6. City of Bacolod vs.

San Miguel
29 SCRA 819
FACTS: On February 17, 1949, the City Council of Bacolod passed Ordinance No. 66,
series of 1949 imposing upon "any person, firm or corporation engaged in the
manufacturer bottling of coca-cola, pepsi cola, tru orange, lemonade, and other soft
drinks within the jurisdiction of the City of Bacolod, a fee of one twenty-fourth (1/24) of a
centavo for every bottle thereof," plus "a surcharge of 2% every month, but in no case to
exceed 24% for one whole year," upon "such local manufacturers or bottler above-
mentioned who will be delinquent on any amount of fees due" under the ordinance. This
ordinance was subsequently amended by Ordinance No. 150 by increasing the fee to
1/8 of a centavo for every bottle thereof.

Such increase was opposed by the appellant San Miguel.

Appellee CoB sued appellant San Miguel. Court rendered judgment in favor of CoB
ordering SM to pay it the sum of P26K and the tax at the rate of 3 centavos per case.
Appellant San Miguel appealed from the said decision to this Court where it pressed the
question of the invalidity of the abovementioned taxing ordinances. In that appeal,
however, the Court affirmed the decision appealed from and upheld the constitutionality
of the questioned ordinances and the authority of the appellee to enact the same.

Moreover, for some other reasons, it was already after this decision had become
final when appellee moved for the reconsideration thereof, praying that the same be
amended so as to include the penalties and surcharges provided for in the ordinances
but the said motion was denied due to the fact that "the decision is already final and
may not be amended." When execution was had before the lower court, the appellee
again sought the inclusion of the surcharges referred to; and once again the move was
frustrated by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which denied the motion.

Failing thus in its attempt to collect the surcharge provided for in the ordinances,
appellee filed a second action to collection the said surcharges (P36K). Appellant San
Miguel filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the grounds that: (1) the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment, and (2) a party may not institute more than one suit for a
single cause of action. This motion was denied by the court a quo so appellant filed its
Answer wherein it substantially reiterated, as affirmative defenses, the above-mentioned
grounds of its motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the parties submitted the case for judgment
on the pleadings, whereupon, the court rendered judgment ordering the defendant San
Miguel Brewery, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P36,519.10 representing the
surcharges as provided in section 4 of Ordinance 66, series of 1949 of the City of
Bacolod.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners act of filing another action for surcharges constitutes
splitting of action.

RULING: Yes. Appellant San Miguels position was upheld by the Court. There is no
question that appellee split up its cause of action when it filed the first complaint seeking
the recovery of only the bottling taxes or charges plus legal interest, without mentioning
in any manner the surcharges.

The rule on the matter is clear. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court of 1940
which were still in force then provided:

SEC. 3. Splitting a cause of action, forbidden. A single cause of action cannot

be split up into two or more parts so as to be made the subject of different
complaints.
 SEC. 4. Effect of splitting. If separate complaints were brought for different
parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in
abatement of the others, and a judgment upon the merits in either is available as
a bar in the others.

Indeed, this rule against the splitting up of a cause of action is an old one. In fact,
it preceded the Rules of Court or any statutory provision.

The classical definition of a cause of action is that it is "a delict or wrong by which
the rights of the plaintiff are violated by the defendant." Its elements may be generally
stated to be (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a corresponding obligation on
the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission of the plaintiff
which constitutes a violation of the plaintiff's right which defendant had the duty to
respect. In the last analysis, a cause of action is basically an act or an omission or
several acts or omissions.
A single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as
when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal
obligations. On the other hand, it can happen also that several acts or omissions may
violate only one right, in which case, there would be only one cause of action. Again the
violation of a single right may give rise to more than one relief. In other words, for a
single cause of action or violation of a right, the plaintiff may be entitled to several
reliefs. It is the filing of separate complaints for these several reliefs that constitutes
splitting up of the cause of action. This is what is prohibited by the rule.

Furthermore, when appellant failed and refused to pay the difference in bottling
charges such act of appellant in violation of the right of appellee to be paid said charges
in full under the Ordinance, was one single cause of action, but under the Ordinance,
appellee became entitled, as a result of such non-payment, to two reliefs, namely: (1)
the recovery of the balance of the basic charges; and (2) the payment of the
corresponding surcharges, the latter being merely a consequence of the failure to pay
the former. The obligation of appellant to pay the surcharges arose from the violation by
said appellant of the same right of appellee from which the obligation to pay the basic
charges also arose. Upon these facts, it is obvious that appellee has filed separate
complaints for each of two reliefs related to the same single cause of action, thereby
splitting up the said cause of action.
7. Jalandoni v. Martir-Guanzon
102 Phil. 859
FACTS: On January 9, 1947, the appellant spouses began a suit (Case No. 573)
against the appellees Antonio Guanzon, eta al., for partition of various lots and for
recovery of damages caused by the defendants' unwarranted refusal to recognize
plaintiffs' right and partition said lots, as was to account for and deliver plaintiff's share in
the crops obtained during the agricultural years from 1941-1942 to 1946-1947.

Meanwhile, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental held for plaintiffs and
ordered the partition of the lands involved, but denied their claim for damages because
of failure to "prove the exact and actual damages suffered by them. The decision having
become final because none of the parties appealed therefrom, the plaintiffs instituted
the present action seeking recovery from the defendants for moral and exemplary
damages, share of the products of the property from 1947 until 1955, taxes due unpaid
and attorneys fees. Upon motion of defendant's, the court a quo dismissed the second
complaint for failure to state a cause of action; and after their motion to reconsider was
denied, plaintiffs appealed to this Court on points of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not dismissal was proper.

RULING: Yes. The Court found the dismissal of the lower court to have been correctly
entered. Except as concomitant to physical injuries, moral and corrective damages
(allegedly due to suffering, anguish and anxiety caused by the refusal of defendants in
1941 to partition the common property) were not recoverable under the Civil Code of
1899 which was the governing law at the time. Recovery of such damages was
established for the first time in 1950 by the new Civil Code, and action not be made to
apply retroactively to acts that occurred character of these damages. The rule is
expressly laid down by paragraph 1 of Article 2257 of the new Code.

Moreover, as to the value of the plaintiff's share in the products of the land during
the time that the former action was pending (which are the damages claimed under the
second cause of action), their recovery is now barred by the previous judgment.

Also, in the same way that plaintiffs claimed for their share of the produce from
1941 to 1947, these later damages could have been claimed in the first action, either in
the original complaint or else by supplemental pleading. To allow them to be recovered
by subsequent suit would be a violation of the rule against multiplicity of suits, and
specifically of sections 3 and 4 of Rules 2 of the Rules of Court, against the splitting of
causes of action, since these damages spring from the same cause of action that was
pleading in the former case No. 573 between the same parties. Anent the land taxes
allegedly overdue and unpaid, it is readily apparent that, taxes been due to the
government, plaintiffs have no right to compel payment thereof to themselves. Little
need be said concerning the claim for attorney's fees under the fourth cause of action. If
they be fees for the lawyer's services in the former case, they are barred from recovery
for the reasons already given; if for services in the present case, there is no jurisdiction
therefor, since no case is made out for the plaintiffs.

8. Joseph vs. Bautista

170 SCRA 540
FACTS: Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck for conveying
cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. The said
cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan
from Pangasinan. Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck at
Dagupan City. Thereupon, while said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway
proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise
proceeding in the same direction.

At about the same time, a pick-up truck, supposedly owned by respondents

Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva,
tried to overtake the cargo truck thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the
shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner sustained a bone
fracture in one of his legs.

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as

owner of the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and against
respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively,
of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict. Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging
that he is not and never was an owner of the pick-up truck and neither would he acquire
ownership thereof in the future.
Moreover, petitioner, with prior leave of court, filed his amended complaint
impleading respondents Jacinto Pagarigan and a certain Rosario Vargas as additional
alternative defendants. Petitioner apparently could not ascertain who the real owner of
said cargo truck was, whether respondents Patrocinio Perez or Rosario Vargas, and
who was the real owner of said pick-up truck, whether respondents Antonio Sioson or
Jacinto Pagarigan. Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim
against her co-defendants for indemnity and subrogation in the event she is ordered to
pay petitioner's claim, and therein impleaded cross-defendant Alberto Cardeno as
additional alternative defendant. Respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno,
Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, thru their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the
Philippines, paid petitioner's claim for injuries sustained. And by reason thereof,
petitioner executed a release of claim releasing them from liability. A few months after,
they also paid respondent Patrocinio Perez' claim for damages to her cargo truck.
Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a "Motion
to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva,
Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging that respondents
Cardeno and Villanueva already paid damages to respondent Perez, and alleging
further that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid an amount to
petitioner. Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-defs.' motion and
Counter Motion" to dismiss. The so-called counter motion to dismiss was premised on
the fact that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of the other respondents
inured to the benefit of respondent Perez, considering that all the respondents are
solidarity liable to herein petitioner. Respondent judge issued the questioned order
dismissing the case, and a motion for the reconsideration thereof was denied.
Petitioner, by way of appeal, contends that respondent judge erred in declaring that the
release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of respondents Sioson, Villanueva and
Pagarig.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners contention is correct.

RULING: No. The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the- delict or
wrong violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from
several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises. In the case at bar, there is no
question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a
single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the different
respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed by law.

Therefore, the trial court was correct in holding that there was only one cause of
action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the
defendants therein were not necessarily identical since the respondents were not
identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy
necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the
proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission which,
obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.

There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily liable to petitioner.
On the evidence presented in the court below, the trial court found them to be so liable.
It is undisputed that petitioner, in his amended complaint, prayed that the trial court hold
respondents jointly and severally liable.

The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to petitioner, the full
payment made by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release from any
and all liability to petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment and release from
liability of the other solidary debtors, including herein respondent Patrocinio Perez.
9. PNB vs. Estanislao Militar
467 SCRA 377
FACTS: Deogracias, Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad, all surnamed Militar, were heirs of
Estanislao Militar and the registered co-owners of Lot Nos. 3011 and 3017 covered by
OCT No. T-8238-A (0-16879) and OCT No. 94-(0-16878).

On August 16, 1941, Deogracias sold his undivided share in Lot No. 3011 to
Pedro Golez, and in Lot No. 3017 to spouses Sofronio and Lourdes Lumagbas. Golez
annotated the sale at the back of the title thereof while spouses Lumagbas caused the
subdivision of Lot No. 3017 into Lot No. 3017-A and Lot No. 3017-B, with Lot No. 3017-
A registered in their names under TCT No. 8239. Notwithstanding the sale, Deogracias
continued to occupy a portion of Lot No. 3011 and Lot No. 3017-B until his death on
March 17, 1964. Glicerio died on March 22, 1939, Tomas on August 20, 1959 and
Caridad on April 29, 1957. Glicerio and Caridad died without issue. Deogracias was
survived by Teodorico and Remedios, while Tomas was survived by Wenceslao and
Ladislao.

However, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 24, 1975, Deogracias, Glicerio,
Tomas and Caridad purportedly sold Lot No. 3011 to spouses Rodolfo and Nilda
Jalbuna. In another Deed of Sale dated April 25, 1975, Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad
purportedly sold Lot No. 3017-B to the same spouses. Consequently, titles to Lot Nos.
3011 and 3017-B were cancelled and new titles, TCT Nos. 39083 and 39082,
respectively, were issued to spouses Jalbuna.

Subsequently, Lot No. 3011 was subdivided into Lot No. 3011-A and Lot No.
3011-B, with Lot No. 3011-A registered in the name of spouses Jalbuna and Lot No.
3011-B in the name of Golez.

On June 5, 1975, spouses Jalbuna mortgaged Lot No. 3017-B to Philippine

National Bank (PNB) as security for a loan. When they defaulted, PNB extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage and sold Lot No. 3017-B at public auction, with PNB as the
highest bidder. Title thereto was consolidated in the name of PNB and was issued TCT
No. T-61465.

Thereafter, PNB sold the lot to spouses Johnny and Nona Lucero, who were issued
TCT No. 76938. As the new owners of Lot No. 3017-B, they filed an ejectment case
against Tranquilina, Azucena, Freddie and Eduardo, all surnamed Militar, the actual
occupants therein.

On October 2, 1989, Tranquilina, Azucena, Freddie and Eduardo as surviving

heirs of Teodorico and Deogracias Militar, filed a complaint against spouses Jalbuna,
PNB, and spouses Lucero for Reconveyance of Title, Annulment of Sale, Cancellation
of Titles and Damages. Other heirs of Deogracias on the side of Remedios filed a
complaint-in-intervention to join the plaintiffs. They prayed for: 1) the declaration of
nullity of the two (2) deeds of sale dated April 24, 1975 and April 25, 1975 covering Lot
No. 3011 and Lot No. 3017-B, respectively; 2) the cancellation of title covering Lot No.
3017-B in the name of spouses Lucero; 3) the cancellation of title covering Lot No.
3011-A in the name of spouses Jalbuna; 4) the reconveyance of Lot 3011-A and Lot No.
3017-B to the heirs of Deogracias Militar; and 5) actual, exemplary and moral damages.

Spouses Jalbuna invoked prescription, non-inclusion of indispensable parties

and lack of cause of action since their predecessor, Deogracias, no longer had interest
over the properties having sold them to third parties. PNB claimed that it was a
mortgaee in good faith and for value; that the title of spouses Jalbuna was free from all
liens and encumbrances when they secured the loan; and that it conducted verification
and inspection of the property before granting the loan.

Spouses Lucero alleged that the complaint was commenced without the real
party in interest; that the cause of action has prescribed; and that they were innocent
purchasers in good faith and for value.

The trial court rendered a decision dated October 18, 1995, dismissing the
complaint, complaint-in-intevention, as well as the cross claim of PNB.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the case was brought by all indispensable parties;
2.) Whether or not petitioners PNB and spouses Lucero were mortgagee
and purchasers in good faith, respectively; and
3.) Whether or not action for reconveyance has prescribed or is barred by
laches.

The court was not persuaded by PNBs claim that the case was not brought by all
indispensable parties as other heirs of Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad have not been
named as parties therein.

An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action
in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The
party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so
inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the
proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be a resolution of the
dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.
There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded
the plaintiff without the presence of the other party?; and, (2) can the case be decided
on the merits without prejudicing the rights of the other party? There is, however, no
fixed formula for determining who is an indispensable party; this can only be determined
in the context and by the facts of the particular suit or litigation.

In the case at bar, the ultimate relief sought by the action is the reconveyance of
titles to their rightful owners. The records reveal that prior to the forgery, the disputed
properties were registered in the names of the co-owners, Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad,
whose interests remained undivided. Thus, if reconveyance of the titles is granted, the
titles will revert back to the estates of the deceased co-owners and not to their individual
heirs, whose interests are divisible and may properly be ventilated in another
proceeding. Therefore, a co-heir may bring such action without necessarily joining all
the other co-heirs as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals:

PNB next argues that since Deogracias sold his shares in the disputed lots, his
heirs, herein respondents, do not have a cause of action against it, spouses Jalbuna
and spouses Lucero.

This argument is proper had Deogracias died ahead of the other co-owners.
However, records show that Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad predeceased Deogracias.
Glicerio died on March 22, 1939, Tomas on August 20, 1959, Caridad on April 29, 1957,
while Deogracias died on March 17, 1964.

Clearly, when Glicerio and Caridad died intestate and without issue, their shares
in the disputed properties were inherited by Deogracias and Tomas. It is this portion that
respondents, as heirs of Deogracias, have an interest on and which vested them with
personality to institute the present case.
 PNB and spouses Lucero claim to be mortgagee and buyers in good faith,
respectively, since title to Lot No. 3017-B appeared to be free from any encumbrance.
They argue that a person dealing with a registered land may rely on the correctness of
the certificate of title and is not required to go beyond it to determine the condition of the
property.

Whether petitioners are innocent mortgagee or purchasers in good faith and for
value, is a factual matter, which cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. Settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence adduced by the parties during
trial. In Heirs of the Late Spouses Aurelio and Esperanza Balite v. Lim, we held that
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon us. These
findings may be reviewed only under exceptional circumstances such as when the
inference is manifestly mistaken; the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
findings of the trial court contradict those of the appellate court; or the latter manifestly
overlooked relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court based on its findings
of facts which are in accord with the documents on record. Thus, we affirm the Court of
Appeals finding that petitioners were not mortgagee or buyers in good faith.

Moreover, the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for
value lies upon him who asserts that status. In discharging the burden, it is not enough
to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith. The rule is settled that a buyer of real
property in possession of persons other than the seller must be wary and should
investigate the rights of those in possession. Without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly
be regarded as buyer in good faith and cannot have any right over the property.

PNB claims that it conducted the necessary inquiry and investigation on the
subject lot and was convinced that Nilda Jalbuna, as one of the heirs of Estanislao
Militar, had every right to mortgage the same, even if she was not in actual possession
thereof. However, considering that the land was in the possession of persons other than
the mortgagors, PNB should have inquired whether the possessors knew that the lot is
being mortgaged, and the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the lot by the
mortgagors. Indeed, while PNB is not expected to conduct an exhaustive investigation
on the history of the mortgagors title, it cannot be excused from the duty of exercising
the due diligence required of a banking institution. In Tomas v. Tomas, we noted that it
is standard practice for banks, before approving a loan, to send representatives to the
property offered as collateral to assess its actual condition and to investigate who are
the real owners thereof. We held that banks are expected to exercise more care and
prudence than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered
lands, for their business is affected with public interest. Verily, PNB was remiss in the
exercise of due diligence required of a banking institution, hence it cannot be
considered as mortgagee in good faith.

Neither could spouses Lucero be considered buyers in good faith. As

respondents neighbors, they could have verified the status of the property they were
buying by inquiring from the possessors thereof. This, they failed to do; hence they
cannot be considered buyers in good faith.

As to whether the action for reconveyance has prescribed, we held in Santos v.

Santos, citing Lacsamana v. CA, that the right to file an action for reconveyance on the
ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is
virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe.
 Neither could laches be successfully invoked. Laches is a doctrine in equity
which has been aptly described as justice outside legality, and applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The
positive mandate of Art. 1410 of the Civil Code conferring imprescriptibility to actions or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract should pre-empt and prevail
over all abstract arguments based only on equity. Certainly, laches cannot be set up to
resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right; thus, respondents can validly
vindicate their inheritance despite the lapse of time.

Finally, while certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable and binding

against the whole world, they merely confirm or record title already existing and vested.
They cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used for
the perpetration of fraud; neither do they permit one to enrich himself at the expense of
others.
10. Republic vs. Marcos Manotoc, et. al
665 SCRA 367
Facts: After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino
created the Presidential Commission of Good Government (PCGG). The PCGG filed a
Complaint against Ferdinand Marcos, who has later substituted by his estate upon his
death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents Imee MarcosManotoc, Irene Marcos
Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Marcos, and Gregorio Araneta III.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are parties in interest.

Ruling: Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the death of
Ferdinand E. Marcos, it is imperative therefore that the estate be duly represented. The
purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to a
litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself
protected, as he continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly
appointed legal representatives of his estate. On that note, we take judicial notice of the
probate proceedings regarding the will of Ferdinand E. Marcos. In Republic of the
Philippines v. Marcos II, it is upheld the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of letters
testamentary in sodium to Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and Imelda Romualdez Marcos as
executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.