G.R. No.

170137 August 27, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RANDY MAGBANUA alias "BOYUNG" and WILSON MAGBANUA, Accused-
appellants.

FACTS:

SPO1 Javier and PO2 Cordero were conducting the traffic on the busy street of Mac-
Arthur Hi-way; there was a white Toyota car that refuses to stop when ordered by SPO1
Javier to give way to the pedestrian. PO2 Cordero flagged down the driver. When the
driver rolled down the window the officers smelled and aroma of marijuana and then
ordered the driver and his companion to step outside the vehicle and when they
checked the back seat, they found a bricks of marijuana. The brothers Randy and
Wilson Magbanua were apprehended by SPO1 Javier and PO2 Cordero. They were
charged and were found guilty of the RTC of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC that the accused was guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. In their respective briefs, the prosecution and the defense presented conflicting
versions of the facts of the case. The prosecution stands by the facts as found by the
RTC, the defenses version was that they are not aware of the existence of marijuana
and that they are working as a driver for a rent car service and that the owner of the bag
of marijuana bricks was a Japanese national. They also contended that there guilt
cannot be found beyond reasonable doubt because of the inconsistent testimony of
SPO1 Javier and PO2 Cordero. The accused-appellant contends that SPO1 Javier
testified that when accused-appellants alighted from the vehicle, he found four (4) bricks
of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, a weighing scale and a cellular phone. He
identified the bricks of marijuana thru his initials. However, on cross-examination, the
same witness stated that he saw the weighing scale only when the same was brought to
their office. Likewise, SPO1 Javier denied placing his initials on the bricks of marijuana,
and only saw the initials when the marijuana was presented in court. Accused-
appellants contend that if SPO1 Javier only saw the initials during the trial of the case,
he could not have identified the specimens presented in court as the ones confiscated
from accused-appellants. According to accused-appellants, the two police officers could
not agree as to how they were able to discover the presence of marijuana inside the
vehicle. SPO1 Javier stated that it was PO2 Cordero who first approached the vehicle,
ordered the accused-appellants to step down from the vehicle and then they smelled
something in the car. On the other hand, PO2 Cordero testified that it was SPO1 Javier
who approached the vehicle and when the window was opened, that was the time they
smelled something leading them to conduct an inspection inside the vehicle.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses would fail to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

Contrary to accused-appellants assertion, there is no real inconsistency between the

testimonies of SPO1 Javier and PO2 Cordero.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the two (2) police officers pointed out
by the accused-appellants are not material but relate only to minor matters. What is
essential in a conviction for violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, is that the possession of the prohibited drug must be duly established. As
long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate each other on material points, the
minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Such minor
inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their credibility as they negate any
suspicion that their testimonies are fabricated or rehearsed. Even the most candid of
witnesses commit mistakes and make confused and inconsistent statements. Generally,
courts give full faith and credit to police officers for they are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner. Courts cannot simply set aside their
testimonies where there is no showing that the search conducted on the accused-
appellants was clearly violative of their constitutional rights or the said search was a
mere ploy to extort on the part of the police officers. Accused-appellants failed to show
any motive why the arresting police officers would falsely impute a serious crime against
them. Without such proof and with the presumption that official duty was performed
regularly, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over
accused-appellants self-serving and uncorroborated denial.
Well-settled is the rule that prosecutions involving the possession of illegal drugs
depend largely on the credibility of the police officer. This Court has access only to the
cold and impersonal records of the proceedings. Thus, the Court relies heavily on the
rule that the weighing of evidence, particularly when there are conflicts in the
testimonies of witnesses, is best left to the trial court which had the unique opportunity
to observe their demeanor, conduct, and manner while testifying.

WHEREFORE, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 185899 December 8, 2010

SPOUSES REUBEN DELA CRUZ AND MINERVA DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
RAMON C. PAPA IV, in his capacity as Co-Administrator of the Estate of ANGELA
M. BUTTE, Respondent.

FACTS:

In 1994, the Intestate Estate of Angela M. Butte (the Estate) filed an action for
cancellation of titles, recovery of properties, and damages against several defendants,
including petitioner spouses Reuben and Minerva Dela Cruz (the Dela Cruzes) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City. On October 21, 1999 the Estate
presented Myron C. Papa (Myron), its executor, to testify on the substance of the
complaint. At the conclusion of Myrons testimony on that day, the RTC required the
Estate and the latter agreed to present Myron anew at the next scheduled hearing to
identify the originals of certain exhibits, after which counsels for the defendants, would
begin to cross-examine him.

But the Estate never got around recalling Myron to the witness stand. He was taken ill
and diagnosed as suffering from stage four colon and liver cancer, prompting
respondent Ramon C. Papa IV (Ramon), the Estates co-administrator, to seek repeated
postponements of hearings in the case to allow Myron undergo intensive treatment.
Later, the Estate filed a motion for leave to have the defendants cross-examine Myron
by deposition at the hospital where he was confined. The RTC granted the motion on
February 22, 2001 and eventually set the deposition-taking on September 7, 2001 but
Myron passed away on August 16, 2001.

On December 5, 2003 the Dela Cruzes filed a motion to strike out Myrons testimony on
the ground of failure to cross-examine him. Meanwhile, the Estate filed its formal offer of
evidence. In a March 4, 2005 Order, the RTC granted the Dela Cruzes motion to strike
out Myrons testimony on the ground that, due to the Estates fault, such testimony was
never completed, depriving the defendants of the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Because the RTC denied the Estates motion for reconsideration, it filed a special civil
action of certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals assailing the March 4,
2005 Order. Meanwhile, on August 16, 2005 the RTC admitted the Dela Cruzes
demurrer to evidence. On July 25, 2008 the CA rendered a Decision, granting the
petition and setting aside the RTCs order that struck out Myrons testimony. The CA
denied the Dela Cruzes motion for reconsideration.
Although the CA likewise set aside the RTCs denial of the respondents documentary
evidence and its admission of the Dela Cruzes demurrer, it held that the RTC may not
be compelled by mandamus to admit the documentary exhibits in issue, since the
matter of admitting them is discretionary upon it. Because the CA declined to
reconsider, the Dela Cruzes filed this petition for review, seeking reinstatement of the
RTCs Order dated March 4, 2005.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in reinstating Myrons testimony after the RTC ordered the
same stricken out for depriving the defendants of the opportunity to cross-examine him.

HELD:

It is evident that the defendants right to cross-examine Myron did not yet come up when
he finished his direct testimony on October 21, 1999. The Estate undertook to return
him to the witness stand to identify for it the originals of certain documents.
Consequently, when Myron was taken ill, the obligation to move the case forward
continued to be on the Estates side. Rather than move it, however, the Estate
repeatedly asked for the deferment of Myrons testimony on the chance that he could
recover and return to court. It took the Estate more than a year to remedy the situation
by asking the RTC to allow the cross-examination of Myron in the hospital where he
was confined. Thus, only when the Court granted this motion on February 22, 2001 did
it become evident that the Estate was waiving the additional direct examination that it
reserved on October 21, 1999. Thus, the turn of the Dela Cruzes to cross-examine
Myron came only after February 22, 2001. When Myron died on August 16, 2001, the
obligation to close his aborted testimony and proceed with its other evidence remained
with the Estate.

But the Estate did nothing for about a year and eight months until December 3, 2003
when, rather than present additional evidence, it asked leave to close its case with a
formal offer of its documentary exhibits. Clearly, it was only at this stage that the Estate
signaled its intention to still avail itself of Myrons unfinished testimony. And the Dela
Cruzes did not lose time to act. On December 5, 2003 they renewed the defendants
earlier motion to expunge such testimony. And this time, the RTC granted the motion. It
did so correctly since the Estate showed a lack of interest in offering a substitute
testimony for that of Myrons.
Since the Estate presented its documentary exhibits and had the same authenticated
through Myrons testimony, it stands to reason that the striking out of the latters
testimony altogether wiped out the required authentication for those exhibits. They
become inadmissible unless the RTC, in its discretion, reopens the trial upon a valid
ground and permits the Estate to rectify its mistakes.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the Court of
Appeals decision and resolution
G.R. No. 162886 August 11, 2008

HEIRS OF THE DECEASED SPOUSES VICENTE S. ARCILLA and JOSEFA

ASUNCION ARCILLA, namely: Aida Arcilla Alandan, Rene A. Arcilla, Oscar A.
Arcilla, Sarah A. Arcilla, and Nora A. Arcilla, now deceased and substituted by her
son Sharmy Arcilla, represented by their attorney-in-fact, SARAH A.
ARCILLA, petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES A. TEODORO, respondent.

FACT:

Ma. Lourdes Teodoro, in her application for land registration filed a belated Certificate
against forum shopping. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Application on the ground
that respondent should have filed the certificate against forum shopping simultaneously
with the petition for land registration which is a mandatory requirement of SC
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and that any violation of the said Circular shall be a
cause for the dismissal of the application upon motion and after hearing.

Opposing the motion to dismiss, respondents asserted that the petitioners' Motion to
Dismiss Application was filed out of time; respondent's failure to comply with SC
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 was not willful, deliberate or intentional; and the
Motion to Dismiss was deemed waived for failure of petitioners to file the same during
the earlier stages of the proceedings.

On July 19, 1999, the MTC issued an Order9 denying petitioners' Motion to Dismiss
Application.

Herein petitioners then filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court of Virac,
Catanduanes. In its Decision dated February 22, 2002, the RTC, Branch 43, of Virac,
Catanduanes dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the Decision of
the MTC. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in
its Order of July 22, 2002.

Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA. On
September 12, 2003, the CA promulgated its presently assailed Decision dismissing the
Petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents application should be dismissed for filing a belated
Certificate against forum shopping.

HELD:

The petition is bereft of merit.

Under the attendant circumstances in the present case, the Court cannot uphold
petitioners contention that respondent's delay of more than two years and three months
in filing the required certificate of non-forum shopping may not be considered
substantial compliance with the requirements of SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94
and Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court; that respondent's reasons of oversight and
inadvertence do not constitute a justifiable circumstance that could excuse her non-
compliance with the mandatory requirements of the above-mentioned Circular and Rule;
that subsequent compliance with the requirement does not serve as an excuse for a
party's failure to comply in the first instance.

In Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, this Court has held that Circular No. 28-91 was
designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration
of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its
own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to
achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. The same guideline still applies
in interpreting what is now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply
disregarded, for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. However, it is equally settled that litigation is not merely a
game of technicalities. Rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. In the instant case, the
Court finds that the lower courts did not commit any error in proceeding to decide the
case on the merits, as herein respondent was able to submit a certification of non-forum
shopping. More importantly, the apparent merit of the substantive aspect of the petition
for land registration filed by respondent with the MTC coupled with the showing that she
had no intention to violate the Rules with impunity, as she was the one who invited the
attention of the court to the inadvertence committed by her counsel, should be deemed
as special circumstances or compelling reasons to decide the case on the merits.

In addition, considering that a dismissal contemplated under Rule 7, Section 5 of the

Rules of Court is, as a rule, a dismissal without prejudice, and since there is no showing
that respondent is guilty of forum shopping, to dismiss respondent's petition for
registration would entail a tedious process of re-filing the petition, requiring the parties to
re-submit the pleadings which they have already filed with the trial court, and conducting
anew hearings which have already been done, not to mention the expenses that will be
incurred by the parties in re-filing of pleadings and in the re-conduct of hearings. These
would not be in keeping with the judicial policy of just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 179540 March 13, 2009

PERFECTA CAVILE, JOSE DE LA CRUZ and RURAL BANK OF BAYAWAN,

INC., Petitioners,
vs.
JUSTINA LITANIA-HONG, accompanied and joined by her husband, LEOPOLDO
HONG and GENOVEVA LITANIA, Respondents.

FACT:

On 5 April 1937, a Deed of Partition5 was entered into by the heirs of the spouses
Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon. Said heirs included the legitimate children of
Bernardo and Tranquilina, namely, (1) Susana Cavile, (2) Castor Cavile, and (3)
Benedicta Cavile; as well as the children of Bernardo by his previous marriages,
specifically: (4) Simplicia Cavile, (5) Fortunato Cavile, and (6) Vevencia Cavile. Subject
of the Deed of Partition were several parcels of land situated in the Municipality of
Tolong, Negros Oriental, which were then covered by Tax Declarations No. 5615, No.
5729, No. 7143, No. 7421 and No. 7956, all under the name of Bernardo.

Also stated in the Deed of Partition was the sale by the other aforementioned legal heirs
to their co-heir Castor of their aliquot shares in the lots covered by Tax Declarations No.
7143, No. 7421, and No. 7956; thus, making Castor the sole owner of the said
properties. Similarly, the Deed of Partition acknowledged the sale by all the legal heirs
to Ulpiano Cavile of their respective shares in the lot covered by Tax Declaration No.
5729, thus, transferring to the latter absolute ownership of said parcel of land.

Thereafter, on 5 August 1960, Castor and Susana executed a Confirmation of

Extrajudicial Partition, whereby Castor recognized and confirmed that the lots covered
by Tax Declarations No. 2039 and No. 2040 were the just and lawful shares of Susana
in the properties left by their deceased parents Bernardo and Tranquilina, and that
Susana was in actual possession of the said properties.

The descriptions of the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 2039 and No. 2040 in the
Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition were strikingly close to those of the lots covered
by Tax Declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956, respectively, in the Deed of Partition.

Fourteen years after the execution of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition in 1960,
respondents filed on 23 December 1974 a Complaint for Reconveyance and Recovery
of Property with Damages before the RTC against Perfecta Cavile, the daughter of
Castor, Jose de la Cruz, the husband of Perfecta (hereinafter petitioner spouses).

Respondents averred in the Complaint that respondents Justina and Genoveva

inherited two parcels of land, covered by Tax Declarations No. 07408 and No. 07409
(subject lots), from their mother Susana, who, in turn, inherited the same from her
parents Bernardo and Tranquilina. Respondents invoked the Confirmation of
Extrajudicial Partition dated 5 August 1960 wherein Castor purportedly recognized
Susanas ownership of the subject lots. Susana had enjoyed undisputed ownership and
possession of the subject lots, paying the realty taxes due and introducing
improvements thereon. Susana was even able to obtain a loan from the Rural Bank of
Dumaguete City sometime in 1960, mortgaging the subject lots as security for the
same.

Respondents alleged that Castor and petitioner spouses eventually intruded upon and
excluded respondents from the subject lots. When Castor died in 1968, petitioner
spouses continued their unlawful occupancy of the subject lots, planting on the same
and harvesting the products.

Respondents claimed that they exerted efforts to settle the matter, but petitioner
spouses stubbornly refused to accede. In 1974, prior to the filing of the Complaint,
respondents again sought an audience with petitioner spouses, yet the latter only
presented to them the Original Certificates of Title covering the subject lots, issued by
the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Negros Oriental, on 9 October 1962, in the
name of petitioner Perfecta. Respondents were, thus, constrained to institute Civil Case
against petitioner spouses and the Rural Bank of Bayawan, Inc., seeking the
cancellation of the OCTs in the name of petitioner Perfecta or, alternatively, the
reconveyance by petitioner spouses of the subject lots to respondents, plus award for
damages.

Petitioner spouses countered in their Answer to the Complaint that, by virtue of the
Deed of Partition dated 5 April 1937, the heirs of both Bernardo and Tranquilina took
exclusive possession of their respective shares in the inheritance. Castor fully
possessed the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7143, No. 7421 and No. 7956, after
his co-heirs sold to him their shares therein. In 1962, Castor sold to petitioner Perfecta
the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956, which corresponded to the
subject lots in the Complaint. Following the sale, petitioner Perfecta took possession of
the subject lots and filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for the issuance of title
over the same. The Bureau issued free patent titles over the subject lots in favor of
petitioner Perfecta and, by virtue thereof, she was able to secure on 9 October 1962,
OCTs No. FV-4976, No. FV-4977, and No. FV-4978 in her name.
The RTC ruled that the petitioner spouses evidence was more worthy of credence in
establishing their ownership of the subject lots. As petitioner Perfecta testified before the
RTC, Castor immediately took possession of the subject lots after the Deed of Partition
was executed in 1937.

The RTC further subscribed to the testimony of Perfecta that the Confirmation of
Extrajudicial Partition was executed by Castor solely to accommodate Susana, enabling
her to obtain a bank loan using the subject lots as collateral.

Without seeking a reconsideration of the above RTC Decision, respondents challenged

the same by way of appeal before the Court of Appeals

On 8 March 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision in favor of
respondents, the decretal portion of which provides:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE

ISSUE:

Who, among the parties herein, have the better right to the subject lots?

HELD:

As held by the Court of Appeals, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition partakes of

the nature of an admission against a persons proprietary interest. As such, the same
may be admitted as evidence against Castor and petitioner spouses, his successors-in-
interest. The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence,
notwithstanding that they are hearsay, is that the necessity of the occasion renders the
reception of such evidence advisable and, further, that the reliability of such declaration
asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest.

Nevertheless, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition is just one piece of evidence

against petitioner spouses. It must still be considered and weighed together with
respondents other evidence vis--vis petitioner spouses evidence. In civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."
"Preponderance of evidence" is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability
of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than
that which is offered in opposition thereto.

Herein, despite the admission made by Castor in the Confirmation of Extrajudicial

Partition against his own interest, the Court is still convinced that the evidence adduced
by the petitioner spouses preponderated over that of the respondents.

In analyzing the two vital documents in this case, the Court discerns that while the Deed
of Partition clearly explained how Castor came to fully own the subject lots, the
Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, even though confirming Susanas ownership of
the subject lots, failed to shed light on why or how the said properties wholly pertained
to her when her parents Bernardo and Tranquilina clearly had other heirs who also had
shares in the inheritance.

Other than the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, respondents were only able to
present as evidence of their title to the subject lots tax declarations covering the same,
previously, in the name of Susana and, subsequently, in their own names. We find such
tax declarations insufficient to establish respondents ownership of the subject lots. That
the disputed property has been declared for taxation purposes in the name of any party
does not necessarily prove ownership.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is hereby GRANTED.
G.R. No. 179748 October 2, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
FEBLONELYBIRTH T. RUBIO AND JOAN T. AMARO, Appellants.

FACT:

At 6:00 a.m. of July 21, 1999, while Magdalena Olpos (Magdalena) was harvesting
peanuts at the upper portion of the land where her house stands, she heard someone
repeatedly shout "Ama, tabang!" (Father, help!). She thus ran towards her son Pepe
Olpos (Pepe), who was at that time plowing a rice field, and asked him to determine
where the shouts emanated.

Both mother and son at once repaired to where they sensed the shouts came from. On
their way, they saw their neighbor, appellant Rubio, "walking very fast towards the
sugarcane plantation," and another neighbor, appellant Amaro, "running towards the
upper portion of the cliff [going] to [his] house." Pepe likewise saw appellants carrying
bloodied hunting knives.

Perfecto Teves (Teves), who was startled by shouts of AAAs aunt CCC that her niece
was already dead, repaired to the crime scene in the course of which he saw appellants
running toward Amaros house.

On reaching what turned out to be the crime scene, Magdalena and Pepe saw the body
of AAA bearing multiple stab wounds, her legs spread apart and her panties pulled
down to knee level.

Magdalena thereafter repaired to her house and related the incident to her daughter
whom she instructed to report to a neighbor. Her son Pepe for his part related the
incident to a neighbor, Rustico Culi, who in turn echoed it to the barangay captain.

BBB, father of the victim, on being informed by his neighbors Rustico Culi and Loreto
Culi at around 8:00 a.m. of the day of the incident that his daughter was raped and
killed, went to the crime scene where he saw Magdalena and Pepe.

Later in the afternoon, Magdalena went back to the crime scene and, finding SPO4
Ramon Sibala and other police officers there, she informed them what she had earlier
witnessed, furnishing them the names of appellants. Albeit appellant Amaro was also
there, Magdalena did not point him out to the police out of fear of Amaros uncles whom
she described as "notorious characters."

SPO4 Ramon Sibala (SPO4 Sibala), who arrived at the crime scene at 2:00 p.m. of the
date of the incident together with two other police officers and Dr. Renacia, talked to
Pepe from whom he could not elicit any response as he observed him to be "hesitant to
say something."

Five days after the incident or on July 26, 1999, Pepe and Magdalena went to the office
of SPO4 Sibala to give their respective statements implicating appellants.

Appellants, denying the charge, interposed alibi:

At 6 a.m. of July 21, 1999, he went to the house of the parents of his cousin-co-
accused-appellant Amaro from whom he successfully sought permission to allow Jomar
Amaro (Jomar), Amaros younger brother, to help him gather cassava root crops in
barangay Alangilan. He and Jomar could not return home in the afternoon because it
was then raining and the flood rendered the river they had to pass through impassable.
They thus spent the night in Alangilan and went home the next morning.

For his part, Amaro claimed as follows:

His brother Jomar and co-appellant Rubio passed by his house at 6:30 a.m. of
the day of the incident to inform him that Jomar had been allowed to go with him to
gather cassava. As he was waiting for the drizzle to subside, he saw two of his
neighbors running. When he asked them what the commotion was about, they told him
that AAA had been killed. He thereupon followed his neighbors to the crime scene and
there saw the body of AAA. He waited for the police to arrive, and when they did arrive
at 2:00 p.m., they conducted an investigation. He was not interrogated, however. More
than two weeks later, he learned that he was being implicated in the crime.

Finding for the prosecution, the trial court convicted appellants by Decision of April 12,
2002. In convicting appellants, both the trial and the appellate courts found that
circumstantial evidence sufficed to hold appellants liable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the circumstantial evidence introduced in the case sufficed to hold the
appellants liable for the offense charged.
HELD:

Under the Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt.36

To assay its probative value, circumstantial evidence must be tested against four
necessary guidelines:

x x x x (a) It should be acted upon with caution; (b) All the essential facts must
be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (c) The facts must exclude every other theory
but that of guilt of the accused; and, (d) The facts must establish with certainty the guilt
of the accused as to convince beyond reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator of
the offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the series of events
pointing to the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt
of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one (1) particular piece of
evidence. It is more like a puzzle which when put together reveals a convincing picture
pointing to the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime. (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Far from being a completed puzzle, the circumstantial evidence adduced in this case
only serves to inculpate doubt in an unprejudiced mind as to the real identities of the
perpetrators of the crime.

Still, even if the Court were to credit the identification of appellants as the ones seen
running away from the crime scene at 6:00 in the morning of July 21, 1999, this is the
only circumstance that was established during the trial. Such circumstance certainly
does not meet the first requisite for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to convict.

Further still, even if appellants were seen carrying bloodied hunting knives, there is no
showing that they matched the instruments, if it was more than one, used in stabbing
AAA vis--vis the size of the wounds in her body.

A judgment of conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty, moral certainty
in an unprejudiced mind that it was the accused who committed the crime, failing which
the accused must be exonerated.45 The prosecution failed to discharge its burden of
establishing the guilt of appellants, however.1avvphi1 This leaves it unnecessary to still
pass on appellants defense.

WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 178202 May 14, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NORMAN SITCO and RAYMUNDO BAGTAS (deceased), Accused-Appellants.

FACTS:

That on or about the 11th day of May 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being private persons
and without authority of law, conspiring[,] confederating and mutually helping with one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver, in
consideration of the sum of P2,000.00+, most of which were boodle or fake money to a
poseur buyer[,] two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline
substance with net weight of 108.40 grams and 105.84 grams respectively, which
substance when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive result for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as "Shabu," a regulated [drug].

During trial, Buan identified accused-appellants, the four (4) PhP 500-bill marked money
used, the shabu confiscated from both accused-appellants, and the marijuana seized
from Bagtas. Buan explained during his testimony that the boodle money placed in-
between the genuine marked money the buy-bust team used was unavailable as it had
been confiscated by a policeman named "Barlin" when he himself (Buan) was arrested
for violating Sec. 27 of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Bagtas branded as fabricated the accusations against him and Sitco. Sitco corroborated
Bagtas testimony, adding that Buan had already been dismissed from the service for
use of illegal drug. On cross-examination, he admitted to having been previously
arrested for possession of shabu and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS CONVICTION ON THE BASIS OF AN UNRELIABLE WITNESS.

HELD:
Sitcos assault on the credibility of Buan is well-taken. As it were, Buans involvement as
a police officer in illegal drug activities makes him a polluted source and renders his
testimony against Sitco and Bagtas suspect, at best. It is like a pot calling a kettle black.

To be believed, testimonial evidence should come only from the mouth of a credible
witness.16 Given his service record, Buan can hardly qualify as a witness worthy, under
the limited confines of this case, of full faith and credit. And lest it be overlooked, Buan
is a rogue cop, having, per his own admission, been arrested for indulging in a pot
session, eventually charged and dismissed from the police service. 17 It would appear,
thus, that Buans had been a user. His arrest for joining a pot session only confirms this
undesirable habit. Buans involvement in drugs and his alleged attempt to extort money
from appellant Sitco in exchange for his freedom has put his credibility under a heavy
cloud.

Chain of Custody

But over and above the credibility of the prosecutions lone witness as ground for
acquittal looms the matter of the custodial chain, a term which has gained traction in the
prosecution of drug-related cases.

In prosecutions involving narcotics and other illegal substances, the substance itself
constitutes part of the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to
sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 20 Of chief concern in drug
cases then is the requirement that the prosecution prove that what was seized by police
officers is the same item presented in court. This identification, as we have held in the
past, must be established with moral certainty21 and is a function of the rule on chain of
custody. The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding
the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the
movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist,
and finally to the court.

.It is unclear at the outset whether Buan himself made the inventory of the seized items.
There is no detail as to who brought the specimens to the forensic laboratory and who
received it prior to the examination by the forensic chemist. It is also uncertain who took
custody of the specimens before they were presented as evidence in court. There are,
thus, glaring gaps or missing links in the chain of custody of evidence, raising doubt as
to the identity of the seized items and necessarily their evidentiary value. This broken
chain of custody is especially significant given that what are involved are fungible items
that may be easily altered or tampered with.
It cannot be over-emphasized that pertinent provisions of RA 9165 require that the
seized illegal items shall, after their inventory, be photographed in the presence of the
drug dealer, representatives of media, the Department of Justice, or any elected public
official who participated in the operation. The records do not yield an indication that this
particular requirement has been complied with.

To reiterate, the chain of custody requirement is necessary in order to remove doubts as

to the identity of the evidence, by monitoring and tracking custody of the seized drugs
from the accused, until they reach the court. We find that the procedure and statutory
safeguards prescribed for compliance by drug enforcement agencies have not been
followed in this case. A failure to comply with the aforequoted Sec. 21(1) of RA 9165
implies a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of
the seized illegal items as part of the corpus delicti.26

To reiterate, in prosecutions involving dangerous drugs, the substance itself constitutes

the key part of the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to
sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In a string of cases, we declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony
of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen
of shabu, and the irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before it
was finally offered in court, fatally conflicts with every proposition relative to the
culpability of the accused.

Given the prosecutions failure to abide by the rules on the chain of custody, the
evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly performed cannot apply
to this case. This presumption, it must be emphasized, is not conclusive. Not only is it
rebutted by contrary proof, as here, but it is also inferior to the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

WHEREFORE, the assailed CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00038 is REVERSED

and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Norman Sitco y De Jesus is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt and is ordered immediately RELEASEDfrom detention, unless he is
confined for any other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections
isDIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken
hereon within five (5) days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182460 March 9, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

Eulogio Quilates (Eulogio) is the owner of a two-storey house in Paringao, Bauang, La

Union. Among the occupants of his house were his sister Felicidad Quilates (Felicidad);
another sister Alicia Manlupig (Alicia); and nephew Herminio Manlupig (Herminio).
Appellant, who is the adopted son of Felicidad, occupied one room in the house. At
around 3:30 p.m. of 24 March 2004, appellant was having a drinking spree with his
cousin Herminio and brothers-in-law Joey Viduya and Ricky Viduya (Ricky) in front of
their house. Appellant and Herminio were arguing over the matter of caring for Felicidad
while the latter was confined in the hospital. Ricky tried to mediate between the two.
Appellant was then seen going inside the house to get a bolo. When he emerged from
the house ten (10) minutes later, he ran after Herminio but the latter managed to escape
unscathed. Appellant again went back to the house.

Meanwhile, after pacifying appellant and Herminio, Ricky resumed drinking. A few
minutes later, he saw smoke coming from the room of appellant. As Ricky was about to
enter the house, he met appellant at the door. Appellant apparently tried to stab Ricky
but was unsuccessful. Ricky witnessed appellant stab Felicidad and Alicia.
Herminio, who had since come back to the drinking table, also saw the smoke. He
peeped through the small window of the house and witnessed appellant burning some
clothes and boxes in the sala. Herminio immediately went inside the house to save his
personal belongings. Upon emerging from the house, Herminio saw his mother, Alicia,
bloodied.

Alicia testifies that she was sitting on a chair near the toilet when she saw smoke
coming out of appellant's room. Before she could react, appellant came charging at her
and stabbed her. She sustained wounds on her upper thigh, arms, below her breast and
on her ear. Alicia was still able to ask for help, and her daughter-in-law brought her to
the hospital.

Eulogio heard a commotion while he was cooking in the second floor of the house.
When Eulogio went down, he already saw smoke coming from the room of appellant.
He then saw Felicidad near the comfort room located outside the house and was
bleeding from her mouth. As he was about to help Felicidad, he met appellant who was
then holding a knife. Eulogio immediately ran away.

Upon seeing Herminio, appellant immediately attacked him with a knife. However,
Herminio and Ricky were able to pin appellant down. Before they could retaliate, the
barangay captain arrived at the scene.10 As a result, eight (8) houses were razed.

Inspector Ferdinand Formacion responded to the fire incident and saw four (4) houses
were already burned. After putting out the fire, he and the arson investigator conducted
an ocular investigation and invited witnesses to the police station to submit their sworn
statements. SPO2 Rodolfo Lomboy, chief investigator of Philippine National Police
Bauang Police Station, was told by witnesses that appellant intentionally set the boxes
on fire inside the house.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the circumstantial evidence on which the guilt was grounded suffice the
conviction of the accused.

HELD:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is

sufficient for conviction if:
 (a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt.

In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of

circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the
criminal responsibility of the accused.27

The appellate court considered the following circumstances to establish an unbroken

chain of events pointing to the logical conclusion that appellant started the fire:

First, accused-appellant Murcia returned inside E. Quilates' house after chasing H.

Manlupig with a bolo and after being pacified by R. Viduya and J. Viduya;

Second, during the resumption of their drinking session, R. Viduya and H. Manlupig saw
a thick smoke emanating from E. Quilates' house particularly the window of accused-
appellant Murcia's room in the ground floor;

Third, H. Manlupig peeped through the said window and saw accused-appellant Murcia
throwing cartons of clothes into the fire. Meanwhile, E. Quilates, who was then cooking
at the second floor, went downstairs and saw the fire coming from the room occupied by
accused-appellant Murcia in the ground floor;

Fourth, R. Viduya saw accused-appellant Murcia stabbing F. Quilates and A. Manlupig,

among other persons. E. Quilates saw his sister F. Quilates with blood oozing from her
mouth. Accused-appellant Murcia met him at the ground brandishing a knife at him
which prevented him from helping the wounded F. Quilates and forced him to run away
for safety. E. Quilates' other sister, A. Manlupig, was also seen wounded and lying
unconscious in the canal; and

Fifth, the houses of E. Quilates and his neighbors were razed by fire and the
commission of the crime of arson resulted in the demise of F. Quilates whose remains
were burned beyond recognition.28

Indeed, appellant was last seen inside the house before the fire started. Eulogio and
Ricky saw smoke emanating from the room of appellant. Herminio testified that he saw
appellant burning clothes in his room. Appellant then went on a stabbing rampage while
the house was on fire. While nobody directly saw appellant burn the house, these
circumstances would yield to a logical conclusion that the fire that gutted eight (8)
houses was authored by appellant.

Worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that on matters involving the credibility of witnesses,
the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses since it has
observed firsthand their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.
Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would
appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the
case, the factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the
trial court remain binding on an appellate tribunal.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding appellant JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED

G.R. No. 154974 February 4, 2008

KAUNLARAN LENDING INVESTORS, INC. AND LELIA CHUA SY, petitioners,

vs.
LORETA UY, respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Loreta filed a complaint before theRTC Dagupan for annulment of real
estate mortgage andrelated documents plus damages against the petitioners,along with
WIlfredo and Magno. She alleged that saiddocuments were absolute nullities due to the
absence ofconsideration and vitiated consent.After the defendants submitted their
Answerwith Counterclaim, the trial court rendered judgmentdeclaring as valid and legal
the subject documents.All parties appealed except for Magno who diedin 1991,
including Lelia. KLIIs appeal was only to the non-award of damages to it.
The CA reversed the trial court decision,declaring the subject documents as null and
void. MRhaving been denied, hence, this petition filed by KLII andLelia.Loreta moves for
the dismissal of the petitiondue to defective verification and certificate of non-
forumshopping.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the president of KLII wasauthorized to sign the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping on its behalf

HELD:

For failure of KLII to present proof that itspresident, Rolando Tan, was authorized to sign
theverification and certificate of non-forum shopping on itsbehalf, the petition must be
denied.In case of a corporation, it has long been settledthat the certificate [of non-forum
shopping] must besigned for and on its behalf by a
specifically authorizedofficer or agent
who has personal knowledge of the factsrequired to be disclosed.x x x xConsequently,
without the needed proof from the boardof directors, the certificate would be
considereddefective. Thus, xxx even the regular officers of acorporation, like the
chairman and president, may noteven know the details required in a certificate of non-
forum shopping; they must therefore be authorized bythe board of directors just like any
other officer or agent.

Disposition:
The merits of the petition, however, justify therelaxation of the rule on verification and
certificate ofnon-forum shopping, for from a review of the recordsLoreta has not proven
by preponderance of evidence thatshe was deceived into signing the documents
required forthe release of the proceeds of the loan.The petition is
GRANTED
. The decision of theCourt of Appeals dated April 11, 2002 is
G.R. No. 181635 November 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
NONOY EBET, Appellant

FACTS:

On February 3, 1997, around 7:30 p.m., three (3) men entered the house of the
spouses Gabriel Parcasio and Evelyn Parcasio. Of the three men, Evelyn recognized
one of them to be appellant Ebet, having been a constant visitor of her husband. Upon
entering, one of the unidentified men poked a gun at Evelyn, while another unidentified
man wielding a knife, held Evelyn's daughter, Joan. At that moment, Evelyn saw
appellant holding a knife and standing at the door of the house. The men asked Evelyn
where her husband was hiding and compelled her to lead them to the house's
underground. After the two unidentified men reached the underground, Evelyn heard
her husband shout for her and her daughters to run, which the latter did. Thereafter, a
gunshot was heard, as well as a commotion underground. Joan, after hearing the
gunshot, returned to the house fearing that her mother was shot. It was then that the
men accosted her and asked for her money. With no money to give, the men took her
bag worth One Hundred Thirty Pesos (P130.00), a wrist watch worth One Hundred
Twenty-Five Pesos (P125.00) and Thirty Pesos (P30.00) cash, the total of which is Two
Hundred Eighty-Five Pesos (P285.00). When the men left the premises, Evelyn went
back to their house and saw her husband bleeding to death due to multiple stab
wounds. The husband eventually died due to the said stab wounds.

For his defense, appellant presented his own testimony, as well as those of Virgilio
Balili, Fernando Saud and Feliciano Jordan. Based on their testimonies, the following
transpired:

On February 3, 1997, appellant was in the house of Agri Saud, which was 200 meters
away from the house of Gabriel and Evelyn Parcasio. Appellant was in the said house
from 5:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. He was there butchering a pig, together with Agri Saud,
Efren Leon, Willy Estigoy and Feliciano Jordan. Appellant claimed that he never left the
house or the group from the time he arrived at Agri Saud's house until they dispersed
later in the evening.
The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide.

On the appeal, the appellant argues that the prosecution witnesses failed to positively
identify him. He also argues that the trial court, in rejecting the defense of alibi, simply
adopted the general principle of alibi as a defense, being inherently weak, but failed to
point out any inconsistencies and falsities to his testimony, as well as those of the other
witnesses for the defense.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the alibi as a defense of the accused.

HELD:

The trial court, in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide, gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
As it explained:

The court finds the testimonies of Evelyn and Joan Parcasio as truthworthy, honest and
straightforward. It is significant to note that the prosecution's testimonies have not been
assailed. No motive was advanced by the defense why the witnesses will falsely testify
and implicate the herein accused in the commission of such a heinous crime. Thus, it
has been ruled by the Supreme Court "that when there is no evidence indicating that the
principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is
that he was not so moved, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. Denial,
like alibi is inherently a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible
testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. (People vs.
Belibet, 194 SCRA 588).

Clearly, it is only the incomplete police blotter that appears to be inconsistent. However,
the said inconsistency has been cured by the sworn statements and the testimonies
given in open court. With that in perspective, this Court, therefore, has no reason to
dispute the trial court's appreciation of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies. Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the assessment of
the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge, because of his
unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a
vantage point denied appellate courts - and when his findings have been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.

Appellant claims that he was butchering a pig at the house of Agri Saud located
at Barangay Perez, Kidapawan City from 5:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. of February 3, 1997.
The said alibi has been supported by the testimonies of two witnesses. However,
appellant failed to prove that it was impossible for him to be physically present at the
place where the crime had taken place and when the crime was being committed. For
alibi to prosper, it must strictly meet the requirements of time and place. It is not enough
to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but it
must also be demonstrated that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
crime scene at the time the crime was committed.30

This Court has always upheld that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and
must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently

and positively ascertained the identity of the accused. And it is only axiomatic that
positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.31

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the Decision dated July 31, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00257, which sustained with
modification, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

FACTS:

The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and
accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan
courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When
Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he
had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.

In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message
service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irishs face
superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A).2 The senders cellphone number, stated in the
message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that
he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003
(Exhibit B).3

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police.
Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he
used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at
the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a
motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers
intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900
cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police
station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"

After trial, the RTC found Irishs testimony completely credible, given in an honest and
spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her
experience, prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of
pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former
sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of
her charges with the verity borne out of human nature and experience." 6 Thus, in its
Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section
5(h) of R.A. 9262.

On Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), 7 the latter rendered a decision dated
January 31, 2008,8affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustans motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

xxx

The subordinate issues are:

xxx

3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in
violation of his constitutional rights; and

4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture
presented in the case.

HELD:
Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him
without any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed
inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the
cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from him at the time of his
arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the
prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was
used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.

Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irishs testimony that
she received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the senders
cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in
communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish
and the police used such numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he
did. Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the confiscated cellphone
and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.

Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish. His
defense was that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who
was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But
Rustan never presented the cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the
messages to him to authenticate the same. The RTC did not give credence to such
version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things
on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.

Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message
constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an
electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture,
Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should
have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered
in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element
of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April
25, 2008.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176389 December 14, 2010

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 176864

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN,
HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO
BIONG, Appellants.
FACTS:

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old,
and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Paraaque City. Following an
intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave
detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them
discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially
to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody
referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it
had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers,
who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P.
Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as
the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory
after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public
prosecutors filed information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.

For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying
they were elsewhere when it took place. Webbs alibi appeared the strongest since he
claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He
presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to
prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation
for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it,
the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial
court remained unfazed by significant discrepancies between Alfaros April 28 and May
22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to protect her
former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative, accused Gatchalian; that no lawyer
assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped her prepare her first
affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she needed
once she disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, modifying the penalty
imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the
award of damages to Lauro Vizconde. 4 The appellate court did not agree that the
accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient
evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada
equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing
her mother and sister.

On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special Division of
five members voted three against two to deny the motion, 5 hence, the present appeal.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a
Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen
specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under
the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the
Rule on DNA Evidence6 to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific
evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the
case.

Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody
of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record
shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the
prosecution offered in evidence in the case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground
that the governments failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial
of his right to due process.

ISSUE:

Accused Webbs motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not the Court
should acquit him outright, given the governments failure to produce the semen
specimen that the NBI found on Carmelas cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that
would prove his innocence.

xxxx
 1. Whether or not Alfaros testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and
identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others
as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief

HELD:

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the
ground of violation of his right to due process given the States failure to produce on
order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken
from Carmela.

The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with
this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her
testimony as Carmelas rapist and killer but serious questions had been raised about
her credibility. At the very least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the
other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be
coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two persons have
the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins. If, on examination, the
DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It
is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro committed
perjury in saying that he did.

Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen
specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland 9 that he cites
has long be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, where the U.S.
Supreme Court held that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen
specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show
bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a
medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought
to have the same subjected to DNA test.

For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did
not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no
Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently,
the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for
DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the
matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webbs application for DNA testing, he
allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken
against him and the other accused.11 They raised the DNA issue before the Court of
Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in
the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA
test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had
in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accuseds lack of
interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice
that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.

1. The quality of the witness

Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four years,
bothered by her conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to come forward and do
what was right? No. She was, at the time she revealed her story, working for the NBI as
an "asset," a stool pigeon, one who earned her living by fraternizing with criminals so
she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers. She had to live a life of lies to get
rewards that would pay for her subsistence and vices.

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for some time, however, they teased her about it and
she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone
who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest.
Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not
happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as well
assume the role of her informant.

2. The suspicious details

But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which even
tallied with the physical evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt, yes.

Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying details.
Everybody was talking about what the police found at the crime scene and there were
lots of speculations about them.

Secondly, the police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Paraaque and charged
them with the crime. The police prepared the confessions of the men they apprehended
and filled these up with details that the evidence of the crime scene provided. Alfaros
NBI handlers who were doing their own investigation knew of these details as well.
Since Alfaro hanged out at the NBI offices and practically lived there, it was not too
difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and gain access to the documents.

3. The quality of the testimony

There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from
inherent inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and the common
behavior of people will help expose a lie.

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains
doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all
possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it
would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt
hangs on to ones inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the
testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the
witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December
15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio
Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada
and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately
RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa
City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
DIRECTED to report the action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt
of this Decision.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 180557 September 26, 2008

HEIRS OF ROQUE F. TABUENA, represented by AURORA P. TABUENA, ESTER P.

TABUENA and ERLINDA T. MARCELLANA, HEIRS OF JOSE TABUENA,
represented by MA. LUZ T. MACASINAG, HEIRS OF ROMULO TABUENA,
represented by MILAGROS ARROYO, HEIRS OF BENJAMIN TABUENA,
represented by MA. VICTORIA TABUENA, and RAFAELA ROSARIO
ESGUERRA, Petitioners,
vs.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:

On September 28, 2000, respondents filed a complaint for determination and payment
of just compensation against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP), which was amended on October 3, 2000, alleging that they
were the owners of Lot No. 6183, an irrigated riceland with an area of 29.9557 hectares
located at Bibincahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon; that 26.2585 hectares of said lot were
brought by DAR under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 (The Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law) and set the total value thereof at P105,572.48, excluding increments, in
contravention of their right to a just compensation; and that the determination of what
constitutes just compensation is inherently a judicial function which cannot and should
not be left to administrative officials

LBP then filed an answer alleging that the complaint states no cause of action because
respondents already received the payment for their property in the form of cash and
bonds and they executed documents evidencing payment of the property to their full
satisfaction, such as the Assignment of Rights, Landowners Affidavit of Warranty and
Undertaking, Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Waiver of Rights, Payment Release
Forms, Special Power of Attorney and Delegation of Special Power of Attorney, copies
of which, together with photocopies of the Case Registry Book and Bond Registry Book,
were attached thereto as Annexes "A" to "G."
LBP alleged that the subject land transfer claim had been settled and extinguished by
virtue of the Deed of Assignment of Rights executed by petitioners in favor of LBP; that
the said deed is the best evidence that the land transfer claim had been consummated;
that since there has been no action on the part of petitioners to annul the same, they
were estopped from assailing its validity; that the just compensation fixed by the trial
court in the amount of P4,855,000.00 was improper since the valuation should be
computed at the time of the taking of the property; that petitioners should have first
availed of the administrative proceedings before the DAR which has primary jurisdiction
over the case; and that it is only after the landowner had disagreed with the valuation of
the DAR that he can file a case before the courts for final determination of just
compensation.

Petitioners claimed that their acceptance of the offered price does not estop them from
questioning the valuation since the Deed of Assignment of Rights is not conclusive proof
that their claim was extinguished; that the trial court did not err in fixing just
compensation in the amount of P4,855,000.00 since the actual taking of the land would
take effect only upon the payment of just compensation.

On July 11, 2007, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing and
setting aside the decision of the trial court and dismissing the complaint for
determination and payment of just compensation.

The Court of Appeals ruled that although the Deed of Assignment of Rights was not
formally offered by the respondent, the same was incorporated in the records of the
case; moreover, petitioners failed to deny it under oath hence, its genuineness and due
execution are deemed admitted; that since petitioners executed a Deed of Assignment
of Rights and acknowledged receipt of the full compensation for the property, there is no
need to bring the matter to the trial court for the determination and payment of just
compensation.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration9 was denied; hence, the instant petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not court erred when it admitted the Deed of Assignment of Rights
considering that the said document was not offered in evidence by respondent thu
petitioners were not given the opportunity to examine the same or to object to its
admissibility.
HELD:

Generally, courts cannot consider evidence which has not been formally offered. Parties
are required to inform the courts of the purpose of introducing their respective exhibits
to assist the latter in ruling on their admissibility in case an objection thereto is made.
Without a formal offer of evidence, courts are constrained to take no notice of the
evidence even if it has been marked and identified. However, this Court has relaxed the
foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered
by the trial court provided the same must have been identified by testimony duly
recorded and incorporated in the records of the case.

In the instant case, the Deed of Assignment of Rights 12 was set up by LBP as an
affirmative defense in its Answer and was incorporated in the records of the case as an
annex.13 Petitioners however failed to question its existence or due execution. On the
contrary, they acknowledged receipt of a portion of the compensation for the
property14 and admitted that the Deed of Assignment of Rights appeared as an
encumbrance in their certificate of title.15 Petitioners failure to specifically deny under
oath the existence, authenticity and due execution of the said document is tantamount
to a judicial admission of its genuineness and due execution. 16 Sections 7 and 8, Rule 8
of the Rules of Court provide:

SEC. 7. Action or defense based on document. Whenever an action or defense is

based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or
document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be
attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the
pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.

SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon
a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in
the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and
sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply
when the adverse party does not appear be a party to the instrument or when
compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 88469 dated July 11, 2007 reversing and setting aside the October 1, 2004
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Agrarian Case No. 2000-
6767 and dismissing petitioners complaint for determination and payment of just
compensation, as well as the October 15, 2007 Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 149193 April 4, 2011

RICARDO B. BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION AND PHILIP SARIA, Respondents,

FACTS:

Respondent RCBC claims that petitioner Bangayan signed a Surety Agreement in favor
of several companies that defaulted in their payment of customs duties that resulted in
the imposition of a lien over the accounts, particularly for the payment of customs duties
assessed by the Bureau of Customs. Respondent bank further claimed that it had
funded the letter of credit availed of by Lotec Marketing to finance the latters
importation with the account of petitioner Bangayan, who agreed to guarantee Lotec
Marketings obligations under the Surety Agreement; and, that respondent bank applied
petitioner Bangayans deposits to satisfy part of Lotec Marketings obligation in the
amount of twelve million seven hundred sixty-two thousand and six hundred pesos
(PhP12,762,600), which resulted in the depletion of the bank accounts.

Respondent RCBC presented Mr. Lao as its lone defense witness. Before the
termination of Mr. Laos direct examination, respondent RCBC filed a Motion to Inhibit
Presiding Judge Pedro Santiago, who subsequently denied the motion. 74 The Order
denying the Motion to Inhibit was the subject matter of petitions filed by respondent
RCBC in the Court of Appeals and subsequently in this Court, which were all dismissed.

In the meantime, when respondent RCBCs witness (Mr. Lao) failed to appear at the
hearing, Judge Santiago ordered that Mr. Laos testimony be stricken off the record
despite respondent banks motion to have the case reset. 76 After the appellate
proceedings for respondent RCBCs Petition as regards the Motion to Inhibit, however,
Judge Santiago set aside his earlier Order and reinstated the testimony of Mr. Lao,
subject to cross-examination. Petitioner Bangayan took exception to the Order
reinstating Mr. Laos testimony, but continued to conduct his cross examination with a
reservation to raise the Order in the appellate courts.

On 17 October 1994, the trial court rendered a Decision in favour of the respondent.
When his omnibus motion to have the Decision reconsidered was denied, 82 petitioner
Bangayan filed a notice of appeal.

ISSUE:

xxx

B. Whether there was reversible error on the part of the lower court in allowing
the testimony of Mr. Lao, despite its earlier Order to strike off the testimony.

xxx

HELD:

The trial court did not commit reversible error when it reinstated the testimony of Mr. Lao
and allowed petitioner Bangayan to cross-examine him.

Petitioner Bangayan also assails the lower courts order that reinstated the direct
testimony of Mr. Lao, respondent RCBCs lone witness. Petitioner claims that Judge
Santiago acted with partiality by reinstating Mr. Laos testimony, because this Court in
another case had already sustained the lower courts earlier Order striking out the
testimony. Hence, petitioner says that the judges reinstatement of Mr. Laos testimony
was in violation of petitioners right to due process.

Petitioner Bangayans arguments are unmeritorious.

There being no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide the judge in the court below in such
cases, there is no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide a court of appeals in reviewing his
action in the premises, and such courts will not therefore attempt to control the exercise
of discretion by the court below unless it plainly appears that there was "inconsiderate
action" or the exercise of mere "arbitrary will", or in other words that his action in the
premises amounted to "an abuse of discretion." But the right of an appellate court to
review judicial acts which lie in the discretion of inferior courts may properly be invoked
upon a showing of a strong and clear case of abuse of power to the prejudice of the
appellant, or that the ruling objected to rested on an erroneous principle of law not
vested in discretion.

Prior to a final judgment, trial courts have plenary control over the proceedings including
the judgment, and in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, may take such proper
action in this regard as truth and justice may require. 127

In the instant case, the trial court was within the exercise of its discretionary and plenary
control of the proceedings when it reconsidered motu propio its earlier order striking out
the testimony of Mr. Lao and ordered it reinstated.129 The order of the judge cannot be
considered as "willful, arbitrary, capricious and uncontrolled discretion," since his action
allowed respondent bank to present its case fully, especially considering that Mr. Lao
was the sole witness for the defense.

Neither can petitioner Bangayan claim any deprivation of due process when the trial
court ordered the reinstatement of Mr. Laos testimony without any motion or prayer
from respondent RCBC. The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of
due process.133 This right, however, has always been understood as requiring not
necessarily an actual cross-examination but merely an opportunity to exercise the right
to cross-examine if desired.134 What is proscribed by statutory norm and jurisprudential
precept is the absence of the opportunity to cross-examine.

In this case, petitioner Bangayans right to due process was not violated, as he was
given the freedom and opportunity to cross-examine and confront Mr. Lao on the latters
testimony. Even if respondent RCBC had not filed any motion, it was well within the
courts discretion to have Mr. Laos testimony reinstated in the "interest of substantial
justice." The proceedings in the trial court in this civil case were adversarial in nature
insofar as the parties, in the process of attaining justice, were made to advocate their
respective positions in order to ascertain the truth. The truth-seeking function of the
judicial system is best served by giving an opportunity to all parties to fully present their
case, subject to procedural and evidentiary rules. Absent any blatant neglect or willful
delay, both parties should be afforded equal latitude in presenting the evidence and the
testimonies of their witnesses in favor of their respective positions, as well as in testing
the credibility and the veracity of the opposing partys claims through cross-examination.

The Court finds no reversible error on the part of the trial court in allowing the full
presentation of the reinstated testimony of respondent RCBCs lone witness, especially
since the other party was afforded the occasion to cross-examine the witness and in
fact availed himself of the opportunity. Although he expressly reserved his right to
question the courts reinstatement of the testimony of the witness, petitioner Bangayan
did not satisfactorily offer convincing arguments to overturn the trial courts order. That
the court gave petitioner the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Lao a remedy that
petitioner even fully availed himself of negates the allegation of bias against the
Judge.

G.R. No. 171497 April 4, 201

MARIA LOURDES TAMANI, CONCEPCION TAMANI, ESTRELLA TAMANI,

TERESITA TAMANI, AZUCENA SOLEDAD, DOLORES GUERRERO, CRISTINA
TUGADE DAMIETA MANSAANG, MANUEL TAMANI, VALERIANA CASTRO,
AURORA SANTIAGO and ROSARIO CASTILLO, Petitioners,
vs.
ROMAN SALVADOR and FILOMENA BRAVO, Respondents.

FACTS:

The respondent spouses filed a Complaint for quieting of title was against the
petitioners, who were legal heirs of the spouses Demetrio Tamani and Josefa
Caddauan, over a 431 sq. m. parcel of land located at Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.

Respondents and the Spouses Tamani are co-owners of an undivided parcel of land
with an area of 776 sq. m. Based on the TCT, respondents own 345 sq. m. of the
property whereas the Spouses Tamani own the remaining 431 sq. m. (disputed
property). The spouses Tamani allegedly sold the disputed property to Milagros Cruz
(Cruz) as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale for a consideration of Php 2,500.00.
Subsequently, Cruz sold the disputed property to respondents through a Deed of
Absolute Sale for the same consideration. Thus, the respondents acquired ownership
over the whole area of 776 sq. m.

In the meantime, Benigno Magpale (Magpale) and Leoncia Velasco (Velasco) filed a
complaint for specific performance against the Spouses Tamani in the RTC compelling
the Spouses Tamani to execute a deed of sale over a residential land which was
alledgedly sold to them without documentation. Since the dismissal of their complaint,
the respondents have remained in possession over the disputed property.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring the Deed of Sale null and void and
directing the RD to cancel the TCT under the name of the respondents. On appeal, the
CA reversed the decision of the lower court declaring the said documents valid.

ISSUE:

COURT OF APPEALS DISUSED (SIC) THE PROPER ROLE OF AN APPELLATE

COURT IN CASES WHERE THERE ARE CONFLICTING EXPERT TESTIMONIES
AND IMPROPERLY INTERPRETED THEIR DUTY TO INDEPENDENTLY EVALUATE
THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE LATE DEMETRIO TAMANI.

xxx

HELD:

Before anything else, this Court observes that the present spectacle of having two
expert witnesses with conflicting findings could have been avoided had respondents
timely objected to petitioners motion to have a second re-examination of Tamanis
signature. After all, respondents are correct in their claim that the first examination was
at the instance of petitioners. Respondents should have, therefore, objected to the
second re-examination, as the RTC would have likely sustained the motion. However, a
perusal of the records24 would show that counsel for respondents never objected to
petitioners motion for a re-examination of Tamanis signature.

The two witnesses, Bienvenido C. Albacea and Mely Feliciano Sorra having examined
the same documents but arrived and submitted opposing conclusions. It would appear,
however, that based on their educational, professional and work backgrounds, the Court
would give more weight to the report and testimony of Mely Feliciano Sorra, that the
questioned documents and the standard documents were written by different persons. 25

The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements
of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in
pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between
genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or
detection from an unpracticed observer.31 While admittedly this Court was unable to fully
comprehend all the differences noted by Sorra given that her testimony was fairly
technical in nature and description, it would, however, not be amiss to state that this
Court has observed a good number of the differences noted by her.

The deed of sale may have been notarized and it is true that a notarial document is
considered evidence of the facts expressed therein. 39 A notarized document enjoys a
prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution, 40 and only clear and
convincing evidence will overcome such legal presumption. 41 Nonetheless, given the
highly questionable circumstances present in the case at bar such prima facie
presumption was properly put in dispute.

Given the manner by which petitioners presented and defended their case, this Court is
of the opinion that respondents should have presented the individual who acted as
witness to the deed of sale and the notary public who acknowledged the instrument to
shed light on the circumstances of the same. However, when Cruz was asked if she
remembered the person who acted as a witness to the deed of sale, Cruz peculiarly
said that she did not know or remember who the individual was.
19. COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION VS ANTONIO LAGMAN

GR NO 165487; July 13, 2011

PEREZ J:

FACTS:

Nelson Santos (Santos) applied for a license with the National Food Authority
(NFA) to engage in the business of storing not more than 30,000 sacks of palay valued
at P5,250,000.00 in his warehouse at Barangay Malacampa, Camiling, Tarlac. Under
Act No. 3893 or the General Bonded Warehouse Act, as amended, the approval for
said license was conditioned upon posting of a cash bond, a bond secured by real
estate, or a bond signed by a duly authorized bonding company, the amount of which
shall be fixed by the NFA Administrator at not less than thirty-three and one third percent
(33 1/3%) of the market value of the maximum quantity of rice to be received.

Accordingly, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (Country Bankers) issued

Warehouse Bond No. 03304for P1,749,825.00 on 5 November 1989 and Warehouse
Bond No. 02355[for P749,925.00 on 13 December 1989 (1989 Bonds) through its agent,
Antonio Lagman (Lagman). Santos was the bond principal, Lagman was the surety and
the Republic of the Philippines, through the NFA was the obligee. In consideration of
these issuances, corresponding Indemnity Agreements were executed by Santos, as
bond principal, together with Ban Lee Lim Santos (Ban Lee Lim), Rhosemelita Reguine
(Reguine) and Lagman, as co-signors. The latter bound themselves jointly and severally
liable to Country Bankers for any damages, prejudice, losses, costs, payments,
advances and expenses of whatever kind and nature, including attorneys fees and legal
costs, which it may sustain as a consequence of the said bond; to reimburse Country
Bankers of whatever amount it may pay or cause to be paid or become liable to pay
thereunder; and to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum computed and
compounded monthly, as well as to pay attorneys fees of 20% of the amount due it.

Santos then secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as collateral. When
the loan matured, Santos defaulted in his payment. The sacks of palay covered by the
warehouse receipts were no longer found in the bonded warehouse. By virtue of the
surety bonds, Country Bankers was compelled to pay P1,166,750.37.

Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum of money docketed

as Civil Case No. 95-73048 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In his
Answer, Lagman alleged that the 1989 Bonds were valid only for 1 year from the date of
their issuance, as evidenced by receipts; that the bonds were never renewed and
revived by payment of premiums; that on 5 November 1990, Country Bankers issued
Warehouse Bond No. 03515 (1990 Bond) which was also valid for one year and that no
Indemnity Agreement was executed for the purpose; and that the 1990 Bond
supersedes, cancels, and renders no force and effect the 1989 Bonds.

The bond principals, Santos and Ban Lee Lim, were not served with summons because
they could no longer be found. The case was eventually dismissed against them without
prejudice. The other co-signor, Reguine, was declared in default for failure to file her
answer.

On 21 September 1998, the trial court rendered judgment declaring Reguine and
Lagman jointly and severally liable to pay Country Bankers the amount of
P2,400,499.87. CA reversed the decision of RTC

While the trial court did not directly rule on the existence and validity of the 1990 Bond,
it upheld the 1989 Bonds as valid and binding, which could not be unilaterally cancelled
by Lagman. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, acknowledged the 1990 Bond as
having cancelled the two previous bonds by novation. Both courts however failed to
discuss their basis for rejecting or admitting the 1990 Bond, which, as we indicated, is
bone to pick in this case.

Lagmans insistence on novation depends on the validity, nay, existence of the allegedly
novating 1990 Bond. Country Bankers understandably impugns both. We see the point.
Lagman presented a mere photocopy of the 1990 Bond.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the presented photocopy of the document is admissible in evidence.

HELD:

. We rule as inadmissible such copy.

Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced whenever its
contents are the subject of inquiry. The rule is encapsulated in Section 3, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, as follow:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of

inquiry is the contents of a documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the
original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production
in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows:
existence, execution, loss, and contents.

A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for
the non-production of the original instrument. When more than one original copy exists,
it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be
used without accounting for the other originals.

Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of these duplicate originals,

Lagman merely presented a photocopy. He admitted that he kept a copy of the 1990
Bond but he could no longer produce it because he had already severed his ties with
Country Bankers. However, he did not explain why severance of ties is by itself reason
enough for the non-availability of his copy of the bond considering that, as it appears
from the 1989 Bonds, Lagman himself is a bondsman.

The Facts and the Case

On November 2, 2004 petitioner Natividad Sta. Ana Victoria applied for registration
under the law[1]of a 1,729-square meter lot in Bambang, City of Taguig, before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of that city. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing the respondent Republic of the Philippines, opposed the application in the
usual form.

Victoria testified and offered documentary evidence to show that the subject lot, known
as Lot 5176-D, Mcadm-590-D of the Taguig Cadastral Mapping is a portion of a parcel
of land with an area of 17,507 sq m originally owned by Victoria's father Genaro Sta.
Ana and previously declared in his name for tax purposes. Upon Genaro's death,
Victoria and her siblings inherited the land and divided it among themselves via a deed
of partition.

The Conversion/Subdivision Plan Victoria presented in evidence showed that the land is
inside the alienable and disposable area under Project 27-B as per L.C. Map 2623, as
certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on January 3, 1968. Victoria testified
that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
continuously, uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely and in the concept of owners
since the early 1940s or for more than 30 years and have been declared as owners for
taxation purposes for the last 30 years. The Republic did not present any evidence in
support of its opposition.
On January 25, 2006 the MeTC rendered a decision, [2] granting the application for
registration and finding that Victoria sufficiently established her claim and right under the
land registration law to have the subject property registered in her name.

The Republic appealed the MeTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), pointing out in
its brief that Victoria failed to present evidence that the subject property is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain and that she failed to establish the kind of
possession required for registration.

In her brief, Victoria replied that the Conversion/Subdivision Plan she submitted carried
a notation that the subject property is within alienable and disposable area. Further, she
attached to her brief a Certification[3] dated November 6, 2006 issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), verifying the subject property as within
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

On June 19, 2007 the CA rendered judgment, reversing and setting aside the MeTC
decision because Victoria failed to prove that the subject lot is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain. She could not, said the CA, rely on the notation in the
Conversion/Subdivision Plan she submitted before the MeTC, although it carried a
notation that the land is alienable and disposable as certified by the Chief of Survey of
the Land Management Services of the DENR on January 3, 1968, because such
notation was made only in connection with the approval of the plan.

On the other hand, the CA could not take cognizance of the DENR Certification of
November 6, 2006 that she submitted together with her appellee's brief even if it were to
the same effect since she did not offer it in evidence during the hearing before the trial
court. The CA found it unnecessary to pass upon the evidence of Victoria's possession
and occupation of the subject property. It denied Victoria's motion for reconsideration
on September 11, 2007.

ISSUE:

The issues in this case are:

XXX

Whether or not Victoria amply proved that the subject lot is alienable and disposable
land of the public main; and
HELD:

The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity of these
documents,34 particularly the Agreement. However, he claims that since the Agreement
does not reflect the true intention of the parties, the Affidavit was subsequently executed
in order to reflect the parties true intention.1avvphi1

The petitioners argument calls to fore the application of the parol evidence rule, i.e.,
when the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement is
deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be
admitted other than what is contained in the written agreement. Whatever is not found in
the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned.

To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to
present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement
if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the written agreement to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of the written
agreement to express the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake,
fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of
the minds of the parties.38

At the trial, the petitioner attempted to prove, by parol evidence, the alleged true
intention of the parties by presenting the Affidavit, which allegedly corrected the mistake
in the previously executed Agreement and confirmed his ownership of the parcels of
land covered by his titles. It was the petitioners staunch assertion that the respondent
co-executed this Affidavit supposedly to reflect the parties true intention.

In the present petition, however, the petitioner made a damaging admission that the
Benigna Deed is fabricated, thereby completely bolstering the respondents cause of
action for reconveyance of the disputed property on the ground of fraudulent registration
of title. Since the Affidavit merely reflects what is embodied in the Benigna Deed, the
petitioners admission, coupled with the respondents denial of his purported signature
in the Affidavit, placed in serious doubt the reliability of this document, supposedly the
bedrock of the petitioners defense.

Curiously, if the parties truly intended to include in the petitioners share the disputed
property, the petitioner obviously need not go at length of fabricating a deed of sale to
support his application for the transfer of title of his rightful portion of the subject
property. Notably, there is nothing in the Affidavit (that supposedly corrected the mistake
in the earlier Agreement) that supports the petitioners claim that the partition of the
subject property is based on the parties actual possession.

The Torrens system of registration cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true
owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or to permit one to
enrich oneself at the expense of others.40 Hence, the CA correctly ordered the
reconveyance of the disputed property, covered by TCT No. 195813, to the respondent.