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CHANCERY COURT OF HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

CHARLES ARAUJO, ET AL.

PLAINTIFFS

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. G. 2016-1008

GOVERNOR DEWEY PHILLIP

PHIL BRYANT, ET AL. DEFENDANTS
________________________________________________________________________________

GOVERNOR BRYANT AND THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT

OF EDUCATIONS REPLY IN SUPPORT
THEIR CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________________________

INTRODUCTION

The Southern Poverty Law Centers oppositional response is noteworthy primarily for what

it does not do. For instance, it does not accurately read or articulate the State Defendants position

on Article 8, Section 206 of the Mississippi Constitution. And because it does not correctly state that

position, it also does not adequately address the argument.

Similarly, for purposes of the Article 8, Section 208 challenge, the SPLC does everything in

its power to avoid grappling with the plain language of the constitutional text. The group also does

not confront the fact that the cases it cites in support of its flawed position interpreted an archaic

version and different provision of the Mississippi Constitution. In fact, this precisely is why the SPLC

has to alter the text of the 1879 case it cites to fit the position the group is advocating.1

Once a proper analysis of case law is performed, and an accurate interpretation of the

Mississippi Constitution is applied, the SPLCs arguments fall apart upon even a perfunctory

inspection. First, it is undeniable that Section 206 calls for local money to be used to support local

1
See SPLC Motion for Summary Judgment at 13; see also Pl. Resp. at 7, Docket Entry No. [58] (altering
the text of Otken v. Lamkin, 56 Miss. 758 (1879)).
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students. Because money simply follows the local student to the place he or she is educated pursuant

to the MCSA, the statute easily satisfies any constitutional dictates. Second, when Section 208 says

that state funds may not be appropriated to a school that is not conducted as a free school, it means

exactly what it says. And because public charter schools charge no tuition, they are conducted as a

free school as required by Section 208.

At the end of the day, this simply is not a close constitutional case. The state and local funding

provisions of the MCSA comport entirely with the Mississippi Constitution, and summary judgment

to the State Defendants remains the correct outcome.

ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS

I. The MCSA Does Not Run Afoul of Article 8, Section 206 of the Mississippi Constitution.

As a preliminary matter, the SPLC spends much of its response brief responding to

arguments never made by the State Defendants. For instance, the SPLC maintains that [t]he State

argues that the Legislatures broad authority allows it to control a school districts ad valorem revenue,

regardless of what Section 206 says. See Pl. Resp. at 2, Docket Entry No. [58]. Quite obviously,

none of the defendantsand certainly not the State onesargue anything close to this.

Nor do the State Defendants ever claim that Section 206 allows a school district to send ad

valorem revenue to any school . . . so long as that school falls within the districts geographic

boundaries. See Pl. Resp. at 3. In fact, the words geographic boundaries appear nowhere in the

State Defendants cross-motion for summary judgment, aside from when the MCSA itself is quoted.

When the State Defendants Section 206 argument properly is analyzed, the fatal defects in

the SPLCs position become clear. Indeed, Article 8, Section 206 has a very basic premise. That

constitutional section calls for local money to be used to support the public education of local students.

In trying (unsuccessfully) to convince the Court otherwise, the SPLC stretches too far the Mississippi

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Supreme Courts Tucker decision and suggests that one districts local funding cannot ever follow a

student from one district to anothereven if the student is being educated in the sister district. But

this is not at all what Tucker held. See Pascagoula School District v. Tucker, 91 So. 3d 598 (Miss.

2012).

Of primary concern in that case was the fact that the statute had the effect of excluding

approximately $46.8 million from the Pascagoula tax base. See id. Indeed, by operation of law, the

statute in Tucker had the same functional effect as assessing one district at more than true value and

the other districts at less than true value. This is so because the statute at issue in Tucker diverted ad

valorem tax revenues from the Pascagoula School District to other school districts not responsible for

educating any of the taxed districts students.

As a result, the non-taxed districts in Tucker had the benefit of receiving local tax dollars

without the burden of providing an education to any of the taxed districts students. In other words,

the statute would cause the taxed district to lose money without easing any of the burden of the

education of students within the district. This is what drove the analysis in Tucker: there was no local

benefit to the local students from the local taxes levied.

It also is what ultimately led to the Supreme Courts decision. The Tucker decision did not turn

on an analysis of the level of control and supervision exercised by local officialsin fact, such a point

is not even discussed by the Court. Instead, the entire case was about the diversion of local funds from

the local tax base to non-taxed districts not responsible for educating any of the local students.2 Tucker,

91 So. 3d at 604 (no authority to levy an ad valorem tax to maintain schools outside its district).

2
It is noteworthy that, in addressing Section 206, the Pascagoula School District did not argue anything
other than precisely what the State Defendants urge here.
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Lest there be any doubt, the easiest and surest guide to the intent behind the text of 206 is to

compare it to its predecessor: Art. VIII, 6 of the Constitution of 1868. That provision created one

state common school fund, which received the proceeds of public land sales, fines, liquor license

fees, and money donated to the state for school purposes. Section 206 in contrast created different

school funds and established the principle of local support for public education. See State Defendants

Cross-MSJ at pp. 17-18, Docket Entry No. [47]. The Tucker decision preserved that principle and

simply reiterated that local school tax levies should benefit local students.

Unlike in Tucker, the MCSA calls for money to follow the student. The charter school statute

thus requires only what other school funding provisions under Mississippi law require. Most notably,

these provisions include state conservatorships and student transfers from one district to the next.

Indeed, in a conservatorship, there is no local control once the State takes over the district,

although public funding (both local and state) continues. See MISS. CODE ANN. 37176, 37-17-

13.3 The SPLC, in addressing this point, does not contend otherwise. Instead, the SPLC maintains

that the temporary nature of a conservatorship alleviates its alleged constitutional infirmity. See Pl.

Resp. to MCSA MSJ at pp. 17, 18, Docket Entry No. [59]. While it is a curious constitutional

hypothesis to allege that it is permissible to violate the Mississippi Constitution as long as the violation

is for some short(er) time period, the SPLCs theory does not make much sense for purposes of a

Section 206 local funding analysis.

Neither does the SPLCs next argument. On page 18 of the brief, the SPLC contends that

conservatorships do not run afoul of Section 206 because they do not eliminate local oversight over

3
The Mississippi Achievement School District is similar to a conservatorship in terms of the lack of local
control and supervision. The purpose of the Mississippi Achievement School District is to transform[ ] persistently
failing public schools and districts throughout the state into quality educational institutions. See MISS. CODE ANN.
37-17-17(1). The Mississippi Achievement School District [is] governed by the State Board of Education. See
id. at 37-17-17 (2); see also id. at 37-17-17 (5)(a) (discussing [t]ransfer of the schools/districts governance
from the local school district to the Mississippi Achievement School District ).
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a district during a state of emergency; [they] merely replace[ ] the officials responsible for performing

that oversight[.] See Pl. Resp. to MCSA MSJ at p. 18, Docket Entry No. [59]. Thus, according to the

SPLC, conservatorships are constitutional because local officials are replaced by non-local officials,

but the MCSA is unconstitutional because local officials are replaced by other non-local officials.4

Such a constitutional notion is as schizophrenic as it is erroneous.

Other portions of the SPLCs briefs read the same way. For instance, on pages 2 and 5,

respectively, of one of the response briefs, the SPLC asserts the following two points:

Tucker made clear that ad valorem revenue can only maintain the schools under the
levying school districts control.
....
[A]d valorem revenue must be used only by the school district that levied the tax.

See Pl. Resp. to the Associations MSJ at pp. 2, 5, Docket Entry No. [59]. Later on, though, the SPLC

backtracks. One page 6 of the brief, for example, the SPLC maintains:

For out-of-district students attending alternative schoollocal district maintenance

funds may be used to pay for the childs education [out of the district].

See id. at p. 6.

Similarly troubling is the SPLCs position on students allowed to transfer from one district to

the next. E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. 37-15-29; MISS. CODE ANN. 37-15-31; MISS. CODE ANN. 37-

151-93(2); MISS. CODE ANN. 37-151-93(1).5 Just as with the charter school legislation, the local ad

4
Section 37-17-6 also provides that the State Board of Education may contract with an appropriate private
entity . . . who will be responsible for the administration, management and operation of the school district . . . .
5
See also MISS. CODE ANN. 37-15-29 (No child shall be required to be transported in excess of thirty
(30) miles on a school bus from his or her home to school, or in excess of thirty (30) miles from school to his or her
home, if there is another school in an adjacent school district located on a shorter school bus transportation route
by the nearest traveled road.); MISS. CODE ANN. 37-151-93(2) (Local maintenance funds shall be paid by the
home school district to the transferee school district for students granted transfers under the provisions of Sections
37-15-29(3) and 37-15-31(3)[.]); see also MISS. CODE ANN. 37-151-93(1) (Legally transferred students going
from one school district to another shall be counted for adequate education program allotments by the school district
wherein the pupils attend school, but shall be counted for transportation allotment purposes in the school district
which furnishes or provides the transportation. The school boards of the school districts which approve the transfer
of a student under the provisions of Section 37-15-31 shall enter into an agreement and contract for the payment or
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valorem levy properly follows the students to the new district in these transfer situations. According

to the SPLC, the transfer provisions differ from the MCSA because the school districts may agree

to the transfers. See Pl. Resp. to MCSA MSJ at p. 7, Docket Entry No. [59].

This argument, though, simply gets it all wrong. That is, while it is nothing short of odd to

argue that a violation of the Mississippi Constitution may be cured by a private agree[ment], the

argument also is mistaken from a legal perspective. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. 37-7-301.1 (The

school board of a school district may adopt any orders, resolutions or ordinances with respect to school

district affairs, property and finances which are not inconsistent with the Mississippi Constitution of

1890, the Mississippi Code of 1972, or any other statute or law of the State of Mississippi); Cappaert

v. Junker, 413 So. 2d 378, 380 (Miss. 1982) (noting that contracts should be invalidated on the ground

that they violate public policy when the contract is prohibited by the Constitution, a statute, or

condemned by some decision of the courts construing the subject matter) (emphasis supplied); E.B.

v. Woodland Hills Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 10-0442, 2011 WL 705224, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2011)

(The school district does not have the power or authority to consent to violate those statutes by private

agreement.).

In addition, the SPLC fails to address provisions in the transfer statutes that do not fit the

groups position. The so-called 30-mile rule is a good illustration. Mississippi law provides that

[n]o child shall be required to be transported in excess of thirty (30) miles on a school bus from his

or her home to school, or in excess of thirty (30) miles from school to his or her home, if there is

another school in an adjacent school district located on a shorter school bus transportation route by

the nearest traveled road. See MISS. CODE ANN. 37-15-29(3); MISS. CODE ANN. 37-151-93.

nonpayment of any portion of their local maintenance funds which they deem fair and equitable in support of any
transferred student.).
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In this situation, Mississippi law calls for local money to follow the local transferred student.

Section 37-151-93(2) provides that [l]ocal maintenance funds shall be paid by the home school

district to the transferee school district for students granted transfers pursuant to the 30-mile rule.

MISS. CODE ANN. 37-151-93(2) (emphasis supplied). Similarly, [i]n the event the parent or legal

guardian of such child and the school board are unable to agree on the school bus mileage required to

transport the child from his or her home to school, an appeal shall lie to the State Board of Education,

or its designee, whose decision shall be final. See MISS. CODE ANN. 37-15-29(3).6

All in all, the SPLCs reading of Tucker collides directly with many other provisions of

Mississippi law, and it is entirely inconsistent with the SPLCs own briefing. The SPLCs position

also cannot be reconciled with the fact that the entire purpose of a local school tax levy is to benefit

local children.

Plainly put, there is nothing in the charter school statute that deviates from Section 206 or

Tuckers explanation of it, as the statute simply requires that money follow the local child. Summary

judgment thus must be granted to the State Defendants on the local funding component of the MCSA.

II. The MCSA Does Not Run Afoul of Article 8, Section 208 of the Mississippi Constitution.

The last sentence of Article 8, Section 208 of the Mississippi Constitution could not be clearer.

It provides that that no state funds be appropriated to any school that is not conducted as a free

school. Ignoring the plain language of that constitutional provision, the SPLC manufactures a

definition of the word free that relates to a schools manner of supervision. Such a tortured

constitutional interpretation, though, fails on all fronts.

6
The SPLC also of course does not grapple with the fact that their position on Section 206 could have
hindered desegregation. See Lauderdale County School District v. Enterprise Consolidated School District, 24 F.3d
671 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing the desegregation of schools and noting that [t]he basic purpose of the [transfer]
statute was to require local funds to follow transfer students).

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A. The SPLCs continued reliance on Otken and Morris is, at best, misplacedand,
at worse, misleading.

The claimed authority for the SPLCs constitutional premise is Otken v. Lamkin, 56 Miss. 758,

764 (1879) and State Teachers Coll. v. Morris, 165 Miss. 758, 144 So. 374, 374 (1932). However,

neither Otken nor Morris carry the SPLC where they are trying to go for purposes of Section 208. In

fact, a close inspection of those cases provides a graphic example of the SPLCs recurrent technique

of plucking words and phrases from a defining context in pertinent authority and transporting the

words to a more expansive, more pliable settingirresponsibly free of the defining context. The State

Defendants address Otken first, and then move to Morris.

Otken v. Lamkin. For at least two immediate reasons, the SPLCs reliance on Otken is wrong.

First, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Otken was interpreting a dated version and different provision

of Article 8 of the Mississippi Constitution. The case is thus not useful at all for purposes of an analysis

of the current version of Section 208. Second, and in any event, even when Otken interpreted the word

free, it construed the term to relate to whether tuition was charged.

As already noted, the starting point for any analysis of Otken has to be with the constitutional

provisions at issue when the case was decided. Otken was decided under the 1868 version of Article

8, which read very differently than it does now. The 1868 version of Article 8 contained various

subsections that, in part, established: (i) a uniform system of free public schools; (ii) a State

Superintendent of Public Education to supervise those schools; and (iii) a Superintendent of Public

Education in each county. See MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. 8, 1, 2, and 4.

When Otken referred to the schools manner of supervision, it was referring to the requirement

of a uniform system and superintendent-required supervision. For instance, the Otken court found

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that the plaintiffs first prevailed because the Legislature had provided support to schools that are not

to come under the supervision, in any respect,7 of the State or county superintendent. Id. at 764-65.

While the SPLC focuses only on this cherry-picked phrase from Otken, the very next paragraph

is where the Court separately addressed the word free, as defined in the 1868 version of Article 8:

[A]nd, so far from being free, it is expressly enacted that the pupils attending them shall
pay the full tuition exacted by the private persons conducting them[.]

Otken, 56 Miss. at 764-65 (emphasis supplied); see also id. at 763 (noting that the schools at issue

are not free . . . but are allowed to establish their own rates of tuition). At no point, then, did the

Otken court conflate the cost of the school with the schools manner of supervision.

Still more, the uniformity and superintendent supervision requirements are now absent from

Article 8 altogether, and those dictates were never found in a version of Section 208. In the same vein,

the Otken Court could not have interpreted the free school phrase in Section 208 of the Constitution

(the issue before this Court), as that dictate was not contained in the 1868 version of that section.

In 1868, the dictates of Section 208 were located in Section 9 of Article 8 and simply read:

No religious sect or sects shall control any part of the school or university funds of this State. MISS.

CONST. of 1868, art. 8, 9.8 It was not until 1890 that the Mississippi Constitution made Section 208

what it is today, and the last sentence of that provisions requires only that the school be free.

This precisely is why the SPLC has to alter the text of Otken to fit the argument now advanced

by the group. For instance, on page 7 of the response, the SPLC purports to quote Otken as follows:

7
While Article 8 reads very differently now than it did at the time of the Otken decision, charter schools
also are different in that public charter schools must comply with MDEs comprehensive regulations concerning
special education services, school facilities, federal program funding, student assessments, learning standards, and
graduation requirements. See MISS. CODE ANN. 37-28-45, 37-28-43, 37-28-39, 37-28-37. Public charter schools,
in addition, are subject to the same accountability rating system designed and maintained by MDE, as are traditional
public schools. See MISS. CODE ANN. 37-28-45. Still more, the Charter Authorizer Board is a state agency.
8
A similar provision to the current version of Section 208 was not found in either the 1817 or the 1832
Constitutions.
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Through the years, some provisions of Article VIII have been revised from time to time.
But for nearly 140 years, the fundamental requirements for schools within that system
have been clear: they must be under the general supervision of the State superintendent
and the local supervision of the [district] superintendent, are free from all sectarian
religious control, and ever open to all children within the ages of five and twenty-one
years.

See Pl. Resp. at 7, Docket Entry No. [58] (brackets in the SPLCs brief).

When Otken is quoted correctly, however, it actually reads: general supervision of the State

superintendent and the local supervision of the county superintendent. Otken, 56 Miss. at 765. The

case decision of course reads this way because the Court was interpreting the former version of Article

8 that required a uniform system, with State Superintendent supervision and a Superintendent of

Public Education in each county. See MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. 8, 1, 2, and 4.

But those requirements are no longer in our Constitution.9 In fact, if they werethat is, if this

Court simply were to extrapolate Otkens outdated language and apply it to the present-day version

of Article 8then state funding for JPS and Mississippis municipal school districts (among others)

also would be in jeopardy. This is so because those school systems indisputably are not governed by

a county superintendent.

Yet the lack of control and supervision by a county, or even a local, superintendent is not

fatal to any of these Mississippi schools because the Mississippi Constitution has evolved since the

time of Otken. So, too, has education and educational opportunities in the State. The charter school

legislation is but one example of thisand it is a constitutional one at that.

9
See, e.g., MISS. CONST. art. 8, 204 (allowing the Legislature to abolish the office of the county
superintendent); see also State Defendants Cross-MSJ at pp. 18-19, Docket Entry No. [47] (discussing the changes
to Article 8, 201, 202, and 203).
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State Teachers College v. Morris. The SPLCs narrative on the Mississippi Supreme

Courts decision in State Teachers Coll. v. Morris, 165 Miss. 758, 144 So. 374 (1932) is no better

than the citations to Otken. This is so for at least three reasons.

First, the uniform system of free public schools in the former version of Section 201 was

still in the Mississippi Constitution in 1932 when Morris was decided. Thus, when Morris cited Otken

and discussed the establishment and control of the system of schools at issue, it was interpreting the

former uniformity provision in Section 201.

To be sure, the Morris Court explicitly stated as follows:

In order for a school to be within the system of free public schools required by section
201 of the Constitution, the establishment and control thereof must be vested in the
public officials charged with the duty of establishing and supervising that system of
schools. Otken v. Lamkin, 56 Miss. 758[.]

Id. at 376 (emphasis supplied).

Second, even when Morris discussed purported supervision and control under Section 201, it

held only that the establishment and control thereof must be vested in the public officials charged

with the duty of establishing and supervising that system of schools. See id. It did not set forth any

four-factor test, as incorrectly suggested by the SPLC.

Third, it is undeniable that public charter schools operate under the Authorizer Board, a state

agency which oversees public charter schools and has the power to close them. Accordingly, even

though Morris was reviewing the Constitution from 1932 that contained a uniformity provision, the

decision still appears in line with how the Mississippi Legislature created public charter schools.

Compare MISS. CODE ANN. 37-28-7 (There is created the Mississippi Charter School Authorizer

Board as a state agency with exclusive chartering jurisdiction in the State of Mississippi) with Morris,

144 So. at 376. (establishment and control vested in the public officials charged with the duty of

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establishing and supervising that system of school). The SPLCs reliance on Morris thus misses the

mark in all respects.

B. Public charter schools are free schools pursuant to Section 208 of the Mississippi
Constitution.

Public charter schools easily satisfy Section 208s free school requirement because there is no

tuition charged to attend. See MISS. CODE ANN. 37-28-43(4) (A charter school may not charge

tuition). This should be both the beginning and the end of the Courts constitutional analysis, as

[w]hen interpreting a constitutional provision, [the Court] must enforce its plain language. Johnson

v. Sysco Food Servs., 86 So. 3d 242, 244 (Miss. 2012).

The plain language of Section 208 is as clear as it gets: nor shall any funds be appropriated .

. .to any school that at the time of receiving such appropriation is not conducted as a free school. See

MISS. CONST., art. VIII 208 (emphasis supplied). In this constitutional context, the word free

simply means free. That is, the last clause of Section 208 refers to a school that does not impose an

impermissible financial burden on public education.

Indeed, contrary to the SPLCs paternalistic rhetoric, there is nothing in Mississippis

Constitution requiring that all schools be supervised by a local or county superintendentlet alone

do any cases define the term free as requiring as much. In fact, as previously noted, many of the

States specialty schools are not governed by a county or local superintendent. These schools include:

the Mississippi School of the Arts, see, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. 37-140-5; the Mississippi School for

Math and Science, see, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. 37-139-3; and schools under a state conservatorship,

see, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. 37176, 37-17-13; MISS. CODE ANN. 37-17-17. The SPLC has no

legitimate retort to any of this.10

10
Curiously, the SPLC manufactures a three-part test for so-called state-owned schools that are not subject
to Section 208s limitations. See Resp. to the Associations MSJ at p. 14, Docket Entry No. [59]. For instance, the
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Instead, the SPLC just repeats its demand for this Court to rubber stamp the reasoning of the

Washington Supreme Court, despite admitting that the court there was analyzing a more rigid and

altogether different constitutional provision. See League of Women Voters of Washington v. State, 184

Wash. 2d 393, 402, 355 P.3d 1131, 1136 (2015), as amended on denial of reconsideration (Nov. 19,

2015). For sure, the SPLCs call is not one this Court should answer, as doing so would compel only

absurd results.

As discussed in the opening memorandum, the Washington Supreme Court found the

Washington Constitution to require a school that is common to all children of proper age and

capacity, free, and subject to and under the control of the qualified voters of the school district.

League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 405 (emphasis supplied). Even in the Washington decision,

though, the control of the school and the cost of the school (i.e., that it be free) were distinct

requirements. While the Washington court determined that both are required per Washingtons

constitutional call for a general and uniform system of public schools that includes common

schools, Section 208 of Mississippis Constitution simply requires that the school be free.

Tellingly, but not surprisingly, the SPLC is unable to cite even a single case ever interpreting

the phrase free school as meaning something more than exactly what it says. In fact, aside from the

ill-conceived reliance on Otken and Morris, the SPLCs discussion of Section 208 is quite

anticlimactic. The reason for this is because Section 208s free school phrase is so easy to define.

SPLC maintains that if a school is individually contemplated by either the Constitution or statute, overseen
exclusively at the state level, and does not receive ad valorem tax revenue, then it does not have to satisfy the
requirements of Section 208. Yet this manufactured test honestly concedes most, if not all, of the SPLCs argument.
Public charter schools in Mississippi are individually contemplated by the MCSA, and the schools are overseen
by an Authorizer Board, which is a state agency. See MISS. CODE ANN. 37-28-1, 37-28-9. Further, as to the third
prong, the SPLC simply conflates Section 208 and state funding with a receipt of local tax money, which makes no
sense and otherwise is bereft of any citation to case law or other legal authority.
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To put it simply, Section 208 means what it says. A free school is one that charges no tuition

just like the public charter schools in Mississippi. Consequently, summary judgment to the State

Defendants on the state funding component of the MCSA remains warranted.

CONCLUSION

At bottom, the instant challenge the MCSA is a classic case of one groups disagreement with

the policy behind the enactment of a state statute. But it is not for the plaintiffs or the Court to

question the wisdom of any constitutional declaration of public policy by the legislative body.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 578 So. 2d 644, 647 (Miss. 1991) (quoting Durham v. Durham, 85 So.

2d 807, 809 (Miss. 1956)).

Instead, it is the Plaintiffs burden to prove the Mississippi Charter Schools Act

unconstitutional beyond all reasonable doubt. They have not. The SPLCs motion for summary

judgment thus must be denied, and summary judgment in favor of Governor Bryant and the

Mississippi Department of Education should be entered.

Respectfully submitted this the 10th day of March, 2017.

GOVERNOR PHIL BRYANT AND THE

MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

BY: JIM HOOD, ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

BY: /s/ Krissy C. Nobile

Harold E. Pizzetta, III, MSB # 9752
Krissy Casey Nobile, MSB # 103577
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Post Office Box 220
Jackson, MS 39205
knobi@ago.state.ms.us
hpizz@ago.state.ms.us

Counsel for Governor Phil Bryant and the

Mississippi Department of Education
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Krissy C. Nobile, do hereby certify that I have electronically filed the foregoing document

with the Clerk of the Court using the MEC system, which sent notification to all counsel of record.

This the 10th day of March, 2017.

/s/ Krissy C. Nobile

KRISSY C. NOBILE

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