Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions,

Vol. 7, No. 2, 225234, June 2006

Ante Pavelic, Charisma and National Mission in ]cd

[ot

Wartime Croatia

IVO GOLDSTEIN
University of Zagreb
IvoGoldstein
Totalitarian
1469-0764
Original
Taylor
7202006
ivo.goldstein@zg.htnet.hr
00000June
& Article
10.1080/14690760600642289
FTMP_A_164207.sgm
andFrancis
(print)/1743-9647
Movements
2006 Ltd and Political
Francis (online)Religions

The wartime regime of Poglavnik (leader) Ante Pavelic is well-known internation- ca[cu
e]t

ally. However, whilst mentioned in many books and texts dedicated to the history
of the Balkans, the biography of its leader has never been presented in detail.
Books published outside of Croatia and the former Yugoslavia dealing with this
period of Croatian history have tended to concentrate on other matters, such as
genocide.1 Even inside Croatia, while there are many books which cover this era,
there is not one that examines Pavelics life.2 Pavelic thus remains one of the most
ca[cu
e]t ca[cu
e]t

enigmatic of the fascist dictators from the 1919-45 epoch, with little written about
his ideas, style and relationship to the Croatian people.
Pavelic was born in Bradina in northern Herzegovina on 14 July 1889. He grad-
ca[cu
e]t

uated from the University of Zagrebs Law School in 1918, and was soon to
become active in the Croatian State Rights Party (the HSP Hrvatska stranka prava,
also known as the Frankovci). His first political speech of note was delivered in the
Zagreb District Assembly in 1927, where he called on all Croatian deputies to
unite around the goal of obtaining Croatian independence. Pavelic fled from ca[cu
e]t

Zagreb following King Alexanders proclamation of the dictatorship in January

1929 and, after few months in Austria and Bulgaria, finally settled in Italy.
Secretly, he had already offered Italy territorial concessions in Croatia as well as
Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly on the eastern Adriatic coast, in return for
assistance in the Croat cause.3 With Italian help, he founded the Ustasha
(Croatian Revolutionary Organisation), and in 1932 began publishing the party
newspaper, Ustas a, vijesnik hrvatskih revolucionara (The Ustasha: Herald of Croatian
oacn
rs[]

Revolutionaries). He was also the author of the Principles of the Ustas a Movement, oacn
rs[]

which was published in June 1933. In it, he called for national exclusiveness
(specifically, the refusal to recognise people other than Croats by descent as
having the right to live within Croatia), advocated the Croatian right to all territo-
ries that had belonged to Croatia or which had been inhabited by Croats in the
past, and called for the unconditional rejection of any common state with other
Yugoslav peoples. From the outset the Ustasha roused people against the Serbs.
Promoting violence was an integral part of their movement: Dagger, revolver,
machine-gun and time bomb; these are the bells that will announce the dawn and

Correspondence Address: Dept. of History, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb Ivana Lucica 3,
10000 Zagreb, Croatia. Email: ivo.goldstein@zg.htnet.hr

ISSN 1469-0764 Print/ISSN 1743-9647 Online/06/020225-10 2006 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/14690760600642289
226 I. Goldstein

the resurrection of the Independent State of Croatia was how the Ustas a vijesnik oacn
rs[]

put it in 1932. Pavelic was personally engaged in the organisation of the 1932
ca[cu
e]t

Velebit Uprising in Croatia, and in the assassination of King Alexander in

Marseilles in 1934.
However, Pavelic came to power as head of the Ustasha regime that governed
ca[cu
e]t

the Independent State of Croatia (ISC Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska) from 1941 to zoacn
r[]

1945 through external rather than internal force of arms. Following the Italo-
German led invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941, Pavelic assumed the position ca[cu
e]t

and title of Poglavnik of the ISC, and became both Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister. Pavelic was the main author and propagator of the Ustasha political
ca[cu
e]t

programme a new order, which adopted many of the traits of the contempo-
rary Italian and German models. Racial laws similar to those in Nazi Germany
were proclaimed, leading to the establishment of concentration and death camps,
the declaration of martial law, the repression of political opposition, and the
persecution of Serbs and other minorities, such as the Jews and Gypsies (although
after German pressure, he eased the terror against Serbs in 1942). With the
collapse of Nazi power, Pavelic was forced to flee though until his death in exile
ca[cu
e]t

in 1959, he retained a small charismatic following among those who saw him as
the great modern visionary of Croatian independence.

The Wartime Ustasha Regime

On 6 April 1941, German, Italian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian forces invaded
Yugoslavia from all sides. Four days later the Independent State of Croatia was
proclaimed. The Germans failed in their attempt to persuade Vladko Mac ek, cao
r[n]

leader of the HSS, to form a puppet-government. Mac ek did not wish to cao
r[n]

compromise himself by collaboration with the invaders, and counted on the HSS
retaining popular support during the war. This gave Pavelic and his followers ca[cu
e]t

their opportunity. Pavelic and 300 Ustasha had returned to Croatia with the
ca[cu
e]t

Italian invasion forces, with a similar number returning with the other invading
forces. Prior to this, the only previous Ustasha operation on Yugoslav soil was
when, on 8 April, they convinced two Yugoslav Army regiments (a total of 8,000
troops) to refuse to resist the invaders. On 16 April 1941, in the Croatian capital,
Zagreb, Pavelic formed the first government of Independent Croatia (which
ca[cu
e]t

comprised most of the territories of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina).

New political institutions were organised very quickly and set out both the
most important laws and the state administration. They established a new order,
which featured the cult of the nation, the state and the leader. One of his Pavelics ca[cu
e]t

closest collaborators, Slavko Kvaternik, stated that

in 12 years of his life in exile, Pavelic accepted more than just the authori-
ca[cu
e]t

tarian system of rule, i.e., the system of personal despotism as modelled

by Mussolini. In his eyes, and in his conscience, the state was neither an
organ nor a manifestation of the peoples will, but rather, in the hands of
authoritarian power-holders, it is an instrument and method for ensuring
the obedience and submission of the peoples will.4

The Ustasha programme of June 1941 expressed this totalitarian idea most
concisely. People were told that In the Ustasha state, created by the Poglavnik and
his Ustashas, people must think like Ustashas, speak like Ustashas, and, most
 Charisma and National Mission in Wartime Croatia 227

importantly, they must act like Ustashas. Soon after this, the Ustasha Corps
(Ustas ka vojnica), which only members of the Ustasha could join, was formed.
oacn
rs[]

There is no doubt that the main organiser of the state system was the Poglavnik,
Ante Pavelic. In many less important matters he supplied the general guidelines.
ca[cu
e]t

In important matters it seems that decisions were made in camera: in talks

between ministers, state secretaries, and representatives of the Ustasha head-
office on one hand, and Pavelic on the other. Pavelic kept a tight rein on every-
ca[cu
e]t ca[cu
e]t

thing; he made all decisions on policy and personnel himself.5 Pavelic arbitrarily ca[cu
e]t

broadened and narrowed his circle of close advisers according to circumstances.

Vladimir Kosak, certainly the ablest economic and financial expert among senior
caso
r[n]

Ustasha officials, said that Pavelic sometimes only consulted with the politically
ca[cu
e]t

strong ministers. Kosak bitterly compared Pavelics political style with that of the
caso
r[n] ca[cu
e]t

notorious Italian mert, whilst also mentioning that the latter was very unwill-
ing to convene government meetings.6
Publicly, there was an attempt to create a cult of the leader. For example, a
document dated 20 December 1944 from Ustasha army headquarters defines the
manner in which the Poglavnik ought to be saluted. All members of the ISCs
armed forces were instructed to stop, stand to attention whilst facing him, and
prepare to salute. Once the Poglavnik was six paces away, the salute was to be
given by raising the right arm and holding it there for six paces. Following this,
they were to come to attention, right-face, and then continue on their way.7 The
procedure was not at all simple, and can be taken as proof that Pavelic and his ca[cu
e]t

supporters wished to emphasise the leadership cult, not least in the armed forces.
Vladimir Zidovec, the ISCs ambassador to Bulgaria and an intelligent witness
Z
[cao
rn]

to the events which followed the establishment of the Pavelic regime, believed ca[cu
e]t

that the rabble-rousing slogans such as those made by Mile Budak (the Minister
of Education), including Flee, curs, across the Drina!, and Nik sics May 1941 scao
[rn] ca[cu
e]t

statement that in our revolution, we will wade knee-high in blood,8 reflected

the spirit and thoughts of Dr. Ante Pavelic and of the Ustasha movement as he ca[cu
e]t

envisioned, formed and brought it to life.9 Zidovec thought that this was the only Z
[cao
rn]

serious plan Pavelic brought back with him from exile: the only plan that had
ca[cu
e]t

been conceived and prepared in advance. If we discount his plans about autoc-
racy, Machiavellianism and the policy of manipulation, he did not bring any ideas
about the state, about how it would work or about the people who would be
needed for real constructive work.10
In most cases, the major protagonists of the incredible cruelty and brutality of
the Ustasha regime came from amongst the several hundred Ustasha supporters
who had returned from exile rather than from regular troops. Their rage was at
least partly the result of their frustration after seven years of internment on the
God-forsaken Lipari Islands to the north and north-west of Sicily. Like any group
of rigid revolutionaries, these were relatively young people in whom imprison-
ment and seemingly hopeless for a long time awoke both extreme hatred and
dreams of revenge. When they returned to Croatia in 1941, they were angry with
everyone and anyone.11 Most of them came from poor village families, often in
remote areas where life was cruel in itself. Their behaviour and outlook, therefore,
were deeply opposed to those of the middle-class as well as to ethnic enemies. As
Luburic confirmed in his statement of 5 November 1941: former migrs always
ca[cu
e]t

led our men and camps: camp commanders were always migrs.12 Addition-
ally, in the country itself there had been a few educated extremists who had more
or less openly announced, and indirectly set the stage for, what was to happen.13
228 I. Goldstein

Both groups intention was to establish a totalitarian state organised on the model
of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, and which was to be as ethnically pure as
possible. Passing racial laws and the mass execution of Jews, Serbs, and
Romanies, and other political adversaries were central parts of this programme.
However, whilst the Germans encouraged genocide against the Jews and Roma-
nies, they were not particularly pleased with the execution of Serbs because this
was one of the main factors behind the development and strengthening of Josip
Broz Titos partisan movement.

Support for Pavelic and His Regime

ca[cu
e]t

Judging from how they greeted the German army in Zagreb and elsewhere, and
from various other evidence, most of the Croatian population were pleased by
the defeat of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the Independent State of
Croatia. People were tired of Yugoslavias semi-democracy, which had brought
little other than economic misery and political repression. They were tired also
of politicians who forever promised but who never delivered. Further evidence
of support comes from the growth in the Ustasha. About 2,000 sworn Ustashas
who had been working in the country clandestinely, and who were to form the
backbone of the new government, welcomed Pavelic back. People subsequently
ca[cu
e]t

flocked to join the movement and, by May 1941, its membership had risen to
100,000.
Most Ustasha sympathisers were from the lower and less educated sections of
society, with the movement being particularly popular in the Dinaric mountains
where Serbs and Croats intermingled (an area where the Communists were also
strong, including veterans from the Spanish Civil War). There were, therefore,
undoubtedly socio-economic and negative political reasons for joining the
Ustasha. However, there were unquestionably aspects of Croatian tradition
which helped Pavelics movement. Croatian political culture was such that it was
ca[cu
e]t

striving to find a leader, whatever his orientation. During the 1920s, the leader of
the Croatian Peasant Party, Stjepan Radic, was just such a person. Another
ca[cu
e]t

example of this popular trait can be seen in the manner in which people greeted
King Alexander when he visited Zagreb in January 1931: thousands waited in the
streets of Zagreb to see the dictator.14
Pavelics greatest achievement was, as the people understood, to secure Croat-
ca[cu
e]t

ian independence. The newly independent state was reconstituted after almost
850 years. He was declared the greatest Croat of all times Croatias most
worthy son [who] brought independence and liberty to his homeland and to
his people who had been waiting 800 years for such a leader. In the eyes of the
Croatian people, he had become a living incarnation of the Croatian state, the
Reviver of Croatia.15 In his speech, Slavko Kvaternik stated that the independent
state had been achieved primarily by our leader, Dr Ante Pavelics, self-sacrifice.
ca[cu
e]t

The impression was deliberately created that it was all a result of the enormous
effort which was being made by the Poglavnik.
Pavelic had attempted to establish his charismatic credentials from the move-
ca[cu
e]t

ments very earliest days. In Ustas a: vijesnik hrvatskih revolucionara, and some other
oacn
rs[]

Ustasha documents, Pavelic used the title Poglavnik. This word evoked a certain
ca[cu
e]t

degree of mysticism. Poglavnik was a new word derived from the traditional
peasant cultural figure of poglavar, or clan leader. An additional element in the
development of this fascination was the fact that the word poglavnik evokes a
 Charisma and National Mission in Wartime Croatia 229

person who is unwilling to compromise. From the outset, Pavelic imposed ca[cu
e]t

himself as the leader, the one who would fight the decisive battle:

Usta sa is a grey falcon

scao
[rn]

It flies ready as living lightning

It awaits call from Ante Pavelic ca[cu
e]t

When he will shout with the trumpet from Gri c16 cao
[rn]

Pavelic also exploited the fact that, in 1929, he had been sentenced to death by the
ca[cu
e]t

Yugoslav court for having cooperated with Bulgaria. From that time on he was
believed to be the Yugoslav regimes most fervent opponent, and a symbol of the
struggle for Croatian independence. By the mid-1930s, the letters ZAP (Zivio Z
[cao
rn] Z
[on
arc]

Ante Pavelic Long live Ante Pavelic), started to adorn the streets of Zagreb.
acu
][et ca[cu
e]t

However, prior to 1941 the development of such a cult had obvious limitations:
there was no possibility of mentioning Pavelics name, not even in those (small ca[cu
e]t

circulation) newspapers that could be labelled nationalistic or pro-Nazi. To do so

would result in their immediate closure.
As Vladimir Zidovec has stated, the reason the Ustasha movement came to
Z
[cao
rn]

power in April 1941 was fantastic blind luck.17 Nevertheless, the association of
the founding of an independent Croatia with Pavelic added a further dimension ca[cu
e]t

to his appeal as a man of destiny. The former Austro-Hungarian colonel, Slavko

Kvaternik, one of the leaders of the countrys nationalist movement, read the
proclamation establishing the Independent State of Croatia on Croatian Radio on
10 April 1941: Croats! By Gods providence and the will of our allies, the arduous
and centuries long struggle of the Croatian people, and the great self-sacrifice of
our leader, Dr Ante Pavelic, and the Ustasha movement in this country and
ca[cu
e]t

abroad, it is ordained that this day, on the eve of the Resurrection of the Son of
God, our country, the Independent State of Croatia, shall also be resurrected
(That year Easter was on 13 April).
In his testimony from prison in postwar Yugoslavia, Vladimir Zidovec, the Z
[cao
rn]

Ustasha regimes ambassador to Bulgaria, stated that initially

Pavelic was making a good impression His rugged appearance, his

ca[cu
e]t

expressive lines, his deep and infallible voice, his self-confident behav-
iour, aloofness in conversation all this showed him to be a strong,
deliberate, measured and important person!18

Pavelics appearance and behaviour attracted individuals to him. Even more,

ca[cu
e]t

they attracted the masses he was a representative person in the true sense,
claimed Slavko Kvaternik, During the first months of his rule, he listened to
people and made many promises. Kvaternik stated that, with these manners, he
blinded people, with their becoming fascinated with him. Included amongst
those who were blinded by Pavelics charms were ministers and officials who, for
ca[cu
e]t

that reason, swore that his politics were good.19

Because of their fascination with him, many began to promote his charismatic
appeal. The Minister of Education, Mile Budak, began one speech thus: Brothers
and sisters! I am the one who has the greatest honour that I could have ever
dreamed of. I bring to heroic Gospic and Lika greetings from the Poglavnik! ca[cu
e]t

After his words, the crowd erupted into enthusiastic cries of long live the
Poglavnik. This was repeated at other public demonstrations, where both city-
230 I. Goldstein

dwellers and peasants acclaimed the Poglavnik and the ISC. At the time of the
ISCs creation, Pavelics position within the state was defined by one of the
ca[cu
e]t

regimes first legal acts, which introduced an oath to the Independent State of
Croatia (which was obligatory for all state employees) declaring Pavelic to be the ca[cu
e]t

representative of the ISCs sovereignty.20

Kvaternik stated that Pavelic never experienced sheer joy and cheerfulness in
ca[cu
e]t

his life: In food and drink he was moderate and restrained. Because of this and
other characteristics, Ante Pavelics life seemed, in the eyes of the common
ca[cu
e]t

people, to be arduous and odious.21 To the ordinary man and woman it seemed
as if Pavelic was living only for Croatia, and that he was sacrificing everything for
ca[cu
e]t

his country. Mile Budak told people that if any person feels a deep love for every
part of the country, for each and every stone, then that person is the Poglavnik.
Budak suggested that the people should not be unduly concerned, because the
Poglavnik is here: if anybody knows what can be done it is the Poglavnik.
He went on to describe how, after conversations with Pavelic, things turned out ca[cu
e]t

exactly as the Poglavnik foresaw, because he always knows how things should
be. Thus, even Budak, one of Pavelics closest collaborators, was able to publicly
ca[cu
e]t

renounce his own views and accept the beliefs and will of the Poglavnik: You
have seen Providence leave the Poglavnik ways to solve problems. One article
published in Hrvatski narod in 1942 quoted Pavelics rabble-rousing words againstca[cu
e]t

the Jews from 1940: for centuries the Jews have plundered the Croatian people
in future, in the ISC, they will not be able to do this.22 The article ended with a
declaration: this message shows the genius of that great man, because he foresaw
everything exactly.23
If anti-Semitic propaganda was pervasive, anti-Islamic views were not. The
Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina were considered to be part of the Croatian
nation. The Ustasha state initiated a special policy of winning them over, calling
them the flower of the Croatian nation, and Bosnia the heart of Croatia. Pavelic ca[cu
e]t

was eager to personally emphasise his positive attitude towards Bosnian

Muslims. He was always very willing to mentioning that his earliest education
was at a Muslim school, and that he was seated alone amongst 30 Muslim chil-
dren.24 When he addressed Croatian soldiers, he added Catholic and Muslim.25
It is impossible to determine whether or not Pavelics statements were sincere; ca[cu
e]t

however, there can be no doubt that he wanted to present himself as the unifier of
the Croatian nation.26
The tendency to identify with Pavelic was reinforced by the growing anonymity
ca[cu
e]t

of other leaders and officials.

Following the establishment of the ISC, many of Pavelics collaborators ca[cu

e]t

began to boast and to publicise themselves in the press. Pavelic was ca[cu
e]t

obviously extremely displeased one day the editor-in-chief of every

newspaper received an order stating that from that moment on, they
were prohibited from identifying any Ustasha official by name. All refer-
ences were to be to the individuals office, e.g., the minister of internal
affairs stated this and that, or he was here and there, but strictly no
names were to be published.27

Moreover, the people who criticised what was going on (political terror execu-
tions, and so on) often seem to have supposed that these things were happening
without Pavelics knowledge: They believed that many people had successfully
ca[cu
e]t
 Charisma and National Mission in Wartime Croatia 231

wormed their way to the top, and that they did stupid and improper things
because Pavelic, as a result of spending 12 years in exile, knew so little about
ca[cu
e]t

these people and circumstances.28

Pavelic subdued people by rewarding them with honours, medals, or high
ca[cu
e]t

office, but only until a particular moment.29 Such was the case of Slavko Kvater-
nik, who was given all possible honours until, in the autumn of 1942, being
dismissed from every position he held. Similar things also happened with other
people.30 Furthermore, Pavelic would not tolerate people of high intellect or ca[cu
e]t

strong character to be close to him, important in the state or in public life if

someone enjoyed a good public image, or was regarded as authority, he was, a
priori, his enemy.31 Kvaternik thought that Pavelic had imitated ancient power- ca[cu
e]t

holders with great success, and that he was a true oriental pagan. Kvaternik
believed that Pavelic must have heard and read about Asian despotism during
ca[cu
e]t

his childhood in Bosnia: It is understandable that people could not see through
him and reveal his true character, because he was obsessed by appearance.
Pavelic kept all collaborators at arms length, and did not allow them to enter his
ca[cu
e]t

private life, refusing to allow them even the minimum degree of intimacy or
friendship.
These points help explain why it was not possible for another charismatic
personality to emerge in Ustasha Croatia. The case of Vlado Singer is a good
example. Born in Virovitica, he was a converted Jew who considered himself to be
Croatian.32 Whilst studying in Zagreb, Singer was the main organiser of many
secret student nationalist groups, while publicly he was the student leader of the
Kvaternik Society (a right-wing group). In 1932 he organised demonstrations
against King Aleksandar, and in 1933 published and edited Nas a gruda, the first oacn
rs[]

Ustasha paper to be published in Croatia. Following the publication of its second

issue, Singer was forced into exile, and joined Pavelic in Italy. Despite everything ca[cu
e]t

he did for the Ustasha movement, and the fact that he had been head of the
regimes intelligence service in the first months of ISC, he was arrested in autumn
1941 and deported to Jasenovac concentration camp, where he was killed in 1943.
From his Yugoslav prison cell, Slavko Kvaternik accused Pavelic of Singers ca[cu
e]t

murder. His contention was that Pavelic believed Singer to be dangerous because ca[cu
e]t

he had known Pavelic whilst he was in exile, and was one of the few people who
ca[cu
e]t

spoke openly about Pavelics failings; Singer also appeared to be gathering ca[cu
e]t

support among sections of young people.33 Of course, another important factor

was that Singer was Jewish. It is quite probable that Pavelic feared that the ca[cu
e]t

Germans would object to a person with a Jewish background holding any state
office. Nevertheless, Pavelics animosity towards Singer, and the danger he felt
ca[cu
e]t

that Singer posed to the maintenance of the charisma myth, were almost certainly
the main reasons behind Singers arrest and subsequent execution.34
Nevertheless, charisma cannot simply be created by a leader, no matter how
shrewd or ruthless they need to play on pre-existing longings and sentiments.
This key point is illustrated by Jure Francetic and Rafael Boban, who are exam- ca[cu
e]t

ples of minor leaders with charismatic appeal. The fact that they managed to
become charismatic personalities reveals as much about their supporters as it
does about the nature of the Ustasha regime. Pavelic may even have encouraged ca[cu
e]t

the development of a charismatic myth around both Francetic and Boban. Fran- ca[cu
e]t

cetic was killed by pro-partisan peasants after his aircraft crashed, while Boban
ca[cu
e]t

was a very junior official, and was not in a position in which he could in any way
jeopardise Pavelics own charismatic appeal. Yet both appealed to deep-rooted
ca[cu
e]t
232 I. Goldstein

longings for charismatic leadership. Both were also directly responsible for many
crimes, which again cannot be separated from traditional animosities. They were
personally involved in the preparation and execution of actions that led towards
the fulfilment of Pavelics planned genocide of Serbs and Jews.35
ca[cu
e]t

Anti-Semitism was also present in the Catholic Church too, though relations
between the church and government were complex. The Archbishop of Zagreb,
Alojzije Stepinac, did not want the ISC government to involve the Catholic
Church in the Ustasha regime. His many statements must, therefore, be read with
this in mind. Whilst he was content to see the creation of the Independent State of
Croatia, he was at pains to avoid making any mention of Pavelic: ca[cu
e]t

Must we emphasise that the blood has begun to run faster in our veins,
that our heart has begun to beat with more life? No reasonable person can
censure this because the finger of God implanted love for ones own
people within each human being, and it is Gods commandment!36

At the beginning of June 1941, the Katolic ki list newspaper, which presented the
caor[n]

views of the Zagreb Archbishopric, wrote that: Providence wanted to reward the
Croats faithfulness to the Church of God by the greatest gift that any people
deserve: an independent and sovereign state.37
During its four-year existence, however, relations between the ISC and the
Vatican were far from ideal. There were moments during which tensions were so
great that one could have reasonably expected a complete breakdown of rela-
tions. One observer even thought that the Croatian government was about to
break off all relations with the Vatican, and that the Vatican was ready to excom-
municate Pavelic.38 Some church people were very quick to express their
ca[cu
e]t

disagreement with, and even their opposition to, the regime. Only days after the
establishment of the ISC, Canon Pavao Loncar called Pavelic a spiritual pauper,
cao
r[n] ca[cu
e]t

adding that priests cannot be Ustasha officers. This was a reaction to the more or
less hidden intentions of the regime to subjugate the Church and to exploit it for
its own benefit. Loncar was reported to the Ustasha authorities, and in August
cao
r[n]

1941 he was tried by the Travelling Summary Court and sentenced to death. The
sentence was later commuted to 20 years in prison. He was released at the end of
1943.39 Another example concerns Franjo Richter, a Croat parish priest, who
refused to hold a ceremonial Te Deum for Pavelic on his name day. The Ustasha ca[cu
e]t

arrested him, took him straight to Jasenovac, and executed him as soon as he
arrived at the camp.40

Conclusion
Focusing on these charismatic aspects of Pavelics rule should not detract atten-
ca[cu
e]t

tion from the fact that whilst the regime may have been initially supported by
many disappointment soon set in. The first great blow to Croatian national feel-
ings was the Rome Agreement of 18 May 1941. This pact ceded almost all of
Dalmatia to Italy, as well as much of the Croatian Primorje and a small part of
Gorski Kotar, despite 90 per cent of the population of these regions being
Croatian, with just under 10 per cent being Serbian alongside a negligible number
of Italians. Other disappointments followed. The racial and ethnic persecution of
Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies, in addition to the cruel terror practised on political
opponents, antagonised most of the Croatian population, making them feel
 Charisma and National Mission in Wartime Croatia 233

insecure. The actions of the Ustasha became infamous, even outdoing the Nazis
brutality.
All this was accompanied by serious economic troubles. The ISC had to bear
the expense of German forces on its territory, and had to pay a proportion of the
costs incurred by Italian forces. Italy annexed its maritime and shipbuilding
regions, Hungary took its more-developed agricultural areas and, somewhat
later, the Partisans seized control of almost all agriculture, forestry, and commu-
nications. The urban population was being squeezed, with many on the verge of
starvation.
Even among Pavelics collaborators doubts began to emerge about his fitness to
ca[cu
e]t

rule. In the summer of 1944, two of the more moderate ISC ministers (Vokic and ca[cu
e]t

Lorkovic) conspired to remove the most compromised and most radical Ustasha
ca[cu
e]t

from power, in the hope of establishing contacts with the western Allies and thus
saving Croatia from the Yugoslav Communist Partisans. With the assistance of
the Germans, Ustasha hard-liners, led by Pavelic, crushed the conspiracy and ca[cu
e]t

executed its ringleaders. The Ustasha regime was, therefore, to remain loyal to the
Third Reich until the very end.
Following the defeat of the Axis, Pavelic fled Croatia with his looted property, ca[cu
e]t

and managed to make his way through Austria and Italy before reaching
Argentina. In 1957 he survived an assassination attempt, and was forced to live
under assumed names. He eventually moved to Spain, where he died in 1959.
For some ardent supporters, Pavelics charismatic appeal was lost as a conse-
quence of his fleeing the country in May 1945 rather than staying and fighting to
the death. However, some Croatian nationalists have taken a more positive view,
emphasising that the idea of statehood was Pavelics true historical legacy. They ca[cu
e]t

believed that, despite

all the mistakes and lies, the Croatian people had became and remained
convinced that the Croatian state is something to which they have a right.
Whilst it should not be the Ustasha state, it would certainly be an inde-
pendent Croatia. In this achievement, one is able to see Ante Pavelics ca[cu
e]t

historical greatness!41

As a result, Ante Pavelic continued to be a charismatic personality in some

ca[cu
e]t

Croatian migr circles, as well as amongst some Croatians remaining in Croatia

after 1945. This aspect, however, must be the subject of another paper.

Notes
1. L. Hory, M. Broszat, Der Kroatische Ustascha-Staat (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1964); J.
Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); E. Paris, Genocide in Satellite Croatia (1941-1945): A Record of
Racial and Religious Persecutions and Massacres, (Melbourne: Srpska Misao, 1981).
2. B. Krizman, Ante Pavelic i usta s e (Zagreb: Globus, 1983); B. Krizman, NDH izmed u Hitlera i Musso-
cau
[]et casor[n] dork[t]s

linija (Zagreb: Globus, 1986).

3. I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, 7/5 (1967), pp.302-5.
4. N. Kisi c-Kolanovi c, Vojskovod a i politika, sjec anja Slavka Kvaternika (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za
ca[cu
e]t ca[cuet] dork[t]s cau
[]et

povijest, 1997), p.179.

5. J. Jareb, Pola stoljec a hrvatske politike (Buenos Aires: Knji znica Hrvatske revije [knj. 4], 1960 [Zagreb:
cau
[]et zo
acr[n]

Institut za suvremenu povijest, 1995]), p.94.

6. Hrvatski Dr zavni Arhiv (HDA - Croatian State Archives), MUP SRH, 013.0.49, Part II, 151, 169;
zcao
[rn]

179; Omert an oath of silence, a pact of silence in the Mafia. See also N. Kisi c-Kolanovi c, ca[cuet] ca[cuet]
234 I. Goldstein

Podr zavljenje imovine Zidova u NDH, Casopis za Suvremenu Povijest 3 (1998), p.440, and S.
z[cao
rn] Z
[cao
rn] C
[on
arc]

Kvaternik and V. Ko sak, V, Historijat usta skog pokreta i NDH, HDA MUP SRH 013.0.2 (1947), caso
r[n] caso
r[n]

p.309.
7. HDA, Folder Ustaska vojnica, Box 3, 2077/939. caso
r[n]

8. The River Drina marks the frontier between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, and was, in those
times, the frontier between the Independent State of Croatia and Serbia. See also, I. Goldstein, The
Boundry on the Drina - the meaning and the development of the mythologem, in Myths and
Boundaries in South Eastern Europe, ed. P. Kolsto (London: Hurst Publications, 2005) 77105.
9. D. Stupari c (ed.), Tko je tko u NDH (Zagreb: Minerva, 1995), p.296. ca[cu
e]t

10. V. Zidovec, Moje sudjelovanje u politickom zivotu, HDA MUP SRH 013.0.56 (1947), p.138.
Z
[cao
rn] cao
r[n] zcao
[rn]

11. Krizman, Ante Pavelic (note 2), pp.564-74.

12. HDA MUP RH, File II/91, Box 150, USIKS 337/41, 814.
13. I. Goldstein, Holokaust u Zagrebu (Zagreb: Novi Liber and Zidovska Op cina Zagreb, 2001), pp.89 ff. Z
[cao
rn] ca[cuet]

14. See the press for that period, for example, Jutarnji list (Zagreb) and Politika (Belgrade).
15. Hrvatska Sloboda, Glasilo Hrvatskog usta skog pokreta u Karlovcu, 8, Karlovac 13, VI (1941), scao
[rn]

pp.1, 8.
16. Usta s a, September 1932. Gric is a hill in Zagreb where the most important state institutions are
casor[n]

positioned.
17. Zidovec, (note 10), p.54.
Z
[cao
rn]

18. Ibid., p.39.

19. Kisi c-Kolanovi c, (note 4), pp.166-67, 187.
ca[cuet] ca[cuet]

20. P. Po zar, Usta s a: Dokumenti o usta s kom pokretu (Zagreb: Zagrebacka stvarnost, 1995), p.138.
zc[ao
rn] casor[n] casor[n] cao
r[n]

21. Kisi c-Kolanovi c, (note 4), p.171.

ca[cuet] ca[cuet]

22. Po zar, (note 20), p.120; Goldstein, (note 13), pp.97-8.

zca[o
rn]

23. Hrvatski narod, 7 August 1942.

24. Hrvatski narod, 24 April 1941.
25. Cited in M. Bzik, Usta s ka pobjeda (Zagreb: Glavni usta ski stan, 1942). casor[n] caso
r[n]

26. I. Goldstein, Usta s ka ideologija o Hrvatima muslimanske vjere i odgovor u c asopisu Handz ar (Sarajevo: casor[n] caor[n] zoacn
r[]

Akademija nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, 2005); E. Red zi c, Sto godina muslimanske zcao
[rn] ca[cuet]

politike: u tezama i kontraverzama istorijske nauke (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju Akademije nauka i
umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, 2000); E. Red zi c BiH u Drugom svjetskom ratu (Sarajevo: Institut zc[ao
rn] ca[cuet]

za istoriju Akademije nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, 1998); Hrvatski narod, 24 April 1941.
27. Zidovec, (note 10), p.48.
Z
[cao
rn]

28. Ibid., p.32.

29. Ibid., p.53.
30. See the case of General Ante Voki c, Armed Forces Minister, in Tomasevich (note 1). ca[cuet]

31. Kisi c-Kolanovi c, (note 4), p.170.

ca[cuet] ca[cuet]

32. Stupari c, (note 9), p.359. ca[cuet]

33. Kvaternik and Ko sak (note 6), pp.45, 151, 201-2, 310; E. D. Kvaternik, Sje c anja i zapa z anja 1925-1945 scao
[rn] ca[u]et zca[orn]

(Zagreb: Nakladnicko dru stvo Star cevi c, 1995), p.131. cao

r[n] caso
r[n] ca[o
rn] ca[cuet]

34. MUP SRH, 013.0.4, Folder Dr Ante Paveli c, The Ustasha movement and the Poglavnik of the ISC Ante ca[cuet]

Paveli c , HDA, p.92. ca[u]et

35. Stupari c, (note 9), pp.42, 117-8. ca[cuet]

36. NAZ (Nadbiskupski arhiv u Zagrebu), Folder Prezidijalni spisi, 59/1941; Hrvatski glas, 1 May
1941; J. Kri sto, Katolic ka crkva i Nesavisna Drzava Hrvatska II, (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za sc[ao
rn] oacn
r[]

povijest, 1998) pp.34-5.

37. Katolic ki list, 21-22/1941. oacn
r[]

38. Zidovec, (note 10), p.56.

Z
[cao
rn]

39. NAZ, Folder Prezidijalni spisi 135/1941; Katolic ki list, 34/1941; Katolic ki list, 1/1943; S. Ko zul, oacn
r[] oacn
r[] zc[ao
rn]

Spomenica z rtvama ljubavi zagrebac ke nadbiskupije (Zagreb: Nadbiskupski duhovni stol, 1992),
zca[orn] oacn
r[]

pp.335-7; NAZ, Lonc ar: 1175; V. Ma cek, Memoari (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod znanje Hrvatska oacn
r[] ca[o
rn]

selja cka stranka, 1992), p.160.

ca[o
rn]

40. A. Ciliga, Sam kroz Europu u ratu (Rome: Na pragu sutra snjice, 1978). sc[ao
rn]

41. Zidovec, (note 10), p.61.

Z
[cao
rn]