vs.

HON. SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional TrialCourt,

First Judicial Region, Dagupan City and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 12510: August 3, 2000FACTS: Alejandra Pablo was convicted of a violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Sheapplied for probation and was later
denied.ISSUE: Whether or not the he should be denied probation on the ground
of disqualification from probation under Section 9 of P.D. 968.HELD: The Court ruled
that under Section 9 of the Probation Law, P.D. 968, the followingoffenders cannot
avail of the benefits of probation:a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term
of imprisonment of more than six years;b) those convicted of subversion or any
crime against the national security or the public order;
c) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or fine of not less than two
hundred pesos
;d) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of this
Decree; ande) those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisions of this Decreebecame applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.The
National Probation Office denied petitioners application for probation underSection 9
paragraph (c) P.D. 968 because a prior conviction was entered against the
petitioneron June 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 94-0199, penalizing her with a fine of
P4,648.00; therebyplacing her within the ambit of disqualification from probation
under Section 9 paragraph (c) of P.D. 968.It is a basic rule of statutory construction
that if a statute is clear, plain and free fromambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without any interpretation. Not onlythat; in the matter of
interpretation of laws on probation, the Court has pronounced that "the
policy of liberality of probation statutes cannot prevail against the categorical
provisions of thelaw."Section 9 paragraph (c) is in clear and plain language, to the
effect that a person whowas previously convicted by final judgment of an offense
punishable by imprisonment of notless than one month and one day and/or a fine of
not less than two hundred pesos, isdisqualified from applying for probation. This
provision of law is definitive and unqualified.There is nothing in Section 9, paragraph
(c) which qualifies "previous conviction" as referring toa conviction for a crime which
is entirely different from that for which the offender is applyingfor probation or a
crime which arose out of a single act or transaction as petitioner would havethe
court to understand.It is well-settled that the probation law is not a
penal statute; and therefore, theprinciple of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. And
when the meaning is clearly discerniblefrom the language of the statute, there is
no room for construction or interpretation.
EFREN SALVAN y PRESENES
vs
.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 153845. September 11, 2003FACTS: Efren Salvan, a bus driver, was
convicted of reckless imprudence resulting inhomicide for the death of John Barry
Abogado. He filed a motion for partial reconsideration,which was later denied, and
an application for probation. He then filed a notice of partialappeal which was denied
for the reason that the application for probation is deemed under thelaw to be a
waiver of the right to appeal.ISSUE: Whether or not the denial or approval of
probation is appealable.HELD: We recall that the law which governs all matters
relating to probation isPresidential Decree No. 968, commonly known as the
Probation Law, as amended byPresidential Decree No. 1990. The provision of the law
that is pertinent to the currentcontroversy reads:SEC. 4.
Grant of Probation.
Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after itshall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant
withinthe period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and
place thedefendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions
as it may deembest;
Provided
, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if thedefendant
has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.Probation may be granted
whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or afine only. An application
for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of theapplication shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.An order granting or denying probation shall
not be appealable.

Relying solely on the letter of the law, the filing of the application for probation
shouldbe deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. However, in the case of
Budlong v. Apalisok
, we hadoccasion to rule that the above provision of the Probation Law clearly
provides only for thesuspension of the sentence imposed on the accused by virtue of
his application for probation. Ithas absolutely no bearing on civil liability.This ruling
was clarified in
Salgado v. Court of Appeals
, wherein we ruled that, althoughthe execution of sentence is suspended by the
grant of probation, it does not follow that thecivil liability of the offender, if any, is
extinguished.The Probation Law prohibits a judge from entertaining or granting an
application forprobation if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the
judgment of conviction
. The fact of conviction most certainly refers to the
criminal
liability of the accused, as a result of a findingmade by a judge that he is guilty of
the crime charged. However, the appeal in this caseinvolved only the
civil
aspect of the trial courts judgment. Hence, we see no reason why,between the
conjoined criminal and civil aspects of a felony, a line cannot be drawn
markingwhere the one springs from the other. Even if by definition civil liability
ex delicto
arises fromthe criminal act, once its existence is established, it should be treated
separately from thecriminal liability. Indeed there is even categorical statutory basis
to state that it subsists despitethe extinguishment of the criminal liability from
which it arose. This was the finding in
Budlongv. Apalisok
and
Salgado v. Court of Appeals
.Thus, we rule that, in an appeal from a judgment of conviction, the criminal liability
andthe civil liability
ex delicto
should be considered independently, each with its owncorresponding effects. In the
present case, the law that bars an appeal of the judgment of conviction, as well as
its corresponding criminal liability, should not bar an appeal of the civilaspect of the
same judgment