t!1at might affect Burmese participation in
ASEAN and/or other organiza ions for Southeast Asian regional cooperation.
Because of a lnajor objective of Burmese foreign policy-to remain neutral
in re ations with al nations and to maintain friendly rela ion" wth Communist
China-membership in an association such as ASEA.l could raise sever: foreign
policy problems. Moreover, the Burmese government is preoccupied with seriou
economic and insurgency problems. T;.ie time, energy, and risks irwo ved in a
foreign policy departure that might jeopardize the major objectives of Burmese
foreign policy must be considered against this backgrounq.
 LtNtl & t.1111< D LlH .. C:
'101..S 9T "OLK t'IT 0,01. 8'T

Asian regionalism
Assoc! tion of Sout.heast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Commu:iist China
economic development
forei p<.>licies-SOutheast As en nations
GEN Ne Win
inBUrgency

Burma
Indonesia
Malaysia
P llippinea
Singapore
Thailand

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