Letting Go and Holding On

Final Paper for Karma and Free Will in Indian Philosophy

Introduction:
Ethics, Morality, Free Will. These are all topical ideas Im comfortable

with as a student majoring in a traditional Western1 academic philosophy

program. That said, approaching a course on karma, and free will

specifically as it is relevant in the context of an Indian philosophy was

challenging for me. This was not because I had significant trouble grasping

the arguments made in the various philosophic schools covered in the

course, but in my ability to face these ideas on their own grounds, rather

than forcing square pegs into the round hole of Western Philosophy.

Encountering the various schools of philosophy covered in this course my

initial, and ongoing instinct was to parallel them to Western philosophic

ideas, theories, and structures, and it took me a great deal of intellectual

grappling in order to let go of that framing; I dont know that I wholly have.

In a lot of ways this course has followed a narrative of letting go and

holding on for me both personally in my preconceived framing and

contextualizing, and within the very philosophic ideas themselves as they

each approach the idea of liberation. Indian philosophic systems on a whole

attempt to address some of the most deeply salient questions of how the

world at large works, what it means to live life well within that world, and

weigh in importantly on questions of agency and free will. I will begin by

exploring the important philosophic space which karma theory occupies, as

1 Western is here taken to refer to views, philosophies, and ideas characteristically

from/developed within a European context.
well as the significance and consequences that the karmic cycle bears on

Indian philosophic systems as a whole, briefly address critiques of karma

theory as fatalistic and lacking in distinct ethics, and then I will examine

both how liberation from the cycle of karma driven rebirth in the different

schools variously informs and supports free will.

Karma Theory and the Issues of Fatalism and Ethics:

Karma theorya system which posits that souls cycle through a

process of rebirth seeking enlightenment or release from this constant

process of reincarnationis fundamental to Indian philosophies and is, in

many ways, the foundation upon which their more complex and nuanced

elements are grounded. In a particular way, each system is dependent on

the notion of karma, and thus implicitly dharma, because while they each

understand the role of agency, the nature of the universe, and the route to

and state of liberation differently, they are all need the karmic cycle to in

order to make sense of their quest for liberation. If there was no cycle of

rebirth in some form or another, the idea of liberation would become

arbitrary liberation from what? would essentially be the question, since

in a one-shot-only kind of system, death is the harbinger of freedomand

the system would most likely devolve into either a heaven-and-hell kind of

moral dichotomy, or shift towards the existentialist or nihilistic view that we

are nothing, and we create and assign all value existing in the world. This

karmic reality so to speak is present in every philosophic system, and it

seems to universally play this grounding role, though the prominence or

importance of it varies across schools of thought.

Looking at karma more specifically, it is the mechanism upon which the

cycle of rebirth is predicated, it determines a number of important elements

pertaining to ones sequential births. Generally, karma is understood as

critical in determining the circumstances of ones birth, for example as

articulated in the Yoga school: ones karmic residue of a past life plays a

determining role in ones dispositional tendencies for the coming life, as

well as the genus of the body one will be born into, the length of each new

life, and the affective quality which the new life will take oni. Given the

soteriological nature of these systems, it follows logically that karma is

deeply important to individuals, and so then is the acquisition of good and

bad karma. This is traditionally understood as facilitated via doing either

dharma, resulting in good karma, or adharma, resulting in bad karma,

and is accumulated across ones many lives. The most basic formulation of

karma is that good karma moves you closer to a life in which you are best

situated for attaining liberation, and bad karma drags you down or away

from such a state, but the ultimate goal is, counterintuitively, not to become

flush with good karma so as to cancel all ones past bad karma. Rather the

goal is to neutralize ones karma by attaining a state in which one is no

longer subject to the accumulation of karma at all, and has worked through

or burned off all ones past karma. This is the first instance in which a

principle of letting go is deeply integrated within the Indian philosophic

systems. An excellent metaphor for the way karma manifests in an

individuals life is to imagine a bowman, he has just fired an arrow: this is

the karma in play for this life time; he holds an arrow knocked: this is the

karma accumulating in this life which will be active in the future; and the

arrow(s) in his quiver are the karma which was previously accumulated, yet

is inactive in this life. Liberation then, karmically, is when the bowman

reaches to knock his next arrow only to find an empty quiverii2.

There have been a number of attempts to problematize the theory3

karma, most notably that it lends itself to fatalism, and implicit to that, the

system is somehow lacking in structured ethics. Due to the fact that karma

theory lays such an important foundation to the philosophic systems,

especially in light of the soteriological nature and thus power these schools

of thought have in directing the paths of peoples lives, these concerns

ought to be addressed in preparation for examining the various conceptions

of enlightenment. Fatalism is essentially a viewpoint which understands all

events as strongly deterministic, thus eliminating any reason for guiding

ones actions according to any sort of morals, or even for acting at all, given

that any choice seems to be no choice at all. This concern is complicated by

the commonly held belief that the universe is without beginning or point of

creationiii, since this can be interpreted as making the whole concept of

karma pointless without the conception of an original act which sets ones

path in motion or is the initial karmic residue. Part of the response to such a

2It might also entail something like no longer having any stakes in what path the arrow let loose
flies, or in no longer being a bowman as previously experienced/was, but Im not exactly sure
how or what is the right way to formulate that.
3 Theories, more accurately.
concern is implicit within the notion of dharma4. This is because it can be

argued dharma stands in place of a more traditionally conceived systems of

ethics5, this incidentally also holds a reply to secondary concern that the

karmic system is flawed on the very count of lacking in ethics, for while
Hindus handle their problems in a way different from that of the West;
which is to say, without ethics, if by ethics we mean not only reflection upon
good and evil or right and wrong, but also derivation of or justification of
patterns of human conduct with reference to ultimate norms and values,iv
dharma effectively fills the role of a structure around which individuals

organize their lives since to traditional Indians, the role is the important

thing the individual must above all be true to his role, and it is this truth

which matters to the cosmic schemev. Thinking of dharma this way helps to

alleviate the impacts of the more deterministic elements in karma theory by

introducing a means by which individuals seem to act on, or at least

influence, their fates.

The Question of Free Will Contextualized:
The way in which dharma seems to set up an individual to have at

least some sway over their lives even within what may be judged as a fairly

deterministic universe mechanic, invites a discussion of the concept of free

will. I wish to approach this concept and the various ways in which different

systems account for the role of agents as free or independent actors, for out

of this complex nexus between the karmic system and the individuals

search for liberation come particular and complex notions of free will

4Note that dharma can variously be translated as Merit, Duty, Law, Virtue, Morality, Social
order, Right, all of which, while failing to fully translate the meaning, do imply the ways in
which dharma may serve the same social function as an ethical system (Class Slides, 01-09-17).

5Here traditional refers to Western conceptions which use normative structures such as the
deontology of Kant (Will every action as a universalizable maxim), or Mills utility principle
(All actions ought to aim at the greatest good for the greatest number).
which are valuable and interesting. I will discuss the different ideas about

the nature of the universe as it pertains to liberation within three non-

theistic schools of thought: The Skhya school, the Buddhist school, and

the Nyya-Vaieika school; as well as three schools which are, to varying

degrees, theistic: The Advaita Vednta school, the Madhva Vednta school,

and the Kashmir aivism school. These do not nearly comprise all the

schools of philosophy covered across the quarter, but I have selected these

particular ones for a number of reasons. For one, given the scope of this

paper, a comprehensive analysis of all the schools would result in an under

analysis of them all. Second, and more importantly, I find that these in

particular help to draw out the relevant issues I find intriguing and in

general are the ones which have provoked the greatest thought from me.
The Non-Theistic Schools:
Skhya structures the universe as a duality, composed by two

elements6 purusa and prakrti. First to distinguish, there are the purusas,7

understood as the eternal and unchanging consciousness, unmixed or

purevi. This element has five different qualities or attributes to it (1)

saksitva: being a witness; (2) kaivalya: isolation or autonomy; (3)

maadhyasthya: indifference; (4) drastrtva: being a seer; and (5) akartr-

bhava: non-agencyvii. By comparison prakrti is the changeable and

6 For lack of a better word, these two elements have qualities and are described as entangled, and
in these ways incline one to conceive of them like physical substances, but they are also the two
categories which compose the entirety of everything including manifested feelings and
experiences, so it seems wrong to talk about them as such.
7 There are actually multiple purusas, but I will for this discussion refer only to purusathis is
not to deny the plurality of purusas, but for clarity of discussion I am generalizing to an instance
of entanglement of a purusa with prakrti.
temporary, it is seen as the source of feelings of agency, and is composed of

buddhi: the intellect or locust of knowledge; ahamkara: the ego; and manas:

the mindviii. This school engage with the idea of a karmic cycle of rebirth, or

samsara, as produced by the mixing of a purusa with prakrti, causing

entanglement out of which the human experience of agency and choice are

derived. Understanding the nature of reality within this duality of

fundamentals, Skhya then posits that liberation is comprised in ones

successful separation of the impure, changable prakrti from the pure and

unchanging purusa. This school structures their path to liberation around

the enumeration, or analytical distinction of and discrimination between,

the two elements. The school thereby emphasizes a discriminatory knowing

focused on the capacity to discern between the manifest, the unmanifest,

and the knower and in this way reach liberating distinction between

purusa and prakrtiix.

Turning specifically to the conception of liberation and the

consideration of free will on the Skhya viewpoint, one must understand

the nature of the individual. There are three distinct attributes of prakrti:

goodness, energy/passion, and inertia,8 understood to be hierarchically

ranked in their value to individuals, and seen to account for the variation of

types and ways of being that are present in the world. The Skhya school

presents ones pursuit of liberation as striving towards attaining a balance

between these qualities as prerequisite for the ultimate liberating

discrimination to occurx. The idea of the action of discrimination and the

8 Sattva: goodness; rajas: energy/passion; tamas: inertia/dullness.

qualities of energy or passion, essentially the individual experiences of

being an agent, are understood as confusion stemming from the

entanglement of prakrti in purusa, and thus liberation in an important sense

will remove one entirely from the feeling of agency and the idea that one

possesses free will. This is because free will and agent-hood in their basic

sense as causes of actioncould not belong to the eternal, changeless

purusa for purusa can do nothing other than be aware (see)xi. Only

prakrti which brings to the mixture the capacity to participate in the cycle

of rebirthxii, thus Skhya understands liberation as separation of purusa

from prakrti, at which point the prakrti is destroyed,xiii and the

phenomenological experience of possessing free will, agency, or even

independency that stem from it are no longer.

The Buddhist, and specifically, the Madhyamaka Buddhism9, way of

conceiving the world also appears dualistic, given its structuring of the

doctrine of two truths, which seems to see reality as split into two levels,

but it in actuality relies on the doctrine of dependent origination, or the idea

that nowhere and in no way do entities exist which originate from

themselves, from something else, from both, or spontaneously,xiv and it is

upon this that the ontological status of emptiness is groundedxv. This does

not falsify the doctrine of two truths, but is built into the very nature of that

relationship. The two truths consist of the level of the conventional truth,

and the level of the ultimate truth, where the experiential world with which

9Note I will use Buddhist for the rest of the paper, but it is specifically this school to which I
am referring.
we are familiar, characterized by seemingly separate and substantively

existing contents, is all part of the conventional level of truth[thus] it is

erroneous to seek to understand things as they really are (ultimate truth) in

terms of any criteria relating to existence,xvi. The level of the ultimate

truth is the realization of the universe as it truly is: empty, where neither

the status of existence nor non-existence applyxvii. If everything is empty,

then it seems impossible to have agency or free will, but thinking in this

way oversimplifies the Buddhist view point. The experience of agency on the

Buddhist view is only relevant at the level of the conventional truth, and so

while it is true the it is false and/or irrelevant once one obtains liberation

and realizes the ultimate truth, this does not devalue the feeling of agency,

and a specific type of free will, upon which I will elaborate later. In fact, the

Buddhist view is one which takes the conventional truth as necessary to the

realization of the ultimate truth, it is the means by which one discovers this

truthxviii To understand this relationship, I find it helpful to imagine a

proverbial ladder up which one is climbing, this ladder represents the world

of the conventional truthit is concrete and you interact with it in such a

way that you feel yourself to be climbing itbut once you reach the top of

the ladder and step away from it, representing achieving understanding of

the ultimate truth, the ladder ceases to exist for youxix. In this way free will

is to the Buddhist instrumentally rather than intrinsically valuable.

Given this role for free will of the agent, Jay L. Garfield proposes a

specific way by which free will can be interpreted that makes sense of it

from and compatible to a Buddhist perspective in a way which is applicable

on a much larger schema. This is, simply, that he draw a contrast between

free will as metaphysical distinction and as a literary distinctionxx, and

advocates for the latter. Defining a literary understanding of free will as one

in which it is the case that the causes of our behavior to be a part of of the

narrative of our lives, as opposed to being simply part of the vast

uninterpreted milieu in which our lives are led, or bits of narratives that

more properly constitute the lives of others as, metaphysically cast, free

will must be understood asxxi. Garfield justifies this this by understanding

the creation of free will as literary importantly replacing the arbitrary

nature of choice that falls out of a metaphysical distinction, stating for

what do we take responsibility and for what are we assigned responsibility?

Those acts we interpretor which are interpreted for usas our own, as

constituting the basis of imputation of our own identitiesxxii. Here Garfield

is hitting upon the critical characteristic of agency, that is the sense of

authorship and ownership of actions, for in any given scenario there are

numerous different narratives along which they can be understood, and

which one chosen genuinely matters.

Taking Garfields own example of being coerced to jump out of a

window or your family will be killed, there is within this example

many ways we might construct a narrative of this case. In one story I

am the passive victim of your blackmail; seen in that way, what we
read as the causes of my jumping are your actions not mine. Reading
the case this way, agency is assigned to you and not to me. In another
narrative, I make the noble sacrifice in the face of circumstances
beyond my control. Here we explain jumping on the grounds of my
own character and desires, locating agency in my person, not yoursxxiii.
This view is not a magic bandage or cure all for the question of free will, as

Garfield quite clearly articulates, noting that the ways and contexts in which

we choose between competing narratives ought to be difficult and provoke

contemplation, but notes that even with this difficulty we have managed to

avoid being forced to look to a will, to its freedom, or to a metaphysics of

agent causationxxiv. Garfield takes this reinterpretation of the question of

free will as having important implications for the Buddhist path to

liberation, stating that

the path to liberation, seen in the context of of a self that is but a
conceptual imputation, is a path to authorship of a narrative in which
a better self is the protagonistthe self I imagine at the higher stages
of the path is free in ways that the self I construct now is not.xxv
The conception of constantly authoring the narrative which attributes

actions and choices to oneself as towards the better, higher self, could not

more perfectly capture necessary role of facilitation that the conventional

truth plays in the Buddhist journey to enlightenment. It is akin to the

climbing of the ladder where ones conceptual truth is this freedom, a

freedom of authoritya freedom of a conceptually imputed person from

the bars of a self-constructed prison, and ultimately, when you reach the

top of the ladder, when that that freedom is complete, there is simply

nothing left to loosexxvi, you are empty.

The Nyya-Vaieika school understands the universe as falling into what

Sue Hamilton calls a system of pluralistic realism, meaning that it takes as

true the independent reality of each object in the world such that they are

distinct from and independent of our selves.xxvii The focus then of this school

is upon the investigation of that plurality, in order to classify it according to

the different types of entity of which it is comprised.xxviii Given this goal,

Nyya-Vaieika understands liberation more in terms of knowledgefully

understanding and enumerating the categories of substances and qualities

in order to obtain the highest good: enlightenment/liberation.xxix Of the

many independent things investigated in this system, the self is a critical

component, and is understood as possessing distinctly the qualities of

desire, aversion, volition, and moral responsibility [karma] as well as

cognition.xxx Given the Nyya-Vaieika conception of the universe and the

objects and beings within it, they cannot account for a self that is lacking in

qualities, seeing the dualistic view which isolates the self in pure

consciousness as illogical since to be conscious requires that one has the

capacity to undergo cognition, which ultimately entails being a cognitive

agent and as such one must not merely be a passive instrument of some

other causal factor.xxxi

This understanding of the self allows this school to work upon a very

relatable picture of agency and free will, as Nyya-Vaieika takes the true

self as that which receives the karmic results of actions, based in the

perceived metaphysically necessary relationship that unless the individual

selves who experience the fruit of their actions are also the direct bearers of

karmic merit, there would be no appropriate metaphysical tie between

selves, their actions, and the consequences of their actionsxxxii. There is

then a very important way in which Nyya-Vaieika seeks to affirm the

more conventional, phenomenological experience of free will, founded in

three distinct elements of its theory: (i) its categorization of volition and
agency as features of the self and not some faculty like the buddhi or

manas; (ii) its argument that for karma/moral responsibility and the pursuit

of liberation to make sense, the self must be the direct bearer of various

properties which are synthesized in agency; and (iii) its attempt to

undermine the conception of a dualism of knowledge and action by

arguing that knowing is itself an expression of agency.xxxiii In this way Nyya-

Vaieikas metaphysics of personhood stands in the middle of the two

poles occupied by Samkhya [Skhya] and Buddhism, by holding on one

hand that the qualities of the self can undergo change, but do so without

diminishing the immortality of the self or soul as it cycles through

samsara,xxxiv and in this way the school holds a certain friction the self and

the world of the now as we experience it and act upon it, but is vital to

understanding that liberation is attained via knowing as an understanding

of the knowledge of all the independent aspects comprising the universe.

The Theistic Schools:
Advaita Vednta is a non-dualistic school that has structured itself

around the divine being, Brahman, such that everything is Brahman.

Brahman is the ultimate being, and possesses the characteristics of being

eternal, uncreated, indivisible, unchanging, infinite, pure, free,

liberated.xxxv Brahman is the Creator of everything, but importantly it is

understood that the Creator is not independent. He does not have free

choice,xxxvi as this would cause the system to be dualistic, and in this way

contradict its central tenant that everything is Brahman. Rather,

agents are bound due to ignorance ... Due to self-imposed bondage, the

phenomenal self undergoes karmic flux,xxxvii and in this way the

phenomenological experience of being an independent, self-driven, person

is an illusion, it is like a dream. The world we experiencei.e. not Brahman

is an imagination, and this imagination is twofold: at the subjective level,

the self imagines itself as an agent engaged in action and as the locus of

sensation; on the objective level, it constitutes the external reality that

accommodates its own fanciesxxxviii. The subjective and objective levels of

illusion are often likened to a dream or an optical illusion, in the sense that

they seem very realand evoke real emotional and physiological responses,

but upon waking or taking a better look, their true nature is broken or

revealed.
This dream analogy is critical to understanding the role which free

will plays inside the Advaita Vednta school of thought, for in many way the

clearest role for free will that could be seen to exist as anything more than

an false is in this very structuring of the illusory, phenomenological, and

empirical reality since the self is nothing but Brahman in reality, the self is

autonomous in giving rise to the world of commonsense experiencexxxix.

This said, agency is really more of a road block that a tool10 to liberation

since from the Advaita standpoint, the discourse on the autonomy of an

agent is a quest to alter one's own dreams, and the Advaitins are interested

not in changing the dream, but in waking upxl. Importantly, there is no

change in the agent upon achieving liberationagain the dream analogy is

useful: you are still you when you wake up, but the dream which a moment

ago felt so real to you, in which your actions really did seem to matter, is

10 As it might be understood as in say the Buddhist tradition.

now an indisputable illusion. Considering the Advaita Vednta picture of the

world, it makes sense that their route then to this waking is seen as being

via knowledge alone, though there is some concession that actions working

through ones karma and feelings of devotion to Brahman can assist.xli

Madhvas school of Davaita Vednta is a dualistic system, and in this way is

set apart from the other Vedanta schools. Duality does not quite capture

fully the picture of the universe which this school puts forth, rather it posits

a multiplicity of eternal real entities or ultimate differences:11 (1) between

the Lord (isvara) and the finite self (jiva); (2) between the lord and

insentient matter (jada); (3) between the selves and matter; (4) between

distinct selves; and (5) between distinct units of matter.xlii The entirety of

this system hangs upon ones devotion to Visnu, and perhaps counter

intuitively chooses to affirm the individual selves as agents even in

liberation on this very reasoning, because claiming that the self actualizes

this agency even in liberation, [they are] allowing its devotion to God to

manifest eternallyxliii. Despite this affirmation of agency, it is qualified

agency in that, contrary to many formulations which emphasize

independence, the agency of Davaita Vednta is a dependent agency, since

independence is a quality belonging alone to Vishnu, while the individual

selves are eternally subordinate to and dependent on Visnuxliv.

The Davaita Vednta schools perspective on liberation is also fascinatingly

unique. It holds that while dependent beings, individuals are held to be

responsible for good and bad deeds and are punished and rewarded

11Bheda.
accordingly,xlv it is in this way that the karmic cycle plays its role within

this systemwhich is not to affirm the lack of Visnus ultimate control, as

Vishnu can properly be said to be the agent of the cyclical process of the

worldxlvi. The true dependent nature of beings becomes clear in that every

individual is subject to the eternal hierarchical status that forms part of the

selfs inherent nature and largely determines each selfs destiny.xlvii The

different inherent natures are divided into three categories, and it is such

that liberation is only available to the first category, mukti-yogya or those

literally destined for liberation, while the second category sti-yogya or

nitya-sasrins are fated to forever cycle through samsara, but can never

attain liberation, and finally the third category, ha-tamo-yogya are those

individuals whose internal natures leave them destined for hell or lower

birthsxlviii. In addition to this Liberation is only granted by the Grace of

Visnu, which importantly structures the motivation for ones actions or

expression of free will which this system grants. That is to say action

properly has three causes: first, ones destiny as given by which of the three

internal nature one possesses; second, ones karma; and third, ones

volition12, yet as dependent agents, these are all critically under the control

of Vishnu as the ultimate agent.xlix To obtain liberation one must be totally

devoted to Vishnu, a devotion which requires both realization that one may

never achieve liberation, and yet choose to live with the believe that one has

been blessed with the number one nature destined to liberation. In this way,

12 jva-prayatna.
the Davaita Vednta system stiffens the faith to eradicate doubts, for

destined or not, ones liberation is dependent on that total belief. l

Kashmir aivism, while classed as non-dualistic or monistic, for its

underlying principle is that everything is iva, and the whole of the world

and individual experiences is essentially just a thought within ivas headli,

there is an underlying triadism that can be seen as structuring the sources

of all appearance where there is first iva, who creates from his

imagination the world as though independent of himself (whereas it is

always an expression of his will), second akti as the energy through

which this is achieved, and third, Au as the individualized tman who

takes local initiativeslii. This triadism, and Kashmir aivism generally, is

formulated importantly around the grammar of agency. Like the

Grammarians, the school of Kashmir aivism examines the kraka-s13, but

contrary to the Grammarian school which focuses on the ways in which

agency is held in the role in the given sentence,liii aivism attempts to re-

center the importance of the cognitive agent, mover, or source of the

action in any given sentence by stressing the fact that while...all of the

karakas are understood to function in accomplishing the overall action or

process...expressed by the verb. They do this through their own subordinate

processes.liv An example of what is meant here lies in the classic the pot is

cooking rice,lv where yes, grammatically, the agent in this sentence is the

pot, but the entire instance can be understood as cooking, and thus the

13Action Facilitators / Participants.

verb provides the locus for the overall process, and it is, grammatically the

conscious agent who is instigator (prayojaka) of all the subordinate

processes constituting the larger one,lvi thereby it is also the agent who

carries the most importance or power.

The grammatical reflections discussed above are central in Kashmir

aivism for their ideas about liberation, specifically there is a relationship

between liberation and grammatical personsi.e. pronouns I/We, You, and

He/She/It/Theyas they are used to express state of being. On this

formulation, I/We is equivalent to ivaor the self revealed through

Supreme Speech[the] Sovereign ruler; You is equivalent to aktior that

to whom Supreme Speech is revealed to or asit is the personalized

expression; He/She/It (etc.) is equivalent to the Human, the unenlightened,

inert.lvii These assignments are justified on the primacy of each

grammatical persons degree of extensionthat is, You can include He,

She or They, and We can include both You and He, She, or They,lviii where

the widest extension is attributed to iva as a reflection of the concept of

ivas perfect egoity.lix Liberation, freedom from the karmic cycle is then,

on this view, achieved via the recognition of that perfect egoity, such that

one identifies with the I/We of first person, releasing My, or the

misconception that knower & known are differentlx. The Tantric elements of

Kashmir aivism are deeply apart of this processes because of their

reflection of a pursuit of power,lxi and thus formulate the iva conception of

empowered identity.lxii The final goal of liberation is to realize ones shared

identity with the ultimate agent: the perfect and timeless Supreme

Lordlxiii.
Free Will in Letting Go and Holding On:
I will now briefly reconstruct each schools perspective of liberation in

order to examine the role of free will as letting go and holding on. First, the

very concept of liberation requires a notion of release: release from the

karmic cycle, and so theories of liberation and free wills place in it must

therefore represent a sort of final word on attachment to free will. Starting

from the top, Skhya understands liberation as separation of purusa from

prakrti, at which point the prakrti is destroyed,lxiv and the phenomenological

experience of possessing free will, agency, or even independency that stem

from it are no longer. In this way, free will is a false reality, only a product of

contamination of the true, pure, and unchanging agentseerpurusa.

Buddhism sees liberation as reaching the Ultimate Truththat everything is

emptyinstrumentally via the cognition of the Conventional Truth. This

leaves room for free will within the conceptual truth as allowing a specific

type of freedom: a freedom of authoritya freedom of a conceptually

imputed person from the bars of a self-constructed prison, but ultimately,

when you reach the top of the ladder, when that that freedom is complete,

there is simply nothing left to looselxv, you are empty and must let go of

even this narrative variety of free will. Nyya-Vaieika, sees knowing as an

expression of agency such that liberation is attained via knowing as an

understanding of the knowledge of all the independent aspects comprising

the universe, and so liberation is itself an action as awareness involves a

kind of activity, something that must be performed by the very being who is

aware,lxvi thus Nyya-Vaieika expresses a preservation, or holding on to

of, free will in this way. Advaita Vednta posits the realization that

everything is Brahman, the waking from the dream where one acts as an

agent possessing free will, and in the liberated state becomes wholly

Brahman in a way almost akin to the emptiness of Buddhism, and such a

statethe very waking is a relinquishing of free will. Davaita Vednta

presents liberation as achieved via the grace of god. This requires a total

belief in Vishnu and actions of devotion toward Vishnu, despite the pre-

determined capacity for liberation housed in ones nature. Davaita Vednta,

in affirming individual selves as agents even in liberation, seems to hold on

to free will so as to always manifest ones devotion to God, but that devotion

in itself seems to be a letting go of free will replaced by a total devotion

even in the face of the unknowable. Finally, the Kashmir aivism school

identifies liberation as via identification with iva, achieved via the

recognition of that perfect egoity, such that one identifies with the I/We of

first person, releasing My, or the misconception that knower & known are

differentin this way Kashmir aivism requires the letting go of any

conception of will intrinsic to the individual, and only in existence as ivas

will.
The majority of the schools posit the ultimate falsity of free will, and

their means to liberation requires the release of ones attachment to

feelings of agency or independent free willthe notable exception being the

Nyya-Vaieika school. I am deeply attracted to the idea that it is vital for

attaining the ones ultimate happiness in life, be that formulated as

liberation or not, there must be a way in which one embraces the need for

and the release of free will. Sam Harris, in his exploration of free will which

seeks to establish its factual non-existence, states that

There are scientific, ethical, and practical truths appropriate to every
occasion... There is no contradiction here. Our interests in life are not
always served by viewing people and things as collections of atomsbut
this doesnt negate the truth or utility of physics.lxvii
It is this contextualizing of the relevance of the role of free will in any given

context that I find most valuable and relevant, butjust as one must release

free will for true liberationholding this mindset requires one to release

attachment to a ultimate truth of free will in every situation.

Bibliography:
Bryant, Edwin F., and Matthew R. Dasti, eds. Free Will, Agency, and
Selfhood in Indian
Philosophy. New York: Oxford UP, 2014. Print.

Includes: Cardona, Datsi, Garfield, Lawrence, and Timalsina.

Creel, Austin B. Dharma as an Ethical Category Relating to Freedom and

Responsibility. Philosophy
East and West. 22.2 (1972: 155-68. JSTORE [JSTORE]. Web. 29 Jan.
2017.

Hamilton, Sue. Indian Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford

UP, 2001. Print.

Harris, Sam. Free Will. New York: Free. 2012. Print.

Matilal, Bimal K. 1992. "A Note on amkara's Theodicy." Journal of Indian

Philosophy 20 (4): 363-
76.
Prem Pahlajrai. Karma and Free Will in Indian Philosophy. Class Lectures.
Jan 4th-March 8th.

Potter, Karl. 2001. "How Many Karma Theories Are There?" Journal of
Indian
Philosophy 29 (1-2): 231-9.

Potter, Karl. 1980. "The Karma Theory and Its Interpretation in Some Indian
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Traditions, Wendy Doniger, ed. 241-67. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
i Potter, 1980; p.243-4.
ii T.M.P. Mahadevans quiver of arrows analogy.
iii Matilal, 1992; p.365.
ivCreel, 1972; p.166.
v Creel, p.158
vi Prem Pahlajrai. January 25th, 2017. Lecture.
vii Prem Pahlajrai. January 25th, 2017. Lecture.
viii Pahlajrai. January 25th, 2017. Lecture.
ix Hamilton, 2001; p.113
x Hamilton, p.115
xi Edwin Bryant, 2014, p. 19, 22
xii Hamilton, p.116
xiiiPrem Pahlajrai. January 25th, 2017. Lecture.
xiv Hamilton, p.95.
xvHamilton, p. 96.
xviHamilton, p. 96-7.
xvii Hamilton, p. 96.
xviii Prem Pahlajrai, Class Slides/Lecture, 02-08-17.
xix Prem Pahlajrai, Class Slides/Lecture, 02-08-17.
xx Garfield, 2014; 180.
xxi Garfield, 2014; 180.
xxii Garfield, 2014; 180.
xxiiiGarfield, 2014; 181.
xxivGarfield, 2014; 181.
xxv Garfield, 2014; 182.
xxvi Garfield, 2014; 183.
xxviiHamilton, p. 70.
xxviiiHamilton, p.71.
xxix Hamilton, p.78
xxx Datsi, 2014; p.112.
xxxi Datsi, p. 120, 124.
xxxii Datsi, p.125.
xxxiii Datsi, p.134.
xxxiv Datsi, p.135.
xxxv Prem Pahlajrai, Class Slides/Lecture, 02-27-17.
xxxvi Matilal, 1992; 365
xxxvii Timalsina, 2014; p.190.
xxxviii Timalsina, p.190.
xxxix Timalsina, 193.
xl Timalsina, 197.
xliPrem Pahlajrai, Class Slides/Lecture, 02-27-17.
xliiBuchta, 2014; p. 255.
xliii Buchta, p. 257.
xliv Buchta, p. 257.
xlv Buchta, p. 257.
xlvi Buchta, p. 257.
xlvii Buchta, p. 256.
xlviiiPrem Pahlajrai, Class Slides/Lecture, 04-06-17.
xlixPrem Pahlajrai, Class Slides/Lecture, 04-06-17.
lPotter 1963; p.251.
liPrem Pahlajrai, Class Slides/Lecture, 04-08-17.
liiPrem Pahlajrai, Class Slides/Lecture, 04-08-17.
liii Cardona, 2014; p.88.
liv Lawrence, 2014; p.216
lv Cardona, 2014; p.88.
lvi Lawrence, p.216.
lvii Prem Pahlajrai, Class Slides/Lecture, 04-08-17.
lviii Lawrence, p.221.
lix Lawrence, p.221.
lx Prem Pahlajrai, Class Slides/Lecture, 04-08-17.
lxi Lawrence, p.211.
lxii Lawrence, p.222.
lxiii Lawrence, p.223.
lxivPrem Pahlajrai. January 25th, 2017. Lecture.
lxv Garfield, 2014; 183.
lxviDasti, p.133.
lxvii Harris, 2012; p.46.