Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Regulations
25.301 Loads.
(a) Strength requirements are specified in terms of limit loads (the maximum loads to be
expected in service) and ultimate loads (limit loads multiplied by prescribed factors of
safety). Unless otherwise provided, prescribed loads are limit loads.
(b) Unless otherwise provided, the specified air, ground, and water loads must be
placed in equilibrium with inertia forces, considering each item of mass in the airplane.
These loads must be distributed to conservatively approximate or closely represent
actual conditions. Methods used to determine load intensities and distribution must be
validated by flight load measurement unless the methods used for determining those
loading conditions are shown to be reliable.
(c) If deflections under load would significantly change the distribution of external or
internal loads, this redistribution must be taken into account.
[Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-23, 35 FR 5672,
Apr. 8, 1970]
(b) Typical Interpretation: Inertia loads must be applied on structures. Loads and
moments must be in equilibrium with reactions at the aircraft structure interface points.
Acceptable load application methods (simulated and real world) are body loads, pressure
loads (using load spreaders) and point loads where applicable.
For example, during landing, the net inertia loads from all the internal items of mass
(passengers, interiors structures, seats, crew etc.) travel throughout the aircraft structure.
They travel along their respective load paths and are finally balanced by the reaction
loads at the landing gear and aerodynamic lift under the wings.
Hence, the applied loading needs to resemble as closely as possible, the real landing
loads when sizing is done. Conservatism in included in the form of safety factors as
needed. In addition, it must also be shown that the applied loading is verified to be a
reliable way of loading the structures.
(c) Typical Interpretation: The effect of large deformations must be accounted for in the
applied loading. For example, in case of the airplane wings, the large deflection of the
wing tip results in follower forces normal to the surface of the wing, these must be
accounted for.
In other words, not considering follower forces may be more conservative for the cabin
partition itself. But, if the load path beyond the partition or bulkhead is negatively
impacted, then it becomes important to account for such nonlinear geometry follower
force effects.
We can see in the figure above that follower forces could result in two different types of
reaction loads at the aircraft interface, but the interface may not be designed to accept
such loading. Again, this is just an example to explain the reason for this particular FAA
regulation. Thus, it may be required to supply such data to the aircraft integrator to meet
compliance requirements as deemed necessary.
Unless otherwise specified, a factor of safety of 1.5 must be applied to the prescribed limit
loads which are considered external loads on the structure. When a loading condition is
prescribed in terms of ultimate loads, a factor of safety need not be applied unless
otherwise specified.
In the previous section, we looked at 14 CFR Subpart C Section 25-301. The -303
regulation is related to it, in the sense that now we have a number called the "safety
factor". The 301 regulation said that the loads are prescribed in terms of limit and ultimate
loads. But this regulation goes farther, and says that the ultimate load is 1.5 times the
limit load.
Safety Factors
For example, in the case of cabin interior items, the ultimate load factor in the forward
(FWD) direction is usually 9.0G. This load has the 1.5 safety factor included in the applied
load. Therefore, forward limit load would be 6.0G. For some research and military aircraft,
ultimate load safety factor may be lower at around 1.2. Limit loads must be sustained by
the structure without any permanent detrimental deformation. Here is a link that explains
some more.
There may be load cases such as in flight loads, sustained during turbulence. These
loads may be prescribed in terms of limit loads. In such cases, margins of safety must be
written against the critical yield strength of the structural member's material. In theory, the
ultimate loads will never be encountered under normal operations during the entire
service life of an aircraft.
The maximum normal operation loads expected are limit loads. The 1.5 safety factor has
proven to be statistically and historically adequate for many decades now. But that does
not mean there could be incidents such as severe crashes. In such cases the loads would
be far greater and catastrophic than the ultimate loads the aircraft was designed for.
Because you can never really design something to survive every possible crash or
landing, the best we can do is design for a reasonably severe crash or landing.
Aircraft cabin interiors are generally certified to ultimate loads in various directions,
including linear combinations of different directions. For example, 2.3G SIDE + 1.5G
DOWN load case can be a limit or ultimate load case, depending on the guidelines
included in the Structural Design Criteria (SDC) document provided by the OEM (original
equipment manufacturer) or an aircraft integrator or a completions center.
In case of engine nacelle components such as the thrust reverser (TR), there may be
hundreds of different load cases. These cases may include various limit, ultimate and
ultimate at 1.0 safety factor load cases. Most of these load cases are provided by the
engine manufacturer. But there are other load cases that are induced into the TR due to
the systems within the nacelle.
For example, the TR actuation system is one such critical system. It induces heavy loads
into the TR structure during landing, or on the ground, or in certain failure cases in flight. It
is critical to nail down which load case has what safety factor, in order to meet compliance
requirements.
In cabin interiors however, almost all cases are ultimate load cases including abuse, rapid
decompression, emergency landing etc. These cases include the 1.5 safety factor. At the
most, there may be 15 to 20 different load cases including any applicable combined inertia
load cases.
Practical Example
Consider a fighter jet whose Gross Take Off Weight is 30,000 lbs
In a wing test, it was found that the wing fails at an ultimate load of 243,000 lbs
What is the Design Margin of Safety (MS)? This is a conservative MS value compared to
the tested load and goes beyond the standard Ultimate MS compared to Ultimate Material
Strength. There may be various conservative assumptions and factors that determine the
standard ultimate Load value which may be lower than the tested value.
From 14 CFR Subpart C Section 25-303, for aircraft the safety factor = 1.5
In this case, the V-N diagram of the jet was found to have a 9.0 load factor for limit load.
Therefore, Design Limit = 9.0 x Gross Take Off Weight at 1.0G = 9.0 x 30,000 lbs =
270,000 lbs
The objective would be to minimize this +0.2 MS value to close to zero thus optimizing
the design to ultimate failure strength especially because the failure load is known from
testing. This process is called optimal "sizing".
(a) The structure must be able to support limit loads without detrimental permanent
deformation. At any load up to limit loads, the deformation may not interfere with safe
operation.
(b) The structure must be able to support ultimate loads without failure for at least 3
seconds. However, when proof of strength is shown by dynamic tests simulating actual
load conditions, the 3-second limit does not apply. Static tests conducted to ultimate
load must include the ultimate deflections and ultimate deformation induced by the
loading. When analytical methods are used to show compliance with the ultimate load
strength requirements, it must be shown that
(1) The effects of deformation are not significant;
(2) The deformations involved are fully accounted for in the analysis; or
(3) The methods and assumptions used are sufficient to cover the effects of these
deformations.
(c) Where structural flexibility is such that any rate of load application likely to occur in
the operating conditions might produce transient stresses appreciably higher than those
corresponding to static loads, the effects of this rate of application must be considered.
(d) [Reserved]
e) The airplane must be designed to withstand any vibration and buffeting that might
occur in any likely operating condition up to VD/MD, including stall and probable
inadvertent excursions beyond the boundaries of the buffet onset envelope. This must
be shown by analysis, flight tests, or other tests found necessary by the Administrator.
(f) Unless shown to be extremely improbable, the airplane must be designed to
In the previous sections, we looked at 14 CFR Subpart C Section 25-301, and 14 CFR
Subpart C Section 25-303.
The 14 CFR Subpart C Section 25-305 regulation is related to both. Now we have some
more specifics on the strength and deformation requirements under limit and ultimate
loads. OK let us break it down.
If an interior structure is designed in such a way that these deflections are constrained,
for example vertical deflections of floor beams, it could be severely detrimental to both
the aircraft structure and the interior structures. So care needs to be taken in addressing
these issues for compliance.
Under ultimate load the structure must be capable of holding the load for a minimum of
3 seconds. For example, in any ultimate load static test, the load is held for 3 seconds in
front of the witnessing DER before the test is considered a success.
How do we interpret this? One way to think about it is that 1 second may be too short to
conclude the structure is truly sustaining the applied loading without failure. Another
way is to cover the possibility that the ultimate load in a crash situation may last up to
three seconds. Parts of the aircraft may deform under loading and sustain the load on
other components for up to three seconds. These are just my thoughts though.
The exception to this condition is when aircraft seats are tested to 16.0G dynamic
loading. In that test, the seat certification does not require a 3 second hold, the load is
considered as an instantaneous G load amplification. The seat is accelerated on a track
and the acceleration is continuously measured. At the end of the track are a bunch of
wires that stop the seat. They are adjusted to make sure the peak acceleration of the
seat reaches is at least 16.0G.
When actual static tests are conducted, its more straightforward to show compliance,
the proof is in the test results.
This is not so much of a concern for interiors, with the exception of Sustained Engine
Imbalance Analysis, the analysis of the effect on interior items close to an engine that is
out of balance.
The regulation is more applicable to components that are relatively flexible, that tend to
resonate and oscillate. This amplifies the deflection and thus the induced load at
resonance within the dynamic range of engine vibration.
On engine nacelles for example, an equivalent static load factor may be used to size
components subject to vibration and resonance within the engine frequency range.
14 CFR Subpart C Section 25-305 (e) and (f) are out of the scope for interiors so I will
stop here.
(a) Compliance with the strength and deformation requirements of this subpart must be
shown for each critical loading condition. Structural analysis may be used only if the
structure conforms to that for which experience has shown this method to be reliable.
The Administrator may require ultimate load tests in cases where limit load tests may be
inadequate.
(b) -(c) [Reserved]
(d) When static or dynamic tests are used to show compliance with the requirements of
25.305(b) for flight structures, appropriate material correction factors must be applied
to the test results, unless the structure, or part thereof, being tested has features such
that a number of elements contribute to the total strength of the structure and the failure
of one element results in the redistribution of the load through alternate load paths.
[Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-23, 35 FR 5672,
Apr. 8, 1970; Amdt. 25-54, 45 FR 60172, Sept. 11, 1980; Amdt. 25-72, 55 FR 29775,
July 20, 1990]
The certification process involving compliance with 14 CFR Subpart C Section 25-
305 Strength and Deformation regulation can be achieved either by analysis, by test, or
a combination of both. It is important to note however that certification entirely by stress
analysis is generally not acceptable. There will be some level of testing, required to
produce acceptable allowable loads and margins of safety.
First, it is not sufficient to show compliance only by analysis of one critical load case. For
example, 9.0G forward is generally a critical load case.
Compliance must be shown for every critical load case. For instance, 6.5G DOWN, or
Rapid Decompression, or any other load case that is required to be evaluated including
any load sharing and contact due to deflections, as shown in the previous section, 14
CFR Subpart C Section 25-305 Strength and Deformation.
In case of cabin interiors, stress analysis methods and procedures are well established.
Industry standard classical hand calculation methods, and margin of safety calculations
are employed. In addition, finite element analysis and modeling is used for analysis.
Many critical safety margin calculations utilize tested allowable loads.
1. Panel Flexure and Core Shear (click to read more about this) allowable stresses
2. Panel Joints allowable loads and moments testing
3. Sandwich panel insert testing
Almost all testing conducted in cabin interiors structures is to ultimate loading. The
combination approach above is mainly intended to minimize testing effort required to
show compliance. However, care needs to be taken in selecting efficient and accurate
analysis methods and acceptable allowable data to ensure cost savings.
The second part of this 14 CFR Subpart C Section 25-307 regulation provides guidance
on redundant load paths.
Panel pins are typically placed at every 2 to 4 inches along the panel joint. This type of a
joint inherently has redundancy built into the joint. The same is true for joints with multiple
inserts.
However, B-Basis is typically not allowed at critical locations such as floor fitting inserts
or top attachment inserts. Here A-Basis is generally required. More details are included
in this post on A-Basis and B-Basis values.
Following that, the structure is loaded again all the way up to ultimate load, which usually
includes a 1.15 fitting factor. So this is an example to ensure compliance with part (d)
of 14 CFR Subpart C Section 25-307 regulation. During stress analysis as well, we use
fitting factors in margin of safety calculations. A lot of the regulations overlap in terms of
interpretation, we will cover the fitting factors and other material factors in more detail in
subsequent sections.
In this section, we will try to dig into the next regulation, 14 CFR Subpart C Section 2-561,
and try to understand what it means.
25.561 - General
(a) The airplane, although it may be damaged in emergency landing conditions on land
or water, must be designed as prescribed in this section to protect each occupant under
those conditions.
(b) The structure must be designed to give each occupant every reasonable chance of
escaping serious injury in a minor crash landing when
(1) Proper use is made of seats, belts, and all other safety design provisions;
(3) The occupant experiences the following ultimate inertia forces acting separately
relative to the surrounding structure:
(ii) Penetrate fuel tanks or lines or cause fire or explosion hazard by damage to
adjacent systems; or
(iii) Nullify any of the escape facilities provided for use after an emergency landing.
(2) When such positioning is not practical (e.g. fuselage mounted engines or auxiliary
power units) each such item of mass shall be restrained under all loads up to those
specified in paragraph (b)(3) of this section. The local attachments for these items should
be designed to withstand 1.33 times the specified loads if these items are subject to
severe wear and tear through frequent removal (e.g. quick change interior items).
(d) Seats and items of mass (and their supporting structure) must not deform under any
loads up to those specified in paragraph (b)(3) of this section in any manner that would
impede subsequent rapid evacuation of occupants.
[Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-23, 35 FR 5673,
Apr. 8, 1970; Amdt. 25-64, 53 FR 17646, May 17, 1988; Amdt. 25-91, 62 FR 40706, July
29, 1997]
Note the language used in parts (a) and (b) of this regulation. The interpretation of that
language is important here in terms of minimum ultimate loads.
There is very little anyone can do with current design practices and standards to protect
the occupants in such a crash.
Although certain radical design features may help mitigate a severe crash to some extent,
it would either be cost prohibitive or too heavy. Also, it would most likely be unsuitable for
mass transport on an economical scale.
Therefore, the FAA mandates certain minimum ultimate loads or ultimate load factors that
the aircraft and cabin interiors must be designed to withstand, based on past aviation
history. These ultimate loads or load factors are limited to minor crash landings that may
be survivable, provided the conditions in b(1)(2) are met.
As the regulation says, these minimum ultimate loads are 9.0G FWD, 3.0G UP, 6.0G
DOWN, 3.0G SIDE (LHS and RHS), and 1.5G AFT.
But what exactly is a minor crash landing? How do we make sense of these ultimate
loads? The ultimate loads presented in b(3) above are relative load factors.
14 CFR Subpart C Section 25 561: Ultimate Loads, 9.0G FWD Inertia Load Factor
Looking at the image above, let us say the pilots are able to land this aircraft with wheels
up in an emergency situation. They land it on its belly and on a stretch of flat land (can be
a body of water as well). As the plane slides along, the ground (or water) underneath
exerts a drag force due to friction.
But the plane has a lot of inertia (weight moving FWD at high speed), it wants to keep
moving forward (FWD). The relative acceleration FWD is what the FAA mandates as the
9.0G FWD ultimate loads condition. This is a minimum ultimate loads condition (in this
case the FWD direction) that the aircraft and its cabin structures must be designed to
withstand for at least 3.0 seconds. During this process, the equations of static equilibrium
at an instant produce these relative accelerations or body loads with respect to the
surrounding structure.
It is very much like you slamming on the breaks of your car while driving at 70 miles per
hour (similar to the drag force on the plane). You plunge forward with your seat belt on.
In the beginning, your chest will feel an immense force as you push FWD on it. But as
you slow down and spring back occurs, the G force you experience on your chest
decreases.
Until the plane comes to a stop, the aircraft and its cabin structures must be designed to
not break free from their supports due to a peak 9.0G FWD ultimate loads condition. This
is considered a minimum to give the occupants a fair chance of escape.
The same applies to all other ultimate loads directions, applied independently from each
other. The reason for independent loading is to ensure sizing for maximum ultimate loads
in each specific direction.
In addition to the minimum FAA mandated ultimate loads mentioned above, there may be
additional load cases required by either the completion center, the aircraft integrator, or
the OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer, example Boeing).
Boeing requires higher load factors than those mandated by this regulation in some
cases. It also requires various combination load cases (also analyzed as ultimate loads)
that combine different ultimate loads in different directions and magnitudes based on the
aircraft type.
For example, if you are sizing a structure to be installed in a Boeing 737-600, Boeing
requires a 3.5G UP and 6.5G DOWN load case (higher than the FAA mandated cases).
An additional 3.0G SIDE (LHS and RHS) + 1.5G DOWN combination load case is also
required.
There may be interior items that aren't required to be substantiated to ultimate loads as
they are only used in flight.
Examples are flight attendant jump seats or lower lobe crew rests. For such items, a
different set of 'Flight' load factors may be used, but these are also analyzed as ultimate
loads.
The reason for this is simple, in flight turbulence will cause the FWD and Aft ends of the
aircraft to experience greater G loads due to the longer moment arms from the CG of the
aircraft. So these cases could very well end up being critical sizing cases for some
components.
After all, the aircraft is a simply supported beam, with the total lift at the wings of this
beam, the overall weight acting down at the forward side of this beam, which is balanced
by the down force on the horizontal stabilizers at the aft side of this beam. This type of a
spread is important to obtain a good tradeoff between efficiency and stability.
So we can see how an aircraft can be treated as a simply supported beam and how the
inflight turbulence static equivalent load cases would tend to be more severe at the FWD
and Aft ends of this simply supported beam.
This section sort of ties into another regulation on retention of items of mass. But we will
discuss that later.
The bottom line for interior items is that almost all loose contents of the interior equipment
or cabin structures are restrained using various restraint devices such as latches and
hinges on doors, quarter turn retainers, the walls of the structures made from sandwich
panels etc.
Generally, there are no items allowed to be completely unrestrained in any direction that
could fly out into the cabin and either insure the occupants or impede their safe egress
after an emergency landing condition. Thus all these restraint devices are sized for
ultimate loads.
Restraint devices are considered quick change or frequent wear and tear items.
Therefore, a 1.33 safety factor is required on quarter turn retainers for example, multiplied
with maximum ultimate loads.
Seat structures, and any other interior items are allowed to deform under ultimate loads,
however, not so much that the safe egress of the occupants is impeded. Complying with
this requirement is a little subjective in nature and probably depends on the acceptance
of the DER or ODA Unit Member approving the test.
Note that it is not quite as straight forward to satisfy, if certification is done by analysis
instead of static test. But we know that ultimate loads are 1.5 times limit loads. In other
words, limit loads are 2/3 rds the ultimate loads. For most Aluminum alloys, the material's
yield strength is also close to 2/3rds of the ultimate strength as well.
Therefore, if we are able to show a decent positive safety margin under ultimate loads,
then it is also reasonable to demonstrate no permanent deformation under limit loads and
acceptable permanent deformation under ultimate loads. With composite materials, there
is no appreciable yielding before failure and therefore a positive safety margin is sufficient
to comply with this part of the regulation.
(a) The seat and restraint system in the airplane must be designed as prescribed in this
section to protect each occupant during an emergency landing condition when
(1) Proper use is made of seats, safety belts, and shoulder harnesses provided for in the
design; and
(2) The occupant is exposed to loads resulting from the conditions prescribed in this
section.
(b) Each seat type design approved for crew or passenger occupancy during takeoff and
landing must successfully complete dynamic tests or be demonstrated by rational
analysis based on dynamic tests of a similar type seat, in accordance with each of the
following emergency landing conditions. The tests must be conducted with an occupant
simulated by a 170-pound anthropomorphic test dummy, as defined by 49 CFR Part 572,
Subpart B, or its equivalent, sitting in the normal upright position.
(1) A change in downward vertical velocity ( v) of not less than 35 feet per second, with
the airplane's longitudinal axis canted downward 30 degrees with respect to the horizontal
plane and with the wings level. Peak floor deceleration must occur in not more than 0.08
seconds after impact and must reach a minimum of 14g.
(c) The following performance measures must not be exceeded during the dynamic tests
conducted in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section:
(1) Where upper torso straps are used for crew members, tension loads in individual
straps must not exceed 1,750 pounds. If dual straps are used for restraining the upper
torso, the total strap tension loads must not exceed 2,000 pounds.
(2) The maximum compressive load measured between the pelvis and the lumbar column
of the anthropomorphic dummy must not exceed 1,500 pounds.
(3) The upper torso restraint straps (where installed) must remain on the occupant's
shoulder during the impact.
(4) The lap safety belt must remain on the occupant's pelvis during the impact.
(5) Each occupant must be protected from serious head injury under the conditions
prescribed in paragraph (b) of this section. Where head contact with seats or other
structure can occur, protection must be provided so that the head impact does not exceed
a Head Injury Criterion (HIC) of 1,000 units. The level of HIC is defined by the equation:
Where:
(6) Where leg injuries may result from contact with seats or other structure, protection
must be provided to prevent axially compressive loads exceeding 2,250 pounds in each
femur.
(7) The seat must remain attached at all points of attachment, although the structure may
have yielded.
(8) Seats must not yield under the tests specified in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this
section to the extent they would impede rapid evacuation of the airplane occupants.
OK, this regulation pretty much deals exclusively with seats, their attachments to the seat
track floor structure, their dynamic test conditions for certification etc.
So what does this have anything to do with the other monument structures such as
bulkheads or partitions/dividers or galleys or lavatories?
The regulation specifies the load factors and testing requirements for seat certification.
And these tests are dynamic tests. The seats are accelerated to 16G and then brought to
a total stop as specified in the regulation within a specific time period.
Generally, anytime there is a monument in front of a row of seats, the common practice
is to maintain a gap that is large enough that the test dummy head misses it completely.
But when this is not possible for whatever reason, then the stiffness of the monument in
front of the seats becomes important. This is because the test must simulate the contact
between the test dummy head and the monument structure in front of it, to meet the
stringent HIC criteria for certification.
As we can see in the video above, passenger seats only have the waist harness. The
dummy head is moving and basically hits the knees. But if it is obstructed by a windscreen
or a partition for example, then the HIC number due to the emergency landing dynamic
load test requirement may be too high to certify the seat and the layout of passengers
(LOPA).
This dynamic load may also need to be considered as a separate load case if other load
cases are not as critical to certify that monument.
From the Ultimate Loads post, we know that there are certain load cases that are specific
to in flight turbulence, for example the 6.5G DOWN flight load case.
Jump seats are not supposed to be used as TTL seats, meaning they are not allowed to
be used for Taxi Takeoff Landing (TTL). And they do not have any seat track attachments
like normal TTL seats do.
Therefore, emergency landing dynamic loads are not applicable. However, the DOWN
flight loads are significant, especially considering the weight of the crew member and the
seat weight itself.
Because there is a tangent effect that needs to be considered for jump seats attached to
monuments.
Just like the seat belts, the jump seats and attachments are also required to be certified
for severe wear and tear factor of 1.33, due to frequent in flight use.
Although not common, some DERs may require that this factor be extended to the
monument structure attachments (such as floor fitting installations) to the aircraft structure
under this jump seat. So, keep this in mind and do not be alarmed if it happens to you,
you heard it from me, :-)
In this relatively short post, we will dig into the next regulation, 14 CFR Subpart C Section
25-601.
The airplane may not have design features or details that experience has shown to be
hazardous or unreliable. The suitability of each questionable design detail and part must
be established by tests.
One simple blanket statement, the regulation basically envelopes the general requirement
that mandates the avoidance and elimination of any Hazardous Unreliable Design
Features that experience has brought to light.
So, what is the major lesson here? The FAA is making sure that plane design is done in
a way that learns from past mistakes, catastrophes, crashes etc. that were the result of
using a hazardous unreliable design feature.
So we now know that those batteries and containment, if not designed and tested
properly, is a hazardous unreliable design feature regulated by 14 CFR Subpart C Part
25.601. Hence compliance must be shown by test if a similar battery design and
containment is used in a new plane design.
The FAA imposed special conditions to comply with this regulation on Li-Ion batteries and
containment installations, such as 14 CFR 25.1353 for electrical equipment installations,
and 14 CFR Part 25.863 which was originally not intended for batteries but for flammable
fluid fire protection requirements.
This regulation's impact on cabin interiors has also led to many improvements in design.
For example, if a glass partition was designed for aesthetic purposes, but let us say it has
been proven to be one of the hazardous unreliable design features. The glass shatters
under certain conditions thus seriously inhibiting safe egress of the occupants.
Maybe there are certain seat belt design features that are also hazardous unreliable
design features that violate 14 CFR 25.601, unless they are tested to comply with the
regulation, they cannot be certified.
The above are just examples, compliance with 14 CFR 25.601 ensures that such
hazardous unreliable design features do not make it to production, unless certified by test
and proven to be safe and reliable.
The intent of this regulation is not to regulate every little aspect of airplane design but to
make sure manufacturers and OEMs learn from past bad ideas and hazardous unreliable
design features, or even unusual and novel design features that do not have sufficient
regulations to ensure safety of such features.
25.603 - Materials
The suitability and durability of materials used for parts, the failure of which could
adversely affect safety, must
(c) Take into account the effects of environmental conditions, such as temperature and
humidity, expected in service.
[Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-38, 41 FR 55466,
Dec. 20 1976; Amdt. 25-46, 43 FR 50595, Oct. 30, 1978]
The point here is that materials used in aerospace applications must have very well
established strength, durability, and process specifications, with supporting test data for
a clear path to certification and use in aerospace applications. WHY? SAFETY...... that is
the cardinal rule.
Let us say you are an adventurist, and you are about to embark on an expedition that you
have never been on before. How do you really feel safe about it? You guessed it, with the
knowledge of people who have already been there done that and documented everything
about that adventure.
You researched it, understand it and make sure to implement every rule of it, and that is
how the FAA feels confident about products that come to its doors for certification as well.
A manufacturer than can consistently and diligently demonstrate this has a lot to gain and
maintain.
In simpler terms, any aerospace part must be made from a material that complies with
strict manufacturing process standards acceptable for use in aerospace applications.
Per 14CFR 25.603(b), all structural materials and fasteners must conform to approved
specifications. For example, aluminum materials must be specified using Aerospace
Material Specifications (AMS) maintained by the Society of Automotive Engineers.
Fasteners must be specified using Army-Navy (AN), Military Specification (MS), and
National Aerospace Standard (NAS) specifications. If a material specification or fastener
specification is used which is not published by one of the organizations listed above
(example: Hi-Loks) then that specification must be approved by the respective ODA as a
part of each project on which it is used.
Humans without wings flying at 30,000 to 40,0000 feet above sea level, sitting in a seat
inside a pressurized barrel is unnatural and no joke.
It is serious business and extremely risky. And without quality materials helping us do
that, it is simply impossible.
Let us consider the engine nacelle for example. If there is one part of the aircraft where
Armageddon shines, that is the engine nacelle and the engine itself. It is probably where
the worst of the worst conditions come together in perfect synergy, and where the first
line of safe flight defense begins.
The key to the critical path to certification (CPTC) for these conditions is the use of a
material that complies with all of these important regulations.
Learn more about how this regulation ties into the Proof of Structure regulation. Learn
more about A-Basis and B-Basis allowable values.
(a) The methods of fabrication used must produce a consistently sound structure. If a
fabrication process (such as gluing, spot welding, or heat treating) requires close control
to reach this objective, the process must be performed under an approved process
specification.
(b) Each new aircraft fabrication method must be substantiated by a test program.
[Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-46, 43 FR 50595,
Oct. 30, 1978]
In the last post on materials, we discussed the importance of the quality of materials.
Such materials are used to manufacture parts and products. But how can we make sure
that every time a product is manufactured, especially the same part is used on multiple
aircraft, the part is essentially the same in terms of structural integrity? This is where the
fabrication methods regulation kicks in. It is not enough to simply use quality materials,
the fabrication methods used also are of critical importance.
Consider our good old sandwich panel, it is typically manufactured in large quantities,
meaning mass produced.
In part (a) of this regulation, the FAA is basically saying that the "manufacturing process
specifications" of these panels, or the fabrication methods, must be nailed down to be
consistent and certified. In such situations, it is acceptable to prove to the FAA that the
panels produced meet the requirement of consistent quality and strength requirements,
with an approved testing schedule of samples of those panels. The emphasis of this
regulation also shines light on the quality control of the fabrication methods.
This way, every single panel does not need to be tested for compliance with the
regulations. WHY? Because you already have a certified "process specification" with
coupon testing and documentation procedures in place to convince the FAA that you
don't need to test every panel. This also ties into developing A-Basis and B-
Basis allowable values.
As Boeing, Airbus and other OEMs did with radically new composite airframe structures
for example, if some day you come up with brand new fabrication methods to
manufacture a jet engine out of carbon nano tubes, or maybe you figured out how to make
the wings from a special kind of spider web material (I am kidding of course, but you get
the idea, and don't let me stop your imagination from flying high..), it must be proven to
the FAA that the same structure is in compliance with all the regulations via an extensive
testing program.
These new radical fabrication methods must also have certified process specifications to
ensure consistent quality of the part or end product that can use the results of the testing
program for compliance.
Before you read on, I suggest you read through this advisory circular: AC20-71
25.607 Fasteners
(a) Each removable bolt, screw, nut, pin, or other removable fastener must incorporate two
separate locking devices if
(1) Its loss could preclude continued flight and landing within the design limitations of the
airplane using normal pilot skill and strength; or
(b) The fasteners specified in paragraph (a) of this section and their locking devices may not be
adversely affected by the environmental conditions associated with the particular installation.
(c) No self-locking nut may be used on any bolt subject to rotation in operation unless a non-
friction locking device is used in addition to the self-locking device.
In the last post, we studied the importance of fabrication methods and process
specifications. In this post, we will dig into a very important design feature that must be
used for critical fasteners to comply with this regulation.
As is clear from part (a) of this regulation (see the regulation text above), removable
fasteners that are primarily intended to transfer shear load (single or double) between
critical joint members must incorporate two separate locking devices or features. This is
applicable to bolts that also serve as axis of rotation for the joint members.
It is common practice to include one locking device, such as self-locking nut with a detent
in the threads. But for critical applications such as control surfaces rotating using clevis
and bolt fulcrum parts, dual locking devices are mandatory as the loss of this bolt (slipping
or sliding out due to failure of the single locking device) would impact safe flight and
landing.
If the bolt or fastener is designed to rotate in the applications, or is allowed to rotate, then
a self-locking nut or any self-locking device is not allowed. In such cases, other non-
friction type devices must be used such as cotter pins that pass through the shank and
the head of the bolt.
Read this article for more details: Non Self Locking Nuts
(a) Be suitably protected against deterioration or loss of strength in service due to any
cause, including -
(1) Weathering;
(b) Have provisions for ventilation and drainage where necessary for protection.
Special coatings
Surface chemical treatments
Heat treatments
Special design features
Protection Tapes etc.
Let us discuss one such important treatment that affects aluminum parts, which
is "Anodization".
Benefits of Anodization:
So, what exactly is this process? Its a critical process to achieve protection against
corrosion for components made from aluminum alloys such as AL 2024, 7075 etc. There
are three main types of this process:
https://youtu.be/O0GQPHh3Szk
So the benefits are obvious, it provides corrosion protection in areas of moisture and
acidic environments. But from a stress engineering standpoint, what are the downsides?
The main mechanism of anodization is the creation of microscopic pores on the metal
surface during anodization. This process therefore has a detrimental influence on the
fatigue or endurance capability of these parts. Watch the video above to learn more about
the process.
Stress Impact:
The way this detrimental impact on the fatigue allowable stress is accounted for is by:
Either knocking down the fatigue allowable stress using a factor (depending on
a company's internal guidelines). This factor is between 0.0 < K < 1.0 (the thicker the
protection layer, the lower the anodization factor K due to deeper pores)
Or, assuming a stress concentration effect, thus dividing the applied tensile stress on the
component with the anodization factor K
The final stress value including the factor effect is used in the margin of safety
calculation.
Alright, now that we have covered that part, let us look at part (b).
Note that here, we are talking about protection of structure against rapid decompression
loading using design features such as ventilation or drop down panels. This is covered in
detail in part (g) in the link above, so check it out. Vent areas are included throughout the
cabin and other areas to prevent excessive pressure differentials as discussed in the link
above.
Now, in the context of corrosion due to humidity or acidic conditions, ventilation could
be as simple as providing a path or conduit for humidity to escape. Similarly, in areas that
are expected to get wet, such as toilet floors or door entry areas, there may be special drain
hole design features that prevent water accumulation, thus reducing or preventing
corrosion.
Conclusion:
Aerospace components made from Aluminum alloys are typically protected against
corrosion using thin layer anodization. So as a stress engineer, you must account for the
fatigue capability knock down effect when writing fatigue margins. It is also important to
note that fatigue allowable stress is usually a low number compared to ultimate or yield
strength. So any knockdown could really hurt your fatigue margins.
(a) Material strength properties must be based on enough tests of material meeting
approved specifications to establish design values on a statistical basis.
(b) Material design values must be chosen to minimize the probability of structural
failures due to material variability. Except as provided in paragraphs (e) and (f) of
this section, compliance must be shown by selecting material design values which
assure material strength with the following probability:
(1) Where applied loads are eventually distributed through a single member within an
assembly, the failure of which would result in loss of structural integrity of the
component, 99 percent probability with 95 percent confidence.
(2) For redundant structure, in which the failure of individual elements would result in
applied loads being safely distributed to other load carrying members, 90 percent
probability with 95 percent confidence.
(d) [Reserved]
(f) Other material design values may be used if approved by the Administrator.
[Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-46, 43 FR 50595, Oct. 30,
1978; Amdt. 25-72, 55 FR 29776, July 20, 1990; Amdt. 25-112, 68 FR 46431, Aug. 5, 2003]
Part (a) if this regulation combines two things, acceptable material specifications as well
as tests required to establish the strength of materials and their properties.
If you would like to learn more about the STAT17 tool used to perform statistical
reduction, then check out this link: STAT17
When tested as described in part (a) above, it is quite possible there is some variation
among the 100 different test results in the strength of materials.
This is not good as we need to rely on a strength value to write the margin of safety,
especially if the structure is a single load path structure.
Hence, we need confidence in the strength of materials values. This is the main driver for
the large number of samples and therefore the need for statistical reduction to a single
value. The values fall into three main categories.
Typically, B-Basis values are higher (although not always) than A-Basis values. But the
use of these values depends on the type of structure, as noted in the regulation, and
explained more below so keep reading.
(1) Where applied loads are eventually distributed through a single member within an
assembly, the failure of which would result in loss of structural integrity of the
component, 99 percent probability with 95 percent confidence.
What this means is that there are no fail-safe load paths possible in the assembly, and
there is only one primary load path. The failure of this load path results in catastrophic
failure or significant safety issues. In such cases, the more stringent A-Basis strength of
materials must be used.
(2) For redundant structure, in which the failure of individual elements would result in
applied loads being safely distributed to other load carrying members, 90 percent
probability with 95 percent confidence.
In a redundant structure, there are multiple load paths in the assembly. The failure of one
member results in the safe redistribution or redundant load redistribution to other
members in the same assembly. In such cases, B-Basis strength of materials values are
allowed.
An example may be a joint that has multiple fasteners or rivets. If the failure of one
fastener or rivet (negative MS with A-Basis) is shown to safely redistribute the load to the
redundant fasteners or rivets, and has a positive margin using B-Basis, then B-Basis is
acceptable per this regulation.
14 CFR Subpart C Section 25-609 covered important aspects related to the negative
impacts of corrosion, humidity, and other factors on the strength of materials.
It also covers the means of protection against such issues and the positive and negative
side effects of these means of protection. For example, anodizing is used against corrosion
of aluminum alloys, so read that post if you want to learn more.
In this regulation, the main topic is temperature. Temperature, either very hot or very
cold, has the impact of either decreasing or slightly increasing the strength of materials
respectively, if it is strictly based on an estimated temperature reduction factor (TRF).
The effect of any extrapolated TRF increasing the strength of materials allowable value at
low temperatures (well below room temperature) is generally disallowed, and the cut off
is set at "no change" from room temperature value for low temperatures.
But for higher temperatures, the TRF is a factor that is less than 1.0. and must be
multiplied with the strength of materials to determine the actual allowable value under
the temperature environment. The TRF is generally obtained from existing curves
included in MMPDS for a material and temper as well as raw material form.
If you draw a vertical line from 240 Deg. F and intersect with the 10,000-hour exposure
curve, and then read across on the vertical axis, we get TRF = 0.76
Hence, the room temperature ultimate tensile (as well as shear, bearing and Young's
modulus if separate curves are not available for each ultimate value) strength of materials
may be reduced by a factor of 0.76 for calculations purposes. This method or practice may
vary from company to company, but the fact remains that the TRF must be accounted for.
Another important compliance factor is the thermally induced load which may also affect
the induced load within various components. So, thermal loads may have to be added to
or subtracted from a mechanical load case induced load, in a particular component, under
a thermal environment corresponding to that mechanical or aero load case.
There may be situations during the service life cycle of a component, a different material
is required for one time use which was not used before by that manufacturer.
Or, there may be a unique assembly whose collective strength is tested for a one time use
on a particular aircraft application. In such cases, the component or assembly is tested
using close to exact load and constraint conditions, to determine the superior strength.
Of course, the use of safety factors is understood in margin calculations. This is submitted
to the FAA for certification of that part or assembly, instead of using any MMPDS values,
which may be lower than needed. The assumption here is that the part or assembly is not
included in a multiple STC for that design, in other words it is not duplicated and used on
any other application or aircraft except for that one time for an STC.
These concepts can have a significant impact, especially on fatigue strengths, and
therefore also have a significant sizing impact on a component.
For each fitting (a part or terminal used to join one structural member to another), the
following apply:
(a) For each fitting whose strength is not proven by limit and ultimate load tests in
which actual stress conditions are simulated in the fitting and surrounding structures,
a fitting factor of at least 1.15 must be applied to each part of -
(1) For joints made under approved practices and based on comprehensive test
data (such as continuous joints in metal plating, welded joints, and scarf joints
in wood); or
(2) With respect to any bearing surface for which a larger special factor is used.
(c) For each integral fitting, the part must be treated as a fitting up to the point at
which the section properties become typical of the member.
(d) For each seat, berth, safety belt, and harness, the fitting factor specified in
25.785(f)(3) applies.
[Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-23, 35 FR 5674, Apr. 8,
1970; Amdt. 25-72, 55 FR 29776, July 20, 1990]
14 CFR Subpart C Section 25-303 provides guidance on the safety factors related to
limit and ultimate loads. In addition, this regulation requires a factor called the "fitting
factor".
"What is a fitting factor and when do we need to apply this fitting factor?"
The answer varies by company, sometimes the fitting factor can be an obscure thing to
pin down. But, if you were to sum the reason up in one word, it would
be "UNCERTAINTY".
Reading the text in part (a) of this regulation we can interpret it as follows:
Considering a structural load path, if the members along this load path are
not actually tested to the actual loading and stress conditions, instead
certified by analysis, then a fitting factor must be applied to account for the
variability in analysis/material/manufacturing conditions of each part of the
installation, viz.,
For limit and ultimate cases, a fitting factor of 1.15 is applicable (only in cases where
wear and tear is not an issue, or frequent removal and installation is not required).
Panel pin joints also require the 1.15 fitting factor.
The figure below is a schematic of a sandwich panel floor fitting installation (upstream
of the fitting), and its components. Each of these components will require the 1.15 fitting
factor:
So, in what situations can the fitting factor be omitted? Again, this can vary from company
to company.
But typically:
When an actual production assembly is tested and this assembly is used only once, no
fitting factor is necessary
If a joint is manufactured based on a standard process already tested and certified and
allowable values are known from comprehensive tests
If a larger special factor is used for a cast part in the fitting installation, then that part does
not need any other fitting factor
In general, a fitting factor is not required for the sandwich panel checks in cabin interiors
Examples maybe:
Part (d) of this regulation refers to a different regulation that requires a higher 1.33
fitting factor for components subjected to frequent removal and installation or
frequent operation, thus leading to wear and tear.
In some cases, critical components may be made using the casting process, and 14 CFR
Part 25-621 provides guidance on it.
But why is this done? Generally, it is done to reduce manufacturing costs for high
volume ship sets, and cutting down machining and material costs.
For a detailed explanation of the impacts and safety factors, refer to this FAA AC
(Advisory Circular): AC 25.621-1, Casting Factors
14 CFR Part 25-623 provides guidance on pin or fastener joints that may have a
significant gap by design. In such case, the parts will most likely pound each other's
bearing surfaces due to vibration. This has a detrimental impact on the bearing strength
margin. Therefore, a safety factor is used to account for this behavior.
To be safe, in most instances, a DER or an ODA Unit Member or the customer may require
the 1.15 fitting factor for all parts of the load path.
MS = Allowable Load / (FF * Applied Load) - 1 = Allowable Load / (1.15 * Applied Load)
-1
OR
But there may be situations where you get a negative MS with an unnecessary fitting factor
requirement, for example:
The MRB or production stress engineer does not have enough wiggle room in the MS value
in case of a repair or a defect tag
May be there is a change in applied loading
Or a maybe there is a change in part design
In such cases, the 1.15 fitting factor may be negotiated out upon the approval of the
signatory authority (DER) or signatory body (ODA Unit).
How did you use the fitting factor in your own experience? Comment below
the post....
Cheers...
(a) Each compartment for the stowage of cargo, baggage, carry-on articles, and
equipment (such as life rafts), and any other stowage compartment, must be designed
for its placarded maximum weight of contents and for the critical load distribution at
the appropriate maximum load factors corresponding to the specified flight and
ground load conditions, and to those emergency landing conditions of 25.561(b)(3)
for which the breaking loose of the contents of such compartments in the specified
direction could -
(2) Penetrate fuel tanks or lines or cause fire or explosion hazard by damage to
adjacent systems; or
(3) Nullify any of the escape facilities provided for use after an emergency landing.
(b) There must be a means to prevent the contents in the compartments from becoming
a hazard by shifting, under the loads specified in paragraph (a) of this section. For
stowage compartments in the passenger and crew cabin, if the means used is a latched
door, the design must take into consideration the wear and deterioration expected in
service.
[Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-32, 37 FR 3969, Feb. 24,
1972; Amdt. 25-38, 41 FR 55466, Dec. 20, 1976; Amdt. 25-51, 45 FR 7755, Feb. 4, 1980; Amdt.
25-139, 79 FR 59430, Oct. 2, 2014]
[Tweet "http://www.stressebook.com/stowage-compartments/"]
Throughout the cabin of a large aircraft, there can be literally hundreds of different
stowage compartments. Some examples are as follows:
Any of these stowage compartments may face any direction, FWD/Aft or Side or DOWN
directions. In each case, the contents must be secured.
A placard is a small sheet metal label that indicates the maximum certified weight that
the compartment can hold, and other details. There may be thousands of these little
placards in a large aircraft, indicating various things to the cabin crew and passengers.
Stowage compartments restraint devices (doors, latches, quarter turns etc.) must be
certified to the maximum load factors and under the worst possible loading conditions.
For example, consider a large compartment door (loose contents) facing the FWD
direction with a latch at the top and bottom. The worst possible loading would be a bottom
concentrated load with the bottom latch disengaged. Similarly, to account for load shifting
a 60-40 load ratio may be used. This is done to analyze the restraint devices on each side
of the door including the door latch assembly, the door hinge assembly and associated
hardware.
The regulation also mandates full enclosure of stowage compartments for more than 10
seats. This means that the stowage compartments must include doors with latches, or
appropriate restraint devices to enclose the contents completely.
The regulation does not provide any specifics on the density to be used for the contents of
stowage compartments that are meant for miscellaneous stowage. This guidance may be
provided by the DER.
In general, the highest density is 10 lb/ft^3, this may decrease based on the height of the
CG points of the stowage compartments. However, for overhead stowage the DER may
specify 10 lb/ft^3. In addition, there may be DER requirements for higher densities or
rounding off of the placard maximum weights to the nearest 5 lb.
The key to compliance is 'safety'. The contents should not break free due to non-inclusive
loading and result in any of the (1) (2) or (3) conditions as noted in part (a) of the
regulation.
It is possible that the contents within the stowage compartments may shift during flight.
In some cases, this can damage the fiberglass skin of the stowage compartments panels.
For example, standard units or meal carts are usually made from metal casings with sharp
corners. Rub strips and other features not only serve as protection against panel puncture
from these contents, but also to constrain the contents from shifting and imposing
unexpected loading on the restraint devices.
In the case of the cargo areas, the shifting of the baggage can cause huge issues. The
overall CG of the baggage compartment can shift so much that it can be a hazard to safe
flight controls. This is the reason for using cargo nets, strap down nets and other restraint
devices in the cargo bay.
There are two ways to ensure compliance to the 'wear and tear' component of part (b) of
this regulation.
One acceptable way to comply with part (b) is by providing dual latching mechanisms
on the doors of stowage compartments.
On smaller doors, there may be one single latch with two bolts, either both manual or
one spring loaded and one manual.
Latches and quarter turns are restraint devices that are frequently engaged and
disengaged. Dual latch design practice ensures compliance with the wear and tear
requirement. However, each bolt must be shown good for the total load, including the
1.33 wear and tear factor.
The idea is that for certification by analysis purposes, one bolt is assumed to be
disengaged or failed under the ultimate load per 14 CFR Subpart C Section 25-561.
A couple of popular restraint device manufacturers are Actron, and Stealth, check out
their websites for more information.