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DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The Facts:
The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,4 granted the petition
and reversed the RTC decision. The decision, including the
decretal portion, partially reads:
[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer
scrutiny of the records reveals, as correctly noted by the Solicitor
General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. x x x.
xxxx
In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the
evidence adduced by Robert fell short of establishing the fact that
at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a
psychological defect which in fact deprived [her] of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.5
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
II
III
Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his
marriage even in the absence of any medical, psychiatric or
psychological examination of the wife by a competent and
qualified professional. To bolster his claim, he avers that the
Metropolitan Tribunal already declared that Luz exhibited grave
lack of discretion in judgment concerning the essential rights and
obligations mutually given and accepted in marriage. The said
decision was affirmed by the NAMT.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. x x x.
xxxx
x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x.
The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law
that based on the deposition of the petitioner the respondent
understandably ignored the proceedings completely for which she
was duly cited for Contempt of Court and premised on the
substantially concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the woman
Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through her
action and reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-in-
fact, her grave lack of due discretion in judgement for marriage
intents and purposes basically by reason of her immaturity of
judgement as manifested by her emotional ambivalence x x x.
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision
of the RTC. (Emphases in the original; Underscoring supplied)
xxxx
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ATTESTATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Footnotes
2 Id. at 76-77.
3 Id. at 48.
5 Id. at 57-59.
6 Id. at 76.
9 G.R. No. 159594, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 33, 42-43.
10 335 Phil. 664, 676 678 (1997).
15 Rollo, p. 83.
17 609 Phil. 316, 336 (2009), also citing Santos v. Santos, supra.
Case Digest
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Did the totality of the evidence adduced by Robert prove that Luz
is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code?
RULING:
No. The Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological
incapacity
contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations," not
merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse. Indeed, to be declared clinically or
medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to
perform one's duties is another.
FERNANDO, J.:
Footnotes
5 Petition, Annex A.
6 Ibid, Annex B.
8 64 Phil. 33.
11 Petition, Annex A.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid, Annex B.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid, Annex C.
16 Ibid.
19 Ibid, 391-392.
23 Ibid.
28 Ibid, 630.
31 Ibid, 738.
32 42 Phil. 886.
33 Ibid, 899-900.
35 70 Phil. 141.
36 Ibid, 148.
37 80 Phil. 770.
38 Ibid, 774-775.
Case Digest
FACTS:
RULING:
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Case
The .38 caliber revolver without serial number and four (4) live
ammunitions, subject of the offense, are ordered delivered to any
authorized representative of the Philippine National Police,
Firearms and Explosives Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City.[2]
The Facts
While inside the hut, appellant surrendered to the team two cans
containing dried marijuana fruiting tops. One can contained
twenty (20) bricks of fruiting tops. The team searched the hut in
the presence of appellant and his live-in partner. They found a
plastic container under the kitchen table, which contained four (4)
big bricks of dried marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber revolver
with four live ammunitions. The team seized the prohibited drug,
the revolver and ammunitions. The team seized and signed a
receipt for the seized items. Barangay Captain Barnachea and
SPO1 Edgar Bermudez of the Masinloc Police Station also signed
the receipt as witnesses. SPO1 Buloron and his companions
arrested appellant and brought him to San Marcelino, Zambales.
Miguel Buccat, who personally knew the accused for about ten
(10) years, identified the house depicted on a photograph as that
house belonging to the accused.[9] (Citations omitted)
Moreover, the RTC held that no less than the barangay captain of
the place named in the search warrant led the police to the
house. Thus, appellant could not deny that he owned it.
The Issues
Main Issue:
The only link that can be made between appellant and the subject
hut is that it was bought by his brother Leonardo a.k.a. Narding
Estella.[18] We cannot sustain the OSGs supposition that since it
was being rented by the alleged live-in partner of appellant, it
follows that he was also occupying it or was in full control of it. In
the first place, other than SPO1 Bulorons uncorroborated
testimony, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to
prove that the person renting the hut was indeed the live-in
partner of appellant -- if he indeed had any. Moreover, the
testimony of Barnachea serves to undermine, not advance, the
position of the prosecution. We quote from his testimony:
Q Do you know who is the owner of that house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, so far how many people [rented] that place or that house?
A Because when I asked Eva she replied that they [were] only
renting that house, sir.
A No, sir.
Q So, what you know is that Eva lives alone in that house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you do not know if the accused was renting [it] or not?
At most, the testimony shows that the subject hut was bought by
Narding Estella and rented by someone named Eva. The attempt
to make it appear that appellant occupied it, or that it was under
his full control, is merely conjectural and speculative. We have
often ruled that courts do not rely on evidence that arouses mere
suspicion or conjecture.[20] To lead to conviction, evidence must
do more than raise the mere possibility or even probability of
guilt.[21] It must engender moral certainty.
The OSG maintains that when appellant was shown the search
warrant and asked about the existence of prohibited drug in his
possession, appellant went inside the hut, took his stock of
marijuana and turned it [over] to the police officers.[23] This,
according to the prosecution, clearly showed that he was not only
occupying the hut, but was in fact using it to store the prohibited
drug.[24]
In the case at bar, we believe that the trial court erred in adopting
the prosecutions dubious story. It failed to see patent
inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses testimonies about
the search undertaken.
PROS. QUINTILLAN:
Q When the police officer showed that search warrant what did
Antonio Estella said, if any, if you hear[d]?
Q And you saw him and then the search warrant was presented,
isnt it?
A Yes, sir.
A What they did they show to Tony the search warrant and I also
read the contents of the search warrant, sir.
Q And when Tony was shown that search warrant what did he do
immediately after being shown that search warrant?
A He just [sat] and then he stood up, sir.
Q And where did Antonio Estella go when the police entered the
house?
INTERPRETER:
COURT:
PROS. QUINTILLAN:
Q And when the police entered the house did not Tony go with
them?
The OSG argues that [e]ven assuming that appellant was not the
occupant of the hut, the fact remains that he voluntarily
surrendered the marijuana to the police officers. After appellant
had surrendered the prohibited stuff, the police had a right to
arrest him even without a warrant and to conduct a search of the
immediate vicinity of the arrestee for weapons and other unlawful
objects as an incident to the lawful arrest.[31]
Given this backdrop, the police authorities cannot claim that the
search was incident to a lawful arrest. Such a search presupposes
a lawful or valid arrest and can only be invoked through Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which we
quote:
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7 Rule 112.
In the case before us, searched was the entire hut, which cannot
be said to have been within appellants immediate control. Thus,
the search exceeded the bounds of that which may be considered
to be incident to a lawful arrest.
Objections to the
SO ORDERED.
[2] Assailed Decision, pp. 20-21; rollo, pp. 40-41; records, pp. 237-
238.
[9] Appellants Brief, pp. 7-9; rollo, pp. 73-75; signed by Atty.
Sancho A. Abasta Jr.
[10] This case was deemed submitted for decision upon this
Courts receipt of Appellees Brief on August 6, 2001. Appellants
Brief was filed on March 27, 2001. The filing of a Reply Brief was
deemed waived, as none had been filed within the reglementary
period.
[11] Appellants Brief, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 69-70. Original in upper
case.
[12] Art. III, 2 of the 1987 Constitution, provides: The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
[13] Art. III, 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, provides: Any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
[21] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] People v. Rafael, 343 SCRA 97, October 13, 2000; People v.
Mendoza, 332 SCRA 485, May 31, 2000; People v. Badon, 308
SCRA 175, June 10, 1999; People v. Compendio Jr., 258 SCRA 254,
July 5, 1996.
[32] Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1999 7th rev.
ed., p. 527.
Case Digest
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether the search undertaken inside the hut during which the
incriminating evidence was allegedly recovered was legal.
RULING:
vs.
vs.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Facts
Jose T. Lajom (Lajom)7 and his mother Vicenta Vda. De Lajom
(Vda. De Lajom)8 were the registered owners of several parcels of
land with an aggregate area of 27 hectares (ha.), more or less,
located at Alua, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-707859 issued by the Registry of
Deeds ofNueva Ecija (subject land).
For its part, the LBP agreed with the DAR valuation and insisted
that PD 27 and EO 228, on which the DAR valuation was based,
were never abrogated by the passage of RA 6657,contrary to
Lajoms stance.22
In a Decision23 dated March 11, 2004, the RTC rejected the DAR
valuation and, using the formula Land Value = (AGP x 2.5
Hectares x Government Support Price [GSP] x Area) under PD 27
and EO 228, fixed the just compensation for the subject portion at
the total amount of P3,858,912.00, with legal interest at the rate
of 6% p.a. from 1991 until fully paid.24
The RTC set the AGP at 160 cavans of palayper ha. per year,
taking judicial notice of the fact that the normal production of 120
cavans thereof per ha. per year has been increased with the
"advent of new modern farm technology" coupled with the
utilization of high-breed variety of palay, good weather, and
continuous supply of irrigated water.25 With respect to the GSP,
the RTC pegged the same at P400.00, per certification from the
National Food Authority fixing the GSP at the same amount as of
1991, when the subject portion was actually expropriated.26
Using the above formula, therefore, the RTC computedthe just
compensation as follows: AGP (160) x 2.5 x GSP (P400.00) x Area
(24.1182 has.) = P3,858,912.00.27
The CA Ruling
Case law instructs that when the agrarian reform process under
PD 27 remains incomplete and is overtaken by RA 6657, such
aswhen the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be
settled, as in this case, such just compensation should be
determined and the process concluded under RA 6657, with PD 27
and EO 228 applying only suppletorily.39 Hence, where RA 6657 is
sufficient, PD27 and EO 228 are superseded.40
Records show that even before Lajom filed a petition for the
judicial determination of just compensation in May 1993, RA 6657
had already taken effect on June 15, 1988. Similarly, the
emancipation patents had been issued in favor of the farmer-
beneficiaries prior to the filing of the said petition, and both the
taking and the valuation of the subject portion occurred after the
passage of RA 6657. Quite evidently, the matters pertaining to
the correct just compensation award for the subject portion were
still in contention at the time RA 6657 took effect; thus, as
correctly ruled by the CA, its provisions should have been applied,
with PD 27 and EO 228 applying only suppletorily.
As a final word, the Court would like to emphasize that while the
agrarian reform program was undertaken primarily for the benefit
of our landless farmers, this undertaking should, however, not
result in the oppression of landowners by pegging the cheapest
value for their lands. Indeed, although the taking of properties for
agrarian reform purposes is a revolutionary kind of expropriation,
it should not be carried out at the undue expense of landowners
who are also entitled to protection under the Constitution and
agrarian reform laws.56
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The Decision dated
February 26, 2008 and the Resolution dated October 17, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89545 which: (a) upheld
the valuation of the subject portion computed by the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23 (RTC) without, however,
taking into account the factors enumerated under Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 6657, as amended; and (b) deleted the interest
award pegged at the rate of 6% per annum (p.a.) from 1991 until
fully paid and, instead, awarded the interest at the rate of 12%
p.a. in the nature of damages from March 11, 2004 until fully
paid, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Civil Case No.
1483-AF is REMANDED to the RTC for reception of evidence on the
issue of just compensation in accordance with the guidelines set
in this Decision. The RTC is directed to conduct the proceedings in
said case with reasonable dispatch and submit to the Court a
report on its findings and recommended conclusions within sixty
(60) days from notice of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Chief Justice
Footnotes
2 Rollo (G.R. No. 184982), pp. 39-91; rollo (G.R. No 185048), pp.
54-70.
4 Id. at 7-9.
7 Records show that Jose T. Lajom died during the pendency of his
petition before the RTC or on June 28, 1999 (see Certificate of
Death; id. at 289) and that he was substituted by his heirs Porfirio
Rodriguez, et al. (see Orders of the RTC dated May 21, 2002 and
May 27, 2001; id. at 320 and 321, respectively).
9 Id. at 291-293.
12 Id. at 300-311.
19 Id. at 249.
21 See rollo (G.R. No. 184982), pp. 217, 247-A, and 248.
22 Id. at 218.
23 Id. at 215-221.
24 See id. at 220-221.
25 Id. at 219.
26 Id. at 220.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 222-223.
29 Id. at 10-35.
30 Id. at 31-32.
31 Id. at 29.
32 Id. at 30.
33 Id. at 29-30.
36 Id. at 7-9.
37 Id. at 39-91.
39 See LBP v. Santiago, Jr., G.R. No. 182209, October 3, 2012, 682
SCRA 264, 277-278; citations omitted.
43 Id. at 608.
44 LBP v. Heirs of Salvador Encinas, G.R. No. 167735, April 18,
2012, 670 SCRA 52, 60.
45 See LBP v. Dumlao, 592 Phil. 486, 504 (2008). See also LBP v.
Heir of Trinidad S. Vda. De Arieta, G.R. No. 161834, August 11,
2010, 628 SCRA 43, 66.
53 DAR v. Goduco, G.R. Nos. 174007 and 181327, June 27, 2012,
675 SCRA 187, 205.
A big portion of the land owned by Jose T. Lajom, and his mother,
Vicenta Vda. De Lajom, was placed under the governments
Operation Land Transfer Program pursuant to P.D. 27 otherwise
known as the Tenants Emancipation Decree. The Department of
Agriculture (DAR), through the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP),
offered to pay Lajom just compensation but despite its
nonpayment, DAR has already granted twelve (12) Emancipation
Patents. Lajom rejected the DAR valuation and alleged that
computation of just compensation must be based on the provision
of RA 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
and not P.D. 27 and/or E.O. 228. LBP alleged that P.D. 27 and E.O.
228 were never abrogated by the passage of RA 6657. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) rejected the DAR valuation and, under
P.D. 27 and E.O. 228, fixed the just compensation at the total
amount of P2,858,912.00, with legal interest at the rate of 6% p.a.
from 1991, when the subject portion was actually expropriated,
until fully paid. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the RTC Decision. It applied the provisions of RA 6657
as basis in the computation of just compensation, deleted the
award of 6% interest p.a. and ordered petitioner LBP to pay 12%
interest on the just compensation by way of damages from the
time of issuance of emancipation patents until fully paid.
ISSUES: Is interest computed on the just compensation in the
nature of damages when the government delay in its payment?
RULING:
Yes. The Court has previously allowed the grant of legal interest in
expropriation cases where there was delay in the payment of just
compensation, deeming the same to be an effective forbearance
on the part of the State. To clarify, this incremental interest is not
granted on the computed just compensation; rather, it is a
penalty imposed for damages incurred by the landowner due to
the delay in its payment. Thus, legal interest shall be pegged at
the rate of 12% p.a. from the time of taking until June 30, 2013.
Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, just
compensation shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% p.a.,
conformably with the modification on the rules respecting interest
rates introduced by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board
Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
5
G.R. No. 190901 November 12, 2014
AMADA COTONER-ZACARIAS, Petitioner,
vs.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
For their part, the Sun spouses argued good faith belief that
Amada was the real owner of the property asAmada showed them
a tax declaration in her name and the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Lupa" allegedly executed by the Revilla spouses.18 When the Sun
spouses discovered there was another sale with the Casorla
spouses, they were assured by Amada that she had already
bought back the property from the Casorla spouses.19
Subsequently, the Casorla spouses executed a deed ofabsolute
sale dated December 16, 1991 in favor of the Sun spouses.20
They also argued prescription against the Revilla spouses, and
prayed for damages against Amada by way of crossclaim.21
SO ORDERED.23
Amada appealed the trial courts decision, while the Sun spouses
partially appealed the decision as to interest and damages.
SO ORDERED.25
Respondents Revilla spouses argue that the court did not err in
ordering reinstatement of the property tothem. First, the defense
that the Sun spouses were buyers in good faith is a personal
defense that cannot be raised by petitioner who was not privy to
the sale between the Casorla spouses and the Sun spouses.41
Second, an alternative prayer for damages cannot be interpreted
as an admission that the relief for reinstatement is not viable.42
Third, the transaction happened prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code; thus, Article 172 of the Civil Code applies such that
"[t]he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husbands consent, except in cases provided by law."43
Consequently, the result is the same even if respondent Paz
Castillo-Revilla did not testify that the signature is not hers, as she
cannot bind the entire property without her husbands consent.44
Lastly, no unjust enrichment exists since they were deprived of
their property for so long.45
I.
The four basic elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of
the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint
seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights,
the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to
institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which
he bases his suit; and, (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in
the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not
held to be barred.48
II.
This court finds that respondents Revilla spouses paid the proper
docket fees, thus, the trial court acquired jurisdiction.
It is true that "[i]t is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action."54
The Court serves warning that itwill take drastic action upon a
repetition of this unethical practice. To put a stop to this
irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages
being prayed for not only inthe body of the pleading but also in
the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails
to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in
the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi case in sofar as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.57 (Emphasis
supplied)
This ruling was circularized through Supreme Court Circular No.
758 addressed to all lower court judges and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for dissemination to and guidance for all its
members.
III.
The third issue involves the reinstatement of respondents Revilla
spouses in the property and reconveyance of its tax declaration in
their favor.
Article 2132 of the Civil Code provides that "[b]y the contract of
antichresis the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of
an immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to
the payment of the interest, if owing, and thereafter to the
principal of his credit."
The term, antichresis, has a Greek origin with "anti (against) and
chresis (use) denoting the action of giving a credit against the
use of a property."75
Historically, 15th century B.C. tablets revealed that "antichresis
contracts were commonly employed in the Sumerian and
Akkadian Mesopotamian cultures."76 Antichresis contracts were
incorporated in Babylonian law, modifying and combining it with
that of mortgage pledge.77 Nearing the end of the classical
period, antichresis contracts entered Roman law that "adopted
the convention that the tenant usufruct had to be exactly
compensated by the interest on the lump sum payment."78
During the middle ages, canon law banned antichresis contracts
for being a form of usury.79 These contracts only reappeared in
the 1804 Napoleonic Code that influenced the laws of most
countries today.80 It had been observed that "antichresis
contracts coexist with periodic rent contracts in many property
markets."81
Antichresis also requires that the amount of the principal and the
interest be in writing for the contract to be valid.86
However, the issue before us does not concern the nature of the
relationship between the parties, but the validity of the
documents that caused the subsequent transfers of the property
involved.
This court has held that the "question of forgery is one of fact."87
Well-settled is the rule that "[f]actual findings of the lower courts
are entitled great weight and respect on appeal, and in fact
accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence on the
record."88
The Court of Appeals agreed with the finding of the trial court that
the signature of Alfredo Revilla in the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Lupa" was forged:
Article 165 of the Civil Code states that "[t]he husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership." Article 172 of the Civil
Code provides that "[t]he wife cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without the husbands consent, except in cases
provided by law."92 In any case, the Family Code also provides as
follows:
This court has held that "the rule in land registration law that the
issue of whether the buyer of realty is in good or bad faith is
relevant only where the subject of the sale is registeredland and
the purchase was made from the registered owner whose title to
the land is clean[.]"97 Our laws have adopted the Torrens system
to strengthen public confidence in land transactions: [T]he Torrens
system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be
the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land
titles and to insure their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a
piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title thereto is
valid, he should not run the risk of losing his acquisition. If this
were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded
and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated
and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of
ownership.98
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
3 Id. at 3738.
5 Id. at 45.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 46.
13 Id. at 46.
14 Id.
16 Id. at 4647.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 47.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
23 Id. at 173.
25 Id. at 189.
26 Id. at 131. Article 2134 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he
amount of the principal and of the interest shall be specified in
writing; otherwise,the contract of antichresis shall be void."
27 Id.
29 Id. at 132.
30 Id. at 134.
32 Id. at 136.
33 Id. at 137, citing Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Spouses
Cayetano, G.R. No. 179909, January 25, 2010, 611 SCRA 96 [Per J.
Villarama, Jr., First Division].
34 Id. at 139.
35 Id. at 140.
36 Id. at 141, citing Tiro v. Philippine Estates Corporation,585 Phil.
306 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
38 Id. at 152.
39 Id. at 153.
41 Id. at 156.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 157.
46 Id. at 135.
53 Id. at 140.
54 Ungria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165777, July 25, 2011, 654
SCRA 314, 325 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division], citing Pantranco
North Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105180, July 5,
1993, 224 SCRA 477, 478 [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division].
59 Rollo, p. 51.
60 G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 91 [Per J. Peralta,
Third Division].
61 Id. at 99. See also Unilongo v. Court of Appeals, 365 Phil. 105,
114115 (1999) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc]; Ermita v. Aldecoa-
Delorino, G.R. No. 177130, June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 128, 137 [Per
J. Carpio Morales, En Banc], citing Fernando v. Spouses Lim, 585
Phil. 141 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
62 Rollo, p. 60.
63 Id. at 20.
64 Id. at 167.
66 Rollo, p. 64.
67 Id. at 67.
68 Id. at 131.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 161.
71 See Bangis v. Heirs of Adolfo, G.R. No. 190875, June 13, 2012,
672 SCRA 468, 472 [Per J. PerlasBernabe, Third Division].
72 Rollo, p. 146.
73 Id. at 161162.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 6.
81 Id.
90 Id. at 140.
92 See Fabrigas v. Del Monte, 512 Phil. 627, 640642 (2005) [Per
J. Tinga, Second Division] for its discussion on Article 172 and the
Civil Code and the status of contracts entered by a wife without
her husbands consent.
93 Rollo, p. 54.
94 Id. at 134.
95 Id. at 166.
Case Digest
FACTS:
In 1984, Amada sold the property to the spouses Adolf and Elvira
Casorla
(Casorla spouses). In turn, the Casorla spouses sold the property
to spouses Rodolfo and Yolanda Sun (Sunspouses). Upon Alfredo
Revillas return from Saudi Arabia, he discovered that the
propertys tax declaration was already in the name of the Sun
spouses. Subsequently, the Revilla spouses were served a copy of
the answer in the land registration case filed by the Sun spouses,
with a copy of the Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupaattached to it.
The Revilla spouses then filed a complaint for the annulment of
sales and transfers of title and reconveyance of the property with
damages against Amada, the Casorla spouses, the Sun spouses,
and the Provincial Assessor of Cavite. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) ruled in favor of there villa
spouses. Amada appealed but it was denied, as well as her
motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUES:
RULING:
ESCOLIN, J.:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103,
171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312,
324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404,
406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504,
521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661,
718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961,
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166,
1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772,
1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-
1847.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 &
65.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject
of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel
the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the
concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law
connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable
and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not
subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures.
The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule
of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be
informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to
obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the
settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases
that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its
penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published and the people officially and specially informed of said
contents and its penalties.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply
to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect.
Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only
a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a
different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be
published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Separate Opinions
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the
concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law
connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable
and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not
subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures.
The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule
of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be
informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to
obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the
settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases
that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its
penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published and the people officially and specially informed of said
contents and its penalties.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply
to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect.
Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only
a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a
different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be
published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
9 93 Phil.. 68,.
Fernando, CJ.:
Teehankee, J.:
1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per
the late Chief Justice Paras.
Plana, J.:
Case Digest
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
7
G.R. No. L-23326 December 18, 1965
REGALA, J.:
Republic Act No. 3836 was originally House Bill No. 6051, which
was introduced by Congressmen Marcial R. Pimentel of Camarines
Norte and Marcelino R. Veloso of the Third District of Leyte, on
May 6, 1963. On the same date, it was referred to the Committee
on Civil Service. which on the following May 8, submitted its
REPORT No. 3129, recommending approval of the bill with
amendments, among others, that the word "TWENTY" in the bill
as filed representing the number of years that a senator or
member must serve in Congress to entitle him to retirement
under the bill must be reduced to "TWELVE" years, and that the
following words were inserted, namely, "AND THE SAME (referring
to gratuity) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM ANY TAX WHATSOEVER AND
SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FROM ATTACHMENT OR EXECUTION NOR
REFUNDABLE IN CASE OF REINSTATEMENT OR REELECTION OF
THE RETIREE." On May 8, 1963, the bill with the proposed
amendments was approved on second reading. It was passed on
third reading on May 13, 1963, and on the same day was sent to
the Senate, which, in turn, on May 23, 1963, passed it without
amendment. The bill was finally approved on June 22, 1963. As
explained in the EXPLANATORY NOTE attached to the bill, among
others
Second legal point Whether or not Republic Act No. 3836 falls
within the prohibition embodied in Art. VI, section 14 of the
Constitution.
It is worthy to note that the original salary for the members of the
National Assembly (unicameral body) was fixed at P5,000.00 per
annum each. This was raised to P7,200 per annum by the
enactment of the 1940 Constitutional amendment, when the
unicameral body, the National Assembly, was changed to
Congress, composed of two bodies, the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Again, in 1964, by the enactment of Republic Act
4143, the salary for the Members of Congress was raised to
P32,000.00 per annum for each of them; and for the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to
P40,000.00 per annum each.
In the first place, while the said law grants retirement benefits to
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives who are
elective officials, it does not include other elective officials such
as the governors of provinces and the members of the provincial
boards, and the elective officials of the municipalities and
chartered cities.
The principle of equal protection of law embodied in our
Constitution has been fully explained by Us in the case ofPeople
v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126, where We stated that the classification to
be reasonable must be based upon substantial distinctions which
make real differences and must be germane to the purposes of
the law.
Fourth Legal Point Whether or not the title of Republic Act No.
3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in the act.
We are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general
disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional provision
with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally.
Footnotes
1
Kubbs v. Thompson, 56 N.E. 2d 761; Reid v. Smith, 375 Ill.
147, 30 N.E. 2d 908; Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E.
130; Burke v. Snively, 208 111. 328; Jones v. Connel, 266 Ill.
443, 107 N.E. 731; Dudick v. Baumann, 349 111. 46, 181 N.E
690.
2
Aruego, Know Your Constitution, p. 58.
Case Digest
FACTS:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA)
assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows
retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to
Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both
Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an
attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of
salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office,
contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution. The same provision constitutes selfish class
legislation because it allows members and officers of Congress to
retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity
equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service,
which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of
the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the
government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of
service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one
month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot
exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave,
commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of
Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to
further increase their compensation in violation of the
Constitution.
The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant
of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to
the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute
forbidden compensation within the meaning of Section 14 of
Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does
not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable
vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely in
the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring
member and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase
their salary.
ISSUE:
whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article
VI, of the Constitution which reads as follows:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives
shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual
compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each,
including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and
exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective
districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative
and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators,
when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise
provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.
RULING:
Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first
determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the
amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies
a special proviso which reads as follows: No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the members of the National Assembly elected
subsequent to approval of such increase. In other words, under
the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the
National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no
increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the
approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section
14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation other
emoluments. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental
question as to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in
Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term other
emoluments.
Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or
employment; that which is received as compensation for services
or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees
and perquisites.
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another
species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for
services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the
emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act,
which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were
immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration
of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly
runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional.
8
G.R. No. L-18456 November 30, 1963
PAREDES, J.:
The trial court did not predicate its decision declaring the deed of
chattel mortgage valid solely on the ground that the house
mortgaged was erected on the land which belonged to a third
person, but also and principally on the doctrine of estoppel, in
that "the parties have so expressly agreed" in the mortgage to
consider the house as chattel "for its smallness and mixed
materials of sawali and wood". In construing arts. 334 and 335 of
the Spanish Civil Code (corresponding to arts. 415 and 416,
N.C.C.), for purposes of the application of the Chattel Mortgage
Law, it was held that under certain conditions, "a property may
have a character different from that imputed to it in said articles.
It is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement,
treat as personal property that which by nature would be real
property" (Standard Oil Co. of N.Y. v. Jaranillo, 44 Phil. 632-
633)."There can not be any question that a building of mixed
materials may be the subject of a chattel mortgage, in which
case, it is considered as between the parties as personal property.
... The matter depends on the circumstances and the intention of
the parties". "Personal property may retain its character as such
where it is so agreed by the parties interested even though
annexed to the realty ...". (42 Am. Jur. 209-210, cited in
Manarang, et al. v. Ofilada, et al., G.R. No. L-8133, May 18, 1956;
52 O.G. No. 8, p. 3954.) The view that parties to a deed of chattel
mortgagee may agree to consider a house as personal property
for the purposes of said contract, "is good only insofar as the
contracting parties are concerned. It is based partly, upon the
principles of estoppel ..." (Evangelista v. Alto Surety, No. L-11139,
Apr. 23, 1958). In a case, a mortgage house built on a rented
land, was held to be a personal property, not only because the
deed of mortgage considered it as such, but also because it did
not form part of the land (Evangelista v. Abad [CA];36 O.G. 2913),
for it is now well settled that an object placed on land by one who
has only a temporary right to the same, such as a lessee or
usufructuary, does not become immobilized by attachment
(Valdez v. Central Altagracia, 222 U.S. 58, cited in Davao Sawmill
Co., Inc. v. Castillo, et al., 61 Phil. 709). Hence, if a house
belonging to a person stands on a rented land belonging to
another person, it may be mortgaged as a personal property is so
stipulated in the document of mortgage. (Evangelista v.
Abad, supra.) It should be noted, however, that the principle is
predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house to be
a chattel, a conduct that may conceivably estop him from
subsequently claiming otherwise (Ladera, et al.. v. C. N. Hodges,
et al., [CA]; 48 O.G. 5374). The doctrine, therefore, gathered from
these cases is that although in some instances, a house of mixed
materials has been considered as a chattel between them, has
been recognized, it has been a constant criterion nevertheless
that, with respect to third persons, who are not parties to the
contract, and specially in execution proceedings, the house is
considered as an immovable property (Art. 1431, New Civil Code).
ISSUE:
W/N the deed of real estate mortgage and chattel mortgage
appended to the complaint is valid notwithstanding the fact that
the house was made subject of chattel mortgage for the reason
that it is erected on a land that belongs to a third person.
HELD:
Where a house stands on a rented land belonging to
another person, it may be the subject matter of a chattel
mortgage as personal property if so stipulated in the document of
mortgage, and in an action by the mortgagee for the foreclosure,
the validity of the chattel mortgage cannot be assailed by one of
the parties to the contract of mortgage.
Furthermore, although in some instances, a house of mixed
materials has been considered as a chattel between the parties
and that the validity of the contract between them, has been
recognized, it has been a contant criterion that with respect
to third persons, who are not parties to the contract, and
specially in execution proceedings, the house is considered as
immovable property.
9
A.C. No. 2474 June 30, 2005
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In the interim, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court took effect. Hence,
the OSG transferred the disbarment case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP). On October 19, 1998, IBP Commissioner
Julio C. Elamparo required the parties to manifest within ten (10)
days from notice whether they are still interested in pursuing the
case.7
For his part, respondent moved to postpone the hearing eight (8)
times. In one of those instances, particularly on August 28, 2001,
complainant moved "that respondent be deemed to have
waived his right to present evidence and for the case to
be deemed submitted for resolution in view of his
continuing failure to present his evidence." However,
complainant withdrew such motion upon the promise of the
respondents counsel that on the next hearing, scheduled on
October 4, 2001, he would definitely present his clients evidence.
But even before that date, respondent already manifested that he
would not be able to return to the Philippines for his direct
testimony. Instead, he promised to submit his "direct testimony in
affidavit form."9 In an Order issued that day, the IBP
Commissioner reset the hearing for the last time on January 24,
2002 and warned respondent that should he fail to appear or
present his "direct testimony in affidavit form," the case will be
deemed submitted for resolution.10 On January 24,
2002, respondent neither appeared nor presented his
"direct testimony in affidavit form," hence, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.11
Fifth, the Resolution dated June 21, 2003 of the IBP Board of
Governors imposing upon him the penalty of one (1) year
suspension "has attained finality and should be
deemed served already."
I - Improper Party
II Due Process
IV - Laches
xxxxxx
VI - Good Faith
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1
Which we treat as a motion for reconsideration.
2
Rollo, at 354.
3
Rollo at 199 - 201.
4
Then pending in the Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 27,
Pasay City, Annex "D" of the Complaint, id.at 13-19.
5
Dated December 13, 1984.
6
OSG Records at 5. The OSG issued the Order dated
December 20, 1984 suspending the scheduled hearing until
the Court orders otherwise. (OSG Records at 1)
7
Records of the Commission on Bar Discipline at 11.
8
Dated November 13, 1998, id. at 13.
9
Manifestation with Motion, Records of the Commission on
Bar Discipline at 45
10
Order dated December 4, 2001, Records of the
Commission on Discipline at 51.
11
Order dated January 24, 2002, Records of the Commission
on Discipline at 97.
12
Except the 5th issue mentioned earlier.
13
Pimentel, Jr. vs. Llorente, A.C. No. 4680, August 29, 2000,
339 SCRA 154.
14
A.C. No. 2884, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 93.
15
Hearings set on February 2, 1999, May 7, 1999, May
16,2000, June 15, 2000, August 24, 2000, November 21,
2000, January 18, 2001, February 20, 2001, April 24, 2001,
May 17, 2001, June 28, 2001, August 28, 2001, October 4,
2001, December 4, 2001, and January 24, 2002.
16
Montemayor vs. Bundalian, G.R. No. 149335, July 1, 2003,
405 SCRA 264.
17
Comment to Respondents Motion to Vacate, at 2.
18
Cuyegkeng vs. Cruz, No. L- 16263, July 26,1960, 108 Phil.
1147.
19
A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC, January 31, 2002, 375 SCRA 339.
20
A.C. No. 2349, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 6.
21
Art. 220, Family Code. See also Art. 356 of the Civil Code
and Art. 3 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (or PD 603).
22
Art. 68, Family Code.
23
Adm. Case No. 3249, November 29, 1989, 179 SCRA 680.
Case Digest
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
10
DECISION
Based on the Pre-trial Order dated July 8, 1985, the parties agreed
that the issues are the following:
Thus, this Court hereby declares that the plaintiffs are the owners
of the parcels of land subject of this action having acquired it from
their late father, Antonio Francisco by hereditary succession.
Prescription and laches cannot be raised against the plaintiffs. If
there is/are somebody who is/are guilty of laches in this case, it
would be the defendants. Because for a considerable long period
of time, they failed to obtain a title over the parcels in question.
SO ORDERED. 12
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in its
Decision promulgated on August 25, 1994, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
SO ORDERED. 13
Likewise, the trial court correctly held that defendants Abad had
no right to the parcel of land they were occupying, thus:
Footnotes
5. Rollo, p. 22
12. Rollo, p. 28
13. Rollo, p. 51
17. Records, p. 48
22. Id
Case Digest
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale was void for lack of marital
consent.
RULING:
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis
or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a
leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. If
she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may
compel her to grant the same.
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal
partnerships before the effective date of this Code.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering
from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant
display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and
had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two
children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such
immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are
indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage.8
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and
property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family
Code.
SO ORDERED.9
II
III
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the
trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage.10
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
dated January 8, 2002.11 Hence, the instant petition.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court
has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner
and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with
the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1
Exhibits F and F-3.
2
Exhibit F.
3
Exhibit H.
4
Exhibit I.
5
Exhibit J.
6
Exhibit K.
7
Exhibits D to D-3.
8
Exhibit L; Records pp. 57-78.
9
Rollo, p. 49; penned by Presiding Judge Josefina Guevarra-
Salonga (now an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals).
10
Rollo, pp. 33-44; per Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez,
Jr., with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Eliezer
R. Delos Santos, concurring.
11
Rollo, p. 45.
12
310 Phil. 21 (1995).
13
Id., at 40-41.
14
Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, 9 February 2001,
351 SCRA 425.
15
Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA
588, 594.
16
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 87-88.
17
ART. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on
any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive
conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child
or a child of the petitioner;
ISSUE:
12
G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Facts
"On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid
complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given
his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by
Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
"On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the
complaint, ruling that under the provisions of the Family Code as
well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the complaint
is now barred x x x."6
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that
since the putative father had not acknowledged or recognized
Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have
been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the
opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest
of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in
1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code,
which allows an action for recognition to be filed within four years
after the child has attained the age of majority. The subsequent
enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.
Issues
II
III
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall
discuss them jointly.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an
action for recognition as follows:
"ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may
be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases:
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that
have already vested prior to its enactment should not be
prejudiced or impaired as follows:
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,15 the Court laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is procedural or substantive:
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for
recognition of "natural" children. Thus, petitioner contends that
the provision cannot be availed of by respondent, because at the
time of his conception, his parents were impeded from marrying
each other. In other words, he is not a natural child.
"A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each
other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a natural
child."20
"How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code
allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity or spurious
children under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284
of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory
recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 3-14. The Petition was signed by Atty. Wenceslao
B. Trinidad.
2
Special First Division; penned by J. Jesus M. Elbinias
(presiding justice and Division chairman); concurred in
by JJ Delilah Vidallon Magtolis and Edgardo P. Cruz
(members).
3
Rollo, pp. 33-37.
4
Rollo, p. 18. J. Andres B. Reyes Jr. signed for J. Magtolis who
was on leave.
5
Assailed Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 37.
6
Assailed Decision, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 33-34.
7
This case was deemed submitted for decision on August 16,
2000, upon this Courts receipt of petitioners Memorandum
signed by Atty. Jose Allan M. Tebelin. Respondents
Memorandum, signed by Attys. Felix D. Carao Jr. and R.A.V.
Saguisag, was received by this Court on August 14, 2000.
8
Rollo, pp. 103-116; original underscored and in upper case.
9
Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4; Rollo, p. 106.
10
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code (1995
ed.), p. 282.
11
Reyes v. Commission on Audit, 305 SCRA 512, 518, March
29, 1999, per Pardo, J.
12
Medina Investigation & Security Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 144074, March 20, 2001, per Gonzaga-
Reyes, J.
13
81 Phil. 648, March 8, 1949.
14
Ibid., pp. 649-650, per Tuason, J.
15
295 SCRA 470, 492, September 16, 1998.
16
Ibid., p. 492, per Regalado, J.
17
178 SCRA 684, October 26, 1989.
18
254 SCRA 711, March 13, 1996.
19
251 SCRA 206, December 12, 1995.
20
Ibid., p. 212, per Romero, J.
21
72 SCRA 307, August 10, 1976.
22
Ibid., pp. 314-315, per Aquino, J. (later CJ).
23
Cf. Jose C. Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and
Jurisprudence, (1993 rev. ed.), p.218.
24
Pages 12-15.
Case Digest
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his
secretary Carolina Alejo and was named Adrian Bernabe who was
born on September 18, 1981. After Ernesto Bernabe and Rosalina,
his legal wife died, the only heir left is Erestina. Carolina, in behalf
of Adrian, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an
acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and be given a
share of his fathers estate.
ISSUE:
RULING:
13
G. R. No. 155320 February 5, 2004
RENATO F. HERRERA, petitioner
vs.
PLARIDEL ELMER J. BOHOL, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner insists that "suspension for one (1) month without pay"
imposed upon him by the Ombudsman, and "suspension of not
more than one months salary" stated in the above law are
different. To support his argument, petitioner cites the following
excerpt from Lapid v. Court of Appeals7 -
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Entitled "Renato F. Herrera, Director III, Department of
Agrarian Reform v. Plaridel Elmer J. Bohol."
2
Entitled "Plaridel Elmer J. Bohol v. Renato F. Herrera,
Director III, Department of Agrarian Reform."
3
Rollo, pp. 58-64; Original Record, pp. 0121-0127.
4
Decision dated March 15, 2002; Rollo, pp. 84-91.
5
334 SCRA 738 (2000).
6
Id., p. 103.
7
Supra, note 5.
8
Rollo, p. 73.
9
U.P. v. Civil Service Commission, 228 SCRA 207, 213 (1993).
10
389 SCRA 570 (2002).
11
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobreba, 375 SCRA 81,
87 (2002); Reyes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 374 SCRA 86, 92
(2002).
12
Young v. Office of the Ombudsman, 228 SCRA 718, 722
(1993).
Case Digest
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
14
G.R. No. 154499 March 14, 2003
Mendoza, J.:
The case arose from a letter, 2 dated May 19, 1999, which
respondent Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSMI) sent
to then BSP Governor Gabriel Singson. In its letter, RBSMI charged
petitioners with violations of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) and Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
The Monetary Board of the BSP created a committee to
investigate the matter.
The action of the MB was followed on March 20, 1998 by the MBs
notation of DRBs report on the corrective measures taken by
complainant on the serious findings/exceptions in the September
15, 1996 General Examination. However, as there were some
major and/or serious exceptions/findings which remained
uncorrected, the MB again ordered its DRB to continue the
verification/monitoring of RBSMI until the exceptions/findings
were fully corrected.
SO ORDERED.
...
....
(b) Professionalism - Public officials and employees shall
perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree
of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They
shall enter public service with utmost devotion and
dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong
perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue
patronage.
Moreover, it is clear from the records that RBSMI was given not
only one but two opportunities to answer the findings in the
report before the report was submitted to the MB. It should be
noted that the exit conference for the 1996 General Examination
was originally scheduled on January 13, 1997. However, upon the
request of RBSMIs corporate counsel, the examination was
postponed to January 21, 1997. RBSMI was furnished a copy of
the findings on January 9, 1997. Although RBSMI claimed that the
copy it received was unreadable, it made this accusation only
after the complaint had been filed with the Monetary Board.
On the other hand, the imposition of the P2.5 million fine was
made on the basis of the finding of legal reserve deficiencies.
Soriano wrote to the BSP authorizing the latter to debit its
demand deposit in the amount of the penalty a few days after MB
Resolution No. 96 was issued. It took RBSMI more than one year
before it contested the imposition of the penalty. That the BSP
subsequently reversed, albeit conditionally, the debiting of the
amount of penalty is not an admission that it erred in imposing
the same. It was only an accommodation on the part of the BSP to
ease the financial difficulties of RBSMI. More importantly, it was a
conditional reversal pending the resolution of the dispute on the
finding of legal reserve deficiency.
By and large, therefore, we find that while there may have been
some irregularities and badges of unprofessionalism which can be
held against petitioners, these are not so grave as to merit the
imposition of the penalty of fine equal to six months salary
imposed by the appellate court. The modification of the Court of
Appeals decision is proper.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1
Per Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia with Justices Roberto
A. Barrios and Bienvenido L. Reyes concurring.
2
CA Rollo, p. 201.
3
Id., p. 245.
4
Id., p. 270.
5
Id., p. 278.
6
Id., p. 118.
7
Id., p. 460.
8
Resolution of the BSP Ad Hoc Committee, p. 6; CA Rollo, p.
68.
9
CA Rollo, p. 470.
10
Id., p. 340.
11
Id., p. 342.
12
Resolution, p. 8; CA Rollo, p. 70.
13
CA Rollo, p. 485.
14
Id., p. 463.
15
Id., p. 464.
16
Resolution, p. 14; CA Rollo, p. 76.
17
Copy of Memorandum; CA Rollo, p. 524.
18
Id.
19
CA Rollo, p. 490.
20
Id., p. 491.
21
Id., p. 581.
22
Photocopy of the article; CA Rollo, p. 527.
23
CA Rollo, p. 63.
24
Rollo, p. 40.
25
CA Decision, p. 22; Rollo, p. 61.
26
Circular No. 1312, Series of 1991; Circular No. 172, Series
of 1998; Circular No. 193, Series of 1999; Circular No. 207,
Series of 1999; Circular No. 225, Series of 2000; Circular No.
237, Series of 2000; and Circular No. 256, Series of 2000. CA
Rollo, pp. 888-904.
27
Mr. Soriano met and discussed with Mr. Castillo and Mr.
Villacorta on his own accord. The affidavits of Mssrs. Castillo
and Villacorta fully support this statement. (See notes at 11
and 12) Moreover, Mr. Sorianos own statements revealed
that he was undecided as to whether he should sell the bank
or not inasmuch as he was concerned with how much the
bank would sell for. (See RBSMIs Petition for Review with the
Court of Appeals, pp. 8-10; CA Rollo, pp. 31-33.)
Case Digest
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
15
G.R. No. 155855, January 26, 2004
MA. SALVACION BUAC AND ANTONIO BAUTISTA,
PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ALAN
PETER S. CAYETANO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
First. The key to the case at bar is its nature. The case at bar
involves the determination of whether the electorate of Taguig
voted in favor of, or against the conversion of the municipality of
Taguig into a highly urbanized city in the plebiscite conducted for
the purpose. Respondents submit that the regular courts of
justice, more specifically, the Regional Trial Court, has the
jurisdiction to adjudicate any controversy concerning the conduct
of said plebiscite. We hold that the invocation of judicial power to
settle disputes involving the conduct of a plebiscite is misplaced.
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution defines judicial power as
including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government." According to Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, "the
first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of
judicial power involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred by law."[7] The case at bar assailing the regularity of the
conduct of the Taguig plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case
calling for the exercise of judicial power. It does not involve the
violation of any legally demandable right and its enforcement.
There is no plaintiff or defendant in the case at bar for it merely
involves the ascertainment of the vote of the electorate of Taguig
whether they approve or disapprove the conversion of their
municipality to a highly urbanized city. There is no invocation of a
private right conferred by law that has been violated and which
can be vindicated alone in our courts of justice in an adversarial
proceeding. Rather, the issue in the case at bar is the
determination of the sovereign decision of the electorate of
Taguig. The purpose of this determination is more to protect the
sovereignty of the people and less to vindicate the private
interest of any individual. Such a determination does not
contemplate the clash of private rights of individuals and hence
cannot come under the traditional jurisdiction of courts.
Fourth. An eye contact with our Constitution and related laws will
reveal that only contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of elected officials are subject to the exercise of
judicial power of our courts or quasi-judicial power of our
administrative agencies, thus: (a) contests involving elective
municipal officials are tried and decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, while those involving barangay officials are tried and
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction; in both cases,
however, the COMELEC exercises appellate jurisdiction; (b)
contests involving all elective regional, provincial and city
officials fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial power; (c) contests
involving members of the House of Representatives fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of quasi-judicial power; (d)
contests involving members of the Senate fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the exercise
of quasi-judicial power; and, (e) contests involving the President
and the Vice President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, also in the exercise of quasi-
judicial power.
SO ORDERED.
Tinga, J., took no part. One of the intervenors and former counsel
for the intervenor.
10.
Presided
[2]
by Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion. with
Commissioners Mehol K. Sadain and Florentino A. Tuazon. Jr. as
members.
[3]
Motion to Dismiss, Annex "J", Petition, Rollo at 120-130.
Carpio.
[11]
Manifestation in Lieu of Comment. Rollo. pp. 415-418.
Petition. o, p. 213.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.,
(1) xxx
Thus, this Court has ruled that the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the
COMELEC is found only in Section 2(2) of Article IX-C and nowhere
else. In Baytan v. COMELEC,[1] the Court held:
xxx We agree with the Solicitor General that ". . . [t]he issuance of
[COMELEC] Resolution No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the
COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of its
administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary,
authority on the part of respondent COMELEC; let alone an
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to hear and
resolve controversies defining the rights and duties of party-
litigants, relative to the conduct of elections of public officers and
the enforcement of the election laws." (Citation omitted.) Briefly,
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and
regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was
not issued pursuant to the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions but
merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over
the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be
deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by this
Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said
resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action
before the trial courts. (Emphasis supplied)
351 SCRA 44; Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497. 4 August 1994, 235
SCRA 135.
DISSENTING OPINION
With due respect, I dissent from the majority decision that the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over the
present petition to annul the results of the plebiscite held on April
25, 1998 on the proposed conversion of Taguig from a
municipality into a highly urbanized city.
(I) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall.
In Lopez v. Roxas,[3] this Court held that the Constitution vests the
entirety of judicial power in the judicial branch "except only so
much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency' in
which case said agency would be exercising quasi-judicial power.
Consequently, where the power has not been expressly delegated
by either the law or the Constitution to "some other agency," the
same remains lodged with the judicial branch.
Since neither the Constitution nor any law confers upon the
COMELEC the jurisdiction to order the revision and recount of
ballots in plebiscites or any contests arising from plebiscite
results, it is the judicial branch that can take cognizance thereof.
The majority also view the case as not calling for the exercise of
judicial power as it does not involve violation of any legally
demandable and enforceable right nor the protection of the
private interest of any individual and does not contemplate the
clash of contending private parties. I beg to differ. The Taguig
electorate, being directly affected by the proposed conversion
into cityhood, has the constitutionally vested right to vote in said
plebiscite.[4] The exercise of such right would be futile if it does not
come with the concurrent right to a canvass free from fraud,
anomalies and irregularities. As said right is alleged to have been
impaired, as in the case at bar, then there exists a controversy
which calls for the exercise of judicial power.
(Italics supplied)
applies.
The above-quoted provision is not limited to traditional civil
cases, i.e., involving the violation of a right of specific person, as
the majority seems to point out. The Rules of Court provides
for special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for
questioning the legality of any law, act, order or ordinance.
Thespecial civil action of quo warranto may also be commenced
by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic or the
Philippines. Such civil actions do not necessarily involve a
violation of a specific right of a particular person.
RULING: