Case Title: Date: September 9, 1933

JOSE R. PAGANIBAN, complainant,

vs. G.R. No.:
ELIAS BORROMEO, respondent. Ponente: Malcolm, J. En Banc
Nature of Action: Complaint for disbarment for
professional malpractice.
Topic:
Facts:

The respondent admits that, in his capacity as notary public he legalized the document which is the basis of the
complaint against him, and that the document contains provisions contrary to law, morals and good customs, but by
way of defense disclaims any previous knowledge of the illegal character of the document.

On November 25, 1931, Alejandro Pabro and Juana Mappala husband and wife, subscribed a contract before the
notary public Elias Borromeo, who was at that time a regularly admitted member of the Philippine Bar.

The contract in question had been prepared by the municipal secretary of Naguilian, Isabela. Attorney Borromeo
cooperated in the execution of the document and had, at lease, some knowledge of its contents, although he may not
have been fully informed because of a difference in dialect. The contract in substance purported to formulate an
agreement between the husband and the wife which permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine and the
wife to live in adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from either one of them.

Issue: W/N the contract sanctioned an illicit and immoral purpose.

W/N a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct as a notary public.
Ruling:
1. YES.
2. YES.

Ratio:
The contract of the spouses, it will be recalled, was executed at a time when the Spanish Penal Code, as modified by
Act No. 1773 was in force.

Conceding, however, that the more liberal provisions of the Revised Penal Code should be given application, it
is herein provided that the consent or pardon given by the offended party constitutes a bar to prosecution for
adultery or concubinage.
In this instance, if the spouses should retain their present frame of mind, no prosecution of either one by the
other could be expected.
Nevertheless, we think it far from the purpose of the Legislature to legalize adultery and concubinage. They
still remain crimes, with the qualification that prosecution cannot be instituted if the offended party consent
to the act or pardon the offender. This is a matter of future contingency and is not matter for legalization in
wanton disregard of good morals.
We hold the contract to contain provisions contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a
consequence not judicially recognizable.

We think there can be no question as to the right of the court to discipline an attorney who, in his capacity as
notary public, has been guilty of misconduct. To the office of notary public there is not attached such
importance under present conditions as under the Spanish administration.
Even so, the notary public exercise duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. It is for the notary to
inform himself of the facts to which he intends to certify, and to take part in no illegal
enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has been admitted to the practice of law, and such, in
the commingling of his duties as notary and lawyer, must be held responsible for both.
We are led to hold that a member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public of a
 disgraceful or immoral character may be held to account by the court even to the extent of
disbarment.
As mitigating circumstances, there may be taken into consideration (1) that the attorney may not have
realized the full purport of the document to which he took acknowledgment, (2) that no falsification
of facts was attempted, and (3) that the commission of the respondent as a notary public has
been revoked. Accordingly, we are disposed in this case to exercise clemency and to confine our
discipline of the respondent to severe censure.
Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:
Case Title: Date:
June 21, 1940

In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent,

G.R. No.: A.C. No. 932
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner- Nature of Action:
complainant. Ponente: LAUREL, J.:
Topic: Marriage Not Subject to Stipulation
Facts:

In this administrative case, the Solicitor General charged the respondent Atty. Roque Santiago
with malpractice and prayed that disciplinary action be taken against him.

The respondent gave legal advice to one Ernesto Baniquit who was living separately from his wife for some
nine consecutive years and seeking to contract a second marriage. The respondent assured Baniquit that
he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again. The lawyer prepared a document (Exhibit A)
stating that the contracting parties, husband and wife, were authorized to marry again and at the same
time giving the authorization to renounce or waive each members right against the party marrying.

The notary let the husband and wife execute and acknowledge the document and declared that they were
again single and as such could contract another marriage.

Relying on this document, Baniquit contracted a second marriage.

Baniquit then remarked, "Would there be no trouble?" Upon hearing it the respondent stood up and,
pointing to his diploma hanging on the wall, said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be
valid."

The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up the defense that he had the idea that
seven years separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them to contract a second marriage and
for that reason prepared Exhibit A, but immediately after the execution of said document he realized that
he had made a mistake and for that reason immediately sent for the contracting parties who, on June 30,
1939, came to his office and signed the deed of cancellation Exhibit A.

Issue:
1.) Is Roque guilty of malpractice? - YES
2.) Controlling: Is Exhibit A, the document that decreed the separation of the Spouses Baniquit valid?
- NO

Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)

1.) Yes. The advice given by the respondent and his preparation and acknowledgment by of the
contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law.
2.) No. Marriage separation should have should be sanctioned in the proper court and before the
separation. Apart from this, the document subverts the vital foundation of the family, marriage,
and is contrary to law, morals and public policy.

Ratio:
There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and
Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and
acknowledged by him as a notary public is contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation
of the family.

The advice given by the respondent, the preparation and acknowledgment by him of the contract
constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law. The admission of a lawyer to
the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred is
dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to society.

When it appears that he, by recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to be entrusted
with the responsibilities and obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of this
professional privilege should be declared terminated.

In the present case, respondent was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly
negligent in giving the complainant legal advice. Drastic action should lead to his disbarment and this is
the opinion of some members of the court. The majority, however, have inclined to follow the
recommendation of the investigator, the Honorable Sotero Rodas, in view of the circumstances stated in
the report of said investigator and the fact that immediately after discovering his mistakes, respondent
endeavored to correct it by making the parties sign another document cancelling the previous one.

The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one year. So ordered.
Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:
Case Title: Date: May 19, 1975.
SATURNINO SELANOVA, complainant, vs.
ALEJANDRO E. MENDOZA, City Judge G.R. No.: A.M. No. 804-CJ.
Mandaue City, respondent.
Nature of Action: Complaint for gross ignorance of the law.
Ponente: AQUINO, J (2nd Division)
Topic: Marriage; Concept and Nature; Not subject to
stipulation.
Facts:

Saturnino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro E. Mendoza of Mandaue City with gross ignorance of the law for
having prepared and ratified a document dated November 21, 1972, extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal
partnership of the complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza.

One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse (as the case may be) would withdraw the complaint for
adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the other and that they waived their "right to prosecute each
other for whatever acts of infidelity" either one would commit against the other.

Judge Mendoza in his comment on the charge purposed to convey the impression that he was aware of the invalidity
of the agreement but he nevertheless ratified it and gave it his nihil obstat on the assurance of the spouses that they
would ask the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (where they were residing) to approve the agreement. That
pretension is disbelieved by the Judicial Consultant.

Respondent Judge alleged that he relied on the provision that "the husband and the wife may agree upon the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval" (Par. 4, Art. 191, Civil
Code).

He argues that to give the prohibition against an extrajudicial liquidation of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage "an unqualified and literal legal construction" would lender nugatory the aforequoted provisions of article
191. He cites Lacson vs. San Jose-Lacson as authority for the propriety of an extrajudicial agreement for the
dissolution during the marriage of the conjugal partnership as long as the agreement is subsequently approved by
the court.

Respondent Judge surmised that Selanova's complaint was instigated by a lawyer whose case was adversely decided
by the Judge. That speculation was denied by Selanova who also belied Judge Mendoza's version that the
complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza, "together with their parents", came to the office of Judge Mendoza and
solicited his help in the amicable settlement of their marital imbroglio.

According to Selanova, in 1972 his father was already dead and his mother was ninety-one years old. They could not
possibly have come to Judge Mendoza's office. Selanova said that only he and his brother-in-law, Arcadio Ceniza, an
alleged classmate of Judge Mendoza, were the persons who went to the Judge's office. But that version may be
inaccurate and oversimplified, considering that the agreement was signed before Judge Mendoza not only by
Selanova but also by his wife and two witnesses, Lamberts M. Ceniza and Florencio C. Pono.

Judge Mendoza retired on February 27, 1975 when he reached the age of seventy. In his letter of April 8, 1975 he
asked for a compassionate view of his case considering his forty-three years' service in the government (he started
his public career in 1932 as a policeman and became a justice of the peace in 1954). He also cited the financial
predicament of his big family occasioned by the delay in the payment of his retirement and terminal leave pay.

The case was not referred to a Judge of the Court of First Instance for investigation because actually no factual issues
necessitate a hearing and presentation of evidence. Respondent Judge admitted that he was responsible for
the execution of the questioned document, an extrajudicial "Liquidation of Conjugal Properties",
which he caused complainant Saturnino Selanova and his wife, Avelina Ceniza, to sign.

In that instrument Judge Mendoza divided the two pieces of conjugal assets of the spouses by allocating to the
husband a thirteen-hectare riceland and to the wife the residential house and lot. The last paragraph of the
 instrument, which licensed either spouse to commit any act of infidelity, was in effect a ratification of their personal
separation.

Issue: WoN the extrajudicial "Liquidation of Conjugal Properties" signed by the parties without judicial declaration
for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership was valid.

Ruling: NO. Contracts for personal separation of spouses and extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership are
void.
Ratio:

The respondent overlooks the unmistakable ruling of this Court in the Lacson case that judicial sanction for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage should be "secured beforehand."

The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the following provisions of the Civil Code:

ART. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:

(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of
the absolute community of property between husband and wife;

Even before the enactment of the new Civil Code, this Court held that the extrajudicial dissolution of
the conjugal partnership without judicial approval was void.

On the other hand, disciplinary action had been taken against notaries who authenticated agreements for the
personal separation of spouses wherein either spouse was permitted to commit acts of infidelity.

In the instant case, respondent Judge, due to his unawareness of the legal prohibition against contracts
for the personal separation of husband and wife and for the extrajudicial dissolution of their
conjugal partnership, prepared the said void agreement which was acknowledged before him as
"City Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio". (Because he was admitted to the bar in 1948 and, consequently,
he did not study the new Civil Code in the law school, he might not have been cognizant of its aforecited article
221).

Taking into account that circumstance and his apparent good faith and honest desire to terminate the marital
conflict between the complainant and his wife, we are of the opinion that a drastic penalty should not be imposed on
him. But he deserves a severe censure for his mistake in preparing and notarizing the aforementioned immoral and
illegal agreement. Such severe reprimand should not be an obstacle to his enjoyment of retirement privileges,
assuming that there are no causes for depriving him of such benefits.
Notes:

Case Title: Date: June 6, 1990

SYLVIA LICHAUCO DE LEON, petitioner, G.R. No. 80965

vs. Nature of Action: Petition for Certiorari
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MACARIA DE Ponente: Medialdea, J. ; First Division
LEON AND JOSE VICENTE DE LEON, respondents. Topic:
Marriage Not Subject to Stipulation
Facts:
October 18, 1969 - Private respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were united
in wedlock before the Municipal Mayor of Binangonan, Rizal.
August 28, 1971 - A child named Susana L. De Leon was born from this union.
Sometime in October, 1972 - A de facto separation between the spouses occured due to irreconcilable marital
differences, with Sylvia leaving the conjugal home.
Sometime in March, 1973 - Sylvia went to the US where she obtained American citizenship.
November 23, 1973 - Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco, a petition for
dissolution of marriage against Jose Vicente. In the said divorce proceedings, Sylvia also filed claims for support
and distribution of properties.
Ssince Jose Vicente was then a Philippine resident and did not have any assets in the United States, Sylvia chose to
hold in abeyance the divorce proceedings, and in the meantime, concentrated her efforts to obtain some sort of
property settlements with Jose Vicente in the Philippines.
March 16, 1977 - Sylvia succeeded in entering into a Letter-Agreement with her mother-in-law, private respondent
Macaria De Leon.
On the same date, Macaria made cash payments to Sylvia in the amount of P100,000 and US$35,000.00 or
P280,000.00, in compliance with her obligations as stipulated in the Letter-Agreement.
March 30, 1977 - Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the CFI of Rizal a joint petition for judicial approval of
dissolution of their conjugal partnership.
After ex-parte hearings, the trial court issued an Order dated February 19, 1980 approving the petition.
March 17, 1980 - Sylvia moved for the execution of the order. However, Jose Vicente moved for a reconsideration
of the order alleging that Sylvia made a verbal reformation of the petition as there was no such agreement for the
payment of P4,500.00 monthly support to commence from the alleged date of separation in April, 1973 and that
there was no notice given to him that Sylvia would attempt verbal reformation of the agreement contained in the
joint petition.
While the said motion for reconsideration was pending resolution, on April 20, 1980, Macaria filed with the trial
court a motion for leave to intervene alleging that she is the owner of the properties involved in the case. The
motion was granted.
October 29, 1980 - Macaria, assisted by her husband Juan De Leon, filed her complaint in intervention. She
assailed the validity and legality of the Letter-Agreement which had for its purpose, according to her, the
termination of marital relationship between Sylvia and Jose Vicente.
However, before any hearing could be had, the judicial reorganization took place and the case was transferred to
the RTC of Pasig.
December 29, 1983 - the trial court rendered judgment favoring the intervenor, Macaria and declaring null and
void the letter agreement dated March 16, 1977 and declaring the conjugal partnership of the spouses Jose Vicente
and Sylvia dissolved.
Sylvia appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
The CA affirmed the decision in toto. The motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
W/N the letter agreement is valid
Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)
No. The Letter-Agreement is not valid.
Ratio:
The third paragraph of the Letter-Agreement reads: In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination
of relations between the undersigned and her lawfully wedded husband, Jose Vicente De Leon, your son, the
following are agreed upon...
The use of the word relations is ambiguous as it is subject to interpretation. There being a doubt as to the
meaning of this word taken by itself, a consideration of the general scope and purpose of the instrument in which
it occurs and Article 1374 of the Civil Code which provides that the various stipulations of a contract shall be
 interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly, is
necessary.
Sylvia insists that the consideration for her execution of the Letter-Agreement was the termination of property
relations with her husband. Indeed, Sylvia and Jose Vicente subsequently filed a joint petition for judicial approval
of the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, sanctioned by Article 191 of the Civil Code. On the other hand,
Macaria and Jose Vicente assert that the consideration was the termination of marital relationship.
The Court sustained the observations and conclusions made by the trial court -- the parties contemplated not
only to agree to a judicial separation of property of the spouses but likewise to continue with divorce
proceedings (termination of marital relationship in its entirety) The last sentence of paragraph 2 under
"Obligations of the Wife" unequivocally states: "It is the stated objective of this agreement that said divorce
proceedings (in the United States) will continue. Macaria signed the Letter-Agreement to buy peace for herself
and for her whole family, primarily for the peaceful and amicable termination of marital relationship between her
Jose Vicente and Sylvia (basis: deposition of Macaria).

Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

If the stipulation is contrary to law, morals or public policy, the contract is void and inexistent from the
beginning.

Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.

Marriage is not a mere contract but a sacred social institution. Thus, Art. 52 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulations...
In the petition for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, it was made to appear that the said properties are
conjugal in nature. However, Macaria was able to prove that the questioned properties are owned by her. Neither
Sylvia nor Jose Vicente adduced any contrary evidence.

Granting, in gratia argumenti, that the consideration of the Letter-Agreement was the termination of property
relations, the Court agreed with the CA that the agreement is nevertheless void because it contravenes Article 221
of the Civil Code.

Besides, the Letter-Agreement shows on its face that it was prepared by Sylvia, and in this regard, the ambiguity in
a contract is to be taken contra proferentem, i.e., construed against the party who caused the ambiguity and could
have also avoided it by the exercise of a little more care. Article 1377, Civil Code

Sylvia alleges further that since the nullity of the Letter-Agreement proceeds from the unlawful consideration
solely of Macaria, applying the pari delicto rule, it is clear that she cannot recover what she has given by reason of
the Letter-Agreement nor ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised her. Sylvia alleged that it was Jose
Vicente who initiated the move to convince her to agree to a dissolution of their conjugal partnership due to his
extra-marital activities and that Macaria only wanted her to be out of the picture.

On her part, Macaria raises the defenses of intimidation and mistake which led her to execute the Letter-
Agreement. Sylvia unashamedly nagged Jose Vicente and Macaria to get money and when she did not get her
demands, she threatens them to bring Jose Vicente to court for support. (based on Macarias deposition).

The Court did not agree with the trial court that there was intimidation involved (on the part of Macaria). In order
that intimidation may vitiate consent and render the contract invalid, the following requisites must concur: (1)
 that the intimidation must be the determining cause of the contract, or must have caused the consent to be given;
(2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real and serious, there being an evident
disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of the contract as
the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from
whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury.

Applying the foregoing, the claim of Macaria that Sylvia threatened her to bring Jose Vicente to court for support,
to scandalize their family by baseless suits and that Sylvia would pardon Jose Vicente for possible crimes of
adultery and/or concubinage subject to the transfer of certain properties to her, is obviously not the intimidation
referred to by law.

With respect to mistake as a vice of consent, neither is Macaria's alleged mistake in having signed the Letter-
Agreement because of her belief that Sylvia will thereby eliminate inheritance rights from her and Jose Vicente,
the mistake referred to in Article 1331 of the Civil Code, supra. It does not appear that the condition that Sylvia
"will eliminate her inheritance rights" principally moved Macaria to enter into the contract. Rather, such condition
was but an incident of the consideration thereof which, is the termination of marital relations.

Both parties acted in violation of the laws. However, the pari delicto rule, expressed in the maxims "Ex dolo malo
non oritur actio" and "In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis," which refuses remedy to either party to an
illegal agreement and leaves them where they are, does not apply in this case.

Article 1414 of the Civil Code, which is an exception to the pari delicto rule, is the proper law to be applied. It
provides:

When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose, the contract may be repudiated by one of the
parties before the purpose has been accomplished, or before any damage has been caused to a third person. In
such case, the courts may, if the public interest wig thus be subserved, allow the party repudiating the contract to
recover the money or property.

Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been accomplished and to adhere to the pari
delicto rule in this case is to put a premium to the circumvention of the laws, positive relief should be granted to
Macaria. Justice would be served by allowing her to be placed in the position in which she was before the
transaction was entered into.

Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

Contents of the Letter-Agreement:
This letter represents a contractual undertaking among (A) the undersigned (B) your son, Mr. Jose Vicente de Leon,
represented by you, and (C) yourself in your personal capacity.

You hereby bind yourself jointly and severally to answer for the undertakings of Joe Vincent under this contract.

In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of relations between the undersigned and her lawfully
wedded husband, Jose Vicente de Leon, your son, the following are agreed upon:

Obligations of Jose Vicente de Leon and/ or yourself in a joint and several capacity:

1. To deliver with clear title free from all liens and encumbrances and subject to no claims in any form whatsoever the
following properties to Sylvia Lichauco-de Leon hereinafter referred to as the wife:

A. Suite 11-C, Avalon Condominium, Ortigas Ave., corner Xavier St., Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines.
B. Apartment 702, Wack Wack Condominium, Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines.
C. The rights to assignment of 2 Ayala lots in Alabang, Rizal (Corner lots, 801 s q. meters each). (Fully paid).
 D. 2470 Wexford Ave., South San Francisco, California, U.S.A. (Lot 18 Block 22 Westborough Unit No. 2).
(Fully paid).
E. 1) The sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) 2) $30,000 3) $5,000

2. To give monthly support payable six (6) months in advance every year to any designated assignee of the wife for the
care and upbringing of Susana Lichauco de Leon which is hereby pegged at the exchange rate of 7.50 to the dollar
subject to adjustments in the event of monetary exchange fluctuations. Subsequent increase on actual need upon
negotiation.

3. To respect the custody of said minor daughter as pertaining exclusively to the wife except as herein provided.

Obligations of the wife:

1. To agree to a judicial separation of property in accordance with Philippine law and in this connection to do all that
may be necessary to secure said separation of property including her approval in writing of a joint petition or consent
decree.

2. To amend her complaint in the United States before the Federal Court of California, U.S.A. entitled " Sylvia
Lichauco de Leon vs. Jose V. de Leon" in a manner compatible with the objectives of this herein agreement. It is the
stated objective of this agreement that said divorce proceedings will continue.

3. All the properties herein described for assignment to the wife must be assigned to Sylvia Lichauco de Leon upon the
decree of the Court of First Instance in the Joint Petition for Separation of Property; except for the P100,000, $30,000
and $5,000 which will be paid immediately.

4. This contract is intended to be applicable both in the Republic of the Philippines and in the United States of
America. It is agreed that this will constitute an actionable document in both jurisdictions and the parties herein waive
their right to object to the use of this document in the event a legal issue should arise relating to the validity of this
document. In the event of a dispute, this letter is subject to interpretation under the laws of California, U.S.A.

5. To allow her daughter to spend two to three months each year with the father upon mutual convenience.

Case Title: Date: March 31, 1962

FABIAN PUGEDA, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RAPAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD G.R. No.: L-16925
TRIAS, assisted by her husband Angel Sanchez, Ponente: LABRADOR, J.
CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her husband
Victoriano Salvanera, GABRIEL TRIAS, minors Nature of Action:
ROMULO VINIEGRA, GLORIA VINIEGRA and Topic: marriage; proof of marriage
FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR., assisted by
guardian-ad-litem, Rafael Trias, TEOFILO
PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA PUGEDA, assisted by
her husband Ramon Portugal, defendants-
appellants.
Facts:
Parties:
o Plaintiff 2nd husband of the deceased Maria Ferrer
o Defendants
 Rapael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Gabriel, minors Romulo et. al. children of
Maria Ferrer in 1st marriage with Mariano Trias
Teofilo and Virginia children of 2nd marriage of Maria with Fabian Pugeda,
plaintiff
Disputed properties:
o 23 lots in the San Francisco de Malabon estate in General Trias, Cavite
o house of strong materials
o barn/camarin of strong materials
o sets of household furniture
Fabian claims that during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and the deceased
Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired with conjugal partnership funds lots Nos. 273, 2650, 2680,
2718 and 2764 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate with the following interest therein;
71% in lot No. 273, 82% in lot No. 2650, 77% in lot No. 2652, 77% in lot No. 2080, 64% in lot
No. 2718 and 76% in lot No. 2764; that plaintiff is the owner of one-half of the said interest
in the lots above-mentioned; that upon the death of Maria C. Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and
defendants became co-owners of said properties and defendants managed the properties in
trust as co-owners thereof. Plaintiff prays that the properties above described, acquired as
conjugal properties by the plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned -and one-
half thereof be given as share therein of plaintiff.
Defendants Trias denied existence of the 2nd marriage with Fabian Pugeda, claiming that
theres no record of marriage existed in the municipality of Rosario, Cavite, thru a photostatic
copy of said records
CFI decision
o Valid 2nd marriage
After a review of the testimonial and documental evidence, it is concluded
that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer on
January 5, 1916, this conclusion being borne out not only by the chain of
circumstances but also by the testimonies of the witnesses to the celebration
of the marriage, who appeared to be truthful, as well as by the fact that
plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer lived together as husband and wife for
eighteen years (1916-1934) and there is a strong presumption that they were
actually married.
o lots in question were conjugal properties of the 1st marriage between Mariano and
Maria
The evidence introduced at the trial shows that the lands subject of the action
were formerly Friar Lands included in the San Francisco de Malabon Estate,
province of Cavite, which were acquired under certificates of sale in the name
of Mariano Trias in the year 1910 and later assigned to his widow Maria C.
Ferrer in the year 1916.
CA remanded the case to CFI after defendants filed a motion for new trial after
discovering several documents that shows an approved project of partition in the Intestate
case of Mariano Trias
CFI new decision the 2 marriages should participate in the ownership of the lands,
according to the actual contributions made by each marriage in the installments in payment
of the lands.
Issues:
1. W/N the absence of the marriage certificate in the civil registrar invalidates the 2 nd marriage
of Maria with Fabian?
2. W/N the disputed properties, which were acquired during the first marriage but were paid in
full during the 2nd marriage are conjugal properties of the latter?

Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)

1. NO
2. NO
Ratio:
1. Marriage requisites
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother,
while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to
the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in
the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, and the forwarding
of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of said requisites. (Madridejo v. De
Leon, 55 Phil., 1) .
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, has
been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the
solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage. (55 C.J.S., p.
900).
2. Conjugal properties
SC ordered the case dismissed; modified the CFI decision wherein the disputed properties where
to be divided equally to the children of Maria, 1/8 per child.
In the case of friar lands the purchaser becomes the owner upon issuance of the certificate of sale
in his favor, subject only to cancellation thereof in case the price agreed upon is not paid. In case
of sale of public lands if the applicant dies and his widow remarries both she and the second
husband are entitled to the land; the new husband has the same right as his wife. Such is not the
case with friar lands. As indicated in Section 16 of Act 1120, if a holder of a certificate dies before
the payment of the price in full, the sale certificate is assigned to the widow, but if the buyer does
not leave a widow, the right to the friar lands is transmitted to his heirs at law.
It is true that the evidence shows that of the various parcels of land now subject of the action none
was paid for in full during the marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and that payments
in installments continued to be made even after the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer on
January 5, 1916. But it is also true that even after said marriage the certificates of sale were
assigned to Maria C. Ferrer and installments for the lots after said marriage continued in the
name of Maria C. Ferrer; also all the amounts paid as installments for the lots were taken from the
fruits of the properties themselves, according to the admission of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda himself.
There is another reason why the above conclusion must be upheld in the case at bar, and that is
the fact that in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Mariano Trias,
which was instituted in August 1915, the inventory of the estate left by said deceased included the
lots purchased from the Friar Lands Estates (Exh. 2, Trias) and the project of partition in said
special proceedings submitted to the court as Exh. 3-Trias adjudicated 1/2 of said lands as the
share of Mariano Trias in the conjugal properties, the other 1/2 being awarded to Maria C. Ferrer.
The above considerations, factual and legal, lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the friar
lands purchased as above described and paid for, had the character of conjugal properties of the
spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. But another compelling legal reason for this
conclusion as against plaintiff, is the judicial pronouncement on said nature of the lands in
question. In the year 1915, even before the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer took place, the
latter was appointed administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband Mariano Trias in Civil
Case No. 860 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite (Exh. "1" Trias). An inventory of the estate
left by the deceased Mariano Trias, dated January 15, 1929, was submitted by her and on April 10,
1929, the project of partition of the properties was submitted. The project includes the friar lands
subject of the action, and in accordance with it one-half of the properties listed in the inventory
was adjudicated to the deceased Mariano Trias as his share and the other half adjudicated to
Maria C. Ferrer also as her share. The share of Mariano Trias was decreed in favor of his children
and heirs. This project of partition was approved by Judge Manuel V. Moran in an order dated
February 11, 1929, submitted to the Court of Appeals as Annex "E", pp. 114-115 of the record on
appeal.
The pendency of the above intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Mariano Trias
must have been known to plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, who is a lawyer. It does not appear, and neither
does he claim or allege, that he ever appeared in said proceedings to claim participation in the
properties subject of the proceedings. His failure to intervene in the proceedings to claim that the
friar lands or some of them belonged to himself and his wife Maria C. Ferrer, shows a conviction
on his part that the said friar lands actually belonged to the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C.
Ferrer, and that he had no interest therein. The project of partition was approved as late as 1929,
by which time plaintiff and defendant had already been married for a period of 13 years. Plaintiff's
failure to assert any claim to the properties in the said intestate proceedings during its pendency
now bars him absolutely from asserting the claim that he now pretends to have to said properties.
Case Title: JUANITA SISON, petitioner,
vs.
TE LAY LI, defendant and appellant.
Date: May 7, 1952
CA No.: 7937-R [CA 49 OG 3909]
Nature of Action: Appeal from the decision
of the CFI Davao declaring 2 marriages
celebrated one after another on April 28, 1949
between plaintiff Juanita Sison and defendant
Te Lay Li, null and void, on the ground that
plaintiff's consent was obtained through force
and intimidation employed upon her by her
father.

Ponente: REYES, J.B.L.,

Topic: Requites Legal Capacity Parental
Consent
FACTS:

1. Plaintiff and defendant married in the morning of April 28, 1949 before Judge Delfin
Holifena of Municipal Court of Davao City, and in the afternoon of the same day were
remarried in accordance with the rites of the Republic of China before Chinese Consul
S. T. Mih in his office in Davao City.

2. In relation to the topic, the following is an excerpt of the plaintiffs testimony as

corroborated by her mother:

o Defendant never wooed her because her marriage was arranged by her father.
Her father brought up the topic 2 weeks after the marriage. Whenever she
opposed the idea of marriage, her father would whip her often. One time, the
whipping resulted to her falling on galvanized iron roofing sheet resulted in a
wound on her right leg around 6 inches long.
o Two days before her marriage, she ran away from home to live with her teacher
Miss Andrea Go. Miss Go took her to one Judge Hofilena who advised her to
not marry a man she did not like. On the same day, she slept in Miss Gos
house and the next morning, both the plaintiff and Miss Go went to a house of
Judge Fernande to seek his advise. In turn, the Judge referred them to the
Fiscal Aida Gil- Damaso. The plaintiff was picked up from the house of the
Fiscal by her father who promised her that she would no longer be forced to
marry against her will.
o This promise was not made good as her father renewed the topic of marriage to
the defendant, guarded his daughter throughout the night, and the next
morning, handed her a knife telling her to choose between her life or his if she
did not want to marry the defendant. It was at this point that the plaintiff
feared her father and then consented to the marriage twice on the same day.
3. Throughout their marriage, plaintiff considered the defendant a stranger. During her
stay with the defendant, she was kept as a prisoner, preventing her to run away. They
do sleep in the same room him in bed and her in a chair. They do not have sexual
intercourse except for that one time defendant forced her with a knife to submit to his
wishes. It was after that event that she had the courage to escape his house.

4. Defendant avers: their marriage is regular and legal stressing the fact that when the
plaintiff was asked if she was willing to take defendant as her lawful wedded husband,
 she answered in the affirmative. This act indicated that she entered into the marriage
freely and voluntarily.

5. TC Ruled: plaintiffs marriage was consummated only by intimidation and force and
that plaintiff never for a moment acquiesced to the status of a wife to the defendant
and declared the marriages between them, null and void.

Issue: Whether the affirmative answer to the wedding vows indicate free and
voluntary consent to marriage?
Ruling: NO.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the sole modification that
the amount ordered returned to the plaintiff should be P1,248, according to the evidence, and
not P1,200. Costs against appellant.
Ratio: It is urged for appellant that the marriage ceremony being in all respects regular and
legal and in strict compliance with all the formal requisites of law, plaintiffs voluntary consent
may thus be inferred from the circumstances of the ceremony; it having been repeatedly held
by the Supreme Court that it is necessary for the order of society and for prevention of constant
violation of decency and law to aid acts intended to validate marriages and retard acts to
invalidate them. Although as a general rule, the law will not look behind the appearance of
consent which was clearly manifested to determine its reality, the rule has been announced,
however, that mere words without any corresponding intention will not create the marriage
relation, and that notwithstanding the formalities indicating consent have been complied with,
there not a valid marriage where the parties do not intend to enter into the marriage. And while
it is true that it is the policy of the law to maintain the marriage ties, when it is amply
proved that the marriage is effected through duress and intimidation and without
consent and against the will of one of the parties, there are no ties to be preserved
and the marriage should consequently be annulled. xxx
While a marriage effected by force or intimidation may be ratified and confirmed by
cohabitation, such cohabitation must be voluntary and must be something more than merely
living together in the same house or even occupying the same bed, but is the living together of
the parties as husband and wife, and including sexual relations.
Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes: N/A
Case Title: Date: March 14, 1955
PEDRO V. VILAR, petitioner-appellant,
vs. GAUDENCIO V. PARAISO, respondent-appellant. G.R. No.: G.R. No. L-8014
Ponente: Bautista Angelo, J. EN BANC
Nature of Action:
Topic: Solemnizing Officer; How Authorized
Facts:

In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio V. Paraiso were among the
candidates registered and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija.
After the canvass was made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso garnered 1,509, and as a result the municipal
board of canvassers proclaimed the latter as the mayor duly elected with a plurality of 41 votes.
However, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he was then a minister of the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code, Vilar instituted the present quo warranto proceedings praying that
Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume office and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be
declared null and void. He also prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of
respondent Paraiso.
Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines on August 21, 1951, that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a
special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951, and that even if respondent was not eligible to the office,
petitioner could not be declared elected to take his place.
After due trial, the court found respondent to be ineligible for the office of mayor, being an ecclesiastic, and,
consequently, it declared his proclamation as mayor null and void, but refrained from declaring petitioner as
mayor-elect for lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so.
From this decision both parties have appealed, respondent from that portion finding him ineligible, and petitioner
from that portion holding he cannot be declared elected as mayor for lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so.

Issue: W/N respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office under section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
Ruling: Yes. That respondent never ceased as minister of the order to which he belonged and that the resignation he
claims to have filed months before the date of the elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the
law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office.
Ratio:

If respondent really and sincerely intended to resign as minister of the religious organization to which he belonged for
the purpose of launching his candidacy why did he not resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation
registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries. The importance of resignation cannot be underestimated.

The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the minister to
discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This
information is necessary for the protection of the public. This is especially so with regard to the authority to
solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil
Code).
It is no argument to say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not upon
respondent, but upon the head of his organization or upon the official in charge of such registration, upon
proper showing of the reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon the interested
party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed
to do.
And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as
minister knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office

We are therefore constrained to hold that respondent is disqualified to hold the office of mayor as
found by the trial court.
As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible, petitioner can be declared elected, having obtained second
place in the elections, our answer is simple: this Court has already declared that this cannot be done in the
absence of an express provision authorizing such declaration. Our law not only does not contain any
such provision but apparently seems to prohibit it.

Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

1. The evidence for petitioner tends to show that respondent was ordained as minister of the Evangelical Church
of the Philippines in 1944 and as such was given license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public
Libraries;
2. That since 1944 up to 1950 he acted as minister in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, continuously and without
interruption and has been renewing his license to solemnize marriages as prescribed by the regulations of the
Bureau of Public Libraries;
3. that on April 19, 1950, respondent transferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, having been
assigned to work in the same place and chapel during the years 1944-1950; that on April 7, 1951, respondent
applied for, and was issued, a license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries as minister of
the new church up to the end of April, 1952; t
4. hat said license has never been cancelled, as neither the head of the united church nor respondent has
requested for its cancellation; and that respondent has been publicly known as minister of the United Church
of Christ, but he has not attached to his certificate of candidacy a copy of his alleged resignation as minister.
Case Title: Date: April 11, 2002
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE
SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent. G.R. No.: A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390
Ponente: PUNO, J.: FIRST DIVISION
Nature of Action:
Topic:
Facts:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-
Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his
territorial jurisdiction.

They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away.

However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not
recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine
Navy.

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings

respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the
marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were
complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the
rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then
requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.

Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted
to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to
solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties,
the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of
human compassion.
He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from
a stroke.

After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their
failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give
the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with
Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.

Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence
of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own
fault and negligence.

Issue: W/N respondent judge had authority to solemnize a marriage outside of his jurisdiction

Ruling: no. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.

Ratio:
it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped
in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor
Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such
marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract
of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.

On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote
the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T.
Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to
submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court
judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction
as defined by the Supreme Court.

However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within
said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there
is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect
the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law
and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People
vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent
issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by
law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent
judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge
acted in gross ignorance of the law.

Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has
consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of
exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as
the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.[5] Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely
private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one
reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter
which involves the Courts constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught,
undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining
authority.[6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future will be dealt with more severely.