CHAPTER II. THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 2. Vol. I, rec.).
2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any
person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other
relevant attribute.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
I. Requirements for Application to the BAR
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of
Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL
TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members,
1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty.
Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo
Pablo, Jr. for disciplinary action for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar
Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-
correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar
Landicho who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of
70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively invited the attention of the Court to "The starling
fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for
one reason or another, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p.
1
Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein
stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination
notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations to raise the grades prior to the
release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper
parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their
grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper
request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates.
Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were
not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford
sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to
ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects Political Law and Public
International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a
successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however,
were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of
the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E.
Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar
examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and
57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which
was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the
passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn
statements on the matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the
five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under
which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated
and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to
him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the
examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of
passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the
Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and
therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court
likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163,
p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause
within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.).
while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March
19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the
hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition
to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-
47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince
came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo
who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political
Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but
Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help
in the correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public
International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of
this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in
Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was
also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law also
underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned
out to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further
investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a
notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to
50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate
by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were
summoned to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the
Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one
Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel
L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical
injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student
of the same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973
(Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having
been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention
of this fact which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on
October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda.
Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on
November 14, 1973.
2
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in
Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to
testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence
only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted
as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The
same became the basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony
in the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the
circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks
in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was
correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant,
explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations
that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all
subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary high
grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back
the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of
grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought
back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation,
because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline
and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will
get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief
that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the
paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such
re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is
numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers
were based on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation
of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was
reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No.
8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972
affidavit with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not
reconsidered as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of these
answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2
and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No.
951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution
of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in
other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the
belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of
said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about
October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty.
Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point that
with respect to the correction of the examination
booklets of bar candidates I have always followed
him and considered his instructions as reflecting the
rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court
with respect to the same; that I have no alternative
but to take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering
his misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real
and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not
bother any more to get the consent and permission
of the Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at
that time, I was isolating myself from all members of
the Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the
Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified as a
bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return
for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and
evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the
one who made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
3
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law
and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain
from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code
numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February
5, 1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a
Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions.
The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code
number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was
possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because it
appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according
to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher grades in
other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in
remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the
notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I
was authorized to do so because the same was still within my control
and authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not been
identified or that the code number decode and the examinee's name was
revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in
the case present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or
revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a
particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations
to me, and as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the
grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the
answer, and graded it in accordance with the same standards I had used
throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the
examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with
the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he had
assured me that the code number of the examinee in question had not
been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total
grade in the notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and properly
initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1
to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy
thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof,
and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent
Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier
sworn statement and in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and
international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the
examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the
resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I
do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to
the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to
make such review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether
I was authorized to make such revision and was so assured of my
authority as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his
identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular
and so appeared to be in the regular course of express prohibition in the
rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant
was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as
much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I
be identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in
the evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority
with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were
unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the
official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied
by two companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit
to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used
to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same
condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said
notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error
in the correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I
considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee
had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was
84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as
unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the
position to know and that there was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the
examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it
was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the
examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim
was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation
that he had passed the other subjects. ...
4
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners'
Committee consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one
subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review
the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the
Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the
candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely
no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in
office, and did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of
contract with him before or rather the review and even up to the present
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12,
1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect
examination books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong,
Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the
books in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the
papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1)
paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed
the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in
Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would make
the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a
raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark
and revised also the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee
concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word
of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the
examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor
did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972,
that:
 xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February
1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in
my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to
me an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously
graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he
used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me
to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had
previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had done
well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade
that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was short of
passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were
reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the
Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to
the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in
good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I
would reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was
entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar
Confidant to address such a request to me and that the said request was
in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-
evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my
re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some items,
made deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in
other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled
the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade
increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in
my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents
of his sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the
total grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to
74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he
could be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of the
Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr.
Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such
omission, that
5
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first
time, he was not aware, not having been apprised
otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the
Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or
suggest that the grade of a particular examination
notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every
right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature
of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request
was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee
concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated
each and every answer written in the notebook.
Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the
Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of
doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it
was only in that particular subject that the said
examine failed, herein respondent became
convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher
grade than that previously given to him, but that he
did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest
appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It
should also be mentioned that, in reappraising the
answers, herein respondent downgraded a previous
rating of an answer written by the examinee, from
9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17,
1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee
after the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar
examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to
re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's
notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
 That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of
this particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in
the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his
sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that
I re-evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in
Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the
agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners
Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the
Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the
candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the
aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law
pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and
that I have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading
sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the
writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize
all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evalation on
the basis of the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly
earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight
should then be given to clarify of language and
soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for
re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release
of the results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests
6
of the examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them
would copy their answers and have them checked by their professors.
Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re-correction
and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or
requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they
have to be denied because the result of the examinations when released
is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that
motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners
for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners
concerned in his hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in
so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in
him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee
concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because
the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to
the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not
remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he
remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee during the
meeting a matter concerning another examinee who obtained a passing
general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the
Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of raising the
grade in said subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the
Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the
said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned
is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would
stir such serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity
because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another
sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into
believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective
subjects, the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were
submitted to the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all
good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential
Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that
portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the
examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not
re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks
in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the
early part of February, 1972, on my way back to the
office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a
sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that
the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number
from any object and the first number that comes into
my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy.
At that moment, the first number that I saw was
"954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance
(evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a
post standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura
street towards the Supreme Court building from San
Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-
eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo High
School(photograph of the number '954', the
contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the
post to which it is attached is identified and marked
as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh.
4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza
Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such
number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then
bought, whose last three digits corresponded to
"954". This number became doubly impressive to me
because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket
number was "27", a number that is so significant to
me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively
to link or connect it with said number whenever
possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on
the Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first
took charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up
to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or
"227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List is
7
identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the
figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a
Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and
the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh.
6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo
and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as
Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh.
8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the list
as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born
out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On
November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army
stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was
hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital
as a result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific War
broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still
confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and
strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941
resulting in many casualties. From then on, I
regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a
new life for me having been saved from the
possibility of being among the casualties;(b) On
February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army
byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February
27, 1947, I got married and since then we begot
children the youngest of whom was born on
February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after
buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at the
time was on the checking of the notebooks. While
thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing
the office code number "954". As the number was
still fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity
prompting me to pry into the contents of the
notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing
and language and the apparent soundness of the
answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith on
the basis of the aforementioned Confidential
Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-
Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set them
aside and later on took them back to the respective
examiners for possible review recalling to them the
said Confidential Memorandum but leaving
absolutely the matter to their discretion and
judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference
to either of the two cases which I brought to the attention of the
committee during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer
back to the respective examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing
general average but with a grade below 50% (47%)
in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee
bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked
as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile
Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the
original grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-
evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline
general average of 73.15% with a grade below 60%
(57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not
pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the
data thereon. It turned out that the subject was
Political and International Law under Asst. Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this
examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified
and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook
in Political and International Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original grade of
57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh.
10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and
International Law is precisely the same notebook
mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-
evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political
and International Law in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I
made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee
authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners
concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to
review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told
the Committee that there was very little time left and that the increase in
grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter
the outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
8
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's
story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all
the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and
the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the
entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of
August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into
the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant
Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as
required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for
taking the bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to
reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it
now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where the
respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed,
met only once in the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly
manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's
resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former
Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular
in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately
nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar
Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as
stated in the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having
redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise:
First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the
Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him and not done
generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are
supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades
was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a
matter of policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing
in that year's examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only
respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is
the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein
 Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused
actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To
assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would be
presuming all the members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid
of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their work that
year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible
from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes to show
said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make
this Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant
Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the
existence of some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The
evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners
were in the performance of their duties and that they should be regarded
as such in the consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically
and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of
the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-
examiners to make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after
the corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar
Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the
latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the
representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all
subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high
grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner
concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation,
representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of
passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will
get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and
under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further
belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and
9
reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook
belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number
954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did
not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-
Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V,
pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects
including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could
not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion
Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent
Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested
respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given,
explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the
examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively
low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average
of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and
observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet
find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also
examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo
called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum
that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of
legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems
rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial
weight should be given to clarify of language and soundness of
reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing
that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and
further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's
answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that
particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated
with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The
said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in
his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2-
Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the
passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went
to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination
papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo
brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-
Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular
examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in
Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-
evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar
examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible the respondent
Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who
are failing in just one subject respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told
the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated
the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78%
from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding
corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook
with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang
(Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below
the passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought
back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former
informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and
Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in
his assigned subject Criminal Law that the examinee who owns that particular notebook
had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal
Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade.
Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did
not want to be the one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the
grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the
mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code
Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71;
Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo
when the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo
declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed
in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the
examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy
of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation requested by
respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V,
p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a
passing grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law.
10
For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo
neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme by securing authorization from the
Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest,
the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and
the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was
informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except
Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order
members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his
willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to
respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with
a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-
evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not
however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A&
B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular
examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented
to make the re-evaluation of the said paper(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo
likewise added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his
personal records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his
report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with
Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo
returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was
around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook
bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual
amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said
notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular
notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial
Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the
grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in
an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code
number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent. relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus
deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang
A in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to
be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E.

GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five
examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the
passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that
enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making
74% the passing average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent
(50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute
that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the
said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-
studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five
examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject
and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-
evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor
subjects while his general average was only 66.25% which under no circumstances or
standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the
borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the
examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was in
Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and
individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:

BAI
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang
failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent
Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of 1. Political Law Public
the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar or 30 weighted points
Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief
that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or BAI
betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the
examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the Labor Laws and Social
matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.). evaluation made.

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential 2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of or 33 weighted points.
the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the
re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such
suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy. Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
evaluation made.

We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian
whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by 3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other. or 30 weighted points.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case 4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation 22 weighted points.
and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is 5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust 11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as
BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his

11
 Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the
five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of
66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage
and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other
examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of
examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-
evaluated for each of the latter who Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg
and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-
evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark
before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected
notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual
grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average.
That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and
failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and
on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73,
etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot
assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is
not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request
for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the
Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes
himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention
of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can
hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers
for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better
averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101,
rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays
respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to
the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of
66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than
ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice
to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other
examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates.
And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or
even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and
increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.
12
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of
Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his
actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety
evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the
agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the
examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and
three (3) subjects respectively as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's
notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn
statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant
consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for
support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August
27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19,
1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an
after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE
LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND
OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER
BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS
GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid
notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and
Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz
and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed
that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first
meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners
concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the
disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent
Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper
which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51,
rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by
respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two
examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by
respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the
Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28,
41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the
Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X,
Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one Labor Laws 3%
notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by
his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's Taxation 69%
examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty
dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee Mercantile Law 68%
and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when
respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in
code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case Political Law are as follows:
No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of
Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. BA
23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their
admission in evidence.
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in Civil Law 75% 75% = "
one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the Taxation 69% 69% = "
subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
grade below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.). Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613
(belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%
return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an
examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said
notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code (Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other
was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee failing grades. These are:
(Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was
referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Political Law 70%
Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him. Taxation 72%

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as
members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all follows:
the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck
the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60- BA
63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-
Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was Civil Law 89% 89% = "
referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) Taxation 72% 72% = "
subjects, as follows: Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points

13
 Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee,
Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz
in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February,
1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner
Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination
Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-
evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and
Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under
the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law
as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of having betrayed the trust
and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar
examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause
and the corresponding investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
A are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-
evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects Civil Law, Political and International
Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession,
which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules
and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals;
and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re:
Cunanan Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The
14
determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly
involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar
who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting
as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the
individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same
time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with
the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in
accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final
approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily
confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the
Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent
Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent
Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence
reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled
respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a
complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the
matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine
whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the
Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited
was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the
proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance
with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others,
with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every
applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or
bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of
good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to
lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise
terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character.
Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to
determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal
record whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is
still pending becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar
examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure
not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but
also of all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the
application form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962
did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as
already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral
character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so
that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral
character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a
better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an
applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its dismissal
or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for
admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the
second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of
applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been
accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral
turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when
Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the
Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether
involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under
oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal
Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any
crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No.
1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from
the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending
in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in
his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently
concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in
1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in
court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court,
respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times
and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact
that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of
his license to practice law is well settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent,
in withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of
this court, to whom he applied for admission, information respecting so
serious a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon
the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to
whom he applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation,
neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been
15
forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N W
709 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender
to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of
attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion
of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court
should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the
character of the applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from
which he comes. The finding of indictments against him, one of which
was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which should
have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as were
available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to
deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite
his having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal
case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was
confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure
for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate
his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore
unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court
requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys,
respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the
Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed
the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate
and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del
Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one
who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the
exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are
not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to
receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to
 clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him
to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American
cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present
case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past
nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the
grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the
requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the
Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis
of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb.
23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re:
Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs.
Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs.
Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court
found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the
crime of falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI
Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now
deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty.
Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-
correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant
Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the
grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said
notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These
the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed
the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without
any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members
to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised
greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the
request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the
Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At
least the respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or
show them the complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by
respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was
on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was
really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar
examinations could have been avoided.
16
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared
under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased
grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto
Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it
would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely
because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of
respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this particular
examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot
remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol.
V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69,
rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee
seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this
examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass
the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is
the practice used to be done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject'
so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate'
and he left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I
could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more
lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had
a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and
initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by
respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that
the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a
certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent
Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo
Q And by reason of that information you made the
re-evaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your
own accord in the absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my
report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also
allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April
17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2,
Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought
back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because
according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could
reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing
mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further
belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated
the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian,
Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the
belief that I am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of
said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and
giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that
said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said
examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but he
did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the
passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee
had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was
84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce
the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly
claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper
influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.
17
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given
after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners,
which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of
the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any
disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained
to remind herein respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of members
to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest absolute purity
of the proceedings and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and
vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973,
claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending
undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's
refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend a participant in the
1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records
will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late
Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute
Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the
investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not
make this charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred
the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho
before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be
misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this
case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does
not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee,
who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of
respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner
Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations.
Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination
booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V,
pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the
official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a member
of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute
adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the
bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent
Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable
consideration.
A a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official
release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to
his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the
BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more
or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March
5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date,
however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages
covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total
amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913:
date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972:
Second mortgage P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument
April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol.
III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only
P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less,
of the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that
P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the
P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and
received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars
($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00
loan from his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in
respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which hefiled on
January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank
deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank
deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows
therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement
under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The
amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his
1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein
involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
18
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his
married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said
amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged
note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he received
the $200 was not even presented by respondent during the investigation.
And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this
time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator
the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as
borne out by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his
sister, who has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa
or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that
the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or
undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their
BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00
(Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 date of instrument; August 23,
1972 date of inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage
in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent
and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143.
Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF
Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo
and thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III,
rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the
encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent
Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a
month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In
his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection
with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house
and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed,
however, as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS
real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets
and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is
a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime
between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the
fact that no such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and
liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however,
that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement
was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement,
his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was
P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.
 The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties,
tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination
committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's
examination papers or to show that the money used by respondent
Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came from respondent
Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent
Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar
Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12,
1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo
surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring
from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but
after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to
January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00.
He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his
BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e)
in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform
an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated
by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties
of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced
to commit such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer
once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary
as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
19
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of
Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were
examined as they are part of the records of this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E.
Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the
bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational
program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days 1951 to 1955 up to
his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) 1955 to 1958.
From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine
Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans
including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent
Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator,
Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9,
Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct
contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational
benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver July 31,
1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended
to the availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila
taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent
Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical
assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during
the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol.
VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955
of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the
transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution
effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished
to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the
Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even
know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I.
Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every
semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he
had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to
take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing
Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City
Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he
investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and
disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties
as veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational
benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met
him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT
RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND
HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ.,
concur.

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII,
pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.
Antonio, J., is on official leave.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the
Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.). Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged.
During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had
no communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and
does not remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed
with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and
Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at II. MORAL FITNESS Rule 7.03
Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was
hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there
when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 [A.C. No. 6408. August 31, 2004]
(Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
46, rec.). ISIDRA BARRIENTOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELERIZZA A. LIBIRAN-
METEORO respondent.
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces,
otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member RESOLUTION
thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached
and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at
Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of
recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-
December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.). Meteoro for deceit and non-payment of debts.

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to
the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior
authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of
the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D.
LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE
20
A letter-complaint dated May 21, 2001 was filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) under the names of Isidra Barrientos and Olivia C. Mercado, which was
signed, however, by Isidra only. It states that: sometime in September of 2000, respondent
issued several Equitable PCIBank Checks in favor of both Isidra and Olivia, amounting
to P67,000.00, and in favor of Olivia, totaling P234,000.00, for the payment of a pre-existing
debt; the checks bounced due to insufficient funds thus charges for violation of B.P. 22 were
filed by Isidra and Olivia with the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan; respondent sent text
messages to complainants asking for the deferment of the criminal charges with the promise
that she will pay her debt; respondent however failed to fulfill said promise; on May 16, 2001,
respondent, through her sister-in-law, tried to give complainants a title for a parcel of land in
exchange for the bounced checks which were in the possession of complainants; the title
covered an area of 5,000 square meters located at Bantug, La Torre, Talavera, Nueva Ecija,
registered in the name of Victoria Villamar which was allegedly paid to respondent by a client;
complainants checked the property and discovered that the land belonged to a certain Dra.
Helen Garcia, the sole heir of Victoria Villamar, who merely entrusted said title to respondent
pursuant to a transaction with the Quedancor; complainants tried to get in touch with
respondent over the phone but the latter was always unavailable, thus the present complaint.
[1]
On July 13, 2001, in compliance with the Order[2] of the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), respondent filed her Answer alleging that: she issued several Equitable
PCIBank checks amounting to P234,000.00 in favor of Olivia but not to Isidra; said checks
were issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation but said amount had already been paid
and replaced with new checks; Isidra signed a document attesting to the fact that the subject
of her letter-complaint no longer exists; [3] she also issued in favor of Olivia several Equitable
PCIBank checks amounting to P67,000.00 for the payment of a pre-existing obligation; the
checks which were the subject of the complaint filed at the City Prosecutors Office in
Cabanatuan City are already in the possession of respondent and the criminal case filed by
complainants before the Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City Branch 3 was already
dismissed; the Informations for Violation of B.P. 22 under I.S. Nos. 01-14090-03 [4] were never
filed in court; Olivia already signed an affidavit of desistance; respondent did not send text
messages to Isidra and Olivia asking for deferment of the criminal complaints neither did she
present any title in exchange for her bounced checks; she never transacted with Isidra since
all dealings were made with Olivia; and the present complaint was initiated by Isidra only
because she had a misunderstanding with Olivia and she wants to extract money from
respondent.[5]
Attached to said Answer is an affidavit signed by Olivia C. Mercado which states as
follows:
1. That I am one of the complainants for the Disbarment of Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro filed
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines National Office in Pasig City, Philippines docketed
as CBD case no. 01-840;
2. That the filing of the said complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was
brought about by some misunderstanding and error in the accounting of the records of the
account of Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro;
3. That I was the one who transacted with Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro and not my co-
complainant Isidra Barrientos;
4. That all the pieces of jewelry were taken from me by Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro and the
corresponding checks were given to Isidra Barrientos through me;
21
5. That my name was indicated as co-complainant in a letter-complaint filed by Ms. Isidra
Barrientos against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro but I am not interested in pursuing the complaint
against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro since the complaint was brought about by a case of some
mistakes in the records;
6. That I, together with Isidra Barrientos had already signed an affidavit of desistance and
submitted the same before the Municipal Trial Court Branch III of Cabanatuan City w(h)ere
Criminal Case Nos. 77851 to 56 for violation of BP 22 were filed against Atty. Meteoro;
7. That with respect to I.S. nos. 03-01-1356 to 1361 the case was not filed in court and I have
also executed an affidavit of desistance for said complaint;
8. That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of all the foregoing and to prove that I
have no cause of action against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro.[6]
On August 9, 2001, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice of Hearing requiring both parties to
appear before it on September 6, 2001. On said date, both parties appeared and agreed to
settle their misunderstanding.[7]
On November 27, 2001, the parties agreed that the balance of P134,000.00 which
respondent acknowledged as her indebtedness to complainant will be settled on a staggered
basis. Another hearing was then set for February 5, 2002. Respondent failed to appear in
said hearing despite due notice. It was then reset to February 28, 2002 with the order that
should respondent fail to appear, the case shall already be submitted for resolution.[8]
Respondent appeared in the next two hearings. However, this time, it was complainant
who was unavailable. In the hearing of July 31, 2002, respondent was absent and was
warned again that should she fail to appear in the next hearing, the Commissioner shall
resolve the case. On said date, respondent did not appear despite due notice.[9]
On August 1, 2002, respondent filed with the Commission a motion for reconsideration
of the July 31 order stating that: she got sick a few days before the scheduled hearing; she
had already paid complainant the amount of P64,000.00; in March of 2002, respondents
father was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit of the University of Santo Tomas Hospital thus
she was not able to settle her remaining balance as planned; and because of said
emergency, respondent was not able to fully settle the balance of her debt up to this date.
Respondent prayed that she be given another 60 days from August 1,2002 to finally settle her
debt with complainant.[10]
On April 30, 2003, the IBP-CBD issued an order granting respondents motion and
setting aside the order dated July 31, 2002. It noted that while respondent claims that she
already paid complainant P64,000.00, the photocopies of the receipts she submitted
evidencing payment amount only to P45,000.00.[11] A hearing was then set for May 28, 2003
at which time respondent was directed to present proof of her payments to the complainant.
The hearing was however reset several times until August 20, 2003 at which time, only
complainant appeared. Respondent sent somebody to ask for a postponement which the
commission denied. The commission gave respondent a last opportunity to settle her
accounts with complainant. The hearing was set for October 7, 2003 which the commission
said was intransferrable.[12]
On October 7, 2003, only complainant appeared. The commission noted that
respondent was duly notified and even personally received the notice for that days hearing.
The case was thereafter submitted for resolution.[13]
On October 24, 2003, the Investigating IBP Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan
submitted his report pertinent portions of which read as follows:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro has committed a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Office holds that she has. More
particularly, the respondent, by initially and vehemently denying her indebtedness to herein
complainant and then subsequently admitting liability by proposing a staggered settlement
has displayed a glaring flaw in her integrity. She has shown herself to possess poor moral
characters. In her motion for reconsideration, seeking the reopening of this case, the
respondent made a false assertion that she had settled up to P64,000.00 of her indebtedness
but the receipts she submitted total only P50,000.00. What is more disconcerting is that while
she is aware and duly notified of the settings of this Office respondent has seemingly ignored
the same deliberately. Finally, the respondent has not offered any satisfactory explanation for,
nor has she controverted the complainants charge that she (respondent) had tried to
negotiate a transfer certificate of title (TCT) which had been entrusted by a certain Dra. Helen
Garcia to her relative to a transaction which the former had with the Quedancor where
respondent was formerly employed. Based on all the foregoing findings and the deliberate
failure of the respondent to come forward and settle her accountabilities, inspite of several
warnings given her by the undersigned, and her failure to attend the scheduled hearings
despite due notice, this Office is convinced that Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro has committed
a glaring violation not only of her oath as a lawyer but also the dictates of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
which mandates that a worthy member of the Bar must constantly be of good moral character
and unsullied honesty.[14]
He then recommended that Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro be suspended from the
practice of law for two years and meted a fine of twenty thousand pesos. [15]
On October 29, 2003, respondent filed another motion for reconsideration stating that:
she was not able to receive the notice for the October 7 hearing because she was in Bicol
attending to pressing personal problems; she only arrived from the province on October 25,
2003 and it was only then that she got hold of the Order dated October 7; from the very
beginning, respondent never intended to ignore the Commissions hearings; as much as she
wanted to pay complainant in full, the financial crisis which hit her family since 2001 has
gravely affected her ability to pay; until that day, the expenses incurred by respondent due to
the hospitalization of her father has not been paid in full by her family; the family home of
respondent in Cabanatuan has already been foreclosed by the bank; respondents husband
has been confined recently due to thyroid problems and respondent herself had sought
medical help on several occasions due to her inability to conceive despite being married for
more than five years; if not for said reasons, respondent could have already paid the
22
complainant despite respondents knowledge that the amount complainant wanted to collect
from her is merely the interest of her debt since she already returned most of the pieces of
jewelry she purchased and she already paid for those that she was not able to return.
Respondent prays that the resolution of the case be deferred and that she be given another
90 days from said date or until January 19, 2003 to settle whatever balance remains after
proper accounting and presentation of receipts.[16]
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution as
follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-67
CBD Case No. 01-840
Isidra Barrientos vs.
Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with
modification, and considering respondents glaring violation not only of her oath as a lawyer
but of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-
Meteoro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
and Restitution of P84,000.00 to complainant.[17]
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP except as to the alleged
matter of respondent offering a transfer certificate of title to complainants in exchange for the
bounced checks that were in their possession.
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless
checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension
from the practice of law.[18] Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and
vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but
also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith
and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.[19] They must at all times faithfully perform
their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt
payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflect the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[20] Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states that:
CANON 1 -- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this case, respondent in her answer initially tried to deny having any obligation
towards Isidra Barrientos. Upon appearing before the IBP-CBD, however, respondent
eventually acknowledged her indebtedness to Isidra in the amount of P134,000.00, promising
only to pay in a staggered basis. Her attempt to evade her financial obligation runs counter to
the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility, above quoted, and violates the
lawyers oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for
money or malice.[21]
After respondent acknowledged her debt to complainant, she committed herself to the
payment thereof. Yet she failed many times to fulfill said promise. She did not appear in most
of the hearings and merely submitted a motion for reconsideration on August 1, 2002 after
the IBP-CBD Commissioner had already submitted the case for resolution. She claimed that
she got sick days before the hearing and asked for sixty days to finally settle her account.
Again, she failed to fulfill her promise and did not appear before the Commission in the
succeeding hearings despite due notice. After the case was submitted anew for resolution on
October 6, 2003, respondent filed another motion for reconsideration, this time saying that
she was in the province attending to personal matters. Again she asked for another ninety
days to settle her entire debt. This repeated failure on her part to fulfill her promise puts in
question her integrity and moral character. Her failure to attend most of the hearings called by
the commission and her belated pleas for reconsideration also manifest her propensity to
delay the resolution of the case and to make full use of the mechanisms of administrative
proceedings to her benefit.
She also could not deny that she issued several checks without sufficient funds, which
prompted Isidra and Olivia to file complaints before the prosecutors office in Cabanatuan City.
Her only excuse is that she was able to replace said checks and make arrangements for the
payment of her debt, which led to the dismissal of the criminal complaints against her.
We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
her unworthy of public confidence.[22] The issuance of a series of worthless checks also
shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act
to the public interest and public order.[23] It also manifests a lawyers low regard to her
commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably
tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem. [24]
Mere issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer, regardless of whether or not the same
were issued in his professional capacity to a client, calls for appropriate disciplinary
measures. As we explained in Co vs. Bernardino:[25]
The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not
ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or
private capacity. Where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyers professional
23
dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing him from the office of attorney.
The evidence on record clearly shows respondents propensity to issue bad checks. This
gross misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member of
the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt[26] (Citations omitted).
She also claims that her father was hospitalized in March 2002 and that she and her
husband also had to seek medical help which greatly affected her ability to pay. She however
did not present any proof to substantiate such claims. She also did not appear personally
before the complainant and the commission, in spite of the many opportunities given her, to
make arrangements for the payment of her debt considering the circumstances that befell her
family. Instead, she waited until the case was submitted for resolution to allege such facts,
without presenting any proof therefor.
We cannot uphold the IBP in finding that since respondent has not offered any
explanation for, nor has she controverted the complainants charge that she tried to negotiate
with them a transfer certificate of title that had been entrusted to her by a client, she should
be held liable therefor. Basic is the principle that if the complainant, upon whom rests the
burden of proving her cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon
which she bases her claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove her exception or
defense.[27] Simply put, the burden is not on the respondent to prove her innocence but on the
complainants to prove her guilt. In this case, complainants submitted a photocopy of a TCT in
the name of Victoria Villamar together with their letter-complaint, which according to
complainants was the title respondent tried, through her sister-in-law, to negotiate with them
in exchange for the bounced checks in their possession. [28] No other evidence or sworn
statement was submitted in support of such allegation. Respondent in her answer,
meanwhile, denied having any knowledge regarding such matter and no further discussion
was made on the matter, not even in the hearings before the commission. [29] For this reason,
we hold that respondent should not be held liable for the alleged negotiation of a TCT to
complainants for lack of sufficient evidence, but only for the non-payment of debts and the
issuance of worthless checks which were sufficiently proved and which respondent herself
admitted.
We reiterate that membership in the legal profession is a privilege and demands a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law.[30]
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondents misconduct. The IBP
Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
six months. In Lao vs. Medel,[31] which also involved non-payment of debt and issuance of
worthless checks, the Court held that suspension from the practice of law for one year was
appropriate. Unlike in the Lao case however, respondent is this case paid a portion of her
debt, as evidenced by receipts amounting to P50,000.00. Thus we deem that six months
suspension from the practice of law and the restitution of P84,000.00 to complainant Isidra
Barrientos would be sufficient in this case.
 WHEREFORE, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro is found guilty of gross misconduct
and is hereby SUSPENDED for six months from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt
of this Decision, and is ordered to pay complainant Isidra Barrientos the amount
of P84,000.00, as balance of her debt to the latter, plus 6% interest from date of finality of
herein decision.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the
IBP as well as the court administrator who shall circulate herein Resolution to all courts for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), on official leave.
[A.C. No. 5151. October 19, 2004]
PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR., MELITON
D. EVANGELISTA, SR., and NELSON B. MELGAR, complainants, vs. ATTY.
NORBERTO M. MENDOZA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon M.
Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D. Evangelista, Sr., and Nelson B. Melgar against Atty. Norberto M.
Mendoza for Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross Misconduct.
Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that respondent, a former Municipal
Trial Court Judge, abandoned his legal wife, Felicitas V. Valderia in favor of his paramour,
Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon G. Marcos; respondent and
Marilyn dela Fuente have been cohabiting openly and publicly as husband and wife in Brgy.
Estrella, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro; respondent had fathered two children by his paramour
Marilyn dela Fuente; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente declared in the birth certificates of
their two daughters that they were married on May 12, 1986, making it appear that their two
children are legitimate, while in respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed with the
COMELEC during the 1995 elections, respondent declared that his wife is Felicitas V.
24
Valderia; in respondents certificate of candidacy for the 1998 elections, he declared his civil
status as separated; such declarations in the birth certificates of his children and in his
certificate of candidacy are acts constituting falsification of public documents; and
respondents acts betray his lack of good moral character and constitute grounds for his
removal as a member of the bar.
Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states that complainants, who are his
political opponents in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, are merely filing this case to exact revenge
on him for his filing of criminal charges against them; complainants illegally procured copies
of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna
Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1993, thus, such documents are inadmissible in evidence; respondent did not participate in
the preparation and submission with the local civil registry of subject birth certificates;
respondent never declared that he had two wives, as he has always declared that he is
separated in fact from his wife, Felicitas V. Valderia; and complainants have used this issue
against him during elections and yet, the people of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still elected him
as Mayor, hence, respondent has not offended the publics sense of morality.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(hereinafter IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the IBP conducted hearings.
Witnesses for complainants, Nelson B. Melgar and Romeo M. Laygo, submitted their
affidavits as their direct testimony and were subjected to cross-examination by respondents
counsel.
Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit as follows: He knows respondent for
they both reside in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Respondent is known as a practicing lawyer
and a former Municipal Trial Court Judge. Respondent has been cohabiting openly and
publicly with Marilyn dela Fuente, representing themselves to be husband and wife, and from
their cohabitation, they produced two children, namely, Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente
Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza. Sometime in 1995, he (witness
Melgar) received a letter from a concerned citizen, informing him that respondent was
married to Felicitas Valderia of San Rafael, Bulacan, on January 16, 1980, but respondent
abandoned his wife to cohabit with Marilyn dela Fuente. Attached to the letter was a
photocopy of a Certification issued by the Civil Register attesting to the marriage between
respondent and Felicitas Valderia. He also received information from concerned citizens that
Marilyn dela Fuente is also legally married to one Ramon G. Marcos, as evidenced by a
Certification from the Office of the Civil Register. Respondent stated in his Certificate of
Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1995 that he is still legally married to Felicitas Valderia.
In respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1998, he declared his
civil status as separated. Respondent has represented to all that he is married to Marilyn dela
Fuente. In the Naujanews, a local newspaper where respondent holds the position of
Chairman of the Board of the Editorial Staff, respondent was reported by said newspaper as
husband to Marilyn dela Fuente and the father of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna
Normina.
 On cross-examination, witness Melgar testified as follows: He was the former mayor of
Naujan and he and respondent belong to warring political parties. It was not respondent who
told him about the alleged immoral conduct subject of the present case. Although he received
the letter of a concerned citizen regarding the immoral conduct of respondent as far back as
1995, he did not immediately file a case for disbarment against respondent. It was only after
respondent filed a criminal case for falsification against him that he decided to file an
administrative case against respondent.[1]
On re-direct examination, witness Melgar testified that there were people who were
against the open relationship between respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente as respondent
had been publicly introducing the latter as his wife despite the fact that they are both still
legally married to other persons, and so someone unknown to him just handed to their maid
copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.[2]
The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was adopted as his direct testimony, is
practically identical to that of witness Melgar. On cross-examination, witness Laygo testified
that he was not the one who procured the certified true copies of the birth certificates of Mara
Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza,
as somebody just gave said documents to Nelson Melgar. He was a municipal councilor in
1995 when the letter of a concerned citizen regarding respondents immorality was sent to
Melgar, but he did not take any action against respondent at that time.[3]
Complainants then formally offered documentary evidence consisting of photocopies
which were admitted by respondents counsel to be faithful reproductions of the originals or
certified true copies thereof, to wit: a letter of one Luis Bermudez informing Nelson Melgar of
respondents immoral acts,[4] the Certification of the Local Civil Registrar of San Rafael,
Bulacan, attesting to the celebration of the marriage between respondent and one Felicitas
Valderia,[5] the Birth Certificate of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza, [6] the Birth
Certificate of Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, [7] the Certificate of Candidacy of
respondent dated March 9, 1995, [8] the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March
25, 1998,[9]Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro dated
October 27, 1998, attesting to the marriage celebrated between Marilyn dela Fuente and
Ramon Marcos,[10]and the editorial page of the Naujanews (February-March 1999 issue),
[11]
wherein it was stated that respondent has two daughters with his wife, Marilyn dela
Fuente.
Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any evidence and merely
submitted a memorandum expounding on his arguments that the testimonies of complainants
witnesses are mere hearsay, thus, said testimonies and their documentary evidence have no
probative weight.
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-
2004-123, reading as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
25
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondents violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Norberto
M. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits
satisfactory proof that he is no longer cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and has
abandoned such immoral course of conduct.
Portions of the report and recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
upon which the above-quoted Resolution was based, read as follows:
FINDINGS:
The evidence of complainants to support their charge of immorality consists in a) the
testimonies of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo given by way of affidavits executed under
oath and affirmed before the Commission and b) their documentary evidence consisting of
their Exhibits A to H.
Respondent filed his comment through counsel and did not formally present or offer any
evidence. Respondent opted not to present his evidence anymore because according to him
there is none to rebut vis--vis the evidence presented by the private complainants.
Respondent instead submitted a memorandum through counsel to argue his position. As can
be seen from the comment and memorandum submitted, respondents counsel argues that
the complaint is politically motivated since complainants are political rivals of respondent and
that the birth certificates Exhibits D and D-1 which were offered to show that respondent sired
the children namely Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna
Normina dela Fuente Mendoza out of his cohabitation with Marilyn dela Fuente are
inadmissible because they were allegedly secured in violation of Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 1993. The rest of the exhibits are either hearsay or self-serving according to
respondent.
The witnesses who are also two of the complainants herein, on the other hand, categorically
state in their affidavits [Exhibits A and B] particularly in paragraph 2 that Respondent has
been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn de la Fuente, representing themselves to be
husband and wife. In paragraph 10 of said affidavits the witnesses also categorically state
that respondent has even represented to all and sundry that Marilyn de la Fuente is his wife.
These categorical statements made under oath by complainants are not hearsay and remain
un-rebutted. Respondent chose not to rebut them.
Exhibit E, the Certificate of Candidacy executed by respondent shows that respondent is
married to one, Felicitas V. Valderia. As shown by Exhibit H, a marriage certificate, Marilyn de
la Fuente is married to one, Ramon G. Marcos. Duly certified true copies of said exhibits
have been presented by complainants.
With respect to Exhibits D and D-1, we believe that they are competent and relevant
evidence and admissible in this proceedings. The exclusionary rule which bars admission of
illegally obtained evidence applies more appropriately to evidence obtained as a result of
illegal searches and seizures. The instant case cannot be analogous to an illegal search or
seizure. A person who violates Rule 24 of Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited
by respondent risks the penalty of imprisonment or payment of a fine but it does not make the
document so issued inadmissible as evidence specially in proceedings like the present case.
Exhibits D and D-1 which are duly certified birth certificates are therefore competent evidence
to show paternity of said children by respondent in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary.
By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Nelson
Melgar and Romeo Laygo, and corroborated by the documentary exhibits will show that
indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a certain Marilyn de la Fuente who is
not his wife and that out of said cohabitation respondent sired two children. These facts we
repeat have not been denied by respondent under oath since he chose to just argue on the
basis of the improper motivations and the inadmissibility, hearsay and self-serving nature of
the documents presented. Complainants have presented evidence sufficient enough to
convince us that indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a person who is not his
wife. The evidence taken together will support the fact that respondent is not of good moral
character. That respondent chose not to deny under oath the grave and serious allegations
made against him is to our mind his undoing and his silence has not helped his position
before the Commission. As between the documents and positive statements of complainants,
made under oath and the arguments and comments of respondent submitted through his
lawyers, which were not verified under oath by respondent himself, we are inclined and so
give weight to the evidence of complainants. The direct and forthright testimonies and
statements of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo that respondent was openly cohabiting with
Marilyn de la Fuente is not hearsay. The witnesses may have admitted that respondent
Mendoza did not tell them that a certain Marilyn de la Fuente was his paramour (for why
would respondent admit that to complainants) but the witnesses did state clearly in their
affidavits under oath that respondent was cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente who is not
respondents wife. Again their categorical statements taken together with the other
documents, are enough to convince us and conclude that respondent is not of good moral
character.
Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that possession of good moral character
is a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued
possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of
law [Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586 (1956); Cordova vs. Cordova 179 SCRA 680
(1989); People vs. Tuanda 181 SCRA 682 (1990)]. The moral delinquency that affects the
fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274 SCRA 1
(1997)].
In the instant case respondent has disregarded and made a mockery of the fundamental
institution of marriage. Respondent in fact even so stated in Exhibit F that he is separated
from his wife. This fact and statement without any further explanation from respondent only
contributes to the blot in his moral character which good moral character we repeat is a
continuing condition for a member to remain in good standing. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code
26
of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Respondent has violated this rule against engaging in immoral conduct.
We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the pronouncement made in Santos vs. Dischoso,
84 SCRA 622 (1978) that courts should not be used by private persons particularly
disgruntled opponents to vent their rancor on members of the Bar through unjust and
unfounded accusations. However, in the instant case the charges can hardly be considered
as unfounded or unjust based on the evidence presented. The evidence presented shows
that respondent no longer possess (sic) that good moral character necessary as a condition
for him to remain a member of the Bar in good standing. He is therefore not entitled to
continue to engage in the practice of law.
We find such report and recommendation of the IBP to be fully supported by the
pleadings and evidence on record, and, hence, approve and adopt the same.
The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum of evidence required in
administrative proceedings which is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conviction. [12]
Witness Melgars testimony that respondent had been publicly introducing Marilyn dela
Fuente as his wife is corroborated by the contents of an article in the Naujanews, introducing
respondent as one of Naujans public servants, and stating therein that respondent has been
blessed with two beautiful children with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente. [13] It should be noted
that said publication is under the control of respondent, he being the Chairman of the Board
thereof. Thus, it could be reasonably concluded that if he contested the truth of the contents
of subject article in the Naujanews, or if he did not wish to publicly present Marilyn dela
Fuente as his wife, he could have easily ordered that the damning portions of said article to
be edited out.
With regard to respondents argument that the credibility of witnesses for the
complainants is tainted by the fact that they are motivated by revenge for respondents filing
of criminal cases against them, we opine that even if witnesses Melgar and Laygo are so
motivated, the credibility of their testimonies cannot be discounted as they are fully supported
and corroborated by documentary evidence which speak for themselves. The birth
certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela
Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M.
Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente; and the Certification from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in its records of an entry of a marriage
between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia celebrated on January 16, 1980, are public
documents and are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein, as provided for under
Article 410[14] of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina
dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16,
1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente, are
inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1993, which provides as follows:
Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records.
(1) The records of a persons birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no
information relating thereto shall be issued except on the request of any of
the following:
a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;
b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in
administrative, judicial or other official proceedings to determine the identity
of the childs parents or other circumstances surrounding his birth; and
c. in case of the persons death, the nearest of kin.
(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
at least two months or a fine in an amount not exceeding five hundred pesos,
or both in the discretion of the court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.
There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only
question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth
certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for
sanctions against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere
does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render said
records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only
provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and
seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable searches
and seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the government or the
state.[15] In People vs. Hipol,[16] we explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers
governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted
interference by any department of government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be
extended to the acts complained of in this case. The alleged warrantless search made by
Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurers office, can hardly fall within the ambit of
the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.
27
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the
subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules
on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in
question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into
consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent.
Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente
Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and respondents Certificate of
Candidacy dated March 9, 1995 wherein respondent himself declared he was married to
Felicitas Valderia, were never denied nor rebutted by respondent. Hence, said public
documents sufficiently prove that he fathered two children by Marilyn dela Fuente despite the
fact that he was still legally married to Felicitas Valderia at that time.
In Bar Matter No. 1154,[17] good moral character was defined thus:
. . . good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or
from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in
the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not
satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.
In Zaguirre vs. Castillo,[18] we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, to wit:
. . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute
a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a member of the Bar and officer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses
but must also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he
is flouting those moral standards and, thus, ruled that siring a child with a woman other than
his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer.[19]
We must rule in the same wise in this case before us. The fact that respondent
continues to publicly and openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal wife, thus, siring
children by her, shows his lack of good moral character. Respondent should keep in mind that
the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain ones good standing in the
legal profession.[20] In Aldovino vs. Pujalte, Jr.,[21] we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of
members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.
Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an
attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the
right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the
privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
impelled her to file a complaint for legal separation and support. A criminal case for adultery
against Benita and respondent later followed.
In his Answer[2] dated July 31, 1975, respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife
and the mother of their 12 children. He denied, however, having cohabited with Benita. And
he pointed to his complaining wife as the cause of their separation, stating the observation
that she was always traveling all over the country, ostensibly for business purposes, without
his knowledge and consent, x x x thereby neglecting her obligations toward her family.[3]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY of Issues having been joined, hearings were conducted before the Office of the Solicitor
immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is General and, subsequently, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on
Bar Discipline (Commission). At the hearings, Rebecca presented both oral and documentary
evidence to support her allegations of abandonment and immorality.
REBECCA B. ARNOBIT, A.C. No. 1481
Complainant, Aside from her testimony, Rebecca presented two other witnesses, viz: Venancia M.
Present: Barrientos, her sister, who identified a letter dated August 28, 1970 written by respondent to
PUNO, C.J., her, addressing her as Vending (Exhibit B-1), therein asking for forgiveness for the
QUISUMBING, unhappiness he caused his family; and Melecio Navarro, husband of Benita, who testified
YNARES-SANTIAGO, about how respondent took his wife Benita as a mistress, knowing fully well of their lawful
CARPIO, marriage.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, Rebecca also presented the affidavits of National Bureau of Investigation agents Eladio C.
AZCUNA, Velasco and Jose C. Vicente (Exhibits H-1 and H-2) to show the existence of a prima
TINGA, facie case for adultery. The pictures and baptismal and birth certificates of Mary Ann, Ma.
CHICO-NAZARIO, Luisa, Caridad, and Ponciano Jr., all surnamed Arnobit, were submitted to prove the fact that
VELASCO, JR., respondent sired four illegitimate children out of his illicit cohabitation with Benita.[4]
NACHURA,
REYES, According to the investigating commissioner, respondent, despite due notice, repeatedly
ATTY. PONCIANO P. ARNOBIT, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and absented himself when it was his turn to present evidence, adding that scheduled hearings
Respondent. BRION, JJ. had to be postponed just to afford respondent ample opportunity to present his side of the
Promulgated: controversy. The investigating commissioner also stated that, in most cases, respondent
October 17, 2008 would seek postponement, pleading illness, on the very date of the hearing. And according to
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x the Commission, its several directives for respondent to send by mail his affidavits and
DECISION documentary exhibits in lieu of personal appearance so that the commission could finish with
the investigation proved futile.
PER CURIAM: In its Report dated June 21, 1995, the Commission found respondent liable for
abandonment and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three (3)
months. The recommendation portion of the report reads, as follows:
Rebecca B. Arnobit, in her affidavit-complaint[1] dated May 11, 1975, prays that the Court
exercise its disciplinary power over her husband, respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, on the WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended to the Board of Governors
grounds of Immorality and Abandonment. that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) months as a lesson for him to change his ways. An indefinite
In her complaint, Rebecca alleged that she and respondent were married on August 20, suspension is not recommended because it has been gathered from
1942. Twelve children were born out of this union. Rebecca further alleged seeing complainant herself that respondent supports himself through the
respondent through law school, continuously supporting him until he passed the bar practice of law which would be cruel for us to curtail at this time when he
examinations and became a member of the Philippine bar. Several years after, however, or in is already advanced in age the penalty of three (3) months suspension
1968, respondent left the conjugal home and started cohabiting with one Benita Buenafe and recording of such penalty in his record being sufficient to berate him
Navarro who later bore him four more children. Respondents infidelity, according to Rebecca,
28
 as to his lack of responsibility as evidenced by his abandonment of the
children. [Report and Recommendation rendered by Commissioner
Vicente Q. Roxas]
On January 27, 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XII-96-43 adopting
and approving the Commission report aforementioned.
While the Court concurs with the inculpatory findings of the IBP on the charge of
abandonment, it cannot bring itself to agree that respondent is liable only for that offense. As
it were, the charge for gross immoral conduct has sufficiently been proven. Following
established jurisprudence, respondent deserves to be disbarred.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct:
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
As this Court often reminds members of the bar, the requirement of good moral character is
of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of
legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the
legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad
character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right
and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he
deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all.[5]
Immoral conduct has been described as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.[6]
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community.[7] A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also so
29
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is
flouting those moral standards.
A review of the records readily reveals that despite the protracted delay in the hearings
mainly caused by respondents failure to appear, complainant relentlessly pursued this
administrative case against her husband. She was, to be sure, able to establish by clear,
convincing, and preponderant evidence his commission of marital infidelity and abandonment
of his family.
Although respondent in his answer denied abandoning complainant and their children and
offered an explanation as to the cause of his and his wifes separation, he opted not to take
the witness stand and be cross- examined on his sworn answer. Neither did he bother to call
and present his alleged paramour, Benita, who could have had disproved an existing
adulterous relationship between them, or, at least, confirm his protestation about the paternity
of her four children. Significantly, Benitas husband, no less, risked personal ridicule by
testifying on the illicit liaison between his wife and respondent.
The fact that respondents philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his
profession would not save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for
any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with which his license and the law
invest him.[8] To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, [t]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138,
[9]
of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct x x x
of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.[10] To reiterate, possession of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification
for all members of the bar.
While the onus rests on the complainant proffering the charges to prove the same,
respondent owes himself and the Court the duty to show that he is morally fit to remain a
member of the bar. Mere denial of wrongdoing would not suffice in the face of clear evidence
demonstrating unfitness.
When ones moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his
cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves the individual concerned to meet the charges
squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court,
that he is morally fit to keep his name in the Roll of Attorneys. [11] Respondent has not
discharged the burden in this regard. Although duly notified, he never attended the hearings
to rebut the serious charges brought against him, irresistibly suggesting that the charges are
true.
Undoubtedly, respondents act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and have children
with another woman constitutes grossly immoral conduct. And to add insult to injury, there
seems to be little attempt on the part of respondent to be discreet about his liaison with the
other woman.
As we have already ruled, disbarment is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful
wife to maintain an illicit relationship with another woman who had borne him a child. [12] In the
instant case, respondents grossly immoral conduct compels the Court to wield its power to
disbar. The penalty is most appropriate under the premises.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Ponciano P. Arnobit is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this Decision
be entered into the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished the
IBP and circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 5454. November 23, 2004]
CARMELINA Y. RANGWANI, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMON S. DIO, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed against Atty. Ramon S. Dio by Carmelina Y.
Rangwani before this Court. In her complaint, Rangwani alleged that sometime in the years
1995 to 1996, Atty. Dio befriended her. Owing to his status in the community as a good
lawyer and businessman, respondent was able to convince the complainant to part with her
title to a parcel of land located in Dasmarias, Cavite, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 2791-97, Entry 5320-102. After the lapse of five months, complainant demanded the
return of her title from respondent who promised to return the same but failed to do so. After
ten months, respondent was nowhere to be found. Complainant, with the help of an informer,
was able to locate respondent who turned out to have transferred his residence to Makati
City. Upon confrontation, respondent retorted that he could not give back the title to the land.
Instead, he offered to buy the property. Thus, he issued the following checks[1] to complainant:
Check No. Date Amount
0062631 May 15, 1999 P50,000.00
0062632 June 15, 1999 50,000.00
0062633 July 15, 1999 50,000.00
0062634 July 30, 1999 52,570.00
30
When deposited, all the checks bounced for the reason closed account.
In the year 1999, complainant filed Criminal Cases No. 55666, No. 57029, No. 276070,
and No. 279784 for violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against the respondent.
Warrants for the arrest of respondent in relation to these cases were issued.[2]
On 29 August 2001, this Court, acting on the Complaint, issued a resolution requiring
the respondent to comment thereon on the complaint. [3] On 22 November 2001, respondent
filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Comment and for a Formal Hearing. In
this motion, he bared that the Courts resolution requiring him to comment was sent to his
parents residence. He claimed he has been living for the past two years in a rented house at
Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila, and has been in the province for the last three weeks
attending to business concerns. He said he was not aware that a disbarment complaint has
been filed against him. While he admitted that there were cases previously filed by
complainant against him, said cases had already been withdrawn and the corresponding
desistance, waiver and quitclaim had been signed by her and that complainant had in fact
received (already) the monetary claims or their equivalent involving said cases. [4] Respondent
was, therefore, under the belief that all those cases had been dismissed. Hence, he said, he
was unaware that warrants for his arrest were issued. He had been a lawyer for the past
twenty-three years and this is the first and only case filed against him before the Court and in
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). He was a working student who took various jobs
at the early age of seventeen. He took the 1977 bar exams and landed No. 13 with an
average of 88.88%. He said his title as a lawyer and his license to practice are the only
legacies he can leave to his children; hence, he prays that he be given the chance to be
heard formally to be able to air his side.
On 16 January 2002, complainant filed her counter-affidavit [5] disputing her alleged
withdrawal of this complaint and the denial by the respondent of the standing warrants of
arrest against him arising out of the incident in question. The same was referred to the IBP.
In a resolution dated 28 January 2002,[6] this Court resolved to grant respondents
Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Comment on the administrative complaint and
for a Formal Hearing, and noted the comment therein. The case was referred to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation within ninety days from notice.
On 02 May 2002, complainant submitted a letter [7] to the IBP withdrawing the complaint
she filed against respondent, stating that after much reflection and recall of the antecedent
facts that led to the filing of the complaint, I have finally decided to withdraw the same as it
arose purely out of misunderstanding and miscommunication and definitely not warranting
any disciplinary action much less disbarment and apologize for whatever inconvenience the
complaint had cause[d] the office.
In an Order dated 19 June 2002, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala of the IBP,
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), to whom the case was assigned for investigation,
report and recommendation, notified the parties to appear for a hearing at said office on 03
July 2002.
 Per order dated 03 July 2002 of Commissioner Maala, it appears that when the case
was called for hearing, neither complainant nor respondent appeared. It was not shown,
however, whether they received notices of the scheduled hearing, hence, the same was
ordered cancelled and reset to 17 July 2002.
In a resolution dated 05 August 2002, this Court acting on the letter of complainant
dated 02 May 2002, resolved to note the same and referred it to the IBP.
On 07 October 2002, complainant submitted to the IBP a motion to hold and to quash
withdrawal of the administrative case expressing a desire to actively pursue her complaint.
According to complainant, respondent begged her to dismiss the administrative
complaint she filed and promised to settle his obligations with her. It was only for this reason
that she agreed to sign a written withdrawal of her complaint. This was, however, a mere
promise which remained unfulfilled.[8]
Not very long after, on 25 October 2002, complainant again filed before the IBP a
Motion to Dismiss Complaint. As is usual in desistance, complainant manifested her interest
to have the complaint dismissed after what she said was a mature reflection, realizing that
respondent had served her faithfully, honorably and well in the various cases that he had
handled for her at a time when she needed it most. She articulated that the cases she had
filed against the respondent have long been settled between them and should have been
dismissed by the Court, but she was not aware that respondents presence is necessary for
the dismissal of those cases, and she could not locate respondent. She only discovered later
on that he was actually taken very ill due to hypertension and gastro-intestinal problems. On
the other hand, respondent, in an effort to exculpate himself, averred he was under the
impression that complainant would take care and see to the dismissal of the said cases
against him. To convince the IBP that the case should be dismissed, complainant likewise
claimed that respondent had no more obligation to her because the same had been offset by
legal services rendered by the latter after an accounting was taken.[9]
In an Order dated 05 November 2002, issued by IBP Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala, the parties were notified to attend a hearing on the case which was set on
04 December 2002.[10] This scheduled hearing was, however, reset to 12 December 2002 for
failure of the complainant to appear on the earlier date. [11] At the hearing set on 12 December
2002, both parties appeared but complainant moved to reset on 29 January 2003 without
objection from the respondent.[12]
On 31 January 2003, the IBP, in Compliance[13] with this Courts resolution dated 20
November 2002[14] directing it to submit a status report on the case every first day of the
month until termination of the investigation, stated that because of complainants failure to
appear and affirm her Affidavit of Desistance despite several hearings set by the
Commission, it now considered the cases submitted for report and recommendation and to
be decided on the merits thereof.
31
Per report of Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, respondent Atty. Ramon S. Dio
was found to have committed gross misconduct, and he was, thus, recommended to be
suspended for a period of one year from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and
member of the bar. This was reduced to six months by the IBP Board of Governors in a
resolution dated 21 June 2003, which reads:
RESOLUTION
NO. XV-2003-343
Adm. Case No.
5454
Carmelina Y.
Rangwani vs.
Atty. Ramon S.
Dio
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with
modification as to penalty to conform to the evidence, and considering that respondents
issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. 22 constitutes serious misconduct and
in addition respondent committed gross misconduct when he failed to comply his promise to
complainant to settle the case, Atty. Ramon S. Dio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for six (6) months.
We agree with the IBPs finding of guilt as the same is fully anchored on the evidence
on record and on applicable laws, rules and jurisprudence.
Quite conspicuously, despite the opportunities accorded to respondent to refute the
charges against him, he failed to do so or even offer a valid explanation. The record is bereft
of any evidence to show that respondent has presented any countervailing evidence to meet
the charges against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter
lack of respect towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate the cases. [15] On
the contrary, respondents comments only markedly admitted complainants accusations.
[16]
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He
must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times
is expected of him.[17] These, the respondent miserably failed to do.
Respondent relies, quite heavily, on the complainants move to dismiss the complaint, to
secure exoneration. His reliance is misplaced. Firstly, because the same has not been
confirmed and substantiated by the complainant at all as she failed to appear in the hearings
scheduled for the purpose despite due notice. Secondly, and most importantly, we have
consistently looked with disfavor upon such desistance of complainants because of legal and
jurisprudential injunction.
Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Service or dismissal. . . . .
...
No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute
the same.
In Bais v. Tugaoen,[18] the Court frowned upon the complainants affidavit of desistance,
hence, in spite of it, proceeded with the complaint against the erring judge.
In Reyes-Domingo v. Morales,[19] we expostulated that:
The withdrawal of a complaint for lack of interest of a complainant does not necessarily
warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint (Dagsa-an v. Conag, 290 SCRA 12
[1998]). The Court cannot be bound by the unilateral decision of a complainant to desist from
prosecuting a case involving the discipline of parties subject to its administrative supervision
(Zamora v. Jumamoy, 238 SCRA 587 [1994]). The need to maintain the faith and confidence
of our people in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities demands that
proceedings in administrative cases against public officers and employees should not be
made to depend on the whims and caprices of complainants who are, in a real sense, only
witnesses (Sy v. Academia, 198 SCRA 705 [1991]).
The later case of Executive Judge Pacifico S. Bulado v. Domingo Tiu, Jr. (A.M. No. P-96-
1211, 31 March 2000, pp. 4-5, 329 SCRA 308), more pointedly stated that
While complainant in this case may have forgiven respondent, this Court, charged as it is with
enforcing discipline in the judiciary, cannot simply close its eyes to respondents acts of
extreme intransigence. Withdrawal of the complaint will not free respondent from his
administrative liability (Estreller v. Manatad, Jr., 268 SCRA 608 [1997]), particularly because
administrative proceedings are imbued with public interest, public office being a public trust
(Gacho v. Fuentes, Jr., 291 SCRA 474 [1998]).
The need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government, its agencies
and its instrumentalities requires that proceedings in administrative cases should not be
made to depend on the whims and caprices of the complainants who are, in a real sense,
only witnesses therein (Estreller v. Manatad, supra; Gacho v. Fuentes, supra). The court
cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter that involves its disciplinary
authority over all employees of the judiciary; otherwise, our disciplinary power may be put to
naught (Sandoval v. Manalo, 260 SCRA 611 [1996]).
32
Finally, in Bolivar v. Simbol,[20] the Court, citing In re Davies,[21] ruled that the discipline
of lawyers cannot be cut short by a compromise or withdrawal of charges:
It is contended on the part of the plaintiff in error that this settlement operated as an
absolution and remission of his offense. This view of the case ignores the fact that the
exercise of the power is not for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies between parties, but
to protect the court and the public against an attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his
profession. He had acted in clear disregard of his duty as an attorney at the bar, and without
good fidelity to his client. The public had rights which Mrs. Curtis could not thus settle or
destroy. The unworthy act had been fully consummated.
Respondents act of having borrowed the title to the land of complainant, his presumed
use of the said title for his personal gain, his failure to return the same despite repeated
demands and worse, his issuance of three checks in exchange for the said land title which
bounced, constitute gross misconduct for which he must be disciplined. In this connection
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is unequivocal. It states:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.[22]
In the case of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles v. Atty. Thomas Uy, Jr.,[23] this Court held:
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of
fidelity and good faith. It is designed to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything
of that kind from being done for the protection of the client (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1992 ed., p.
188).
Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall hold
in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
Furthermore, Rule 16.01 of the Code also states that a lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client. The Canons of Professional Ethics is
even more explicit:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses
or takes advantages of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession
of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any
circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.
This Court, in several cases, [24] has time and again ruled that the fiduciary duty of a
lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique position of trust and
confidence, and distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence is
betrayed, the faith of the people not only in the individual lawyer but also in the legal
profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required to at
all times maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty and integrity
of their profession.
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer should
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client. [25]
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that
renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Every lawyer should act and
comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the
legal profession.[26]
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers at all times
to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession.[27]
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The question now arises as to the proper penalty to be imposed.
As to the propriety of imposing the supreme penalty of disbarment, the rule is that
disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. [28] While we will not hesitate to remove
an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it,
we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.
[29]
In this case, we find suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent -
suspension being primarily intended not as a punishment, but as a means to protect the
public and the legal profession.[30]
The following cases rendered by this Court and the penalties imposed thereto where
Rule 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility finds application are enlightening.
In the earlier case of Aya v. Bigornia,[31] the Court ruled that money collected by a
lawyer in favor of his clients must be immediately turned over to them and failure to do so
merits a penalty of suspension for six months. In Daroy v. Legaspi,[32] the Court held that
33
lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of
their clients and failure to do constitutes professional misconduct warranting disbarment.
Subsequently, in the case of Obia v. Catimbang,[33] respondent Atty. Basilio M. Catimbang
was ordered indefinitely suspended for failure to return the amount of P11,000 entrusted to
him. Still later, in Dumadag v. Lumaya,[34] the Court likewise ordered the indefinite suspension
of Atty. Ernesto L. Lumaya for his receipt of and failure to deliver the amount of P4,344 to his
client, complainant in the case.
In the case of Burbe v. Magulta,[35] this Court imposed upon Atty. Magulta the penalty of
suspension for one (1) year for his conversion into legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by
his client.
In the case of Nuez v. Ricafort,[36] this Court ordered the indefinite suspension of Atty.
Romulo Ricafort for his act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of an alias writ of execution
for money judgment rendered against him.
Therein, the Court held:
There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that
respondent gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed
dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with
palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery of the
proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefore. Then,
despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in
default, he appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended
such a step because he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state,
respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to enjoy the
fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and
unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of
execution. But, remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in continued pursuit of a
clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully adjudged
by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were
drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation
as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not
pay the obligation.
While the case of Nuez v. Ricafort[37] holds some similarity to the present case, it is
material to note that this is the first time that a complaint of this nature has been filed against
the respondent. Likewise, unlike the Nuez case, the criminal cases filed by the complainant
have not been finally disposed of, hence, no conviction against respondent was ever
obtained. On all fours to this case is the case of Lao v. Medel.[38] Respondent Atty. Robert W.
Medel, who issued four checks which were subsequently dishonored totaling twenty-two
thousand pesos (P22,000) in payment of his outstanding obligation, was ordered suspended
for one year by this Court in line with the cases of Co. v. Bernardino,[39] Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon,
Jr.,[40] andSaburnido v. Madroo.[41]
 Finally, in the most recent case of Isidra Barrientos, et al. v. Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-
Meteoro,[42] this Court imposed upon respondent Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months for having issued several checks to the complainants in
payment of a pre-existing debt without sufficient funds - MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, A.C. No. 6593
Complainant,
We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn Present:
against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed PUNO, C.J.,
on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her CARPIO,
unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the CORONA,
remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the CARPIO MORALES,
public interest and public order. It also manifests a lawyers low regard to her commitment to VELASCO, JR.,
the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the NACHURA,
image of the profession she should hold in high esteem. - versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
This Court justified the imposition of a lighter penalty of six months upon Atty. Libiran- BERSAMIN,
Meteoro instead of one year as was imposed in the case of Lao v. Medel[43] on the ground of DEL CASTILLO,
Atty. Libiran-Meteoros payment of a portion of her debt to the complainant. *
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
In the same manner, we find that the lesser penalty of six months cannot be imposed PEREZ, and
upon herein respondent Atty. Dio on the ground that, just like the case of Lao v. Medel, there ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. **
MENDOZA, JJ.
is no showing of any restitution whatsoever in this case on the part of the respondent. VALENCIA, Promulgated:
Likewise, the fraudulent manner by which he was able to entice complainant to entrust to him Respondents. ______________
the title to her land should also be taken into account.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
As was so aptly stated in Cuizon v. Macalino:[44]
DECISION

Such conduct indicates the respondents unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on PER CURIAM:
him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action. Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit[1] and a supplemental
[2]
affidavit for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and
Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon S. Dio is found guilty of GROSS
Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:
MISCONDUCT and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondents
1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our
suspension is effective upon his receipt of notice of this Decision.
marriage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita,
Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x
Let notice of this Decision be spread on respondents record as an attorney in this
Court, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Court Administrator for 2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6)
circulation to all courts concerned. children, namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza,
Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed
SO ORDERED. Garrido;

3. xxxx
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one
Tinga, J., no part, relationship to a party. of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the
later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that

34
 the former is a child of my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as
a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters
told me that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband
strolling at the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita, Manila
together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty.
Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido,
respectively x x x
5. xxxx
6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to
secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others
that the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar
Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were married at
Hongkong sometime on 1978.
7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined
Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence x x x
8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to
give us our needed financial support to the prejudice of our children
who stopped schooling because of financial constraints.
xxxx
That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his
mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia
considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only mental
anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless
nights; x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit,[3] Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and
imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was
already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed
he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that
Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his bad boy image before she married
him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty.
Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his
difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his
second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with
Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all
graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.
[4]
Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her
profession for the past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became
a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of
35
Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before
he became a lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit,[5] Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty.
Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the
marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty.
Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic
relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in
1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this
silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second
family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of
her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia
also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings [6] in view of the
criminal complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity[7] (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss [8] the complaints after the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and
Maelotisea an absolute nullity. Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the
respondents argued that she had no personality to file her complaints against them.The
respondents also alleged that they had not committed any immoral act since they married
when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed
before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this
motion.[9]
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against
the respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who
is the father of her six (6) children. [10] The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied
this motion.[11]
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating
Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents
disbarment.[12] The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board
of Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with modification under
Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Atty.
Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality required as
members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for
gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.

Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
denied his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He
submits that under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would
warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the
IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations
to retain his profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to
lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal
(Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the
petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand,
advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty.
Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other
administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.
THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of
Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to
Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar.[13] We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason
to depart from this ruling. [14] First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the
public.[15] The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of
the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for
the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may
inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a
direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; [16] effectively,
his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the
Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts
charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty.
36
Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification
to be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts
complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we
explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[17] the possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent
judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral
fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer. [18] Admission to the practice only
creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a
lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after
admission to the Bar.[19]
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes
the disciplinary authority of the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to
the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the
implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
which expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral
conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of
law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of
disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance
cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have
stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note
further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence;
her evidence are now available for the Courts examination and consideration, and their
merits are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her
affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely
becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in
continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community.[20] Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed undersuch
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.[21] We
make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires
grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.[22]
In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who
contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[23] the respondent lawyer entered into multiple
marriages and subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the
respondents pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family
institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of
values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening
of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward
respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his
marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondents act of contracting
the second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good
moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to
the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[25] where the
respondent secretly contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in
Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage a
sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a
second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions
of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his
disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the
highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies;
thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had
the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife;
marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he
was already married to Constancia.[26] This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to
lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea
notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of
an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his
two marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional
implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by
his second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon
the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who
was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with
Maelotisea was not valid.
37
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in
Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another
marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously
cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his
wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten
(10) years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary
to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his
responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge,
to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the
present complaint was filed against him.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession,
specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules
of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his
admission to the Bar.[27] As a lawyer, he violated his lawyers oath,[28] Section 20(a) of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court,[29] and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[30] all of
which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he
committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first marriage
with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to
nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which commands that he shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands
that [a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession;
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that, [a] lawyer shall
not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would
set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he
violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he
discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of
convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In
this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards
and norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[31] Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
[32]
Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation.
[33]
Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be
disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized. [34]
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should
be administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in
March 27, 1978 when they got married shall not afford them exemption
from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a condition
precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction
whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional
capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his marriage to
complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from
responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the respondent was
subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that respondents
exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of them as
members of the Bar.[35]
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective
reality.[36] To have good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of
being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally
entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the
place where she is known. [37] The requirement of good moral character has four general
purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to
protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. [38] Each
purpose is as important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer,
Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to
Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante, she was
under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic
relationship with him for about six (6) years during the subsistence of his two marriages. In
1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second
marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good
moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values,
whose confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latters family problems,
would not aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking
advice, thereby effectively alienating the other persons feelings and affection from his wife
and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null and void,
the fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6)
children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as
he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that
time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her
liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing
38
his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty.
Valencias presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children
for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the
prism of law.
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second
marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may
be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity
of Atty. Garridos marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this
expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not
within the country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of
Atty. Garridos second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine
marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family.
Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed
her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their
marriage in Hongkong[39] leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in
Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the
subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note
that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the
surname of her husband. Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not
live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this
marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all sharing her husband with another
woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral
values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions
grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she
married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a
family. Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the
confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic
relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already
mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of
shocking the communitys sense of decency; while she professed to be the lawfully wedded
wife, she helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and
did not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the
legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the
highest standards of morality.[40] In Barrientos v. Daarol,[41] we held that lawyers, as officers of
the court, must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the
bar and after she became a member of the legal profession.
Conclusion
 Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege
bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn
where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required
of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena
P. Valencia for this reason.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the
power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal
professional and as an officer of the Court.[42]
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is
one of them. The records show the parties pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that
demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them
for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the
court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of
supporting his children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The
extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable
traits of character.
In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally
demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside
without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of the
administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the
circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle whose incidents
crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality,
violation of the Lawyers Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality,
violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E.
Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and
Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
39
ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, A.C. No. 6396
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO,
Respondent, Promulgated:
October 25, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court.
Members of the bar decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a manner befitting their
noble profession.
Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
a Complaint-Affidavit[1] with supporting documents[2] against respondent Atty. Virgil R. Castro
for Unprofessional Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule
8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[3] The charge in the complaint is summed up
as follows:
Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya
Chapter. On 5 May 2003, respondent went to complainants office to inquire whether the
complete records of Civil Case No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino Castillano v. Sps. Federico S.
Castillano and Felicidad Aberin, had already been remanded to the court of origin, MCTC
Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted that respondent was
not the counsel of record of either party in Civil Case No. 784.
Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted
since a certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to
serve as basis for the transmittal of the records to the court of origin. To this respondent
retorted scornfully, Who will certify the Court of Appeals Decision, the Court of Appeals? You
mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified true copy? Surprised at this
outburst, complainant replied, Sir, its in the Rules but you could show us the copy sent to the
party you claim to be representing. Respondent then replied, Then you should have notified
me of the said requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been frequenting your office
since then, but you never bothered to notify me. Complainant replied, It is not our duty, Sir, to
notify you of the said requirement.
Respondent then answered, You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the
record of the case? Complainant responded, No, Sir, I mean, its not our duty to notify you that
you have to submit a copy of the Court of Appeals decision. Respondent angrily declared in
Ilocano, Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay? (You mean to say you dont
care anymore? Is that the way it is?) He then turned and left the office, banging the door on
his way out to show his anger. The banging of the door was so loud it was heard by the
people at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing was taking place.[4]
After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his finger at
complainant and shouted, Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales
kaniak ah! (Vulva of your mother! If you are harboring ill feelings against my client, dont turn
your ire on me!) Complainant was shocked at respondents words but still managed to reply, I
dont even know your client, Sir. Respondent left the office and as he passed by complainants
window, he again shouted, Ukinnam nga babai! (Vulva of your mother, you woman!)[5]
Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office of
which she was, and still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her credibility had
been tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to command full respect from her
staff.[6]
The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported by
an Affidavit[7] signed by employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the
incident. The Affidavit narrated the same incident as witnessed by the said employees.
A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was filed by complainant on 25
September 2003.[8]
On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order[9] requiring respondent to submit his answer
to the complaint. Respondent submitted his Compliance[10] dated 18 June 2003. Respondent
explained that he was counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 847, entitled Sps. Federico
Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al., filed with the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch
30. He learned of the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64962
with respect to Civil Case No. 847 before the lower court. Prior to the incident, he went to the
office of the complainant to request for the transmittal of the records of the case to the MCTC
and the complainant reassured him of the same.
Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the
records on 5 May 2003. However, he has no explanation as to what transpired on that day.
40
Instead, he narrates that on 25 May 2003, twelve days after the incident, the records had not
yet been transmitted, and he subsequently learned that these records were returned to the
court of origin.
The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25
September 2003 by the Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However, on said
date, only complainant appeared. The latter also moved that the case be submitted for
resolution.[11] Respondent later on filed a Manifestation stating that the reason for his non-
appearance was because he was still recuperating from physical injuries and that he was not
mentally fit to prepare the required pleadings as his vehicle was rained with bullets on 19
August 2003. He also expressed his public apology to the complainant in the
same Manifestation.[12]
Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next
hearing date in view of respondents public apology, adding that respondent personally and
humbly asked for forgiveness which she accepted.[13]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded
and warned that any other complaint for breach of his professional duties shall be dealt with
more severely.[14] The IBP submitted to this Court a Notice of Resolution adopting and
approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.[15]
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of
Civil Case No. 784. Had he been counsel of record, it would have been easy for him to
present the required certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He need not
have gone to Manila to procure a certified true copy of the decision since the Court of
Appeals furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate original or certified true
copy of its decision.
His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were
already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and there
being no authorization from either the parties to represent them, respondent had no right to
impose his will on the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach
upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the
right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel.
Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case
No. 784, respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of
record of that case. It does not matter whether he did so in good faith.

Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784,
respondent acted rudely towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk of
court and uttered at her the most vulgar of invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but also
unbecoming considering that he did all these to a woman and in front of her subordinates.
As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,[16] respondent ought to have realized that this
sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and
erode public respect for it.[17] These acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their
brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or
contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and thrives despite conflicting interest. It emanates
solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the honorable performance of professional
duty.[20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with
more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate
annotation in the record of the respondent.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely SO ORDERED.
reflect on his fitness to practice law, now shall he, whether in public or
private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND
CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that
lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers.
Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act
honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves without
reproach at all times.[18]
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not
categorically deny the charges in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of the
prefatory facts of the case as well as of the incident on 5 May 2003.

Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that respondents

uncharacteristic behavior was not an isolated incident. He has supposedly done the same to
Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the latter having filed a case
against respondent pending before this Court.[19] We, however, cannot acknowledge such
allegation absent any evidence showing the veracity of such claim. No affidavits to that effect
were submitted by either Atty. Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.

Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that
respondent had apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to
say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are
accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent
afterwards. The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be
taken back. Hence, he should bear the consequences of his actions.

41
 CONRADO QUE, A.C. No. 7054 attacked the complainants and his siblings titles over the property
Complainant, subject of the unlawful detainer case;
PUNO, C J.,
CARPIO, (2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject
CORONA, cases in order to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient
CARPIO MORALES, administration of justice for his own personal gain and to defeat the
CHICO-NAZARIO, right of the complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC and
VELASCO, JR., RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case;
NACHURA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, (3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his adversary
BRION, and the courts by resorting to falsehood and deception to misguide,
PERALTA, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice. The
BERSAMIN, respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of
DEL CASTILLO, the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by fabricating
ABAD, and an imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court which
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in
the said case. The complainant alleged that the respondent did this
ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR. Promulgated: to cover up his lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived his
Respondent. clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the above falsehood.[4]
December 4, 2009
(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned
and defamed the good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo
Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous counsel of the respondents
clients.

x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x (5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a complaint for disbarment,[1] Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla,
Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of
committing the following violations of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions
for annulment of title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a
petition for annulment of judgment before the RTC and lastly, a
petition for declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject
cases) to assail and overturn the final judgments of the Metropolitan
Trial Court[2] (MeTC) and RTC[3] in the unlawful detainer case
rendered against the respondents clients. The respondent in this
regard, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the
MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well that these courts have jurisdiction
over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly
in court in the petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants,
three of whom are already deceased;
(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the second
petition for annulment of title as counsel for the Republic of
the Philippines without being authorized to do so.
Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52)
litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him.
The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.
In his Answer,[5] the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan
Development Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the underprivileged, the
less fortunate, the homeless and those in the marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He agreed
to take over the cases formerly handled by other KDC members. One of these cases was the
unlawful detainer case handled by the late Atty. Catolico where the complainant and his
siblings were the plaintiffs and the respondents present clients were the defendants.
With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent professed
his sincerity, honesty and good faith in filing the petitions complained of; he filed these

42
petitions to protect the interests of his clients in their property. The respondent asserted that
these petitions were all based on valid grounds the lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC and the
RTC over the underlying unlawful detainer case, the extrinsic fraud committed by the late
Atty. Catolico, and the extrinsic fraud committed by the complainant and his family
against his clients; he discovered that the allegedly detained property did not really belong to
the complainant and his family but is a forest land. The respondent also asserted that his
resort to a petition for annulment of judgment and a petition for declaratory relief to contest
the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all parts of his legal strategy to protect the
interests of his clients.
On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of the
disbarment complaint), the respondent maintained that his allegations were based on his
observations and the notes he had taken during the proceedings on what the presiding judge
dictated in open court.
The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court (with respect
to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the disbarment complaint). He claimed that the 52 litigants in Civil
Case No. Q-03-48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he immediately rectified his error by
dropping them from the case. On the petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent
claimed that a majority (31 out of 49) of the litigants who signed the certification constituted
sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping. The respondent likewise denied
having represented the Republic of the Philippines in the second petition for annulment of
title. The respondent pointed out that there was no allegation whatsoever that he was the
sole representative of both the complainants (his clients) and the Republic of
the Philippines. The respondent pointed out that the petition embodied a request to the Office
of the Solicitor General to represent his clients in the case.[6]
The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust,
wrongful or immoral acts towards the complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted
in good faith in his dealings with them and his conduct was consistent with his sworn duty as
a lawyer to uphold justice and the law and to defend the interests of his clients. The
respondent additionally claimed that the disbarment case was filed because the complainants
counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty. Uy), had an axe to grind against him.
Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings [7] before the IBP that the present
complaint violated the rule on forum shopping considering that the subject cases were also
the ones on which a complaint was filed against him in CBD Case No. 03-1099 filed by Atty.
Uy before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The respondent also posited that the present
complaint was filed to harass, ridicule and defame his good name and reputation and,
indirectly, to harass his clients who are marginalized members of the KDC.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil
Case No. Q-03-48762, Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan [8](Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan) found all the charges against the respondent meritorious. In his
Report and Recommendation, he stated:
43
While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect
the cause and rights of his client with all the fervor and energy within his
command, yet, it is equally true that it is the primary duty of the lawyer to
defend the dignity, authority and majesty of the law and the courts which
enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and defend the cause of
his clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and
must not encourage multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in forum-
shopping.[9]
On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner
Cunanan noted the unnecessary use by the respondent of legal remedies to forestall the
execution of the final decisions of the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainer
case against his clients.[10]
On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the
respondent in filing two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment
and later on a petition for declaratory relief were all done to prevent the execution of the final
judgment in the unlawful detainer case and constituted prohibited forum-shopping.[11]
On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found ample
evidence showing that the respondent was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in his
petition for annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities and attributed acts to Atty. Catolico
and to the presiding judge, all of which were untrue. [12]
On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded the respondents
explanation that he had no intention to represent without authority 15 of the litigants (three of
whom were already deceased) in the petition for annulment of judgment (Civil Case No. Q-
01-45556). To the Investigating Commissioner, the respondent merely glossed over the
representation issue by claiming that the authority given by a majority of the litigants complied
with the certification of non-forum shopping requirement. The Investigating Commissioner
likewise brushed aside the respondents argument regarding his misrepresentation in the
second complaint for annulment of title since he knew very well that only the Solicitor General
can institute an action for reversion on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Despite this
knowledge, the respondent solely signed the amended complaint for and on behalf of his
clients and of the Republic.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through its
Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-1100, adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and recommended that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. [13] On reconsideration,
the Board of Governors reduced the respondents suspension from the practice of law to one
(1) year.[14]
The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable
for the imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these
transgressions should carry.
 The Courts Ruling
Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and the Board of Governors of the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline.
We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed
involving the respondent; another complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been
filed. In Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,[15] we
suspended the respondent from the practice of law for his willful and intentional falsehood
before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We initially
imposed a suspension of two (2) years, but in an act of leniency subsequently reduced the
suspension to six (6) months.[16]
Abuse of court procedures and processes
The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of
serious misconduct for abusing court procedures and processes to shield his clients from the
execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case against
these clients:
First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
53892) with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
to question the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction. In dismissing the
respondents petition, the CA held:
Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the
proper remedy, still it must be rejected for failure of petitioners to
satisfactorily demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the ejectment case.[17]
Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the
respondent again questioned the MeTCs and the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful
detainer case in a petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-
45556) before the RTC with an ancillary prayer for the grant of a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction. The RTC dismissed this petition on the basis of the motion to
dismiss filed.[18]
Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-99-38780 and Civil Case No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the complainants title to the
property involved in the unlawful detainer case. The records show that these petitions were
both dismissed for lack of legal personality on the part of the plaintiffs to file the petition.[19]
Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for
annulment of title, the respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the complainant and his siblings from exercising their
rights over the same property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The respondent based
44
the petition on the alleged nullity of the complainants title because the property is a part of
forest land.
Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions he
had filed in several courts the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of judgment,
the second petition for annulment of complainants title and the petition for declaratory relief
reveal the respondents persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final
decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in the unlawful detainer case.
Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated attempts go beyond the
legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his
client.These are already uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of
the MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to observe the
rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. By his
actions, the respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and efficient
administration of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.[20]
Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping
The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility,[21] as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of
which are directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both
violations constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to degrade the administration of
justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure; [22] and add to the congestion of the heavily
burdened dockets of the courts.[23]
While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts jurisdiction
may be a procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the respondents
subsequent petitions involving the same property and the same parties not only demonstrate
his attempts to secure favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious objective as well of
preventing the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case
against his clients. This intent is most obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment of
judgment and declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing the execution of the unlawful
detainer decision, long after this decision had become final.
Willful, intentional and deliberate
falsehood before the courts
The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful,
intentional and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.
First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch
101, Quezon City, the respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the
annulment sought. The extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last paragraph of the petition, as
follows:
 In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately
neglected to file the proper remedy then available after receipt of the
denial of their Motion for Reconsideration thus corruptly sold out the
interest of the petitioners (defendants therein) by keeping them away
to the Court and in complete ignorance of the suit by a false pretense of
compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging representing them when in
truth and in fact, have connived with the attorney of the prevailing
party at his defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner (defendants
therein) [24]
Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion for
reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he
believed that the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC are null and void.
[25]
These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of
supporting the petition for annulment. Worse, it involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack
on the reputation of a law office colleague, another violation we shall separately discuss
below.
Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second
petition for annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule that
only the Solicitor General may commence reversion proceedings of public lands [26] on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines. This second petition, filed by a private party and not by the
Republic, showed that: (a) the respondent and his clients requested that they be represented
by the Solicitor General in the proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines was simply
impleaded in the amended petition without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the respondent
signed the amended petition where he alone stood as counsel for the plaintiffs. In this
underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel the Republic to litigate and waste its
resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.
Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of
the order dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the
court and his clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this wise:
Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show,
that after both counsel have argued on the aforesaid pending
incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in open court, and in the
presence and within the hearing distance of all the plaintiffs and their
counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved: TO DENY
THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS
COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE
REMAINING PERIOD.[27][Underscoring and emphasis theirs]
The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually
for the respondents application for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on the
adverse partys motion to dismiss.[28] The records also show that RTC-Branch 101 held in
abeyance the respondents application for injunctive relief pending the resolution of the motion
to dismiss filed by the adverse party.[29] As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge of RTC-
Branch 101:
45
Browsing over the records of this case specifically the
transcripts of stenographic notes as transcribed by the Stenographer, the
same will indicate that the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration
are not true.
how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the
factual and legal bases as required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover,
there are no indications or iota of irregularity in the preparation by
Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the Court interpreter of the
Minutes of the open Court session.[Underscoring theirs]
The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations,
the respondent took advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who
are all squatters) to convince them to support, through their affidavits, his false claims on
what allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing. [30]
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the
Code of Professional Responsibility for violating the lawyers duty to observe candor and
fairness in his dealings with the court. This provision states:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be mislead by
an artifice.
Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a
lawyer never to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of
fact or law.[31] The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the court
makes him an indispensable participant in the administration of justice, [32] and that he is
expected to act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work. [33] His duty as a lawyer obligates him
not to conceal the truth from the court, or to mislead the court in any manner, no matter how
demanding his duties to his clients may be. [34] In case of conflict, his duties to his client yield
to his duty to deal candidly with the court.[35]
In defending his clients interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01,
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain
the lawful objectives of his clients x x x
This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means
as are consistent with truth and honor.[36] He should not prosecute patently frivolous and
meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions. [37] The recital of what the respondent
did to prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he actually
committed what the above rule expressly prohibits.

Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers
To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the
respondent attacked (as quoted above) the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and
accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with the counsel for the
adverse party.
We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon
his accusation against Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only participated
in the cases previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the same time, the
respondents petition for annulment of judgment also represented that no second motion for
reconsideration or appeal was filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful
detainer case for the reason that the respondent believed the said decisions
were null and void ab initio.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair
in his professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues. He was unfair because he
imputed wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively
maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend himself.
Unauthorized appearances
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans finding that the respondent twice
represented parties without proper authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of
judgment; and second, in the second petition for annulment of title.[38]
In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for
annulment of judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the
other 15 individuals did not. We cannot agree with the respondents off-hand explanation that
he truly believed that a majority of the litigants who signed the certification of non-forum
shopping in the petition already gave him the necessary authority to sign for the others. We
find it highly improbable that this kind of lapse could have been committed by a seasoned
lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of law for more than 30
years and who received rigid and strict training as he so proudly declares, from the University
of the Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms with which he was previously
associated.[39] As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the respondents explanation of
compliance with the rule on the certification of non-forum shopping glossed over the real
charge of appearing in court without the proper authorization of the parties he allegedly
represented.
In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of
title, the respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of
the Philippines in actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition
46
where he impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and
consent, as a surreptitious way of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the
amended complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs his clients and the Republic.
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
when he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not
represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from the latters representative or, in the
absence thereof, without leave of court. [40] The willful unauthorized appearance by a lawyer
for a party in a given case constitutes contumacious conduct and also warrants disciplinary
measures against the erring lawyer for professional misconduct.[41]
The Respondents Defenses
We find no merit in the respondents defenses.
Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious
advantage of another. Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith
connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even
though the forms and technicalities of law, together with the absence of all information or
belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious." [42] Bad faith, on the other hand,
is a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-
interest, ill will or for an ulterior purpose. [43] As both concepts are states of mind, they may be
deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more particularly, from the acts and
statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry.
In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the
interests of his clients. We draw this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious
recourses he made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of the final
judgments of the MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and
experience and misread the Rules immeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith.
We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading
the soundness and merit of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the execution of the
MeTC and RTC decisions, considering his own conduct of presenting conflicting theories in
his petitions. The succession of cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the sincere
and honest belief he claims; these are simply scattershot means to achieve his objective of
avoiding the execution of the unlawful detainer judgment against his clients.
On the respondents allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy,
it is not amiss to note that this was the same defense he raised in the first disbarment case.
[44]
As we explained in Plus Builders, the exercise of a lawyers discretion in acting for his
client can never be at the expense of truth and justice. In the words of this cited case:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client,
full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give
a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his
clients case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and
legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings
 only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes
to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself
of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give
aid nor consent to the same; and that he will conduct [himself] as a
lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state, the
lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth
and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds
of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and
advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action
propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.
[45]
We cannot give credence to the respondents claim that the disbarment case was
filed because the counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. We
reject this argument, considering that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the present disbarment
case against him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own
separate disbarment case against the respondent.
The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the
complainants unimportant and with very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment
proceeding is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of
the court and a participant in the dispensation of justice an issue where the complainants
personal motives have little relevance. For this reason, disbarment proceedings may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also
explained in the case In re: Almacen:
. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not - and does not
involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
xxx
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether
or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer
of-the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
[46]
47
Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the
complainant Que and his counsel to file the present disbarment case.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of
professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards
imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year
suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to
the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed,
and the nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to
gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the
appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law
profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has
disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even
his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such
traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the
orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical
infraction of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia
versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for
misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for
collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by
reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the
respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and
since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondents
professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164
dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of
the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty.
Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyers
Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule
19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold
that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993
DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO REY
MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH
NURSES ASSOCIATION, represented by RAOULITO GAYUTIN, respondents.
Renato J. Dilag and Benjamin C. Santos for petitioners.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondent Ombudsman.
Crispin T. Reyes and Florencio T. Domingo for private respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992,
directing the preventive suspension of petitioners,
Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C. Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III;
Conrado Rey Matias, Technical Assistant to the Chief of Hospital; Cora C. Solis, Accountant
III; and Enya N. Lopez, Supply Officer III, all of the National Center for Mental Health. The
petition also asks for an order directing the Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw
and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the Ombudsman, from participation in
the preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-17; Annexes to
Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-21).
The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with
the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the recommendation of Director
Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, without affording petitioners the
opportunity to controvert the charges filed against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify
Director Arnaw and Investigator Villa-Rosero for manifest partiality and bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15).
On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents' Comment on the petition.
On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners filed a "Supplemental Petition (Rollo,
pp. 124-130); Annexes to Supplemental Petition; Rollo pp. 140-163) and an "Urgent
Supplemental Manifestation" (Rollo,
pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental Manifestation; Rollo, pp. 173-176),
respectively, averring developments that transpired after the filing of the petition and stressing
the urgency for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order.
48
On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . . Resolved to REQUIRE the respondents to
MAINTAIN in the meantime, the STATUS QUO pending filing of comments by said
respondents on the original supplemental manifestation" (Rollo, p. 177).
On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of Health to
comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 182-192, Annexes, pp.
192-203). In a Resolution dated October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of
Health to comment on the said motion.
On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus Submission," respondent NCMH
Nurses Association submitted its Comment to the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent
Supplemental Manifestation. Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers
of petitioners in contempt and to disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-267). Attached to the "Omnibus
Submission" as annexes were the orders and pleadings filed in Administrative Case No.
OBM-ADM-0-91-1051 against petitioners (Rollo, pp. 268-480).
The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners with:
(1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their clients petitioners
Buenaseda, et al., to openly defy, ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously
evade their preventive suspension by Order of July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2)
"unlawfully interfering with and obstructing the implementation of the said order (Omnibus
Submission, pp. 50-52; Rollo, pp. 259-260); and (3) violation of the Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and of unprofessional and unethical conduct "by foisting blatant
lies, malicious falsehood and outrageous deception" and by committing subornation of
perjury, falsification and fabrication in their pleadings (Omnibus Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo,
pp. 261-263).
On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a "Manifestation and Supplement to 'Motion to Direct
Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with 22 September 1992 Resolution'"
(Manifestation attached to Rollo without pagination between pp. 613 and 614 thereof).
On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November 10,
1992, alleging that: (a) "despite the issuance of the September 22, 1992 Resolution directing
respondents to maintain the status quo, respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance
the implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension; (b) the clear intent and spirit of the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the implementation of
petitioners' preventive suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant
petition; (c) respondent Secretary's acts in refusing to hold in abeyance implementation of
petitioners' preventive suspension and in tolerating and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the
OIC appointed to replace petitioner Buenaseda, are in violation of the Resolution dated
September 22, 1992; and
(d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to comply with the Resolution dated
September 22, 1992 immediately, by restoring the status quo ante contemplated by the
aforesaid resolution" (Comment attached to Rollo without paginations between pp. 613-614
thereof).
In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary to
comply with the aforestated status quo order, stating inter alia, that:
It appearing that the status quo ante litem motam, or the last peaceable
uncontested status which preceded the present controversy was the
situation obtaining at the time of the filing of the petition at bar on
September 7, 1992 wherein petitioners were then actually occupying
their respective positions, the Court hereby ORDERS that petitioners be
allowed to perform the duties of their respective positions and to receive
such salaries and benefits as they may be lawfully entitled to, and that
respondents and/or any and all persons acting under their authority
desist and refrain from performing any act in violation of the
aforementioned Resolution of September 22, 1992 until further orders
from the Court (Attached to Rollo after p. 615 thereof).
On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General, commenting on the Petition, Supplemental
Petition and Supplemental Manifestation, stated that (a) "The authority of the Ombudsman is
only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;" and (b) "Assuming
the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there
are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not
been met in the instant case" (Attached to Rollo without pagination).
In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners adopted the position of the Solicitor
General that the Ombudsman can only suspend government officials or employees
connected with his office. Petitioners also refuted private respondents' motion to disbar
petitioners' counsel and to cite them for contempt (Attached to Rollowithout pagination).
The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend
government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the
Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said
officials and employees.
In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioners, respondents
(Urgent Motion to Lift Status Quo, etc, dated January 11, 1993, pp. 10-11), invoke Section 24
of R.A. No. 6770, which provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending
an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a)
the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
(b) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against
him.
49
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by
the Office of Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay,
except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the
Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent,
in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing
the period of suspension herein provided.
Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension given the Ombudsman under
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 was contemplated by Section 13 (8) of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform
such functions or duties as may be provided by law."
On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners claim that under the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the departments and
other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative
investigation conducted by his office. Hence, he cannot order the preventive suspension
himself.
They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the
Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function, and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.
The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of the Constitutions, the Ombudsman
has three distinct powers, namely: (1) direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against public officials or employees at fault; (2) recommend their removal, suspension,
demotion fine, censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel compliance with the recommendation
(Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 9-10).
The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren call that can easily mislead, unless
one bears in mind that what the Ombudsman imposed on petitioners was not a punitive but
only a preventive suspension.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the suspension"
of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive
measure. All the words associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to
penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule
of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other
words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of
terms in which it is found or with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75
Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively
suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a
procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with
the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the
appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In
order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the
Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such
investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the
danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the
intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide
when the persons facing administrative charges should be preventively suspended.
Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed
(Crawford, Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero, 92
Phil. 456 [1953]). The test in determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is imposed
for the punishment of a wrong to the public or for the redress of an injury to an individual (59
Corpuz Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code prescribing
the procedure in criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to be interpreted liberally (People
v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644).
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to
perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said
statute, particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation
that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will
hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally
construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was created (Cf.
Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. (2d)
213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E., 438 [1934]).
In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court, holding that a preventive suspension is
not a penalty, said:
Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If
after such investigation, the charges are established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is
removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in
administrative cases who are employed in his office, the Solicitor General leans heavily on
50
the phrase "suspend any officer or employee under his authority" in Section 24 of R.A. No.
6770.
The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which dealt with preventive suspension and which authorized the chief of a bureau or office to
"suspend any subordinate or employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an
investigation . . . ."
Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266), which superseded Section 694 of
the Revised Administrative Code also authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend
any subordinate officer or employees, in his bureau or under his authority."
However, when the power to discipline government officials and employees was extended to
the Civil Service Commission by the Civil Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No. 805), concurrently
with the President, the Department Secretaries and the heads of bureaus and offices, the
phrase "subordinate officer and employee in his bureau" was deleted, appropriately leaving
the phrase "under his authority." Therefore, Section 41 of said law only mentions that the
proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend "any subordinate officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation . . ." (Sec. 41).
The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the proper disciplining authority to
"preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation" (Sec. 51).
The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words "subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving
the phrase to read "suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation . . . ." The conclusion that can be deduced from the deletion of the word
"subordinate" before and the words "in his bureau" after "officer or employee" is that the
Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and
employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of whether they are employed "in his
office" or in other offices of the government. The moment a criminal or administrative
complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent therein is deemed to be "in his
authority" and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent should be placed under
preventive suspension.
In their petition, petitioners also claim that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the suspension order without
affording petitioners the opportunity to confront the charges against them during the
preliminary conference and even after petitioners had asked for the disqualification of
Director Arnaw and Atty. Villa-Rosero (Rollo, pp. 6-13). Joining petitioners, the Solicitor
General contends that assuming arguendo that the Ombudsman has the power to
preventively suspend erring public officials and employees who are working in other
departments and offices, the questioned order remains null and void for his failure to comply
with the requisites in Section 24 of the Ombudsman Law (Comment dated December 3,
1992, pp. 11-19).
Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of the Ombudsman was
validly issued even without a full-blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence by
the parties. In Nera, supra, petitioner therein also claimed that the Secretary of Health could
not preventively suspend him before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint.
The contention of petitioners herein can be dismissed perfunctorily by holding that the
suspension meted out was merely preventive and therefore, as held in Nera, there was
"nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before tho charges
against him are heard . . . (Nera v. Garcia., supra).
There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman cannot order
the preventive suspension of a respondent unless the evidence of guilt is strong and (1) the
charts against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct
or neglect in the performance of duty; (2) the charge would warrant removal from the service;
or (3) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The same conditions for the exercise of the power to preventively suspend officials or
employees under investigation were found in Section 34 of R.A. No. 2260.
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to
decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No.
6770, which expressly left such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman
on the basis of the administrative complaint. In the case at bench, the Ombudsman issued
the order of preventive suspension only after: (a) petitioners had filed their answer to the
administrative complaint and the "Motion for the Preventive Suspension" of petitioners, which
incorporated the charges in the criminal complaint against them (Annex 3, Omnibus
Submission, Rollo, pp. 288-289; Annex 4, Rollo,
pp. 290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply to the answer of petitioners, specifying
23 cases of harassment by petitioners of the members of the private respondent (Annex 6,
Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 309-333); and (c) a preliminary conference wherein the
complainant and the respondents in the administrative case agreed to submit their list of
witnesses and documentary evidence.
Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991 their list of exhibits (Annex 8 of Omnibus
Submission, Rollo, pp. 336-337) while private respondents submitted their list of exhibits
(Annex 9 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 338-348).
Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy
de Villa-Rosero acted with manifest partiality and bias in recommending the suspension of
petitioners. Neither can it be said that the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in acting favorably on their recommendation.
The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of petitioners with unlawfully causing or
otherwise inducing their clients to openly defy and disobey the preventive suspension as
ordered by the Ombudsman and the Secretary of Health can not prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-
261). The Motion should be filed, as in fact such a motion was filed, with the Ombudsman. At
any rate, we find that the acts alleged to constitute indirect contempt were legitimate
51
measures taken by said lawyers to question the validity and propriety of the preventive
suspension of their clients.
On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate language used by counsel for
private respondents hurled against petitioners and their counsel (Consolidated: (1) Comment
on Private Respondent" "Urgent Motions, etc.;
(2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private Respondent's Comment and
Supplemental Comment, pp. 4-5).
A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause. The language of a
lawyer, both oral or written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of
the legal profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession
(Lubiano v. Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]). The use of abusive language by counsel against
the opposing counsel constitutes at the same time a disrespect to the dignity of the court of
justice. Besides, the use of impassioned language in pleadings, more often than not, creates
more heat than light.
The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in the instant special civil action,
which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving
persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of
procedure for the discipline of members of the bar separate and apart from the present
special civil action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to be maintained in
the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Melo, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J., concurring:
I agree that the Ombudsman has the authority, under Sec. 24 of R.A.
No. 6770, to preventively suspend any government official or employee administratively
charged before him pending the investigation of the complaint, the reason being that
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the prosecution of the case.
However, in the case before us, I am afraid that the facts thus far presented may not provide
adequate basis to reasonably place petitioners under preventive suspension. For, it is not
enough to rule that the Ombudsman has authority to suspend petitioners preventively while
the case is in progress before him. Equally important is the determination whether it is
necessary to issue the preventive suspension under the circumstances. Regretfully, I cannot
see any sufficient basis to justify the preventive suspension. That is why, I go for granting oral
argument to the parties so that we can truthfully determine whether the preventive
suspension of respondents are warranted by the facts. We may be suspending key
government officials and employees on the basis merely of speculations which may not serve
the ends of justice but which, on the other hand, deprive them of their right to due process.
The simultaneous preventive suspension of top officials and employees of the National
Center for Mental Health may just disrupt, the hospital's normal operations, much to the
detriment of public service. We may safely assume that it is not easy to replace them in their
respective functions as those substituting them may be taking over for the first time. The
proper care of mental patients may thus be unduly jeopardized and their lives and limbs
imperilled.
I would be amenable to holding oral argument to hear the parties if only to have enough
factual and legal bases to justify the preventive suspension of petitioners.
CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the bar in good
standing.
Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law, except:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the
latter's death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to
persons specified in the agreement; or
(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased
lawyer; or
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan
even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement.
A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
52
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and
Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against
Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of
the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross
Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from
the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint
for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices
filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar
Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on
behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based
in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed
Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty.
Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in
person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature
appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced
Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo
signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty.
Bancolos affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-
affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed
the Complaint since the falsification of the counsels signature posed a prejudicial question to
the Complaints validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for
Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia
and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he
falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence
an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo,
that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracias case and that the Complaint filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolos
instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for
falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo
and to revive the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and
Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the
criminal case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of
evidence. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without
prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and
other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of
substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
a complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolos law partner. The
complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated
further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was
forged. Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for
other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned
signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo
were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only
were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also
involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to
Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted
that the criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before
the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases
were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the
assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings
and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the
pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office.
Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against
them since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly
supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary
Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties
were directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference
scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date,
complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25
September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving
notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment
complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to
have waived their right to participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were
53
directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received
complainants position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents position paper dated
23 October 2006.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that
Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while
Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice
of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in
their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing
in the complaint filed against complainants Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the
Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures
appearing in the various documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such
pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon
9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the
aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for
him from signing personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not
just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and
undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored
the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy
and irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and
Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the
charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command
responsibility". x x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in
1995 and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm
designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to
exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers
in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his
responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry
the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his
law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this
task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolos violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors
RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
case for lack of merit.8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion
for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate
Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants Motion for Reconsideration and Comment
Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both
complainants and Atty. Bancolos motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no
cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed
Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Courts Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty.
Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a
violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.
54
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive
right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he
fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of
those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It
devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of
the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid
of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to
aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing of
a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for
members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are
personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he
may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsels signature
serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for
delay.11 Thus, by affixing ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the
responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document.1wphi1
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe
that he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional
trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not
take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his
signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an
opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty.
Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation
of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not
cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty.
Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the
communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary,
albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an
act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had
knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or
tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP
Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is
warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this
Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all
the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 3593 March 23, 1907
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,
vs.
C.W. NEY and JUAN GARCIA BOSQUE, defendants.
Attorney-General Araneta for plaintiff.
C.W. Ney for defendants.
TRACEY, J.:
This proceeding is to punish the defendants for contempt.
In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia Bosque, was not entitled to
admission to practice law in the Philippine Islands, upon the ground that after the change of
sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as such was not qualified for
admission to the bar (In re Bosque, 1 Phil. Rep., 88), and an order was entered accordingly.
55
In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant Ney, a practicing attorney, to
carry on business together, sending out a circular signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that they
had established an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands and
that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation and office work relating to
Spanish law. The paper was headed "Law Office Ney & Bosque. Juan G.
Bosque, jurisconsulto espaol C.W. Ney, abogado americano."
Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally appeared in the courts, and with
one exception, occuring through an inadvertance, papers from the office were signed not with
the firm name alone nor with any designation of the firm as attorneys, but with the words "Ney
& Bosque C.W. Ney, abogado."
On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September 15, 1906, this court
refused to consider petitions so singed with the names of the defendants and the practice
being repeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers sent to the Attorney-
General to take appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon instituted this proceeding.
The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend their acts as being within the
law.
Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every pleading must be subscribed
by the party or his attorney, does not permit, and by implication prohibits, a subscription of the
names of any other persons, whether agents or otherwise; therefore a signature containing
the name of one neither a party nor an attorney was not a compliance with this section, nor
was it aided by the too obvious subterfuge of the addition of the individual name of a licensed
attorney. The illegality in this instance was aggravated by the fact that one of the agents so
named was a person residing in these Islands to whom this court had expressly denied
admission to the bar. The papers in question were irregular and were properly rejected. We
refuse to recognize as a practice any signature of names appended to pleadings or other
papers in an action other than those specified in the statute. A signature by agents amounts
to a signing by non-qualified attorneys, the office of attorney being originally one of agency.
(In re Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We do not, however, mean to discountenance the use of a
suitable firm designation by partners, all of whom have been duly admitted to practice.
It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application for the suspension or removal
of the defendant Ney from his office as attorney. The defendant Bosque, not being an officer
of the court, could not be proceeded against in that way, and probably for that reason the
Attorney-General instituted this form of proceeding.
Should either of these defendants be thus punished for contempt?
Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as follows:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or
command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;
 2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in
his official transactions.
NICOLAS O. TAN, A.C. No. 6483
Complainant,
Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts is restricted to punishment for acts
Present:
so defined. (Ex parteRobinson, 86 U.S., 505.)

Puno, C.J.,
As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or command of this court has been Quisumbing,
disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney. The only order that the defendant Bosque can Ynares-Santiago,
have disobeyed is the one denying him the right to practice law. This order, however, was Sandoval-Gutierrez,
directly binding upon him, notwithstanding proceedings taken for its review, and any hope on Carpio,
his part of ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for its violation. Even had he been - versus - Austria-Martinez,
entitled under the statute to practice law without any license from the court and without an Corona,
application to it, yet its order made on his own petition. A mandate of the court, while in force, Carpio-Morales,
must be obeyed. The irregular signature to papers, though affixed by his associate, had his Azcuna,
authorization and constitutes a substantial attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the firm Tinga,
circular in setting forth the establishment of an office for the general practice of law in all the Chico-Nazario,
courts of the Islands, amounted to an assertion of his right and purpose, not effectively Garcia,
qualified by the addition that he would devote himself to consultation and office work relating Velasco, Jr.,
to Spanish law. Spanish law plays an important part in the equipment of a lawyer in the Nachura, and
Archipelago, standing on a different footing from the law of other foreign countries, in regard Reyes, JJ.
to which a skilled person might as a calling, advise without practicing law. The fact stated on ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR.,
the circular that he was a Spanish lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer of his professional Respondent. Promulgated:
character in the Islands. Independent of statutory provisions, a foreigner is not by reason of August 31, 2007
his status disqualified from practicing law. One of the most eminent American advocates was x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
an alien barrister admitted to the bar after a contest in the court of New York State. (In
re Thomas Addis Emmett, 2 Cain's Cases, 386.) Consequently the conduct of the defendant
DECISION
Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a proceeding to which he was a party.

Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is obviously not answerable,
inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court. On the other hand, under this subdivision, the
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct amounted to misbehavior. We
are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a general
On July 13, 2004, Nicolas O. Tan filed a complaint against Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr. for
practitioner Ney participated, and for the improper signature of the pleadings he was chiefly
misappropriation of funds and issuance of bum checks.
and personally responsible. It is impossible to say that the signature itself was a violation of
the law, and yet hold guiltless the man who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add
that his persistent and rash disregard of the rulings of the court has not commended him to
our indulgence, while the offensive character of certain papers recently filed by him forbids us
Tan alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Balon relative to the returned checks issued
from presuming on the hope of his voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of
to the former by Jose G. Guisande. Atty. Balon sent demand letters to Guisande but
members of the bar.
thereafter failed to inform Tan about the status of the same. Tan alleged that as a fellow
Rotarian, he regularly met Atty. Balon but the latter said nothing about the case.
The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in the sum of 200 pesos, to
be paid into the office of the clerk of this court within ten days, with the costs de oficio. So Tan thus engaged the services of another lawyer, Atty. Romualdo Jubay, who filed an estafa
ordered. case against Guisande. During the proceedings, Guisandes counsel informed Tan and Atty.
Jubay that out of the P96,085.00 originally owed, P60,000.00 was already collected by Atty.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Willard, JJ., concur. Balon.
Johnson, J., does not concur in the result.

56
When confronted by Tan, Atty. Balon admitted that he collected the amount of P60,000.00
from Guisande. He then proposed to Tan that 20% of the P60,000.00 or P12,000.00 be
applied as attorneys fees. He offered to pay the remaining balance of P48,000.00 with
interest of 6% from September 29, 1999 to January 13, 2003 by issuing two postdated
checks. However, the two checks issued by Atty. Balon bounced for reason account closed
when presented for payment.
Upon being informed of the dishonor, Atty. Balon offered to settle his obligations by depositing
cash in Tans account. However, he was only able to deposit a total amount
of P20,000.00. Despite several demands, Atty. Balon failed to fully settle his
obligations. Thus, Tan filed the instant complaint.
In his Comment, Atty. Balon alleged that he had fully paid his obligations; that on several
occasions, he rendered legal services to Tan for free; that the administrative complaint was
intended to harass him and to stop him from filing a collection case for unpaid legal services
against Tan.
On December 8, 2004, we referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation. The IBP held a mandatory conference and conducted a hearing
on August 24, 2005. During the hearing, Atty. Balon admitted that he was not able to fully pay
his obligations to Tan.[1] The parties were then directed to submit their respective position
papers on or before September 12, 2005.
Complainant submitted his position paper. Respondent, however, submitted a Motion to
Suspend the Period to File Position Paper and to Defer the Submission of the Case for
Resolution and With Motion to Set Case for Trial and/or Reception of Evidence. In the same
Motion, particularly paragraph 6 thereof, respondent claimed that the IBP has no jurisdiction
over the complaint as it concerns a contract of loan, rather than a fiduciary transaction of
lawyer-client relationship. The IBP granted the motion and scheduled the hearing
on December 6, 2005.
Subsequently, however, the Investigating Commissioner learned that respondent had been
disbarred by the Court in Lemoine v. Balon, Jr.[2] on October 28, 2003, or even prior to the
institution of the instant complaint. Thus, the IBP deemed the proceedings closed and
terminated for lack of disciplinary jurisdiction over respondent in view of his prior
disbarment. At the same time, it ordered respondent to show cause why he should not be
cited for contempt for failing to inform the IBP of his disbarment and for continuing to
represent that he is still a member of the Bar.
In his explanation, respondent alleged that he assumed the IBP knew of his disbarment; that
his disbarment attained finality only on April 12, 2005; and that he intended to discuss his
disbarment in the position paper he is yet to submit to the IBP.
Unsatisfied with the explanation, the IBP recommended that respondent be cited for
contempt for continuing to practice law despite his disbarment.
57
On March 7, 2007, we required the parties to manifest whether they are willing to submit the
case for resolution. However, on May 4, 2007, complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance
claiming that the filing of the instant case was a product of misunderstanding and
misapprehension of facts; and that he and the respondent had cleared their differences and
reconciled their accounting records. Consequently, he is no longer interested in pursuing the
complaint.
On the other hand, respondent filed on May 8, 2007 a Manifestation and Motion claiming that
considering complainants Affidavit of Desistance, it would be prudent for the Supreme Court
to refer the matter back to the IBP.
In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr., respondent was found unfit to remain as a member of the Bar after
committing malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct. He received the check corresponding
to his clients insurance claim, falsified the check and made it payable to himself, encashed
the same and appropriated the proceeds. The Court found his acts so appalling and his
character grossly flawed that it ruled in this wise:
Specifically with respect to above-quoted provision of Canon
16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Filipino lawyers
principal source of ethical rules, which Canon 16 bears on the principal
complaint of complainant, a lawyer must hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that he may come to possess. This commandment
entails certain specific acts to be done by a lawyer such as rendering an
accounting of all money or property received for or from the client as well
as delivery of the funds or property to the client when due or upon
demand. Respondent breached this Canon when after he received the
proceeds of complainants insurance claim, he did not report it to
complainant, who had a given address in Makati, or to his co-attorney-in-
fact Garcia who was his contact with respect to complainant.
In fact, long after respondent received the December 23,
1998 check for P525,000.00 he, by his letter of March 26, 1999 to
Garcia, had even the temerity to state that the claim was still pending
and recommend acceptance of the 50% offer . . . which is P350,000.00
pesos. His explanation that he prepared and sent this letter on Garcias
express request is nauseating. A lawyer, like respondent, would not and
should not commit prevarication, documented at that, on the mere
request of a friend.
By respondents failure to promptly account for the funds he
received and held for the benefit of his client, he committed professional
misconduct. Such misconduct is reprehensible at a greater degree, for it
was obviously done on purpose through the employment of deceit to the
prejudice of complainant who was kept in the dark about the release of
the check, until he himself discovered the same, and has to date been
deprived of the use of the proceeds thereof.
A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his
client not only violates his duty of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to the
clients cause but also degrades himself and besmirches the fair name of
an honorable profession.
That respondent had a lien on complainants funds for his
attorneys fees did not relieve him of his duty to account for it. The
lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes that the
client agrees with the amount of attorneys fees to be charged. In case of
disagreement or when the client contests that amount for being
unconscionable, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds
in his possession to the payment of his fees. He can file, if he still deems
it desirable, the necessary action or proper motion with the proper court
to fix the amount of such fees.
In respondents case, he never had the slightest attempt to
bring the matter of his compensation for judicial determination so that his
and complainants sharp disagreement thereon could have been put to
an end. Instead, respondent stubbornly and in bad faith held on to
complainants funds with the obvious aim of forcing complainant to agree
to the amount of attorneys fees sought. This is an appalling abuse by
respondent of the exercise of an attorneys retaining lien which by no
means is an absolute right and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in the
delivery of money and property to his client when due or upon demand.
Respondent was, before receiving the check, proposing a
25% attorneys fees. After he received the check and after complainant
had discovered its release to him, he was already asking for
50%, objection to which complainant communicated to him. Why
respondent had to doubly increase his fees after the lapse of about one
year when all the while he has been in custody of the proceeds of the
check defies comprehension. At any rate, it smacks of opportunism, to
say the least.
As for respondents claim in his June 2001 Supplement to his
Counter-Affidavit that he had on several occasions
from May 1999 to October 1999 already delivered a total of P233,000.00
out of the insurance proceeds to Garcia in trust for complainant, this
does not persuade, for it is bereft of any written memorandum thereof. It
is difficult to believe that a lawyer like respondent could have entrusted
such total amount of money to Garcia without documenting it, especially
at a time when, as respondent alleged, he and Garcia were not in good
terms. Not only that. As stated earlier, respondents Counter-Affidavit
of February 18, 2000 and his December 7, 1999 letter to complainant
unequivocally contained his express admission that the total amount
of P525,000.00 was in his custody. Such illogical, futile attempt to
exculpate himself only aggravates his misconduct. Respondents claim
discredited, the affidavits of Leonardo and Roxas who, acting allegedly
for him, purportedly gave Garcia some amounts forming part of
the P233,000.00 are thus highly suspect and merit no consideration.
58
The proven ancillary charges against respondent reinforce the
gravity of his professional misconduct.
The intercalation of respondents name to the Chinabank check
that was issued payable solely in favor of complainant as twice
certified by Metropolitan Insurance is clearly a brazen act of falsification
of a commercial document which respondent resorted to in order to
encash the check.
Respondents threat in his December 7, 1999 letter to expose
complainant to possible sanctions from certain government agencies
with which he bragged to have a good network reflects lack of character,
self-respect, and justness.
It bears noting that for close to five long years respondent has
been in possession of complainants funds in the amount of over half a
million pesos. The deceptions and lies that he peddled to conceal, until
its discovery by complainant after about a year, his receipt of the funds
and his tenacious custody thereof in a grossly oppressive manner point
to his lack of good moral character. Worse, by respondents turnaround in
his Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he already delivered to
complainants friend Garcia the amount of P233,000.00 which, so
respondent claims, is all that complainant is entitled to, he in effect has
declared that he has nothing more to turn over to complainant. Such
incredible position is tantamount to a refusal to remit complainants funds,
and gives rise to the conclusion that he has misappropriated them.
In fine, by respondents questioned acts, he has shown that he
is no longer fit to remain a member of the noble profession that is the
law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., is found
GUILTY of malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct in the practice of
his profession as a lawyer and he is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of
the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of
Attorneys and to inform all courts and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines of this Decision.
Respondent is ordered to turn over to complainant, Daniel
Lemoine, the amount of P525,000.00 within thirty (30) days from notice,
without prejudice to whatever judicial action he may take to recover his
attorneys fees and purported expenses incurred in securing the release
thereof from Metropolitan Insurance.
SO ORDERED.
It appears that after the chastisement he received from the Court and despite having been
stripped of the privilege to practice law, respondent was unrepentant and unmoved as he
continued to commit falsehood and dishonest acts.

In the instant case, respondent collected the money intended for his client without informing
the latter of such receipt. Worse, he used the amount for personal purposes. It was almost
four years from the time he received the money that his client knew of the
collection. Although respondent offered to pay the amount, he was not able to fully pay the
same. He even had the temerity to allege in his comment that he has fully paid the amount
only to admit during the hearing conducted by the IBP that he only paid a portion
thereof. Moreover, the checks he issued to Tan as payment bounced for insufficiency of
funds.
Notwithstanding his disbarment on October 28, 2003, he continued to represent
himself as a lawyer, not only before the IBP but also before this Court. In the Motion for
Extension dated October 5, 2004, respondent signed his name under Balon Law Office and
appended his PTR, IBP and Roll numbers. [3] He also signed as Notary Public in the Affidavit
of Service of Sally I. Leonardo.[4]
In his Comment dated October 21, 2004, respondent prayed in the alternative that the case
be referred to the IBP[5] despite his prior disbarment. Again he signed his name below Balon
Law Office[6] and as Notary Public in the Affidavit of Service.[7]
In the Rejoinder dated December 15, 2004, respondent reiterated his prayer that the case be
referred to the IBP for investigation[8] despite knowledge of IBPs lack of jurisdiction in view of
his prior disbarment. He again appended his name under Balon Law Office together with his
Roll number.[9]
There is no merit in respondents contention that he continued to represent himself as a
lawyer because the disbarment became final only on April 12, 2005. Good faith and fair
dealing require him to disclose his disbarment. Instead, he continued to sign the pleadings as
a lawyer and as notary public.
Moreover, we note that even after the disbarment became final on April 12, 2005,
respondent continued to represent himself as a lawyer. During the IBP hearing on August 24,
2005, he deliberately failed to mention his prior disbarment. In the Motion to Suspend the
Period to File Position Paper and to Defer the Submission of the Case for Resolution and
With Motion to Set Case for Trial and/or Reception of Evidence dated September 9, 2005,
although he did not append the title Attorney to his name, yet he affixed his PTR, IBP and
Roll numbers under his signature. The same is true with the Urgent Motion for
Postponement dated November 23, 2005. This notwithstanding the Courts Decision
onOctober 28, 2003 to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
As a former lawyer, respondent should know that the IBPs jurisdiction is limited to the
members of the Bar. In fact, in the Motion to Suspend the Period to File Position Paper and
to Defer Submission of the Case for Resolution dated September 9, 2005, respondent
alleged that the IBP has no jurisdiction over the instant complaint because it allegedly
concerns a contract of loan, and not a fiduciary transaction between a lawyer and his
client. However, after the IBP found out his duplicity and referred the case back to this Court,
and after the complainant submitted his Affidavit of Desistance, respondent still has the
59
temerity to say that it would be prudent for the Honorable Court, if the same will also be
referred to the IBP for appropriate action x x x.
Respondent is making a mockery of the proceedings as well as of the authority of the IBP
and the Court. After claiming that the IBP has no jurisdiction over the complaint, he now
alleges that it would be prudent for this Court to refer back the case as well as the
complainants affidavit of desistance to the IBP.
In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr., respondent was found guilty of grave misconduct for
misappropriating the funds of his client. In the instant case, respondent committed the same
reprehensible act. In addition, he continued to represent himself as a lawyer despite his prior
disbarment, and committed contumacious acts before the IBP and the Court. Such utter
disregard of this Courts authority must not be countenanced.
It has been held that contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the
court, such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect.[10] It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts order but
such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. [11]
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides that a person may be punished for indirect
contempt for:
xxxx
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of
this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as
such without authority;
xxxx
The same Rule further provides that a person may be punished for indirect contempt after a
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon and to be heard by himself or counsel. In the instant case, respondent was ordered
to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for not disclosing his prior disbarment
and for continuing to represent himself as a lawyer. He submitted an explanation but we find
the same unsatisfactory.
Thus, respondent was properly accorded his right to due process. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence
one may have in support of ones defense. To be heard does not only mean verbal arguments
in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.[12]
A person adjudged guilty of indirect contempt may be punished by a fine not
exceeding P30,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both. [13] Under the
circumstances prevailing in the instant case, we find the fine in the maximum amount
of P30,000.00 as appropriate.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Amadeo E. Balon, Jr. is found guilty of INDIRECT
CONTEMPT and is ordered to pay a FINE of P30,000.00 payable in full within a non-
extendible period of five days from receipt of this Resolution, and strongly warned to refrain
from any further attempts to make a mockery of judicial processes and that commission of
the same or similar act will merit a more severe sanction. Failure to pay the fine within the
given period will subject respondent to imprisonment until full compliance. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994
FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO
SABSALON,respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to
annul the decision 1of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering
petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their
accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the
date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount
as and for attorney's fees.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts
involved should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to
clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as
taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist
only for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is
also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that
beset their individual lives.
60
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners
as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule.
Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-
conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make
a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working
day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he
already failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was
working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of
petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his
money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to
his home province to recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same
terms and conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on
an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions,
he failed to report for work during his schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous
day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite
repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards
it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash
deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his
deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi
he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses
incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his
deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his
termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi
seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration
Office of the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal
and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took
private respondents two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was not
consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the
filing of the case could be interpreted as a mere afterthought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents
failed to controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi
Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his
taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment
with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private
respondents' services were not illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the
labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the
beginning of this resolution.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now
before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the
NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by
the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore,
arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any
shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor
Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the
Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry.
Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded
therefor.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. No employer shall require his
worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the
reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment
supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in such
trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is
a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the
Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or
damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does
not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the
remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners,
the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no longer
existed. In other case, any balance due to private respondents after proper accounting must
be returned to them with legal interest.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00
1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
61
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
1990 605.00 570.00
1991 165.00 2,300.00
P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P
2,700.00
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his
deposits through valesor he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners
in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned
questioning the same even in the present petition. We accordingly agree with the
recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows that he had not
withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash
deposits. 5
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision:
"Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the
taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has
driven to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents
(petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to
shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who
washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the
amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words in
parentheses added.)
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash
payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents
from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the
Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi
industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
[AC-5365. April 27, 2005]
Spouses FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES, complainants, vs. Atty. VICTOR V.
DECIEMBRE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
 Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility was the
malevolent act of respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted to him as security for
a loan by writing on those checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at all, despite his
full knowledge that the loan they were meant to secure had already been paid.
The Case
Before us is a verified Petition[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed by
Spouses Franklin and Lourdes Olbes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court.
Petitioners charged respondent with willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. After he had filed his Comment [2] on the Petition,
the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Caesar R.
Dulay, held several hearings. During those hearings, the last of which was held on May 12,
2003,[3]the parties were able to present their respective witnesses and documentary evidence.
After the filing of the parties respective formal offers of evidence, as well as petitioners
Memorandum,[4] the case was considered submitted for resolution. Subsequently, the
commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation dated January 30, 2004, which was later
adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XV-2003-177 dated
July 30, 2004.
The Facts
In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees working
at the Central Post Office, Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier receiving a monthly
salary of P6,700, and Lourdes, a mail sorter, P6,000.[5]
Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for a loan from
Rodela Loans, Inc., in the amount of P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued and
delivered to respondent five Philippine National Bank (PNB) blank checks (Nos. 0046241-45),
which served as collateral for the approved loan as well as any other loans that might be
obtained in the future.[6]
On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37
corresponding to the loan plus surcharges, penalties and interests, for which the latter issued
a receipt,[7]herein quoted as follows:
August 31, 1999
Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan of P10,000.00 taken
earlier by Lourdes Olbes.
(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre
62
8-31-99
P10,000.00
PNB Check No. 46241 8/15/99[8]
Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of the five) blank
PNB Checks (Nos. 0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount of P50,000
each, with different dates of maturity -- August 15, 1999, August 20, 1999, October 15, 1999
and November 15, 1999, respectively.[9]
On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal
an Affidavit-Complaint against petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP)
22. He alleged therein that on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in the afternoon at Cainta,
Rizal, they personally approached him and requested that he immediately exchange with
cash their postdated PNB Check Nos. 0046241 and 0046242 totaling P100,000.[10]
Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against petitioners
another Affidavit-Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22. He stated, among others, that
on the same day, July 15, 1999, around two oclock in the afternoon at Quezon City, they
again approached him and requested that he exchange with cash PNB Check Nos. 0046243
and 0046244 totaling P100,000.[11]
Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went either to
Cainta, Rizal, or to Quezon City to transact business with respondent. Allegedly, they were in
their office at the time, as shown by their Daily Time Records; so it would have been
physically impossible for them to transact business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after an interval of
only thirty minutes, in Quezon City, especially considering the heavy traffic conditions in those
places.[12]
Petitioners averred that many of their office mates -- among them, Juanita Manaois,
Honorata Acosta and Eugenia Mendoza -- had suffered the same fate in their dealings with
respondent.[13]
In his Comment,[14] respondent denied petitioners claims, which he called baseless and
devoid of any truth and merit. Allegedly, petitioners were the ones who had deceived him by
not honoring their commitment regarding their July 15, 1999 transactions. Those
transactions, totaling P200,000, had allegedly been covered by their four PNB checks that
were, however, subsequently dishonored due to ACCOUNT CLOSED. Thus, he filed criminal
cases against them. He claimed that the checks had already been fully filled up when
petitioners signed them in his presence. He further claimed that he had given them the
amounts of money indicated in the checks, because his previous satisfactory transactions
with them convinced him that they had the capacity to pay.
 Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal transactions, Q. These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the complainants on
which were not in any way connected with his profession as a lawyer. The criminal cases July 15, 1999, is that correct?
against petitioners were allegedly private actions intended to vindicate his rights against their
deception and violation of their obligations. He maintained that his right to litigate should not A. I will consult my records, You Honor, because its quite a long time. Yes, Your
be curtailed by this administrative action. Honor, the first two checks is in the morning and the next two checks is in
the afternoon (sic).
Report of the Investigating Commissioner
COMM. DULAY:
In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Which are the first two checks?
Code of Professional Responsibility.

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
The commissioner said that respondents version of the facts was not credible.
Commissioner Dulay rendered the following analysis and evaluation of the evidence
presented: The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the morning.
And Check No. 46243 and 46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor.

In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his complaint filed before the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Rizal respondent stated that: ATTY. PUNZALAN:

2. That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E. OLBES and
FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with
cash, right there and then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be
immediately used by them in their business venture.
Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City respondent stated that:
Q. Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these two checks
with number 0046241 and 0046242 xxx have been issued to you?
A. I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the morning around 9:30
to 10:00.
Q. This was issued to you in what particular place?

2. That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M., both A. Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.
LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to
immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated checks Q. Is that your house?
totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business venture.

A. No, its not my house?

The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct contrast to his
testimony before this Commission on cross-examination during the May 12, 2003 hearing,
thus: Q. What is that, is that your law office?

ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing) A. That is my retainer client.

Q. Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the complainant issued to Q. What is the name of that retainer client of yours?
you, you filed two separate criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig City
and the other in Quezon City, is that correct? ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

A. Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at different banks. Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the question?

ATTY. PUNZALAN:
63
 That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility because according to
you these checks have been issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a
retainer. Thats why I am asking your client
COMM. DULAY:
Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction with the
complainants. As between his version as to when the four checks were given, we find the
story of complainant[s] more credible. Respondent has blatantly distorted the truth, insofar as
the place where the transaction involving the four checks took place. Such distortion on a
very material fact would seriously cast doubt on his version of the transaction with
complainants.

The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that he said it was
issued here in Pasig. What building? Furthermore respondents statements as to the time when the transactions took place are
also obviously and glaringly inconsistent and contradicts the written statements made before
the public prosecutors. Thus further adding to the lack of credibility of respondents version of
ATTY. DECIEMBRE: the transaction.

AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor. Complainants version that they issued blank checks to respondent as security for the
payment of a loan of P10,000.00 plus interest, and that respondent filled up the checks in
COMM. DULAY: amounts not agreed upon appears to be more credible. Complainants herein are mere
employees of the Central Post Office in Manila who had a previous loan of P10,000.00 from
What is the materiality of knowing the name of his clients office? respondent and which has since been paid x x x. Respondent does not deny the said
transaction. This appears to be the only previous transaction between the parties. In fact,
complainants were even late in paying the loan when it fell due such that they had to pay
ATTY. PUNZALAN: interest. That respondent would trust them once more by giving them another P200,000.00
allegedly to be used for a business and immediately release the amounts under the
Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he is telling the circumstances described by respondent does not appear credible given the background of
truth. The place, Your Honor, according to the respondent is his client. Now the previous transaction and personal circumstances of complainants. That respondent who
I am asking who is that client? is a lawyer would not even bother to ask from complainants a receipt for the money he has
given, nor bother to verify and ask them what businesses they would use the money for
COMM. DULAY: contributes further to the lack of credibility of respondents version. These circumstances
really cast doubt as to the version of respondent with regard to the transaction. The resolution
of the public prosecutors notwithstanding we believe respondent is clearly lacking in honesty
Your answer. in dealing with the complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be jailed as a result of
respondents filing of the criminal cases. Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also
ATTY. DECIEMBRE: filed similar cases against the co-employees of complainants in the Central Post Office and
respondent is facing similar complaints in the IBP for his actions.[15]
A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.
The Courts Ruling
Q. And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon issued PNB
Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244, is that correct? We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved and
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. However, the penalty should be more severe than
A. Yes. what the IBP recommended.

Q. So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were four checks
issued in the place of your client in Pasig City, two in the morning and two
in the afternoon?
A. That is correct, sir.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. [16] It
is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess
good moral character.[17] A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is
clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the

64
advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he [or she] has sworn to be a
fearless crusader.[18]
By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law,
and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. [19] Lawyers
should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach,
in order to promote the publics faith in the legal profession. [20]
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:
Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
xxxxxxxxx
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxxxxxxx
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of members of the
bar.[21] Such conduct of nobility and uprightness should remain with them, whether in their
public or in their private lives. As officers of the courts and keepers of the publics faith, they
are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to
behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.[22]
The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. The oath
is a sacred trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Thus, lawyers may be
disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such
conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.[23]
In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of petitioners,
who said that they had given five blank personal checks to respondent at the Central Post
Office in Manila as security for the P10,000 loan they had contracted. Found untrue and
unbelievable was respondents assertion that they had filled up the checks and exchanged
these with his cash at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal. After a careful review of the records, we
find no reason to deviate from these findings.
Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an
inevitable conclusion. Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained from him by
65
petitioners. According to Franklin Olbes testimony on cross-examination, they asked
respondent for the blank checks after the loan had been paid. On the pretext that he was not
able to bring the checks with him,[24] he was not able to return them. He thus committed
abominable dishonesty by abusing the confidence reposed in him by petitioners. It was their
high regard for him as a member of the bar that made them trust him with their blank checks.
[25]
It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously
transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that
had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondents full knowledge that the loan
supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of
falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.
And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment,
respondent had the temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners, thereby
exhibiting his vile intent to have them punished and deprived of liberty for frustrating the
criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist on them. As a matter of fact, one of the petitioners
(Franklin) was detained for three months [26] because of the Complaints. Respondent is clearly
guilty of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. He committed an act indicative of
moral depravity not expected from, and highly unbecoming, a member of the bar.
Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the
practice of law. It is equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege.[27] Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.[28] No moral qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness and candor.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places a
premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.[30] Lawyers must be ministers of
truth. Hence, they must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all
their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.[31]
Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are
disgraceful and dishonorable;[32] they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of
criminal laws.[33]
Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild.
His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the
filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome.
In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,[34] the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA) by the
respondent to make it appear that he was authorized to sell anothers property, as well as his
fraudulent and malicious inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a Memorandum of Agreement to
give a semblance of legality to the SPA, were sanctioned with suspension from the practice of
law for five years. Here, the conduct of herein respondent is even worse. He used falsified
checks as bases for maliciously indicting petitioners and thereby caused the detention of one
of them.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and
violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law effective immediately. Let copies of this
Decision be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to
append a copy to respondents personal record. Let another copy be furnished the National
Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33672 September 28, 1973
VICENTE MUOZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents, DELIA T.
SUTTON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
We have before us a task far from pleasant. Respondent, Delia T. Sutton, a member of the
Philippine Bar, connected with the law firm of Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Parlade, and
Associates, must be held accountable for failure to live up to that exacting standard expected
of counsel, more specifically with reference to a duty owing this Tribunal. She failed to meet
the test of candor and honesty required of pleaders when, in a petition for certiorari prepared
by her to review a Court of Appeals decision, she attributed to it a finding of facts in reckless
disregard, to say the least, of what in truth was its version as to what transpired. When given
an opportunity to make proper amends, both in her appearance before us and thereafter in
her memorandum, there was lacking any showing of regret for a misconduct so obvious and
so inexcusable. Such an attitude of intransigence hardly commends itself. Her liability is clear.
Only her relative inexperience in the ways of the law did save her from a penalty graver than
severe censure. So we rule.
The background of the incident before us was set forth in our resolution
of July 12, 1971. It reads as follows: "Acting upon the petition for review
in G.R. No. L-33672, Vicente Muoz v. People of the Philippines and the
Court of Appeals, and considering that the main issue therein is whether
petitioner Muoz is guilty of homicide through reckless negligence, as
charged in the information; that in the language of the decision of the
Court of Appeals "the prosecution and the defense offered two
66
conflicting versions of the incident that gave rise to the case"; that, upon
examination of the evidence, the Court of Appeals found, as did the trial
court, that the version of the prosecution is the true one and that of the
defense is unbelievable; that this finding of the Court of Appeals is borne
out by substantial evidence, whereas the version of the defense is
inconsistent with some established facts, for: (a) petitioner's theory, to
the effect that his boat had been rammed by that of the complainant, is
refuted by the fact that after hitting the left frontal outrigger of the latter's
boat, the prow and front outrigger of petitioner's motorboat hit also the
left front portion of complainant's boat where the complainant was
seated, thereby hitting him on the back and inflicting the injury that cause
his death so that, immediately after the collision - part of petitioner's
boat was on top of that of the complainant; (b) these circumstances,
likewise, indicate the considerable speed at which petitioner's motorboat
was cruising, (c) petitioner's motorboat had suffered very little damage,
which would have been considerable had it been rammed by the
offended party's boat, the latter being bigger than, as well as provided
with an engine twice as powerful as, that of the petitioner; and (d)
although appellant's boat carried several passengers, including children,
and was, in fact, overloaded, appellant acted as pilot and, at the same
time, as its machinist, thereby rendering it difficult for him to manuever it
properly; the Court resolved to [deny] the petition upon the ground that it
is mainly factual and for lack of merit. Considering further, that the
petition quotes, on page 5 thereof a portion of the decision appealed
from, summing up evidence for the defense, and makes reference
thereto "findings" of the Court of Appeals, which is not true; that, on page
6 of the petition, petitioner states, referring to a portion of the same
quotation, that the same "are the established uncontroverted facts
recognized by the Court of Appeals," which is, likewise, untrue; that, on
page 8 of the petition, it is averred "It being conceded that the two
versions recounted above are by themselves credible, although they are
conflicting the same cannot be binding on, and is therefore, reviewable
by the Honorable Supreme Court. Where the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals [are conflicting], the same [are not binding] on the Supreme
Court. (Cesica v. Villaseca, G.R. L-9590, April 30, 1957)" although, in
fact, no conflicting findings of fact are made in the decision appealed
from; and that, on page 9 of the petition, it is alleged that the Court of
Appeals had"affirmed the minimum penalty of one (1) year and one (1)
day imposed by the lower court," although, in fact, minimum penalty
imposed by the trial court was "four(4) months of arresto mayor"; the
Court resolved to require counsel for the petitioner to show cause, within
ten (10) days from notice, why they should not be dealt with for contempt
of court [or] otherwise subjected to disciplinary action for making
aforementioned misrepresentations." " 1
A pleading entitled "Compliance with Resolution" by the aforesaid law
firm was filed on August 14, 1971. There was no attempt at justification,
because in law there is none, but it did offer what was hoped to be a
 satisfactory explanation. If so, such optimism was misplaced. It betrayed
on its face more than just a hint of lack of candor, of minimizing the
effects of grave inaccuracies in the attribution to the Court of Appeals
certain alleged facts not so considered as such. It was then to say that
the least a far from meticulous appraisal of the matter in issue. Much of
what was therein contained did not ring true.
Under the circumstances, we set the matter for hearing on September 14 of the same year,
requiring all lawyers-partners in said firm to be present. At such a hearing, respondent Delia
T. Sutton appeared. While her demeanor was respectful, it was obvious that she was far from
contrite. On the contrary, the impression she gave the Court was that what was done by her
was hardly deserving of any reproach. Even when subjected to intensive questioning by
several members of the Court, she was not to be budged from such an untenable position. It
was as if she was serenely unconcerned, oblivious of the unfavorable reaction to, which her
evasive answers gave rise. There certainly was lack of awareness of the serious character of
her misdeed. The act of unruffled assurance under the circumstances was hard to
understand. Perhaps realizing that the Court was not disposed to look at the matter as a
minor peccadillo, Attorney Sedfrey A. Ordoez of the law firm expressly acknowledged that
what appeared in its petition for certiorari prepared by respondent Delia T. Sutton insofar as it
did misrepresent what is set forth in the Court of Appeals decision sought to be reviewed was
reprehensible, and did make with the proper spirit of humility the necessary expression of
regret.
What is more, the law firm in a pleading entitled "Joint Apology to the Supreme Court" filed on
December 1, 1971, signed jointly by Sedfrey A. Ordoez and Delia Sutton, did seek to make
amends thus: "1. That undersigned attorney, Delia T. Sutton, together with Messrs. Sedfrey A.
Ordoez, Pedro L. Yap and Custodio O. Parlade, partners in the firm of Salonga, Ordoez,
Yap, Parlade & Associates, appeared before this Honorable Court on November 22, 1971,
pursuant to an order dated October 18, 1971; 2. That with all the sincerity and candor at the
command of undersigned attorney, the circumstances surrounding her preparation of the
pleading which gave rise to the instant citation to show cause why she should not be
punished for contempt of court were explained by her, with the assistance of Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordoez; 3. That the undersigned Delia T. Sutton had no intention to misrepresent any
question of fact before this Honorable Court for her personal gain or benefit, and that it was
her lack of adequate extensive experience in preparing petitions for certiorari which may have
caused the inaccurate statements in the said petition which were enumerated in the order of
this Honorable Court; 4. That undersigned Delia T. Sutton contritely realizes the errors which
she committed in the preparation of the said petition for certiorari and that the same will not
recur in the future as she will always abide by the provisions on candor and fairness in the
Canons of Professional Ethics, which reads: "22. [Candor and Fairness]. The conduct of
the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and
fairness. It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote the contents of a paper,
the testimony of a witness, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the
language of a decision or a textbook or; with knowledge of its invalidity, to cite as authority a
decision that has been overruled, or a statute that has been repealed; or in argument to
assert as fact that which has not been proved, or in those jurisdictions where a side has the
opening and closing arguments to mislead his opponent by concealing or withholding
positions in his opening argument upon which his side then intends to rely. ..." 5. That
67
undersigned Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez joins Atty. Delia T. Sutton in expressing his own
apologies to the Honorable Court for not having thoroughly supervised the preparation by
Atty. Delia T. Sutton of a type of pleading with which she was not thoroughly familiar." 2
The "Joint Apology" thus offered did mitigate to some extent the liability of respondent Sutton.
Some members of the Court feel, however, that it does not go far enough. While expressing
regret and offering apology, there was lacking that free admission that what was done by her
should not characterized merely as "errors" consisting as they do of "inaccurate statements."
If there were a greater sincerity on her part, the offense should have been acknowledged as
the submission of deliberate misstatements. There ought to be, for the apology to gain
significance, no further attempt at minimizing the enormity of the misdeed. It is then as if
there was hardly any retreat from the untenable stand originally taken. The mood, even at
this stage, seems to be that she could brazen it out as long as the words indicative of an
apology were offered. This Court does not view matters thus. To purge herself of the
contempt, she ought to have displayed the proper spirit of contrition and humility. The burden
cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by
counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations
submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected
to display the utmost zeal in defense of a client's cause, it must never be at the expense of
deviation from the truth. As set forth in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing
operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class,
and to deprive the profession of that full measure of public esteem and confidence which
belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does the false claim, often set up by the
unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do
whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause." 3 What is more, the
obligation to the bench, especially to this Court, for candor and honesty takes precedence. It
is by virtue of such considerations that punishment that must fit the offense has to be meted
out to respondent Delia T. Sutton.
At the same time, the attitude displayed by one of the senior partners, Attorney Sedfrey A.
Ordoez, both in the appearances before the Court and in the pleadings submitted, must be
commended. He has made manifest that his awareness of the role properly incumbent on
counsel, especially in his relationship to this Court, is deep-seated. It must be stated,
however, that in the future he, as well as the other senior partners, should exercise greater
care in the supervision of the attorneys connected with their law firm, perhaps inexperienced
as yet but nonetheless called upon to comply with the peremptory tenets of ethical conduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Delia T. Sutton is severely censured. Let a copy of this resolution
be spread on her record.
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, G.R. No. 162059
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
 - versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
SANDIGANBAYAN and Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. January 22, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholar** accused, along with her
brother, of swindling government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang
kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the
Resolutions[1] of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the
information and her motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-
Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed
by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve
a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation
of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. [2] On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings
and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the
Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).[3]
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. [4] President
Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for
the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the
Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. [5] The succeeding student regent,
Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA
sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently
filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the
Ombudsman.[6]
68
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to
indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.[7] The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA
and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized
under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended committed as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH
EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the
Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon
City, while in the performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with
intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud the government by falsely and fraudulently representing to
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated and
renamed as President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall, and for
which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the
amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine
Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and
believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and
delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October
24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00),
which check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D.
Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal use
and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the accused for
them to return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to
do so to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan
does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as
UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No.
8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. [8]It
has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.[9] It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by
Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II
of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was
duped. Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from
Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.[10]
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a
student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in
contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She added that
she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such
power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in
the information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime
was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.[11]
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.[12] It disputed petitioners interpretation of the
law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch-all
phrase in relation to office, thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against
petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the money is a
matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.[13]
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, was a public officer. As a
member of the BOR, she had the general powers of administration and exercised the
corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a public office, petitioners stance
that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not
an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to
include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated.[14]
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for
lack of merit.[15] It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are
within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the
prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan
also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials and
employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no
single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense
of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office.
Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of
the student body, she was never a public officer since she never received
any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no
69
moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. (Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan
has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials
enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary
grades, because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these
officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the
Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant
belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and
corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and
appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided
by law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own
government and to enact for the government of the university such
general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are
consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on
recommendation of the President of the University, professors,
instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their
compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as
it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave of absence
under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of law
to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an
investigation and hearing shall have been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only
through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-
stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the
governing body of the corporation.

It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of
the Philippines is performing functions similar to those of the Board of
Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion
that being a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls
within the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested with
original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not
occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same
of P15 Million was received from former President Estrada and not from
the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be
properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case.[16]
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.[17] The motion
was denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.[18]
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that THE RESPONDENT COURT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACKAND/OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED
IN THE INFORMATION.[19]
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary
Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in relation
to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the
government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural
grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is
denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. [20]Remedial
measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and
often dismissed.[21] The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a
single action.[22]
70
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[23] the Court clearly explained
and illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is
merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment
or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be
followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision
is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The
same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that
instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a
judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court,
in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or
prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the
court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion
to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of
appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples
of the exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a
motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the
City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the
case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a
motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court
granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court
from further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a
motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted the
petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking
cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a
motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the
petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the
case.
 In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of
a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted
the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the
petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy
was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further
action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the
motion to quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and
the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.[24]
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan. [25]She repeats
the reference in the instant petition for certiorari[26] and in her memorandum of authorities.[27]
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical
error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by
the Sandiganbayan.[28]
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief
legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan
was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos onJune
11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public
officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve
with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all
times accountable to the people.[29]
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on
December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[30]
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further
altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made
succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997
by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
71
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;
(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position
of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended
or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27
and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
final judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the
exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction
as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary
writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions
of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in
cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these
petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may
thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court
of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from
the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
72
tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts
which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding,
the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of
civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and
jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to
reserve the filing such civil action separately from the criminal action
shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had
heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been
rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan
or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise
the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17,
1960. The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which
constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. [31] Pursuant to Section 10 of
R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.[32]
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by
petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private
individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be
unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation with any
public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or
close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving
any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other
person having some business, transaction, application, request or
contract with the government, in which such public official has to
intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by
consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word close personal
relation shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal
connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy
which assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or
cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section
3 hereof.
 In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt
practices and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among
those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument,
petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the
succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a
sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.[33] Interpretatio talis in
ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity,
such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan
mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-
tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference
to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. [34] The intention
of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act
is to be taken into view.[35] In other words, petitioners interpretation lies in direct opposition to
the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best
interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.[36] Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum
statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa
ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials
in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafaas one of
the offenses included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other
felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,[37] the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development
Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:
73
The National Parks Development Committee was created
originally as an Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the
development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks
(Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No.
69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia
were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3).
Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of
Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November
27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President
(E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed
NPDC as a regular government agency under the Office of the President
and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued
direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness
in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.[38] Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs
cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter
would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above
intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of
Bondocs cases and those of the government employees separately
charged for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses
charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine
of P6,000.00, committed by government employees in conspiracy with
private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the
exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot
be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that
even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless
not be possible.
Petitioner UP student regent
is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any
salary or remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that
We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We
ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer. [39] The 1987 Constitution
does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found
in different statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court held that:
 A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and
Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political
system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only
because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and
conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested
interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity
as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
In Laurel v. Desierto,[41] the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested
is a public officer.[42]
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact,
a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary
grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan
also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,
[43]
We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by
express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.[44]
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner
falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions
similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. [45] By express mandate of
law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office.
[46]
At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.[47]
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in
an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.[48]
74
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the
Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced
instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and
technical training.[49] Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no
dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.[50]
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan
would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation to
her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of
the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to
contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing
body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in
relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. [51] More than
that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent
in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash. [52] Otherwise, jurisdiction would
become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.[53]
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner,
being then a student regent of U.P., while in the performance of her official
functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position,
with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x
x. (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did
not quash the information based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds and not
from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the
President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the
information, it is averred that petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying
and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said
accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00).

Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000
is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant
case.[54]
A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.
As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his
reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A
review of his motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils
the misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that a lawyer shall not
misquote or misrepresent.
[55]
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos, where Atty
Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The
Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from that with
which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition
may warrant suspension or disbarment.[56]
We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A
lawyers conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and fairness. [57]The
administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and
honesty before the courts.[58]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10548 December 10, 2014
CAROLINE CASTANEDA JIMENEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Board of Governors
(IBP-BOG), dated January 3, 20131 and March 22, 2014,2 adopting and approving the
findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) which found Atty. Edgar 8. Francisco
75
(Alty Francisco) administratively liable for multiple violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and recommended the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the
practice of law.
On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a complaint, dated July 14, 2007,3 filed by Caroline
Castaeda Jimenez (complainant)against Atty. Francisco for multiple violations of the CPR.
On October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco filed his Answer.4 On June 26, 2009, the mandatory
conference was held and terminated. Only the counsel for Atty. Francisco appeared. The
notice of the said conference addressed to complainant was returned with the notation
"unknown at the given address." No new address was provided by the complainant. Both
parties wererequired to submit their respective position papers. For this purpose, Atty.
Francisco adopted his Answer. The Antecedents
Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint for estafa
against complainant, her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Geraldine Antonio,
Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez.5 The said complaint was
docketed as IS No. 074314 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City. Jimenez
alleged that he was the true and beneficial owner of the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and
Development Corporation (Clarion), which was incorporated specifically for the purpose of
purchasing a residential house located in Forbes Park, Makati City (Forbes property). The
incorporators and original stockholders of Clarion were as follows:
Thomas K. Chua - P500,000.00
Teresita C. Alsua - P500,000.00
Myla Villanueva - P249,998.00
Edgar B. Francisco - P1.00
Soledad Gamat - P1.00
Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarions Articles of Incorporation, the above-named
stockholders, except for Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed of assignment of their
respective shares in favor of complainant, who was then Jimenezs common-law
partner.Clarions total capitalization was only P5,000,000.00. Thus, in order to achieve its
purpose of purchasing the Forbes property, Clarion simulated a loan from the complainant in
the amount of P80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes property in the
amount of P117,000,000.00 from Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a check
in the said amount which was funded entirely by Jimenez. The sale, however, was
undervalued. In the deed of sale, it was made to appear that the Forbes property was
purchased for P78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money used as the purchase price was not
reflected in the books of Clarion.
On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua assigned their shares in Clarion to
Jimenez by virtue of a deed of trust. On the other hand, Mylas 249,997 shares were
transferred to complainant based on a deed of assignment. The remaining one (1) share was
transferred to Ma. Carolina C. Crespo. These transactions appeared in Clarions General
Information Sheet (GIS)filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Resultantly, the subscribed shares of Clarion were as follows:
Mark Jimenez - P 500,000.00
Caroline Jimenez - P 749,997.00
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo - P 1.00
Edgar B. Francisco - P 1.00
Soledad Gamat - P 1.00
On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his shares to complainant by another deed of
assignment, making her the holder of Clarion shares amounting to P1,249,997.00.
According to Jimenezs complaint, while he was in prison in the United States in 2004, he
learned from Atty. Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel), approached the
complainant and threatened her, claiming that the United States Internal Revenue Service
(IRS)was about to go after their properties. Marcel succeeded in persuading complainant to
transfer her nominal shares in Clarion to Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of
assignment. Again, this was reflected in Clarions GIS for the year 2004.
Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that, through fraudulent means,
complainant and her co-respondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property for sale
sometimein August 2004. The said property was eventually sold to Philmetro Southwest
Enterprise Inc. (Philmetro)for the amount of P118,000,000.00 without Jimenezs knowledge.
This sale was again undervalued at P78,000.000.00 per the deed of sale. Atty. Francisco
relayed to Jimenez that he was the one who received the payment for the sale of the Forbes
property and that he handed all the proceeds thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the
presence of complainant.
Jimenezs complaint for estafa was based on complainants alleged participation in the
fraudulent means in selling the Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion with
Jimenezs money. Complainant was duty bound to remit all the proceeds of the sale to
Jimenez as the true and beneficial owner. Complainant and her co-respondents, however,
misappropriated and converted the fundsfor their personal use and benefit.
In support of Jimenezs complaint for estafa, Atty. Francisco executed an affidavit reiterating
its factual averments.6 A perusal of this affidavit likewise would show the following claims and
admissions, among other things, of Atty. Francisco:
1. Sometime in August 2004, complainant called him, asking for assistance in the
documentation of the sale of the Forbes property owned by Clarion. Atty. Francisco
asked her if she had secured permission from Mark Jimenez and complainant
answered in the affirmative.
76
2. The Board of Directors of Clarion issued a resolution authorizing him to negotiate
the sale of the property.
3. For purposes of the sale, he opened an account with Security Bank, San
Francisco Del Monte branch. When the cash payment was deposited, he withdrew
the amount and handed the same to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of
complainant.
4. All transfers of shares were caused without any consideration. The transfer
taxes, however, were paid.
5. When Mark Jimenez returned to the Philippines, he was able to confirm that the
sale of the Forbes property was without his knowledge and approval. The proceeds
of the sale had already been farmed out to different corporations established by
complainant and her sister.
6. The frequent changes in stockholdings were premeditated in order to steal the
money of Mark Jimenez.
The Complaint
Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa filed by
Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty.
Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and Clarions corporate counsel and
secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty. Francisco for
representing conflicting interests. According to her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco
regarding the legal implications of Clarions transactions. More significantly, the principal
documents relative to the sale and transfer of Clarions property were all prepared and
drafted by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law office.7 Atty. Francisco was the one who
actively participated in the transactions involving the sale of the Forbes property. Without
admitting the truth of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that its execution
clearly betrayed the trust and confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason,
complainant prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Francisco.
The Respondents Position
In his Answer,8 Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez initially engaged his services in 1998 for
the incorporation of Clarion for the purpose of purchasing a residential house in Forbes Park,
where he intended to live with his long-time partner, the complainant; that the original
incorporators and stockholders of Clarion held their respective shares in trust for Jimenez;
that the subsequent changes in the ownership of Clarion shareholdings were also pursuant to
Jimenezs orders; and that as the corporate secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, he
prepared all the legal documentation togive effect to the said transfers and, ultimately, to the
purchase of the Forbes property.
Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004, Jimenez was imprisoned in the United
States for excessive contributions to the Democratic Party; that during this time, Jimenezs
son, Marcel, and the complainant, asked him again to changethe ownership of Clarion shares
in order to avoid the attachment of Jimenezs properties in a tax evasion case; that he
acceded to the request on the belief that this was in accordance with Jimenezs wishes; and
that as a result, almost 100% of Clarions ownership was transferred in the name of
Geraldine Antonio.
Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter, complainant tasked him to talk to prospective
buyers and to negotiate the sale of the Forbes property until it was sold for P118,000,000.00;
that Marcel and complainant led him to believe that Jimenez had knowledge of the sale as
they were in constant communication with him; that all these representations, however,
turned out to be false when Jimenez returned tothe Philippines and discovered that the
proceeds of the sale were coursed through other corporations set up by complainant and her
sister; that Jimenez likewise learned of the successive sale of his other properties, including
Meridian Telekoms Inc., by the members of his family; and that this led to the filing of the
estafa case against the complainant and the others. As a witness to the fraud committed
against Jimenez, Atty. Francisco executed the affidavit narrating the facts and circumstances
surrounding the said transactions.
Atty. Francisco mainly argued thathe violated neither the rule on disclosures of privileged
communication nor the proscription against representing conflicting interests, on the ground
that complainant was not his client. He was the lawyer of Jimenez and the legal counsel of
Clarion, but never of the complainant. He might have assisted her in some matters, but these
were all under the notion that Jimenez had given him authority to do so. Further, though he
acted as legal counsel for Clarion, no attorney-client relationship between him and
complainant was formed, as a corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its
shareholders. While he admitted that the legal documentation for the transfer of shares and
the sale of the Forbes property were prepared by him and notarized by the members of his
law firm, he averred that these acts were performed in his capacity as the corporate secretary
and legal counsel ofClarion, and not as a lawyer of complainant. Therefore, he served no
conflicting interests because it was not a "former client" and a "subsequent client" who were
the opposing parties in litigation.
He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his client, the rule on privileged
communication does not apply to his case. Here, complainant failed to allege, muchless
prove, the requisites for the application of the privilege. When Atty. Francisco denied being
her lawyer, the complainant should have established, by clear and convincing evidence, that
a lawyer-client relationship indeed existed between them. Complainant failed to do this.
Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa case was but a truthful narration of
facts by a witness, Atty. Francisco cited Gonzaga v. Caete,9 where the Court ruled that "the
fact that one of the witnesses for the defendant had been formerly the lawyer for the
defendant in this suit was no ground for rejecting his testimony." In this case, he merely
attested to the fraudulent acts of complainant, in the course of which, he defended and
served Jimenez as a client. This was likewise pursuant to the rule that unlawful and illegal
77
motives and purposes were not covered by the privilege. It was just unfortunate that he fell
for the ploy of complainant.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
In the Commissioners Report,10 dated November 7, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner,
Atty. Jose I. dela Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),found Atty. Francisco guilty of
violations of the CPR and recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year from the
practice of law. Initially, the Investigating Commissioner noted that the subsequent affidavit of
desistance executed by Jimenez in the estafa case did not affect the investigation conducted
by the CBD as it was not an ordinary court which accepted compromises or withdrawals of
cases. After weighing on the claims of the parties, the Investigating Commissioner concluded
that nothing in the records would show that a lawyer-client relationship existed between Atty.
Francisco and Jimenez.11 The circumstances would show that Atty. Francisco was an original
incorporator and shareholder of Clarion. He was also the legal counsel and corporate
secretary of the said corporation, the articles of incorporation of which did not include
Jimenez as an original incorporator. He became a stockholder only in 2001, when Jimenez
acquired shares from Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua. Jimenezs participation in Clarion
affairs again stopped when he assigned the entirety of his shares in favor of complainant.
Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion as alluded to by Atty. Francisco, the
report stated that it would appear that the latter permitted misrepresentations as to Clarions
ownership to be reported to the SEC through its GIS. The Investigating Commissioner also
pointed out Atty. Franciscos clear admission that the transfer of shares within Clarion were
"without any consideration," ran counter to the deeds of assignment that he again admittedly
executed as corporate counsel. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan
and undervalued the consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property, which
displayed his unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1 of
the CPR. Further, when he executed the affidavit containing allegations against the interest of
Clarion and complainant, the Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Francisco violated
the rule on privileged communication and engaged in an act that constituted representation of
conflicting interests in violation of Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR.
In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,12 the IBP-BOG adopted and approved, in toto, the findings
and recommendation of the CBD against Atty. Francisco.
The respondent received a copy of the said resolution on March 26, 2013 and moved for its
reconsideration.13
Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the IBP-BOG, reasoning out that the penalty
of suspension of one (1) year is too severe considering that in his more than three decades of
practice, he had never been involved in any act that would warrant the imposition of
disciplinary action upon him. It was only in 2007, when his client, Jimenez, experienced a
difficult crisis involving his children and common-law partner that he experienced a major
upheaval in his professional life. He apologized for his not being too circumspect in dealing
with the relatives of Jimenez.
As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco reiterated that his participation in the execution
of the documents pertaining to the sale of the Forbes property were all connected to his
capacity as Clarions corporate secretary and legal counsel, not to mention his ties with his
client and friend, Jimenez. He admitted that he owed fidelity to Clarion and Jimenez, but
denied that this duty extended to the incorporators and shareholders of Clarion. Thus, when
complainant sought advice in her capacity as a shareholder in Clarion, no fiduciary duty
arose on his part. In his own words, Atty. Francisco insisted that "Carol is not Clarion and vice
versa."14
Attached to Atty. Franciscos motion for reconsideration was an affidavit executed by
Jimenez, stating that he had retained the legal services of Atty. Francisco since 1999.
Espousing Atty. Franciscos defenses, Jimenez asserted that Atty. Franciscos law firm was in
charge of all the companies he owned in the Philippines.He directed Atty. Francisco to
execute all the documentation to show his ownership of these companies, including Clarion.
These documents were in the possession of complainant for safekeeping. When Jimenez ran
for Congress in 2001,Atty. Francisco personally assisted him in the filing ofhis certificate of
candidacy and the proceedings before the electoral tribunals. While he was in prison in the
United States, it was Atty. Francisco who visited and told him that his children, Myla and
Marcel, were then facilitating the sale of one of his companies, Meridian Telekoms, Inc.,
without his knowledge. He asked Atty. Francisco to keep quiet about his childrens betrayal
and to wait until he could go home. When he filed the criminal cases against his children and
complainant, the latter even filed a frivolous kidnapping case against Atty. Francisco.
According to Jimenez, the people who committed crimes against him were now exhausting all
possible means to keep Atty. Francisco silent and to prevent the latter from performing his
duties as a lawyer.
In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,15 the IBP-BOG denied the respondents motion for
reconsideration.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The Courts Ruling
Violations of Canons 1 and 10
of the CPR and the Lawyers Oath
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.0 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. To the
best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid any
78
act or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyers personal deference to the law not only
speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and obedience tothe law, on the part of the
public.
Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers.
Any act or omission that is contraryto, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of,
disobedient to, or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily
imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such
element.16 To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray;
be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straight
forwardness17 while conduct that is "deceitful" means the proclivity for fraudulent and
deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of
the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon.18
Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in
law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport
themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, inorder to promote the
publics faith in the legal profession.19 "To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and
respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be over emphasized.
Considering that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold
the law, it is imperative that they live by the law."20
When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to "obey the laws," "do no
falsehood," and conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion.21
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his sworn
duty. He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he admitted to having
allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to the SEC, the significant
matters regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently, its corporate shareholdings. In the
documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of assignment and the GIS, Atty.
Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the validity of these transfers of shares,
making it appear that these were done for consideration when, in fact, the said transactions
were fictitious, albeit upon the alleged orders of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner
was correct in pointing out that this ran counter to the deeds of assignment which he
executed as corporate counsel. In his long practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to
assume that Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on contracts, corporation law and the
rules enforced by the SEC. As corporate secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to
register valid transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he chose to advance the interests of his
clientele with patent disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to
have simulated the loan entered into by Clarion and to have undervalued the consideration of
the effected sale of the Forbes property. He permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat the
government of taxes. Unquestionably, therefore, Atty. Francisco participated in a series of
grave legal infractions and was content to have granted the requests of the persons involved.
Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenezs wishes, or pursuant to
complainants misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty. Franciscos act
of drafting, or at the very least, permitting untruthful statements to be embodied in public
documents. If the Court allows this highly irregular practice for the specious reason that
lawyers are constrained to obey their clients flawed scheming and machinations, the Court
would, in effect, sanction wrongdoing and falsity. This would undermine the role of lawyers as
officers of the court.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of their
clients should never be attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes
absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. It needs to be emphasized that
the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice, and
mustbe held within the bounds of reason and common sense. His responsibility to protect
and advance the interests of his client does not warranta course of action propelled by ill
motives and malicious intentions.22
In the same vein, Atty. Franciscos admissions show that he lacks candor regarding his
dealings. Canon 10 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to the court." Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the CPR provides that "a lawyer shall do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to
be misled by an artifice." Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding
truth and the rule oflaw. They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially
with the court.23
From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated his duties as a lawyer embodied in the
CPR, namely, to avoid dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and to actwith
candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01, Canon 10). Also, Atty. Franciso desecrated his
solemn oath not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of the same.
Rule on Conflicting Interests and
Disclosure of Privileged
Communication
With respect to Atty. Franciscos alleged representation of conflicting interests and disclosure
of privileged communication, the Court deviates from the findings of the IBP-BOG.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts."24 "The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideallybe imbued with
the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must
prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients most confidential information to his/her
lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client
can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the
79
lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions withthe client. Part of the
lawyers duty in this regard isto avoid representing conflicting interests"25Thus, even if
lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional
employment if the same would trigger a violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest.
In Quiambao v. Bamba,26 the Court discussed the application of the rule on conflict of interest
in this wise:
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose.
Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine whether a
lawyers conduct lies within this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to
fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim
for the other client. Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be opposed by that
same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still
another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a
former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same actionor in an unrelated action. It is of no
moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the
lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the
confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions
are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would
lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective
retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to
both clients.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-
client relationship. The purpose of the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary nature of the
ties between an attorney and his client. Conversely, a lawyer may not be precluded from
accepting and representing other clients on the ground of conflict of interests, if the lawyer-
client relationship does not exist in favor of a party in the first place.
In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of interests, a
scrutiny of the parties submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant failed to
establish that she was a client of Atty. Francisco.
First, complainants claim of being Atty. Franciscos client remains unsubstantiated,
considering its detailed refutation. All that the complaint alleged was that Atty. Francisco was
Clarions legal counsel and that complainant sought advice and requested documentation of
several transfers of shares and the sale of the Forbes property. This was only successful in
showing that Atty. Francisco, indeed, drafted the documents pertaining to the transaction and
that he was retained as legal counsel of Clarion. There was no detailed explanation as to how
she supposedly engaged the services of Atty. Francisco as her personal counsel and as to
what and how she communicated with the latter anent the dealings she had entered into.
With the complaint lacking in this regard, the unrebutted answer made by Atty. Francisco,
accompanied with a detailed narrative of his engagement as counsel of Jimenez and Clarion,
would have to prevail.
Second, there is a stark disparity inthe amount of narrative details presented by the parties.
Atty. Franciscos claim thathe was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and not of the
complainant, was clearly established in a sworn statement executed by Jimenez himself.
Complainants evidence pales in comparison with her claims of being the client of Atty.
Francisco couched in general terms that lacked particularity of circumstances.
Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not to file a reply to Atty. Franciscos
answer. This could have given her opportunity to present evidence showing their professional
relationship. She also failed to appear during the mandatory conference with the IBP-CBD
without even updating her residential address on record. Her participation in the investigation
of the case apparently ended at its filing.
In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove the allegations in the
complaint by preponderant evidence. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It
means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not
there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the
facts towhich they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that
preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.27
Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his entanglement with this fiasco among the
members of Jimenezs family by taking an upfront and candid stance in dealing with
Jimenezs children and complainant. He could have been staunch in reminding the latter that
his tasks were performed in his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion and Jimenez. Be that as
it may, Atty. Franciscos indiscretion does not detract the Court from finding that the totality of
evidence presented by the complainant miserably failed to discharge the burden of proving
that Atty. Francisco was her lawyer. At most, he served as the legal counsel of Clarion and,
based on the affirmation presented, of Jimenez. Suffice it to say, complainant failed to
establish that Atty. Francisco committed a violation of the rule on conflict of interests.
80
Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not apply. In Mercado v. Vitriolo, 28 the
Court elucidated on the factors essential to establish the existence of the said privilege, viz:
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship,
and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter
declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss
whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged
or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the
prospective client. xxx
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The
client must intend the communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure
between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware,
discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement
prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing
party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel
not in his professional capacity, are not privileged communications, the element of
confidentiality not being present.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or
obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the
purpose of seeking legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal
advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
[Emphases supplied]
Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the evidence on record Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Edgar B. Francisco and
fails to demonstrate the claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant failed to furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
establish the professional relationship between her and Atty. Francisco. The records are Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.
further bereft of any indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the Forbes property was
given to Atty. Francisco in confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of what she had Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so
communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of circumstances under which the confidential that the Court can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.
communication was relayed. All that complaint alleged in her complainant was that "she
sought legal advice from respondent in various occasions."29 Considering that complainant
failed to attend the hearings at the IBP, there was no testimony as to the specific confidential SO ORDERED.
information allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco without her consent. It is, therefore, difficult,
if not impossible, to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
communication. As held in Mercado, such confidential information is a crucial link in COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT
establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It BY OTHERS.
is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.30 It cannot be gainsaid then that
complainant, who has the burden of proving that the privilege applies, failed in this regard. Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
The Penalty Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an record or have no materiality to the case.
attorney, for violating of the lawyers oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the legal Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities
profession as embodied in the CPR,31 for the practice of law is a profession, a form of public only.
trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good
moral character.32 The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.33 RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ADM. CASE No. 7006
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR Present:
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving PUNO, C.J.,
moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order QUISUMBING,
of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A YNARES-SANTIAGO,
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ.
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good CARPIO,
demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of CARPIO MORALES,
privileged communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing AZCUNA,
Clarion tomake untruthful representations to the SEC and in other public documents, still TINGA,
constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a suspension CHICO-NAZARIO,
from the practice of law for six (6) months is warranted. GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and REYES, JJ.
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN Promulgated:
WARNING that a commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the October 9, 2007
imposition of a more severe penalty. X ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ X

81

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim.
Case No. 5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding
Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29.
Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C.
Buyser, RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser
denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus
presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the
charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount
of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the
deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original
charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec. 4,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.[1]
In an Order dated August 30, 2002, [2] Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further
trying the case because of the harsh insinuation of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo
that he lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by allegedly suggesting the filing of
the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.
The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by
Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably
resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond
at P40,000.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12,
2002, which motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In
October, 2003, respondent appealed from the Orders dated November 12,
2002 and February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the
publication of an article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18,
2003issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled Senior prosecutor lambasts
Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, reads:
SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge
in Surigao City for allowing a murder suspect to go out on bail.
Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge
Manuel Tan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based
in Surigao City for ruling on a motion that sought a bailbond
for Luis Plaza who stands charged with murdering a policeman . . . .
82
Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.
Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable
offense. But Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a
murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution
is weak.
But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who
previously handled it, Judge F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence
to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the case for an unclear reason.
xxx
Bagabuyo said he would contest Tans decision before the
Court of Appeals and would file criminal and administrative charges
of certiorari against the judge.
Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt
by Judge Tan.
This is the only way that the public would know that there are
judges there who are displaying judicial arrogance. he said. [3]
In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed
respondent and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to
appear in court on September 20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited for indirect
contempt of court for the publication of the article which degraded the court and its presiding
judge with its lies and misrepresentation.
The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge Buyser
described the evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused only for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself
from the case for an unclear reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002,
declared in open court in the presence of respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the
case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent that he lacked the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge.
On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that
the Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He disclosed that
respondent, in a press conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When
asked by the trial court why he printed such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only source
was respondent.[4] Mr. Francisco clarified that in the statement alleging that Judge Buyser
inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason, the phrase for an unclear reason, was
added by the newspapers Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.[5]
Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but
refused to answer whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed
a motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of
court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. [6] The Courts Order datedSeptember
30, 2003 reads:
ORDER
Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie
clothed in half truth to give it a semblance of truth is hereby ordered to
pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for obstinately refusing to
explain why he should not be cited for contempt and admitting that the
article published in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18, 2003
and quoted in the Order of this Court dated August 21, 2003 which is
contemptuous was caused by him to be published, is hereby adjudged to
have committed indirect contempt of Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule
71 of the Rules of Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of
30 days in jail. The BJMP is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio
Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond of P100,000.00.
SO ORDERD.[7]
Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the
law. He appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.
Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the
media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan
and the trial courts disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.
In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required
respondent to explain and to show cause within five days from receipt thereof why he should
not be held in contempt for his media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding
judge, and why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 11[8] and Rule 13.02 of Canon
13.[9]
In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio,
and that the interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in his news program
between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by Tony Consing
on October 1 and 2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program.In those radio
interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who does not know the law, a liar,
and a dictator who does not accord due process to the people.
The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.
On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time
to File Answer to Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal importance and
needed ample time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to
properly prepare for his defense.
83
In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It stated
that a bill of particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that
respondentsactions and statements are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.
On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared in
court nor informed the court of his absence. The trial court issued an Order dated December
4, 2003 cancelling the hearing to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for, and
ordered him to appear on January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why he should not
be cited in contempt of court pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated October 20,
2003. However, respondent did not appear in the scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.
On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondents Answer dated January 8,
2004. Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station
DXKS. He, however, stated that right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was
approached by someone who asked him to comment on the Order issued in open court, and
that his comment does not fall within the concept of indirect contempt of court. He also
admitted that he was interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the latters instance. He
justified his response during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right
of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice.
On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor
Bagabuyo has grossly violated the Canons of the legal profession and
[is] guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to
the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law.
Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court,
for which he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT
for ninety (90) days to be served at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the
maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00). Future acts
of contempt will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to
the Supreme Court for automatic review and for further determination of
grounds for [the] disbarment of Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.[10]
The trial court found respondents denials to be lame as the tape of his interview
on October 2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the court and its officers, thus:
TONY CONSING: Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay
ang gamayng panahon ang samad
sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin pa
ba ni. O ingnon nato duna na bay
pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna
karon?
(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not changed
your mind yet?)
BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o
ang pagsiguro, ang mga Huwes nga
dili mahibalo sa balaod tangtangon
pagka abogado, mao kana.
(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are
ignorant of the law should be
disbarred. Thats it.)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan
karon nga hunahuna mahitungod
nianang mga Huwes nga dili
kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay
magkalami. Kada adlao nagatoon
ako. Nagabasa ako sa mga bag-
ong jurisprudence ug sa atong
balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod nga
inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso
nga disbarmentniining di mahibalo
nga Huwes, sigurado gayod ako nga
katangtangan siya sa
lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga Huwes
nga dili mahibalo sa balaod,
pagatangtangon na, dili lamang sa
pagka-Huwes kon dili sa pagka-
abogado. Tan-awa ra gyod kining
iyang gibuhat nga Order, Ton,
ang iyang pagkabakakon . . . .
(Thats true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are
ignorant of the law is made firmer by
time. I study everyday. I read new
jurisprudence and the law to insure
that when I file the disbarment case
against this Judge who does
not know his law, I am certain that he
loses his license. . . . This judge who
is ignorant of the law should not only
be removed as a judge but should
also be disbarred. Just take a look at
his Order, Ton, and see what a liar he
is . . . .)
84
xxx
BAGABUYO : Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga
nakaingon ako nga bakakon kini,
nag-ingon nga kini konong order
given in open court, ang kalooy sa
dios, ang iyang order sa Korte wala
siya mag-ingon ug kantidad
nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . .
(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states that
this Order was given in open court,
and in Gods mercy, he did not
state the amount
of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . . .)
BAGABUYO : Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako
siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik dayon,
ug miingon siya, BJMP arrest
Bagabuyo.
(Because he does not know the law, I
said, Your Honor, I have the right to
appeal. Then he came back and
said, BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo.)
xxx
BAGABUYO : . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa.
Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang
iyang pagka gross ignorance of the
law. . . .
(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will
see his gross ignorance of the law. . .
.)
xxx
TONY CONSING : So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?
(So what is your plan now?)
BAGABUYO : Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon
matangtang na siya sa pagka
abogado. . . .
(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan
niyang hibaw-an nga ang trabajo sa
Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon ang
tawo hambugero . . . . Ug ang akong
gisulti mao lamang ang balaod nga
siya in fact at that time I said he is
not conversant of the law, with
regards to the case of murder. . . .
(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know that
it is not for a judge to determine if a
person is a braggart. . . .And what I
said was based on the law. In fact, at
that time, I said he is not conversant
of the law, with regards to the case of
murder . . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao
kana, pero unsa may iyang katuyoan
ang iyang katuyoan nga ipa-adto ako
didto kay didto, iya akong
pakauwawan kay iya kong sikopon,
iya kong ipa-priso, pero kay di man
lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ang iyang
gui orderan BJMP, intawon por dios
por Santo, Mr. Tan, pagbasa intawon
ug balaod, naunsa ka ba Mr.
Tan? Unsa may imong hunahuna
nga kon ikaw Huwes, ikaw na ang
diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a
democratic country where all and
everyone is entitled to due process of
law you did not accord me due
process of law . . . .
(I sat down. . . . Thats it. But what was his purpose? He made me come
in order to humiliate me because he
wanted me arrested, he wanted me
imprisoned, but because he is
ignorant of the law, he ordered the
BMJP. For Gods sake, Mr. Tan, whats
wrong with you, Mr. Tan? Please
85
read the law. What is your
thinking? That when you are a judge,
you are also a dictator? No way, no
sir, ours is a democratic country
where all and everyone is entitled to
due process of law you did not
accord me due process of law. . . .)
TONY CONSING: So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga
maaksiyonan kini, with all this
problem sa Korte Suprema.
(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given action
with all the problems in the Supreme
Court.)
BAGABUYO : Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang
akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga
Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod
pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang
pagka Huwes. . . . Apan unsa man
intawon ang balaod ang iyang gibasa
niini nadunggan ko nga kini kuno
siya madjongero, mao bitaw
na, madjong ang iyang guitunan?
(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges
who are ignorant of the law must be
removed from the Bench. But what
law has he been reading? I heard
that he is a
mahjong aficionado (mahjongero)
and that is why he is studying
mahjong.[11]
The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of
the court, is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should
notpromote distrust in the administration of justice.
The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the practice
of law under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court [12] for any of the causes mentioned in
Sec. 27[13] of the same Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted
to be silent. Thus, it held that the requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.
 In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,[14] Rule 138 and Sec. 9,[15] Rule 139 of
the Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar
Confidant the Statement of Facts of respondents suspension from the practice of law, dated
July 14, 2005, together with the order of suspension and other relevant documents.
In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the
article in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the
integrity and independence of the court and its officers, and respondents criticism of the trial
courts Order dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS,both in
connection with Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation of oath of office by
respondent. It stated that the requirement of due process was complied with when
respondent was given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent chose to remain silent.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial courts
order of suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.
The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has
been reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.[16] that:
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of
his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment
unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct
in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive
in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind
of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or
in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and
moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the
Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership
therein.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are
devolved by law as a consequence.[17] Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain
obligations.[18] Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should
insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer shall submit
grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.
86
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the
holding of a press conference where he made statements against the Order dated November
12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was
displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigaojudge
for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondents statements in the article, which were made while
Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which
states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule
11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper
authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated
Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was
ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of
studying the law, and that he was a liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to conduct [himself]
as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to [his] clients.
As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set
the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers. Montecillo v. Gica[19] held:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the
dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to
the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of
our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the
rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because
respect for the institution must always be maintained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of
violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyers Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality of this Decision, with
a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

No costs. SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005]
RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
In a letter[1] to the Chief Justice bearing date February 21, 2005, with copies thereof
furnished all the Associate Justices of the Court and other government entities, RTC judges
and counsels listed thereunder, Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, who identified himself as member,
Philippine Bar, expressed his frustrations over the unfavorable outcome of and the manner by
which the Court resolved the following cases filed by him, to wit:
1. UDK-12854, Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
2. G.R. No. 149334, Artemio Dalsen vs. Commission on Elections
3. G.R. No. 148440, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
4. G.R. No. 152766, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
5. G.R. No. 154310, Noel Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
6. G.R. No. 155446, Allan Reynold Cu vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
7. G.R. No. 156630, Ronilo Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
8. G.R. No. 157046, Ronilo Sorreda vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al.
9. G.R. No. 164163, Glenn Caballes vs. People, et al.
10. G.R. No. 164677, Marissa Macarilay vs. Hon. Alba-Estoesta, et al.
In said letter, Atty. Sorreda recounted the alleged circumstances surrounding the
dismissal on February 7, 2000[2] of the very first case he filed with the Court, UDK-12854,
entitled Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al. Frustrated with the adverse ruling
87
thereon, Atty. Sorreda had previously written a letter[3] dated April 2, 2001 addressed to the
Chief Justice, copy furnished all the Associate Justices of this Court, the Court of Appeals
and the Office of the Solicitor General, denouncing the Court, as follows:
Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the manner the Court comported itself in the aforesaid case
is totally execrable and atrocious, entirely unworthy of the majesty and office of the
highest tribunal of the land. It is the action not of men of reason or those who believe
in the rule of law, but rather of bullies and tyrants from whom might is right. I say,
shame on the High Court, for shoving down a hapless suitors throat a ruling which,
from all appearances, it could not justify.
Reacting to the above, the Court, in an en banc Resolution dated August 14, 2001,
[4]
required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he should not be properly disciplined for
degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme Court by using vile, offensive, intemperate
and contemptuous derogatory language against it.
In response to the show cause order, Atty. Sorreda addressed two (2) more letters to
the Court dated December 2, 2001[5] and June 16, 2002,[6] arguing for the propriety of his
action and practically lecturing the Court on his concepts of Legal and Judicial Ethics and
Constitutional Law. In its Resolutions of January 15, 2002 [7] and August 27, 2002[8], the Court
merely noted said two letters.
Quoted from his earlier communications are the following statements of Atty. Sorreda
disparaging the Court with intemperate, insulting, offensive and derogatory language, to wit:
SOMETHING HAS GOT TO BE SERIOUSLY AND TERRIBLY WRONG WITH THE
COUNTRYS JUSTICE SYSTEM[9]
WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THIS COUNTRY, MR. CHIEF
JUSTICE?
xxx xxx xxx
I therefore deplore and condemn in the strongest term such strong-handed actuations as the
Honorable Court has displayed. They are as one might expect in a dictatorship or
authoritarian regime.[10]
Persistent in imputing to the Court and its Justices offensive and uncalled remarks,
Atty. Sorreda again went on a rampage in his subject letter of February 21, 2005:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Chief Justice, I do not doubt that these ten cases are among the most palpably
meritorious cases that have ever been brought before the Supreme Court, or any court of
justice for that matter. I cannot doubt that were it not for the Sollegue miscounting, and the
other incidents that ensued from it, at least some of these ten cases would have met with
entirely different endings, so obvious and patent are their merits to any reasonable and
impartial mind.
In short, Mr. Chief Justice, it is obvious that the High Court has taken it personally
against me. To the detriment of my innocent clients. And of justice.
Mr. Chief Justice, why should this be? If the Court had anything against me, I stood ready to
have the ax fall on my own neck, if it came to that. As I had stated in one communication-
[I]f there is one thing I agree with in the High Courts position, it is that x x x if indeed I had
wronged the Court in the way it had described, and if indeed my explanations and arguments
lack merit, I should indeed be disciplined; and surely no less than DISBARMENT will do. It
should also be done as swiftly as possible, given the gravity of the charge and the high
dignity and importance of the institution attacked. Now on January 22, 2002 and May 7, 2002,
the Court has resolved to deny to the undersigned the full opportunity for self-defense that he
request therefore he is now left without any defense, and he can only wonder why no
sanction has come down until the present time.
Might it be because I had continued, Of course, I shall also only expect that such judgment,
when it does come, will be a fully-reasoned one, as thoroughly discussed perhaps as that
in In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562, for the proper guidance of all concerned- and the Court
knows that it is not able to give such a fully-reasoned judgment as I ask? But rather than
admit it has done wrong and rectify the same, it would rather get back at me by means of
unfavorable rulings in the cases I elevate to it- let the innocent litigants, whose only mistake
was to hire me as their counsel, and the cause of justice suffer as they may.
Mr. Chief Justice, that is not only unjust; that is craven cowardice, to deal with an
adversary like that. It is not something I would have expected from the supreme judges
of the land.
I can only view other happenings in the Honorable Court in such light. The same verifications
that were previously unfaulted, suddenly became course for dismissal. What other
interpretation can I give it, than that the court had run out of excuses to dismiss, since I was
being careful not to repeat the same adjudged shortcomings; and was now scrounging every
which way for one, just so to make sure I continue to get my comeuppance.
That of the first nine cases, not one was assigned to the Third Division- only either to the
Second Division, then chaired by Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, which handled
the Sollegue case; or the First Division, chaired by the Chief Justice, to whom I have directly
written afterwards. Could it be only a coincidence - or is it a more likely explanation that the
powers-that-be in the Court wanted to be very sure I never get favorable ruling? Especially
when it is considered that, following Justice Bellosillos retirement on November 12, 2003, for
the first time in the history of the nations judiciary a vacancy in the Supreme Court was filled
up way beyond the constitutionally prescribed period of 90 days- and after so much mystery
and intrigue has surrounded the appointment of his successor, Justice Minita V. Chico-
88
Nazario. In fact Justice Nazario was sworn in on July 14, 2004, just one day before a new
retirement took place, this time of Justice Jose C. Vitug. It was only following this latest
retirement, that for the first time this counsel had a case assigned to other than the First and
Second Division. Could it be that Justice Vitug, then Chairman of the Third Division, and
Justice Nazario, erstwhile presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, had redoubtable
reputations for independent-mindedness; and the powers-that-be in the court exercised their
utmost influence to at least prevent the both of them sitting in the bench at the same time,
lest together they should buck the system and divide the Court, if not successfully sway the
Court to favorably rule on the undersigned counsels cases before it?
xxx xxx xxx
But this time, in these ten cases I have recounted, I am wholly convinced that the court is in
the wrong. I cannot but thus be filled with both acute sadness and burning
indignation. Sadness as counsel, to come to the realization that the high institution of
which I am an officer has sunk to such a low. Indignation as a citizen, that the public
officers who are supposed to serve him and help him find justice, should instead give
judgments that so insult the intelligence and glare with iniquity.
Mr. Chief Justice, whatever gave the Court the notion that it could pronounce 29 days as
greater than 60 days, and not to have to account for it? Who can believe that the supposedly
most illustrious legal minds of the land, would miss seeing grave abuse of discretion in the
actions of an agency that directly contravened numerous laws and rules all at once? How
could democracys vaunted last bulwark suffer a widow and her children to thereafter live in
their toilet, by sanctioning the plainly void sale and illegal demolition of their erstwhile family
home? Did the court pause for even three minutes to put itself in the shoes of an evidently
innocent man kept locked up for three years now on a manifestly false and fabricated charge,
before it so blandly invoked its discretion not to entertain his appeal at all? Where did the
Court get such brazenness, such shameless boldness, as to dismiss on the ground
that the docket fees had not been paid, when the evidence clearly show they in fact
were? What manner of men are you- even challenging the citizenry to inform on the
corrupt, and the bar to become like Frodo in the fight against societys evils in your
public speeches and writings, and yet you yourselves committing the same evils when
hidden from public view. Are all these rulings in the ten cases not the clearest
manifestation that the supreme magistrates have bought into the What-are-we-in-
power-for mentality? (Underscoring ours)
Upon instructions of the Chief Justice, Atty. Sorredas aforesaid letter of 21 February
2005 was included in the March 15, 2005 en banc agenda of the Court.
In an en banc Resolution[11] dated March 15, 2005, the Court again required Atty.
Sorreda to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for
maliciously attacking the Court and its Justices.
By way of compliance to the second show cause order, Atty Sorreda, in his letter of
May 10, 2005[12], again with copies thereof furnished the Justices, judges and lawyers
thereunder listed, states that he does not see the need to say any more because the cause
has already been shown as clear as day in his earlier letter of 21 February 2005, adding that
[T]he need is for the High Tribunal to act on the instant matter swiftly and decisively. While
admitting the great seriousness of the statements and imputations I have leveled against the
Court, he dared the Court whether it is capable of a judgment that will be upheld by the
Supreme Judge.
After going over the records of the cases in which Atty. Sorreda accuses the Court of
being unfair in the resolution thereof, the Court stands by its rulings thereon. Atty. Sorreda
mockingly stated that the Court does not know how to count when it dismissed the Sollegue
case on ground of failure to file the petition therein within the reglementary period. For the
enlightenment of the good counsel, the Court dismissed the petition in Sollegue not only for
failure to have it filed within the period fixed in Sec. 4, Rule 65 but also for failure to submit
the duplicate original or certified true copy of the questioned resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated June 28, 1999 in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule 46, in
relation to Sec. 2, Rule 56.[13] In another case, Ronilo Sorreda vs. CA, Atty. Sorreda claimed
that said case was dismissed on the mere ground of insufficient verification. Again, Atty.
Sorreda must be reminded that the petition was dismissed not merely for defective
verification but more so because the petition was evidently used as a substitute for a lost
remedy of appeal.[14] We see no need to belabor the grounds for the dismissal of the other
cases enumerated by counsel, said grounds having been stated in the respective minute
resolutions which were plain, clear, simply worded and understandable to everyone, even to
those who do not have a formal education in law. Suffice it to say that the dismissal of those
petitions was the result of a thorough deliberation among members of this Court.
Atty. Sorredas imputation of manipulation in the assignment and raffle of cases is
utterly baseless and at best a mere figment of his imagination.
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to
bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful
purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt
in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyers oath and a transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In Ang vs. Castro[15], this Court held that if a pleading containing derogatory, offensive
and malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings
are pending, it is direct contempt, equivalent as it is to a misbehavior committed in the
presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Direct
contempt is punishable summarily.[16]
Atty Sorredas conduct likewise violated the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically -
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
89
xxx
Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the courts.
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or
having no materiality to the case.
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his
clients genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights,
as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, [17] he must do so only within the
bounds of the law.[18] A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context of the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all,
every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from
responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyers fidelity to his client must not be
pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be done within
the confines of reason and common sense.[19]
Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, is entitled to criticize the rulings
of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed with error. But, certainly,
this does not give him the unbridled license to insult and malign the Court and bring it into
disrepute. Against such an assault, the Court is duty-bound to act to preserve its honor and
dignity and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.[20]
The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer[21] are enlightening:
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really, there could hardly
be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: To observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. As explicit is the first canon of legal
ethics which pronounces that [i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance. That same canon, as a corollary, makes it
peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor.
And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all good
fidelity xxx to the courts. Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can
only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office
which he is bound to uphold.
In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel,[22] Justice Sanchez further
elucidated:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the
courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous
to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has
it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help
build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice.
Likewise, in Zaldivar vs. Gonzales,[23] we held:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks
to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that
freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs an occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirement of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is
the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There
is no antimony between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering
justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured
only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, with the
context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are
accepted by the general community.
As officer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of
the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. [24] No less must this
be and with greater reasons in the case of the countrys highest court, the Supreme Court, as
the last bulwark of justice and democracy
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice, to which his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought
to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascription can hardly be justified nor can it have a place in the dignity of
judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that
must at no time be lost to it.[25]
Here, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and
constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Free expression,
after all, must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean,
ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.[26]
We have constantly reminded that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his
professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the
Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.[27]
In the very recent similar case of Tacardon, et al vs. Ponce Enrile,[28] we imposed on the
respondent therein the penalty of suspension from the Bar. Here, as in Tacardon, we find the
exclusion of Atty. Sorreda from the Bar a fitting sanction until he proves himself worthy to
enjoy the privileges of membership to the profession. It is imperative to instill in him sense of
discipline that should teach him anew of his duty to respect courts of justice, especially this
90
Tribunal. This rehabilitation must be done outside the brotherhood he has dishonored and to
which he will be allowed to return only after he has purged himself of his misdeeds. [29]
WHEREFORE, ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of contempt of court and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility amounting to gross misconduct as an
officer of the court and member of the Bar. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED as a
member of the Bar and is prohibited from engaging in the practice of law until otherwise
ordered by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Court Administrator to be distributed to all
courts for their information. This Resolution shall be spread in his personal record and is
immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5686, June 16, 2015
TEODULO F. ENRIQUEZ, Complaint, v. ATTY. EDILBERTO B. LAVADIA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a letter-complaint1 for disbarment filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) by Teodulo2 Enriquez against Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. for gross negligence and
inefficiency in the performance of his duties as a lawyer.
On January 7, 1997, Mr. Ernesto Ouano, Sr. filed a complaint3 for forcible entry against
complainant Teodulo Enriquez before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Talibon,
Bohol. To defend his interests, Enriquez engaged4 the services of the law office of Attys.
Joselito M. Alo, R. L. C. Agapay, and Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. with Atty. Lavadia as the
assigned attorney.5
On March 18, 2000, in open court, Atty. Lavadia agreed to submit their position papers and
affidavits within 30 days from the receipt of the pre-trial order after which, the case would be
submitted for decision. However, Atty. Lavadia failed to file the position paper resulting in the
defendants being declared in default. The MCTC rendered a decision6 in favor of the
plaintiffs.7 Atty. Lavadia filed a notice of appeal8 with sufficient bond.
In its April 26, 2001 Order,9 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Talibon, Bohol dismissed the
appeal based on Section 7(b),10 Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. The RTC stated that Atty.
Lavadia failed to file the appeal memorandum after more than 71 days. Atty. Lavadia moved
for reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC in its June 26, 2001 Order11 pointing
out that it had granted four motions for extension and still no appeal memorandum was filed.
On January 16, 2002, this disbarment complaint was received by the OBC. Enriquez alleged
that in failing to file the necessary pleadings before the court, Atty. Lavadia caused them
great damage and prejudice. This constituted gross negligence and inefficiency in the
performance of his professional duties as a lawyer.12 Enriquez thus prayed that Atty. Lavadia
be disbarred.
On July 3, 2002, this Court required Atty. Lavadia to submit his comment.13
On August 29, 2002, the Court received an ex parte manifestation from Atty. Lavadia stating
that he cannot file a comment because he did not receive a copy of the complaint.14 The
Court, thus, required Enriquez to furnish Atty. Lavadia a copy of the complaint within 10 days
and required the latter to file his comment within 10 days from receipt thereof.15
On December 10, 2002, Enriquez informed16 the Court that he sent a copy of the complaint
and its annexes to Atty. Lavadia on December 6, 2002 as evinced by a receipt. 17
Atty. Lavadia filed two motions for extension18 citing his heavy case load and family problems
as reasons in both instances for not filing the comment. Said motions were granted by the
Court giving Atty. Lavadia another 60 days within which to file his comment. 19
On February 18, 2003, Atty. Lavadia again filed a motion to extend to file his comment due to
his wife's continued illness.20 The Court granted another 30-day period, stating that it would
be the last extension it would grant.21
Failing to submit his comment within the period granted, this Court required Atty. Lavadia to
show cause why he should not be held in contempt and to submit his comment within 10
days from notice.22 Still, Atty. Lavadia failed to comply. The Court thus imposed on him a
P1,000.00 fine or imprisonment of five days if he failed to pay the fine and ordered him to
comply with its previous resolutions.23
Atty. Lavadia paid the fine on June 2, 2005,24 and asked for additional time to file his
comment this time stating that he had moved from Tagbilaran to Cebu because of his wife's
illness which was caused by "dark-beings." He claimed that a series of unfortunate events
plagued them, i.e., their house was razed by a fire, the hard drive of his computer crashing,
and his family members falling ill due to a "dark being."25 The Court thus granted a 30-day
extension.26
Failing once again to file his comment, the Court in its September 19, 2007 Resolution
imposed a fine of P2,000.00 and required Atty. Lavadia to submit his comment within five
days from notice.27 There is no record to show that he complied with the September 19, 2007
Resolution.
In its August 18, 2010 Resolution, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.28
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) scheduled a mandatory conference 29 on
January 14, 2011 but both parties failed to appear.30 Parties were then ordered to submit their
position papers within ten days from receipt of the Order.
91
On April 20, 2011, Atty. Lavadia requested that he be furnished a copy of the complaint
having lost his copy in a fire that razed his home.31 The IBP CBD resolved to furnish Atty.
Lavadia a copy of the complaint. It also directed the parties to file their position papers within
15 days from August 1,2011.32
In its Report and Recommendation,33 the IBP CBD recommended that Atty. Lavadia be
disbarred and his name be withdrawn from the Roll of Attorneys. The IBP CBD found that not
only did Atty. Lavadia cause material prejudice to his clients by neglecting his duties as
counsel in failing to file the necessary pleadings to defend his client's interest, he also
displayed a willful, defiant and cavalier attitude by repeatedly defying the resolutions of the
Court. By his actions the IBP CBD considered Atty. Lavadia unfit to dispense his duties and
responsibilities as an attorney.
On September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) resolved to adopt the report and
recommendation of the IBP CBD.34
Atty. Lavadia moved for reconsideration35 but it was denied.36
After careful review and deliberation, we agree with the report of the IBP that Atty. Lavadia is
administratively liable.
We cannot stress enough that being a lawyer is a privilege with attached duties and
obligations.37Lawyers bear the responsibility to meet the profession's exacting standards.38 A
lawyer is expected to live by the lawyer's oath, the rules of the profession and the Code of
Professional Responsibility(CPR). The duties of a lawyer may be classified into four general
categories namely duties he owes to the court, to the public, to the bar and to his client. 39 A
lawyer who transgresses any of his duties is administratively liable and subject to the Court's
disciplinary authority.40
In the present case, the duties transgressed by Atty. Lavadia fall under those duties to his
client and to the court. This Court notes Atty. Lavadia's propensity for filing motions for
extension of time to file pleadings but failing to file the same, in violation of Rule 12.03 of the
CPR which states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 12.03. - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the sameor offering an
explanation for his failure to do so. (Emphasis supplied)
In fact, such proclivity on the part of Atty. Lavadia to file such motions precisely led to the
filing of this complaint. In the course of this administrative proceeding, he continued to flaunt
to this Court his willful defiance and disregard for court orders.
LAWYER AND CLIENT: RULE 12.03 AND CANON 18 AND RULE 18.03
A lawyer is expected to serve his client with competence and diligence.41 Lawyers are
reminded to note Rules 12.03 and 18.03 of the CPR:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection there with shall render him liable.
In Solidon v. Macalalad,42 we stated that receiving money as acceptance fee for legal
services and failing to render the services is a violation of Canon 18 of the CPR. In that case,
we also stated that a lawyer's failure to file the position paper is a per se violation of Rule
18.03 of the CPR.43 We pointed to the fiduciary nature of a lawyer's duty to his client. We
stated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x x A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the
latter's interest with utmost diligence. The lawyer bears the duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the
law, the interest of his or her client. Accordingly, competence, not only in the knowledge of
law, but also in the management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate attention and
due preparation, is expected from a lawyer.44 (Citations omitted)
In Mariveles v. Mallari,45 we disbarred Atty. Mallari for violating Rules 12.03 and 18.03 of the
CPR. There, Atty. Mallari, after being granted a total of 245 days to file his client's appellant's
brief failed to file the same, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. The Court considered
Atty. Mallari's act a shameless disregard of his duties as a lawyer and found him to be unfit
for membership in the noble profession.46 In the recent case of Figueras v. Jimenez,47 Atty.
Jimenez was found administratively liable for failing to file the appellant's brief on behalf of his
client.
Here, Enriquez paid a total of P29,750.00 as acceptance fee and other fees relating to the
preparation of pleadings for the case including the appeal. Atty. Lavadia however failed to
discharge his duties. He failed to file his client's position paper rendering his client in default.
While he filed a notice of appeal and several motions for extension of time to file the appeal
memorandum, all of which were granted by the lower court, he ultimately neglected to file the
appeal memorandum. Thus, following our pronouncement in Solidon, Atty. Lavadia has
clearly transgressed Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the CPR thereby making him
administratively liable.
As in Mariveles, Atty. Lavadia requested and was granted extensions of time to file the appeal
memorandum after he filed the notice of appeal with sufficient bond. The lower court granted
him four extensions totaling 71 days after which time he still failed to file the appeal
memorandum. His failure adversely affected the cause of Enriquez, his client. In repeatedly
asking for extensions of time without actually filing the appeal memorandum, Atty. Lavadia is
liable under Rule 12.03 of the CPR.
LAWYER AND THE COURTS: RULE 12.03 IN RELATION TO CANON 11
Under Canon 1148 of the CPR a lawyer is required to observe and maintain due respect to the
court and its judicial officers. We read this provision in relation to Rules 10.03 49 and 12.03 of
the CPR for this rule does not merely affect the client but the judicial process.
In Vaflor-Fabroa v. Paguinto,50 this Court reiterated its previous ruling in Sebastian v.
Bajar51 where we stated that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx Respondent's cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent's conduct indicates a
high degree of irresponsibility. A Court's Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere
request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively". Respondent's obstinate refusal to comply with the Court's orders "not only
betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court's
lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."
92
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent's deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to
punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is
imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show
respect to their processes. (Citations omitted).
The present complaint was filed January 2002. We granted Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to
file his comment to the complaint. We issued no less than eight resolutions ordering Atty.
Lavadia to comment: two of which ordered him to pay fines of P1,000.00 and P2,000.00 and
requiring him to show cause for his failure to file and to comply with the Court's resolutions. In
fine, we have granted him a total of 155 days extension to file his comment, in response to
his repeated pleas contained in his numerous ex parte motions. After a lapse of eight years,
this Court referred the case to the IBP where Atty. Lavadia once again filed a motion for
extension to file his position paper but nevertheless failed to file the same.
While this Court is not unsympathetic to the plight of Atty. Lavadia, we cannot countenance
his act of repeatedly pleading for extensions of time and yet not submitting anything to the
Court. This reflects his willful disregard for Court orders putting in question his suitability to
discharge his duties and functions as a lawyer. As we stated in Vaflor-Fabroa52 the Court's
Resolution is not a mere request. A lawyer's blatant disregard or refusal to comply with the
Court's orders underscores her disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too
deserving of reproof. Here, this disbarment case has dragged on for years while we gave
Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to file his comment. Despite the extended time granted him,
he continued to fail to do so. Such obstinate disobedience to the Court's orders merits
disciplinary action.
We said in Figueras v. Atty. Jimenez53 that the determination of whether an attorney should
be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial
discretion. This Court has imposed the penalties ranging from reprimand, warning with fine,
suspension and, in grave cases, disbarment for a lawyer's failure to file a brief or other
pleading.
In the present case, we note that this is Atty. Lavadia's first infraction. However, given his
proven propensity for filing motions for extension of time and not filing the required pleading,
this Court finds that it should impose the severe sanction lest some other unknowing clients
engage his services only to lose their case due to Atty. Lavadia's nonchalant attitude.
Considering the gravity of Atty. Lavadia's cavalier actions both to his client and his impertinent
attitude towards the Court, we find the penalty of DISBARMENT as recommended by the IBP
appropriate.cralawred
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED for violating
Canons 11 and 18 and Rules 10.03, 12.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Court Administrator, the Department of Justice and all courts in the country
for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8197 October 2, 1946
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
MARCELINO ADORABLE, ET AL., claimants;
MIGUEL PEARANDA, claimant-appellant;
PURIFICACION SOLINAP ET AL., claimants-appellees.
Evidente, Butalid and Pearanda for claimant-appellant.
Manuel F. Zamora for claimants-appellees.
RESOLUTION
PERFECTO, J.:
At the reconstitution of the above-entitled case, claimant-appellant presented copies of
several papers, exhibits, pleadings, motions and orders, including copy of the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, record on appeal, and the printed brief of said claimant-
appellant who, at the time he filed his motion for reconstitution on February 26, 1946, was
under the impression that the case, which was pending decision in the Court of Appeals when
the war broke out, remained unacted upon by said court until the motion for reconstitution
was filed.
On June 25, 1946, Attorney Manuel F. Zamora, for the claimants and appellees, acting under
the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility as becomes a deserving member
of the bar, instead of taking advantage of claimant-appellant's ignorance of what really
happened in the Court of Appeals, informed this court that the case had been decided in
favor of said claimant and appellant by the Court of Appeals, filing to said effect the copy of
the decision promulgated on September 9, 1942, sent to him by said court, to save the
appellant the trouble of waiting for the reconstitution of this case and this tribunal the trouble
of deciding again a case already decided.
Upon being informed of the statements of Attorney Zamora, claimant-appellant's attorneys
filed a petition with the commissioner for reconstitution to make a report to this Court that the
records be declared reconstituted, together with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 9, 1942, and that said records be remanded to the lower court for execution of the
decision.lwphi1.net
93
The court resolved to declare that the case is reconstituted and to order that copy of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on September 9, 1942, be sent to the lower
court for execution. This resolution is being adopted not without making of record that the
considered as an example worthy to be remembered by all members of the bar.
[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C.
FLORIDO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James
Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating
his oath as a lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of
Appeals Resolution/Order.[1]
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the
legitimate spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged
and living separately from each other. They have two children namely, Kamille Nicole H.
Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old both of whom are
in complainants custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of
marriage which is pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
54235 entitled, James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al.
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainants
residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor
children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged
Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for
temporary child custody.[2]Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he
had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the
Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the
resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29,
2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the
ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly
arrived and demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened
to forcefully take them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents
of the National Bureau of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The
responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could
be clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in
the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on
complainant the appellate courts resolution/order.[3] In order to diffuse the tension,
complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition
that he would not take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the
presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco,
among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van
arrived at the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod
City. Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they
stayed until later in the morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City,
Branch 31, a verified petition[4] for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right
to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals resolution. In the
meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification
dated January 18, 2002[5] from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering
complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did
not appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his
attorneys oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution
in and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged
granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three
years with a warning that another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment. [6] On
June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
recommendation of the Commission with the modification that the penalty of suspension be
increased to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively
liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
94
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking
the Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is
belied by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As
pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by
respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898, [7] which he filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from
complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to
have participated in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary
would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time
that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily
be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost
zeal in the defense of a clients cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth. [8] Thus, the
Code of professional Responsibility states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled
by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents
of a paper, the language or the argument of an opposing
counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite
as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings
in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but
dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of
the legal profession.[9] The lawyers arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to
both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed
by one gentlemen to another.[10] By calling complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as a
vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a
lawyer.
Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They
constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law.
However, we find that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for
the lesser period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is
hereby imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a
member of the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6986 March 6, 2006
JULIUS V. AGUSTIN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ENRIQUE S. EMPLEO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by complainant Julius V. Agustin against respondent
Atty. Enrique S. Empleo for the latters failure to comply with a court order while acting as the
formers counsel, thereby resulting in the outright dismissal of a case and the complainants
counterclaim therein.
Records reveal that complainant was the defendant in Civil Case No. B-259 for Forcible Entry
with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages then pending before the 2nd Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Bindoy, Negros Oriental, in which respondent was his counsel.
In the course of the proceedings in that case, the MCTC issued an Order on September 25,
1998,2 giving the parties to the case a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof within
95
which to submit their compromise agreement or amicable settlement for the approval of the
court.
With no compromise agreement having been submitted by the parties within the period thus
given or thereafter, the MCTC, some four (4) years later, or on August 5, 2002, issued an
Order3 dismissing Civil Case No. B-259 and the counterclaim therein for failure of the parties
to prosecute.
Blaming his counsel for the dismissal of the case and his counterclaim therein, complainant
filed on October 18, 2004, an administrative complaint against respondent with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), thereat docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1344.
Acting on the complaint, the IBP Director for Bar Discipline, Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan, required
respondent to submit his answer thereto, otherwise he will be considered as in default and
the case heard ex-parte.4
In his answer, respondent admits having been complainants counsel in Civil Case No. B-259
and the dismissal of that case by the MCTC for the parties failure to submit a compromise
agreement. He explained, however, that the non-submission of the compromise agreement
was due to complainants own fault in not contacting him for the purpose of providing the
details of said agreement, pointing out that counsels merely assist their clients and do not
decide for them in a compromise agreement. Respondent likewise averred that complainant
was not prejudiced by the dismissal of Civil Case No. B-259 for the simple reason that the
latter was no less the defendant therein and it was the plaintiff who failed to prosecute the
case for a long period of time. In any event, respondent alleged that the instant administrative
complaint is simply complainants reaction to his letter dated June 15, 20046 relative to his
(respondents) act of having withdrawn as complainants counsel in a different case pending
before another court.
Complainant, in his Reply-Affidavit,7 countered that he contacted respondent several times
regarding the submission of the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. B-259. The first
was on October 20, 1999 at respondents residence as the latter was not at his office at that
time, in compliance with respondents letter requesting to see him. The second was on April
19, 2000 when complainant went to respondents office on account of another case, and
there reminded the latter as to the compromise agreement but respondent just made the
assurance that he will be the one to make the draft and/or prepare the same. The third was
on January 12, 2001, again at the respondents office where, after being reminded as to the
compromise agreement, respondent told him not to be in a hurry because the court can wait
for the compromise agreement and besides he is quite busy with other court cases. Denying
that the administrative complaint is his reaction to respondents letter dated June 15, 2004,
complainant asserted that said letter concerns another case in connection with which he is
preparing another administrative case against respondent.
In his Rejoinder,8 respondent denied that complainant contacted and reminded him about the
subject compromise agreement, averring that any communication that has happened
between him and the complainant pertains to another case. Respondent further averred that
complainant is merely attempting to besmirch his unsullied reputation as a legal practitioner
since 1975.
After the termination of the mandatory preliminary conference, the parties were required to
submit their respective position papers with documentary exhibits and affidavits of witnesses,
if any, within twenty (20) days from notice, after which the case shall be submitted for
resolution.9
Eventually, on July 26, 2005, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Acerey C. Pacheco,
submitted his Report and Recommendation.10 Said the Commissioner in his report:
It is a fact as established by the records that no compromise agreement was submitted to the
court despite the receipt of the Order dated September 25, 1998. While it is true that as
counsel, respondent do not decide for the complainant to enter into such kind of agreement,
respondent is however, duty bound to assist the court in the speedy disposition of cases.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondents asseveration that he waited for the complainant to provide him with details of
the compromise agreement but the latter failed to come does not inspire belief in the face of
the denials made by the complainant. Not even a piece of paper or letter requesting the
complainant to provide him with the details of the agreement was presented to substantiate
such allegation.
And even assuming arguendo that respondent indeed asked the complainant of such details,
the period of almost four (4) years from September 25, 1998 (date of the Order requiring the
submission of the compromise agreement) up to August 5, 2002 (date of the Order
dismissing the case for failure to submit the same) without doing anything to avoid the case
being left "hanging on the air" betrays respondents duty towards the court. As an officer of
the court whose primary function is to assist the court in the impartial and speedy
adjudication of cases, respondent ought to be vigilant and avoid any act or omission that only
impedes and obstructs speedy disposition of cases.
In the case at bar, the period of almost four (4) years of waiting constitutes inaction that
caused unnecessary delay in the disposition of said cases. The fact that no damage or
prejudice was sustained by the complainant, he being the defendant in that case, is of no
moment.
Thus, the Commissioners recommendation:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that herein
respondent be reprimanded for his inaction over the period of almost four (4) years without
doing anything and that a repetition of the same act to be dealt with accordingly.11
96
On October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2005-
9012 adopting and approving the afore-quoted report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the
almost four years of inaction that caused delay in the disposition of the cases, Atty. Enrique
S. Empleo is hereby REPRIMANDED and repetition of the same act shall be dealt with
accordingly.
We are in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
First and foremost among the duties of a lawyer is his duty to the court. The chief mission of
an attorney is to assist in the administration of justice and to this end, his clients success in
the case is subordinate. As mandated in Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN
THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
Like the court itself, a lawyer is an instrument to advance its ends: the speedy, efficient,
impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final
judgments.13 A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid
any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged
as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.14
True, a lawyer cannot enter into a compromise agreement without his clients consent. Be it
remembered, however, that a lawyer is also an officer of the court with the correlative duty to
see to it that cases are disposed in the soonest possible time.
Here, respondent, fully aware that there is a pending court order for the submission of a
compromise agreement, should have taken pains to remind complainant about it and
ascertain the true intent of the latter regarding the same, so that he, as complainants
counsel, can make the necessary legal action in order for the case not to be unduly delayed
and appear not to be indefinitely pending in the docket of the court concerned.
Moreover, by respondents inaction to the court order in Civil Case No. B-259, he has very
well violated his Attorneys Oath to "obey the laws and legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities."
Lastly, we cannot but note that respondent's conduct relative to the civil case in question
likewise fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in violation of Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which demands that a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 of said Canon further states that a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
As complainants counsel in Civil Case No. B-259, it was incumbent upon respondent to invite
his clients attention as to the compromise agreement, especially so when there is a pending
court order for the submission of the same. There is nothing in the record which shows that
respondent did anything in this respect, even when, as per his admission, he and
complainant were in communication at that time, albeit, with regards to another case.
Thus, by just letting the court order for the submission of a compromise agreement in Civil
Case No. B-259 remain unacted upon resulting in the pendency of that case for almost four
(4) years until its dismissal for the parties non-compliance, respondent sorely failed to
perform what is required of him as a lawyer and a member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Enrique Empleo is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
EPIFANIA Q. BANTOLO, Adm. Case No. 6589
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
ATTY. EGMEDIO B. CASTILLON, JR.,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
December 19, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In a letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dated 02 October 1997,
[1]
Epifania Q. Bantolo charged Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. of violating the lawyers oath
and Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for having (i) wittingly or willingly performed,
97
promoted, or sued any groundless, false or unlawful suit, and or giving aid or consent to the
same; (ii) delayed the just execution of the suit without legal or justifiable cause and
employing illegal means and unlawful force to do so; (iii) blatantly showed disrespect to the
Regional Trial Court by disobeying its lawful orders; and (iv) for employing unlawful and illegal
means to attain his ends.
According to complainant, respondent is the lawyer and one of the defendants in a case
involving a parcel of land in Valderrama, Antique. [2] The case was decided in favor of the
complainant and her co-plaintiffs, and thereafter, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue of
which, defendants were ejected from the property. However, respondents, with his co-
defendants subsequently entered the disputed property and harvested the palay planted
therein.[3] Plaintiffs were prompted to move for defendants to be declared in contempt of court
because of their open defiance and willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the court,
which were abetted by the acts of Atty. Egmedio Castillon who is an officer of the court. [4]On
25 January 1991, the trial court declared Atty. Castillon and his co-defendants guilty of
indirect contempt of court, with the penalty of one month imprisonment and fine.
[5]
Subsequently, on 26 July 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court,
with the modification that instead of imprisonment, defendants were ordered to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 each.[6]
In his Answer to Complaint dated 02 March 1998, respondent denied complainants
allegations and claimed that said complaint was a form of harassment. [7] Hearings were
thereafter scheduled but were cancelled and reset due to the unavailability of the
complainant. Finally, on 09 December 1998, a hearing for the reception of complainants
evidence was conducted.[8] While notices were subsequently sent to respondent setting the
case for reception of his evidence, no such hearing pushed through due to respondents
failure to inform the IBP of his new office address. Thus, respondent was deemed to have
waived his right to present evidence.[9]
In the Report and Recommendation (Report) dated 17 March 2004, the investigating
commissioner, Atty. Rafael Antonio M. Santos, found that complainant failed to prove that
respondents actions, with respect to his unsuccessful defense of the case were not within the
bounds of the law. Moreover, that respondent lost his case in the trial court does not
necessarily support the charge of willingly promoting or ruing any groundless, false or
unlawful suit or giving aid, or consenting to the same, [10] he added. Thus, according to the
IBP, the only remaining issue to be resolved is respondents liability, if any, for his
contumacious acts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.[11]
Recognizing that the findings of the trial court and the appellate court with respect to
respondents contumacious acts as final and conclusive, it was found that respondent
committed an act which constitutes a breach of his sworn promise to obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities. Furthermore, the Report noted
respondents attempts to thwart the instant disbarment proceedings, to wit: i) attempt to
mislead the Commission on Bar Discipline by representing that the proceedings relative to
the contempt charges against him are still pending when in fact they had already been
terminated; ii) placing too much emphasis on the alleged lack of personality of the
complainant to file the disbarment complaint; and iii) failure to notify the Commission of his
change of address.[12]
Finding however, that the penalty of disbarment would be reasonable under the
circumstances, the Commission recommended instead the penalty of suspension for one
month.[13] As explained in the Report:
A close examination of the facts of this case reveals that the basis of the
act for which the court found to be contumacious is a claim of ownership
 over the subject property, and thus arose from an emotional attachment
to the property which they had possessed prior to their dispossession as
a consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. 1345. Respondents
subsequent acts, however, including those which were found to be
contumacious, as well as his actuations in the instant case, merit
disciplinary sanctions, for which is recommended that respondent be
suspended for one (1) month.[14]
On 30 July 2004, the IBP passed a resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation, to
wit:
RESOLUTION NO, XVI-2004-376
CBD Case No. 510
Epifania Q. Bantolo vs.
Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that respondent has been found by both the Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals guilty of indirect contempt for disobeying the writ of
execution and for attempting to mislead the Commission into believing
that the contempt charge is still pending by submitting an Order of the
trial court which pertains to a second contempt charge, Atty. Egmedio B.
Castillon, Sr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
month.
The findings and recommendation of the IBP are well-taken.
Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes, and this deference
is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to
punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. [15] Such is the situation in the
instant case. We need not delve into the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals on the contempt case against respondents. Suffice it to say that respondent lawyers
commission of the contumacious acts have been shown and proven, and eventually punished
by the lower courts.
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. Thus, while he owes his entire
devotion to the interest and causes of his client he must ensure that he acts within the
bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth and
justice. More importantly, as an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred
task of administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to
uphold the integrity of the courts [16] and to show respect to its processes. Thus, any act on his
part which tends visibly to obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the administration of
justice constitutes professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action
against him.[17]
Respondents defiance of the writ of execution is a brazen display of disrespect of
the very system which he has sworn to support. Likewise, his various attempts to delay and
address issues inconsequential to the disbarment proceedings had necessarily caused delay,
and even threatened to obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP.
98
Nevertheless, the supreme penalty of disbarment is not proper in the instant case.
The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While the Court will
not hesitate to remove an erring lawyer from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers when the
evidence calls for it, it will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish
the desired end.[18] In the case of respondent, the Court finds that a months suspension from
the practice of law will provide him with enough time to purge himself of his misconduct and
will give him the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal
profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon is found GUILTY of gross misconduct
and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondents
suspension is effective upon notice of this decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in
respondents record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5116 April 13, 2015
DAVAO IMPORT DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOHNNY LANDERO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a Complaint1 for Disbarment filed against Atty. Johnny P. Landero (respondent) on the
grounds of professional misconduct and violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
Factual Antecedents
Sometime in August 1997, complainant Davao Import Distributors, Inc. (complainant),.
through its representative and branch manager, Jimmy Pandili (Pandili), engaged the
services of respondent to file a Complaint2 against Angelita Librando and Juanito Du
(Librando and Du, respectively) for the recovery of one split type air-conditioner with replevin
and damages. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3854 (civil case) before Branch 3 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of General Santos City.
Apparently, Librando purchased on installment basis a split-type floor-mounted air-conditioner
from complainant in the amount of P86,740.00 which the former installed in her beauty salon
located in a commercial building owned by Du. When Librando failed to pay, Pandili went to
her salon only to find out that the same had already closed down. Left in the premises,
however, was the air-conditioning unit Librando purchased from complainant. Claiming that
Du refused to release the unit to complainant as he allegedly intended to retain the same as
a lien for Librando's unpaid rentals, complainant filed the said case.
On the scheduled date of pre-trial on November 10, 1997, respondent failed to appear. And
since he also failed to inform complainant or Pandili of the scheduled pre-trial, they too were
unable to attend. As a result, the case was dismissed for non-suit through an Order 3 of even
date and Du was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte in support of his counterclaim. On
December 9, 1997, the MTCC issued a Decision4 ordering complainant to pay Du the
amounts of P70,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as
litigation expenses.
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration, complainant appealed the MTCC Decision to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). On July 31, 1998, the RTC issued its Decision5 affirming the
MTCC Decision.
Complainant then disbursed to respondent the amount of P1,900.00 so that he may file a
petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA). Initially, respondent filed a motion for
extension of time to file said petition. However, he failed to file the same such that on January
22, 1999 the CA issued a Resolution6 dismissing the appeal.
Hence, this Complaint for Disbarment where complainant asserts that respondent's
actuations of (1) not appearing in the pre-trial of the case, (2) not availing of the legal
remedies against the dismissal of the Complaint due to non-suit, and (3) failing to file a
petition for review, constitute unprofessional behavior or misconduct and violations of Canon
12 of the CPR, which merit disciplinary action, if not, disbarment.
Respondent's Defense
In response to the allegations hurled against him, respondent explained that upon receiving
Du's Answer with Counterclaims, he was alarmed to find out that the property in question was
already in the custody of the sheriff. This was allegedly by reason of an attachment in an
another civil action filed by a different person against Librando. Respondent thus conferred
with the counsel of Du and requested him to withdraw the counterclaim but was turned down
as Du wanted to pursue his claim for damages. He then informed Pandili of the seizure of the
property by the sheriff and of Du's decision not to withdraw the counterclaim. The two of them
allegedly thereafter agreed to just abandon the case. But when he discussed to Pandili that it
is possible that complainant may be assessed for damages, Pandili allegedly panicked and
requested him to delay the execution of the judgment on the counterclaim for fear that he
would be terminated from his job. Acceding, respondent appealed the judgment on Du's
counterclaim but the RTC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MTCC Decision. When
informed about this, Pandili allegedly took from respondent the case folder despite the latter's
warning that they only have 15 days to file a Petition for Review with the CA. It was only after
30 days that Pandili returned to him and begged that he file an appeal, again, for fear that he
would be terminated by complainant. Out of pity, and despite knowledge of the expiration of
the period for filing an appeal, respondent still filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review. Du's counsel opposed the motion pointing out that respondent misled the
99
CA as to the date of his receipt of the assailed RTC Decision so as to make it appear that the
said motion was timely filed. The CA thus ordered respondent to explain. It was at this
juncture that respondent opted not to file the intended petition anymore allegedly because he
would not want to waste the time of the court in resolving a petition which is baseless and
admittedly filed out of time. Proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
On May 24, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner, Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala
(Commissioner Villanueva-Maala) recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for three months.7 This was after she found respondent negligent in the
performance of his duty as counsel for complainant and as an officer of the Court. As counsel
for complainant, it was respondent's duty to attend the pre-trial, justify the filing of the
complaint, and oppose Du's counterclaim. Respondent, however, was remiss in his duty by
deliberately failing to attend the pre-trial, which caused prejudice to complainant in that it was
declared in default and was assessed for damages. Moreover, while respondent claimed that
he did not proceed with the filing of the petition for review with the CA because it was already
out of time, the records, on the contrary, show that he was actually granted by the CA an
extension of 15 days to file the intended petition. Only that he did not file the same on
purpose notwithstanding his receipt from complainant of the amount of P1,900.00 as
payment for docket fees.
In a Resolution8 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala but modified the period of suspension
by increasing it from three months to six months. Respondent then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,9 which the IBP Board of Governors denied in a Resolution10 dated March
21, 2014.
Hence, the transmission of the whole record of the case to this Court for its final action.
Our Ruling
We agree with complainant that respondent displayed unprofessional behavior and
misconduct and violated the CPR.
Respondent himself admitted that he deliberately did not appear at the scheduled pre-trial
conference in Civil Case No. 3854 despite notice and that he did not file a petition for review
after receiving from his client the payment for docket fees and after being granted by the CA
an extension of time to file the same. From these facts alone, it cannot be denied that
respondent's acts constitute misconduct which at the same time amount to violations of the
CPR.
The Court has already held in People v. Sevilleno11 and reiterated in Consolidated Farms, Inc.
v. Atty. Alpon, Jr.12that Canon 1813 of the CPR requires every lawyer to serve his client with
utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable.
As complainant's counsel in Civil Case No. 3854, respondent is duty-bound to handle the
same with zeal and all due diligence.1wphi1 Hence, even assuming that there is truth to his
allegation that he and Pandili already agreed to abandon the case, he should have still
attended the scheduled pre-trial to formally move for its withdrawal. However, despite his
awareness that his absence in the pre-trial would result to a dismissal of the case with
prejudice and to a declaration of his client's default with respect to Du's counterclaim,
respondent still deliberately did not appear thereat. It is worth noting that at that time, Du had
already filed an Answer with Counterclaim. If respondent was indeed concerned about his
client's cause, he should have, under the circumstances, observed the mandate of Section 2,
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. It provides:
RULE 17
Dismissal of Actions
Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. - Except as provided in the preceding section, a
complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon approval of the court and
upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal, the
dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the motion he manifests his preference to have his counterclaim
resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court. (Emphasis supplied)
Had respondent moved for dismissal under the above-quoted rule, the case filed by
complainant would have been dismissed without prejudice thereby giving it the alternative of
re-filing the case should there be a change in circumstances. But due to respondent's
absence and also his failure to inform complainant of the scheduled pre-trial, the Complaint
was dismissed based on Section 314 of the same Rule. This has. the effect of an adjudication
on the merits which, needless to state, curtailed the right of the complainant to refile the case.
Moreover, had respondent been present at the pre-trial and had informed complainant of the
same, the latter would not have been declared in default and, therefore, would have had the
opportunity to present evidence to refute Du's claim for damages against it. To stress, an
attorney is bound to protect his client's interest to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence.15 This, respondent failed to do in utter disregard of Canon 18 of the CPR.
Anent respondent's failure to file the Petition for Review despite being granted an extension
of time to do so, his explanation is as follows:
o) That because of pity I filed an extension of time to file a petition for review alleging that the
plaintiff had just received a decision and the filing is within the reglementary period copy
furnished the counsel of Juanito Du[.] This was opposed by his counsel alleging [I misled] the
court [as] to the correctness of the date of receipt . of said decision. So the court issued an
order directing the undersigned respondent to explain. x x x Because of said opposition the
herein counsel decided not to proceed [with] the filing of [a] petition for review considering it
was already filed out of time and it will only waste the golden time of the court in reviewing a
100
baseless appeal, so the herein respondent advised the manager to be man enough to accept
the truth, otherwise the herein respondent would be dragged deeper in helping him;16
The Court finds respondent's reason to be unacceptable if not downright disrespectful to the
courts. The same only underscores his blatant violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12 of the CPR,
which states:
CANON 12 - A LA WYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY
TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
xxxx
Rule 12.03 -A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.
Respondent needs lecturing that sympathy towards a client does not justify his act of stating
in his motion for extension that he received the RTC Decision at a later date to make it
appear that the filing of the said motion is well-within the period for filing an appeal. Given his
years of experience in the legal profession, respondent should be well aware that "[a] lawyer
is first and foremost an officer of the court. Thus, while he owes his entire devotion to the
interest and causes of his client, he must ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and
common sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth and justice. More importantly,
as an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering
justice, graver _responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity
of the courts and to show respect to its processes. Thus, any act on his part which tends
visibly to obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes
professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him." 17
All told, the Court finds respondent to have committed acts violative of Canons 12and18 of
the CPR.
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the July 17, 2008 Resolution of the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Johnny P. Landero is ordered SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately. He is directed to report the date of
his receipt of this Resolution to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take
effect Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a
member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY
TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared
himself on the law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the order
101
of its proferrence. He should also be ready with the original documents for comparison
with the copies.
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse Court processes.
Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a break or recess
in the trial, while the witness is still under examination.
Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to
impersonate another.
Rule 12.07 - A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly
inconvenience him.
Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
(a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument,
and the like; or
(b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel.