1. El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs.

Palanca

Facts:
Engracio Palanca Tanquin yeng executed a mortgage upon various parcels of real
property situated in Manila in favor of El Banco Espanol-Filipino as security for a loan.
After he executed the mortgage, Engracio returned to China and never went back to RP
until he eventually died. Because of non-payment, the bank filed a suit to foreclose the
mortgage (at this point Engracio was still alive). Since defendant was a non-resident, the
bank gave notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of
the summons to the defendants last known address, which was in China. However, it was
not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, the CFI
proceeded with the case and a judgment by default was rendered in favor of the bank.
Mortgage was foreclosed and the properties were sold in a public auction. After 7 years,
Vicente Palanca, as administrator of Engracios estate, filed a motion to set aside the
judgment by default and to vacate all subsequent proceedings on the ground that the
judgment rendered was void since the court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.

Issue:
WON the CFI acquired jurisdiction over the defendant.

Ruling:
YES. Tanquin yeng is a non-resident and having refused to appear in court voluntarily,
the court never acquired jurisdiction over him. This is, however, not essential since the
foreclosure of mortgage is an action quasi in rem and what is essential is the courts
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the property is based on the following:

(1) That the property is located within the district;

(2) That the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an obligation
fixed upon it by the mortgage; and
(3) That the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into custody, if
necessary, and expose it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. And
since jurisdiction is exclusively over property, the relief granted by the court must be
limited only to that which can been forced against the property itself.

Therefore, whatever may be the effect in other respects of the failure of the Clerk of the
Court to mail the proper papers to the defendant in Amoy, China, such irregularity could
impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court.

2. anuran vs aquino
3. johnlo trading v flores
4. caeda vs. ca

Facts:

Gueson for value received, executed a promissory note in favor of Caneda, promising to
pay monthly installments with interest per annum. That to secure the obligation, he
executed a chattel mortgage and used a Toyota Jiffy jeep as collateral; that it is
expressly provided for in the promissory note that in case of default in any
installment would deem that whole obligation demandable. This promissory note was
later assigned to FNCB.
Gueson then defaulted in his obligation and had an outstanding balance. Despite
demands on Gueson, he failed and refused to pay. This prompted FNCB to file an
action for replevin and sum of money, and in the alternative, prayed for the
payment of the outstanding balance plus interest. Gueson in his answer alleged that
he was just an accommodation party in favor of Caneda. This was denied by Caneda.
The trial court held that Gueson was indeed an accommodation party in favor of
Caneda; that there was a novation in the form of substitution of debtors when Caneda
executed the undertaking assuming the liability of Gueson in favor of FNCB; that the
phrase with recourse to Gueson in case of default found in the undertaking was
inserted only after Caneda and FNCB had already signed the undertaking and
without the knowledge of Gueson and that Caneda was in bad faith when it tried to
evade payment of a justly-secured legal obligation.

Issue:
WON accommodation of party is allowed.

Ruling:
As to the merits of the case, it is undisputed that Gueson executed a promissory
note in favor of Caneda, secured by a chattel mortgage on a Toyota Jiffy jeep as
collateral; which promissory note and chattel mortgage was assigned by Caneda in favor
of FNCB evidently to secure his obligation with said company, with the knowledge
and consent of Gueson.
As between Gueson and Caneda, it is obvious that whether private agreement
between them is binding on them alone and not on FNCB whose only concern in the
whole transaction is the repayment of the loan it has extended. As regards FNCB, Caneda
is the real debtor of the company and Gueson is only an accommodation party of
Caneda. The trial court held that there was novation as there was substitution of
debtors when Caneda executed the undertaking. But the CA is correct, by saying
that there was no novation. Novation is never presumed. It must be explicitly
stated. Caneda merely confirmed that he was the real debtor of FNCB in the
undertaking signed, while Gueson merely accommodated Caneda in signing the
promissory note and executing the chattel mortgage.
Thus, it has been ruled that one who signs as maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser, without
receiving value therefore, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other
person is liable to the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding the
fact that such holder at the time of the taking the instrument knew him to be
only an accommodation party. Nonetheless, after paying the holder, he is entitled
to obtain reimbursement from the party accommodated.

Likewise, it is no defense to state that Caeda and Gueson didn't receive any value for
the promissory note executed, both claiming to be accommodation parties. A
third person advances the face value of the note to the accommodated party at
the time of the creation of the note,
the consideration for the note as regards the maker is the money advanced to the
accommodated party, and it cannot be said that the note is lacking in consideration as
to the accommodating party just because he himself received some of the money. It
is enough that the value given for the note
at the time of its creation.

5. gomez v. ca

Facts:
A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that 12 parcels of land belonged to
one Consolacion Gomez. Consolacion later died and the 12 parcels of land were inherited
by Jose Gomez et al her heirs. The heirs agreed to divide the property among them.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the trial
court issued an order of general default. On August 5, 1981, the court rendered its
decision adjudicating the subject lots in Gomez et als favor. The decision became final
and executory hence the court directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office
(GLRO) to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated.
GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and petitioned for its setting aside.
He discovered that the 12 parcels of land were formerly part of a titled land which was
already granted by homestead patent in 1929. Under the law, land already granted by
homestead patent can no longer be the subject of another registration. The lower court
granted Silverios recommendation.
Gomez et al invoked Sec. 30 and 32 of PD 1529 (Land Registration Act) which provides
that after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an
order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of
registration and certificate of title. That once the judgment becomes final and executory
under Sec 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course.

Issue:
Whether or not to set aside the lower courts initial ruling on approving the adjudication
even after it had became final and executory.
Ruling:
Yes. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land
registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until
after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. The
Supreme Court has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land
Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed
from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in
the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the
court rendering it.

6.
7
8.VELAYO-FONG V. SPOUSES VELAYO

Facts:
Spouses Raymond and Maria Hedy Velayo filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against
Velayo-Fong. In the complaint, Spouses Velayo alleged that Velayo-Fong was a resident of Honolulu,
Hawaii, USA. Since Velayo-Fong was a non-resident and not found in the Philippines, Spouses Velayo-
Fong prayed for a writ to attach Velayo-Fong's properties found inthe Philippines.

However, before the application for the writ can be acted upon by the RTC, Spouses Velayo filed an
Urgent Motion praying that the summons be served toVelayo-Fong at her Two Condominium Suites.
One at Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City and another, at Burgos Street, T. Towers Condominium, Makati.
Subsequently, the RTC granted the said motion. Then, the Process Server indicated on his Officers
Return that after several failed attempts to serve the copy of summons and complaints issued at the given
addresses of Velayo-Fong, finally, the Process Server was able to serve personally the summons together
with the copy of the complaint upon Velayo-Fong, not at her two addresses but at the lobby of a hotel,
right in the presence of a lobby counter personnel but Velayo-Fong refused to sign in receipt thereof.

Later, the RTC in its Order declared Velayo-Fong in default for failure to file an answer. Velayo-Fong,
upon knowing the order of the RTC, filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default claiming that she was
prevented from filing a responsive pleading and defending herself against respondents' complaint
because of fraud, accident or mistake; that contrary to the Officer's Return, no summons wasserved upon
her; that she has valid and meritorious defenses to refute respondents' material allegations.

The RTC denied the Motion and CA affirmed RTCs order. Now, Velayo-Fong questioned the propriety
and validity of the service of summons made upon her as she did not remember having been served with
summons but remembers that a man hurled some papers at her while she was entering the elevator and,
not knowing what the papers were all about, she threw back the papers to the man before the elevator
closed; that she has a valid and meritorious defense to refute the material allegations of
respondents' complaint. She also argued that the summons should have been served through
extraterritorial service since she is a non-resident.
Issues:
1. How may service of summons be effected on a non-resident?
2. WON there was a valid service of summons on Velayo-Fong.

Ruling:

1.Under Sec. 17, Rule 14, when the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country,
summons may be served extraterritorially. This kind of service of summons applies only where the
action is in rem because in in remand quasi in rem actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the
res. Where the action is in personam and when the defendant is a non-resident, personal service of
summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. This cannot be
done, however, if the defendant is not physically present in the country, and thus, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.

In the present case, Spouses Velayo's cause of action and their prayer that actual and moral damages, plus
attorney's fees, be awarded in their favor affect the parties alone, not the whole world. Any judgment
therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. Thus, it is an action in personam. As such,
personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over their persons. Although in the complaint, Velayo-Fong was alleged to be a non-resident who is not
found in the Philippines for which reason the Spouses first prayed that a writ of preliminary attachment
be issued against her properties within the Philippines to confer jurisdiction upon the RTC. However, the
spouses did not pursue its application for said writ when Velayo-Fong was subsequently found physically
present in the Philippines and personal service of summons was effected on her.

2. A process server's certificate of service is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out in the certificate.
Between the claims of non-receipt of summons by a party against the assertion of an official whose duty
is to send notices, the latter assertion is secured by the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed.

To overcome the presumption of regularity of performance of official functions in favor of such Officer's
Return, the evidence against it must be clear and convincing. In this case, Velayo-Fong failed to come
forward with the requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the presumption of regularity of performance
on the part of the process server stands.

9.
10. Manotoc v. Court of Appeals 499 SCRA 21

Facts:
Mrs. Agapita Trajano sought the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the US
District Court of Hawaii against Ma. Imelda M. Manotoc (Imee Marcos) for the wrongful
death of Mr. Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence in the Philippines
allegedly working for Manotoc.The RTC issued summons for Manotoc addressed at
Alexandra Homes, Pasig. It was served on a Macky dela Cruz described as a caretaker of
her unit. Manotoc failed to file her answer and was declared in default. On October 1993,
manotoc filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person,
stating that she is not a resident of the said condo and that she does not hold office there,
as well as that Macky dela Cruz is not her representative or employee. Thus no valid
service was made. Further, she states that she is a resident of Singapore. On October
1994, the RTC denied the motion. On December 1994, denied her MR for lack of merit.
Manotoc filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA on January 1995, that
was denied on March 1997, and the MR denied on April 1997. The CA ruled that:

1) As per findings of the trial court, the residence of Manotoc was indeed atAlexandra
Homes.

2)The disembarkation/embarkation cord and certification were hearsay. It rejected a proof

of her residency in Singapore based on her passport in which two pages were withheld.

Issue:
Whether there was valid substituted service.

Ruling:
No. In actions strictly in perosnam jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
mandatory and can be complied with valid service of summons

If defendant cannot be served, for excusable reason, within a reasonable time, substituted
service can be resorted to.It is extraordinary in character and a derogation of the usual
method of service thus rules for such must be faithfully complied with. The requirements
of valid substituted service if there is impossibility of prompt personal service which is
15-30 days for the sheriff are:
1) By leaving copies of summons at defendants residence with a person of suitable age
and discretion residing therein or by leaving copies at the defendants office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge.
2) The sheriff must narrate in specific details how service in person became impossible.
3) The attempt must be extraordinary and at least three times. The person of suitable age
and discretion must be at least 18 years old, able to read the summons written in English,
and must be with confidential relation to defendant. A competent person in charge can be
the president or manager. The substituted service was invalid because the sheriff did not
comply with the requirements. Macky dela Cruz was not a representative of Manotoc.
Therefore, since there was no valid service of summons, there was no jurisdiction
acquired. The RTCs decision is null and void.

31. Tiu v. middleton, 310 scra 580,586

Facts: Silvestre Tiu assails two Orders, both dated August 3, 1998, rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City (Branch 14) in Civil Case No. 4516-14-28. The
first Order, which was issued in open court, reads:
Considering the written arguments of both parties herein, the Court finds that the witness
of defendant Silvestre Tiu, Ms. Antonia Tiu, who is the aunt of the defendant, whose
name was not disclosed in the pre-trial brief is ordered excluded pursuant to the
provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure wherein it is required that all names of
witnesses must be stated in the Pre-Trial Brief. The second Order denied reconsideration.

The facts are undisputed. The present Petition arose from a Complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession of real property, accounting and damages filed against herein
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City.

Before the commencement of trial, the court a quo sent a Notice of Pre-trial Conference,
stating in part: The parties are WARNED that witnesses whose names and addresses are
not submitted at the pre-trial may not be allowed to testify at the trial, and documents not
marked as exhibits at the pre-trial, except those not then available or existing, may be
barred admission in evidence

In his Pre-trial Brief, petitioner averred that he would be presenting six witnesses, but he
did not name them. After the pre-trial conference, the court a quo issued a Pre-trial Order
stating that the petitioner would present six witnesses and specifying the hearing dates for
the said purpose.

Trial ensued, and herein respondents, as plaintiffs in the case below, presented their
witnesses in due course. When his turn came, petitioner called Antonia Tiu as his first
witness. Citing Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Court, respondents objected,
arguing that the witness could not be allowed to testify because petitioner had failed to
name her in his Pre-trial Brief. Sustaining respondents, the lower court then issued its
assailed Orders.

Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law. On petitioners Motion, this
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the lower court from proceeding
with the case until further notice.

Issues:
1. Whether or not it is still proper to question the deficiency of ones pre-trial brief on a
technical matter after the pre-trial conference has long been terminated, the Pre-Trial
Order issued, and the question interposed for the first time in the middle of a trial on the
merits.

2. Whether or not the trial court could with propriety inhibit a witness from assuming the
witness stand purely on the basis that his name is not listed where there is neither warning
nor injunction in its Pre-Trial Order.

3. Whether or not the trial court may ban with propriety an unlisted witness in the
absence of a specific law supporting such order.
4. Whether or not the higher consideration of due process should yield to a procedural
technicality.

5. Whether or not the petitioners can make an unnamed witness to testify.

Ruling:

In ruling that Antonia Tiu could not be presented as a witness, the trial court ratiocinated:
The plaintiffs counsels, Atty. Ricardo Lumantas and Atty. Benjamin Galindo, had cited
authorities that said witness, Ms. Antonia Tiu, must be barred as a witness because her
name was not included in the pre-trial brief. The plaintiffs cited Sec. 6 of Rule 18, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it
was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964
Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. Hailed as the most important procedural
innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, pre-trial seeks to achieve the
following:

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of

dispute resolution;

(b) The simplification of the issues;

(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;

(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to

avoid unnecessary proof;

(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;

(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;

(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of

dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;

(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and

(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.

Hence, the provision in the Pre-trial Order allowing petitioner to present six
witnesses shall control the subsequent course of action. The court a quo proceeded with
the trial without modifying the Order. In the same vein, respondents did not challenge it
before the trial. Neither did they invoke the power of the trial court to compel the
petitioner to submit the names of his witnesses and summaries of their testimonies. By
their silence, respondents acquiesced to the Pre-trial Order allowing the presentation of
petitioners unnamed witnesses. Modifying a pre-trial order during the trial or, worse,
when the defendant is about to present witnesses will indubitably result in manifest
injustice. This could not have been the intention of the Rules.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the
two assailed Orders, dated August 3, 1998, issued by the RTC Branch 14, Oroquieta City,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court
is hereby lifted and the trial court is ORDERED to proceed with the hearing and to allow
petitioner to present his six witnesses. No pronouncement as to costs.