Application of Article 2.

Law shall take effect 15 days following the completion of its

publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of General Circulation, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

LARA V. DEL ROSARIO

GR 6339, 50 O.G. 1957

In the case of Lara v. Del Rosario (GR 6339, 50 O.G. 1957), the Supreme Court in an
obiter dictum (obiter because the principal date concerned in the case was September 4,
1950) held that the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect on Aug.30, 1950. This date is exactly
one year after the Official Gazette publishing the Code was released for circulation, the said
release having been made on Aug. 30, 1949.This ruling with respect to the effectivity date
seems to be contrary to the provision of the law which states that This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication (Art. 2, Civil Code), not after circulation. And under
the Revised Administrative Code (Sec. 11), for the purpose of xing the date of issue of the
Official Gazette, it is conclusively presumed to be published on the date indicated therein as
the date of issue. It should be remembered that the June 1949 issue of the Official
Gazette was circulated on Aug. 30, 1949. While it is no doubt desirable that the date of issue
should be the same as the date of circulation, for otherwise the public may be unduly
prejudiced, still no amount of judicial legislation can or should outweigh the express
provision of Sec. 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. Dura lex sed lex (the law maybe
harsh but it is the law). Furthermore, the ruling in the Del Rosario case is contrary to the
Supreme Courts statement in a prior case that the reason for the conclusive presumption in
the Revised Administrative Code is obviously to avoid uncertainties likely to arise if the date
of publication is to be determined by the date of the actual release of the Gazette. (Barretto, et al.
v. Republic, L-2738, 2739, and 2740, Prom. Dec. 21, 1950).

Applications of Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

In Re: Filart 40 Phil. 205

Mistake of Lawyer No man is supposed to know any branch of the law perfectly,
particularly when called upon to act at once without time for reflection, the knowledge which
we use the utmost industry to acquire, is often forgotten at the moment when most needed.
The science of law is a most extensive and difficult one. Cases frequently occur when
learned men differ, after the greatest pains is taken to arrive at a correct result. No one,
therefore, would dare to pursue the profession of law, if he were held responsible for the
consequences of a casual failure of his memory, or a mistaken course of reasoning. It has
thus been held that a lawyer cannot be disbarred for an honest mistake or error of law.

MARBELLA-BOBIS VS. BOBIS

GR. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
336 SCRA 747

FACTS:
1. In October 1985, private respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a rst marriage with one
Maria Dulce Javier.
2. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullied or terminated, the same respondent
contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 1996 and
allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
3. An information for bigamy was led
4. Sometime, thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of his rst marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage
license.
5. Respondent then led a Motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for
bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the rst marriage as a prejudicial
question to the criminal case.
6. The trial court granted the motion to suspend the criminal case.
7. Petitioner led a Motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
8. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Does the subsequent ling of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for Bigamy?

HELD:
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimate connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon
which the criminal action is based, but also that the relocation of the issues raised in the
civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the
defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the
criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may
proceed.

Its two elements are: a) the civil action involves an issue similarly or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all
the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information,
considering that the prosecution has not yet presented its case.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second
marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party
may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties particularly the
accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the rst
marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial
declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be
remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur
two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been
valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the rst marriage.

As ruled in LANDICHO VS. RELOVA (22 SCRA 731), he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the rst marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the
ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for
concubinage, the SC held the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is
not a prejudicial question (BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE, 334 SCRA 106). This ruling applies here
by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.

Application of Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided.

LORENZO VS. POSADAS

64 PHIL 353

Facts:
On 27 May 1922, Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, leaving a will and considerable
amount of real and personal properties. Hanleys will provides the following: his money will
be given to his nephew, Matthew Hanley, as well as the real estate owned by him. It further
provided that the property will only be given ten years after Thomas Hanleys death. Thus, in
the testamentary proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga appointed P.J.M.
Moore as trustee of the estate. Moore took oath of office on March 10, 1924, and resigned on
Feb. 29, 1932. Pablo Lorenzo was appointed in his stead. Juan Posadas, Collector of Internal
Revenue, assessed inheritance tax against the estate amounting to P2, 057.74 which
includes penalty and surcharge. He led a motion in the testamentary proceedings so that
Lorenzo will be ordered to pay the amount due. Lorenzo paid the amount in protest after CFI
granted Posadas motion. He claimed that the inheritance tax should have been assessed
after 10 years. He asked for a refund but Posadas declined to do so. The latter
counterclaimed for the additional amount of P1,191.27 which represents interest due on the
tax and which was not included in the original assessment. However, CFI dismissed this
counterclaim. It also denied Lorenzos claim for refund against Posadas. Hence, both
appealed.

Issue: Whether the estate was delinquent in paying the inheritance tax and therefore liable
for the P1, 191.27 that Posadas is asking for?

Held: Yes. It was delinquent because according to Sec. 1544 (b) of the Revised
Administrative Code, payment of the inheritance tax shall be made before delivering to each
beneciary his share. This payment should have been made before March 10, 1924, the date
when P.J.M. Moore formally assumed the function of trustee.

Although the property was only to be given after 10 years from the death of Hanley, the
court considered that delivery to the trustee is delivery to cestui que trust, the beneciary
within the meaning of Sec. 1544 (b).

Even though there was no express mention of the word trust in the will, the court of rst
instance was correct in appointing a trustee because no particular or technical words are
required to create a testamentary trust (69 C.J., p. 711). The requisites of a valid
testamentary trust are: 1) sufficient words to raise a trust, 2) a denite subject, 3) a certain
or ascertained object. There is no doubt that Hanley intended to create a trust since he
ordered in his will that certain of his properties be kept together undisposed during a xed
period or for a stated purpose.

Application of Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, and good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law.

Ferazzini v. Gsell, 34 Phil. 697 (1916)

NON-INVOLVEMENT CLAUSE IN A CONTRACT VALID, PROVIDED THERE IS LIMITATION

AS TO TIME, PLACE AND TRADE.

Held: As early as 1916, the validity of a non-involvement clause has already been
discussed. In Ferazzini v. Gsell, 34 Phil. 697 (1916), it was held that such clause was
unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore against public policy. In Ferrazzini, the
employee was prohibited from engaging in any business or occupation in the Philippines for
a period of ve years after the termination of his employment contract and must rst get the
written permission of his employer if her were to do so. The Court ruled that while the
stipulation was indeed limited as to time and space, it was not limited as to trade. Such
prohibition, in effect, forced an employee to leave the Philippines to work should his
employer refuse to give a written permission.

Excerpt from the case:

The agreement between the parties was palpably and unequivocably a combination in
restraint of trade, and to enhance the price in the market of an article of primary necessity
to cotton planters. Such combination are contrary to public order, and cannot be enforced in
a court of justice.

By "public policy," as dened by the courts in the United States and England, is intended
that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has
a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good, which may be termed the
"policy of the law," or "public policy in relation to the administration of the law." (Words &
Phrases Judicially Dened, vol. 6, p. 5813, and cases cited.) Public policy is the principle
under which freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted by law for the good of the
public. (Id., Id.) In determining whether a contract is contrary to public policy the nature of
the subject matter determines the source from which such question is to be solved.
(Hartford Fire Ins. Co. vs. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. 904, 906.)

The foregoing is sufficient to show that there is no difference in principle between the public
policy (orden publico) in the two jurisdictions (the United States and the Philippine Islands)
as determined by the Constitution, laws, and judicial decisions.

In the United States it is well settled that contracts in undue or unreasonable restraint of
trade are unenforcible because they are repugnant to the established public policy in that
country. Such contracts are illegal in the sense that the law will not enforce them.

The contract under consideration, tested by the law, rules and principles above set forth, is
clearly one in undue or unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore against public policy. It
is limited as to time and space but not as to trade. It is not necessary for the protection of
the defendant, as this is provided for in another part of the clause. It would force the plaintiff
to leave the Philippine Islands in order to obtain a livelihood in case the defendant declined
to give him the written permission to work elsewhere in this country.

Application of Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation,
or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders, and regulations shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

CONFLICTS OF SPECIAL LAW AND GENERAL LAW:

If the general law was enacted rst, the special law is considered the exception to the
general law. Therefore the general law remains a good law, and there is no repeal

LICHAUCO & COMPANY., PETITIONER, VS. SILVERIO APOSTOL, AS DIRECTOR OF

AGRICULTURE, AND RAFAEL CORPUS, AS SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, RESPONDENTS
44 Phil 138

FACTS: Lichauco & Co. petitioned for the writs of mandamus and injunction against Silverio
Apostol and Rafael Corpus allegedly refusing Lichauco & Co to import from Pnom-Pehn, in
French Indo-China, a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum
except upon the condition, stated in AO No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture contending that
said cattle shall have been immunized from the rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-
Pehn.

The petitioner asserted that under the rst provision to section 1762 of the Administrative
Code (amended by Act no. 3052), the petitioner has an absolute and unrestricted right to
import Carabao and other draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum from
Pnom-Pehn, Indo-China, into the Philippine Islands and that the respondents have no
authority to impose upon the petitioner previous said restrictions.

Respondents relied upon section 1770 of the Administrative Code and AO no. 21 of the
Bureau of Agriculture in relation with Dept. Order No. 6.

ISSUE: Whether section 1770 has been repealed by implication, in so far as it relates to
draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum?

HELD: Section 1762 is for the general rule, while section 1770 is for particular contingency
and not inconsistent with Section 1762.

Petition does not show sufficient ground for granting the writs of mandamus and injunction.

DISPOSITION: We are of the opinion that the contention of the petitioner is untenable, for
the reason that section 1762, as amended, is obviously of a general nature, while section
1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in section 1762.
Section 1770 is therefore not to be considered as inconsistent with section 1762, as
amended; on the other hand, it must be treated as a special qualication of section 1762. Of
course the two provisions are different, in the sense that if section 1762, as amended, is
considered alone, the cattle which the petitioner wishes to bring in can be imported without
restriction, while if section 1770 is still in force the cattle, under the conditions stated in the
petition, can be brought in only upon compliance with the requirements of Administrative
Order No. 21. But this difference between the practical effect of the two provisions does not
make then inconsistent in the sense that the earlier provision (sec. 1770) should be deemed
repealed by the amendatory Act (3052).

That section 1770 is special, in the sense of dealing with a special contingency not dealt
with in section 1762, is readily apparent upon comparing the two provisions. Thus, we nd
that while section 1762 relates generally to the subject of the bringing of animals into the
Island at any time and from any place, section 1770 confers on the Department Head a
special power to deal with the situation which arises when a dangerous communicable
disease prevails in some dened foreign country, and the provision is intended to operate
only so long as that situation continues. Section 1770 is the backbone of the power to
enforce animal quarantine in these Islands in the special emergency therein contemplated;
and if that section should be obliterated, the administrative authorities here would be
powerless to protect the agricultural industry of the Islands from the spread of animal
infection originating abroad.
PHIL. ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. VS. TORRES, 212 SCRA 298; G.R. NO.
101279, AUGUST 6, 1992

Facts: DOLE Dept. Order No. 16 temporarily suspends the recruitment by private
employment agencies of Filipino DH going to Hong Kong in view of the need to establish
mechanisms that will enhance the protection for the same.
The DOLE, through POEA took over the business of deploying such HK-bound workers.
Pursuant to the above order, POEA issued memorandum circular no. 30 providing guidelines
on the government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to HK and the
accreditation of HK recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers, and the
memorandum circular No. 30, pertaining to the processing of employment contracts of
domestic workers for HK.

Petitioner contends that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess
of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars.

Issue: WON the take-over of the business deploying DH to HK by DOLE and POEA through
an administrative order and circular is valid.

Held: Yes. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and
regulate recruitment and placement activities. The challenge administrative issuance
discloses that the same fall within the administrative and police powers expressly or by
necessary implication conferred upon the respondents.

Applications of:
Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines.

Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

FLORESCA VS. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION

G.R. NO. L-30642 (APRIL 30, 1985)

FACTS:

Several miners, who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba,
Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of
the mine. The heirs of the deceased claimed their benets pursuant to the Workmens
Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation Commission. They also petitioned
before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages, pointing out that the
complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take
necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground.
Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already
claimed benets under the Workmens Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds
jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between availing
themselves of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the
regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from
the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may
avail themselves cumulatively of both actions.

RULING:

The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benets under the
Workmens Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before
the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in
its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation
under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and
regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the
Workmens Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation.
The choice of the rst remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullies
the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their
bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmens Compensation Act
should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

Applications of:
Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order, or policy shall not be
countenanced.

Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.

Martinez v Van Buskirk

18 Phil 79

Facts:
1. On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding
a carromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant (used for the
transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached), came from the opposite
direction, while their carromata went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon
pass by. However, instead of merely passing by, the horses ran into
the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious
cut upon the plaintiffs head.

2. The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the
time of the accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable
cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle Herran,
and for that purpose the defendants employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the
front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered.
However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing
them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown upon the ground.

3. From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The
court specically cited a paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to
reverse such decision.

Issue: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable
team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of
such driver.

NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner
described by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a
long time, have not been destructive and which are approved by the society are considered
as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as unreasonable or imprudent.

The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are benecial rather
that prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led
to an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent because
of such circumstances.

The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to deliver
products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice to leave
the horses in the manner in which they were left during the accident. It has been practiced
for a long time and generally has not been the cause of accidents or injuries the judgment is
therefore reversed.

Application of Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall
be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-ve days each; months, of thirty days;
days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days
which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the rst day shall be excluded, and the last day included.

MARIANO S. GONZAGA v. AUGUSTO CE DAVID

G.R. No. L-14858

December 29, 1960

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

The essential antecedents of this case are not disputed. On February, 1957, Mariano
Gonzaga, as owner, registered with the Motor Vehicles Office a cargo truck and a passenger
bus, paying the rst installment for registration fees due on said vehicles for 1957. To cover
the second installment for registration fees, Gonzaga remitted to the Provincial Treasurer of
Cagayan, by registered mail, P500.00, under postal money orders Nos. 18553, 18554 and
18555, purchased from and issued by the Post Office of Camalaniugan, Cagayan. The postal
cancellation mark on the envelope containing the remittance of Gonzaga bears the date
August 31, 1957; so does the postal cancellation mark on the face of the money orders.

The Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of Cagayan ruled that pursuant to Section 8 (1),
Act 3992, otherwise known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the second installment for
registration fees was payable on or before the last working day of August; that the last
working day of August, 1957 was Friday, August 30, 1957; that consequently, the remittance
of Gonzaga bearing postal cancellation mark dated August 31, 1957 was made beyond the
time xed by law. Accordingly, said official sought to impose a 50% delinquency penalty, or
otherwise, threatened to conscate the certicate of registration for the two trucks (Annexes
"B" & "C").

Gonzaga brought this action in the Court of First Instance, which, upon a stipulation of facts,
rendered judgment, the dispositive part reading

POR TANTO, el Juzgado dicta decision declarando, como por la presente declara, que
el pago hecho con los giros postales Nos. 18553, 18554 y 18555, por el recurrente,
se ha hecho dentro del plazo jado por ley; y, por tanto, el recurrente no ha incurrido
con morosidad en cuanto a dicho pago.

Se ordena al recurrido, sus agentes y representantes, que se abstengan de conscar

el certicado de registro de los dos trucks del recurrente, por la alegada morosidad
del citado pago.

Sin costas.

ASI SE ORDENA.

The only issue in this appeal is whether the remittance of petitioner-appellee covering the
second installment of registration fees for 1957, made by registered mail with postal
cancellation dated August 31, 1957, was within the time xed by law.

The following are the pertinent provisions of Act 3992 as amended

Sec. 8 (I) ". . . The registration fees provided in this Act for trucks may be payable in
two equal installments, the rst to be paid on or before the last working day of
February, and the second to be paid on or before the last working day of August.
(Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 6 (b) "The date of cancellation of the postage stamps of envelopes containing
money orders, checks, or cash shall be considered as the date of application. . . .
In support of its contention that August 30, and not August 31, was the last working day of
August, 1957, respondent-appellant invokes Republic Act No. 1880, otherwise known as the
"40-Hour Week Law", pursuant to which government offices are to hold office from Monday
to Friday only, unless one of those expressly exempted therefrom.

As correctly held by the court below, the fact that pursuant to Republic Act 1880, the Motor
Vehicles Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, had no office on Saturday, Aug. 31, 1957, is
immaterial in the case. The last working day contemplated in Sec. 8(I) of Act 3992 as
amended should not necessarily mean the last working day for Motor Vehicle Office. Under
Sec. 6(b) of said Act, providing for payment of registration fees by mail, the date of
cancellation of the postage stamps of the envelope containing the remittance is considered
the date of application. Consequently, where the manner of payment falls under said Section
6(b), the law, in recognizing the date of cancellation as the date of application, impliedly
permits of a remittance or payment within that last day of August that the Post Office may
still effect cancellation; and the remittance, in fact, bears a postal cancellation, dated August
31, 1957. Moreover, it is not pretended by respondent-appellant that the Post Office ceased
or has ceased to transact business and discharge its functions on Saturdays by reason alone
of Republic Act No. 1880. Clearly, therefore,the remittance by petitioner-appellee was within
the by law, as provided in Section 8 (I), in connection with Section 6 (b) of Act 3992, as
amended.

The fact that August 31, 1957 was declared a special public holiday by Proclamation No. 437
(dated August 21, 1957) of the President of the Philippines did not have the effect of making
the preceding day, August 30, the last day for paying registration fees without penalty. On
the contrary, Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code provides

Sec. 31. Pretermission of holiday. Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act
required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done the next
succeeding business day.

In Calano vs. Cruz, 91 Phil., 247, we ruled as follows:

The complaint led by the petitioner herein was presented in the court a quo on
November 23, 1951, exactly on the eight day after the proclamation of the
respondent as duly elected councilor for the Municipality of Orion, Bataan. It
happens, however, that November 22, 1951, the last day of the seven-day period
prescribed by Section 173 of the Revised Election Code, was declared a "Special
Public Holiday For National Thanksgiving" by Proclamation No. 290, series of 1951, of
the President of the Philippines. The trial court held that the provisions of Section 1 of
Rule 28 of the Rules of Court could not be applied to the case at bar because it is an
election case (Rule 132, Rules of Court), and declared that the complaint was led
outside of the period provided for by law. Assuming that Section 1 of Rule 28 of the
Rules of Court is not applicable, the law applicable is Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which provides that "Where the day, or the last day, for doing
 any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the
next succeeding business day." The court a quo, therefore, committed an error in
declaring that the complaint was led out of time.

The ruling is on all fours on the issue before us, and against respondent-appellant.

The decision appealed from is affirmed. Without costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes,
and Dizon, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-32116 April 2l, 1981

RURAL BANK OF CALOOCAN, INC. and JOSE O. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and MAXIMA CASTRO, respondents.

FACTS:
Maxima Castro, accompanied by Severino Valencia, went to the Rural Bank of Caloocan to
apply for a loan. Valencia arranged everything about the loan with the bank. He supplied to
the latter the personal data required for Castro's loan application. After the bank approved
the loan for the amount of P3, 000.00, Castro, accompanied by the Valencia spouses,
signed a promissory note corresponding to her loan in favor of the bank. On the same day,
the Valencia spouses obtained from the bank an equal amount of loan for P3, 000.00. They
signed another promissory note (Exhibit "2") corresponding to their loan in favor of the bank
and had Castro affixed thereon her signature as co-maker. Both loans were secured by
a real-estate mortgage on Castro's house and lot. Later, the sheriff of Manila sent a notice to
Castro, saying that her property would be sold at public auction to satisfy the obligation
covering the two promissory notes plus interest and attorney's fees. Upon request by Castro
and the Valencias and with conformity of the bank, the auction sale was postponed, but was
nevertheless auctioned at a later date. Castro claimed that she is a 70-year old widow who
cannot read and write in English. According to her, she has only nished second grade. She needed
money in the amount of P3, 000.00 to invest in the business of the defendant spouses
Valencia, who accompanied her to the bank to secure a loan of P3, 000.00. While at the
bank, an employee handed to her several forms already prepared which she was asked to
sign, with no one explaining to her the nature and contents of the documents. She also
alleged that it was only when she received the letter from the sheriff that she learned that
the mortgage contract which was an encumbrance on her property was for P6.000.00 and
not for P3,000.00 and that she was made to sign as co-maker of the promissory note without
her being informed. Castro led a suit against petitioners contending that thru mistake on
her part or fraud on the part of Valencias she was induced to sign as co-maker of a
promissory note and to constitute a mortgage on her house and lot to secure the questioned
note. At the time of ling her complaint, respondent Castro deposited the amount of P3,
383.00 with the court a quo in full payment of her personal loan plus interest. Castro prayed
for:
1. the annulment as far as she is concerned of the promissory note (Exhibit "2")and
mortgage (Exhibit "6") insofar as it exceeds P3,000.00; and
2. for the discharge of her personal obligation with the bank by reason of adeposit of
P3,383.00 with the court a quo upon the ling of her complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent court correctly affirmed the lower court in declaring the
promissory note (Exhibit 2) invalid insofar as they affect respondent Castro vis--vis
petitioner bank, and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) valid up to the amount of P3,000.00
only.

HELD: Yes. RATIO:

While the Valencias defrauded Castro by making her sign the promissory note and the
mortgage contract, they also misrepresented to the bank Castro's personal qualications in
order to secure its consent to the loan. Thus, as a result of the fraud upon Castro and the
misrepresentation to the bank inflicted by the Valencias both Castro and the bank committed
mistake in giving their consents to the contracts. In other words, substantial mistake vitiated
their consents given. For if Castro had been aware of what she signed and the bank of the
true qualications of the loan applicants, it is evident that they would not have given their
consents to the contracts. Article 1342 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 1342.
Misrepresentation by a third person does not vitiate consent, unless such misrepresentation
has created substantial mistake and the same is mutual.

We cannot declare the promissory note valid between the bank and Castro and the mortgage
contract binding on Castro beyond the amount of P3, 000.00, for while the contracts
may not be invalidated insofar as they affect the bank and Castro on the ground of fraud
because the bank was not a participant thereto, such may however be invalidated on
the ground of substantial mistake mutually committed by them as a consequence of the
fraud and misrepresentation inflicted by the Valencias. Thus, in the case of Hill vs. Veloso,
this Court declared that a contract may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent if
deceit by a third person, even without connivance or complicity with one of the contracting
parties, resulted in mutual error on the part of the parties to the contract. The fraud
particularly averred in the complaint, having been proven, is deemed sufficient basis for the
declaration of the promissory note invalid insofar as it affects Castro vis--vis the bank, and
the mortgage contract valid only up to the amount of P3, 000.00.

COMPUTATION OF TIME

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. L-7234
May 21, 1955

Facts:
On May 28, 1953, Paz M. Del Rosario committed slight physical injuries. The information was
led on July 27, 1953. Thereupon, the accused led a motion to quash the information to
ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Article 90 and 91
of the Revised Penal Code. The municipal court sustained this motion and dismissed the
case. Thus, this appeal of dismissal is made directly to the court.

Issue:
Whether or not the offense charged to the plaintiff-appellant had already prescribed.

Ruling:
The offense have not yet prescribed because the provision in the Revised Penal Code does
not provide the computation of month therefore it must be supplied by Article 13 of the Civil
Code which provides for the computation of years, months, days and nights. According to
Article 13 of the Civil Code a month is a 30-day month not the solar or civil month. Further,
the Supreme Court held that the case took effect on May 28, 1953 after the New Civil Code
take effect so the new provisions should apply.