Yoldalar, olaanst neme sahip bir kongredeyiz.

Bu mecliste temsil edilen

taraflarn ardnda bir byk devrimci gemi yatmaktadr. Bununla beraber bugn
kendi devrimci sosyalist ordumuzu nasl ina edeceimizi reniyoruz ve bunda
baarl olmak zorundayz. Bu ordu, u an terhis edilen u alaylarn tamamen
kart olmaldr.
Comrades, we are present at a congress of exceptional importance. The parties
represented in this assembly have behind them a great revolutionary past.
Nevertheless, at this time we are learning, and we must succeed in learning, how
to build our own revolutionary socialist army, which shall be the complete
contrary of those regiments, now demobilised, which were held together by the
will of the masters, who introduced compulsory discipline into them. Before us
lies the task of creating an army organised on the principle of comradely trust
and revolutionary labour-order. This is, without any doubt, an extraordinarily
great, complex and difficult task. Incidentally, the bourgeois press writes a lot
about our having only now, at last, understood that to defend the country an
armed force is needed. That is nonsense, of course: we knew, even before the
October Revolution, that so long as the class struggle continues between the
exploiters and the working people, any revolutionary state must be strong
enough to repulse successfully the imperialist onslaught. The Russian Revolution,
unprecedented in strength, could not, of course, retain the old Tsarist army,
within which had been formed, like a stout strong point, a heavy class discipline
that established a bond of compulsion between soldier and commander.
nmzdeki ilk karmak grev, ordu iindeki snf basksn tamamen yok etmek

We were faced, first of all, with the complex task of completely destroying class
oppression within the army, thoroughly smashing the class fetters, the old
discipline of compulsion, and creating a new armed force for the revolutionary
state, in the form of the Workers and Peasants Army, acting in the interests of
the proletariat and the rural poor. We know from experience that that part of the
old army which was left after the revolution was in no state to offer active
resistance to the advancing forces of the counter-revolution. We know that
improvised units were formed, in rough-and-ready fashion, from the best sections
of the workers and peasants, and we remember well how these heroic units
succeeded in crushing the treacherous movement organized by all sorts of Black
Hundred activists. We know how these volunteer partisan regiments fought
victoriously against those within the country who wanted to be the revolutions
executioners. But when it became a matter of combating the counter-
revolutionary forces coming from outside, our forces proved unreliable, owing to
their inadequate technical training and the excellent organization of the enemys
units.

Bunu hesaba katarak, devrim iin lm kalm meselesi, ii ve kyllerin devrimci

ruh ve programlarna btnyle yant verecek mtekabil gte bir ordunun
hemen oluturulmas sorununa
Taking this into account, we see that the question of life and death for the
revolution which confronts us is the question of immediately creating an army of
corresponding strength, which will fully answer to the revolutionary spirit and
programme of the workers and peasants. In trying to fulfill this complex task of
first-priority state importance, we are, of course, encountering great difficulties.
In the first place must be mentioned the difficulties in the field of transport and
the movement of food-supplies, difficulties caused by the civil war. Civil war is a
direct duty for us when what is involved is the suppression of counter-
revolutionary hordes, but the fact that it exists nevertheless gives rise to
difficulties in our work of urgently bringing a revolutionary army into existence.

In addition, the task of organising this army is hindered by an obstacle that is

purely psychological in character: the whole preceding period of war considerably
impaired labour discipline, and an undesirable element of declassed workers and
peasants appeared among the people.

Devrimin daha nce tarihte hi grlmedik bir ekilde kahramanlkla, Rusya

emeki kitlelerinin gstermi olduu kahramanlkla talandrldn hepimiz
biliyoruz ama
In no way do I make this a matter of reproach either to the revolutionary workers
or to the working peasantry. We all know that the revolution was crowned with
heroism such as history had never seen before, heroism displayed by the working
masses of Russia, but it cannot be concealed that in many cases the
revolutionary movement weakened for a time their capacity for systematic and
planned work.

lkel anarizm, tahsilatlar, sefahat. Bunlar tm gcmzle mcadele etmemiz

gereken, bilinli ii ve kyllerin en iyi kesimlerinin kar koymas gereken
olaylardr.
Elemental anarchism, the activity of bagmen, debauchery these are
phenomena which we need to combat with all our strength, phenomena which
must be opposed by the best section of the conscious workers and peasants.

Askeri komiseryalarn temel grevlerinden bir dieri de, ii kitlelerine, ideolojik

propaganda yoluyla herkes tarafndan iyice renilmesi gereken devrimci dzen
ve disiplinin gerekliliine dair farkndalk kazandrmaktr.
And one of the fundamental tasks falling to the lot of the military commissars is
that of bringing to the working masses, by means of ideological propaganda,
awareness of the need for revolutionary order and discipline, which must be
persistently mastered by each and everyone.

Ordunun planl rgtlenmesine ynelik almalar engelleyen tm bu olaylarn

yan sra, btnyle maddi engellerle karlayoruz. Ordunun idaresi iin eski
aygt yok ettik ve yeni bir organ yaratmalyz. Bu yzden ara dnemde, bu
alanda tam dzen salanm deil. Devletimizin askeri mlkleri, lkenin her
tarafna kaotik biimde dalm ve kayt altna alnmamtr. Ka fieimiz,
tfeimiz, ar ya da hafif topumuz, uamz, zrhl aracmz olduunu bilmiyoruz.
Dzen yok. Eski kayt aparat ezildi, buna karn yenisi hala rgtlenme srecinde
bulunuyor.
Besides all these phenomena that hinder the work of planned organisation of the
army, we come up against obstacles of a purely material order. We have
destroyed the old apparatus for administering the army, and we need to create a
new organ. Owing to this in-between situation, there is at present a lack of
complete order in this sphere. The military property of our state is scattered
chaotically all over the country, and has not been registered: we do not know
precisely either the number of cartridges, of rifles, of heavy and light artillery, of
aeroplanes, of armoured cars. There is no order. The old recording apparatus has
been smashed, while the new one is still only in process of being organized.

Askeri idarenin inas alannda, 8 Nisan tarihli kararnameyi temel almalyz.

Bildiini gibi, Avrupal Rusya yedi, Sibirya ise blgeye ayrld.

lke apnda rgtlenen yerel askeri komiseryalar ann tamam, Sovyet

rgtleriyle yakndan balantldr. Bu sistemi ileyie koyarak,
The entire network of local military commissariats which is being organised
throughout the country is closely linked with the Soviet organisations. By putting
this system into effect we shall obtain that centre around which planned work on
organising the Red Army can be accomplished.

Everyone knows that, up to now, chaos has reigned in the localities, and this, in
its turn, has created frightful disorder at the center as well. We know that many
of the military commissars often express dissatisfaction with the central authority
and, in particular, with the Peoples Commissariat for Military Affairs. There have
been cases when sums of money which had been requested for the upkeep of the
army were not despatched in time. We have received very many express
telegrams with demands for money, but no estimates were sent with these
telegrams. Sometimes this put us in an extremely difficult situation: we could
make only advance payments: all this produced disorder, owing to the fact that
very often there did not exist in the localities any businesslike administrative
organ.

We took steps urgently to establish in the localities the nuclei of commissariats,

to consist of two representatives of the local soviets and one military specialist.

This local board, a sort of local military commissariat, will be the organization that
can, in a given locality, fully ensure the planned formation and servicing of the
army. Everyone knows that the army which we are now building on voluntary
principles is regarded by the Soviet Government as merely provisional.
As I said, our programme has always included the slogan: defence with all our
strength of our revolutionary workers country, the hearth of socialism. Voluntary
recruitment is only a temporary compromise to which we have had to resort in a
critical period of complete collapse of the old army and intensification of civil war.
We appealed for volunteers for the Red Army in the hope that the best forces of
the working masses would respond. Have our hopes been realised? It must be
said that they are realised only 33 1/3 per cent. There are, of course, in the Red
Army very many heroic, self-sacrificing fighters, but there are also many
worthless elements hooligans, near-do-wells, the dregs.

Undoubtedly, if we were to give military training to the whole working class,

without exception, this element, which in quantity is comparatively small, would
not constitute any serious danger to our army: but now, when our forces are so
small, this element is an unavoidable and undesirable thorn in the flesh of our
revolutionary regiments.

It is the responsibility of the military commissars to work tirelessly to raise the

level of consciousness within the army and ruthlessly to eradicate the
undesirable element which has got into it.

In order to implement conscription, to defend the Soviet Republic, we need to

take into account not only weapons, not only rifles, but also people.

We must draw into the work of creating the army the younger generations, the
youth who have not yet experienced war, and who are always distinguished by
the elan of their revolutionary spirit and their display of enthusiasm. We must
discover how many persons we have who are liable for military service, must
establish complete order in the registering of our forces, and must create a
distinctive Soviet system of accounting. This complex task is now the
responsibility of the military commissariats in the volosts, uyezds and provinces,
and of the districts which unite them. But here arises the question of the
commanding apparatus: experience has shown that lack of technical forces has a
baneful effect on the success of attempts to form revolutionary armies, because
the revolution has not brought forth from the midst of the working masses
warriors with a knowledge of the military art. This is the weak spot in all
revolutions, as we learn from the history of all previous risings.

If among the workers there had been a sufficient number of comrades who were
military specialists, the problem would have been solved very simply, but,
unfortunately, we have extraordinarily few persons with military training.

The duties of members of the commanding apparatus can be divided into two
parts: the purely technical and the moral-political. If both of these qualities are
united in one person, that gives us the ideal type of leader-commander for our
army. But, alas, that phenomenon is met with very rarely indeed. There is not one
of you, I am sure, who will say that our army can manage without specialist
commanders. This in no way belittles the role of the commissar. The commissar is
the direct representative of the Soviet power in the army, the defender of the
interests of the working class. If he does not interfere in military operations, it is
only because he stands above the military leader, watches everything he does,
checks on every step he takes.

The commissar is a political worker, a revolutionary. The military leader answers

with his head for all his activity, for the outcome of military operations, and soon.
If the commissar has observed that there is danger to the revolution from the
military leader, the commissar has the right to deal ruthlessly with the counter-
revolutionary, even to the point of shooting him.

In order that we may be able quickly to train our own peasant and worker
officers, fighters for socialism, we have in a number of places set about
organizing schools of instruction which will train and instruct representatives of
the working people in the art of war.

There is one other task which our army must perform. This task concerns the
struggle against the bagmen and the rich speculators who hide grain from the
poor peasants.

We need to throw our best organized units into the regions rich in grain, where
energetic steps must be taken to combat the kulaks, through agitation or even by
applying decisive measures.

We are faced, in general, by colossal tasks, but I think we shall not lose heart,
despite the fact that even amongst us Soviet workers one sometimes meets
sceptics and moaners.

If they fall into despair, let them get out of the way while we stubbornly continue
with our titanic work. It must be kept in mind that the working people were
cruelly oppressed for many centuries, and that, in order finally to throw off the
yoke of slavery, we shall need many years of learning from experience and from
the mistakes and blunders which we ourselves often commit, but which will
feature ever more rarely in our activity.

At this congress we shall exchange our observations, we shall learn something

from each other, and I am sure that you will go back to your localities and
continue your creative work in the interests of the labor revolution. In the name
of the Peoples Commissariat for Military Affairs and the Council of Peoples
Commissars I greet you, and I conclude my speech with Long live the Soviet
Republic! Long live the Workers and Peasants Red Army!