3/8/2017 VictoryLinervsGammad:159636:November25,2004:J.

YnaresSantiago:FirstDivision:Decision

FIRSTDIVISION

[G.R.No.159636.November25,2004]

VICTORY LINER, INC., petitioner, vs. ROSALITO GAMMAD, APRIL ROSSAN P.

GAMMAD, ROI ROZANO P. GAMMAD and DIANA FRANCES P. GAMMAD,
respondents.

DECISION
YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:

[1]
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the April 11, 2003 decision of the Court of
[2]
AppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.63290whichaffirmedwithmodificationtheNovember6,1998decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 5 finding petitioner Victory Liner, Inc.
liableforbreachofcontractofcarriageinCivilCaseNo.5023.
The facts as testified by respondent Rosalito Gammad show that on March 14, 1996, his wife
[3]
Marie Grace PagulayanGammad, was on board an airconditioned Victory Liner bus bound for
Tuguegarao,CagayanfromManila.Atabout3:00a.m.,thebuswhilerunningatahighspeedfellona
ravinesomewhereinBarangayBaliling,Sta.Fe,NuevaVizcaya,whichresultedinthedeathofMarie
[4]
Graceandphysicalinjuriestootherpassengers.
[5]
OnMay14,1996,respondentheirsofthedeceasedfiledacomplaint fordamagesarisingfrom
[6]
culpacontractualagainstpetitioner.Initsanswer, thepetitionerclaimedthattheincidentwaspurely
accidentalandthatithasalwaysexercisedextraordinarydiligenceinits50yearsofoperation.
[7] [8]
Afterseveralresettings, pretrialwassetonApril10,1997. Forfailuretoappearonthesaid
[9] [10]
date, petitioner was declared as in default. However, on petitioners motion to lift the order of
[11]
default,thesamewasgrantedbythetrialcourt.
AtthepretrialonMay6,1997,petitionerdidnotwanttoadmittheproposedstipulationthatthe
deceasedwasapassengeroftheVictoryLinerBuswhichfellontheravineandthatshewasissued
PassengerTicketNo.977785.Respondents,fortheirpart,didnotacceptpetitionersproposaltopay
[12]
P50,000.00.
After respondent Rosalito Gammad completed his direct testimony, crossexamination was
[13] [14]
scheduledforNovember17,1997 butmovedtoDecember8,1997, becausethepartiesandthe
counselfailedtoappear.OnDecember8,1997,counselofpetitionerwasabsentdespiteduenotice
[15]
andwasdeemedtohavewaivedrighttocrossexaminerespondentRosalito.
[16]
Petitioners motion to reset the presentation of its evidence to March 25, 1998 was granted.
[17]
However, on March 24, 1998, the counsel of petitioner sent the court a telegram requesting
postponementbutthetelegramwasreceivedbythetrialcourtonMarch25,1998,afterithadissued
[18]
anorderconsideringthecasesubmittedfordecisionforfailureofpetitionerandcounseltoappear.
OnNovember6,1998,thetrialcourtrendereditsdecisioninfavorofrespondents,thedispositive
portionofwhichreads:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsideredandintheinterestofjustice,judgmentisherebyrenderedinfavorofthe
plaintiffsandagainstthedefendantVictoryLiner,Incorporated,orderingthelattertopaythefollowing:

1.ActualDamagesP122,000.00
2.DeathIndemnity50,000.00
3.ExemplaryandMoralDamages400,000.00
4.CompensatoryDamages1,500,000.00
5.AttorneysFees10%ofthetotalamountgranted
6.CostoftheSuit.
[19]
SOORDERED.

On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with
modificationasfollows:

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[T]heDecisiondated06November1998isherebyMODIFIEDtoreflectthatthefollowingareherebyadjudged
infavorofplaintiffsappellees:

1.ActualDamagesintheamountofP88,270.00

2.CompensatoryDamagesintheamountofP1,135,536,10

3.MoralandExemplaryDamagesintheamountofP400,000.00and

4.Attorneysfeesequivalentto10%ofthesumoftheactual,compensatory,moral,andexemplary
damageshereinadjudged.

ThecourtaquosjudgmentofthecostofthesuitagainstdefendantappellantisherebyAFFIRMED.
[20]
SOORDERED.

Represented by a new counsel, petitioner on May 21, 2003 filed a motion for reconsideration
praying that the case be remanded to the trial court for cross examination of respondents witness
[21]
and for the presentation of its evidence or in the alternative, dismiss the respondents complaint.
[22]
InvokingAPEXMining,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals, petitionerargues,interalia,thatthedecisionofthe
trial court should be set aside because the negligence of its former counsel, Atty. Antonio B.
Paguirigan,infailingtoappearatthescheduledhearingsandmoveforreconsiderationoftheorders
declaring petitioner to have waived the right to crossexamine respondents witness and right to
presentevidence,deprivedpetitionerofitsdayincourt.
[23]
OnAugust21,2003,theCourtofAppealsdeniedpetitionersmotionforreconsideration.
Hence,thispetitionforreviewprincipallybasedonthefactthatthemistakeorgrossnegligenceof
itscounseldeprivedpetitionerofdueprocessoflaw.Petitioneralsoarguesthatthetrialcourtsaward
ofdamageswerewithoutbasisandshouldbedeleted.
Theissuesforresolutionare:(1)whetherpetitionerscounselwasguiltyofgrossnegligence(2)
whetherpetitionershouldbeheldliableforbreachofcontractofcarriageand(3)whethertheaward
ofdamageswasproper.
Itissettledthatthenegligenceofcounselbindstheclient.Thisisbasedontherulethatanyact
performedbyacounselwithinthescopeofhisgeneralorimpliedauthorityisregardedasanactof
his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of counsel may result in the rendition of an
unfavorablejudgmentagainsttheclient.However,theapplicationofthegeneralruletoagivencase
should be looked into and adopted according to the surrounding circumstances obtaining. Thus,
exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the court in cases where reckless or gross
negligenceofcounseldeprivestheclientofdueprocessoflaw,orwhenitsapplicationwillresultin
outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property or where the interests of justice so require, and
accord relief to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyers gross or palpable mistake or
[24]
negligence.
The exceptions, however, are not present in this case. The record shows that Atty. Paguirigan
filed an Answer and Pretrial Brief for petitioner. Although initially declared as in default, Atty.
Paguirigan successfully moved for the setting aside of the order of default. In fact, petitioner was
represented by Atty. Paguirigan at the pretrial who proposed settlement for P50,000.00. Although
Atty. Paguirigan failed to file motions for reconsideration of the orders declaring petitioner to have
waived the right to crossexamine respondents witness and to present evidence, he nevertheless,
filed a timely appeal with the Court of Appeals assailing the decision of the trial court. Hence,
petitionersclaimthatitwasdenieddueprocesslacksbasis.
Petitionertooisnotentirelyblameless.Priortotheissuanceoftheorderdeclaringitasindefault
[25] [26]
fornotappearingatthepretrial,threenotices(datedOctober23,1996, January30,1997, and
[27]
March 26, 1997, ) requiring attendance at the pretrial were sent and duly received by petitioner.
However, it was only on April 27, 1997, after the issuance of theApril 10, 1997 order of default for
failure to appear at the pretrial when petitioner, through its finance and administrative manager,
[28]
executedaspecialpowerofattorney authorizingAtty.Paguiriganoranymemberofhislawfirmto
representpetitioneratthepretrial.Petitionerisguilty,attheleast,ofcontributorynegligenceandfault
cannotbeimputedsolelyonpreviouscounsel.
ThecaseofAPEXMining,Inc.,invoked by petitioner is not on all fours with the case at bar. In
APEX,thenegligentcounselnotonlyallowedtheadversedecisionagainsthisclienttobecomefinal
andexecutory,butdeliberatelymisrepresentedintheprogressreportthatthecasewasstillpending
[29]
withtheCourtofAppealswhenthesamewasdismissed16monthsago. Thesecircumstancesare
absentinthiscasebecauseAtty.Paguirigantimelyfiledanappealfromthedecisionofthetrialcourt
withtheCourtofAppeals.

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[30]
InGoldLineTransit,Inc.v.Ramos, theCourtwassimilarlyconfrontedwiththeissueofwhether
ornottheclientshouldbeartheadverseconsequencesofitscounselsnegligence.Inthatcase,Gold
Line Transit, Inc. (Gold Line) and its lawyer failed to appear at the pretrial despite notice and was
declared as in default. After the plaintiffs presentation of evidence exparte, the trial court rendered
decision ordering Gold Line to pay damages to the heirs of its deceased passenger. The decision
became final and executory because counsel of Gold Line did not file any appeal. Finding that
Goldline was not denied due process of law and is thus bound by the negligence of its lawyer, the
Courtheldasfollows

Thisleadsustothequestionofwhetherthenegligenceofcounselwassogrossandrecklessthatpetitionerwas
deprivedofitsrighttodueprocessoflaw.Wedonotbelieveso.Itcannotbedeniedthattherequirementsofdue
processwereobservedintheinstantcase.Petitionerwasneverdeprivedofitsdayincourt,asinfactitwas
affordedeveryopportunitytobeheard.Thus,itisofrecordthatnoticesweresenttopetitionerandthatits
counselwasabletofileamotiontodismissthecomplaint,ananswertothecomplaint,andevenapretrialbrief.
Whatwasirretrievablylostbypetitionerwasitsopportunitytoparticipateinthetrialofthecaseandtoadduce
evidenceinitsbehalfbecauseofnegligence.

Intheapplicationoftheprincipleofdueprocess,whatissoughttobesafeguardedagainstisnotthelackof
previousnoticebutthedenialoftheopportunitytobeheard.Thequestionisnotwhetherpetitionersucceededin
defendingitsrightsandinterests,butsimply,whetherithadtheopportunitytopresentitssideofthe
controversy.Verily,aspetitionerretainedtheservicesofcounselofitschoice,itshould,asfarasthissuitis
concerned,beartheconsequencesofitschoiceofafaultyoption.Itspleathatitwasdeprivedofdueprocess
echoesonhollowgroundandcertainlycannotelicitapprovalnorsympathy.

Tocatertopetitionersargumentsandreinstateitspetitionforrelieffromjudgmentwouldputapremiumonthe
negligenceofitsformercounselandencouragethenonterminationofthiscasebyreasonthereof.Thisisone
casewherepetitionerhastobeartheadverseconsequencesofitscounselsact,foraclientisboundbytheaction
ofhiscounselintheconductofacaseandhecannotthereafterbeheardtocomplainthattheresultmighthave
beendifferenthadhiscounselproceededdifferently.Therationalefortheruleiseasilydiscernible.Ifthe
negligenceofcounselbeadmittedasareasonforopeningcases,therewouldneverbeanendtoasuitsolongas
anewcounselcouldbehiredeverytimeitisshownthatthepriorcounselhadnotbeensufficientlydiligent,
[31]
experiencedorlearned.
[32]
Similarly,inMacalalagv.Ombudsman, aPhilippinePostalCorporationemployeechargedwith
dishonestywasnotabletofileananswerandpositionpaper.Hewasfoundguiltysolelyonthebasis
of complainants evidence and was dismissed with forfeiture of all benefits and disqualification from
governmentservice.ChallengingthedecisionoftheOmbudsman,theemployeecontendedthatthe
grossnegligenceofhiscounseldeprivedhimofdueprocessoflaw.Indebunkinghiscontention,the
Courtsaid

Neithercanheclaimthatheisnotboundbyhislawyersactionsitisonlyincaseofgrossorpalpable
negligenceofcounselwhenthecourtscanstepinandaccordrelieftoaclientwhowouldhavesufferedthereby.
Ifeveryperceivedmistake,failureofdiligence,lackofexperienceorinsufficientlegalknowledgeofthelawyer
wouldbeadmittedasareasonforthereopeningofacase,therewouldbenoendtocontroversy.Fundamentalto
ourjudicialsystemistheprinciplethateverylitigationmustcometoanend.Itwouldbeaclearmockeryifit
wereotherwise.Accesstothecourtsisguaranteed,buttheremustbealimittoit.

Viewedvisvistheforegoingjurisprudence,tosustainpetitionersargumentthatitwasdenieddue
process of law due to negligence of its counsel would set a dangerous precedent. It would enable
every party to render inutile any adverse order or decision through the simple expedient of alleging
gross negligence on the part of its counsel. The Court will not countenance such a farce which
[33]
contradictslongsettleddoctrinesoftrialandprocedure.
Anentthesecondissue,petitionerwascorrectlyfoundliableforbreachofcontractofcarriage.A
common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide,usingtheutmostdiligenceofverycautiouspersons,withdueregardtoallthecircumstances.
Inacontractofcarriage,itispresumedthatthecommoncarrierwasatfaultorwasnegligentwhena
passengerdiesorisinjured.Unlessthepresumptionisrebutted,thecourtneednotevenmake
an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory
[34]
presumptionmayonlybeovercomebyevidencethatthecarrierexercisedextraordinarydiligence.
In the instant case, there is no evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the proximate
causeofMarieGracesdeathwasthenegligenceofpetitioner.Hence,thecourtsbelowcorrectlyruled
thatpetitionerwasguiltyofbreachofcontractofcarriage.
Nevertheless,theawardofdamagesshouldbemodified.
[35] [36]
Article1764 inrelationtoArticle2206 oftheCivilCode,holdsthecommoncarrierinbreach
of its contract of carriage that results in the death of a passenger liable to pay the following: (1)
indemnityfordeath,(2)indemnityforlossofearningcapacity,and(3)moraldamages.

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Inthepresentcase,respondentheirsofthedeceasedareentitledtoindemnityforthedeathof
[37]
MarieGracewhichundercurrentjurisprudenceisfixedatP50,000.00.
Theawardofcompensatorydamagesforthelossofthedeceasedsearningcapacityshouldbe
deleted for lack of basis. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the
claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning
capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is
selfemployedearninglessthantheminimumwageundercurrentlaborlaws,andjudicialnoticemay
betakenofthefactthatinthedeceasedslineofworknodocumentaryevidenceisavailableor(2)
thedeceasedisemployedasadailywageworkerearninglessthantheminimumwageundercurrent
[38]
laborlaws.
[39]
InPeople v. Oco, the evidence presented by the prosecution to recover damages for loss of
earning capacity was the bare testimony of the deceaseds wife that her husband was earning
P8,000.00 monthly as a legal researcher of a private corporation. Finding that the deceased was
neither selfemployed nor employed as a dailywage worker earning less than the minimum wage
underthelaborlawsexistingatthetimeofhisdeath,theCourtheldthattestimonialevidencealoneis
insufficienttojustifyanawardforlossofearningcapacity.
[40]
Likewise,inPeoplev.Caraig, damagesforlossofearningcapacitywasnotawardedbecause
thecircumstancesofthe3deceaseddidnotfallwithintherecognizedexceptions,andexceptforthe
testimonyoftheirwives,nodocumentaryproofabouttheirincomewaspresentedbytheprosecution.
Thus

ThetestimonialevidenceshowsthatPlacidoAgustin,RobertoRaagas,andMelencioCastroJr.werenotself
employedoremployedasdailywageworkersearninglessthantheminimumwageunderthelaborlaws
existingatthetimeoftheirdeath.PlacidoAgustinwasaSocialSecuritySystememployeewhoreceiveda
monthlysalaryofP5,000.RobertoRaagaswasthePresidentofSinclairSecurityandAlliedServices,a
familyownedcorporation,withamonthlycompensationofP30,000.MelencioCastroJr.wasataxidriver
ofNewRocalexwithanaveragedailyearningofP500oramonthlyearningofP7,500.Clearly,thesecases
donotfallundertheexceptionswhereindemnityforlossofearningcapacitycanbegivendespitelackof
documentaryevidence.Therefore,forlackofdocumentaryproof,noindemnityforlossofearningcapacitycan
begiveninthesecases.(Emphasissupplied)

Here,thetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealscomputedtheawardofcompensatorydamagesfor
lossofearningcapacityonlyonthebasisofthetestimonyofrespondentRosalitothatthedeceased
was 39 years of age and a Section Chief of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Tuguergarao District
[41]
Office with a salary of P83,088.00 per annum when she died. No otherevidence was presented.
Theawardisclearlyerroneousbecausethedeceasedsearningsdoesnotfallwithintheexceptions.
However, the fact of loss having been established, temperate damages in the amount of
P500,000.00shouldbeawardedtorespondents.UnderArticle2224oftheCivilCode,temperateor
moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be
recoveredwhenthecourtfindsthatsomepecuniarylosshasbeensufferedbutitsamountcannot,
fromthenatureofthecase,beprovedwithcertainty.
[42]
In Pleno v. Court of Appeals, the Court sustained the trial courts award of P200,000.00 as
temperatedamagesinlieuofactualdamagesforlossofearningcapacitybecausetheincomeofthe
victimwasnotsufficientlyproven,thus

Thetrialcourtbasedtheamountsofdamagesawardedtothepetitioneronthefollowingcircumstances:

Astothelossorimpairmentofearningcapacity,thereisnodoubtthatPlenoisanent[re]preneurandthe
founderofhisowncorporation,theMayonCeramicsCorporation.Itappearsalsothatheisanindustriousand
resourcefulpersonwithseveralprojectsinline,andwereitnotfortheincident,mighthavepushedthem
through.Onthedayoftheincident,PlenowasdrivinghomewardwithgeologistLongleyafteranocular
inspectionofthesiteoftheMayonCeramicsCorporation.Hisactualincomehoweverhasnotbeensufficiently
establishedsothatthisCourtcannotawardactualdamages,but,anawardoftemperateormoderatedamages
maystillbemadeonlossorimpairmentofearningcapacity.ThatPlenosustainedapermanentdeformitydueto
ashortenedleftlegandthathealsosuffersfromdoublevisioninhislefteyeisalsoestablished.Becauseofthis,
hesuffersfromsomeinferioritycomplexandisnolongeractiveinbusinessaswellasinsociallife.Insimilar
casesasinBorromeov.ManilaElectricRailroadCo.,44Phil165Coriage,etal.v.LTBCo.,etal.,L11037,
Dec.29,1960,andinAraneta,etal.v.Arreglado,etal.,L11394,Sept.9,1958,theproperawardofdamages
weregiven.

Werulethatthelowercourtsawardsofdamagesaremoreconsonantwiththefactualcircumstancesofthe
instantcase.Thetrialcourtsfindingsoffactsareclearandwelldeveloped.Eachitemofdamagesisadequately
supportedbyevidenceonrecord.

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[43]
Article2224oftheCivilCodewaslikewiseappliedintherecentcasesofPeoplev.Singh and
[44]
People v. Almedilla, to justify the award of temperate damages in lieu of damages for loss of
earningcapacitywhichwasnotsubstantiatedbytherequireddocumentaryproof.
Anent the award of moral damages, the same cannot be lumped with exemplary damages
[45]
becausetheyarebasedondifferentjuralfoundations. Thesedamagesaredifferentinnatureand
[46]
requireseparatedetermination. Inculpacontractualorbreachofcontract,moraldamagesmaybe
recoveredwhenthedefendantactedinbadfaithorwasguiltyofgrossnegligence(amountingtobad
faith)orinwantondisregardofcontractualobligationsand,asinthiscase,whentheactofbreachof
contract itself constitutes the tort that results in physical injuries. By special rule in Article 1764 in
relationtoArticle2206oftheCivilCode,moraldamagesmayalsobeawardedincasethedeathofa
[47]
passengerresultsfromabreachofcarriage. Ontheotherhand,exemplarydamages,whichare
awarded by way of example or correction for the public good may be recovered in contractual
obligationsifthedefendantactedinwanton,fraudulent,reckless,oppressive,ormalevolentmanner.
[48]

Respondentsintheinstantcaseshouldbeawardedmoraldamagestocompensateforthegrief
caused by the death of the deceased resulting from the petitioners breach of contract of carriage.
Furthermore, the petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the extraordinary diligence required for
[49]
commoncarriers,itispresumedtohaveactedrecklessly. Thus,theawardofexemplarydamages
is proper. Under the circumstances, we find it reasonable to award respondents the amount of
P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. These amounts are not
[50]
excessive.
TheactualdamagesawardedbythetrialcourtreducedbytheCourtofAppealsshouldbefurther
[51]
reduced.InPeoplev.Duban, itwasheldthatonlysubstantiatedandprovenexpensesorthosethat
appeartohavebeengenuinelyincurredinconnectionwiththedeath,wakeorburialofthevictimwill
[52]
be recognized. A list of expenses (Exhibit J), and the contract/receipt for the construction of the
[53]
tomb(ExhibitF) inthiscase,cannotbeconsideredcompetentproofandcannotreplacetheofficial
receipts necessary to justify the award. Hence, actual damages should be further reduced to
[54]
P78,160.00, whichwastheamountsupportedbyofficialreceipts.
[55]
PursuanttoArticle2208 oftheCivilCode,attorneysfeesmayalsoberecoveredinthecaseat
barwhereexemplarydamagesareawarded.TheCourtfindstheawardofattorneysfeesequivalent
to10%ofthetotalamountadjudgedagainstpetitionerreasonable.
[56]
Finally,inEasternShippingLines,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals, itwasheldthatwhenanobligation,
regardlessofitssource,i.e.,law,contracts,quasicontracts,delictsorquasidelictsisbreached,the
contravenor can be held liable for payment of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages,subjecttothefollowingrules,towit

1.Whentheobligationisbreached,anditconsistsinthepaymentofasumofmoney,i.e.,aloanorforbearance
ofmoney,theinterestdueshouldbethatwhichmayhavebeenstipulatedinwriting.Furthermore,theinterest
dueshallitselfearnlegalinterestfromthetimeitisjudiciallydemanded.Intheabsenceofstipulation,therate
ofinterestshallbe12%perannumtobecomputedfromdefault,i.e.,fromjudicialorextrajudicialdemand
underandsubjecttotheprovisionsofArticle1169oftheCivilCode.

2.Whenanobligation,notconstitutingaloanorforbearanceofmoney,isbreached,aninterestontheamountof
damagesawardedmaybeimposedatthediscretionofthecourtattherateof6%perannum.Nointerest,
however,shallbeadjudgedonunliquidatedclaimsordamagesexceptwhenoruntilthedemandcanbe
establishedwithreasonablecertainty.Accordingly,wherethedemandisestablishedwithreasonablecertainty,
theinterestshallbegintorunfromthetimetheclaimismadejudiciallyorextrajudicially(Art.1169,Civil
Code)butwhensuchcertaintycannotbesoreasonablyestablishedatthetimethedemandismade,theinterest
shallbegintorunonlyfromthedatethejudgmentofthecourtismade(atwhichtimethequantificationof
damagesmaybedeemedtohavebeenreasonablyascertained).Theactualbaseforthecomputationoflegal
interestshall,inanycase,beontheamountfinallyadjudged.

3.Whenthejudgmentofthecourtawardingasumofmoneybecomesfinalandexecutory,therateof
legalinterest,whetherthecasefallsunderparagraph1orparagraph2,above,shallbe12%perannum
fromsuchfinalityuntilitssatisfaction,thisinterimperiodbeingdeemedtobebythenanequivalenttoa
forbearanceofcredit.(Emphasissupplied).

Intheinstantcase,petitionershouldbeheldliableforpaymentofinterestasdamagesforbreach
ofcontractofcarriage.Consideringthattheamountspayablebypetitionerhasbeendeterminedwith
certainty only in the instant petition, the interest due shall be computed upon the finality of this
[57]
decisionattherateof12%perannumuntilsatisfaction,perparagraph3oftheaforecitedrule.

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WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is PARTIALLYGRANTED. The April 11,
2003decisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.63290,whichmodifiedthedecisionofthe
Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in Civil Case No. 5023, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Victory Liner, Inc., is ordered to pay respondents the
following: (1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Marie Grace PagulayanGammad (2)
P100,000.00asmoraldamages(3)P100,000.00asexemplarydamages(4)P78,160.00asactual
damages(5)P500,000.00astemperatedamages(6)10%ofthetotalamountasattorneysfeesand
thecostsofsuit.
Furthermore, the total amount adjudged against petitioner shall earn interest at the rate of 12%
perannumcomputedfromthefinalityofthisdecisionuntilfullypaid.
SOORDERED.
Quisumbing,Carpio,andAzcuna,JJ.,concur.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,(Chairman),onofficialleave.

[1]
Rollo, p. 57. Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Eugenio S.
LabitoriaandRegaladoE.Maambong.
[2]
Rollo,p.135.PennedbyJudgeRolandoL.Salacup.
[3]
Motheroftheotherrespondents(TSN,1July1997,p.8).
[4]
TSN,1July1997,pp.46.
[5]
Records,p.1.
[6]
Id.,p.10.
[7]
Initially set on November 7, 1996 (Records, p. 16) but moved to December 18, 1996 on motion of petitioners counsel
(Records,p.20),andthereaftermotuproprioresetbythecourttoFebruary12,1997(Records,p.24).Finally,upon
agreementofbothcounsels,pretrialwasscheduledtoApril10,1997.
[8]
OrderdatedFebruary12,1997,Records,p.27.
[9]
Records,p.29.
[10]
Id.,p.31.
[11]
OrderdatedMay6,1997,Records,p.33.
[12]
PretrialOrderdatedMay6,1997,Records,p.34.
[13]
Originally set on August 13, 1997 (Records, p. 36), but was rescheduled by the trial court to November 17, 1997
(Records,p.38).
[14]
Records,p.39.
[15]
Id.,p.41.
[16]
Id.,p.44.
[17]
Id.,p.45.
[18]
Id.,p.46.
[19]
Rollo,pp.140141.
[20]
Id.,pp.7980.
[21]
CARollo,p.93.
[22]
377Phil.482(1999).
[23]
ResolutiondatedAugust21,2003,Rollo,p.83.
[24]
APEXMining,Inc.,supra,pp.493494.
[25]
Records,p.19.
[26]
Id.,p.25.
[27]
Id.,p.28.
[28]
CARollo,p.95.
[29]
377Phil.482,494495(1999).
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[30]
415Phil.492(2001).
[31]
Id.,pp.504505.
[32]
G.R.No.147995,4March2004.
[33]
ProducersBankofthePhilippinesv.CourtofAppeals,430Phil.812,830(2002).
[34]
BaliwagTransit,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,326Phil.762,768(1996).
[35]
ART.1764.DamagesincasescomprisedinthisSectionshallbeawardedinaccordancewithTitleXVIIIofthisBook,
concerningDamages.Article2206shallalsoapplytothedeathofapassengercausedbythebreachofcontractby
acommoncarrier.
[36]
ART.2206.Theamountofdamagesfordeathcausedbyacrimeorquasidelictshallbeatleastthreethousandpesos,eventhough
theremayhavebeenmitigatingcircumstances.Inaddition:
(1)Thedefendantshallbeliableforthelossoftheearningcapacityofthedeceased,andtheindemnityshallbepaidtothe
heirsofthelattersuchindemnityshallineverycasebeassessedandawardedbythecourt,unlessthedeceased
onaccountofpermanentphysicaldisabilitynotcausedbythedefendant,hadnoearningcapacityatthetimeofhis
death
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir
called to the decedents inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the
personcausingthedeath,foraperiodnotexceedingfiveyears,theexactdurationtobefixedbythecourt
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mentalanguishbyreasonofthedeathofthedeceased.
[37]
Tiuv.Arriesgado,G.R.No.138060,1September2004.
[38]
Peoplev.Oco,G.R.Nos.13737071,29September2003,412SCRA190,222.
[39]
Supra.
[40]
G.R.Nos.11622427,28March2003,400SCRA67,8485.
[41]
TSN,1July1997,p.8.
[42]
G.R.No.L56505,9May1988,161SCRA208,224225.
[43]
412 Phil. 842, 859 (2001). In this case, the Court awarded P200,000.00 temperate damages in place of the
P5,760,000.00 awarded by the trial court as damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased because the
prosecutiondidnotpresentthebestevidencetoprovethedeceasedsincome.
[44]
G.R.No.150590,21August2003,409SCRA428,433.Here,theCourtdidnotcomputedamagesforlossofearning
capacity on the basis of the widows testimony that his deceased husband was earning P22,000.00 a month and
P10,000.00fromhissideline.Instead,thewidowwasawardedP25,000.00astemperatedamages.
[45]
Peoplev.Trapane,436Phil.671,682(2002).
[46]
Peoplev.Astudillo,G.R.No.141518,29April2003,401SCRA723,739.
[47]
Expertravel&Tours,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,368Phil.444,448449(1999).
[48]
Yobidov.CourtofAppeals,346Phil.1,13(1997).
[49]
Id.
[50]
FortuneExpress,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,364Phil.480,496(1999).
[51]
G.R.No.141217,26September2003,412SCRA131,139.
[52]
Records,p.53.
[53]
Id.,p.49.
[54]
ExhibitC,ExhibitD,ExhibitE,Records,pp.4748ExhibitGandExhibitH,Records,pp.5051.
[55]
ART.2208.Intheabsenceofstipulation,attorneysfeesandexpensesoflitigation,otherthanjudicialcosts,cannotbe
recovered,except:
(1)Whenexemplarydamagesareawarded
...
[56]
G.R.No.97412,12July1994,234SCRA78,9596.
[57]
SeeTheInsularLifeAssuranceCompany,Ltd.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.126850,28April2004.Inthiscase,the
Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and in lieu thereof decreed the award of, among others,
P500,000.00monthly,representingtheunrealizedmonthlyincomeofpetitionerorP6MillionayearfromDecember

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1, 1992 until respondent vacates the leased premises. The interest imposed was 12% per annum computed from
thefinalityofthedecisionoftheCourt.

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