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G.R. No.

L-17959 January 24, 1922

ROBERT S. CLEMONS, petitioner,


vs.
WILLIAM T. NOLTING, as Auditor of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, respondent.

FACTS:

This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court for the writ of mandamus. Its purposes
to compel the respondent "to countersign or cause to be countersigned the original warrant, a copy
of which is set forth in paragraph 10 of the complaint, and to deliver the same to the plaintiff so that
he may present it to the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands and receive payment thereon in the sum
of P73.33, an amount which is alleged to be due him by the Government of the Philippine Islands."

G.R. No. L-1573 March 29, 1948

KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA


PILIPINAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GOTAMCO SAW MILL, respondent-appellee.

FACTS:

The "Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas"


prays that the orders of the Court of Industrial Relations dated
September 23, 1946 (Annex A) and March 28, 1947 (Annex B) and
its resolution of July 11, 1947 (Annex C) be reversed and vacated.
The laborers, who are members of "Kaisahan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas" declared a strike on
September 10, 1946, "which suspended all the work in the
respondent company". A temporary solution coming from the
court was issued and subsequently accepted by Francisco Cruz,
the labor leader, to put an end to it. Certain conditions were set.
First, all the laborers and workingmen will receive an over-all
increase of P2.00 daily, without meal. Second, the management
will permit the laborers to bring with them home, if available,
small pieces of lumber to be utilized as firewood.

In 1947, the respondent Gotamco Saw Mill filed with the


Court of Industrial relations an urgent motion asking that the
petitioning union be held for contempt of court for having staged
a strike during the pendency of the main case. Petitioner filed an
answer with a counter-petition alleging, certain discriminations in
the respondent's saw mill. In the counter-petition also, said
petitioner asked the respondent be held for contempt for having
employed four new Chinese laborers during the pendency of the
hearing of the main case, without express authority of the court.
Respondent, on the other hand, also filed with the court another
urgent motion for contempt against the petitioning union for
picketing and for grave threats.

After the presentation of evidence pertinent to the incidents


three questions were determined. first, if there was a violation by
the petitioning union of the order of the court; second, whether
the facts and circumstances attending the picketing constitute
contempt of court; third, whether there was a violation by the
respondent of section 19 of the Commonwealth Act No. 103, in
taking four Chinese laborers pending the hearing and without
express authority of the court; and fourth, whether the dismissal
of Maximino Millan was with or without just cause.

The court, passing upon these questions, found and held:

(1) That there was a violation of the order of the court dated
September 23, 1946, by the petitioning union and thereby
ordered Atty. Pastor T. Reyes, special agent of the court, to
take such action as may be warranted in the premises
against the person or persons responsible therefor for
contempt:

(2) That the question of picketing being closely and


intimately related to the strike which had been found illegal,
did not need to be passed upon, it being imbibed by
question No. 1;
(3) That there being no strong and clear proof on the
question of respondent having violated section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, respondent was
thereby exonerated from any liability in connection with the
alleged employment of four Chinamen;

(4) That Maximino Millan being of troublesome nature and


unworthy to work among his fellow laborers, his petition for
reinstatement contained in demand No. 5 of the main case
was thereby denied.

The above cited resolution of July 11, 1947, was entered by


the Court of Industrial Relations, sitting in banc. The CIR denied
reconsideration of the petitioning union's contention. The union
argues that the provisions of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No.
103, was not issued in conformity with the requisites of said
section, because, there had been no proper hearing and there
was no express finding by the court that public interest required
the return of the striking workers. The further contention is that,
granting that if the order was issued in conformity with said
section 19, said provision is unconstitutional for being in violation
of the organic proscription of involuntary servitude.

*The order pertained here is the order of September 23, 1946

ISSUE: WON Sec 19 of CA No 103 is unconstitutional for being in


violation of the organic proscription of involuntary servitude.

RULING:

The court believes that section 19 is constitutional. To start


with, this section is presumed to be constitutional. The provisions
of Act No. 103 were inspired by the constitutional injunction
making it the concern of the State to promote social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. In
order to attain this object, section 19 was promulgated which
grants to labor what it grants to capital and denies to labor what
it denies to capital. Section 19 complements the power of the
Court to settle industrial disputes and renders effective such
powers which are conferred upon it by the different provisions of
the Court's organic law, more particularly, sections 1 and 4, and
"other plenary powers conferred upon the Court to enable it to
settle all questions matters, controversies or disputes arising
between, and/or affecting employers and employees", "to prevent
non-pacific methods in the determination of industrial or
agricultural disputes"

The Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Industrial


Relations that section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is
constitutional. It does not offend against the constitutional
inhibition prescribing involuntary servitude. An employee entering
into a contract of employment said law went into
effect, voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those
prescribed in said section 19, among which is the "implied
condition that when any dispute between the employer or
landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted
to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration,
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending award or
decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or
walk out of his employment when so joined by the court after
hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has
already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of
the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public
interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be
promptly decided or settled ...". The voluntariness of the
employee's entering into such a contract of employment he
has a free choice between entering into it or not with such an
implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary
servitude ensuing. The resolution of July 11, 1947, states that the
order of September 23, 1946, was issued after a series of
preliminary hearings or conferences, and we are satisfied that
these were "hearings" within the meaning of the above
mentioned section 19 of the law. The record certainly reveals that
what was done during and what resulted from said preliminary
hearings or conferences were reported to the court at a formal
hearing. As to public interest requiring that the court enjoin the
strike or walk out, or the return of striking laborers, aside from the
legal presumption that the Court of Industrial Relations complied
with the provisions of the law in this respect, we think that,
considering the universally known fact, of which this Court takes
judicial notice, that as a result of the destructions wrought by the
late war, the economic and social rehabilitation of the country
urgently demands the reconstruction work will inevitably tend to
paralyze, impede or slow down the country's program of
rehabilitation which, for obvious and natural reasons, the
government is striving to accelerate as much as is humanly
possible.

Finally, this Court is not authorized to review the findings of


fact made by the Court of Industrial Relations, however, Mr.
Justice Briones thinks that we should expressly reserve our
opinion on the constitutionality of the above statutory and
reglementary provisions should it, in the future, become
necessary to decide it.

For all these considerations, the orders and resolution of the


Court of Industrial Relations assailed by the instant petition are
hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant. So
ordered.
A.M. No. 297-MJ September 30, 1975

AVELINA SERAFIN, complainant,


vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE SANTIAGO LINDAYAG, respondent.

FACTS:

Complainant originally filed on October 19, 1971 with the


Secretary of Justice the instant administrative complaint for
capricious and malicious admission in his court of a criminal
complaint for estafa against Serafin and causing her wrongful
arrest and detention, against respondent Santiago Lindayag,
municipal judge of Guiguinto, Bulacan. On December 28, 1971,
then Executive Judge Andres Sta. Maria to whom the
administrative complaint had been referred sent his indorsement
to the Department of Justice recommending the exoneration of
respondent on the ground that complainant, assisted by her
counsel, had filed a motion to withdraw her complaint.

The Mendoza spouses executed sworn statements as


offended parties before respondent judge. The complaint
shows on their very face that their case was about a simple
debt of P1,500.00 borrowed by complainant, Serafin, from Mrs.
Mendoza and which she had failed to repay despite her promise
to do so by January and February, 1971. (Both sworn statements
recite that complainant borrowed the amount - "ay umutang..... si
ginang Avelina N. Serafin" and did not pay the same.)

After preliminary investigation, respondent Judge, recklessly


issued a warrant of arrest against Serafin despite of the fact that
there is no vestige of the essential elements of estafa as provided
in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code but that they had simply
lent complainant the sum of P1,500.00 without any collateral or
security because complainant was an old friend . In admitting
such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from
the very face of the complaint and the "evidence" presented, and
issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly
baseless finding "that the accused is probably guilty of the crime
charged," respondent grossly failed to perform his duties properly
which in this instance was to dismiss the complaint outright
since it is elementary that non-payment of an indebtedness is not
a criminal act, much less estafa; and that no one may be
criminally charged and punished for non-payment of a loan of a
sum of money.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge erred in


causing complainant wrongful arrest and detention.

RULING:

The Judiciary Act, Republic Act No. 296, precisely requires in


section 87 thereof that "(N)o warrant of arrest shall be issued by
any municipal judge in any criminal case filed with him unless he
first examines the witness or witnesses personally, and the
examination shall be under oath and reduced to writing in the
form of searching questions and answers." Respondent utterly
failed to comply with this requirement of searching questions and
answers in his examination of the complaining witness. Worse, the
one question propounded by him shows that he did comprehend
that the "criminal" complaint involved a mere failure to pay a
simple indebtedness and yet he found probable cause of the
herein complainant's guilt of estafa and forthwith issued the
warrant of arrest against her which would indicate that either
he believed that non-payment of an indebtedness constitutes the
crime of estafa which would make him guilty of gross ignorance of
the law or although knowing the law, of nevertheless disregarding
it and giving due course to the town police chief's "prosecution"
on behalf of the municipal secretary which would constitute an
utter betrayal of his oath of office to render justice to every man.

As stressed therein by the Court citing other precedents, "(A)


judge who disregards deliberately or is ignorant of the basic
fundamentals of law and justice is unfit to continue in office.
Respondent's separation from the service is thus called for, in line
with the Court's action in Tadiar vs. Caces (dismissing therein
respondent judge for dereliction of duty in resolving a motion to
dismiss a criminal case only after 18 months and failing to file the
same and serve a copy thereof on the prosecution) and
in Municipal Council of Casiguran Quezon vs. Morales (dismissing
therein respondent judge for unjustified absences from his station
and being "unmindful of the exigencies of the public service and
neglectful of his duties to the prejudice of the residents of
Casiguran")."

Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is
considered a simple loan granted by her friends to her. There is no
collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of
the spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a
letter of demand she promised to pay them and said that if she
failed to keep her promise, they could get her valuable things at
her home. Under the Constitution she is protected. Accordingly,
respondent is hereby dismissed from the office of municipal judge
of Guiguinto, Bulacan.

The Clerk of Court is directed to endorse to the Chief,


National Bureau of Investigation, the original complaint and
purported amended complaint both allegedly executed by former
Guiguinto chief of police Juan P. Estrella as per his affidavit
submitted with respondent's memorandum of November 11, 1974
as well as other pertinent documents and exhibits for comparison
and determination of the genuineness of said signatures and for
the filing of the proper criminal prosecution should the findings of
the National Bureau of Investigation so warrant.