LABREV - POLENGPAULING
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS/BASIS
i. Art. II, Sec. 10 (Social Justice)
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all
phases of national development.
ii. Art. II, Sec. 18 (Protection to Labor Clause)
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social
economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare.
iii. Art. III, Sec. 8 (Right to Organize Unions)
Section 8. The right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
iv. Art. XIII, Sec. 3 (Protection to Labor Clause)
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor,
local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
B. CIVIL CODE
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared
responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes,
including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and
employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in
the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to
reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and
growth.
v. Art. XIII, Sec. 14 (Protection of Women)
Section 14. The State shall protect working women by
providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into
account their maternal functions, and such facilities and
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable
them to realize their full potential in the service of the
nation.
i. Art. 1700
Article 1700. The relations between capital and labor are
not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts must yield to the common
good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special
1
LABREV - POLENGPAULING
laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and
lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of
labor and similar subjects.
ii. Art. 1702
Article 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all
labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety
and decent living for the laborer.
C. DEFINITIONS
i. Labor Law
It is the body of statutes, rules, regulations, doctrines and
principles governing the relations, interactions or dynamics
between labor and capital, which include but not limited to
their rights, obligations and liabilities.
LABOR LAW - The law governing the rights and duties of
the employer and employees (1) with respect to the terms
and conditions of employment and (2) with respect to labor
disputes arising from collective bargaining respecting such
terms and conditions.
ii. Labor Standards
Labor standards law is that part of labor law which
prescribes the minimum terms and conditions of
employment which the employer is required to grant to its
employees.
As defined in the case of Maternity Childrens Hospital vs.
Sec of Labor [G.R. No. 78909. June 30,1989], Labor
Standards refers to the minimum requirements prescribed
by existing laws, rules and regulations relating to wages,
hours of work, cost-of-living allowance, and other monetary
and welfare benefits, including occupational safety, and
health standards.
These are laws which set out the minimum terms,
conditions and benefits of employment that the employers
must provide or comply with and to which employees are
entitled as a matter of legal right. Labor standards, as
defined more specially by jurisprudence, are the minimum
requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules and
regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living
allowance, and other monetary and welfare benefits,
including occupational, safety and health standards
(Maternity Children's Hospital vs. Secretary of Labor,
G.R. No. 78909, 30 June 1989).
iii. Labor Relations
Labor relations law is that part of labor law (Book V of the
Labor Code) which deals with unionism, collective
bargaining, grievance machinery, voluntary arbitration,
strike, picketing and lockout.
Labor Relations refers to the law which seeks to stabilize
the relation between employers and employees, to forestall
and thresh out their differences through the
encouragement of collective bargaining and the settlement
of labor disputes through conciliation, mediation and
arbitration.
These are the body of laws, which have for its purpose, the
harmonization of the relationship between labor and
management, through institutional mechanism, whether
individually or collective, by means of compulsory or
voluntary arbitration, conciliation and mediation. The end
objective of labor law, is the attainment of industrial peace
in company level in particular and in the industrial front
in general.
iv. Social Legislation/Welfare Laws
These refer to the special laws and statutes impressed with
public interest, the enactment of which by the legislature is
geared to flesh-out the Constitution's social justice
provisions, their intendment being the welfare of society as
a whole and the working class in particular.
Social Legislation comprises the general laws that are supposed to protect
the welfare of the public in general. Part of this would be the Social
Security Law, the Employees Compensation Commission and the revised
GSIS Act. The Agrarian Reforms Law is also included. The basis of all these
enactments and legislations is SOCIAL JUSTICE.
2
LABREV - POLENGPAULING
Art. 223. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
A. Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty
(30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for
decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the
following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that
workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages
arising from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code,
including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;
and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security,
Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from
employer-employee relations, including those of persons in
domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied
with a claim for reinstatement.
B. The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters.
C. Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the
Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.
Article 288. Termination by Employer
An employer an terminate an employment for any of the following causes
a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representatives in connection with
his work;
b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized representative;
d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or
his duly authorized representatives; and
e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Article 289. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel
The employer may also terminate the employment of any
employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of
the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the
workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month
before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to installation
of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be
entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or
to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in case of closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6)
months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.
Article 290. Disease as Ground for Termination
An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has
been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as to
the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay
equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2) month
salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least
6 months shall be considered as one whole year.
3
LABREV - POLENGPAULING
Article 291. Termination by Employee
(a) An employee may terminate without just cause the employee-employer
relationship by serving a written notice on the employer at least in month
in advance. The employer upon whom no such notice was served may hold
the employee liable for damages.
(b) An employee may put an end to the relationship without serving any
notice on the employer for any of the following just causes:
1. Serious insult by the employer or his representative on the
honor and person of the employee;
2. Inhuman and unbearable treatment accorded the employee by
the employer or his representative;
3. Commission of a crime or offense by the employer of his
representative against the person of the employee or any of the
immediate members of his family; and
4. Other causes analogous to any of the foregoing.
CASES
CALALANG VS WILLIAMS
FACTS: Maximo Calalang brought a Petition for a writ of Prohibition against
the respondents alleging that the National Traffic Commission, in its
resolution, recommend to the Director and Secretary of Public Works that
the animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the Rosario
Street extending from Plaza Calderon dela Barca to Dasmarinas St from
7:30am 12:30pm and from 1:30PM 5:30PM and along Rizal Avenue
crossing to Antipolo St to Echague St from 7AM 11PM from a period of 1
YEAR.
The Chairman of NTC recommended to the Director with the
approval of the Secretary to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate
and control the use and traffic on national roads. The indorsement was
later on approved.
Calalangs Contention: As a consequence of the enforcement, all
animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in
the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but
of the riding public as well.
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of
infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.
ISSUE: WON the rules and regulations infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all the people.
HELD: NO!
The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not
through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a
4
LABREV - POLENGPAULING
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption
of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society
and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all
groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with
the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
greatest good to the greatest number."
PASEI vs DRILON
FACTS: PASEI is a firm primarily engaged in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female, for overseas placement. PASEI challenges the
constitutional validity of DO 1 entitled GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS.
PASEIs Contention: The measure is assailed for "discrimination against
males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of
the right to travel.
OSG: Invokes Valid exercise of Police Power.
ISSUE:WON the DO is valid under the Constitution.
HELD: YES!
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction.
It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon
liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not
capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested
measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order
No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby
make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that
"equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not import a
perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are
not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
members of the same class. 16
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female
workers rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight
that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic
servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few
cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment
suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of
torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling
motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of
Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of
exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's
efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first
place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our
men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical predicament. The
petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act
similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not
impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women.
What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that
women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances)
and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government
acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable
demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot,
however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply
no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that
insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that
distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is
justified.
5
LABREV - POLENGPAULING
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to
the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed
objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino
female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of
the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on
deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it
is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is
clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal
measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ." 18), meaning to
say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater
degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is
possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances of
each case.
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable
to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all
Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had
the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have
been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of
them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits
is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an
existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or
resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of
persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but
not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection
clause of the Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as
a law that "takes property from A and gives it to B." 21 It would be an
unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and needless
to state, an invalid act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the classification is
based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and
stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to
recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural
minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an
element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for
the law ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory
legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult to refute
the assertion of denial of equal protection." 23 In the case at bar, the
assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and
not the contrary.)
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of
employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more
paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent,
just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to
send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot
satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these
circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our
toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and
economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government
has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute,
of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its
duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
C. ALCANTARA & SONS VS CA
FACTS: C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc., (the Company) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the manufacture and processing of plywood. Nagkahiusang
Mamumuo sa Alsons-SPFL (the Union) is the exclusive bargaining agent of
the Companys rank and file employees. The Company and the Union
entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that bound them to
hold no strike and no lockout in the course of its life. At some point the
parties began negotiating the economic provisions of their CBA but this
ended in a deadlock, prompting the Union to file a notice of strike. After
efforts at conciliation by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
failed, the Union conducted a strike vote that resulted in an overwhelming
majority of its members favoring it. The Union reported the strike vote to
the DOLE and, after the observance of the mandatory cooling-off period,
went on strike.
The Company, on the other hand, filed a petition with the Regional
Arbitration Board to declare the Unions strike illegal, 5 citing its violation of
the no strike, no lockout, provision of their CBA. LA: Illegal for being
violative of the CBA provision. NLRC: affirmed the decision of LA.
ISSUE: WON the waiver of Strike and Lockout is contrary to the laws or
Constitution.
HELD: NO!
6
LABREV - POLENGPAULING
A strike may be regarded as invalid although the labor union has
complied with the strict requirements for staging one as provided in Article
263 of the Labor Code when the same is held contrary to an existing
agreement, such as a no strike clause or conclusive arbitration
clause.19 Here, the CBA between the parties contained a "no strike, no
lockout" provision that enjoined both the Union and the Company from
resorting to the use of economic weapons available to them under the law
and to instead take recourse to voluntary arbitration in settling their
disputes.
No law or public policy prohibits the Union and the Company from
mutually waiving the strike and lockout maces available to them to give
way to voluntary arbitration. Indeed, no less than the 1987 Constitution
recognizes in Section 3, Article XIII, preferential use of voluntary means to
settle disputes. Thus
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility
between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary
modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their
mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The Court finds no compelling reason to depart from the findings of
the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA regarding the illegality of the
strike. Social justice is not one-sided. It cannot be used as a badge
for not complying with a lawful agreement.
ST. MARY ACADEMY VS PALACIO
FACTS: ST Mary hired CALIBOD, LAQUIO, SANTANDER, SAILE AND
MONTEDERAMOS as classroom teachers and PALACIO as guidance
counsellor. In letters sent to respondents, petitioner informed that their re-
application for school year 2000-2001 could not be accepted because they
failed to pass the LET; that they could not continue practicing because of
DECS MEMO which requires the incumbent teachers to register as
professional teachers under Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of
1994.
They filed a complaint contesting their termination as highly
irregular and premature. Argued that although they are non-board passers,
they entitled to security of tenure and could not be simply trampled upon
their failure to register with PRC.
Petitioner on the other hand contend that they were informed of
their obligation to comply with the mandate of DECS fixing the deadline to
register on Sept. 19, 2000 so it decided to terminate their services as early
as March 31, 2000. Petitioner insists that it has the right to terminate
respondents services as early as March 2000 without waiting for the
September 19, 2000 deadline set by law for respondents to register as
professional teachers due to the need to fix the school organization prior to
the applicable school year. Petitioner justifies respondents termination by
advancing that it would be difficult to hire licensed teachers in the middle
of the school year as respondents replacements. Also, the termination of
respondents in the middle of the school year might result in compromising
the education of the students as well as the school operation. Petitioner
further argues that it cannot hire respondents for the period covering only
June to September as it would contravene the DECSs policy requiring
written contracts of at least one years duration for teachers.
LA: illegally dismissed. Termination was clearly prior to the
September 19, 2000 deadline.
NLRC: affirmed.
CA: affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the termination was illegal.
HELD: YES!
The dismissal of Teresita Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander, and
Montederamos was premature and defeated their right to security of
tenure. Sailes dismissal has legal basis for lack of the required
qualification needed for continued practice of teaching.
Pursuant to RA 7836, the PRC formulated certain rules and regulations
relative to the registration of teachers and their continued practice of the
teaching profession. Specific periods and deadlines were fixed within which
incumbent teachers must register as professional teachers in consonance
with the essential purpose of the law in promoting good quality education
by ensuring that those who practice the teaching profession are duly
licensed and are registered as professional teachers.
7
LABREV - POLENGPAULING
Under DECS Memorandum No. 10, S. 1998, the Board for Professional
Teachers (BPT), created under the general supervision and administrative
control of the PRC, was organized on September 20, 1995 so that, in the
implementation of Sections 26, 27 and 31 of RA 7836, incumbent teachers
as of December 16, 1994 have until September 19, 1997 to register as
professional teachers. The Memorandum further stated that a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was subsequently entered into by the
PRC, Civil Service Commission (CSC) and DECS to further allow those
teachers who failed to register by September 19, 1997 to continue their
service and register. BPT Resolution No. 600, s. 1997 was thereafter passed
to provide the guidelines23 to govern teacher registration beyond
September 19, 1997. Consequently, the deadline was moved to September
19, 2000.
Pursuant to the aforestated law, resolution and memorandum, effective
September 20, 2000, only holders of valid certificates of registration, valid
professional licenses and valid special/temporary permits can engage in
teaching in both public and private schools. 24 Clearly, respondents, in
the case at bar, had until September 19, 2000 to comply with the
mandatory requirement to register as professional teachers. As
respondents are categorized as those not qualified to register
without examination, the law requires them to register by taking
and passing the licensure examination.
Petitioners contentions are not tenable. First, even if respondents
contracts stipulate for a period of one year in compliance with DECSs
directive, such stipulation could not be given effect for being violative of
the law. Provisions in a contract must be read in conjunction with statutory
and administrative regulations. This finds basis on the principle "that an
existing law enters into and forms part of a valid contract without the need
for the parties expressly making reference to it." 27 Settled is the rule
that stipulations made upon the convenience of the parties are
valid only if they are not contrary to law. 28 Hence, mere reliance
on the policy of DECS requiring yearly contracts for teachers
should not prevent petitioner from retaining the services of
respondents until and unless the law provides for cause for
respondents dismissal.
Petitioners intention and desire not to put the students education
and school operation in jeopardy is neither a decisive consideration for
respondents termination prior to the deadline set by law. Again, by setting
a deadline for registration as professional teachers, the law has allowed
incumbent teachers to practice their teaching profession until
September 19, 2000, despite being unregistered and unlicensed.
The prejudice that respondents retention would cause to the schools
operation is only trivial if not speculative as compared to the consequences
of respondents unemployment. Because of petitioners predicament, it
should have adopted measures to protect the interest of its teachers as
regular employees. As correctly observed by the CA, petitioner should have
earlier drawn a contingency plan in the event there is need to terminate
respondents services in the middle of the school year. Incidentally,
petitioner did not dispute that it hired and retained other teachers who do
not likewise possess the qualification and eligibility and even allowed them
to teach during the school year 2000-2001. This indicates petitioners
ulterior motive in hastily dismissing respondents.
It is incumbent upon this Court to afford full protection to labor.
Thus, while we take cognizance of the employers right to protect its
interest, the same should be exercised in a manner which does not
infringe on the workers right to security of tenure. "Under the
policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to
accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane
justification that those with less privilege in life should have more
in law."29
To reiterate, this Court will not hesitate to defend respondents
right to security of tenure. The premature dismissal from the service
of respondents Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander and
Montederamos is unwarranted. However, we take exception to the
case of respondent Saile who, as alleged by petitioner, was not qualified to
take the LET as she only had three out of the minimum 10 required
educational units to be admitted to take the LET pursuant to Section 15 of
RA 7836,30 which fact respondent Saile did not refute. Not being qualified
to take the examination to become a duly licensed professional teacher,
petitioner cannot be compelled to retain her services as she cannot
possibly obtain the needed prerequisite to allow her to continue practicing
the teaching profession. Thus, we find her termination just and legal.
MATERNITY CHILDRENS HOSPITAL VS SEC OF LABOR (mahaba at
medyo magulo, basta kahit daw ung date ng filing complaint ay
hindi covered sa EO 111 kung saan may jurisdiction ang Regional
Directors to award money claims under Art 128, nonetheless, sa
mga previous PDs may power daw ang Regional Directors to award
money claims so long na may EE relationship. Basta parang
ganyan :)
FACTS: Petitioner is a semi-governmental hospital. It has 41 employees.
Aside from salary and living allowances, the employees are given food, but
the amount spent thereof is deducted from their respective salaries.
8
LABREV - POLENGPAULING
10 employees of the petitioner employed in different capacities/positions
filed a complaint with the Office of the Regional Director of Labor and
Employment for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAS.
The Director ordered the inspection and based on the findings, the
Regional Director issued an Order directing payment of 723,888.58
representing underpayment of wages and ECOLAS to all petitioners
employees.
arbiter. . . . (dati daw ay ito, cannot award money
claims, pero..)
We believe, however, that even in the absence of E. O. No. 111, Regional
Directors already had enforcement powers over money claims,
effective under P.D. No. 850, issued on December 16, 1975, which
transferred labor standards cases from the arbitration system to the
enforcement system.

Petitioner appealed and questioned the authority of the Regional Director
to award salary differentials and ECOLAS to private respondents alleging
that the original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims should be
properly lodged to LA.
ISSUE: WON the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case and if so,
the extent of coverage of any award that should be forthcoming, arising
from his visitorial and enforcement powers under Art 128 of the Labor
Code.
Under the then Labor Code therefore (PD 442 as amended by PD 570-a, as
further amended by PD 850), there were three adjudicatory units: The
Regional Director, the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Arbiter. It
became necessary to clarify and consolidate all governing provisions on
jurisdiction into one document. 2 On April 23, 1976, MOLE Policy
Instructions No. 6 was issued, and provides in part (on labor standards
cases) as follows:
POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 6

HELD: YES! TO: All Concerned

This is a labor standards case, and is governed by Art. 128-b of the Labor SUBJECT: DISTRIBUTION OF JURISDICTION OVER LABOR
Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111. Labor standards refer to the minimum CASES
requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules, and regulations relating to
wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and xxx xxx xxx
welfare benefits, including occupational, safety, and health standards
(Section 7, Rule I, Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the
Regional Office, dated September 16, 1987). 1 Under the present rules, a 1. The following cases are under
Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money Regional Director.
claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee relationship, and
the findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer a) Labor standards cases
concerned. arising from violations of
labor standard
Prior to the promulgation of E.O. No. 111 on December 24, 1986, the laws discovered in the
Regional Director's authority over money claims was unclear. The course of inspection or
complaint in the present case was filed on May 23, 1986 when E.O. No. 111 complaints where
was not yet in effect, and the prevailing view was that stated in the case employer-employee
of Antonio Ong, Sr. vs. Henry M. Parel, et al., G.R. No. 76710, dated relations still exist;
December 21, 1987, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the Regional Director, in the exercise of his visitorial
and enforcement powers under Article 128 of the Labor 2. The following cases are under
Code, has no authority to award money claims, the exclusive original jurisdiction of
properly falling within the jurisdiction of the labor
9
LABREV - POLENGPAULING
the Conciliation Section of the Regional course of inspection, or d) there is no more employer-
Office: employee relationship.

a) Labor standards cases
where employer-employee
relations no longer exist;
xxx xxx xxx
6. The following cases are certifiable to the
Labor Arbiters:
a) Cases not settled by the
Conciliation Section of the
Regional Office, namely:
The purpose is clear: to assure the worker the rights
and benefits due to him under labor standards
laws without having to go through arbitration. The
worker need not litigate to get what legally belongs
to him. The whole enforcement machinery of the
Department of Labor exists to insure its expeditious
delivery to him free of charge. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the foregoing, a complaining employee who was denied his rights
and benefits due him under labor standards law need not litigate. The
Regional Director, by virtue of his enforcement power, assured
"expeditious delivery to him of his rights and benefits free of
charge", provided of course, he was still in the employ of the firm.

1) labor standard cases
where employer-employee
relations no longer exist;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Viewed in the light of PD 850 and read in coordination with MOLE Policy
Instructions Nos. 6, 7 and 37, it is clear that it has always been the
intention of our labor authorities to provide our workers immediate access
(when still feasible, as where an employer-employee relationship still
exists) to their rights and benefits, without being inconvenienced by
arbitration/litigation processes that prove to be not only nerve-wracking,
but financially burdensome in the long run.

MOLE Policy Instructions No. 7 (undated) was likewise subsequently issued,
enunciating the rationale for, and the scope of, the enforcement power of
the Regional Director, the first and second paragraphs of which provide as
follows:
POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 7
TO: All Regional Directors
SUBJECT: LABOR STANDARDS CASES
Under PD 850, labor standards cases have been taken from
the arbitration system and placed under the enforcement
system, except where a) questions of law are involved as
determined by the Regional Director, b) the amount
involved exceeds P100,000.00 or over 40% of the equity of
the employer, whichever is lower, c) the case requires
evidentiary matters not disclosed or verified in the normal
Note further the second paragraph of Policy Instructions No. 7 indicating
that the transfer of labor standards cases from the arbitration system to
the enforcement system is
. . to assure the workers the rights and benefits due to him
under labor standard laws, without having to go through
arbitration. . .
so that
. . the workers would not litigate to get what legally
belongs to him. .. ensuring delivery . . free of charge.
Social justice legislation, to be truly meaningful and rewarding to our
workers, must not be hampered in its application by long-winded
arbitration and litigation. Rights must be asserted and benefits received
with the least inconvenience. Labor laws are meant to promote, not
defeat, social justice.

10
LABREV - POLENGPAULING
The Regional Director correctly applied the award with respect to
those employees who signed the complaint, as well as those who did not
sign the complaint, but were still connected with the hospital at the time
the complaint was filed (See Order, p. 33 dated August 4, 1986 of the
Regional Director, Pedrito de Susi, p. 33, Rollo).
The enforcement power of the Regional Director cannot legally be
upheld in cases of separated employees. Article 129 of the Labor Code,
cited by petitioner (p. 54, Rollo) is not applicable as said article is in aid of
the enforcement power of the Regional Director; hence, not applicable
where the employee seeking to be paid underpayment of wages is
already separated from the service. His claim is purely a money claim
that has to be the subject of arbitration proceedings and therefore within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
PAL VS SANTOS
FACTS: Individual respondents were all port stewards and their duties and
responsibilities, among others, are preparing meal orders and checklist,
setting up standards equipment in accordance with the requirements of
the type of service for each flight; skiing, binning and inventorying of
Commisary supplies and equipment.
On several occasions, several deductions were made from their
salary. The deductions represented losses of inventoried items charged to
them for mishandling of company properties.
Private respondents filed a formal grievance. The topics which the
union wanted to be discussed in the said grievance were the
illegal/questionable salary deductions and inventory of bonded goods and
merchandise being done by catering service personnel which they believed
should not be their duty. However, the grievance officer was on vacation
leave. As there was no reply made and considering that petitioner had only
five days to resolve the grievance as provided in CBA, said grievance as
believed by them was deemed resolved in their favor.
When Abad (grievance officer) returned, he scheduled a meeting
and resolved the issue by denying the petition of respondents and ordered
the validity of reduction to only 1/10 of the selling price.
As for the failure of the respondents to conduct a ramp inventory,
the penalty of suspension was imposed against them. After the penalty of
suspension was meted down, PALEA (union) asked for the lifting of the said
penalty. Petitioner stood pat on the validity of the suspension. Hence
respondents filed with the LA a complaint for illegal suspension. LA
dismissed the petition while the NLRC reversed and ordered that the
suspension was illegal.
ISSUE: WON NLRC acted with GAD in rendering the aforementioned
decision.
HELD: NO!
It is a fact that the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring
classes, not only because the Constitution imposes such sympathy, but
because of the one-sided relation between labor and capital. 9 The
constitutional mandate for the promotion of labor is as explicit as it is
demanding. The purpose is to place the workingman on an equal plane
with management with all its power and influence in negotiating for
the advancement of his interests and the defense of his rights. 10 Under the
policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the
interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with
less privileges in life should have more privileges in law. 11
It is clear that the grievance was filed with Mr. Abad's secretary during his
absence. 12 Under Section 2 of the CBA aforequoted, the division head shall
act on the grievance within five (5) days from the date of presentation
thereof, otherwise "the grievance must be resolved in favor of the
aggrieved party." It is not disputed that the grievants knew that division
head Reynaldo Abad was then "on leave" when they filed their grievance
which was received by Abad's secretary. 13 This knowledge, however,
should not prevent the application of the CBA.
Contrary to petitioner's submission, 15 the grievance of employees is not a
matter which requires the personal act of Mr. Abad and thus could not be
delegated. Petitioner could at least have assigned an officer-in-charge to
look into the grievance and possibly make his recommendation to Mr.
Abad.
As respondent NLRC has pointed out, Abad's failure to act on the matter
may have been due to petitioner's inadvertence, 16 but it is clearly too
much of an injustice if the employees be made to bear the dire effects
thereof. Much as the latter were willing to discuss their grievance with their
employer, the latter closed the door to this possibility by not assigning
someone else to look into the matter during Abad's absence. Thus, private
respondents should not be faulted for believing that the effects of the CBA
in their favor had already stepped into the controversy.
11
LABREV - POLENGPAULING
If the Court were to follow petitioner's line of reasoning, it would be easy
for management to delay the resolution of labor problems, the complaints
of the workers in particular, and hide under the cloak of its officers being
"on leave" to avoid being caught by the 5-day deadline under the CBA. If
this should be allowed, the workingmen will suffer great injustice for they
will necessarily be at the mercy of their employer. That could not have
been the intendment of the pertinent provision of the CBA, much less the
benevolent policy underlying our labor laws.
SERRANO VS GALLANT
FACTS: Antonio Serrano worked as Second Officer for respondent
recruitment agency and its foreign principal, Marlow Navigation with a
fixed term of 12 months. At the time of his repatriation, he had served only
2 months and 7 days of his contract, leaving an expired portion of 9
months and 23 days. Petitioners dismissal was declared illegal and he was
awarded, under the prevailing rule, US$ 8,770.00 representing the salary
for 3 months of the unexpired portion of the contract in accordance with
the provisions RA 8042. Petitioner claims that he is entitled to all his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract and not just the 3 months
of the unexpired portion.
He further questioned the constitutionality of the said clause of Sec
10, that:
1. It unduly impairs the freedom of OFWS to negotiate in their
employment contracts a determinate employment period and a fixed
salary package.
2. It impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWS
differently from local Fil workers by putting a cap on the amount of lump
sum salary to which OFWS are entitled in case of illegal dismissal, while
setting no limit to the same monetary award for local workers when their
dismissal is declared illegal;
3. The disparate treatment is not reasonable as there is no
substantial distinction between the two groups; and that it defeats Section
18, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees the protection of the
rights and welfare of all Filipino workers, whether deployed locally or
overseas.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to all his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his contract and not just the 3 months of the unexpired portion.
HELD: YES!
1. The subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious
impact on, OFWS at three levels:
First, OFWS with the employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis
OFWS with employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWS with employment contracts of more than one year;
and
Third, OFWS vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment.
the illegally dismissed OFW with employment contract of less than one
year will be paid all his salaried for the unexpired portion thereof; while the
OFW with employment contract of at least one year or more will only be
awarded whichever is less between three months salary for every year of
the unexpired term or the salary for the unexpired portion thereof.
On the Second, the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination
among OFWS whose contract periods are more than 1 year: those who are
illegally dismissed with less than 1 year left in their contracts shall be
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while
those who are illegally dismissed with on eyear or more remaining in their
contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary
benefits limited to their salaries for three months only.
On the third, prior to RA 8042, OFWS and local workers with the fixed-term
employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of
the computation of their money claims; they were uniformly entitled to
their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. But with the
enactment of RA 8042, illegally dismissed OFWS with an unexpired portion
of 1 year or more in their employment contract have since been differently
treated in that their money claims are subject to 3 month cap, whereas no
such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed term employment.
2. There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector
protected by the Constitution, the Court, after subjecting the classification
to a strict judicial scrutiny, has determined that there is no compelling
state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve. In fine, the
government has failed to discharge its burden of proving of the existence
of a compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the
discrimination against OFWS under the subject clause. Thus, the subject
clause is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWS to equal
protection.
12
LABREV - POLENGPAULING
ANG TIBAY VS CIR
FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company
which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to the alleged shortage of leather,
Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees.
However, the National Labor Union questioned the validity of said
lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU
while no members of the rival union were laid off.
The case reached the CIR where Toribio and NWB won. The Case
was elevated to SC and a motion for new trial was raised by NLU. Toribio
filed a motion opposing the said motion.
ISSUE: What is the function of CIR as a special court?
HELD: The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions
are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No.
103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial
system of the nation.
It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by
the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will
appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and
dynamic.
It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive.
It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands
made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may
include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which
may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section
13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court
have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the
rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the
avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial
Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of
due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of
this character: (memorize natin para sure)
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to represent
ones cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the
hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
7. The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issue involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the
motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the
entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such
evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth hereinabove.
FEDERICO LEDESMA VS NLRC
13
LABREV - POLENGPAULING
FACTS: Petitioner was a bus driver of private respondent on probationary
basis and he was required to report at private respondents training site in
Dasma Cavite under the supervision of De Leon.
Petitioner filed a complaint against De Leon for allegedly abusing his
authority and accused De Leon of immoral conduct allegedly carried out
within the premises.
After few days, De Leon filed a written report against petitioner citing his
suspected drug use. A copy of notice was served to Petitioner and requiring
him to explain within 24 hours why no disciplinary action should be
imposed on him.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA. LA ruled that
the dismissal was illegal but denied his prayer for reinstatement. Both
parties questioned the Labor Arbiters Decision before the NLRC.
Petitioner -> assailed the portion of the Labor Arbiters Decision denying
his prayer for reinstatement, and arguing that the doctrine of strained
relations is applied only to confidential employees and his position as a
driver was not covered by such prohibition.
On the other hand, private respondent controverted the Labor
Arbiters finding that petitioner was illegally dismissed from
employment, and insisted that petitioner was never dismissed from
his job but failed to report to work after he was asked to explain
regarding his suspected drug use.
NLRC granted the appeal raised by both parties and reversed the Labor
Arbiters Decision.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment.
HELD: NO!
Well-entrenched is the principle that in order to establish a case before
judicial and quasi-administrative bodies, it is necessary that allegations
must be supported by substantial evidence. 28 Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 29
In the present case, there is hardly any evidence on record so as to meet
the quantum of evidence required, i.e., substantial evidence. Petitioners
claim of illegal dismissal is supported by no other than his own bare,
uncorroborated and, thus, self-serving allegations, which are
also incoherent, inconsistent and contradictory.
Petitioner was only being given the option to either resign and receive his
separation pay or not to resign but face the possible disciplinary charges
against him. The final decision, therefore, whether to voluntarily resign or
to continue working still, ultimately rests with the petitioner. In fact, by
petitoners own admission, he requested from VP for Administration Ty
more time to think over the offer.
Moreover, the petitioner alleged that he was not allowed to enter the
training site by the guard on duty who told him that he was already
banned from the premises. Subsequently, however, petitioner admitted in
his Supplemental Affidavit that he was able to return to the said site on 3
December 2000, to claim his 16-30 November 2000 salary, and again on 9
December 2000, to receive his 13th month pay. The fact alone that he was
able to return to the training site to claim his salary and benefits raises
doubt as to his purported ban from the premises.
While this Court is not unmindful of the rule that in cases of illegal
dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proof to prove that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause in the case at bar,
however, the facts and the evidence did not establish a prima facie case
that the petitioner was dismissed from employment. 31 Before the private
respondent must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal,
petitioner must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his
dismissal from service. Logically, if there is no dismissal, then there can be
no question as to the legality or illegality thereof
It is true that the Constitution affords full protection to labor, and that in
light of this Constitutional mandate, we must be vigilant in striking down
any attempt of the management to exploit or oppress the working class.
However, it does not mean that we are bound to uphold the
working class in every labor dispute brought before this Court for
our resolution.
The law in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. It should be made clear
that when the law tilts the scales of justice in favor of labor, it is in
recognition of the inherent economic inequality between labor and
management. The intent is to balance the scales of justice; to put the two
14
LABREV - POLENGPAULING
parties on relatively equal positions. There may be cases where the
circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of management
but never should the scale be so tilted if the result is an injustice to the
employer. Justitia nemini neganda est -- justice is to be denied to none.
CRISTOBAL VS ECC
FACTS: The SC rendered a decision in this case finding that Petitioner, the
widow of the deceased Fortunato Cristobal, is entitled to death benefits,
reimbursement of medical, surgical and hospital expenses, funeral
expenses and attorneys fees. Fortunato was shown by clear and
convincing evidence to have contracted a rectal cancer or at least the risk
of contracting the same had been increased.
GSIS filed a motion for recon alleging that the ailment was not listed as
occupational disease thus not compensable. And granting the same is
compensable, the benefits granted are not in accordance with law.
ISSUE: WON the illness of the deceased, rectal cancer, is compensable.
HELD: YES!
The deceased died of rectal cancer on May 27, 1977. Concededly, the
exact cause or etiology of this disease is still unknown. Even respondent
ECC's own medical officer, Dr. Mercia C. Abrenica, certified that "the cause
of rectal carzinoma as of any other malignancies is still unknown" (p. 9,
ECC rec.). Its cause and development are insidious, imperceptible to the
naked eye, and defies expert analysis. Therefore, whether or not the
disease rectal cancer was caused or the risk of contracting the same was
increased by the decedent's working conditions remains uncertain. This
uncertainty, of course, cannot eliminate the probability that the ailment
was work connected as it had been established that the deceased was
exposed to unhygienic "Forking conditions, various chemicals and intense
heat which are generally considered as predisposing factors of cancer. At
this point, there is need to reiterate that when the deceased started
working in 1964, he was free from any kind of disease.
To establish compensability of the claim under the said theory, the
claimant must show proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of
proof required is merely substantial evidence, which means "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion" (Ang Tibay vs. The Court of Industrial Relations and National
Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear and convincing evidence. In this
connection, it must be pointed out that the strict rules of evidence are not
applicable in claims for compensation.
Apparently, what the law merely requires is a reasonable work-connection
and not a direct causal relation. This kind of interpretation gives meaning
and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as
embodied in Article 4 of the new Labor Code which states that "all doubts
in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor
of labor. "
In urging that the disease rectal cancer is not compensable since its nature
or cause is unknown and petitioner was not able to show proof of direct
causal relation, respondents would instruct us to ignore the above
provision of law and the policy of the State of giving maximum aid
and protection to labor as We have stated earlier in the main decision.
As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice
guarantee secured by both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding
claims for compensation especially when there is some basis in
the facts for inferring a work-connection. This should not be confused
with the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under
the Workmen's Compensation Act. While these doctrines may have been
abandoned under the new Labor Code (the constitutionality of such
abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the
law, in general, still subsists. All these factual and legal grounds' were
considered in relation to each other constituting substantial evidence
clearly convincing Us to resolve that rectal cancer is compensable.
15
LABREV - POLENGPAULING

16