Constitutional Law II
concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CASES
WHO EXERCISES THESE GOVT
POWER
cases:
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL
OPERATORS ASSOC., INC VS MAYOR
OF MANILA
G.R. No. L-24693
Police Power Due Process Clause
On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal
Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was
approved by then acting mayor Astorga.
Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and
motels. It classified them into 1st class
(taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at
4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to
get the demographics of anyone who
checks in to their rooms. It compelled
hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so
as not to conceal the identity of their
patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the
validity of the law averring that such is
oppressive, arbitrary and against due
process. The lower court as well as the
appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-
Malate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is
against the due process clause.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga.
There is a presumption that the laws
enacted by Congress (in this case Mun
Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong
foundation of invalidity, the presumption
stays. As in this case, there was only a
stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail
over the presumption. Further, the
ordinance is a valid exercise of Police
Power. There is no question but that the
challenged ordinance was precisely
enacted to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals. This is to
minimize prostitution. The increase in
taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in
doing any business other than legal but
also increases the revenue of the lgu
of police power as well. The due process
contention is likewise untenable, due
process has no exact definition but has
reason as a standard. In this case, the
precise reason why the ordinance was
enacted was to curb down prostitution in
the city which is reason enough and cannot
be defeated by mere singling out of the
provisions of the said ordinance alleged to
be vague.
POLICE POWER
On the legislative organs of the
government, whether national of local,
primarily rest the exercise of the police
power, which, it cannot be too often
emphasized, is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. Police power is
based upon the concept of necessity of the
State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people.43 Police
power has been used as justification for
numerous and varied actions by the State.
These range from the regulation of dance
halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46
and cockpits.47 The awesome scope of
police power is best demonstrated by the
fact that in its hundred or so years of
presence in our nations legal system, its
use has rarely been denied.
May Courts Inquire Upon the Exercise of
Police Power?
In view of the requirements of due process,
equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties, however, the
exercise of such police power insofar as it
may affect the life, liberty or property of
any person is subject to judicial inquiry.
Where such exercise of police power may
be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial
of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guaranty may call
for correction by the courts.
Two types of Due Process
Procedural Due Process: Procedural due
process refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives
a person of life, liberty, or property.49
Procedural due process concerns itself
Constitutional Law II
with government action adhering to the
established process when it makes an
intrusion into the private sphere. Examples
range from the form of notice given to the
level of formality of a hearing.
Substantive Due Process: Substantive
due process completes the protection
envisioned by the due process clause. It
inquires whether the government has
sufficient justification for depriving a
person of life, liberty, or property.
ACEBEDO OPTICAL Co. v. CA
G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000
Police Power as exercised by LGUs,
restrictions and qualifications
Power of city mayor to grant/cancel/revoke
business permits
Granting of business permits vs. granting
of permit to practice profession
FACTS:
Petitioner applied with the Office of the
City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit.
Permit was therefor issued, subject to
certain conditions like prohibition of
putting up an optical clinic, examining
and/or prescribing reading and similar
optical glasses, etc. When it was found that
petitioner violated these conditions, its
business permit was cancelled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition of special
conditions by the public respondents were
acts ultra vires
RULING:
Police Power exercised by LGUs
Police power as an inherent attribute of
sovereignty is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. The State,
through the legislature, has delegated the
exercise of police power to local
government units, as agencies of the State,
in order to effectively accomplish and carry
out the declared objects of their creation.
This delegation of police power is
embodied in the general welfare clause of
the Local Government Code xxx
The scope of police power has been held to
be so comprehensive as to encompass
almost all matters affecting the health,
safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and
convenience of the community. Police
power is essentially regulatory in nature
and the power to issue licenses or grant
business permits, if exercised for a
regulatory and not revenue-raising
purpose, is within the ambit of this power.
Power of city mayor to grant business
permits
The authority of city mayors to issue or
grant licenses and business permits is
beyond cavil. It is provided for by law.
However, the power to grant or issue
licenses or business permits must always
be exercised in accordance with law, with
utmost observance of the rights of all
concerned to due process and equal
protection of the law.
But can city mayor cancel business permits
or impose special conditions? As aptly
discussed by the Solicitor General in his
Comment, the power to issue licenses and
permits necessarily includes the corollary
power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the
same. And the power to revoke or cancel,
likewise includes the power to restrict
through the imposition of certain
conditions.
Did the conditions or restrictions imposed
amount to a confiscation of the business?
Distinction must be made between the
grant of a license or permit to do business
and the issuance of a license to engage in
the practice of a particular profession. The
first is usually granted by the local
authorities and the second is issued by the
Board or Commission tasked to regulate
the particular profession. A business
permit authorizes the person, natural or
otherwise, to engage in business or some
form of commercial activity. A professional
license, on the other hand, is the grant of
authority to a natural person to engage in
the practice or exercise of his or her
profession.
Constitutional Law II
In the case at bar, what is sought by
petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a
permit to engage in the business of
running an optical shop. It does not
purport to seek a license to engage in the
practice of optometry as a corporate body
or entity, although it does have in its
employ, persons who are duly licensed to
practice optometry by the Board of
Examiners in Optometry.
ART. 3 Sec. 1 SCOPE OF PROTECTED
LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY
cases:
DUNCAN ASSOC. OF DETAILMAN-
PTGWO VS. GLAXO WELLCOME
PHILS., INC.
438 SCRA 343
FACTS:
Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical
representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract
of employment signed by Tecson stipulates,
among others, that he agrees to study and
abide by the existing company rules; to
disclose to management any existing
future relationship by consanguinity or
affinity with co-employees or employees
with competing drug companies and
should management find that such
relationship poses a prossible conflict of
interest, to resign from the company.
Company's Code of Employee Conduct
provides the same with stipulation that
management may transfer the employee to
another department in a non-
counterchecking position or preparation
for employment outside of the company
after 6 months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market
Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte area and entered into a
romantic relationship with Betsy, an
employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition.
Before getting married, Tecson's District
Manager reminded him several times of
the conflict of interest but marriage took
place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's
superiors informed him of conflict of
intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply
with the condition (that either he or Betsy
resign from their respective positions).
Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo
transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao
City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his
request against transfer was denied,
Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's
Grievance Committee and while pending,
he continued to act as medical
representative in the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte sales area. On Nov. 15,
2000, the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy
was valid...
ISSUE:
Whether or not the policy of a
pharmaceutical company prohibiting its
employees from marrying employees of
any competitor company is valid
RULING:
On Equal Protection
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade
secrets, manufacturing formulas,
marketing strategies, and other
confidential programs and information
from competitors. The prohibition against
pesonal or marital relationships with
employees of competitor companies upon
Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of
that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. That Glaxo
possesses the right to protect its economic
interest cannot be denied.
It is the settled principle that the
commands of the equal protection clause
are addressed only to the state or those
acting under color of its authority.
Corollarily, it has been held in a long array
of US Supreme Court decisions that the
equal protection clause erects to shield
against merely privately conduct, however,
discriminatory or wrongful.
The company actually enforced the policy
after repeated requests to the employee to
comply with the policy. Indeed the
application of the policy was made in an
impartial and even-handed manner, with
due regard for the lot of the employee.
On Constructive Dismissal
Constructive dismissal is defined as a
quitting, an involuntary resignation
Constitutional Law II
resorted to when continued employment
becomes impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely; when there is demotion in rank,
or diminution in pay; or when a clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by
an employer becomes unbearable to the
employee. None of these conditions are
present in the instant case.
HELD:
The challenged policy has been
implemented by Glaxo impartially and
disinterestedly for a long period of time. In
the case at bar, the record shows that
Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to
eliminate the conflict of interest brought
about by his relationship with Betsy, but he
never availed of any of them.
"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for
lack of merit."
TWO KINDS OF DUE PROCESS
cases:
BANCO ESPANOL FILIPINO v.
PALANCA
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED:
Jurisdiction over the property which is the
subject of the litigation may result either
from a seizure of the property under legal
process, whereby it is brought into the
actual custody of the law, or it may result
from the institution of legal proceedings
wherein, under special provisions of law,
the power of the court over the property is
recognized and made effective.
The action to foreclose a mortgage is said
to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which
is expressed the idea that while it is not
strictly speaking an action in rem yet it
partakes of that nature and is substantially
such.
DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE
PROCEEDINGS: Property is always
assumed to be in the possession of its
owner, in person or by agent; and he may
be safely held, under certain conditions, to
be affected with knowledge that
proceedings have been instituted for its
condemnation and sale.
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y The sovereign authority which organizes a
Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of
real property in Manila to El Banco
Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio
returned to China and there he died on
January 29, 1810 without returning again
to the Philippines. The mortgagor then
instituted foreclosure proceeding but since
defendant is a non-resident, it was
necessary to give notice by publication.
The Clerk of Court was also directed to
send copy of the summons to the
defendants last known address, which is
in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether
the Clerk complied with this requirement.
Nevertheless, after publication in a
newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause
proceeded and judgment by default was
rendered. The decision was likewise
published and afterwards sale by public
auction was held with the bank as the
highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this
sale was confirmed by the court. However,
about seven years after the confirmation of
this sale, a motion was made by Vicente
Palanca, as administrator of the estate of
the original defendant, wherein the
applicant requested the court to set aside
the order of default and the judgment, and
to vacate all the proceedings subsequent
thereto. The basis of this application was
that the order of default and the judgment
rendered thereon were void because the
court had never acquired jurisdiction over
the defendant or over the subject of the
action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant and the
subject matter of the action
Whether or not due process of law was
observed
RULING:
On Jurisdiction
The word jurisdiction is used in several
different, though related, senses since it
may have reference (1) to the authority of
the court to entertain a particular kind of
action or to administer a particular kind of
relief, or it may refer to the power of the
court over the parties, or (2) over the
property which is the subject to the
litigation.
court determines the nature and extent of
Constitutional Law II
its powers in general and thus fixes its
competency or jurisdiction with reference
to the actions which it may entertain and
the relief it may grant.
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by
the voluntary appearance of a party in
court and his submission to its authority, or
it is acquired by the coercive power of
legal process exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the
subject of the litigation may result either
from a seizure of the property under legal
process, whereby it is brought into the
actual custody of the law, or it may result
from the institution of legal proceedings
wherein, under special provisions of law,
the power of the court over the property is
recognized and made effective. In the
latter case the property, though at all times
within the potential power of the court,
may never be taken into actual custody at
all. An illustration of the jurisdiction
acquired by actual seizure is found in
attachment proceedings, where the
property is seized at the beginning of the
action, or some subsequent stage of its
progress, and held to abide the final event
of the litigation. An illustration of what we
term potential jurisdiction over the res, is
found in the proceeding to register the title
of land under our system for the
registration of land. Here the court,
without taking actual physical control over
the property assumes, at the instance of
some person claiming to be owner, to
exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the
property and to adjudicate the title in favor
of the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the
action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be
a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is
expressed the idea that while it is not
strictly speaking an action in rem yet it
partakes of that nature and is substantially
such. The expression "action in rem" is, in
its narrow application, used only with
reference to certain proceedings in courts
of admiralty wherein the property alone is
treated as responsible for the claim or
obligation upon which the proceedings are
based. The action quasi rem differs from
the true action in rem in the circumstance
that in the former an individual is named
as defendant, and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interest
therein to the obligation or lien burdening
the property. All proceedings having for
their sole object the sale or other
disposition of the property of the
defendant, whether by attachment,
foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in
a general way thus designated. The
judgment entered in these proceedings is
conclusive only between the parties.
xxx
It is true that in proceedings of this
character, if the defendant for whom
publication is made appears, the action
becomes as to him a personal action and is
conducted as such. This, however, does not
affect the proposition that where the
defendant fails to appear the action is
quasi in rem; and it should therefore be
considered with reference to the principles
governing actions in rem.
On Due Process
xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding,
however, it may be laid down with
certainty that the requirement of due
process is satisfied if the following
conditions are present, namely; (1) There
must be a court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be
lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or over the property which is
the subject of the proceeding; (3) the
defendant must be given an opportunity to
be heard; and (4) judgment must be
rendered upon lawful hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the
defendant shall have an opportunity to be
heard, we observe that in a foreclosure
case some notification of the proceedings
to the nonresident owner, prescribing the
time within which appearance must be
made, is everywhere recognized as
essential. To answer this necessity the
statutes generally provide for publication,
and usually in addition thereto, for the
mailing of notice to the defendant, if his
residence is known. Though commonly
called constructive, or substituted service
of process in any true sense. It is merely a
means provided by law whereby the owner
Constitutional Law II
may be admonished that his property is the
subject of judicial proceedings and that it
is incumbent upon him to take such steps
as he sees fit to protect it.
It will be observed that this mode of
notification does not involve any absolute
assurance that the absent owner shall
thereby receive actual notice. The
periodical containing the publication may
never in fact come to his hands, and the
chances that he should discover the notice
may often be very slight. Even where
notice is sent by mail the probability of his
receiving it, though much increased, is
dependent upon the correctness of the
address to which it is forwarded as well as
upon the regularity and security of the
mail service. It will be noted, furthermore,
that the provision of our law relative to the
mailing of notice does not absolutely
require the mailing of notice
unconditionally and in every event, but
only in the case where the defendant's
residence is known. In the light of all these
facts, it is evident that actual notice to the
defendant in cases of this kind is not,
under the law, to be considered absolutely
necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in
recognizing the efficacy of a means of
notification which may fall short of actual
notice is apparently this: Property is
always assumed to be in the possession of
its owner, in person or by agent; and he
may be safely held, under certain
conditions, to be affected with knowledge
that proceedings have been instituted for
its condemnation and sale.
Did the failure of the clerk to send notice
to defendants last known address
constitute denial of due process?
The observations which have just been
made lead to the conclusion that the
failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in
fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an
irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due
process of law; and hence in our opinion
that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid
the judgment in this case. Notice was
given by publication in a newspaper and
this is the only form of notice which the
law unconditionally requires. This in our
opinion is all that was absolutely necessary
to sustain the proceedings.
It will be observed that in considering the
effect of this irregularity, it makes a
difference whether it be viewed as a
question involving jurisdiction or as a
question involving due process of law. In
the matter of jurisdiction there can be no
distinction between the much and the
little. The court either has jurisdiction or it
has not; and if the requirement as to the
mailing of notice should be considered as a
step antecedent to the acquiring of
jurisdiction, there could be no escape from
the conclusion that the failure to take that
step was fatal to the validity of the
judgment. In the application of the idea of
due process of law, on the other hand, it is
clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The
jurisdiction being once established, all that
due process of law thereafter requires is
an opportunity for the defendant to be
heard; and as publication was duly made in
the newspaper, it would seem highly
unreasonable to hold that failure to mail
the notice was fatal. We think that in
applying the requirement of due process of
law, it is permissible to reflect upon the
purposes of the provision which is
supposed to have been violated and the
principle underlying the exercise of judicial
power in these proceedings. Judge in the
light of these conceptions, we think that
the provision of Act of Congress declaring
that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law has
not been infringed.
administrative due process:
cases:
SERRANO VS NLRC / ISETANN
FACTS:
Serrano was a regular employee of Isetann
Department Store as the head of Security
Checker. In 1991, as a cost-cutting
measure, Isetann phased out its entire
security section and engaged the services
of an independent security agency.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal among others. Labor arbiter
ruled in his favor as Isetann failed to
establish that it had retrenched its security
section to prevent or minimize losses to its
Constitutional Law II
business; that private respondent failed to
accord due process to petitioner; that
private respondent failed to use reasonable
standards in selecting employees whose
employment would be terminated. NLRC
reversed the decision and ordered
petitioner to be given separation pay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the hiring of an
independent security agency by the private
respondent to replace its current security
section a valid ground for the dismissal of
the employees classed under the latter.
RULING:
An employers good faith in implementing
a redundancy program is not necessarily
put in doubt by the availment of the
services of an independent contractor to
replace the services of the terminated
employees to promote economy and
efficiency. Absent proof that management
acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner,
the Court will not interfere with the
exercise of judgment by an employer.
If termination of employment is not for any
of the cause provided by law, it is illegal
and the employee should be reinstated and
paid backwages. To contend that even if
the termination is for a just cause, the
employee concerned should be reinstated
and paid backwages would be to amend
Art 279 by adding another ground for
considering dismissal illegal.
If it is shown that the employee was
dismissed for any of the causes mentioned
in Art 282, the in accordance with that
article, he should not be reinstated but
must be paid backwages from the time his
employment was terminated until it is
determined that the termination of
employment is for a just cause because the
failure to hear him before he is dismissed
renders the termination without legal
effect.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
cases:
UNITED STATES VS. LUIS TORIBIO
Police Power
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for
a license to have his carabao be
slaughtered. His request was denied
because his carabao is found not to be
unfit for work. He nevertheless
slaughtered his carabao without the
necessary license. He was eventually sued
and was sentenced by the trial court. His
counsel in one way or the other argued
that the law mandating that one should
acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao
is not a valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is
valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The
SC explained that it is not a taking of the
property for public use, within the
meaning of the constitution, but is a just
and legitimate exercise of the power of the
legislature to regulate and restrain such
particular use of the property as would be
inconsistent with or injurious to the rights
of the publics. All property is acquired and
held under the tacit condition that it shall
not be so used as to injure the equal rights
of others or greatly impair the public
rights and interests of the community.
CITY OF MANILA MAYOR ALFREDO
LIM v. JUDGE LAGUIO & MTDC
Facts:
The petitioners seek to reverse the
ruling of the ruling of the RTC regarding
the unconstitutionality of Ordinance No.
7783 which is entitled- AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE
ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Private respondent, Malate Tourist
Development Corporation (MTDC),
contends that the City Council has no
power to prohibit the operation of motels
and that the Ordinance does not constitute
a proper exercise of police power as the
compulsory closure of the motel business
has no reasonable relation to the
legitimate municipal interests sought to be
protected.
The petitioners, on the other hand, argues
that the City Council had the power to
"prohibit certain forms of entertainment in
order to protect the social and moral
Constitutional Law II
welfare of the community" [Section 458 (a)
4 (vii) of the Local Government Code] and
that the Ordinance was enacted by the City
Council of Manila to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community in
conjunction with its police powers [Article
III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No.
409].
Judge Laguio issued an ex-parte temporary
restraining order against the enforcement
of the Ordinance. He also granted the writ
of preliminary injunction prayed for by
MTDC. Hence, the appeal by the
petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance No.
7783 is constitutional
Held: NO
There is a clear invasion of personal or
property rights, personal in the case of
those individuals desirous of owning,
operating and patronizing those motels
and property in terms of the investments
made and the salaries to be paid to those
therein employed. If the City of Manila so
desires to put an end to prostitution,
fornication and other social ills, it can
instead impose reasonable regulations
such as daily inspections of the
establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses or permits; it
may exercise its authority to suspend or
revoke their licenses for these violations;
and it may even impose increased license
fees. In other words, there are other
means to reasonably accomplish the
desired end.
Police power legislation of such
character deserves the full endorsement of
we reiterate our support for it. But inspite
of its the judiciary virtuous aims, the
enactment of the Ordinance has no
statutory or constitutional authority to
stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this
case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the
operation of the enumerated
establishments or order their transfer or
conversion without infringing the
constitutional guarantees not even under
the guise of due process and equal
protection of laws of police power.
The petition is DENIED and the
decision of the Regional Trial Court
declaring the ordinance void is AFFIRMED.
YNOT VS. IAC
G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: (1) notice;
(2) hearing; exceptions
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: (1) public
interest requires government interference;
(2) reasonable means necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose
FACTS:
Petitioners 6 carabaos were confiscated by
the police for having been transported
from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO
626-A. He brought an action for replevin,
challenging the constitutionality of said
EO. The trial court sustained the
confiscation of the animals and declined to
rule on the validity of the law on the
ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its
decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence
this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the confiscation of the
carabaos amounted to arbitrary
confiscation of property without due
process of law
RULING:
Minimum Requirements of Due Process:
Notice and Hearing
The minimum requirements of due process
are notice and hearing which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with
because they are intended as a safeguard
against official arbitrariness. It is a
gratifying commentary on our judicial
system that the jurisprudence of this
country is rich with applications of this
guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule
of law and the ancient rudiments of fair
play. We have consistently declared that
every person, faced by the awesome power
of the State, is entitled to "the law of the
land," which Daniel Webster described
almost two hundred years ago in the
famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the
law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial." It has to be so if
the rights of every person are to be
secured beyond the reach of officials who,
out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance,
Constitutional Law II
would degrade the due process clause into
a worn and empty catchword.
Exceptions to Notice and Hearing
This is not to say that notice and hearing
are imperative in every case for, to be sure,
there are a number of admitted exceptions.
The conclusive presumption, for example,
bars the admission of contrary evidence as
long as such presumption is based on
human experience or there is a rational
connection between the fact proved and
the fact ultimately presumed therefrom.
There are instances when the need for
expeditions action will justify omission of
these requisites, as in the summary
abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad
dog on the loose, which may be killed on
sight because of the immediate danger it
poses to the safety and lives of the people.
Pornographic materials, contaminated
meat and narcotic drugs are inherently
pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed. The passport of a person sought
for a criminal offense may be cancelled
without hearing, to compel his return to
the country he has fled. Filthy restaurants
may be summarily padlocked in the
interest of the public health and bawdy
houses to protect the public morals. In
such instances, previous judicial hearing
may be omitted without violation of due
process in view of the nature of the
property involved or the urgency of the
need to protect the general welfare from a
clear and present danger.
Due Process is a Restraint on Police Power
The protection of the general welfare is the
particular function of the police power
which both restraints and is restrained by
due process. The police power is simply
defined as the power inherent in the State
to regulate liberty and property for the
promotion of the general welfare. By
reason of its function, it extends to all the
great public needs and is described as the
most pervasive, the least limitable and the
most demanding of the three inherent
powers of the State, far outpacing taxation
and eminent domain. The individual, as a
member of society, is hemmed in by the
police power, which affects him even
before he is born and follows him still after
he is dead from the womb to beyond the
tomb in practically everything he does or
owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a
ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion.
Even so, as long as the activity or the
property has some relevance to the public
welfare, its regulation under the police
power is not only proper but necessary.
And the justification is found in the
venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est
suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas, which call for the
subordination of individual interests to the
benefit of the greater number.
First Requisite of Substantive Due Process:
Interests of the Public Generally Require
Interference
xxx we hold with the Toribio Case that the
carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to
speak, has a direct relevance to the public
welfare and so is a lawful subject of
Executive Order No. 626. The method
chosen in the basic measure is also
reasonably necessary for the purpose
sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals, again
following the above-cited doctrine. There is
no doubt that by banning the slaughter of
these animals except where they are at
least seven years old if male and eleven
years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the executive order will
be conserving those still fit for farm work
or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.
Second Requisite of Substantive Due
Process: Reasonable Means Necessary for
the Accomplishment of Purpose, not
Unduly Oppressive Upon Individuals
But while conceding that the amendatory
measure has the same lawful subject as the
original executive order, we cannot say
with equal certainty that it complies with
the second requirement, viz., that there be
a lawful method. We note that to
strengthen the original measure, Executive
Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban
not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that "no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef
shall be transported from one province to
another." The object of the prohibition
escapes us. The reasonable connection
Constitutional Law II
between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the
inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will
not prevent their slaughter there, any
more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition
is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says
executive order, it could be easily
circumvented by simply killing the animal.
Perhaps so. However, if the movement of
the live animals for the purpose of
preventing their slaughter cannot be
prohibited, it should follow that there is no
reason either to prohibit their transfer as,
not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the
means and the end were to be assumed,
we would still have to reckon with the
sanction that the measure applies for
violation of the prohibition. The penalty is
outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported, to be meted
out by the executive authorities, usually
the police only. In the Toribio Case, the
statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to
be imposed by the court after trial and
conviction of the accused. Under the
challenged measure, significantly, no such
trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by
the police and declared, by the measure
itself, as forfeited to the government.
EO 626-A is unconstitutional
In the instant case, the carabaos were
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a
complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which
was ordered confiscated upon his failure to
produce the carabaos when ordered by the
trial court. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which
was carried out forthright. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to
be heard, thus denying him the centuries-
old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there
are occasions when notice and hearing
may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for
these minimum guarantees of due process.
It is also conceded that summary action
may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as procedural due process is
not necessarily judicial only. In the
exceptional cases accepted, however, there
is a justification for the omission of the
right to a previous hearing, to wit, the
immediacy of the problem sought to be
corrected and the urgency of the need to
correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such
pressure of time or action calling for the
petitioner's peremptory treatment. The
properties involved were not even inimical
per se as to require their instant
destruction. There certainly was no reason
why the offense prohibited by the
executive order should not have been
proved first in a court of justice, with the
accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is
penal in nature, the violation thereof
should have been pronounced not by the
police only but by a court of justice, which
alone would have had the authority to
impose the prescribed penalty, and only
after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the
questionable manner of the disposition of
the confiscated property as prescribed in
the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall
"be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal
Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The
phrase "may see fit" is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and
Constitutional Law II
even corruption. One searches in vain for
the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations
that the said officers must observe when
they make their distribution. There is none.
Their options are apparently boundless.
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of
their generosity and by what criteria shall
they be chosen? Only the officers named
can supply the answer, they and they alone
may choose the grantee as they see fit, and
in their own exclusive discretion.
Definitely, there is here a "roving
commission," a wide and sweeping
authority that is not "canalized within
banks that keep it from overflowing," in
short, a clearly profligate and therefore
invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the
challenged measure is an invalid exercise
of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the
law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due
process is violated because the owner of
the property confiscated is denied the right
to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The
conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the
guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation
of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken. For these reasons, we hereby
declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.
YNOT v. IAC
Police Power Not Validly Exercised
There had been an existing law which
prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos
(EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos
issued EO 626-A which not only banned
the movement of carabaos from
interprovinces but as well as the
movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984,
Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos
from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then
charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot
averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it
violated his right to be heard or his right to
due process. He said that the authority
provided by EO 626-A to outrightly
confiscate carabaos even without being
heard is unconstitutional. The lower court
ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a
valid exercise of police power in order to
promote general welfare so as to curb
down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not
valid as it indeed violates due process. EO
626-A ctreated a presumption based on the
judgment of the executive. The movement
of carabaos from one area to the other
does not mean a subsequent slaughter of
the same would ensue. Ynot should be
given to defend himself and explain why
the carabaos are being transferred before
they can be confiscated. The SC found
that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos
is not reasonably necessary to the purpose
of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard
in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment
on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on
judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of
legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of
the properties arbitrarily taken.
Bill of Rights
I. THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION
AND CONTRACT CLAUSES AS LIMITATIONS
ON POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND
TAXATION
Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Art. III, Sec. 10. No law impairing
the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.
Constitutional Law II
LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore
not even required to be conferred by the
Constitution, are the police, eminent domain,
and taxation powers. The Bill of Rights,
notably the due process, equal protection and
non-impairment clauses, is a means of limiting
the exercise of these powers by imposing on
the State the obligation to protect individual
rights. The Bill of Rights is addressed to the
State, notably the government, telling it what it
cannot do to the individual.
A. Due process - Procedural and
Substantive
Civil Procedural Due Process
In civil cases, the SC laid down its
elements in the case of Banco Espanol Filipino v.
Palanca:
a. Court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
b. Court with jurisdiction over the
party-defendant
c. Judgement rendered according to
law.
d. Defendant given the oppotunity to
be heard (requirement on notice and hearing)
Criminal Due Process
In criminal cases, the elements were
laid down in Vera v. People:
a. Accused is informed why he is
proceeded against, and what charge he must
answer.
b. Judgment of conviction is based
on evidence that is not tainted by falsity, and
after the defendant was heard.
If the prosecution produces the
conviction based on untrue evidence, then it
is guilty of depriving the accused of due
process. Thus false testimony can be
questioned by the accused regardless of the
time that lapsed.
c. Judgment according to law
d. Tribunal with jurisdiction
Administrative Due Process
In administrative proceedings, the
elements were laid down in the case of Ang
Tibay v. CIR as the "seven cardinal primary
rights" in justiciable cases before
administrative tribunals:
a. There must be a hearing, where a
party may present evidence in support of his
case.
b. The tribunal must consider the
evidence presented by a party.
c. While the tribunal has no duty to
decide the case correctly, its decision must
be supported by evidence.
d. The evidence supporting the
decision must be substantial. Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
e. The evidence must have been
presented at the hearing or at least contained
in the record and known to the parties affected.
f. The tribunal must rely on its own
independent consideration of evidence, and
not rely on the recommendation of a
subordinate.
g. The decision must state the facts and
the law in such a way that the parties can
know the issues involved and the reasons for
the decision.
Substantive Due Process
Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)
F: Petitioners' 6 carabaos were
confiscated by the police for having been
transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of
EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin,
challenging the consitutionality of the EO. The
trial court sustained the confiscation of the
animals and declined to rule on the validity of
the law on the ground that it lacked authority to
do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC.
Hence this petition for review.
HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC
jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules
of court may provide final judgments of lower
courts" in all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures, lower
courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in
the first instance.
(2) There is no doubt that by banning
the slaughter of these animals (except where
there at least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if
Constitutional Law II
female upon the issuance of the necessary
permit) the EO will be conserving those still fit
for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion. We do not see,
however, how the prohibition of the
interprovincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed any where,
w/ no less difficulty in on province than in
another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in
one province will not prevent their slaughter
there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to
apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could
be easily circumsbcribed by simply killing the
animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement
of the live animals for the purpose of preventing
their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should
follow that there is no reason either to prohibit
their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
(3) In the instant case, the carabaos
were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner
only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
and given a supersedeas bond w/c was ordered
confiscated upon his failure to produce the
carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The
EO defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, w/c was carried out forthright. The
measures struck him at once and pounced upon
the petitioner w/o giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying him elementary fair play.
(4) It is there authorized that the
seized prop. shall "be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may
see fit in the case of carabaos." The phrase
may see fit is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is
laden w/ perilous opportunities for partiality and
abuse, and even corruption. One searches in
vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that
the said officers must observe when they make
their distribution. VV.
B. Due Process and Police Power
Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)
Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and
Holiday s Valid.
F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A
and EH plates on week-ends and holidays in
view of the energy crisis. It excepted, however,
those classified as S (Service), T (Truck), DPL
(Diplomatic), CC (Consular Corps), and TC
(Tourist Cars). The resps., Min. of Public Works,
Transportation, issued memo. providing
penalties for viol. of the LOI, namely, fine,
confiscation of vehicles, and cancellation of
registration. The petitioners brought suit
questioning the validity of the LOI on the ground
that it was discriminatory and a denial of due
process. The resps. denied the petitioner's
allegations and argued that the suit amounted
to a request for advisory opinion.
HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8
cylinder 1969 Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy's
Kaiser Jeep. The enforcement of the LOI to
them would deprive them of prop. They,
therefore, have standing to challenge the
validity of the LOI.
(2) But the LOI cannot be declared void
on its face. It has behind it the presumption of
validity. The necessity for evidence to rebut
such presumption is unavoidable. As
underlying the questions of fact may condition
the constitutionality of legislation the
presumption of validity must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record
overthrowing the statute. The LOI is an energy
conservation measure; it is an apporpriate
response to a problem.
(3) Nor does the LOI deny equal
protection to the petitioners. W/in the class to
w/c the petitioner belongs the LOI operate
equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not
include others does not render it invalid. The
govt is not required to adhere to a policy of "all
or none."
(4) To the extent that the Land Transpo.
Code does not authorize the impounding of
vehicles as a penalty, to that extent the memo.
of the resps. would be ultra vires. VV.
Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA (1983)
Ordinance Prohibiting Barbershops from
Rendering Massage Services Valid.
F: The ordinance was enacted for a two-
fold purpose: (1) To enable the City of Mla. to
collect a fee for operating massage clinics
separately from those operating barber ships
and (2) To prevent immorality w/c might
probably arise from the construction of separate
rooms.
HELD: The SC has been most liberal in
sustaining ordinances based on general welfare
clause. VV.
Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)
Constitutional Law II
F: The petitioners are operators or
nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed
prohibition suits to stop the Mun. of Bocaue
from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the
operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance h
alls in that mun. or the renewal of licenses to
operate them. The CFI upheld the validity of
the ordinance and dismissed the petition.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the
operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be
regulated but not prevented from carrying on
their business. RA 938, as orginally enacted,
granted municipalities the power to regulate the
establishment, maintenance and operation of
nightclubs and the like. While it is true that on
5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c
purported to give municipalities the power not
only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the
operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title
of the law remained the same so that the power
granted to municipalities remains that of
regulation, not prohibition. To construe the
amendatory act as granting mun. corporations
the power to prohibit the operation of
nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that
it violates the constitutional provision that
"every bill shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof."
Moreover, the recentyly-enacted LGC (BP 337)
speaks simply of the power to regulate the
establishment, and operation of billiard pools,
theatrical performances, circuses and other
forms of entertainment. Certiorari granted. VV.
C. Due Process and Eminent
Domain
The taking by the State of private
property in an expropriation proceeding must
be: (1) for public use, (2) with just
compensation, and (3) upon observance of
due process.
Article III, Sec. 9. Private property
shall not be take for public use without
just compensation.
Article XII, Sec. 18. The State may,
in the interest of national welfare or
defense, establish and operate vital
industries and, upon payment of just
compensation, transfer to public
ownership utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the
government.
1. Taking either for public use or
public purpose.
Public Use
Public use is equivalent to public
purpose. It is not confined merely to use by the
public at large (e.g. roads). It is enough that it
serves a public purpose, even if it benefit a
large group of people short of the public in
general (e.g. expropriating property for the
relocation of squatters).
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220
F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought
the expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay
Malubog and Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit
of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of
the property, the CFI authorized the PTA to take
immediate possession of the property. The
charter of the PTA authorizes it to acquire
through condemnation proceedings lands for
tourist zone development of a sports complex.
The petitioners who are occupants of the lands,
filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They
contended that (1) the taking was not for public
use; (2) the land was covered by the land
reform program; and (3) expropriation would
impair the obligation of contracts.
HELD: The concept of public use is not limited
to traditional purposes for the construction of
roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that
"public use" means "use by the public" has
been discarded. As long as the purpose of the
taking is public, then the power of eminent
domain comes into play. It is accurate to state
then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use. The
petititioners have not shown that the area being
developed is land reform area and that the
affected persons have been given emancipation
patents and certificates of land transfer. The
contract clause has never been regarded as a
barrier to the exercise of the police power and
likewise eminent domain. VV.
Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987)
F: On December 5, 1977, the National
Housing Authority filed a complaint for the
expropriation of 25 hectares of land in Antipolo,
Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the
expropriation of private lands for socialized
housing. Among those lands sought to be
expropriated are the petitioners' lands. They
brought this suit in the SC challenging the
constitutionality of PD 1224.
HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized
housing for the purpose of condemnation
proceedings is not public use since it will benefit
only a handful of people. The "public use"
requirement is an evolving concept influences
Constitutional Law II
by changing conditions. Urban renewal or
redevelopment and the construction of low-cost
housing is recognized as a public purpose, not
only because of the expanded concept of public
use but also because of specific provisions in
the Constitution. Shortage in housing is a
matter of state concern since it directly and
significantly affects public health, safety, the
environment and, in sum, the general welfare.
Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of
lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are
owned by a few landowners only. Why should
the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is
not confined to landed estates. The test to be
applied for a valid expropriation of private lands
was the area of the land and not the number of
people who stood to be benefitted. The State
acting through the NHA is vested with broad
discretion to designate the property. The
property owner may not interpose objections
merely because in their judgment some other
property would have been more suitable. The
provisions on just compensation found in PD
1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions
which were declared unconstitutional in EPZA v.
Dulay (1987) for being encroachments on
judicial prerogatives. VV.
2. Just compensation must
be judicially determined
Just Compensation
Just compensation is the fair and
reasonable equivalent of the loss sustained by
the owner of the property due to the taking; it
is the fair market value of the property
measured at the time of the taking, no matter
how long ago it was taken (e.g. the time of the
taking was in the 1920's, the time of payment
was in the 1960's, in the Ministerio and
Amigable cases, supra), and using the
conversion rates at the time of taking
(because according to those cases, Art. 1250
of the Civil Code applied only to contractual
obligations).
EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987)
F: The San Antonio Development
Corporation was the owner of a piece of land in
Lapu-Lapu City which the EPZA expropriated in
1979. The commissioners appointed by the trial
court recommended that the San Antonio
Development Corp. be paid P15.00 per square
meter. EPZA filed a petition for certiorari,
arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation
should be the fair and current market value
declared by the owner or the market value
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
HELD: The method of ascertaining just
compensation under PD 1533 constitutes
impermissible encroachment on judicial
prerogatives. Although the court technically
would still have the power to determine the just
compensation for the property, following the
decree, its task would be relegated to simply
stating the lower value of the property as
declared either by the owner or the assessor.
Just compensation means the value of the
property at the time of the taking. It means a
fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All
the facts as to the condition of the property and
its surroundings, its improvements and
capabilities should be considered. In this case,
the tax declarations used as basis for the just
compensation were made long before the
declaration of martial law when the land was
much cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on
the basis of those documents which are
outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory.
VV.
Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987)
F: Petitioners are the owners of two large
estates known as the Tambunting Estate and
Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila, both of which
were declared expropriated in two decrees
issued by President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD
1670. The petitioners contend that the decrees
violate their constitutional right to due process
and equal protection since by their mere
passage their properties were automatically
expropriated and they were immediately
deprived of the ownership and possession
thereof without being given the chance to
oppose such expropriation. The government on
the other hand contends that the power of
eminent domain is inherent in the State and
when the legislature or the President through
his law-making powers exercises this power, the
public use and public necessity of the
expropriation and the fixing of the just
compensation become political in nature and
the courts must respect the decision.
HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the
procedures adopted and the powers given to
the NHA. The Tambunting subdivision is
summarily proclaimed a blighted area and
directly expropriated by decree without the
slightest semblance of a hearing or any
proceeding whatsoever. The expropriation is
instant and automatic to take effect
immediately upon the signing of the decree. No
deposit before the taking is required. There is
not provision for any interest to be paid upon
unpaid installments. Not only are the owners
given absolutely no opportunity to contest the
expropriation, or question the amount of
payments fixed by the decree, but the decision
Constitutional Law II
of the NHA are expressly declared beyond
judicial review. PD 1669 and 1670 are declared
unconstitutional.
Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The judgment at bar
now learly overturns the majority ruling in JM
Tuason v. LTA that the power of Congress to
designate the particular property to be taken
adn how much may be condemned thereof
must be duly recognized, leaving only as a
judicial question whether in the exercise of such
competence, the party adversely affected is the
victim of partiality and prejudice. The SC now
rules that such singling out of properties does
not foreclose judicial scrutiny as to whether
such expropriation by legislative act
transgresses the due process and equal
protection and just compensation guarantees of
the Constitution. VV.
3. Due process must be
observed
De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660
(1980)
F: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas
Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite
Coastal Road Project, originally called for the
expropriation of properties along Cuneta
Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the
Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the
proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein
and Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests of
residents of the latter, the Commission on
Human Settlements recommended the
reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry
argued the new route withh save the
government P2 million. The government filed
expropriation proceedings against the owners of
Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, among
whom was petitioner.
HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan
streets is arbitrayr and should not receive
judicial aprpoval. The Human Settlements
Commission concluded that the cost factor is so
minimal that it can be disregarded in making a
choice between the two lines. The factor of
functionality strongly militates against the
choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets,
while the factor of social and economic impact
bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta
Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil
down to a choice between people, on one hand,
and progress and development, on the other, it
is to be remembered that progress and
development are carried out for the benefit of
the people. VV.
Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142
(1990)
F: De Knecht was one of the owners of
several properties along the Fernando Rein-Del
Pan streets which the Government sought to
expropriate to give way to the extension of
EDSA and the construction of drainage facilities.
De Knecht filed a case to restrain the
Government from proceeding with the
expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the
lower court but upon certiorari, the SC reversed
the lower court decision and granted the relief
asked for by De Knecht ruling that the
expropriation was arbitrary. The case was
remanded to the lower court.
No further action was taken despite
the SC decision until two years later, in 1983,
when the Government moved for the dismissal
of the case on the ground that the Legislature
has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the
same properties for the same purpose. The
lower court denied tthe motion. Appeal.
RULING: While it is true that said final judgment
of this Curt on the subject becomes the law of
the case between the parties, it is equally true
that the right of petitioner to take private
properties for public use upon payment of just
compensation is so provided in the Constitution
and the laws. Such expropriation proceeding
may be undertaken by the petitioner not only
by voluntary negotiation with the land owners
but also by taking appropriate court action or by
legislation.
When BP 340 was passed, it appears
that it was based on supervening events that
occured after the 1980 decision of the SC on the
De Knecht case was rendered. The social impact
factor which persuaded the Court to consider
this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared.
Moreover, the said decision is no
obstacle to the legislative arm of the
Government in thereafter making its own
independent assessment of the circumstances
then pravailing as to the propriety of
undertaking the expropriation of properties in
question and thereafter by enacting the
corresponding legislation as it did in this case.
The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity
of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision
of the Court must yield to the subsequent
legislative fiat. Charo.
NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)
Constitutional Law II
F: For the construction of its 230 KV
Mexico-Limay transmission lines, Napocor's
lines have to pass the lands belonging to
respondents. Unsuccessful with its negotiations
for the acquisition of the right of way
easements, Napocor was constrained to file
eminent domain proceedings.
ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay
simple easement fee or full compensation for
the land traversed by its transmissin lines.
RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that
"Normally, the power of eminent domain results
in the taking or appropriation of the title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property, but no
cogent reason appears why said power may not
be availed of to impose only a burrden upon the
owner of the condemned property, without loss
of title or possession. It is unquestionable that
real property may, through expropriation, be
subjected to an easement of right of way." In
this case, the easement is definitely a taking
under the power of eminent domain.
Considering the nature and effect of the
installation of the transmission lines, the
limitations imposed by the NPC against the use
of the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters
is allowed below the lines) for an indefinite
period deprives private respondents of ts
ordinary use.
For these reasons, the owner of the
property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation which should neither be more nor
less, whenever it is possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of said
property. Just equiivalent has always been
understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the
thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of
the expropriation. The price or value of the land
and its character at the time of taking by the
Govt. are the criteria for determining just
cmpensation. Charo.
D. Equal Protection
Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress
shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measure that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common
good.
To this end, the State shall
regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
and disposition of property and its
increments.
1. Economic equality
Art. XIII, Sec. 2. The promotion of
social justice shall include the
commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of
initiative and self-reliance.
Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall
afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law. They shall
be entitle to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and
decision-making process affecting the
rights and benefits as may be provided by
law.
The State shall promote the
principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in
settling disputes including conciliation,
and shall enforce their mutual compliance
therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the
relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just
share in the fruits of production and the
right of enterprises to reasonable returns
on investments, and to expansion and
growth.
Art. XII, Sec. 10. The Congress
shall, upon recommendation of the
economic and planning agency, when the
national interest dictates, reserve to
citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty
per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens, or such higher percentage
as Congress may prescribe, certain areas
of investments. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the
formation and operation enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
Constitutional Law II
In the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and
exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction
and in accordance with its national goals
and priorities.
Id., Sec. 2. xxx
The State shall protect the nation's
marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of
poverty.
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court
shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rights of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
There are areas of economic activity
which can be limited to Filipinos. The
Constitution itself acknowledges this in various
places - exploitation of marine wealth (Art. XII,
Sec. 2 par. 2), certain areas of investment (Art.
XII, Sec. 10), to name a few.
In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155
(1937), the SC upheld the validity of the law
which nationalized the retail trade. For the
protection of the law can be observed by the
national interest.
Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937)
But there are areas where aliens cannot
be kept away for the simple reason that they
cannot be deprived of a common means of
livelihood, especially when they are admitted to
the country as immigrants.
In Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Isai Po Ho, 86
SCRA 270 (1978), the SC invalidated a city
ordinance imposing a P500 permit fee for aliens
who wish to engage in the pursuit of an
occupation. The SC noted that this violated the
uniformity of taxation, and deprived aliens of
the right to earn a common livelihood.
Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270
(1978)
F: An ordinance of the City of Manila
prohibited the employment of aliens in any
occupation or business unless they first secured
a permit from the Mayor of Manila and paid a
fee of P500. Respondent, an alien, employed in
Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment
from the CFI declaring the ordinance null and
void.
HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In
imposing a flat rate of P500, it failed to consider
substantial differences in situations among
aliens and for that reason violates the rule on
uniformity of taxation. It also lays down no
guide for granting/denying the permit and
therefore permits the arbitrary exercise of
discretion by the Mayor. Finally, the ordinance
denies aliens due process and the equal
protection of the laws. VV.
In Vera v. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 (1979),
Sec. 169 of the NIRC requiring manufacturers of
skimmed milk (non-fat) to put on its label the
warning that the milk is harmful for infants, was
struck down as unconstitutional on the ground
that it did not require the same labeling in the
case of filled milk (coco-fat added)
At that time of the decision thought, the
law was already inoperative.
Vera v. Cuevas 90 SCRA 379 (1979)
F: Respondents are engaged in the
manufacture and sale of filled milk products.
They brought an action in the CFI for a
declaration of their rights in respect of section
169 of the Tax Code. This provision required
that "all condensed skimmed milk in whatever
form, from which the fatty part has been
removed totally or in part or put on sale in the
Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked
on its immediate containers with the words:
This milk is not suitable for nourishment for
infants less than one year of age.
Constitutional Law II
HELD: Sec. 169 of the Tax Code has been
repealed by RA 344. At any rate, Sec. 169
applied only to skimmed milk and not to filled
milk. Sec. 169 is being enforced only against
respondent manufacturers of filled milk but not
against manufacturers of skimmed milk, thus
denying them the equal protection of the laws.
VV.
2. Political equality
Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person
shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations.
Art. IX, C, Sec. 10. Bona fide
candidates to public office shall be free
from any form of harassment and
discrimination.
In Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392
(1980), the SC upheld the validity of sec. 4 of
Batas Blg. 52 disqualifying retired elective local
officials who have received retirement benefits
and would have been 65 years old at the start
of the term. It does not violate equal
protection, for it gives younger blood the
opportunity to run the local government.
Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
F: Sec. 4 of BP 52 provides in part that
"any retired elective provincial, city ot municipal
official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under
the law and who shall have been 65 years of
age at the commencement of the term of office
to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office
from which he has retired." Petitioner, Governor
of Nueva Vizcaya, sued for prohibition to enjoin
enforcement of the law on the ground that it
was contrary to the equal protection and due
process guarantee of the Constitution.
HELD: Dumlao has not been injured by the
application of the provision. No petition seeking
his disqualification has been filed against him.
His petition is a mere request for advisory
opinion. Nevertheless, because of public
interest, the question should be resolved. The
purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of
younger blood in local governments and
therefore, not invalid. The retired employee in
effect declares himself tired and unavailable for
the same government work. VV.
In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980),
however, the disqualification of candidates con-
victed or simply charged with national security
offenses was struck down as unconstitutional,
for violating the presumption of innocence and
thus ultimately the equal political protection.
Igot c. Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
F: Romeo Igot, as taxpayer, voter and
member of the bar, and Alfredo Salapantan Jr.,
as taxpayer and voter, sued for prohibition to
enjoin enforcement of BP 52, sec. 4 of which
provides for the disqualification as candidate of
any person convicted of subversion,
insurrection or rebellion or similar offenses.
HELD: Neither petitioner has been convicted
nor charged with acts of disloyalty nor
disqualified from being candidates for local
elective positions. They have no personal or
substantial interest at stake and therefore no
locus standi. Neither can they sue as taxpayers
because the statute does not involve
disbursement of public funds. VV.
3. Social equality
Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall
give highest priority to the enactment of
measure that protect and enhance the
right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities and remove cultural inequities
by equitably diffusing wealth and political
power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall
regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
and disposition of property and its
increments.
.
IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Art. III, Sec. 4. No law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech,
of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the Government for redress of
grievance.
Id., Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be
detained solely by reason of his political
beliefs and aspirations.
xxx
A. Philosophical Basis of Guarantees
Free Market Place of Ideas
1. For the discovery of political truth
Constitutional Law II
When men have realized that time has
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-- that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market, and the truth is
the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out. (Justice Holmes, Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616. (1919)
The theory behind freedom of
expression is the principle that ours is a
democratic society, and so the only way to rule
ultimately is by, means of public opinion, which
is possible only when everyone can speak their
minds out and compete in the free market place
of ideas.
2. For self government
United States v. Bustos, 37 P 731 (1918)
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800
(1984), supra
HELD: As a consequence of the search and
seizure, the premises of the "Metropolitan Mail"
and "We Forum" were padlocked and sealed,
with the further result that the printing and
publication of said newspapers were
discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of
previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to
the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law and constitutes a virtual denial
of petitioner's freedom to express themselves in
print. This state of being is patenly anathematic
to a democratic framework where a free, alert
and even militant press is essential for the
political enlightenment and growth of the
citizenry.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 380 US 51 (1964)
3. For individual protection
B. Prior Restraints
Thus any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to the Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutionality, giving
the government a heavy burden to show
justification for the imposition of such restraint.
(New York v. United States (1971); also in New
York Times v. Pentagon and Bantam Books v.
Publication of Pentagon Papers).
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)
Subsequent Punishment
And even subsequent punishment is
tempered by the greater interest of promoting
free public opinion. The most significant
expression is the law on libel.
We consider this case against the
background of a profound national commitment
to debate on public issues being uninhibited,
robust and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials. The falsity of some of the
factual statements and alleged defamations do
not qualify the role. And just as factual error
afforded no warrant for repressing speech that
would otherwise be free, the same is true of
injury to official reputation. (New York Times v.
Sullivan, 380 U.S. 51 (1964)
The interest of society and good
government demands a full discussion of public
affairs. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is a fit subject for proper comment.
Public policy, welfare of society, and the orderly
administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable
and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege. [Justice Malcom, United States v.
Bustos, 731 (1918).]
While, uncer the Revised Penal Code,
any defamatory statement is presumed to be
malicious (malice-in-law), when the defense
proves that the communication is privileged,
such a presumption of malice does not arise
because of the greater public interest involved.
If the communication is absolutely
privileged (as in parliamentary freedom of
speech), the prosecution cannot even prove
malice-in-fact.
If the communication is only qualifiedly
privileged (Art. 354 enumerates the 2
instances: fair and true reporting of an official
proceeding; legal moral or social duty), the
burden is shifted on the prosecution to prove
malice-in-fact, which the defense can overcome
by proving the truth of the defamatory
statement (which in the case of public officials
may or may not constitute a crime, so long as
related to the conduct of his office) and good
motive.
C. Content-Based Restrictions
1. Test of validity of content-based
restrictions
The U.S. Supreme Court and, by
haphazard imitation, the Philippine Supreme
Constitutional Law II
Court, have evolved certain tests to regulate
the contents of speech.
Dangerous Tendency Test: When the
legislative body has determined generally, in
the exercise of its discretion, that utterances of
a certain kind involve such danger of a
substantive evil that they may be punished, the
question whether any specific utterance coming
within the prohibited class is likely, in and itself,
to bring the substantive evils, is not open to
consideration. In such cases, the general
provision of the statute may be constitutionally
applied to the specific utterance if its natural
and probable effect was to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body
might prohibit. [Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652
(1925).]
Example: Art. 142. Inciting to sedition.
When the legislature has decided that one who
advocates a certain conduct is guilty of a crime,
the court cannot intrude. As it evolved, this test
was supposed to apply when there is a statute,
in contrast to the clear and present danger rule
which applies when the speech is not prohibited
by statute.
Clear and Present Danger Test: The
question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree. [Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47
(1919).]
The emphasis of the test is the nature of
the circumstances under which it is uttered.
The speech itself may not be dangerous. As
Holmes said: "Many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so
long as men fight." Or saying "Fire" in a
crowded movie house.
Grave-but-improbable danger: Whether
the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such an invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.
[Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494 (1951),
quoting Judge Learned Hand.]
This test was meant to supplant the
clear and present danger. They both emphasize
the circumstances of the speech, but this latter
test consider the weighing of values.
Direct Incitement Test: The
consitutional guarantees of free speech and
press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation, except where such advocacy or peech
is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action, and is likely to incite or produce
such action. [Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969), cited in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, 134
SCRA 438 (1985).]
The test emphasizes the very words
uttered: (a) What words did he utter? (b)
What is the likely result of such utterance? It
criticizes the clear and present danger test for
being top dependent on the circumstances.
Speaker may, when tested show no incitement
but you know the speaker is inciting to sedition.
Balancing of Interest Test: The court
must undertake the delicate and difficult task of
weighing the circumstances and appraising the
substantiality of the reasons advanced in
support of the regulation of the free enjoyment
of rights. [American Communication Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 US 383 cited in Gonzales v.
COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969A)]
The test applied when two legitimate
values not involving national secuirty crimes
compete. Involves an appoint of the competing
interest. (Gonzales v. Comelec)
In Aver v. Capulong and Enrile, for
instance, it is a question of balancing the
freedom of expression of the producer and the
right to privacy of Enrile.
(not in VV's revised outline)
Balancing of Factors Test: The truth is
theat the clear-and-present danger test is over-
simplified judgement unless it takes into
account also a number of other factors: (1) the
relative seriousness of the danger in
comparison with the value of the occasion for
speech or political activity, (2) the availability
of more moderate controls than those the State
has imposed, and perhaps (3) the specific intent
with which the speech is launched. (Freund,
quoted in Dennis v. United States in the
concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
2. Applications of tests in various
contexts
a. Freedom of expression and national security
Babst v. National Intelligence Board 132
SCRA 316 (1984)
F: Petitioners are journalists and
columnists. On different dates in July 1980, they
were summoned by military authorities for
interrogation regarding their work, feelings,
sentiments, beliefs, associations and even
private lives. In addition, one of them was
Constitutional Law II
charged with libel by a General who sought to
recover P10 million in damages. They brought
an action for prohibition to stop the NIB from
questioning them and from filing libel suits on
matters that had been the subject of inquiry by
the NIB.
HELD: The petition has become moot and
academic. Be that as it may, it is not idle to
note that, while ordinarily, an invitation to
attend a hearing and answer some questions is
not illegal or constitutionally objectionable,
under certain circumstances, however, such an
invitation can easily assume a different
appearance as when it comes from a powerful
group composed predominantly of ranking
military officers and the designate interrogation
site is a military camp.
b. Freedom of expression and criticism of
official conduct: The Test of "Actual Malice"
Read Revised Penal Code, Articles 353-
354 and 361-362
Freedom of expression and libel
Freedom of speech versus right to
reputation. Libel is the most common form of
subsequent punishment. Although one cannot
be prevented from saying something before he
actually says it, one can be held liable for what
one has said if it causes damage to the rights of
others.
Soliven v. Makasiar; Beltran v. Makasiar, 167
SCRA 393 (1988)
F: The President of the Philippines filed a
complaint for libel against the petitioners, who
were the publisher and columnist of the
Philippine Star, based on the following
statement in Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987
totle "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino
Administration": "If you recall, during the
August 29 coup attempt, the President hid
under her bed while the firing was going on -
perhaps the first Commander-in-Chief to do so."
Beltran did not submit a counter affidavit and
instead, moved to dismiss the complaint. The
fiscal denied his motion. Thus, this petition for
certiorari.
HELD: xxx
(3) As regards the contention of
petitioner Beltran that he could not be held
liable for libel bec. of the privileged character of
the publication, the Court reiterates that it is
not a trier of facts and that such a defense is
best left to the trial court to appreciate after
receiving the evidence of the parties. As to
petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel
case to proceed would produce a "chilling
effect" on the press freedom, the Court finds no
basis at this stage to rule on the point. VV.
Manuel v. Cruz-Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989)
Libel suits based on official criticisms should be
dismissed outright unless made in bad faith
F: Petitioner wrote the Chairman of the
Anti-Smuggling Action Center denouncing
abuses allegedly committed by ASAC agents
against petitioner's clients. Petitioner said the
agents subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and
took her necklace and bracelet and her son's
wristwatch plus HK$ 70. But the agents were
exonerated so petitioner filed criminal charges
of robbery. Petitioner found prosecutors
unsympathetic so he filed a civil action for
damages against the agents. Later, the Bulletin
Today published a news item based on
petitioner's letter to ASAC. This became the
basis of an action for libel brought against
petitioner and his clients. Petitioner moved to
quash the case but his motion was denied.
HELD: From the viewpoint of procedural and
substantive law, the charge is defective. The
letter constitutes privileged communication. It
was sent by petitioner in his capacity as lawyer
in the discharge of his legal duty to his clients.
He could also invke his civic duty as a private
individual to expose anomalies in the public
service. The complaint was addressed to the
official who had authority over them and could
impose proper disciplinary sanctions. As an
index of good faith, the letter was sent
privately, directly to the addressee without any
funfare nor publicity. As for the news report, it is
difficult to believe that the petitioner, an
ordinary citizen without known ties to
newspaper, could have by himself caused the
publication. It does not appear either that the
report was paid for like an advertisement. At
any rate, the news item is a true and fair report
of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and
without comments or remarks. VV.
Newsweek Inc. v. IAC 142 SCRA 171 (1986)
F: Petitioner was sued for libel in
connection with the publication in the Feb. 23,
1981 issue of Newsweek of the article "An
Island of Fear." The plaintiffs, sugar planters of
Bacolod, complained that the article portrayed
them as exploiters of sugar workers. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the article was not libelous since it did not
single any particular individual. The trial court
denied the motion and petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari in the IAC which was dismissed.
Thus, this appeal to the SC.
Constitutional Law II
HELD: Where the defamation is alleged to have
been directed at a group or class, it is essential
that the statement must be so sweeping or all-
embracing as to apply to every individual in
that group or class, or sufficiently specific so
that each individual in the class or group can
prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring
the action separately if need be. The disputed
portion which refers to plaintiff Sola never
singled out Sola. The news report merely stated
that the victim had been arrested by members
of a special police unit brought into the area by
Sola, the mayor. Hence, the report referring as it
does to an official act is within the realm of
privileged and is protected by the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and press. VV.
Notes: Since the Newsweek artciles
"Island of fear in the Visayas" did not specify
any individual, it cannot be libelous. An article
must be sufficiently, specific or at least
sweeping as to apply to all members of a group,
in order to be deemed libelous.
Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 116 (1970)
The pictures of a former mayor was
inadvertently published and mistaken for
another man who was a sanitary inspector and
fooled the authorities about the Babuyan
Islands, claiming of murders there, so they
could go and he could be rescued. An erratum
was published by the This Week magazine. The
SC, quoting Quisumbing v. Lopez, however,
found for plaintiff, but with reduced damages,
since the error in in this case could have been
checked consideringing that this was a weekly
magazine and not a daily.
Quisumbing v. Fernando, 96 Phil 510 (1955)
Newspapers should be given leeway and
tolerance to enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important role in our
democracy. In the preparation of stories, press
reporters and editors usually have to race to
their deadlines; and consistently with good faith
and reasonable care, they should not be held to
account, to a point of suppression, for honest
mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
.
Mercado v. CFI of Rizal 116 SCRA 93 (1982)
F: Petitioner was accused of libel on the
basis of a telegram which he sent to the
Secretary of Public Works requesting
investigation of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of the
Public Service Commission "as we have reason
to believe that she has enriched herself thru
corrupt practices xxx." He filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that his communication
was privileged, but his motion was denied. He
filed another motion which was also denied.
Thus, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition in the SC.
HELD: US v. Bustos is a landmark decision
antedating by forty years a similar decision of
the US Supreme Court to the effect that a libel
prosecution must survive the test of whether or
not the offending publication is within the
guarantees of free speech and free press.
However, Justice Malcolm in US v. Bustos was
careful to point out that qualified privilege and
this is one instance may be "lost by proof of
malice." What casts doubt on the good faith of
petitioner is his conduct, vis--vis private
respondent. The tenacity with which petitioner
had pursued a course of conduct on its face
would seem to indicate that a doubt could
reasonably be entertained as the bona fides of
petitioner. The prosecution should be given a
chance to prove malice.
c. Freedom of expression and the right to
privacy
Lagunzad v. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979)
F: Lagunzad filmed the Moises Padilla
story based on a book written by Rodriguez.
xxx Nelly Amane who was a half-sister of
Padilla objected to the movie on the ground that
it contained a portrayal of Padilla's private and
family life, including scenes about his mother,
Maria Soto vda. de Gonzales, and a certain
"Auring" as Padilla's girl friend. Subsequently,
Nelly Amante, together w/ her sister and
mother, agreed to allow petitioner to "exploit,
use and develope the life story of Moises Padilla
for purposes of producing the pictures," in
consideration of P20,000. Petitioner paid
P5,000 but as he failed to pay the balance
agreed upon, he was sued. Judgement was
rendered against him by the trial court, w/c was
affirmed by the CA. Petitioner appealed to the
SC contending that he was forced to enter into
the agreement only to avoid financial loss
caused by delay in the showing of the movie
and the relatives of Padilla did not have a
property right in the life of M. Padilla since
Padilla was a public figure.
HELD: Petitioner's averment is not well taken.
Being a public figure does not automatically
destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The
right to invade a person's privacy to
disseminate public information does not extend
to fictional or novelized representation of a
person, no matter how a public figure he or she
may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that
petitioner exerted efforts to present the true-to-
life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits
Constitutional Law II
that he included a little romance in the film bec.
w/o it, it would be a drab story of torture and
brutality.
Freedom of expression, indeed, occupies
a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil
liberties. It is not, however, w/o limitations. In
the particular circumstances presented and
considering the obligations assumed by
petitioner under the agreement, the validity of
such agreement will have to be upheld
particular bec. the limits of freedom of
expression are reached when expression
touches upon matters of private concern. [In
the agreement signed by him, petitioner
admitted that in the picture produced, he had
"exploited the life story of Moises Padilla for
pecuniary gain, and other profit motives, and
(had) encroached upon the privacy of Moises
Padilla's immediate family, and (had) in fact
included, in the PICTURE's case, persons
portraying some of MOISES PADILLA's kin..."]
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong April 29,
1988
F: Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed
an action in the RTC of Makati to enjoin the
petitioners from producing the movie "The Four
Day Revolution," a documentary of the EDSA
Revolution in 1986 on the ground that it
violated his right to privacy. Petitioners
contended that the movie would not involve his
private life not that of his family. But the trial
court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and
ordered petitioners to desist from making the
movie making reference whatsoever to Ponce
Enrile. This, this action for certiorari.
HELD: Freedom of speech and expression
includes freedom to produce motion pictures
and to exhibit them. What is involved is a prior
restraint by the Judge upon the exercise of
speech and of expression by petitioners.
Because of the preferred character of speech
and of expression, a weighty presumption of
invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint.
The Judge should have stayed his hand
considering that the movie was yet
uncompleted and therefore there was no "clear
and present danger." The subject matter of the
movie does not relate to the private life of
Ponce Enrile. The intrusion is no more than
necessary to keep the film a truthful historical
account. He is, after all, a public figure. The line
of equilibrium in the specific context of the
instant case between freedom of speech and of
expression and the right of privacy may be
marked out in terms of a requirement that the
proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful
and historical in its presentation of facts. There
must be no showing of a reckless disregard of
truth.
Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie
on the 4-day revolution. Enrile, who had
previously been asked for the use of his
character in the movie and had refused the
offer, sued to enjoin the filming because he did
not want any mention of his and his family's
name. The SC lifted the injunction issued by
the lower court on the ground that it amounted
to prior restraint, which is no better if imposed
by the courts than if imposed by administrative
bodies or by ecclesiatical officials.
In Ayer, the reference to Enrile is
unavoidable because his name is part of history
and this cannot be changed or altered; thus his
name can be used so long as only his public life
is dwelled only. But in Lagunzad, although
Moises Padilla was also a public figure, the
movie dealth with both the public and private
lives of Moises Padilla.
d. Freedom of expression and administration of
justice (contempt of court)
In re Ramon Tulfo, AM NO. 90-4-1545-0, April 17.
1990
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 1 (1989)
Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil 152 (1957)
A contempt imposed by the court on the
party who sent a letter to the Presidential Action
Committee complaining about the delay in the
disposition of the agrarian case, was lifted by
the SC. It held that although such a letter
should have been sent to the SC and not the
PAC, it was nevertheless a valid exercise of
speech which did not significantly destroy, the
orderly administration of justice.
People v. Alarcon, 60 Phil 265 (1939)
A person can be held liable for making
comments on a pending case (sub judice) which
have the tendency to impair or obstruct the
orderly administration of justistice. But if the
case is not pending, such comment is a valid
exercise of the freedom of expression.
e. Symbolic Expression-- The Flag-
burning case
Flag burning when done to express
dissent is protected speech.
F: Respondent Johnson participated in a
political demonstration where he burned an
American flag while protesters chanted. No one
was physically injured or threatened with injury,
although several witnesses were seriously
offended by the flag burning. Johnson was
Constitutional Law II
convicted of desecration of a venerated object
in violation of a Texas statute which (1)
prohibited the desecration of, among other
things, a state or national flag, and (2) defined
desecration as the physical mistreatment of
such objects in a way which the actor knows will
seriously offend one or more persons likely to
observe or discover the act. A state court of
appeals affirmed. The Court of Criminal Appeals
of Texas reversed, holding that the desecration
statute as applied violated the defendant's right
to freedom of speech under the Federal Consti-
tution's First Amendment, because the statute
(1) was too broad for First Amendment purposes
as it related to breaches of the peace, and (2)
was not adequately supported by the state's
purported interest in preserving a symbol of
unity.
ISSUE: Whether the flag desecration statute is
unconstitutional
HELD: YES. Decision Affirmed.
Johnson's conviction was inconsistent
with the First Amendment under the particular
circumstances because (1) Johnson's conduct
was sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to implicate the First
Amendment, given that this flag burning was
the culmination of a political demonstration and
that the state conceded that the protester's
conduct was expressive; (2) the state's interest
in preventing breaches of the peace was not
implicated on the record in this case, since (a)
no disturbance of the peace actually occurred
or threatened to occur because of the flag
burning, (b) it cannot be presumed that an
audience which takes serious offense at a
particular expression is necessarily likely to
disturb the peace, and (c) the flag burning does
not fall within the small class of "fighting words"
that are likely to provoke the average person to
retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the
peace; and (3) the state's asserted interest in
preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood
and national unity does not justify the
conviction, since (a) the attempted restriction
on expression is content-based, and thus
subject to the most exacting scrutiny, given
that the flag desecration statute is aimed not at
protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all
circumstances, but only against impairments
that would cause serious offenses to others and
is aimed at protecting onlookers from being
offended by the ideas expressed by the
prohibited activity, and (b) although the state
has a legitimate interest in encouraging proper
treatment of the flag, it may not foster its own
view of the flag by prohibiting expressive
conduct relating to it and by criminally
punishing a person for burning the flag as a
means of political protest.
f. Movies Censorship
While prior restraint is the general rule,
censorship in the movies is tolerated because
by the nature of the medium, it has a greater
impact on the audience and produces instant
reaction for the ideas it presents, unlike
newspapers which are read by people
separated by walls.
Gonzales v. Katigbak, 137 SCRA 356 (1985)
F: Petitioner was the producer of the movie
Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of Review for
Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on
condition that certain deletions were made and
that it was shown on adults only. The petitioner
brought an action, claiming violation of their
freedom of expression.
HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a
method for the communication of ideas and the
expression of the artistic impulse. The power of
the Board is limited to the classification of films.
For freedom of expression is the rule and
restrictions the exception. The power to impose
prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the
presumption is against its validity. Censorship is
allowable only under the clearest proof of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil
to public safety, public morals, public health or
any other legitimate public interest. The Board
committed an abuse of discretion in subjecting
petitioner to difficulty and travail before the
movie was classified as "For adults only"
without deletion. However there is not enough
votes to consider the abuse of discretion grave
as it explained that there were reasons for its
action because of the scenes showing women
erotically dancing naked and kissing and
caressing each other like lesbians. VV.
Notes: The movie involved in this case
was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the censors
wanted to cut in some part and to label "For
Adults". The SC rules that movies are within the
constitutional protection of freedom of
expression, so that censorship is presumed to
be valid as constituting prior restraint. The only
case whe the Board of Censors can order a
deletion is when there is a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil against national
security or public morals or other public
interest. In all other cases, the Board can only
classify.
But a different standard must be
followed in television because of the pervasive
and intrusive influence of the medium on
people who watch its programs without having
to pay anything.
Constitutional Law II
On the issue of obscenity, the SC held
that sex along is not necessarily obscenity, the
test being whether, using contemporary
community standards, the dominant appeal us
to the prurient interest. (Miller v. California).
Thus on this score, it found abuse of discretion
of the part of the Board for subjecting the
producer to difficulty and for entertaining a
narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked the votes
to rules that the abuse was grave.
Tests of obscenity:
(1) Whether the average person,
applying contemporary community standards,
would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest.
(2) Whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable
law.
(3) Whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value. (Miller v. California, 37 L. Ed.
2d 419.)
g. Radio Broadcast
In Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans, 137
SCRA 647, the SC held that radio broadcast also
enjoys the protection of the freedom of
expression. If closed down, the owners enjoy
the rights to due process according to the
standards set in Ang Tibay v. CIR.
But radio deserves greater regulation
than newspapers because it could invade the
privacy of everyone for no fee, and it is such
that one is likely to listen to what is being said.
Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) V. Dans, 137
SCRA 647 (1985)
F: The petitioners filed this action to
compel respondent government officials to
allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE after
it had been closed for allegedly having been
used to incite the people to sedition. The
petitioner contended that it was denied due
process because no hearing was held and no
proof was submitted to establish a factual basis
for the closure. However, before the Court could
promulgate its decision the petitioner filed a
motion to withdraw its action on the ground
that it had sold the radio station to Manuel
Pastrana and that the National
Telecommunications Commission had expressed
its willingness to grant the requisite license.
HELD: The case has been moot and academic.
However, for the guidance of the inferior courts
and administrative bodies, the following
guidelines must be observed: 1) The cardinal
primary requirements in administrative
proceedings as laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR
should be followed before a broadcast station
may be closed; 2) All forms of communication
are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, the
freedom of television and radio broadcasting is
somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom
accorded to newspapers and print media. This
limitation derives from the fact the broadcast
media have a uniquely pervasive presence in
the lives of all Filipinos; 3) The government has
a right to be protected against broadcasts which
incite listeners to violently overthrow it; and 4)
Broadcast stations deserve the special
protection given to all forms of media by the
due process and freedom of expression clauses
of the Constitution.
h. Freedom of Information
Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the
people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to, official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis
for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 (1976)
Access of official records (the docket
book) for any lawful purpose (to look into the
criminal cases for a report on the peace and
order situation of the municipality) is
guaranteed. But it is subject to reasonable
conditions by the custodian of the records.
Garcia v. BOI, 177 SCRA 374 (1989)
D. Content-Neutral Restrictions
O'brien test: A government regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the government; if it
furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged freedom of expression is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. [US v. O'brien, 391 US 367 (1968),
adopted in Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712
(1992)]
1. Regulation of political campaign
Constitutional Law II
National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1
(1992)
F: Petitioners herein were representatives
of mass media which were prevented from
selling and donating space or air time for
political advertisements under RA 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a
violation of the constitutional right to freedom
of expression.
RULING: NO. The Comelec has been expressly
authorized by the Constitution to supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the
franchises or permits for the operation f media
of communication and information. The
fundamental purposes of such power are to
ensure "equal opportunity, time, and space, and
the right to reply," as well as uniform and
reasonable rates of charges for the use of such
media facilities, in connection with "public
information campaigns and forums among
candidates."
Of course, the law limits the right of free
speech and of access to mass media of the
candidates themselves. The limitation however,
bears a clear and reasonable connection with
the objective set out in the Constitution. For it is
precisely in the unlimited purchase of print
space and radio and television time that the
resources of the financially affluent candidates
are likely to make a crucial difference.
Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)
F: Petitoner, Adiong, a 1992 senatorial
candidate, assails Comelec Resolution No. 2347
insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers on mobile places, public or private, and
limits their location or publication to authorized
posting areas.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is
constitutional.
RULING: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on
the citizen's fundamental right of free speech.
There is no public interest substantial enough to
warrant the kind of restriction involved in this
case. The posting of decals amd stickers in
mobile places does not endanger any
substantial government or public interest.
Under the clear and present danger rule, not
only must the danger be patently clear and
pressingly present but the evil sought to be
avoided, must be so substantive as to justify a
clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument
to be stilled.
Significantly, the freedom of expression
curtailed by the prohibition is not so much that
of the candidate or the political party. The
regulation strikes at the freedoom of an
individual to express his preference and, by
displaying it on his car, to convince others to
agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a
candidate but once the car owner agrees to
have it placed on his private vehichle, the
expression becomes a statement by the owner,
primarily his own and not of anybody else.
Morever, The restriction is so broad that
it encompasses even the citizen's private
property, which in this case is a privately owned
vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition,
another cardinal right guaranteed under the
Constitution is violated which is that no person
shall be deprived of his property without due
proocess of law.
2. Freedom of Assembly
Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Blg. 580)
A permit to hold a rally must be filed
with the Office of the Mayor at least, five
working days before the day of the rally.
But no permit from the mayor is
required in case the rally is going to be held in
(i) freedom parks, (ii) inside a private property
(provide with consent of the owner), and (iii)
campuses of state universities (which are left to
university authorities)
The application must be in writing and
must include: (1) names of the organizers and
leaders, (2) date and time, place and street, (3)
size (4)manner of the use of the street, (5)
sound system to be used (6)purpose. It must
also have a statement of the duties of the
rallyists.
The written application is filed with the
Office of the Mayor. Acknowledgemet is given
of its receipt. If the Mayor refuses to accept the
application, then it is enough for filing purposes
if a copy is posted in the premises.
The Mayor has 2 working days to act on
the application. If he does not act, it is deemed
granted.
But if he thinks that the rally creates a
"clear and present danger" to public peace,
order, health, etc., and he has proof of this, he
should not deny the application right away. He
should hold a hearing during which the
applicant can be heard. If after hearing he is
still not satisfied that no danger exists, then he
can deny the application.
The applicant can then go to any court
other than the Supreme Court for the review of
the decision of denial of the mayor. The courts
have 24 hours to act on the petition. If the
judgment is a reversal of the denial, or in any
Constitutional Law II
case if the applicant is satisfied with the
decision, the judgment becomes final and
executory immediately, and no appeal can be
taken by the local authorities anymore.
But if the decision is not satisfactory to
the applicant, then he has 48 hours from receipt
to appeal to the SC.
During the rally, the police must be
limited to maintaining peace and order and so
must stay away by 100 meters from the
rallyists. They must be in full uniform, with
their names visibly written. They can carry no
firearm except a nighstick, but they are allowed
protective devices.
If they anticipate trouble, the police
must call the attention of the leader of the
rallyists. When trouble actually erupts, the
police must not disperse the crowd right away
but first give a warning. If violence persists,
they must give a second warning. If still
violence continues, only then can they fight
back.
If a rally does not have a permit, the
police can disperse the crowd, but they cannot
use violence. Penalty is imposed only on the
leaders and organizers.
Among the duties of the rallyists are: (a)
to inform the members of their duty under the
law, (b) to police their own rank, and (c) to
cooperate with local authorities in maintaining
peace and order.
Notes: The freedom to use public places
to peaceably assemble is best expressed thus:
"Wherever the title or steets and parks may
rest, they have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and, time out of time
have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thought betwee citizens, and
discussing public questions." (Justice Roberts.
Hague v. CIO)
Although under a "permit system",
before one can use a public place, one must
first obtain prior permit from the proper
authorities, the principle has always been that
one has the right to a permit, subject only to
reasonable regulation. The validity of the
permit system has been upheld by the Court,
provided, (a) it is concered only with the time,
place and manner of assembly ad (b) it does
not vest on the licensing authority unfettered
discretion in choosing the groups which could
use the public place and discriminate others.
As held by the SC in Primicias vs Fugoso,
80 Phil. 71, the City Ordinance of Manila giving
authority to the Mayor to issue permits for
parades should be construed to be limited to
the time, place, and manner of the parades
socially to secure public order, convenience and
welfare. Thus, denying the Nacionalista Party a
permit to hold a rally at the Plaza Miranda on
the ground that passions raised by the recent
national election were still high and a rally to
protest election anomalies could only
exacerbate the matter, was overturned by the
court.
Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71
F: This is an action for mandamus
instituted by petitioner Primicias, campaign
manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties, to
compel Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila to
issue a permit for the holding of a peaceful
public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose
of petitioning the government for redress of
grievances. The Mayor denied the application
on the ground that passions still run high due to
the recent election, and a rally to protest
election anomalies might threaten breaches of
the peace and disruption of public order.
ISSUE: W/n the Mayor can refuse to grant the
permit.
RULING: NO. The police power granted to the
Mayor under the Ordinance enacted by the
Municipal Board pursuant to its authority under
the Revised Administrative Code which pertains
to the use of streets and public places, can be
construed only to mean the power to regulate,
which means and includes the power to control,
govern, and to restrain but cannot be construed
as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit."
The Court quoted with approval the
decision in the American case Cox v. State of
New Hampshire, " a statute requiring persons
using public streets for a parade or procession
to procure a special license therefor from the
local authorities is not an unconstitutional
abridgement of the rights of assembly or of
freedom of speech and press, where, as the
statute is construed by the state courts, the
licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the
issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the
time, place, and manner of the parade or
procession, with a view to conserving the public
convenience and of affording an opportunity to
provide proper policing, and are not invested
with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse
license..."
But under the same ordinance, the SC,
in Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970),
upheld the mayor's refusal to grant permit to a
group during weekdays, on a finding that
Constitutional Law II
everytime there was an announced rally, stores
closed and business was gravely affected
because of violent incidents. It found the policy
of the mayor to allow rallies only during
weekends to be reasonable.
Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970)
F: The petitioner, acting in behalf of the
Movement for a Democratic Philippines (MDP),
an association of students, workers and
peasants, applied for a permit from the Mayor
of Manila to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda.
Respondent Mayor denied the application to
hold the rally on the date and time specified by
petitioners in view of the events that transpired
during the last demonstration held by them
which ended in the destruction of public and
private property, loss of a few lives, injuries to a
score of other persons and the closing down of
schools, offices and many stores. The Mayor
suggested that the MDP utilize the Sunken
Gardens near Intramuros for its rally and that
the rally be held during weekends and earlier
during the day so that it may end before dark.
Petitioner challenged the action of the
Mayor on the ground that the same constitutes
a violation of their right to freedom of assembly.
Petitioner contended that the right of the people
to peaceful assembly and to petition the
government for redress of grievances may be
exercised without the prior necessity of
securing a permit from the government and
that such right cannot be fully enjoyed without
the corresponding right to use public places for
that purpose.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor`s denial to
issue a permit amounted to a violation of
petitioner`s right to freedom of assembly.
HELD: NO.
The respondent Mayor has not denied
nor absolutely refused the permit sought by
petitioner. He has expressed willingness to
grant the permit for the peaceful assembly
during certain days and time, and at a place
when they would not disrupt the normal
activities of the community.
The respondent mayor possesses
reasonable discretion to determine or specify
the streets or public places to be used for the
assembly in order to secure convenient use
thereof by others and provide adequate and
proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder
and maintain public safety and order.
Petitioner has failed to show a clear
specific legal duty on the part of respondent
Mayor to grant their application for a permit
unconditionally. Experience in connection with
present assemblies and demonstrations have
shown that they pose a clear and imminent
danger of public disorders, breaches of the
peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an
aftermath of such assemblies, which, petitioner
has manifested, it has no means of preventing.
Charo.
In Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956), the
majority upheld the mayor's denial of permit to
members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect for
the use of a klosk within the town plaza in order
to avoid any untoward incident with members
of the Roman Catholic Church, whose tenets are
opposed to those of the petitioners, and whose
church is very near the klosk.
Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956)
F: The Mayor denied a permit to the
members of the Jehovah's Witnesses to use the
kiosk in the town plaza for the purpose of
holding a public lecture on the ground that the
permit, if granted, may give rise to disturbance
of the religious ceremonies being performed by
the Catholic Church which was said to be within
hearing distance from the kiosk and which
might lead to any untoward incident with
members of the rival denomination.
ISSUE: W/N the denial is valid.
In J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA
553 (1983), the SC found no basis for the denial
of permit to the Anti-Bases Coalition to hold a
march from Luneta to the street fronting the
U.S. Embassy. It affirmed the general rule that
the use of streets is free to all. It found the fear
entertained by city authorities that the rallyists
might be agirated by provocateurs to be
unfounded, given the report of the NPD that
adequate security measures were provided by
the police.
The Court did not rule on the validity of
the ordinance of Manila prohibiting any rally
within 200 meters from any foreign embassy as
a means of complying with the Geneva
Convention that requires the host country to
protect the premises and personnel of the
embassy.
Then it gave guidelines for the issuance
of permits (now in BP 9801 (i) any group which
applies must do so within a sufficient time so
the authority can have time to act: (ii) if a
disagreement arises over a denial of a permit,
the applicant can question the denial in the
lower court, which can try questions of fact and
law, and (iii) appeal can be made to the SC on
an expedited procedure.
Constitutional Law II
J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983)
F: Retired Justice JBL Reyes, on behalf of
the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from
the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and
rally on Oct. 26, 1983 starting 2 p.m. from
Luneta to the gates of the US Embassy. He filed
this petition because as of Oct. 20, there was
yet no action on his request to hold a rally.
HELD: Free speech, like free press, may be
identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public concern without
censorship or punishment. There is to be no
previous retraint whether in the form of libel
suits, prosecution for damages, or contempt
proceedings unless there is a "clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
right to prevent." There can be no legal
objection, absent the existence of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil to the
holding of a peaceful rally at Luneta. Neither
can there be objection to the use of the streets
up to gates of the US Embassy. A statute
requiring persons to secure a special license to
use public streets for a procession is not
unconstitutional. The licensing of authorities are
strictly limited to the consideration of the time,
place and manner and the authorities are not
invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or
refuse a permit.
In German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514
(1985), the SC upheld the power of the city
authorities to close JP Laurel Street fronting
Malacanang from all rallies as a form of "area
restriction", in order to protect the President
and his family, based on the incident in the
early 70s when the gates of the palace were
almost stormed. The rallyists in this case
purported to merely worship at St. Jude's.
In case a rally is held in a private place,
no permit from the mayor is required. However,
the consent of the owner of the place must be
acquired.
German v. Barangan 35 SCRA 514 (1985)
F: On Oct. 2, 1984 the petitioners who
were businessmen, students and employees,
met on JP Laurel Street in Manila for the
ostensible purpose of hearing mass at the St.
Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacaang
grounds. They wore yellow T-shirts and, with
clenched fists, marched on the street and
shouted anti-government invectives. They were
stopped from proceeding to the chapel by the
Presidential Security Command. They brought
an action for mandamus.
HELD: The yellow T-shirts worn by some of the
marchers, their fists clenched and chants of
anti-government investives support the
government's claim that the petitioners purpose
was not really to worship at the chapel but to
hold an anti-government demonstration close to
the residence of the President. The restricted
use of JP Laurel Street is justified. The need to
secure the safety of heads of states cannot be
overemphasized. The threat to their lives is
constant and felt throughout the world. The
petitioners were not restrained in their freedom
of religion but only in the manner by which they
had attempted to translate the same into
action.
In Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359
(1984) and Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985),
the SC upheld the right to expression of
students who held a rally in a private
university. But since they held it beyond the
time granted in a place other than the one
allowed by the administration, their suspension
was condoned.
Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984)
F: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme
Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation. They were granted a
permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger
of two units of the university. On the scheduled
date, the students continued their meeting
beyond the scheduled time and held it in a
different place from that indicated in the permit.
They expressed in a vehement language their
opposition to the merger and as a result,
classes and office work was disturbed.
Petitioners were placed under preventive
suspension. On appeal, they were found guilt of
holding an illegal assembly and oral
defamation. They were suspended for one
academic year. They filed a petition for
certiorari in the SC.
HELD: The petititon may be considered moot
and academic considering that the TRO issued
by the SC allowed the students to enroll. But
there is a need to pass squarely on the
constitutional question. Respect for the
constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and
free speech calls for the setting aside of the
order of suspension. Suspending them for one
year is out of proportion considering that the
vigorous presentation of views was expected.
The excitement of the occasion, the propensity
of speakers to exaggerate and the exuberance
of the youth should be taken into consideration.
Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985)
F: Petitioners were officers and members of
the Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation. They were refused
Constitutional Law II
enrollment for having led a rally on Sept. 28,
1982.
HELD: As held in Malabanan v. Ramento: "If in
the course of such demonstration, with an
enthusiastic audience goading them on,
utterances, extremely critical, at times even
vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite
understandable. They would be ineffective if
during the rally they speak in the guarded and
judicious language of the academe. At any rate,
even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to
accord full credence to their fiery exhortations.
They take into account the excitement of the
occasion, the propensity of speakers to
exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. xxx" The
refusal of the university to enroll the students is
a highly disproportionate penalty.
Notes: Note that while the permit
system is not allowed in the case of publication,
it is allowed in the case of assembly. In
publication, censorship is presumptively
unconstitutional. There is very little possibility
or justification for the regulation of news. The
remedy in this case is prosecution or
subsequent punishment.
But in assembly regulation is allowed
because it is needed by the very nature of the
expression, when people use streets, they may
deprive other groups which want to use the
streets too. So as long as only the incidents of
speech are regulated, the measure is
constitutionally acceptable.
Nestle Phils. Inc. v. Sanchez 154 SCRA 541
(1987)
F: While these cases were pending in the
SC, the labor unions involved intensified the
pickets they had been conducting in front of the
Padre Faura gate of the Court and set up picket
quarters, at times obstructing access to and
egress from the Court's premises. When
required to show cause why they should not be
held in contempt of court, their lawyer
apologized and assured that the above incident
would not be repeated.
HELD: The Court will not hesitate in future
similar situations to apply the full force of the
law and punish for contempt those who attempt
to pressure the Court into acting one way or the
other in any case pending before it. Grievances
must be ventilated in the proper channels, i.e.
through appropriate petitions or pleadings in
keeping with the respect due the courts as
impartial administrators of justice. Moreover,
"parties have a constitutional right to have the
causes tried fairly in court by an impartial
tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public
clamor xxx" The acts of respondents are not
only an affront to the dignity of this Court but
equally a violation of the above-stated right of
the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.
3. Freedom of Association and the right to
strike in the public sector
Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the
people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
The inclusion of the right to unionize in
this article is ill-advised because while the right
to unionize is an economic and labor right, the
right to association in general is a civil- political
right.
Discussed elsewhere is the argument
why public employees cannot engage in
collective bargaining and strike.
SSS Employees Assn vs CA, 175 SCRA 686
(1989)
F: SSS filed w/ the RTC-QC a complaint for
damages w/ a prayer for a writ of prel inj.
against petitioners SSSEA, alleging that the
officers and members of the latter staged an
illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to
the SSS building preventing non-striking
employees from reporting to work and SSS
members from transacting business w/ SSS.
The Public Sector Labor-Management Council
ordered the strikers to return to work but the
strikers refused to do so. The SSSEA went on
strike bec. SSS failed to act on the union's
demands.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, w/c motion
was denied. The restraining order w/c was
previously issued was converted into an
injunction after finding the strike illegal.
Petitioners appealed the case to the CA. The
latter held that since the employees of SSS are
govt employees, they are not allowed to
strike.
HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not
resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary
work stoppages, like workers in the private
sector, in order to pressure the Govt. to accede
to their demands. As now provided under Sec.
4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to
Govern the Exercise of the Right of Govt. EEs to
Self-Organization which took effect after the
initial dispute arose, the terms and conditions of
employment in the Govt, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt.
owned and controlled corporations with original
charters, are governed by law and employees
therein shall not strike for the purpose of secur-
ing changes thereof.
Constitutional Law II
The statement of the court in Alliance of
Govt Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment (124 SCRA 1) is relevant as it
furnishes the rationale for distinguishing bet.
workers in the private sector and govt
employees w/ regard to the right to strike?
Since the terms and conditions of
govt. employment are fixed by
law, govt. workers cannot use the
same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to
secure concessions from their
employers. The principle behind
labor unionism in private industry
is that industrial peace cannot be
secured through compulsion of
law. Relations bet. private
employers and their employees
rest on an essentially voluntary
basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and
other labor and welfare
legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the
unionized private sector are
settled through the process of
collective bargaining. In govt
employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly
given delegated power, the
administrative heads of govt w/c
fix the terms and conditions of
employment. And this is effected
through statutes or
administrative circulars, rules,
and regulations, not through
CBA's
E. Academic Freedom
Garcia v. Faculty of Admission, 68 SCRA 277
(1975)
F: The FAC of the Loyola School of
Theology refused to readmit petitioner, Garcia,
in its M.A. program because they felt that "her
frequent questions and difficulties were not
always pertinent and had the effect of slowing
down the progress of the class;" that it would be
"to the best interest (of the petitioner) to work
with a faculty that is more compatible with her
orientation. Garcia assailled her expulsion for
being unreasonable; that the reasons given
therefor were invalid for nowhere did it appear
that her conduct constituted a violation of the
school's regulations and grave misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not the FAC can be
compelled by mandamus to readmit petitioner.
RULING: NO. The Constitution recognizes the
enjoyment by institutions of higher learning of
the right to academic freedom. The school
decides for itself its aims and objectives and
how best to attain them. It is free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy
certainly extending to the choice of the
students.
The collective liberty of an organization
is by no means the same thing as the freedom
of the individual members within it. In
considering the problems of academic freedom,
one must distinguish between autonomy of the
university, as a corporate body, and the
freedom of the individual university teacher.
The personal aspect of the freedom
consists of the right of each university teacher
to seek and express the truth as he personally
sees it, both in his academic work and in his
capacity as a private citizen. This status of the
individual teacher is as important as the status
of the institution to which he belongs and
through which he disseminates learning.
On other hand, the internal conditions
for academic freedom in a university are that
the academic staff should have de facto control
of the following functions: (a) admission and
examination of students; (b) curricula for
courses of study; (c) appointment and tenure of
office of academic staff; and (d) allocation of
income among the different categories of
expenditure. It is the business of a university to
proviide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation. It is an atmosphere in which the four
essential freedoms of a university prevail - to
determine for itself who may teach, what may
be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may
be admitted to study.
For the above reason, mandamus is not
available for the petitioner. There is no duty on
the part of the School to admit her to study
since the School clearly has the discretion to
turn down even qualified applicants due to
limitations of space, facilities, professors and
optimum classroom size and component
considerations. There are standards to meet
and policies to pursue. What a student
possesses is a privilege rather than a right.
UP v. Ayson, 176 SCRA 647 (1989)
F: In 1972, the UP BOR approved the
establishment of the UPCB Highshool to serve,
among others, "as a laboratory and
demonstration school for prospective teachers -
provided that UPCBHS must be self-supporting."
However, the Dept of Professional Education in
Baguio was never organized. So, the BOR
decided to phase out UPCBHS for failing to
attain the conditions for its creation. The
UPCBHS Foundation Inc. sought to restrain the
University from phasing out the UPCBHS.
Constitutional Law II

ISSUE: Is secondary public education

demandable in an institution of higher learning
such as the UP?

RULING: NO. UP invokes its exercise of

academic freedom. Private respondent invokes
the right to quality education and to free
secondary education.
The rights invoked by private
respondent may be asserted only as against the
Government through the DECS. UP was created
under its charter to provide advanced tertiary
education. An institute of higher learning cannot
be compelled to provide for secondary
education.
It is beyond cavil that UP as an
institution of higher learning enjoys academic
freedom. UPCBHS was established subject to a
number of conditionalities. Failing on such
conditions, UP can order its abolition on
academic grounds. Charo.

UP v. CA, Feb. 9, 1993

F: Former PANAMIN Minister Manuel

Elizalde and the Tasaday representative filed a
complaint for damages and declaratory relief
against UP Professors Jerome Bailen and Zeus
Salazar who disputed the authenticity of the
Tasaday find and made a proposition in various
conferences attended by them that Elizalde
merely fabricated the discovery of the
Tasadays.
UP intervened, aaserting its duty to
protect the respondents as faculty members for
acts and utterances made in the exercise of
academic freedom. The lower court denied UP's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action. Hence this petition.

RULING: With respect to the prayer of the

complaint for "judgment declaring the Tasadays
to be a distinct ethnic community, the lower
court is cautioned that the same is akin to a
prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine
citizenship which may not be granted in a
petition for declaratory relief. The complaint
was filed mainly to vindicate plaintiff's dignity
and honor.
Indeed, it is beyond the province of the
court to make pronouncements on matters
beyond its ken and expertise. To be sure, in
resolving the complaint for damages, the court
may find congruence in what is justiciable and
what falls within the field of the sciences. Still, it
is best to keep in mind that its proper role and
function is the determination of legal issues.