EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63345 January 30, 1986

EFREN C. MONCUPA, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, FABIAN C. VER, GALILEO KINTANAR, FERNANDO GOROSPE, AND JOSE
CASTRO, respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tanada, Jose W. Diokno and Joker Arroyo for petitioner,

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

As early as 1919, in the leading case of Villavicencio v. Lukban (39 Phil. 778, 790), this Court ruled:

A prime specification of al application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. ...

This latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas-corpus has, in law, remained undiminished up to the present. The
respondents' contention that the petition has become moot and academic must necessarily be denied. Efren C. Moncupa
may have been released from his detention cell. The restraints attached to his temporary release, however, preclude
freedom of action and under the Villavicencio v. Lukban rule warrant this Court's inquiry into the nature of his involuntary
restraint and our relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal.

Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50 P.M., at the corner of D.
Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa D. Tuazon was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City
where he was detained. On April 23, 1982, on the allegation that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff
member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and eight (8) other persons.

After two separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force
Makabansa Investigation Group and second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of Quezon City, it was ascertained
that the petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of
the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential
Decree No. 33.

Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one, for illegal possession of firearms before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of Quezon City. Against the
other accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885 as amended. Significantly, the petitioner was
excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, it is significant
that his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. And yet, the petitioner's motions for bail were denied
by the lower court.

Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of petitioner's detention on the ground that the privilege of
the writ had been suspended as to the petitioner. However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss
stating that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on orders of the Minister temporary of
National Defense with the approval of the President. The respondents stated. "Since the petitioner is free and no longer
under the custody of the respondents, the present petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in
similar cases.

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's
temporary release.

It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary release are restrictions imposed on him. These are:

1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval of respondents for any travel
outside Metro Manila.

2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to
change his place of residence.
3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not "participate in any interview conducted by any
local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to the interest of
national security."

4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives.

The petitioner argues that although admittedly his temporary release is an improvement upon his actual detention, the
restrictions imposed by the respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.

The petitioner stresses that his temporary release did not render the instant petitioner moot and academic but that "it
merely shifted the inquiry from the legality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by the
respondents."

We agree with the petitioner.

The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitute
restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical
restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.

In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the women who had been illegally seized and transported against their will to Davao were no
longer under any official restraint. Unlike petitioner Moncupa, they were free to change their domicile without asking for
official permission. Indeed, some of them managed to return to Manila. Yet, the Court condemned the involuntary
restraints caused by the official action, fined the Mayor of Manila and expressed the hope that its "decision may serve to
bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from Megal encroachment."

In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic. Other
precedents for such a conclusion are not wanting.

The decision in Caunca v. Salazar (82 Phil. 851) states:

An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid,
has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been
exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her
personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, from to choose one's
residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to
erroneous belief in the existence of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a
person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the
individual who is illigally deprived of liberty by deprived or physical coercion.

In Tibo v. The Provincial Commander (85 SCRA 564), this Court ruled:

Although the release in the custody of the Deputy Minister did not signify that petitioners could once again
enjoy their full freedom, the application could have been dismissed, as it could be withdrawn by the
parties themselves. That is a purely voluntary act. When the hearing was held on September 7, 1978, it
turned out that counsel for petitioner Bonifacio V. Tupaz could have academic in a hasty manner when he
set forth the above allegations in his manifestation of August 30, 1978, for Attorney Jose C. Espinas, who
appeared for petitioners, while conceding that there was such a release from confinement, also alleged
that it was conditioned on their restricting their activities as labor union leaders to the premises of the
Trade Unions of the Philippines and ABSOLUTE Services, presumably in Macaraig as well as the Ministry
of labor. As the voting was to take place in the business firm in Bataan, the acts set would nullify
whatever efforts they could have exerted. To that extent, and with the prohibition against their going to
Bataan, the restraint on liberty was undeniable. If so, the moot and academic character of the petition was
far from clear.

More recently, we had occasion to rule squarely on whether or not a temporary release from detention renders the petition
for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. As in this case of Moncupa, the petitioners in Toyoto, et al v. Hon. Fidel
Ramos, et al, G.R. No. 69270, October 15, 1985, were temporarily released from detention. The respondents filed a
motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the petitioners had been temporarily released and
their case had, therefore, become moot and academic. The petitioners insisted, however, that their case may be
considered moot and academic only "if their release would be permanent." In ruling for the petitioners, we said:
 Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of
the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a number of cases. But the
instant case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved is whether the State can reserve
the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of
the offense. An affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the
petitioners being merely 'temporary' it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their
acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the
government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a
criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is so
basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration.

In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be
one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary
but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent
developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the
privilege of the writ.

The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue and why the restraints on the petitioner's freedom of
movement should not be lifted.

WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner are
declared null and void. The temporary release of the petitioner is declared ABSOLUTE. No costs,

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin De la Fuente, Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ.,
concur.

Aquino, C.J., took no part.

Plana, J., I reserve my vote.

 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 163108. February 23, 2005]
GLENN CABALLES y CHUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. EMMANUEL D. LAUREA, HON.
BENJAMIN T. ANTONIO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by the petitioner for the
[1]
nullification of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals which dismissed his petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
[2]
corpus for his release from detention despite the pendency of People of the Philippines v. Glenn Caballes for rape, and
its resolution denying his motion for reconsideration thereof.
The antecedents are as follows:
On November 19, 2001, petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape of a minor in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malabon City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25756-MN and raffled to Branch 169, presided by
Judge Emmanuel D. Laurea. Because the petitioner was charged with a non-bailable offense, he was detained.
The petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002 and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. The prosecution
presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Venice Vera Pio, the private complainant, and her mother. The petitioner, through
counsel, commenced his cross-examination of Pio, but failed to complete the same. In January 2003, the petitioner
[3]
engaged the services of a new counsel, Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, who entered his appearance as defense counsel.
During the trial of February 26, 2003, the petitioner continued his cross-examination of Pio but still failed to terminate the
same. The trial was set on March 6, 2003 for the petitioner to terminate his cross-examination of Pio. However, due to the
illness of the private prosecutor, the trial on the said date did not proceed. The trial was further reset to March 17, 2003
during which the petitioner continued with his cross-examination of the private complainant. Thereafter, the continuation of
trial was set on April 3, 21, and 30, 2003. On April 3, 2003, the petitioner concluded his cross-examination of Pio. The
prosecution declared that its next witness would be Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, who had conducted a medico-legal examination of the private complainant, but
stated that he had not been subpoenad. The prosecution prayed for the cancellation of the trial scheduled on April 21,
2003 to give the prosecution time to secure and cause the service of a subpoena duces tecum on him. The petitioner
conformed to the motion of the prosecution.
[4]
On April 28, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for bail.
[5]
The trial of April 30, 2003 did not proceed because the petitioners counsel filed a Manifestation that his presence
was required in an execution sale in Cavite. The said counsel manifested that he reserved his right to cross-examine any
witness the prosecution would present in case trial would proceed on that date; on the other hand, in the event that the
trial court would cancel the trial, he would be available in May 2003 and during the first half of June 2003.
The trial court reset the hearing of the case to 8:30 a.m. of June 19, 2003 and gave the prosecution ten (10) days to
[6]
file its opposition to the petitioners petition for bail. It likewise ordered the issuance of a subpoena to Dr. Jose Arnel
Marquez to require him to attend the trial on the said date.
[7]
On May 5, 2003, the petitioner filed a motion seeking an earlier trial date, invoking his right to speedy trial under the
[8]
Speedy Trial Act of 1998. He also filed a motion for the urgent resolution of his petition for bail.
[9]
On May 12, 2003, the petitioner filed another motion praying that the hearing scheduled on June 19, 2003 be
moved to an earlier date, preferably on May 26, 28 or 29, 2003. In the meantime, the prosecution filed its
[10]
comment/opposition to the petitioners petition for bail.
[11]
On May 13, 2003, the court issued an Order declaring that the petition for bail was submitted for its resolution and
[12]
denying the petitioners motion for an earlier trial date. On June 16, 2003, the trial court issued its Order denying the
petition for bail, on its finding that the evidence of guilt against the petitioner was strong.
During the trial of June 19, 2003, Dr. Marquez failed to appear before the court because, in the meantime, he had
been assigned to the Eastern Police District and failed to receive the subpoena issued to him by the court. The
prosecution prayed for continuance, but the petitioner objected and invoked his right to speedy trial. The court,
nevertheless, granted the motion and reset the trial to July 17, 2003.
On June 27, 2003, the court issued a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez requiring
[13]
him to appear for the trial set on July 17, 2003.
On July 4, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the courts Order dated June 16, 2003 denying
his petition for bail. His motion was set for hearing, also on July 17, 2003. However, the petitioner preempted the
 [14]
resolution of his motion for reconsideration and filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on July 11, 2003 on the ground that
his right to speedy trial had been violated. He made the following allegations:

1. The hearings in the instant case have more often than not been scheduled more than one month apart;

2. In the hearing on April 30, 2003, in particular, the day before undersigned counsel had filed a Manifestation stating inter alia that
his available dates for the next hearing may be any Monday, Wednesday or Thursday for the whole of May 2003 and the first half of
June 2003, except on May 14 and 21 yet Atty. Manalaysay asked for the next hearing on June 19 which is already outside or beyond
the dates mentioned in the manifestation, and which was more than 1-1/2 months away, but which the Honorable Court nonetheless
granted;

3. Atty. Manalaysay has never been able to present any good cause as to how come he was not able to present Dr. Marquez on April
30, 2003, and then again on June 19, 2003; and as aforesaid, his absence on March 6, 2003 has not been supported by any medical
certificate;

4. The first hearing in the instant case was held on June 13, 2002, thus it has now been more than one year, or close to 400 days ago
since trial started; neither has there been any authorization from the Supreme Court that the trial period may exceed 180 days;

5. There has been no statement by the Honorable Court in any of its orders granting continuance that the ends of justice served by
taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial;

6. As above stated, it appears that the prosecution made a false statement before the Honorable Court in claiming they had asked Dr.
[15]
Marquez to testify in the June 19, 2003 hearing, when in fact they had not.

Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez had apparently still not received the subpoena issued by the trial court, because of which the
prosecution again failed to present him as a witness during the trial of July 17, 2003. The prosecution prayed for
continuance, to which the petitioner vigorously objected. The court, however, granted the motion and reset the trial to
[16]
August 11, 2003.
[17]
On July 24, 2003, Judge Laurea issued an Order inhibiting himself from hearing the case to avoid being
misunderstood, to preserve his reputation for probity and objectivity and to live up to the ideal impartial administration of
justice. The case was re-raffled to Branch 170, presided by Judge Benjamin T. Antonio, who calendared the case for trial
[18]
on September 8, 2003. Nevertheless, on August 11, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Judge
Laureas Order dated July 24, 2003, which the latter denied, on the finding that no cogent reason was presented to
[19]
reconsider the same.
During the hearing on September 8, 2003, Judge Antonio granted the private prosecutors motion to be given five (5)
days within which to oppose the petitioners motion to dismiss. Judge Antonio also set the trial on September 18,
[20] [21]
2003. On the latter date, the trial court issued an Omnibus Order denying the petitioners motion to dismiss. The trial
court reasoned that there was no violation of the petitioners right to speedy trial, considering that the apparent delays
could not be attributed to the fault of the prosecution alone. The trial court noted that the petitioner also sought
Postponements of the trials.
Anent the motion for reconsideration of the courts Order dated June 16, 2003 which denied the petition for bail, the
trial court considered the same as having been abandoned by the petitioner upon the filing of his motion to dismiss the
case without waiting for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration on his petition for bail.
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari and
[22]
Prohibition. On October 2, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution requiring the petitioner to inform the court of his choice of
remedy within five (5) days from notice thereof. In compliance therewith, the petitioner filed a manifestation with the
appellate court that he had chosen his petition to be treated as a petition for habeas corpus without prejudice to the
concomitant application of certiorari if the court considered the same necessary or appropriate to give effect to the writ
of habeas corpus.
The petitioner averred that (a) he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and his constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of the case; (b) Judge Laurea erred in inhibiting himself from the case; (c) the trial court committed grave
abuse of its discretion in denying his petition for bail; and (d) Judge Antonio had prejudged the case against him.
On December 9, 2003, the CA issued its assailed Resolution dismissing the petition, viz:

WHEREFORE, for being the wrong or improper remedy, the PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS is DISMISSED.
 [23]
SO ORDERED.

According to the appellate court, while the petitioner manifested his preference that his petition be treated as a
petition for habeas corpus, the same was not the proper remedy to review and examine the proceedings before the trial
court and as a relief from the petitioners perceived oppressive situation in the trial court. The CA further emphasized that
a writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error; that it could not exercise its certiorari jurisdiction over the acts or omission of
the respondent judge as a concomitant remedy; and that the remedy for habeas corpus and certiorari are different in
nature, scope and purpose. The appellate court declared that the petitioner failed to present any evidence to prove that
there was any intentional or deliberate delay caused to prejudice him; nor was there any malice in the failure of the
prosecution to promptly serve the subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to its witnesses. The court also noted that the
resetting of petitioners case may also be attributed to the voluminous work of the RTC involved.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision contending that (a) the congestion of the trial
courts calendar is not a valid ground for continuance of the trial; (b) the trial court failed to secure an extension of time of
the trial period from the Supreme Court; (c) the trial court should have given a precedence to the case, the charge therein
being a heinous crime; (d) his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was proper because his continued detention had
become illegal, following the prosecutor and the trial courts violation of his right to a speedy trial, and the trial courts denial
of his motion to dismiss the case and his petition for bail which was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and (e) a writ
of habeas corpus may be issued with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. However, the CA denied the
petitioners motion for lack of merit.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reiterating the grounds
contained in his motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. The petitioner averred that the appellate court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in rendering its resolution, as well as the resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration thereof.
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
not the proper remedy to assail the trial courts order denying his petition for bail, motion to dismiss the case, and Judge
Laureas order of inhibition. The OSG posits that the petitioner was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of his case as well as under the Speedy Trial Act.
The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not the decision of the CA is already final and executory;
(b) whether the proper remedy from the appellate courts denial of a petitioner for a writ if habeas corpus is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and (c) if in the affirmative, whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the
issuance of the writ.
On the first issue, we find and so rule that the petitioners recourse to this Court via a petition for certiorari from the
decision of the CA dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpusis inappropriate. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 provides that the period for appeal from the judgment of any court in habeas corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48)
hours from notice of the judgment appealed from. While the said provision was not incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, this Court approved Administrative Matter No. 01-1-03-SC amending Section 3, Rule 41of the said Rules,
which took effect on July 15, 2001, thus:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal; appeal in habeas corpus cases.The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record
on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken
within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

Following the rule, the petitioner should have appealed to this Court from the CA decision denying his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, as well as the denial of his motion for reconsideration thereof; instead, the petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The well-settled rule is that certiorari is not available where
the aggrieved partys remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that
certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to
appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two remedies are mutually
[24]
exclusive. An appeal in this case would still have been a speedy and adequate remedy. Consequently, when the
petitioner filed his petition in this Court, the decision of the CA was already final and executory.
It bears stressing that a decision in a habeas corpus action stands in no different position than with any other
proceeding and if the appealed decision is to be reviewed by an appellate court, the remedy is by writ of error because the
[25]
error committed by the court is an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction.
 Besides, as correctly held by the CA, a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial courts denial
of the petitioners motion to dismiss the case, the denial of the petition for bail, as well as the voluntary inhibition of Judge
Laurea.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of
[26]
Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It
seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is
made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal
restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner
[27]
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court.
[28]
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial courts function. It cannot
take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error
that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the
[29]
question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily
granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional
[30]
circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be
pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. In
another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law
and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat
[31]
that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that
where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not
[32]
grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole purpose of
having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into and
[33]
his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person
[34]
who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner
(prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian
[35]
has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is
[36]
entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a palladium of liberty is a prerogative writ which does not issue as a
matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It, is, however, a writ of right on proper formalities being
[37]
made by proof. Resort to the writ is to inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto the right of
[38]
liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The primary, if
not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum is to determine the legality of the restraint under which a
[39]
person is held.
Our review of the petitioners material averments in his petition before the CA reveals that it was a petition for habeas
corpus or, in the alternative, a petition for a writ of certiorari The petitioner assailed therein the orders of the trial court
denying his petition for bail and his motion to dismiss on the ground that he was deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case against him, and questioned Judge Laureas order of inhibition. We agree with the CA that a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be joined with the special civil action for certiorari because the two remedies
are governed by a different set of rules. Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court mandates that the joinder of causes of
action shall not include special actions or actions governed by special rules, thus proscribing the joinder of a special
proceeding with a special civil action.
We also agree with the ruling of the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a remedy different from the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral
attack on the processes, orders, or judgment of the trial court, while certiorari is a direct attack of said processes, orders,
or judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. A
writ of certiorari reaches only jurisdictional errors. It has no other use, except to bring before the court a record material to
be considered in exercising jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches the record. On the other hand, a writ of habeas
corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also reaches jurisdictional matters but does not reach the record. However,
when jurisdiction is obtained by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, to bring the body of the person whose liberty is
involved into court, and if it is necessary, to provide the record upon which the detention is based, that may be
accomplished by using a writ of certiorari as an ancillary proceeding, i.e., it is subordinate to or in aid of the primary action
for the purpose of impeaching the record. When a writ of certiorari is issued as the foundation of jurisdiction to bring it and
direct upon the validity of a judicial determination by any body or officer, jurisdictional questions only are reached, and
[40]
such questions pertaining to the detention made by the officer or body particularly complained of.
The petitioner manifested to the appellate court that his petition should be treated as a petition for habeas corpus.
Even then, the CA rightly dismissed the petition because the petitioner failed to establish his right to the writ. The records
show that the petitioner was charged with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua and was detained based on the said
charge; hence, if the evidence of his guilt is strong, he shall not be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
[41]
prosecution. There is no question that the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense charged and over the person of
the petitioner. The jail warden has the authority and, in fact, is mandated to detain the petitioner until granted bail by the
court, or the case against him dismissed, or until he is acquitted after trial. The petitioner failed to establish that his
incarceration pendente lite was illegal, and likewise failed to establish exceptional circumstances warranting the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus by the appellate court.
[42]
In Galvez v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that a petition for habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail
the denial thereof:

The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that
jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against
him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even
[43]
then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

The remedy of the petitioner from the Order of the trial court denying his petition for bail was to file a petition for
certiorari in the CA if the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
[44]
issuing the said order. If the petitioner had done so, his petition would have been granted because as gleaned from the
assailed order of the trial court, it failed to summarize the testimonies of the private complainant and that of her mother.
[45]
Hence, such order is invalid. The trial court would have had to issue another order containing the summary of the
testimonies of the private complainant and her mother, including its findings and conclusions. However, the petitioner
would still not be entitled to be released from detention in the meantime.
[46]
It bears stressing that under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, the voluntary
inhibition of a Judge is addressed to his sound discretion for just or valid reasons, the primary consideration being that the
[47]
peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. The petitioner should have thus filed a petition for certiorari and/or
prohibition in the CA, instead of a petition for habeas corpus.
In cases where the right of the accused to a speedy trial is violated by the prosecution, the remedy lies in the
procedure provided for under Republic Act No. 8493, as implemented by Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Section 8 of the said Rule provides:

SEC. 8. Sanctions. In any case in which private counsel for the accused, the public attorney, or the prosecutor:

(a) Knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;

(b) Files a motion solely for delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without merit;

(c) Makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a
continuance; or

(d) Willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions hereof, the court may punish such counsel,
attorney, or prosecutor, as follows:

(1) By imposing on a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an accused, a fine not exceeding twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00);

(2) By imposing on any appointed counsel de oficio, public attorney, or prosecutor a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00); and

(3) By denying any defense counsel or prosecutor the right to practice before the court trying the case for a period not exceeding thirty
(30) days. The punishment provided for by this section shall be without prejudice to any appropriate criminal action or other sanction
authorized under these Rules.

If the trial court acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction in granting the
prosecutions motion for the resetting of the trial over the petitioners objections, the more appropriate remedy would have
been to file a petition for certiorari and/or a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to comply with the timeline
provided for by the said Rule for trial and termination of the case.
It was inappropriate for the petitioner to file a petition for habeas corpus assailing the trial courts order denying his
motion to dismiss the case for failure to comply with the timeline provided for by the said Rules. Reading and evaluating
the assailed Order of the trial court dated September 18, 2000, it cannot be gainsaid that the court violated the right of the
petitioner to speedy trial. Thus:

The instant motion is anchored on the alleged violation of and/or to enforce the right of the accused to speedy trial. In invoking such
right, the accused contends that the failure of the prosecution to present the medico-legal officer who examined the victim on two (2)
occasions, and the non-appearance of the private prosecutor on one occasion caused undue delay in the proceedings of this case.

The prosecution vigorously opposed the Motion to Dismiss and claimed that since the prosecution has not yet rested its case, the Court
may not be able to appreciate the merits of the instant motion in the light of the unfinished presentation of evidence for the prosecution
and that the grounds relied by the defense do not touch on the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, but rather on the alleged delay and failure to present Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez of the PNP Crime
Laboratory.

After due consideration, the Court finds the instant motion untenable. The alleged delay and failure to present the medico-legal officer
cannot be attributed to the fault of the prosecution and/or the Court. The prosecution and the Court cannot encroach on the right of the
medico-legal officer to appear inasmuch as his schedule conflicted with the hearings set for his appearance. Moreover, delays assailed
by defense counsel that violated accused right to speedy trial are not all at the instance of the prosecution. In fact, the defense,
contributed to the delay since the former defense counsel and even the present defense counsel sought postponements of the hearings.

Be that as it may, despite the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer, the Court (Branch 169) proceeded in resolving the Petition
for Bail of the accused (albeit unfavorable to the cause of the accused) on the basis of the sole testimony of the complainant, which is
backed up by several jurisprudence to this effect. The defense, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said denial after he has filed a
Motion to Dismiss. The filing of these pleadings adds to the delay until the Presiding Judge who denied the Petition for Bail
voluntarily inhibited himself from this case. Then when the Motion to Dismiss was set for hearing, the Court, in an attempt to expedite
the proceedings, suggested for the parties to stipulate on the medical findings of the medico-legal officer so as to dispense with his
[48]
presentation. Defense counsel, however, would not want to enter into such a stipulation. Hence, another delay.

We agree with the petitioner that a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be filed if one is deprived
of his right to a speedy disposition of the case under Article IV, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution and of his right to due
[49]
process. However, the petitioner never invoked in the trial court his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the
case against him. What he invoked was his right to a speedy trial under Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. He invoked his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case against him, for the first time, only in the
Court of Appeals when he filed his petition for habeas corpus.
Even then, the petitioner failed to establish his claim that he was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
[50]
case. In Marilyn Corpuz, et al., v. Sandiganbayan, the Court had the occasion to state

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of
the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of
justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a
speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The
inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy
disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely
said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends
upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind
that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give
meaning to that intent.

The Court emphasized in the same case that:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial
cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors
must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the
defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect,
namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the
Possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately
the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty
and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is
curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edged sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of
time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require
impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall
deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the government
to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond
that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the
ordinary processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. Different weights should be assigned to
different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or
prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain
some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the prosecution or
a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against the State.

In this case, the petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002. In the meantime, he was able to present only two
witnesses. The petitioner failed to terminate the cross-examination of the private complainant by the year 2002. The Court
cannot determine the reason for the delay because the records of the RTC are not before it. Neither of the parties made
any explanation for the delay; nor is there any showing that the counsel of the petitioner complained about the delay.
Aside from the petitioners claim that the private prosecutor failed to give good cause for his failure to present Dr. Jose
Arnel Marquez during the trial dates April 30, 2003 and June 19, 2003, as well as to substantiate his absence during the
trial of March 6, 2003 with a medical certificate, the petitioner failed to support his claim in his pleadings before the CA
and in this Court. On the other hand, the counsel of the petitioner was absent during the trial on April 30, 2003 because he
had to attend an execution sale in Cavite. The petitioners counsel gave priority to the execution sale and asked for a
resetting despite the fact that his client, the petitioner, was detained for a quasi-heinous crime. While it is true that the trial
was reset to June 19, 2003, or more than one month from April 30, 2003, the petitioners counsel himself manifested that
he was available for trial during the first half of June 2003. There was a difference of only four (4) days from the trial date
set by the court and the available dates suggested by the petitioners counsel. It bears stressing that trial dates cannot be
set solely at the convenience of the petitioners counsel. The trial dates available in the calendar of the court and of the
prosecutor must also be taken into account.
Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case simply
because the private prosecutor failed to submit a medical certificate for his absence during the trial of March 6, 2003. The
petitioner could have asked the court to cite the private prosecutor in contempt of court for his failure to submit the said
certificate; he failed to do so. Moreover, the petitioner failed to establish any serious prejudice by the delay of the trial, and
that the State deliberately delayed the trial to prejudice him.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[21] [40]
Id. at 43. Gaster v. Whitcher, supra.
[22] [41]
Id. at 45. Sec. 7, Rule 114 reads: Capital offense or an offense
[1] [23]
Penned by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, with Id. at 76. punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
[24]
Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. imprisonment, not bailable. No person
Elvi John S. Asuncion, concurring. 144332, June 10, 2004. charged with a capital offense, or an offense
[2] [25]
Criminal Case No. 25756-MN. Gaster v. State ex rel. Whitcher, 94 N.W. 787 (1903). punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
[3] [26]
Rollo, pp. 69-70. 46 F. Supp. 663 (1942). imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
[4] [27]
Id. at 18. Click v. Click, 127 S.E. 194, citing Ex Parte Tom Tong, evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
[5]
Id. at 11. 108 U.S. 556. stage of the criminal prosecution.
[6] [28] [42]
Id. at 12. Burton v. Smithers, 31 F. 2d 966 (1929). 237 SCRA 685 (1994).
[7] [29] [43]
Id. at 13. U.S. v. Pridgeon, 38 L. Ed. 627; Ex Parte Kearsey 38 Id. at 713-714, citing Enrile v. Salazar, etc., et al., 186
[8]
Id. at 27. L. Ed. 391. SCRA 217 (1990).
[9] [30] [44]
Id. at 15. Jones v. Perkins, 62 L. Ed. 1 (1918). People v. Gomez, 325 SCRA 61 (2000).
[10] [31] [45]
Id. at 17. Johnson v. Zerbst, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938). See Goodman v. De la Victoria, 325 SCRA 658 (2000).
[11] [32] [46]
Id. at 95. 39 CJS, Habeas Corpus, 15, p. 448. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
[12] [33]
Id. at 30-31. Sismon v. Georgia Iron and Coal Company, 43 SE, 78 disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
[13]
Id. at 49. (1903). just or valid reasons other than those
[14] [34]
Id. at 32. Brado v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 35 L. mentioned above.
[15] [47]
Id. at 33-34. Ed. 443 (1973). People v. Kho, 357 SCRA 290 (2001).
[16] [35] [48]
Id. at 35. 39 Am. Jur., Habeas Corpus, 86, p. 208. Rollo, pp. 43-44.
[17] [36] [49]
Id. at 36. Click v. Click, supra. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 323 (1996);
[18] [37]
Id. at 38. Bailey, Habeas Corpus, par. 2, p. 6. Olaguer v. Military Commission, 250 SCRA
[19] [38]
Id. at 41. Ex parte Billings, supra. 144 (1987).
[20] [39] [50]
Id. at 42. Caison v. Landon, 96 L. Ed. 547 (1952). G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 2004.
 FIRST DIVISION

SAMUEL BARREDO G.R. No. 168728

y GOLANI,
Petitioner, Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

HON. VICENTE VINARAO,

Director, Bureau of
Corrections,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 2, 2007
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner Samuel Barredo y Golani prays for his release from

the maximum security compound of the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on the ground that he has already served the sentence

imposed on him in Criminal Case Nos. Q-92-38559 and Q-92-38560.

Criminal Case No. Q-92-38559[1] was for carnapping[2] while Criminal Case No. Q-92-38560 was for illegal possession of

firearms.[3] Both cases were filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 103. [4]

The cases were tried jointly. After trial, the court rendered a joint decision finding petitioner guilty of both charges. Relevant

parts of the dispositive portion read:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in Q-92-38559 finding Samuel Barredo,[5] xxx GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt xxx of the crime of Carnapping aggravated and qualified by the frustrated killing of Ciriaco
Rosales and [he is] hereby sentenced to undergo an imprisonment term of THIRTY (30) YEARS;

xxx xxx xxx

In Q-92-38560, Samuel Barredo is hereby found GUILTY as principal beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of P.D. 1866 and he is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment term of EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.[6]

No appeal was made, hence, the decision became final and executory.
 Petitioner was committed to the custody of the Quezon City Jail (as detention prisoner) on March 15, 1993. [7] After

conviction, he was transferred to and confined at the maximum security compound of the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on

July 23, 1994[8] where he is now still detained.

According to petitioner, as of August 2, 2004, he already served a total of 18 years. He claims that, on October 9, 2001, the

Board of Pardons and Parole passed a resolution recommending the commutation of his sentence to a period of from 15 to 20 years.

He further points out that, based on the Bureau of Corrections revised computation table for determining the time to be credited

prisoners for good conduct while serving sentence, he should only serve 14 years, 9 months and 18 days. Thus, this petition.

Is petitioner entitled to the writ of habeas corpus? No.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WILL NOT ISSUE IF DETENTION IS BY

VIRTUE OF VALID JUDGMENT

The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement, detention or deprivation of liberty. [9] It was devised as a

speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. [10] More specifically, it is a remedy to obtain immediate relief

for those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful

custody.[11] It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances under which a person is detained. [12]

The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid

judgment.[13] However, the writ may be allowed as a post-conviction remedy when the proceedings leading to the conviction were

attended by any of the following exceptional circumstances:

(1) there was a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person;

(2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence or

(3) the imposed penalty was excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess. [14]

The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or

by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. [15] Thus, Section 4, Rule 102 of the

Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner was detained pursuant to a final judgment of the Quezon City RTC convicting him for the crimes of carnapping and illegal

possession of firearms. He is therefore not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.

SENTENCE IS VOID INSOFAR AS IT FAILED TO IMPOSE AN
INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, however, the trial court erred in imposing a straight penalty of

imprisonment for 30 years in the carnapping case. The sentence imposed by the trial court deprived petitioner of the benefits of the

Indeterminate Sentence Law.[16] Hence, it was void insofar as it failed to impose an indeterminate sentence.

Since the crime was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, the imposable penalty under the

Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 was imprisonment for not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years. [17] Furthermore,

pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court should have imposed an indeterminate sentence with a maximum term not

exceeding the maximum fixed by the special penal law and a minimum term not less than the minimum term prescribed by the same

law.[18] Therefore, the proper imposable penalty is imprisonment not for 30 years but for an indeterminate sentence of 17 years and 4

months as minimum to 30 years as maximum.[19]

REDUCTION OF PENALTY UNDER AMENDATORY LAW SHOULD

BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY

Petitioner is likewise entitled to a reduction of the penalty imposed upon him in the illegal possession of firearms case in

view of the passage of RA 8294. The law reduced the penalty for simple illegal possession of firearms to prision correccional in its

maximum period and a fine of not less than P15,000. Being favorable to petitioner, RA 8294 should be applied retroactively to benefit

him.[20] Further applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper imposable penalty is imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months and 1

day as minimum to 6 years as maximum.[21]

PETITIONER HAS NOT YET SERVED THE PENALTIES IMPOSED

ON HIM

Petitioner has to serve the penalties imposed on him successively in the order of their severity. [22] Hence, he has to first serve

the more severe penalty, i.e., that imposed in the carnapping case: imprisonment for 17 years and 4 months as minimum to 30 years as

maximum. Only after he has served this will he commence serving the less severe penalty imposed in the illegal possession of

firearms case: imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum. [23]

Per the certification issued by the Bureau of Corrections, [24] as of April 3, 2007, petitioner has served a total of 18 years, 4

months and 26 days, inclusive of his good conduct time allowance and preventive imprisonment. Thus, while he has already served

the minimum penalty in the carnapping case, he has not yet served the minimum penalty in the illegal possession of firearms case.
Consequently, petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Neither is he eligible for parole because only

prisoners who have served the minimum penalty imposed on them may be released on parole on such terms and conditions as may be

prescribed by the Board of Pardons and Parole. [25]

Petitioners claim that the Board of Pardons and Parole passed a resolution recommending the commutation of his sentence

does not justify the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Commutation of sentence is a prerogative of the Chief Executive.[26] Hence,

even if petitioners claim were true, the recommendation of the Bureau of Pardons and Parole was just that, a mere recommendation.

Until and unless approved by the President, there is no commutation to speak of.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
[1]
In this case, he was charged together with Romeo Camacho and Isaias Solsona.
[2]
Penalized under RA 6539, otherwise known as The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
[3]
Penalized under PD 1866, as amended.
[4]
Presided by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.
[5]
His co-accused, Camacho and Solsona, were likewise convicted as they were found to have conspired with each other.
[6]
Joint Decision dated June 30, 1994 promulgated on July 21, 1994. Rollo, pp. 7-13.
[7]
Per certification dated August 17, 1994, issued by the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Quezon City Jail. Id., p. 15.
[8]
Per certification dated August 2, 2004, issued by the Bureau of Corrections. Id., p. 16.
[9]
Go v. Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876, 21 June 2005, 460 SCRA 451.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Id.
[14]
Id.
[15]
De Joya v. The Jail Warden of Batangas City, G.R. No. 159418-19, 10 December 2003, 417 SCRA 636.
[16]
Act No. 4103.
[17]
RA 6539, Section 14.
[18]
Id., Section 1. xxx; and if the offense is punished by [a special] law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
[19]
People v. Viente, G.R. No. 103299, 17 August 1993, 225 SCRA 361.
[20]
See Revised Penal Code, Article 22. Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 343 Phil. 297 (1997).
[21]
Id.
[22]
See Revised Penal Code, Article 70.
[23]
Thus, petitioner has to serve a total of 21 years, 6 months and 1 day as minimum and 36 years as maximum.
[24]
Rollo, p. 90.
[25]
Act No. 4103, Section 5.
[26]
People v. Nardo, G.R. No. 133888, 01 March 2001, 353 SCRA 339.
 SECOND DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF THE G.R. No. 167193

PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
Present:

PUNO,* J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,**
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
ENGR. ASHRAF KUNTING,
Petitioner. Promulgated:

April 19, 2006

x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan and
General Robert Delfin,[1] Philippine National Police (PNP) Intelligence Chief, to bring petitioner Ashraf Kunting before this Court and
show cause why he is illegally detained.

The antecedents are as follows:

On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal Security Act. On
June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task
Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City, Basilan, Branch 2, Ninth
Judicial Region. Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC under
separate Amended Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3674-1187, 3537-1129, 3608-1164, and 3611-1165.

Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp Crame for booking and custodial
investigation.

In a letter dated July 3, 2003, Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Jr., Police Superintendent and Chief of the Legal Affairs Division,
PNP-IG, informed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already in the custody of the PNP-IG.
Atty. Danipog requested for Kuntings temporary detention at the PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City due to the high security risks
involved and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding commitment order.

In a letter dated July 9, 2003, Emilio F. Enriquez, Acting Clerk of Court of the RTC, replied to the request of Atty. Danipog,
thus:
xxx

The undersigned referred the matter to Hon. Danilo M. Bucoy, Presiding Judge of this Court, who issued
the Alias Warrant of Arrest in the herein mentioned case (Criminal Case No. 3674-1187) and per his instruction,
accused As[h]raf Kunting y Barreto [may be] temporarily detained thereat by virtue of the Alias Warrant of Arrest
issued in this case, however considering that the accused is a high security risk, he should be brought
to Isabela, Basilan as soon as the necessary security escort can be provided for his transfer, where the proper
commitment order can be issued as the herein mentioned case is about to be submitted by the prosecution.

Thank you ever so much for your usual cooperation extended to the Court. [2]
 On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division,
PNP-IG, to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation.

On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo,
Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of the venue of the trial
from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons: (1) Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG
stating that utmost effort will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the custody of Kunting from the PNP considering
his importance to the ASG; and (2) there is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained
in Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of the ASG.
On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision against petitioners co-accused in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos.
3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165, finding 17 of the accused, who were tried, guilty of the crime/s charged.

On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Kuntings Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation since the
PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent
and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to turn over Kunting to the court.
In a letter dated February 22, 2005, Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan reiterated the request to Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo to facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of Kuntings case, citing the same grounds in the previous
letter. He added that if Kunting had been transferred to Isabela City, Basilan, he could have been one of the escapees in a jail break
that occurred on April 10, 2004 as suspected ASG members were able to go scot-free.

On March 15, 2005, Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, filed with the RTC a
Motion to Defer Implementation of the Order dated February 11, 2005, citing, among other grounds, the existence of a pending
motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial of Criminal Case No. 3537-1129 against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the
DOJ before this Court. Police Inspector Barbasa prayed that the Order of the RTC dated February 11, 2005, directing the turnover
of Kunting to the court, be suspended until the motion for the transfer of venue is resolved.

On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Kunting stated that he
has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by Police Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and assisted
by PNP Intelligence Chief, General Robert Delfin. He alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against him until he
requested his family to research in Zamboanga City. It was discovered in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared in
the list of accused who allegedly participated in the kidnapping incident which occurred on June 2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan.

Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he promptly filed an Urgent Motion for
Reinvestigation on

September 8, 2003. He was aware that the PNP-IG requested Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo for representation to file a
motion with this Court for the transfer of venue of his case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. Having no further information on
the status of his case, he filed a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation on January 26, 2005. He stated that since no action
was taken by the trial court or the DOJ, he filed this petition to put an end to his illegal detention classified in the records as for
safekeeping purposes only.

The main issue is whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.
 Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to all case of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, [3] and if found
illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee.[4] If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings
terminate.[5]

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall
not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in
the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. [6]

In this case, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue
of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-
IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court.

Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case
Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be
issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals[7] holds that
once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.

Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Order dated February 11, 2005 reiterated its Order dated September 15,
2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, to turn
over Kunting to the court. TThe trial court has been waiting for two years for the PNP-IG to turn over the person of Kunting for the
trial of his case. The PNP-IG has delayed the turn over because it is waiting for the DOJ to request for the transfer of venue of the trial
of the case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. In the absence of evidence that the DOJ has indeed filed a motion for the transfer
of venue, In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General stated that the PNP-IG is presently awaiting the resolution of the Motion
for Transfer of Venue it requested from the DOJ. In this regard, t the Police Chief Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take
positive steps towards action on said motion.comply with the Order of the trial court, dated February 11, 2005, to turn over the body
of petitioner Kunting to the trial court..

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
* On Leave. [4] In Re: Azucena L. Garcia, G.R. No. 141443, August 30, 2000, 339 SCRA 292.
** Acting Chairperson. [5] Supra, note 1.
[1] In his Comment, Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan stated that Police Director [6] Emphasis supplied.
Robert C. Delfin retired from the PNP on May 21, 2005. [7] G.R. No. 107741, October 18, 1996, 263 SCRA 323.
[2] Rollo, p. 131.
[3] In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Capt. Gary Alejano, et al., G.R. No.

160792, August 25, 2005.

 THIRD DIVISION

MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. G.R. No. 162734

SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and
ROSARIO C. SALIENTES, Present:
Petitioners, QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE

JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR.,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH Promulgated:
203, MUNTINLUPA CITY,
Respondents. August 29, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The instant petition assails the Decision[1] dated November 10, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680, which
dismissed the petition for certiorari against the orders of the Regional Trial Court in Special Proceedings No. 03-004. Likewise
assailed is the Court of Appeals Resolution[2] dated March 19, 2004 denying reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the minor
Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonettes parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario
C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but
Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.

Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus and Custody,[3] docketed as Special Proceedings No. 03-004 before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. On January
23, 2003, the trial court issued the following order:

Upon verified Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by Petitioners, the Respondents
Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes are hereby directed to produce
and bring before this Court the body of minor Lorenzo Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003 at 1:00
oclock in the afternoon and to show cause why the said child should not be discharged from restraint.

Let this Writ be served by the Sheriff or any authorized representative of this Court, who is directed to
immediately make a return.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied.

Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed on November
10, 2003. The appellate court affirmed the February 24, 2003 Order of the trial court holding that its January 23, 2003 Order did not
award the custody of the 2-year-old child to any one but was simply the standard order issued for the production of restrained
persons. The appellate court held that the trial court was still about to conduct a full inquiry, in a summary proceeding, on the cause of
the minors detention and the matter of his custody. The Court of Appeals ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied on March 19, 2004.

Hence, petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion,
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing an order for the petitioner-mother to first show
cause why her own three-year old child in her custody should not be discharged from a so-called restraint
despite no evidence at all of restraint and no evidence of compelling reasons of maternal unfitness to
deprive the petitioner-mother of her minor son of tender years. The assailed orders, resolutions and
decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals are clearly void;

2. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion
in issuing a writ of habeas corpus which clearly is not warranted considering that there is no unlawful
restraint by the mother and considering further that the law presumes the fitness of the mother, thereby
negating any notion of such mother illegally restraining or confining her very own son of tender years. The
petition is not even sufficient in substance to warrant the writ. The assailed orders are clearly void.

3. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, the Sombong vs. CA case supports rather than negates the
position of the petitioners.

4. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, summary proceeding does violence to the tender-years-rule

5. The Court of Appeals failed to consider that the private respondent failed to present prima facie proof
of any compelling reason of the unfitness of the petitioner-mother;

6. The Court of Appeals failed to see that the New Rules on Custody SUFFICES AS REMEDY.[6]

Plainly put, the issue is: Did the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed the petition for certiorari against the trial courts
orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003?

Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 [7] of the Family Code, which provides that no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They maintain that
herein respondent Loran had the burden of showing any compelling reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.

Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private respondent was simply
an action for custody, but not habeas corpus.Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the
law, has the right of custody of the minor. They insist there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own
mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause and explain the custody of her very own child.

Private respondent counters that petitioners argument based on Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to the second part
of his petition regarding the custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as the father to see his
son. He asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minors right to see his father and vice
versa. He avers that the instant petition is merely filed for delay, for had petitioners really intended to bring the child before the court
in accordance with the new rules on custody of minors, they would have done so on the dates specified in the January 23, 2003 and
the February 24, 2003 orders of the trial court.

Private respondent maintains that, under the law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental
authority over their son. He alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country as required of her job as an
international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of their son and not the maternal grandparents.

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the assailed January 23, 2003 Order of the trial court did not grant custody
of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his
liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial courts full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still
pending before it.

Under Rule 41, Section 1[8] of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special action under Rule 65.The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the order.

Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. [9] Under Article
211[10] of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and
consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the
court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the
present case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition.[11] Hence, the
remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.

In a petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare
[12]
Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be
the paramount consideration.[13]

Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners
to produce the minor in court and explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line with the directive
in Section 9[14] of A.M. 03-04-04-SC[15] that within fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file
answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This was
exactly what the court did.

Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the
proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondents petition for custody. But it
is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his
child under seven years of age.
In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003. Hence, the Court of
Appeals properly dismissed the petition for certiorari against the said orders of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 10, 2003 and the Resolution dated March 19,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

EDITA T. BURGOS, G.R. No. 183711

Petitioner,
- versus -
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P.
TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ.
GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT.
COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR
GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------x
EDITA T. BURGOS,
Petitioner,
- versus -

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN.

HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P.
TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL.
MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and LT. COL. NOEL
CLEMENT, G.R. No. 183712
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------x
EDITA T. BURGOS,
Petitioner,
- versus -
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.;
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, LT.
GEN. ALEXANDER YANO; and Chief of the
Philippine National Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL
AVELINO RAZON, JR.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 183713

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
June 22, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:
[1]
On July 17, 2008, the Court of Appeals (CA) issued a decision in the consolidated petitions for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas
[2] [3] [4]
Corpus, for Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo filed by petitioner Edita T. Burgos on behalf of her son Jonas
Joseph T. Burgos, who was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four men and by a woman from the extension portion of Hapag
Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, on April 28, 2007.This CA
[5]
decision dismissed the petitioners petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus; denied the petitioners motion to declare
the respondents in contempt; and partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner.

The Antecedents

[6]
The established facts, as found by the CA, are summarized below:

The established facts show that at around one oclock in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, Jonas Joseph T. Burgos a farmer
advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan (a chapter of the militant peasant organization Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas) was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan
Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. On his way out of the
restaurant, Jonas told the manager, Maam aktibista lang po ako! When a security guard tried to intervene, after he noticed that the
group was forcibly dragging a male person out of the restaurant, he was told, Pare, pulis! The guard then backed off but was able to
see that Jonas was forced into the rear portion of a plain maroon colored Toyota Revo with plate number TAB 194. The guard then
noted the plate number and reported the incident to his superiors as well as to the police on duty in the said mall.

On April 30, 2007, the petitioner held a press conference and announced that her son Jonas was missing. That same day,
the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the person abducted was her son Jonas. Upon subsequent police investigation
and LTO verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a certain
Mauro B. Mudlong. It was also later confirmed by employees of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that
Mudlong was arrested and his 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was seized on June 24, 2006 by Cpl. Castro Bugalan and Pfc. Jose Villea of the
th
56 Infantry Battalion (IB) of the Philippine Army for transporting timber without permit. As agreed upon by the DENR employees
th th
and officers of the 56 IB, the vehicle with the license plate no. TAB 194 was impounded in the 56 IB headquarters whose
commanding officer at that time was Lt. Col. Noel Clement.
th
The established facts also show that Lt. Col. Clement and the soldiers of the 56 IB went on retraining at the Headquarters
of the First Scout Rangers Regiment (Camp Tecson) in Brgy. Tartaro, San Miguel, Bulacan starting November 28, 2006. A left-behind
th th
force or a squad remained in the camp of the 56 IB to secure the premises and equipment as it awaited the arrival of the 69 IB,
th th
headed by Lt. Col. Edison Caga, which took over the 56 IBs area of responsibility for the duration of the retraining. The 69 IB
th
arrived at Camp Tecson on December 1, 2006, and remained there until March 7, 2007, when the 56 IB returned. There was no
th
formal turnover or inventory of equipment and vehicles when the 69 IB arrived on December 1, 2006.
th
Meanwhile, on January 17, 2007, Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano took command of the 56 IB from Lt. Col. Clement. The actual
th
turnover of command took place at Camp Tecsonwhere the 56 IB was retraining. At the time Jonas was abducted on April 28, 2007,
th nd th
Lt. Col. Feliciano was the 56 IBs commanding officer. Earlier, on March 23, 2007, 2 Lt. Dick A. Abletes, a member of the 56 IB,
was caught on video talking to two persons, a male and a female, at McDonalds Bocaue. In the video, he was seen handing a
nd
document to the two persons. On March 26, 2007, 2 Lt. Abletes was arrested and charges were soon filed against him with the
Judge Advocate General for violations of Articles 82, 96 and 97 of the Articles of War.
th
Prior to Jonas abduction, Mudlongs 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle remained impounded at the 56 IBs Headquarters. In May 2007,
right after Jonas abduction was made public, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 of this 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was
missing, and the engine and other spare parts were cannibalized.

On direct examination, the petitioner testified before the CA that the police was able to generate cartographic sketches of two (one
[7]
male and one female) of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview of eyewitnesses. The petitioner narrated further that these
cartographic sketches were identified by State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco of the Department of Justice (DOJ); that when she
went to see State Prosecutor Velasco personally, he gave her five names who were allegedly involved in the abduction of Jonas
st [8]
(namely T/Sgt. Jason Roxas, Cpl. Joana Francisco, M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo, and 1 Lt. Jaime Mendaros); and that the information from
 [9]
State Prosecutor Velascos sources corroborated the same information she received earlier from her own sources. The petitioner
also testified that nothing came out of the information given by State Prosecutor Velasco because he was pulled out from the
[10]
investigation by the DOJ Secretary, and that the police, particularly P/Supt. Jonnel C. Estomo, failed to investigate and act upon
[11]
these leads.

On August 30, 2007, P/Supt. Estomo (the lead investigator in the investigation conducted by the Philippine National Police-
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group [PNP-CIDG]) testified before the CA that he did not investigate or look into the identities
[12]
of the cartographic sketches of the two abductors provided by the PNP Criminal Investigation Unit, Quezon City. P/Supt. Estomo
testified further that he showed the photos of Cpl. Bugalan and Pfc.Villea to witness Larry Marquez for identification but failed to
th [13]
show any photos of the other officers and men of the 56 IB. Finally, P/Supt. Estomo also testified that he did not propound any
th
clarificatory questions regarding the disappearance of Jonas Burgos to Lt. Cols. Feliciano, Clement, and Caga of the 56 IB who
[14]
merely voluntarily submitted their statements.

On August 29, 2007, the PNP-CIDG presented Emerito Lipio @ KA TIBO/KA CRIS, Marlon D. Manuel @ KA CARLO, and
Melissa Concepcion Reyes @ KA LISA/RAMIL to support the theory that elements of the New Peoples Army (NPA) perpetrated the
[15]
abduction of Jonas. In his Sworn Statement, Lipio admitted that he is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP)/NPA and that the NPA was behind the abduction of Jonas. Lipio revealed that Jonas is known as @KA RAMON in the
communist movement. He claimed further that he and @KA RAMON belonged to the Bulacan Party Committee, assigned to the
White Area Committee doing intelligence work for the movement under the leadership of Delfin de Guzman @ KA BASTE, and that
[16]
@KA RAMON was their political instructor and head of the intelligence unit in the province.

Sometime early April of 2007, Lipio was present in a meeting between @KA BASTE and @KA RAMON. At this meeting, the
two had a heated argument. For this reason, @KA BASTE instructed Lipio to place @KA RAMON under surveillance as they suspected
[17]
him of pilfering funds from the party and of acting as a military agent.

Lipio further averred that upon instruction of @KA BASTE, he and a certain @KA CARLO proceeded to Ever Gotesco Mall on
April 28, 2007 to monitor the reported meeting between @KA RAMON and other party members. At one oclock in the afternoon,
Lipio and @KA CARLO (who stationed themselves near the entrance/exit of the mall) saw a man, who they recognized as @KA
RAMON, forcibly taken by four men, brought outside of the mall, and shoved inside a Toyota Revo. Lipio further alleged that he
recognized two of the abductors as @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO who he claims to be members of the CPP/NPAs guerilla unit
[18]
(RYG).

In his Sworn Statement, Manuel affirmed and substantiated Lipios statement that @KA RAMON and Jonas are one and the
same person and that he is a member of the communist movement in Bulacan. Manuel also corroborated Lipios statement regarding
the circumstances of the abduction of @KA RAMON at Ever Gotesco Mall on April 28, 2007; he confirmed that he and @ KA TIBO
[19]
witnessed the abduction.

Reyes, a rebel-returnee, provided in her Sworn Statement additional material information regarding the disappearance of
Jonas. Reyes alleged that she was supposed to meet with @KA RAMON and another comrade in the movement (whom she
identified as @KA JO) to discuss the possibility of arranging a meeting with a contact in the military. She averred that she met @KA
JO at about 11:30 a.m. at the Baliaug Transit Terminal, Cubao enroute to Ever Gotesco mall where they would meet with a certain
@KA RAMON. Reyes further narrated that they arrived about noon at Ever Gotesco mall; @KA JO left her at McDonalds and told her
to wait while he went to look for @KA RAMON. After an hour, @KA JO arrived without @KA RAMON and told Reyes to go home and
[20]
just keep in touch through text messaging. Reyes alleged further that she has not heard from @KA JO since.

The CA Findings

In its July 17, 2008 decision, the CA found that the evidence the petitioner presented failed to establish her claimed direct
connection between the abductors of Jonas and the military. The CA noted that the evidence does not show how license plate
th
number TAB 194 (supposedly attached to the 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle impounded at the 56 IB Headquarters) came to be attached to
the getaway Toyota Revo on April 28, 2007, and whether the two license plates are one and the same at all. The CA emphasized that
the evidence does not indicate whether the abductors are members of the military or the police or are civilians; if they are civilians,
whether they acted on their own or were following orders, and in the latter case, from whom.

The CA also found that the investigations by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the PNP leave much to be
[21]
desired as they did not fully exert their effort to unearth the truth and to bring the real culprits before the bar of justice. The CA
held that since the petitioner has established that the vehicle used in the abduction was linked to a vehicle (with license plate
th
number TAB 194) impounded at the headquarters of the 56 IB, it became the burden of the AFP to exercise extraordinary diligence
to determine the why and the wherefore of the loss of the license plate in their custody and its appearance in a vehicle (a maroon
[22]
Toyota Revo) used in Jonas abduction. The CA also ruled that the AFP has the burden of connect[ing] certain loose ends regarding
the identity of @Ka Ramon (as referred to by the petitioners witnesses) and the allegation that @Ka Ramon is indeed Jonas in the
Order of Battle.

As for the PNP-CIDG, the CA branded its investigation as rather shallow and conducted haphazardly. The CA took note that
P/Supt. Estomos investigation merely delved into the administrative liability of Lt. Col. Clement, Lt. Col. Feliciano and Lt. Col. Caga of
th
the 56 IB, and failed to consider them as suspects in the abduction of Jonas. The CA emphasized that the PNP-CIDGs investigation
should focus on the criminal aspect of the present case pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, which mandates the PNP to
investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution.

The CA also found P/Supt. Estomos recommendation that appropriate charges be filed against Mauro Mudlong (registered
owner of the impounded 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle with plate license no. TAB 194) to be without any factual basis since no evidence
was presented to connect the latter to the loss of the license plate as well as to the abduction of Jonas. The CA stressed that it could
th
not find any valid reason why Mudlong should be treated any differently from the three 56 IB colonels whom the PNP-CIDG did not
consider as suspects despite the established fact that license plate no. TAB 194 was lost while in their custody.

On the PNP-CIDGs new information from Lipio who claimed to have seen Jonas being abducted by a certain @KA DANTE
and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG, and on Marlon Manuel, who corroborated Lipios statements, the CA held that
steps should be taken by the PNP-CIDG to verify the veracity of these statements.Notwithstanding the new information, the CA
noted that the PNP-CIDG should not discount the possible involvement of members of the AFP. Thus, the CA concluded that the PNP
must exert extraordinary diligence in following all possible leads to resolve the crime committed against Jonas. Finally, the CA noted
- based on the Certification issued by the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, DOJ dated March 5, 2008 - that no case has been referred
by the PNP to the DOJ for preliminary investigation in relation to the abduction and disappearance of Jonas. This is contrary to PNPs
manifest representation that it had already forwarded all pertinent and relevant documents to the DOJ for the filing of appropriate
charges against the suspects (i.e., @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO).

The CA also held that the petitions for habeas corpus and contempt as against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo must be
dropped since she enjoys the privilege of immunity from suit. The CA ruled that the Presidents immunity from suit is a settled
[23]
doctrine citing David v. Arroyo.

Our Ruling

Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP
have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the
extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these
investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is
undertaken.

From the records, we note that there are very significant lapses in the handling of the investigation - among them the
PNP-CIDGs failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas based on
their interview of eyewitnesses to the abduction. This lapse is based on the information provided to the petitioner by no less than
State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco of the DOJ who identified the persons who were possibly involved in the abduction, namely:
T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and
[24]
an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP. No search and
certification were ever made on whether these persons were AFP personnel or in other branches of the service, such as the
Philippine Air Force. As testified to by the petitioner, no significant follow through was also made by the PNP-CIDG in ascertaining
the identities of the cartographic sketches of two of the abductors despite the evidentiary leads provided by State Prosecutor Velasco
of the DOJ. Notably, the PNP-CIDG, as the lead investigating agency in the present case, did not appear to have lifted a finger to
pursue these aspects of the case.

We note, too, that no independent investigation appeared to have been made by the PNP-CIDG to inquire into the veracity
of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and a certain @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit
RYG. The records do not indicate whether the PNP-CIDG conducted a follow-up investigation to determine the identities and
whereabouts of @KA Dante and @KA ENSO. These omissions were aggravated by the CA finding that the PNP has yet to refer any
case for preliminary investigation to the DOJ despite its representation before the CA that it had forwarded all pertinent and
relevant documents to the DOJ for the filing of appropriate charges against @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO.
 Based on these considerations, we conclude that further investigation and monitoring should be undertaken. While
significant leads have been provided to investigators, the investigations by the PNP-CIDG, the AFP Provost Marshal, and even the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) have been less than complete. The PNP-CIDGs investigation particularly leaves much to be
desired in terms of the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. For this reason, we resolve to refer the
present case to the CHR as the Courts directly commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the investigation of
the Burgos abduction and the gathering of evidence, with the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this
Court. We take into consideration in this regard that the CHR is a specialized and independent agency created and empowered by
the Constitution to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal
[25]
measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines.

Under this mandate, the CHR is tasked to conduct appropriate investigative proceedings, including field investigations
acting as the Courts directly commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo with the tasks of: (a) ascertaining
the identities of the persons appearing in the cartographic sketches of the two alleged abductors as well as their whereabouts;
(b) determining based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of the persons identified by State Prosecutor
Velasco alleged to be involved in the abduction of Jonas, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco
(Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence
Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP; further proceedings and investigations, as may be necessary, should be made to pursue
the lead allegedly provided by State Prosecutor Velasco on the identities of the possible abductors; (c) inquiring into the veracity
of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG; (d)
determining based on records, past and present, as well as further investigation, the identities and whereabouts of @KA DANTE and
@KA ENSO; and (e) undertaking all measures, in the investigation of the Burgos abduction that may be necessary to live up to the
extraordinary measures we require in addressing an enforced disappearance under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons, the Court RESOLVES to:

(1) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to conduct appropriate investigative proceedings, including field
investigations acting as the Courts directly commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - with the tasks
of: (a) ascertaining the identities of the cartographic sketches of two of the abductors as well as their whereabouts; (b) determining
based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of the persons identified by State Prosecutor Velasco alleged to be
involved in the abduction of Jonas namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force),
M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; further proceedings and investigations, as may be necessary, should be made to
pursue the lead allegedly provided by State Prosecutor Velasco on the identities of the possible abductors; (c) inquiring into the
veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit
RYG; (d) determining based on records, past and present, as well as further investigation, the identities and whereabouts of @KA
DANTE and @KA ENSO; and (e) undertaking all measures, in the investigation of the Burgos abduction, that may be necessary to live
up to the extraordinary measures we require in addressing an enforced disappearance under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;

(2) REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to make
available and to provide copies, to the Commission on Human Rights, of all documents and records in their possession and as the
Commission on Human Rights may require, relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and existing laws;

(3) DIRECT the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the Commission on Human Rights the records and results of
the investigation the PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded to the Department of Justice, which were not included in their previous
submissions to the Commission on Human Rights, including such records as the Commission on Human Rights may require, pursuant
to the authority granted under this Resolution;

(4) Further DIRECT the PNP-CIDG to provide direct investigative assistance to the Commission on Human Rights as it may
require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution;

(5) AUTHORIZE the Commission on Human Rights to conduct a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation that extends to
all aspects of the case (not limited to the specific directives as outlined above), as the extraordinary measures the case may require
under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and

(6) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court a Report with its recommendations, copy furnished
the petitioner, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents, within ninety (90) days from
receipt of this Resolution.
 In light of the retirement of Lt. General Alexander Yano and the reassignment of the other respondents who have all been
impleaded in their official capacities, all subsequent resolutions and actions from this Court shall also be served on, and be directly
enforceable by, the incumbents of the impleaded offices/units whose official action is necessary. The present respondents shall
continue to be personally impleaded for purposes of the responsibilities and accountabilities they may have incurred during their
incumbencies.

The dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
[5]
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, based on all of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. The Petition for Habeas Corpus in CA-G.R. SP No. 99839 and the Petition for Contempt in CA-G.R. SP
No. 100230 are both DISMISSED.

2. The Petition for Amparo in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The privilege of the writ
of amparo is granted as hereunder specified, viz:

1. Respondents Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano and Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Jr., are hereby ORDERED to make
available, and provide copies to petitioner, all documents and records in their possession relevant to the case
of Jonas Joseph Burgos, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws;

2. Respondent Commission on Human Rights, through its Chairperson, is DIRECTED to furnish petitioner
documents not yet on file with this Court, pursuant to its undertaking before this Court during the hearing
held on January 21, 2008;

3. Respondent Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Jr. is hereby DIRECTED to continue with, and conduct, a full and
thorough investigation of the case of Jonas Joseph Burgos and to cause the immediate filing of the appropriate
charges against all those who may be found responsible therefor with the Department of Justice;

4. Respondent Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano is likewise hereby DIRECTED to conduct a thorough investigation of the
circumstances surrounding the loss of license plate no. TAB 194 and the possible involvement of any AFP
personnel in the alleged abduction of Jonas Joseph Burgos;

5. Respondents Lt. Gen. Yano and Dir. Gen. Razon are hereby REQUIRED to submit a compliance report to this
Court, copy furnished the petitioner, within ten (10) days after completion of their respective organization.

Petitioners Motion to Declare Respondents in Contempt is DENIED admission and ordered expunged from
the records of this case.

Respondents Manifestation and Motion dated July 1, 2008 is NOTED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL G.R. No. 180906

DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Present:
Petitioners,
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
MANALO, BRION, JJ.
Respondents.
Promulgated:
October 7, 2008
x- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not separated from the
constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar
involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of amparo filed before this Court.

This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 [1] of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents.

This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) [2] filed before this Court by
herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and
agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies,
Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs
under Article VIII, Section 5(5)[3] of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents,
representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU)
to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing,
abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 1[4] of the 1987
Constitution.[5]
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein
petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits,
and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo under Sec. 26[6] of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return
within the period provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed
by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing,
render judgment as required in Sec. 18[7] of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.[8]

On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule and further
resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the CA (Court of
Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition
to the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the
petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.[9]
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the
dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.

The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby
REQUIRED:

1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision all official and
unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already on file
herein;

2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald
Caigas within five days from notice of this decision.

3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel
(military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days
from notice of this decision.

The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or
his duly authorized deputy, the latters authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance
with this directive.

SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents:

Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers
and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were
not able to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by
the barangay hall.[11]

On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several
armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he was
Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and
nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was
kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but
three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay. [12]

Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz,
and Pula de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout.They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly
taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed
men.[13]

The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the
soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias
Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and abducted
him was Ganata. He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors was George who was tall, thin, white-
skinned and about 30 years old.[14]

The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them were
beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldos. The van stopped several times until
they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left open,
Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their
guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymonds) room and it was his (Raymonds) turn to be beaten
up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New Peoples Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit
with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA
members he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.[15]

In the next days, Raymonds interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call them
sir, and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived
and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other
soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in
Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents
abduction.[16] While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat
him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with
left-over and rotten food.[17]

On the third week of respondents detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with
urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and
burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they
stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they
would come back the next day and kill him.[18]

The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise with the chains put on him
to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped
through the window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his
chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who
were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.[19] He reached the
highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him
to another place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his
back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called Mam or Madam suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond
before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.[20]

For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the wounds were almost healed,
the torture resumed, particularly when respondents guards got drunk. [21]

Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in
that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and
sleeping. He counted that eighteen people[22] had been detained in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.[23]

For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with two rooms
and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers
marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the DTU. [24]

At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine samples and marked
them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt
other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines,
including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of respondents urine test and advised them to
drink plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the
master of the DTU, Master Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there,
he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them. [25]

One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed men wearing fatigue
suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey
house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilarios men.[26]

From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a big
unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan for about three months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to
them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was
already waiting, seated. He was about two arms length away from respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to
which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond
if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that
Gen. Palparan was an evil man.[27]

Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?

Sumagot akong, Siyempre po, natatakot din

Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, bastat sundin nyo ang lahat ng
sasabihin ko sabihin mo sa magulang mo huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right
dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na
kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno.[28]
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning,
Hilario, Efren and the formers men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents house. Raymond was shown to
his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond
relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymonds parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymonds
parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were then
brought back to Sapang.[29]

When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the four masters who were
there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse.[30] When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white
vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the
medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also
said that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not be given another chance. [31] During
his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture. [32]

One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named Alive, was green and
yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if
they were getting their dose of the medicine. The Alive made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking
up.[33]

After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that while in
Sapang, he should introduce himself as Oscar, a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again
Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians.[34]

After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three
unidentified men in a big white vehicle.Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold
was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the barracks.[35]

The next day, Raymonds chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in
a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the
barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of
the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was
crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the
laundry.[36]

After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel
Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with Allan whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called
master or commander by his men in the 24 th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times,
Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back
on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed. [37]

On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive
and should continue along their renewed life.Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents
to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back
to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using
the name Oscar and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24 th Infantry Battalion whose
names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.[38]

On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the 24 th Infantry Battalion
in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion
stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as Mar and Billy beat him up and hit him in the stomach with
their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising
livestock.[39]

Raymond recalled that when Operation Lubog was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to
take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA.They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an
old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA
members in his house.[40] Another time, in another Operation Lubog, Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA
men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right
before Raymonds eyes.[41]

From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and
some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to
do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007. [42]

In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to
detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang
baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang
nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa
kanyang katawan at itoy sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.

Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at
dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon
nang nililinis ang bakas.

Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan,
ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya
tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.

Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak,
dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang
ang amoy.

May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa
Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.

xxx xxx xxx

Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen.
Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na
galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng
kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na
kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.

Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi
ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi
pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na
kami kinakadena.[43]
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald
(Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their family. They
were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were
instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal,
Laguna.[44]

Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for
which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond
asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone
was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.

There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards lived in the other
three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents house did not have electricity. They used a
lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking
session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond
and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound
for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.[45]

Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymonds affidavit insofar as they related to matters they witnessed
together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before
he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When
Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the
NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no
longer bear the pain.

At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and
brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed
to use the name Rodel and to represent himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along
Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while
Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of Alive in different houses. In these trips,
Hilario drove a black and red vehicle.Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once
outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and CampTecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board,
Welcome to Camp Tecson.[46]

Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in
forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human rights violations,
particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after
their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars
borne by respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted
on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took
photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination. [47]

Petitioners dispute respondents account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of
the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held
incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas
corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431
against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24 th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as
Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit
 (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and
Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals
dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine
Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General, 7 th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was
introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27,
2007, it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any
capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents were illegally
detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter.[48]

Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National Defense,
which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers alleged abduction. He
also claimed that:

7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations, neither does he
undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP
operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing strategic
policy direction to the Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the
Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to
submit report of such compliance Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have
issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of
action in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP:

(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;

(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the
petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;

(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;

(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or
practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;

(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and

(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.[49]

Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he
received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the
following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued
directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and
the recent reappearance of the petitioners.

3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher headquarters and/or
direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message
on November 05, 2007, addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D
PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX 3 of this Affidavit.

3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative
to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought
for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.

3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the Writ of Amparo
(G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeo pending before the Supreme
Court.
 3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the surrounding
circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military
personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of
justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the process. [50]
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R.
No. 179994, another amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and Merino, which averred among others, viz:

10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24 th Infantry Batallion detachment as detention area,
I immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any
detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino being held captive;

11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24 th IB in Limay, Bataan;

12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine National Police,
Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was reported to their good
office;

13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged beachhouse in Iba,
Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino were
detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used by
armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeo and Merino.[51]

It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt.
Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission
of the Return and would be subsequently submitted.[52]

Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7 th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army, based in FortMagsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers
Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan. [53] The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the
7th Infantry Division.[54]

On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito
Palaran,[55] through his Assistant Chief of Staff,[56]to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under
his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy
Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the
veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the
administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any.[57] Jimenez testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint
as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the
television, and he was concerned about what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction. [58]

Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements and conducting an
investigation on May 29, 2006.[59] The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.[60] The
investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were
no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated[61] as
according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six persons. [62]

Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements. [63] The six persons were not known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first
time to meet them.[64] During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall,
Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons. [65]
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the
next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two
signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006.[66] When the Sworn
Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30,
2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006.[67] He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel.[68]

As petitioners largely rely on Jimenezs Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report is herein substantially
quoted:

III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken
from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by
unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims
filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti
Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU).

a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit B) states that he was at
Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church located
nearby his residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being
informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As
to the allegation that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU
and that they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and
CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims.

b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit C) states that he is a
resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato
Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active
members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an
NPA Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for
accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the
concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came only to know about the
incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA
vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a
member of the CAFGU.

c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit O) states that he is a resident
of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato
Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the background of the two (2) brothers
Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother
KUMANDER BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he
was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when
he arrived home in their place. He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact
that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA
Commander who killed his father and for that reason they implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA
vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said Manalo brothers.

d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit E) states that he is a resident of
Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his
barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that
on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being
informed only about the incident lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being
abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated him was
because there are those people who are angry with their family particularly victims of summary execution (killing)
done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their
brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently
denied any involvement on the abduction of the Manalo brothers.
 e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit F) states that he is a resident of
Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na Bato,
San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He
claims further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is
an NPA leader. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the
alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by his barrio
mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who
are his brothers.

f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit G) states that he is a resident of
Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member
based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further
that they are active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA
BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he
was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about the incident which is
the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan
informed him about the matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one
of the abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service
to the government as a CAA member.

IV. DISCUSSION

5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking them to the alleged
abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore
to that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation.

Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of the father of Randy
and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were
the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused
claiming that the Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however,
that in the first place, they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of
CAFGUs, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside
their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection
with the CPP/NPA is concerned.

V. CONCLUSION

6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction committed by the above
named respondents has not been established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any
administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2)
civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.

8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed. [69]

In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate courts assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the
December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY
SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT
RAYMOND MANALO.
 II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS

(HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN
CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B)
CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka
ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT
GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS,
TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO
THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.[70]

The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its
beginning.

The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a two-day National
Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17,
2007. The Summit was envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances,[71] hence representatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice
system[72] participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.

On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced
disappearances.[73] It was an exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our peoples
constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial
law regime.[74] As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings
committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.[75] On the other hand, enforced
disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law.[76]

The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. Amparo literally means protection in Spanish.[77] In 1837, de Tocquevilles Democracy in
America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to
many Mexican jurists.[78] One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native
state, Yucatan,[79] which granted judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This
idea was incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of those rights
granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and
Executive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case
in litigation, making no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation. [80]
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism. [81] If, after hearing, the judge determines
that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the officials superiors, to cease the violation and
to take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the
principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which
prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them
from using this power to make law for the entire nation. [82]
The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response to the
particular needs of each country.[83] It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexicos
self-attributed task of conveying to the worlds legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful
history conceived.[84] What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights
later evolved for several purposes: (1) amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ;
(2) amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) amparo casacion for the judicial review of the
constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and
(5) amparo agrario for the protection of peasants rights derived from the agrarian reform process. [85]

In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses
especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the
whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.[86] Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain,
however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights. [87]

In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of amparo, several of the
above amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the
Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The Clause accords a similar general
protection to human rights extended by the amparo contra leyes, amparo casacion, and amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is
comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution. [88] The Clause is an offspring of
the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.[89]

While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,[90] these remedies may not be adequate to address the
pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a
writ of amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the AmparoRule,
this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human
rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides
rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs
available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.[91]

The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it
facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long
run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.

In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order [92] to stop
petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23,
2007,[93] prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders,
Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5)
of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007,
they moved to have their petition treated as an amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the
Manalo brothers enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion.

With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners first argument in disputing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible
uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein
respondent Raymond Manalo.[94]

In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners cause of action, to determine
whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:

Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their claims by substantial
evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
(emphases supplied)

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.[95]

After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from
their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained
until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent
Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents harrowing
experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the
following: Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel. [96] (N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na
galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel.[97] May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang
hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.[98] Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang
bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena.[99] Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto
kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar.[100]

We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalos affidavit and testimony, viz:
the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein respondents)
to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house
through the rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU
auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the
CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also
 CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military men
were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their
long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.

We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were either members or
sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando,
the brother of petitioners.

The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The
investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7 th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU
auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the
participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly
exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated

Gen. Palparans participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners
captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no
controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and
told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparans direct and personal role in
the abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long
captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that
unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without
probable cause.

In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman;
Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence
to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilarios involvement
could not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which
the petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas
proceedings at rollo, p. 52)

However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the petitioners were brought
away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents
during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a
Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a
week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to
Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan where they
were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face
with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners
parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join
anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they join
any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four Master
Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when
Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other
occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.

It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners was
established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was
similarly established.

xxx xxx xxx

As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the abduction. We also do, for,
indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming. [101]
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalos statements were not corroborated by other independent and
credible pieces of evidence.[102] Raymonds affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo
Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the
physical injuries inflicted on respondents,[103] also corroborate respondents accounts of the torture they endured while in
detention. Respondent Raymond Manalos familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the DTU, as shown in his
testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the Division Training Unit, [104] firms up respondents story that they were detained
for some time in said military facility.

In Ortiz v. Guatemala,[105] a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Commission considered similar
evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan
government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The Commissions findings of fact were
mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal. [106] These
statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when she was being driven out of the military
installation where she was detained.[107] She was also examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular
second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered
while in detention.[108]

With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that
much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will
depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other
evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were
detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no
surprise.

We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced
disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and
surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not free in
every sense of the word[109] as their movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial
Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These
people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents rights to
life, liberty and security.[110] (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept
captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.[111]

Elaborating on the right to security, in general, respondents point out that this right is often associated with liberty; it is
also seen as an expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment. Conceding that there is
no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights to be kept free from
torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places[112] fall under the general coverage of the right to security of
person under the writ of Amparo. They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person
in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person,
respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile[113] that the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no
undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty[114] such as a requirement to report under unreasonable restrictions that
amounted to a deprivation of liberty[115] or being put under monitoring and surveillance.[116]

In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their
right to security.

Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as respondents assert. The right to
security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:
 Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of ones person, including the extensions of his/her person houses, papers, and
effects against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the states power over a persons home and possessions, but more
importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself. [117] The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court
in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: [118]

The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent violations of
private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law
acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted.
(Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential
condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home
or of persons and correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The
constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed
absolute as nothing is closer to a mans soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal
security. Any interference allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons. [119] (emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 [120] guarantees essentially the right to be alive[121] - upon which the
enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: The
life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful
ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his
person and property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of mans
existence.[122] In a broad sense, the right to security of person emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his
limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is
invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature,
temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.[123]

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.

First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that freedom
from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. [124] It is the right to security of
person as the word security itself means freedom from fear. [125] Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.[126] (emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are
established by law. (emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or
security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same
stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to
another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in
the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to security is actually the freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the
threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security
mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.[127]
 Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III,
Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without a search
warrant.[128] Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or
invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical
injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because
they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. [129]

Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force
the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity
as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically
proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense).Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion of bodily
integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of freedom from threat as afore-discussed.

Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of an
offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more be protected from these
degradations.

An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.[130] In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that
the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ... (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other
hand, provides that (n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Although the
application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in
holding, viz:

...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time when they could
reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate the circumstances
in question.

xxx xxx xxx

... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural obligation under
Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations.[131] (emphasis supplied)

The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement that the protection of the bodily
integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz:

gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental
freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights conventions is discrimination within the
meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These
rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of person.[132]
 Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In the context of
the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under
Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect
for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. [133] As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the
importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,[134] viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to
be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as
a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer
of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. [135]

This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been interpreted by the United
Nations Human Rights Committee[136] in not a few cases involving Article 9 [137] of the ICCPR. While the right to security of person
appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist
independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of
person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,[138] a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school
in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:

The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph one
could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux
prparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other
provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the
right to liberty and the right to security of the person. These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses
in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is to be found
in article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only to
situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the
rights enshrined in the Covenant.It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known
threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise
detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect
them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security
of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the
Covenant.[139] (emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,[140] which involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience who
continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release from detention. In a catena of cases, the
ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,[141] involving discrimination, intimidation and
persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,[142] involving the abduction of the complainants
husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,[143] involving the murder of the complainants partner
and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,[144] involving an
assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.

Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the right to security not only as prohibiting the State from
arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty.[145] The ECHR
interpreted the right to security of person under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on
disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.[146] In this case, the claimants son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been
seen since. The familys requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested
that this was a violation of her sons right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
 ... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and
procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect
the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to
account for his or her whereabouts.For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take
effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective
investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen
since.[147] (emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine whether there is a
continuing violation of respondents right to security.

First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents life, liberty and security.

While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, would be killed. In
Raymonds narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted to escape
from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain Mam, who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.

This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they
are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought
to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in
Limay, Bataan, respondents captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent
Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na
kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi. [148]

The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their escape, this
continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only
in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen
Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others.

Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat
to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or
activities.[149] Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to
show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless,
the circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent
threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and
life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.

Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide
protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an
effective investigation of respondents abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners own witness, Lt.
Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.

The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn
Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He was
present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question
to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six
implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a
policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the writ of amparo is
issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the
aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them;
determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or
persons involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court. [150] Petitioner AFP
Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National
Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of
establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide
results of the investigations to respondents.[151] To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner
Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they
now seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo.

Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents right to
security as a guarantee of protection by the government.

In sum, we conclude that respondents right to security as freedom from threat is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and
security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective
investigation and protection on the part of the military.

Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.

First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their
case, except those already in file with the court.

Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and
Donald Caigas.

Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and charts, and reports of any
treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical
personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.

With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents partakes of the
characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with
prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and
(4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce.[152] In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague
allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be
produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents
to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been
shown.

Petitioners arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant
for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people
from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as
respondents.

Instead, the amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:

Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.

Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any
party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession,
custody or control

In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad, [153] the respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena
duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The
company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down
the argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable
searches prohibited by the Constitution

Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook to provide results of the investigations conducted or to be
conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ
of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.

With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt.
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper,
immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ of amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and
jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to
threat of personal injury or even death.

On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom
respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of
respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be
served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the respondents rights. The list of
medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical
interventions, when applicable and necessary.

In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret
walls.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is

affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
 REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[24]
Id. at 204.
[25]
Id. at 204-205.
[26]
[1]
Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for appeal, viz: Id. at 205.
[27]
Sec. 19. Appeal Any party may appeal from the final judgment Id.; TSN, November 13, 2007, pp. 36-38.
[28]
or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may Exhibit D, CA rollo, p. 205.
[29]
raise questions of fact or law or both. Id.
[30]
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days Id.
[31]
from the date of notice of the adverse judgment. Id. at 206.
[32]
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas TSN, November 13, 2007, p. 44; Exhibit F shows eights pictures of highest ranking
corpus cases. officers of the AFP and PNP in their uniforms; Exhibit F-1 is the picture of Gen.
[2]
G.R. No. 179095 filed on August 23, 2007. Palparan identified by respondent Raymond Manalo, CA rollo, p. 214.
[33]
[3]
1987 PHIL. CONST. Art. VIII, 5(5) provides for the rule-making power of the Exhibit D, CA rollo, p. 206.
[34]
Supreme Court, viz: Id. at 207.
[35]
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: Id.
[36]
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement Id. at 207-208.
[37]
of constitutional rights Id. at 208.
[38]
[4]
1987 PHIL. CONST. Art. III, 1 provides in relevant part, viz: Id.
[39]
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, libertywithout due process of law Id. at 209.
[40]
[5]
CA rollo, pp. 26-27. Id.
[41]
[6]
Section 26 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides, viz: Id.
[42]
Sec. 26. Applicability to Pending Cases. This Rule shall govern Id.
[43]
cases involving extralegal killings and enforced disappearances Id. at 210-211.
[44]
or threats thereof pending in the trial and appellate courts. Id. at 211.
[45]
[7]
Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides, viz: Id.
[46]
Sec. 18. Judgment. The court shall render judgment Exhibit C (Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Reynaldo Manalo para sa Hukuman), CA rollo,
within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for pp. 196-197.
[47]
decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by TSN, November 13, 2007, pp. 85-90; Exhibit G is the background of the case of
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, CA rollo, p. 216; Exhibits G-1 to G-2 are the report
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; proper for Reynaldo Manalo containing a narration of his ordeal and complaints, and
otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. Dr. Molinos physical findings, analysis and recommendations, CA rollo, pp. 217-
[8]
CA rollo, pp. 86-87. 218; Exhibit G-3 are the pictures taken of Reynaldo Manalos scars, CA rollo, p. 219;
[9]
Id. at 1-6. Exhibits G-4 to G-5 are the report proper for Raymond Manalo with similar contents
[10]
Id. at 82-83. as Reynaldos report, CA rollo, pp. 220-221; Exhibits G-6 to G-7 are the pictures of
[11]
Exhibit D (Sinumpaang Salaysay para sa Hukuman ni Raymond Manalo), CA rollo, Raymond Manalos scars, CA rollo, pp. 222-223.
[48]
pp. 200-201; TSN, November 13, 2007, p. 47. CA rollo, pp. 112-113; rollo, pp. 94-95.
[49]
[12]
Exhibit D, CA rollo, pp. 200-201. CA rollo, pp. 122 and 171; rollo, pp. 28-29.
[50]
[13]
Id. at 201-202. CA rollo, pp. 124-125; 177-178; rollo, pp. 29-31.
[51]
[14]
Id. CA rollo, pp. 191-192; rollo, 106-107.
[52]
[15]
Id. at 202. Id. at 107.
[53]
[16]
A Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed on May 12, 2006 in the Court of Appeals by TSN, November 14, 2007, p. 25.
[54]
the relatives of herein respondents. (CA-G.R. SP. No. 94431). The petition alleged that Id. at 84.
[55]
military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries forcibly took petitioners from their homes in Id. at 36.
[56]
Bulacan on February 14, 2006. Id. at 40.
[57]
Impleaded as respondents were Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, then the Commanding Id. at 41.
[58]
General of the Philippine Army; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, then the Commanding Id. at 92.
[59]
Officer, 7th Infantry Division, stationed in Luzon; M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Id. at 46.
[60]
Castillo; and civilians Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Pula dela Id. at 44.
[61]
Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, all CAFGU members. Id. at 46.
[62]
Respondents denied any involvement in the petitioners abduction and disappearance. Id. at 80.
[63]
After hearing, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on June 27, 2007, viz: Id. at 28.
[64]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Id. at 50.
[65]
respondents Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz, Pula de la Id. at 55-56.
[66]
Cruz, Rudy Mendoza and CAFGU members Michael de la Id. at 57-61.
[67]
Cruz and Randy Mendoza are illegally detaining Raymond and Id. at 61-63.
[68]
Reynaldo Manalo, and are hereby ordered to RELEASE said Id. at 63.
victims Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo within ten (10) [69]
days from receipt hereof; otherwise, they will be held in Exhibit 3-C, CA rollo, pp. 238-240.
[70]
contempt of court.This is without prejudice to any penalty that Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[71]
may be imposed should they be found later by any other court Rule on the Writ of Amparo: The Rationale for the Writ of Amparo, p. 43.
[72]
of justice to be criminally, administratively, or civilly liable for Id.
[73]
any other act/s against the persons of aforenamed victims. Rule on the Writ of Amparo: Annotation, p. 47.
[74]
(CA rollo, pp. 60-61) Id. Article VIII, 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution provides for this rule-making
On July 18, 2007, the relatives of the petitioners appealed the decision to the Supreme power, viz:
Court. (G.R. No. 178614). Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in the Court of Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
Appeals. (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
On August 13, 2007, the petitioners escaped from captivity. Consequently, they filed of constitutional rights
[75]
motions to withdraw the petition for habeas corpus in the CA and this Court as it had Rule on the Writ of Amparo: Annotation, p. 48. This is the manner the term is used in
become moot and academic. (CA rollo, p. 101; rollo, pp. 54-55) United Nations instruments.
[76]
[17]
Exhibit D, CA rollo, pp. 200-201. Rule on the Writ of Amparo: Annotation, p. 48. This is the definition used in the
[18]
Id. at 203. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.
[77]
[19]
TSN, November 13, 2007, p. 29. Barker, R., Constitutionalism in the Americas: A Bicentennial Perspective,
[20]
Exhibit D, CA rollo, p. 203. 49 University of Pittsburgh Law Review (Spring, 1988) 891, 906.
[78]
[21]
Id. Id., citing Zamudio, F., A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo,
[22]
Daniel Mendiola; Oscar Leuterio; mag-asawang Teresa at Vergel; isang 9 California Western International Law Journal (1979) 306, 309.
[79]
nagngangalang Mang Ipo at Ferdinand mula sa Nueva Ecija; isang taga-Bicol na At the time it adopted Rejns amparo, Yucatan had separated itself from Mexico. After
ikinulong doon ng isa o dalawang araw lamang (siyay inilabas at hindi ko na nakitang a few months, the secession ended and the state resumed its place in the union.
muli); isang taga-Visayas (na ikinulong doon ng isa o dalawang araw; siyay inilabas at (Barker, R., supra at 906.)
[80]
hindi ko na siya nakita); mga nagngangalang Abel, Jojo at isa pa mula sa Nueva Ecija (na Acta de Reformas, art. 25 (1847) (amending Constitution of 1824).
[81]
tumagal doon ng isang araw at isang gabi, pagkatapos ay inilabas din); isang Acta de Reformas, art. 25 (1847) (amending Constitution of 1824); CONST. of 1857,
nagngangalang Bernard mula sa Hagonoy, Bulacan; ang apelyido ni Bernard ay tila arts. 101, 102 (Mex.); CONST. art. 107 (Mex.).
[82]
Majas ngunit hindi ako sigurado sa apelyido niya. Nang dinala doon si Bernard, inilabas Barker, R., supra at 906-907. See also Provost, R. Emergency Judicial Relief for
sina Mang Ipo at Ferdinand; dalawang lalaking may edad na, taga-Pinaud at dinukot sa Human Rights Violations in Canada and Argentina, University of Miami Inter-
poultry (tumagal lang sila ng mga isang araw at tapos inilabas at hindi ko na nakita American Law Review (Spring/Summer, 1992) 693, 701-702.
[83]
uli). (CA rollo, pp. 203-204) Rule on the Writ of Amparo: Annotation, p. 45. See Article 107 of the Constitution
[23]
Exhibit D, CA rollo, pp. 203-204. of Mexico; Article 28(15) of the Constitution of Ecuador; Article 77 of the
 Constitution of Paraguay; Article 43 of the Constitution of Argentina; Article 49 of 2. Any act of enforced disappearance places the
the Constitution of Venezuela; Article 48 (3) of the Constitution of Costa Rica; and persons subjected thereto outside the protection of the law and
Article 19 of the Constitution of Bolivia. inflicts severe suffering on them and their families. It
[84]
Provost, R., supra at 698, citing Ramirez, F., The International Expansion of the constitutes a violation of the rules of international law
Mexican Amparo, 1 Inter-American Law Review (1959) 163, 166. guaranteeing, inter alia, the right to recognition as a person
[85]
Rule on the Writ of Amparo: Annotation, p. 45; see also Zagaris, B., The Amparo before the law, the right to liberty and security of the
Process in Mexico, 6 Mexico Law Journal (Spring 1998) 61, 66 and Provost, person and the right not to be subjected to torture and other
R., supra at 708-709. cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It also
[86]
Rule on the Writ of Amparo: Annotation, p. 45. violates or constitutes a grave threat to the right to life.
[87]
Brewer-Carias, (emphasis supplied)
A., The Latin American Amparo Proceeding and the Writ of Amparo in Various international human rights conventions and declarations affirm the right to
the Philippines, Second Distinguished Lecture, Series of 2007, Supreme Court, security of person, including the American Convention on Human Rights;
Philippine Judicial Academy in coordination with the Philippine Association of Law European Convention on Human Rights; African Charter; Inter-American
Schools, March 7, 2008. Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against
[88]
See 1987 PHIL. CONST. Art. III, 13 & 15; Art. VII, 18; Art. VIII, 5(1). Women; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, African Womens
[89]
5 U.S. 137 (1803). See Gormley, K. Judicial Review in the Americas: Comments on Protocol, and the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women.
[127]
the United States and Mexico, 45 Duquesne Law Review (Spring, 2007) 393. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides, viz:
[90]
Rule on the Writ of Amparo: Annotation, p. 47. Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
[91]
Deliberations of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, August 10, available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security
2007; August 24, 2007; August 31, 2007; and September 20, 2008. is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
[92]
G.R. No. 179095. omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
[93]
CA rollo, p. 3. individual or entity. (emphasis supplied)
[94] [128]
Rollo, p. 35. People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868 (1998).
[95] [129]
Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, Jr., A.C. No. 7214, November 30, 2006, 509 SCRA 1. Book Two, Title Eight, Crimes against Persons, of the Revised Penal Code consists
[96]
CA rollo, p. 210. of two chapters: Chapter One Destruction of Life, and Chapter Two Physical
[97]
Id. Injuries.
[98] [130]
Id. (App. No.26853/04), ECtHR Judgment of July 13, 2006.
[99] [131]
Id. at 203. Id. at pars.196-197.
[100] [132]
Id. at 211. General Recommendation No. 19 on Violence against Women of the Committee on
[101]
Rollo, pp. 74-76. the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. Adoption of the Report, U.N.
[102]
Id. at 40. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 11th Sess.,
[103]
CA rollo, pp. 219, 222-224. Agenda Item 7, at para. 8, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/1992/L.1/Add.15 (1992); see
[104]
TSN, November 14, 2007, p. 66. also Lai, S. and Ralph, R., Female Sexual Autonomy and Human Rights, 8 Harvard
[105]
Case 10.526, Report No. 31/96, Inter-Am.C.H.R.,OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. at Human Rights Journal (Spring, 1995) 201, 207-208.
[133]
332 (1997). 1987 PHIL. CONST. Art. II, 11, provides, viz:
[106]
Id. at par. 49. Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person
[107]
Id. and guarantees full respect for human rights.
[108] [134]
Id. at par. 50. I/A Court H.R. Velsquez Rodrguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Series C No. 4.
[109] [135]
Rollo, p. 182. Id. at par. 177.
[110] [136]
Id. Created under Article 28 of the ICCPR as the treaty-based body charged with the
[111]
Id. at 183. authoritative interpretation of the ICCPR. See Russell-Brown, S., Out of the Crooked
[112]
Respondents cite 1987 PHIL. CONST. Art. III, 12(2) which provides, viz: Timber of Humanity: The Conflict Between South Africas Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and International Human Rights Norms Regarding Effective Remedies,
(2) No torture, force, violence threat, intimidation, or any other 26 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review (Winter 2003) 227.
[137]
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any The ICCPR provides in Article 9(1), viz:
person under investigation for the commission of an 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No
offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one
other similar forms of detention are prohibited. shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in
[113]
225 Phil. 191 (1986). accordance with such procedure as are established by law.
[114]
Rollo, pp. 182-183. (emphasis supplied)
[115] [138]
Id. at 183. Communication No. 195/1985, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985 (1990).
[116] [139]
Id. Id. at , par. 5.5.
[117] [140]
Bernas, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: Communication No. 314/1988, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/314/1988 (1993).
[141]
A COMMENTARY (2003) 162. Communication No. 468/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/468/1991 (1993).
[118] [142]
No. L-41686, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA 86. Communication No. 542/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/542/1993 (1996).
[119] [143]
Id. at 100-101. Communication No. 711/1996, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/68/D/711/1996 (2000).
[120] [144]
1987 PHIL. CONST. Art. III, 1 provides, viz: Communication No. 821/1998, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/821/1998 (2000).
[145]
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property Powell, R., The Right to Security of Person in European Court of Human Rights
without due process of law Jurisprudence, 6 European Human Rights Law Review (2007) 649, 652-653.
[121] [146]
But see Bernas, supra at 110. The constitutional protection of the right to life is not Kurt v. Turkey (1999) 27 E.H.R.R. 373.
[147]
just a protection of the right to be alive or to the security of ones limb against Id. at pars. 122 and 123.
[148]
physical harm. CA rollo, p. 210.
[122] [149]
Separate Opinion of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Rollo, p. 182
[150]
454 Phil. 504 (2003). Rollo, pp. 28-29.
[123] [151]
Sandifer, D. and L. Scheman, THE FOUNDATION OF FREEDOM (1966), pp. 44- Rollo, pp. 29-31. The directives issued by the petitioners are in line with Article 13 of
45. the 1992 U.N. Declaration on Enforced Disappearances which states that, any person
[124]
Schmidt, C., An International Human Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 15 William and having knowledge or legitimate interest who alleges that a person has been subjected
Mary Bill of Rights Journal (February, 2007) 983, 1004. to enforced disappearance has the right to complain to a competent and independent
[125]
Id., citing Websters Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 780 (1971). state authority and to have that complaint promptly, thoroughly and impartially
[126]
The U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance investigated by the authority.
[152]
also provides for the right to security under Article 2, viz: Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[153]
84 Phil. 127 (1949).
 EN BANC

REVEREND FATHER ROBERT P. REYES, G. R. No. 182161

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus -
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY RAUL M. Promulgated:

GONZALEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND
COMMISSIONER MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN HIS
December 3, 2009
CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,

Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For resolution is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
February 4, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 00011 which dismissed
the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, as amended. It
also assails the CAs Resolution dated March 25, 2008, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid February 4, 2008 Decision.
The undisputed facts as found by the CA are as follows:
Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30,
2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were brought
to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M.
Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold
petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.
 On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering
respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned
case in the interest of national security and public safety.

On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the
crime of Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an
Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.

On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
and Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce
any evidence indicating his specific participation in the crime charged; and that under the Constitution,
the determination of probable cause must be made personally by a judge.

On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against
petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. The trial court ratiocinated that the evidence
submitted by the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors failed to show that petitioner and the other
accused-civilians conspired and confederated with the accused-soldiers in taking arms against the
government; that petitioner and other accused-civilians were arrested because they ignored the call of
the police despite the deadline given to them to come out from the 2ndFloor of the Hotel and submit
themselves to the police authorities; that mere presence at the scene of the crime and expressing ones
sentiments on electoral and political reforms did not make them conspirators absent concrete evidence
that the accused-civilians knew beforehand the intent of the accused-soldiers to commit rebellion; and
that the cooperation which the law penalizes must be one that is knowingly and intentionally rendered.

On December 18, 2007, petitioners counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote the DOJ Secretary
requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 07-3126.

On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to petitioners letter stating that the DOJ could not act
on petitioners request until Atty. Chavezs right to represent petitioner is settled in view of the fact that a
certain Atty. J. V. Bautista representing himself as counsel of petitioner had also written a letter to the
DOJ.

On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the
rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists; that on December 19, 2007, petitioner was
held by BID officials at the NAIA as his name is included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been
for the timely intervention of petitioners counsel, petitioner would not have been able to take his
scheduled flight to Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007, petitioner was able to fly back to the
Philippines from Hong Kong but every time petitioner would present himself at the NAIA for his flights
abroad, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers because of the continued inclusion of
his name in the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of Justice has not acted on his request for
the lifting of HDO No. 45. Petitioner further maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court
for the availment of the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on petitioners right to travel is illegal.

On January 24, 2008, respondents represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed
the Return of the Writ raising the following affirmative defenses: 1) that the Secretary of Justice is
 authorized to issue Hold Departure Orders under the DOJ Circulars No. 17, Series of 1998 [2] and No. 18
Series of 2007[3] pursuant to his mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987 as ahead of the
principal law agency of the government; 2) that HDO No. 45 dated December 1, 2007 was issued by the
Sec. Gonzales in the course of the preliminary investigation of the case against herein petitioner upon
the request of the DILG; 3) that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature in view of public respondents
pending Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2008 filed by the respondents of the Order dated
December 13, 2007 of the RTC dismissing Criminal Case No. 07-3126 for Rebellion for lack of probable
cause; 4) that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a motion to lift HDO No. 45
before the DOJ; and 5) that the constitutionality of Circulars No. 17 and 18 can not be attacked
collaterally in an amparo proceeding.

During the hearing on January 25, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. at the Paras Hall of the Court of Appeals,
counsels for both parties appeared. Petitioners counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez manifested that
petitioner is currently in Hong Kong; that every time petitioner would leave and return to the country,
the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several minutes because of the
existing HDO; that the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO has no legal basis; and that petitioner
did not file a motion to lift the HDO before the RTC nor the DOJ because to do so would be tantamount
to recognizing the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO.

For respondents part, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) maintained that the Secretary of
the DOJs power to issue HDO springs from its mandate under the Administrative Code to investigate and
prosecute offenders as the principal law agency of the government; that in its ten-year existence, the
constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17 has not been challenged except now; and that on January 3,
2008, the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors had filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
Dismissal of the trial court.

On February 1, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation attaching thereto a copy of the Order
dated January 31, 2008 of the trial court denying respondent DOJs Motion for Reconsideration for utter
lack of merit. The trial court also observed that the said Motion should be dismissed outright for being
[4]
filed out of time.

The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated
petitioners constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no
power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis
since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.
On February 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and
denying the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[5] thereon was also denied in the assailed
Resolution[6] dated March 25, 2008.
Hence, the present petition which is based on the following grounds:

I.
 THE DOJ SECRETARYS ARROGATION OF POWER AND USURPATION OF AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A
HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED THROUGH A RATIONALE THAT IT HAS SUPPOSEDLY
BEEN REGULARLY EXERCISED IN THE PAST OR HAS NEVER BEEN QUESTIONED (IN THE PAST).

II.

THE DOJ HAS CLAIMED A POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO INDEPENDENT OF THAT OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS, HENCE, PETITIONER CANNOT MERELY RELY ON THE RESIDUAL POWER OF THE
RTC MAKATI IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 07-3126 TO ASSAIL SUCH CLAIMED POWER.

III.

THE UTMOST EXIGENCY OF THE PETITION IS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE CONTINUING

ACTUAL RESTRAINT ON PETITIONERS RIGHT TO TRAVEL THROUGH THE MAINTENANCE OF HIS NAME IN
THE HDO LIST AND DOES NOT SIMPLY HINGE ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS
ABLE TO TRAVEL DESPITE SUCH A RESTRAINT.

IV.

DOJ CIRCULAR 17 SERIES OF 1998 PROVIDES NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE DOJ SECRETARYS
CLAIMED POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO FOR IT IS NOT A STATUTE. THE CIRCULAR ITSELF APPEARS NOT TO
BE BASED ON ANY STATUTE, HENCE, IT DOES NOT HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW AND NEED NOT BE
ATTACKED IN A DIRECT PROCEEDING.[7]

Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to
situations of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole
gamut of liberties protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues that [liberty] includes the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude and
includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways. Part of the
right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is the right of a person to travel.
In their Comment,[8] both respondents Secretary Gonzalez and Commissioner Libanan
argue that: 1) HDO No. 45 was validly issued by the Secretary of Justice in accordance with
Department of Justice Circular No. 17, Series of 1998,[9] and Circular No. 18, Series of
2007,[10] which were issued pursuant to said Secretarys mandate under the Administrative
Code of 1987, as head of the principal law agency of the government, to investigate the
commission of crimes, prosecute offenders, and provide immigration regulatory services; and;
2) the issue of the constitutionality of the DOJ Secretarys authority to issue hold departure
orders under DOJ Circulars Nos. 17 and 18 is not within the ambit of a writ of amparo.
The case hinges on the issue as to whether or not petitioners right to liberty has been
violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle
him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
 The petition must fail.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,[11] made a categorical
pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof, thus:
x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law.[12]

In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[13] the Court laid down the basic principle regarding the rule on
the writ of amparo as follows:
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these
Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a
writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its
issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by
justifying allegations of fact, to wit:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the
threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be
described by an assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how
such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting affidavits;
 (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the
manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the
threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.[14]

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to
what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or
is being committed. (Emphasis supplied)

Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the
protection of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to
travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of
the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.
In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,[15] the Court explained the
concept of right to life in this wise:
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive-
upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a
guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived
in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life
lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security
of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades the whole history of
man. It touches every aspect of mans existence. In a broad sense, the right to security of person
emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and
his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is
invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment
of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.[16]

The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon.
Laguio, Jr.,[17] in this manner:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into
mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of
 man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint
as are necessary for the common welfare. x x x

Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.[18] thoroughly expounded on the

import of the right to security, thus:

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise
of this right.

First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people. (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that freedom from fear
is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the right
to security of person as the word security itself means freedom from fear. Article 3 of the UDHR
provides, viz:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

xxx

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any threat to
the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is
a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-
founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the
variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the
stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to security is actually
the freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of
Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part
of the provision.

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body
cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It
may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of
physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates.Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a
person.

xxx

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by

the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of
the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right
to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a
 corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II,
Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is
rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when
they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of
justice. x x x (emphasis supplied)[19]

The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another.[20] As we have
stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,[21] xxx a persons right to travel is subject to the usual
constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases,
whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a
matter of the courts sound discretion. [22]

Here, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of

the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that
his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal
recourse or remedy.
In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I XIII, Inc. et al.,[23] this Court ruled
that:
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the
protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and
security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this
nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by
the writ.

We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the provision of
Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads
Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been commenced, no
separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the
criminal case.

The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ
of amparo.

Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-
Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however, did not
file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJs HDO, as his co-accused did in the same criminal
case. Petitioner argues that it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said HDO,
and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the lifting of the HDO but also to question
before this Court the constitutionality of the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue an
HDO.[24] We quote with approval the CAs ruling on this matter:
 The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the Supreme Court of its pronouncement
in Crespo v. Mogul[25] that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case
such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Despite the denial of
respondents MR of the dismissal of the case against petitioner, the trial court has not lost control over
Criminal Case No. 07-3126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its residual power, the court a
quo retains the authority to entertain incidents in the instant case to the exclusion of even this
Court. The relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO was and is available by motion in the
criminal case. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of amparo, supra).[26]

Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to
separately and directly intervene through the writ of amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz v. Del
Rosario,[27] thus:
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory
dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly
intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to
life, liberty or security the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect is immediately in
danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an
application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on
certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed
criminal case.

Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his

apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO.[28] Petitioners apprehension is
at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty
actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also
renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ
Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of
Hold Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations
Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other Purposes).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA dated February
4, 2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Consti II case digest:GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent RAUL
CASTAEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief,
Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners, vs.
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact,Respondent.

Writ of Habeas Corpus

Writ of Amparo

G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009

Syllabus:

We review in this petition for review on certiorari the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A-G.R.
AMPARO No. 00009. This CA decision confirmed the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the
Writ of Amparo at the petition of his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis (respondent). The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby FINDS that this is an "enforced disappearance"
within the meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in the Amparo Rules. The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby
extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.

Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG) who should
order COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga City, to aid him; (2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP,
who should order his men, namely: (a) respondent GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL. AHIRON AJIRIM,
both head of TASK FORCE TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR. SUPERINTENDENT LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response, to aid him as their superior- are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts, not only to
protect the life, liberty and security of Engr. Morced Tagitis, but also to extend the privileges of the writ of amparo to Engr. Morced
Tagitis and his family, and to submit a monthly report of their actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this
Court to monitor the action of respondents.

This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and as
to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti-Terror Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which is a
separate and distinct organization from the police and the CIDG, in terms of operations, chain of command and budget.

This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the
rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies, as a remedy, the courts directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of
action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint
criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.

Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by
action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to
file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.

Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement
in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but
have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases,
the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is
preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
FACTS:
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB
scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately
checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga.
When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at
around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to
the latters Manila-based secretary who did not know of Tagitis whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply
wait.

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis fellow student
counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn
affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis disappearance.

More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary Jean Tagitis filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA
through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel
Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet.

Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos City,
Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts
of her husband. All of her efforts did not produce any positive results except the information from persons in the military who do
not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men. According to reliable information she received,
subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held
against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups particularly
the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.

She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, seeking their help to find her
husband, but was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband was not missing but was with another woman having good
time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the refusal of the PNP to help and provide police assistance in locating her missing
husband.

Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the different police headquarters namely Police Headquarters in Cotabato City,
Davao City, Zamboanga City and eventually in the National Headquarters in Camp Crame in Quezon City but her efforts produced no
positive results. These trips exhausted all of her resources which pressed her to ask for financial help from friends and relatives.

She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, she has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of her husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis, from the illegal clutches of his
captors, their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subjects human and constitutional rights, except
the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.

On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008,
and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ.

In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any involvement in or knowledge of
Tagitis alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action
against them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. In addition, they all claimed that
they exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active measures to investigate, search and locate Tagitis and to apprehend the
persons responsible for his disappearance.
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced disappearance" under
the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA held that "raw reports"
from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasims subsequent and belated
retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.

The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police theories painting the disappearance
as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any
trust regarding money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he or she
did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of
his second wife," on the basis of the respondents testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives under the
Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the latter divorced his first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the CA
also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis disappearance, since
the respondent, the police and the military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis abduction or demand for payment
of ransom the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the CIDG Chief,
Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER
Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with
the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then
respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the
military, that was involved.

On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 9,
2008.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.

RULING:

The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced disappearance, thus the privilege of the Writ of Amparo
applies.

Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed
by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
which place such a person outside the protection of the law." Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced
disappearance are essentially fourfold:

(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person;
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.

There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis
went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The
undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned the petitioner, Tagitis colleagues and even the police authorities is that
Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of the portions the petitioners
cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;(e) The actions and
recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission.

The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual
violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the
76
cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the
nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with
certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is
detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of
situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is
to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.

To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition
should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause
of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition
should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements
namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or
security are present.

The properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleaders knowledge about Tagitis disappearance, the participation by agents of the
State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as
well as the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a cause of
action.

If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the
Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the
Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the affiants
direct testimony. This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the
petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by submitting
a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is
essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness
(Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the
allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.

The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitlers Nact und Nebel Erlass or
Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941. The Third Reichs Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in
occupied territories "endangering German security"; they were transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a
trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government officials from providing information
about the fate of these targeted persons.

In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories, and 855 cases were recorded during the
period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead.
During former President Corazon C. Aquinos term, 820 people were reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were
documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The number of enforced
disappearances dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos term when only 87 cases were reported, while the three-year term
of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization, reports that
as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a total of 193 victims of enforced disappearance under incumbent President
Gloria M. Arroyos administration. The Commission on Human Rights records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced
disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have
undetermined status.Currently, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance reports 619
outstanding cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008.
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof."We
note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this
jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the
Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance:

Justice Puno stated that, as the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not
crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances

and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws.

Although the Courts power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal
protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the
public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can
make a difference even if only procedurally in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have had a
hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.

The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is
to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when
governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life
of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ
are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the
complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the disappeared person and the
restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty
parties.

During the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (in Paris, France on February 6,
2007, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed
by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
which place such a person outside the protection of the law.

In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, we held that:

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic
law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights"
under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.

Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims
of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of
justice. The duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective.

Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an Enforced Disappearance

The unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases; these difficulties form part of the setting that the
implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter. These difficulties largely arise because the State itself the party whose
involvement is alleged investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary
difficulties are generally threefold.

First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. In addition, there are usually no witnesses
to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for
their own lives.

Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central piece of evidence in
an enforced disappearance

Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced disappearance ever occurred.
"Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to
escape the application of legal standards ensuring the victims human rights.

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.

The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.

We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the Philippine legal system. In
child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness is expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay
rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any
criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the adverse party.

CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY

Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure, made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to
some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot
but point to this conclusion. For why would the government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had
not been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least
credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the governments cap under the circumstances of the disappearance? From
this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced
disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, evidence at hand
and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and government complicity, under a background
of consistent and unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis
outside the protection of the law a situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.

Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their duties when the
government completely failed to exercise the extral.'

To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the
PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results through hearings the CA may deem appropriate
to conduct.
[G.R. No. 138731. December 11, 2000]

TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA MANUEL Vda. DE BIASCAN, petitioner, vs. ROSALINA C. BIASCAN, respondent.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
[1]
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Case No. 44306 affirming the orders dated
October 22, 1996 and February 12, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Manila. These orders dismissed the appeal of
petitioner from the orders dated April 2, 1981 and April 30, 1985 of the same Regional Trial Court.

The facts of the case are as follows:

[2]
On June 3, 1975, private respondent Rosalina J. Biascan filed a petition denominated as Special Proceeding No. 98037 at the then
Court of First Instance, Branch 4, Manila praying for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Florencio Biascan
and Timotea Zulueta. In an Order dated August 13, 1975, private respondent was appointed as regular administratrix of the estates.

On October 10, 1975, Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, the legal wife of Florencio Biascan entered her appearance as Oppositor-
[3]
Movant in SP. Proc. No. 98037. Simultaneous with her appearance, she filed a pleading containing several motions including a
motion for intervention, a motion for the setting aside of private respondents appointment as special administratrix and
[4]
administratrix, and a motion for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan.

After an exchange of pleadings between the parties, Judge Serafin Cuevas, then presiding judge of CFI Manila, Branch 4, issued an
[5]
Omnibus Order dated November 13, 1975 which, among others, granted Marias intervention and set for trial the motion to set
aside the Orders appointing respondent as administratrix.
[6]
On April 2, 1981, the trial court issued an Order resolving that: (1) Maria is the lawful wife of Florencio; (2) respondent and her
brother are the acknowledged natural children of Florencio; (3) all three are the legal heirs of Florencio who are entitled to
participate in the settlement proceedings; (4) the motion to set aside the order appointing private respondent as administratrix is
denied; and (5) the motion to approve inventory and appraisal of private respondent be deferred. Maria, through her counsel,
[7]
received a copy of this April 2, 1981 Order on April 9, 1981.

On June 6, 1981, or fifty-eight (58) days after he receipt of the April 2, 1981 Order, Maria filed her motion for
[8] [9]
reconsideration which private respondent opposed.

On November 15, 1981, the fourth floor of the City Hall of Manila was completely gutted by fire. The records of the settlement
[10]
proceedings were among those lost in the fire. Thus, on January 2, 1985, private respondent filed a Petition for Reconstitution of
the said records.

Due to the delay caused by the fire and the reconstitution of the records, it was only on April 30, 1985 that the Regional Trial Court
[11]
of Manila, Branch 4 issued an Order denying Marias June 6, 1981 Motion for Reconsideration.

Sometime thereafter, Maria died and her testate estate also became the subject of settlement proceedings. Atty. Marcial F. Lopez
was appointed as interim special administrator and engaged the services of the Siguion Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Offices
on Behalf of the estate.

On August 21, 1996, the law firm was allegedly made aware of and given notice of the April 30, 1985 Order when its associate visited
Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to inquire about the status of the case. The associate checked the records if there was
proof of service of the April 30, 1985 Order to the former counsel of Maria, Atty. Marcial F. Lopez, but he discovered that there was
[12] [13]
none. He was able to secure a certification from the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 which stated
that there was no proof of service of the Order dated April 30, 1985 contained in the records of SP. Proc. No. 98037.
[14]
A Notice of Appeal dated April 22, 1996 was filed by petitioner from the Orders dated April 2, 1981 and April 30, 1985 of the trial
court. While the said notice of appeal was dated April 22, 1996, the stamp of the trial court on the first page of the notice clearly
 [15]
indicated that the same was received by the trial court on September 20, 1996. A Record of Appeal dated September 20, 1996
was likewise filed by petitioner.
[16]
On October 22, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners appeal on the ground that the appeal was filed out of
time. The trial court ruled that the April 2, 1981 Order which was the subject of the appeal already became final as the Motion for
Reconsideration thereof was filed sixty-five (65) days after petitioner received the same. In addition, the court ruled that the notice
of appeal itself was filed manifestly late as the same was filed more than 11 years after the issuance of the June 11, 1985 Order
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The Motion for Reconsideration dated November 13, 1996 of petitioner was
[17]
likewise denied by the trial court in an Order dated February 12, 1997.
[18]
Not satisfied with this decision, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Mandatory Injunction with the Court of
Appeals questioning the October 12, 1996 and February 12, 1997 Orders of the Regional Trial Court.
[19]
In a Decision dated February 16, 1999, the First Division of the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari of
[20]
petitioner. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated May 18, 1999.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari where petitioner sets forth the following ground for the reversal of the decision of the
appellate court:

THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (REVIEWING COURT) HAS SANCTIONED THE DEPARTURE BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA BRANCH 4 (TRIAL COURT) FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED 16
FEBRUARY 1999 DECISION AND THE 18 MAY 1999 RESOLUTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE ERRONEOUS FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT
THAT THE ORDER DATED APRIL 2, 1981 BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO OPPOSITION ON ITS
[21]
TIMELINESS WAS FILED AND MOREOVER NO RULING AS REGARDS ITS TIMELINESS WAS MADE.

There is no merit in the petition.

Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the orders and judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of
an appeal. Thus:

Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. An interested person may appeal in a special proceeding from an
order or judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court or a Juvenile and domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:

(a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive shares of the estate to which such person is
entitled;

(c) Allows, or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of
the estate in offset to a claim against it;

(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or
guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from
the appointment of a special administrator; and

(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an
order granting or denying a motion for new trial or for reconsideration.

An appeal is allowed in these aforesaid cases as these orders, decrees or judgments issued by a court in a special proceeding
[22]
constitute a final determination of the rights of the parties so appealing. In contrast, interlocutory orders are not appealable as
these are merely incidental to judicial proceedings. In these cases, the court issuing such orders retains control over the same and
[23]
may thus modify, rescind, or revoke the same on sufficient grounds at any time before the final judgment.
In the instant case, the Order dated April 2, 1981 of the trial court decreed, among others, that Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, the
lawful wife of the deceased Florencio Biascan, private respondent Rosalina Biascan and her brother, German Biascan, are entitled to
participate in the settlement proceedings. Moreover, the said Order likewise denied Marias motion to set aside the order appointing
private respondent as regular administratrix of the estate. These rulings of the trial court were precisely questioned by Maria in her
Motion for Reconsideration dated June 6, 1981.

The ruling of the trial court that Maria, private respondent Rosalina Biascan and German Biascan were entitled to participate in the
settlement proceedings falls squarely under paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court as a proper subject of appeal. By
so ruling, the trial court has effectively determined that the three persons are the lawful heirs of the deceased. As such, the same
may be the proper subject of an appeal.

Similarly, the ruling of the trial court denying petitioners motion to set aside the order appointing private respondent as the regular
administratrix of the estate of Florencio Bisacan is likewise a proper subject of an appeal. We have previously held that an order of
the trial court appointing a regular administrator of a deceased persons estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties
[24]
thereunder, and is thus, appealable. This is in contrast with an order appointing a special administrator who is appointed only for
a limited time and for a specific purpose. Because of the temporary character and special character of this appointment, the Rules
[25]
deem it not advisable for any party to appeal from said temporary appointment. Considering however that private respondent
has aleready been appointed as regular administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan, her appointment as such may be
questioned before the appellate court by way of appeal.

It is thus clear that the Order dated April 2, 1981 may be the proper subject of an appeal in a special proceeding. In special
proceedings, such as the instant proceeding for settlement of estate, the period of appeal from any decision or final order rendered
[26]
therein is thirty (30) days, a notice of appeal and a record on appeal being required. The appeal period may only be interrupted by
the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires without an appeal or a motion for
reconsideration or new trial being perfected, the decision or order becomes final.

With respect to the Order dated April 2, 1981 issued by the trial court, petitioner admits that Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, its
predecessor-in-interest, received a copy of the same of April 9, 1981. Applying these rules, Maria or her counsel had thirty (30) days
or until May 9 within which to file a notice of appeal with record on appeal. She may also file a motion for reconsideration, in which
case the appeal period is deemed interrupted.

Considering that it was only June 6, 1981, or a full fifty-eight (58) days after receipt of the order, that a motion for reconsideration
was filed, it is clear that the same was filed out of time. As such, when the said motion for reconsideration was filed, there was no
more appeal period to interrupt as the Order had already become final.

Petitioner insists, however, that the order dated April 2, 1981 of the trial court did not become final and executory as no opposition
on its timeliness was filed and no ruling as regards its timeliness was made. Petitioner argues that although its motion for
reconsideration was denied in the Order dated April 30, 1985, the denial was made on grounds other than its failure to ask for a
reconsideration within the period prescribed by law. As such, petitioner concludes, any procedural defect attending the Motion for
Reconsideration was deemed cured when the trial court, in its Order dated April 30, 1985, took cognizance of the same and
rendered its ruling thereon.

There is no merit in this argument.

It is well-settled that judgment or orders become final and executory by operation of law and not by judicial declaration. Thus,
[27]
finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or motion for
reconsideration or new trial is filed. The trial court need not even pronounce the finality of the order as the same becomes final by
operation of law. In fact, the trial court could not even validly entertain a motion for reconsideration filed after the lapse of the
[28]
period for taking an appeal. As such, it is of no moment that the opposing party failed to object to the timeliness of the motion for
reconsideration or that the court denied the same on grounds other than timeliness considering that at the time the motion was
filed, the Order dated April 2, 1981 had already become final and executory. Being final and executory, the trial court can no longer
[29]
alter, modify, or reverse the questioned order. The subsequent filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality
[30]
of the judgment or order.
Even if we assume that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner had the effect of suspending the running of the appeal
period for the April 2, 1981 Order, it is clear that petitioners notice of appeal of the orders of the trial court was still filed out of time.

Under Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court then applicable, the time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or
for a new trial shall be deducted from the period from which to make an appeal. The rule further states that where the motion was
filed during office hours of the last day of the appeal period, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in which the
party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.

The Order of the trial court denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the April 2, 1981 Order was issued on April 30,
1985. Allegedly, petitioner was only made aware of this April 30, 1985 Order on August 21, 1996 when it inquired from the trial
court about the status of the case. Giving petitioner the benefit of the doubt that it had indeed received notice of the order denying
its motion for reconsideration on August 21, 1996, it follows that petitioner only had until the following day or on August 22, 1996
within which to perfect the appeal.

At this point, we note with disapproval petitioners attempt to pass off its Notice of Appeal as having been filed on August 22,
1996. In all its pleadings before this Court and the Court of Appeals, petitioner insists that its Notice of Appeal was filed the day after
it secured the August 21, 1996 Certification from the trial court. While the Notice of Appeal was ostensibly dated August 22, 1996, it
[31]
is clear from the stamp of the trial court that the same was received only on September 20, 1996. Moreover, in the Order dated
October 22, 1996 of the trial court denying petitioners appeal, the court clearly stated that the Notice of Appeal with accompanying
Record on Appeal was filed on September 20, 1996.

Considering that it is clear from the records that petitioners notice of appeal was filed on September 20, 1996, the same was clearly
filed out of time as it only had until August 22, 1996 within which to file the said pleading. And while the rules on special proceedings
[32]
recognize that a motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal and record of appeal may be granted,

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. The decision dated February 16, 1999 and the
Resolution dated May 18, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.