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TAADA V. TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 | G.R. No.

L-63915
(Apr. 24, 1985)
Ponente: Escolin, J.

Facts:

Invoking the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on the matters of public
concern, petitioners sought for a writ of mandamus to compel respondent officials to publish in the
Official Gazette the various Presidential Decrees (PDs), Letters on Instructions (LOIs), General Orders,
Proclamations, Executive Orders, Letters of Information, and Administrative Orders to be valid and
enforceable.

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant

PETITIONERS: maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to
compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be
given due course.

Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than
the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed
be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the
government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for
respondents in this case.

RESPONDENTS further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It
is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the
date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The
point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided,

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Issue: WON the publication of the laws in the Official Gazette is necessary for their effectivity.

Held:

Publication of laws is a condition sine qua non for their effectivity, giving the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia
legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice of.

Needless to say, the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process.
It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. Thus, presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect.

The respondents are ordered to publish all unpublished presidential issuances of general application,
which are of no force and effect, unless so published.

Relevant Opinions:

C.J. Fernando (Concurring, qualified; opinion concurred by JJ. Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas,
Alampay)
Without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party
who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of
law. But it does not mean that publication must be in the Official Gazette. Justice Plana points out that the
Constitution does not require publication in the Official Gazette.

J. Plana (Concurring, qualified; opinion concurred by JJ. Cuevas, Alampay)


The Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws
to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in
the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise.

Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Commonwealth Act No. 638 does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be
published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette.

J. Teehankee (Concurring, concurring also with opinion of J. Melencio-Herrera)


The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal
application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set
procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a
reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey
before they can be punished for its violation, citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated
in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said
contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of
the Civil Code.

J. Melencio-Herrera (Concurring)
There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. When a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only
fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if
the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
Relevant Laws:

Article IV, Section 6, 1973 Constitution (Now Article III, Section 7, 1987* Constitution):
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, [as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development,]* shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

Article 2, New Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 200 (s. 1987):
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

Section 1, Commonwealth Act No. 638:


There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published;
[4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time
to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. x x x

Nuez v. Sandiganbayan
Petitioner: Rufino Nuez

Respondent: Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines

Ponente: Fernando, CJ

Facts:

Nunez was accused before Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in
several cases.

Upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds.
Sandiganbayan denied the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration.

Hence the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity of Presidential
Decree 1846 creating the Sandiganbayan.

He contends that the creation of Sandiganbayan is violative of the due process, equal protection,
and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.

The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioners right to equal protection, because appeal
as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and
limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one
chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two chances;
while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and
to CA and SC.

Issue: Whether or not PD 1846 creating Sandiganbayan violated equal protection right?
Held:

Petition dismissed.

The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have
original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption.

The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan,
precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the
public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware
as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different
procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not
necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it
must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices a
showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.

Justice Makasiar (concurring and dissenting):


Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of
its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts first, to the
CA, and thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft
and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only
allowed one appeal to the SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a
collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination.
Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a
trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry
and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures
better justice to the accused and to the people.

Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be
reviewed by the SC through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the SC only to question of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial
court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of
fact and of law are reviewed, first by the CA, and then by the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of
justice in criminal cases when the trial courts judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals,
which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality
unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.

Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused,
which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973
Constitution).
ANG TIBAY v COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 69 Phil
635
FACTS

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. prayed for the vacation of the judgment rendered by
the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new
trial.

The union avers that:


- Teodoros claim that there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to
temporarily lay off the members of the union is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the
Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather;

- that the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by
Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal;

- that the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood; that important
documents attached are inaccessible to the respondents.

ISSUE: WON the union was denied procedural due process by the CIR

HELD: No.

The CIR, a special court created under CA 103, is more an administrative than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation.

It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is
essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented
to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only
exercises judicial or quasi - judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers
and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees
but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines,
to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between,
and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them. It may
appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and
compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital
industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is
a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There
are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place
when directly attached.
This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence
must be substantial.
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their
duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of
securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry
may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their
report and decision are only advisory.

(6) The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision.

(7) The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

- In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, except as to the alleged agreement between the
Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst
for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

- This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent
National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given
opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence
as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the CIR is new. The
failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial is grant ed, and the entire record of the
case shall be remanded to the CIR.

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD VS CA

Petitioner: POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD

Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION

FACTS:

Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with
untreated wastewater which were being discharged directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-
Tinejeros River.

On September 22, 1988, petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order based on 2
findings made on Solar Textile Finishing Corportions plant, directing Solar immediately to cease and
desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations as they were clearly in violation of Section
8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 (Pollution Control Law) and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations. Solar then filed a motion for reconsideration which was
granted by the Pollution Adjudication Board for a temporary operation.

However, Solar went to the RTC for certiorari and preliminary injunction against the Board but the same
was dismissed based on 2 grounds i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned order of the
Board as well as the writ of execution was the proper remedy, and that the Boards subsequent order
allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solars petition moot and academic.

On appeal, the CA reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case for further
proceedings. (CA also declared the Writ of Execution null and void.

Petitioner: Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte
orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such
establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum
permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board).

Solar: On the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex part order
may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
welfare, or to animal and plant life" and argued that there were no findings that Solars wastewater
discharged posed such a threat.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had
been denied due process by the Board.

SUB-ISSUE: Whether or not the Pollution Adjudication Board has legal authority to issue the Order and
Writ of Execution against Solar Textile Finishing Corporation.

RULING:

YES, CA erred.

YES, the Order (CDO) was lawful and w/in the authority of the Board. The relevant pollution control
statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive,
sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as police power.

The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner
Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders under the following circumstances:

Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders under
the following circumstances:

(a) Public Hearing . . . .Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the
discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal
or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an
ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of
operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a
prior public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until
said establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or
modified or nullified by a competent court.

On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health,
safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be
issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the waste discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set
by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by the
Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence
of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards.

*Please see case for the comparison of Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 on allowable
standards and the findings of the Board. (Basta, I assure you lumagpas yung results.)

~Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously violates the directive of the
Commission by undertaking dyeing operation without completing first and operating its existing WTP. The
analysis of results on water samples taken showed that the untreated wastewater from the firm pollutes
our water resources.

Minor lang naman yung change in ownership from Fine Touch Finishing Corp to Solar Textile Finishing
corp. I didnt include it na, basta the 1st owner was issued a notice of violation 1st. Basta hindi lang based
on the 1st test yung basis of the issuance of CDO. (meaning reinspections were conducted also when i
was already under the ownership of Solar and
~Petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing (Patient) in its efforts to enforce the
applicable standards vis- a-vis Solar.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here
presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into
the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over
the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years.

It doesnt mean that they cant contest the CDO issued and the findings, it just means that that opportunity
is subsequently available to Solar. Prima facie is enough cause we have to protect (insert environment
stuff here).
The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal
to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should
have sought instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of
Execution, and instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals.

RULING: Petition is given DUE COURSE; CA Decision and Resolution is SET ASIDE; Order of Board
and writ of execution as well as trial courts decision is REINSTATED.