CASE NO.
1 Settled is the rule that a defective notarization will strip the
SARILI VS. LAGROSA G.R. No. 193517 January 15, 2014
Facts: Respondent is the owner of a certain parcel of land
which he has been religiously paying the real estate taxes for
since its acquisition. Respondent is a resident of California,
USA, and during his vacation in the Philippines, he discovered
that a new certificate of title to the subject property was
issued by the RD in the name of Victorino married to Isabel
Amparoby virtue of a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale dated
February 16, 1978 (February 16, 1978 deed of sale)
purportedly executed by him and his wife, Amelia U. Lagrosa.
In their answer, Sps. Sarili maintained that they are innocent
purchasers for value, having purchased the subject property
from Ramon B. Rodriguez, who possessed and presented a
Special Power of Attorney to sell/dispose of the same, and, in
such capacity, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
November 20, 1992 conveying the said property in their
favor. In this relation, they denied any participation in the
preparation of the February 16, 1978 deed of sale, which may
have been merely devised by the "fixer" they hired to
facilitate the issuance of the title in their names.
Issue: Whether there is a valid conveyance of the property?
Ruling: The strength of the buyers inquiry on the sellers
capacity or legal authority to sell depends on the proof of
capacity of the seller. If the proof of capacity consists of a
special power of attorney duly notarized, mere inspection of
the face of such public document already constitutes
sufficient inquiry. If no such special power of attorney is
provided or there is one but there appears to be flaws in its
notarial acknowledgment, mere inspection of the document
will not do; the buyer must show that his investigation went
beyond the document and into the circumstances of its
execution.
document of its public character and reduce it to a private
instrument, and the evidentiary standard of its validity shall
be based on preponderance of evidence.
Since Sps. Sarilis claim over the subject property is based on
forged documents, no valid title had been transferred to
them.
CASE NO. 2
BJDC CONSTRUCTION, REPRESENTED BY ITS
MANAGER/PROPRIETOR JANET S. DELA CRUZ,
Petitioner,
v.
NENA E. LANUZO, CLAUDETTE E. LANUZO, JANET E.
LANUZO, JOAN BERNABE E. LANUZO, AND RYAN JOSE E.
LANUZO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 161151, March 24, 2014
FACTS:
This case involves a claim for damages arising from
the death of a motorcycle rider in a nighttime accident due to
the supposed negligence of a construction company then
undertaking reblocking work on a national highway. The
plaintiffs insisted that the accident happened because the
construction company did not provide adequate lighting on
the site, but the latter countered that the fatal accident was
caused by the negligence of the motorcycle rider himself.
Nena alleged that she was the surviving spouse of
the late Balbino who figured in the accident that transpired at
the site of the reblocking work at about 6:30 p.m. on
October 30, 1997; that Balbinos Honda motorcycle
sideswiped the road barricade placed by the company in the
right lane portion of the road, causing him to lose control of
his motorcycle and to crash on the newly cemented road,
resulting in his instant death; and that the companys failure
to place illuminated warning signs on the site of the project,
especially during night time, was the proximate cause of the
death of Balbino.
In its answer, BJDC denied Nenas allegations of
negligence, insisting that it had installed warning signs and
lights along the highway and on the barricades of the project;
that at the time of the incident, the lights were working and
switched on; that its project was duly inspected by the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the Office
of the Mayor of Pili, and the Pili Municipal Police Station; and
that it was found to have satisfactorily taken measures to
ensure the safety of motorists.
ISSUE:
Whether or not heirs of Balbino were able to
establish by preponderance of evidence the negligence of
BJDC.
HELD:
NO. The party alleging the negligence of the other
as the cause of injury has the burden to establish the
allegation with competent evidence. If the action based on
negligence is civil in nature, the proof required is
preponderance of evidence.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party
who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies
the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner
required by the Rules of Court, but it may rest on the
defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential
allegations but raises affirmative defense or defenses, which
if proved, will exculpate him from liability.
The Court affirmed the findings of the RTC, and
rules that the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of
proof, did not establish by preponderance of evidence that
the negligence on the part of the company was the
proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino.
During the trial, the Lanuzo heirs attempted to
prove inadequacy of illumination instead of the total omission
of illumination. In contrast, the company credibly refuted the
allegation of inadequate illumination. The Court observes,
too, that SPO1 Corporal, a veteran police officer detailed for
more than 17 years at the Pili Police Station, enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official
duties. In his report, it was mentioned that upon arrival at
the scene of the incident it was noted that road
sign/barricade installed on the road has a light.
CASE NO. 3
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 200055, September 10, 2014,
STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. ARNOLD
CUARESMA AND JERRY B. CUARESMA, RESPONDENTS.
Two vehicles, one driven by Jefferson, and insured by
Standard Insurance Co. (Standard), and the other driven by
Arnold and Jerry, collided with each other. When the damage
to the vehicle of Jefferson was repaired, he executed a
Release of Claim to subrogate Standard Insurance to all his
rights to recover on all claims, demands and right of action
on account of the loss, damage, or injury sustained as a
result of the accident. Standard thus sent several demand
letters upon Arnold and Jerry to pay the sum it spent on
repairing the vehicle driven by Jefferson. Meanwhile, Arnold
and Jerry filed a case and and an Information was filed
against Jefferson for Reckless Imprudence resulting in
Damage to Property before the MTC. Standard, during the
pendency of the case, filed a case for Sum of Money against
Arnold and Jerry with the MeTC of Manila. The defendants
Arnold and Jerry, however, were declared in default, hence
the MeTC rendered judgment declaring them liable to pay
Standard Insurance for the cost of repairs of Jeffersons
vehicle borne by Standard. On appeal to the RTC, however,
the latter reversed and set aside the judgment of the MeTC,
finding that Standard failed to prove its case. To Arnold and
Jerrys argument that it should be consolidated with the
criminal case, it ruled that the criminal and civil cases can
proceed independently. The RTC faulted Standard for not
presenting the police officer who prepared and signed the
Traffic Accident Report. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
ruling, hence, Standard is now before the Supreme Court
questioning the dismissal by the RTC of its case, alleging that
its failure to present the police officer who prepared and
signed the Traffic Accident Report is not fatal to its cause.
The Supreme Court:
In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making
allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. He must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense
offered by his opponent. This principle equally holds true,
even if the defendant had not been given the opportunity to
present evidence because of a default order.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of
the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight
of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence.
It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy
of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. The
reason for this is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Mere allegations,
therefore, cannot be deemed as evidence.
To prove the allegations in its complaint, herein petitioner
presented testimonies of its assured and its Assistant Vice-
President, the Traffic Accident Investigation Report, and
documents evidencing the assureds insurance policy with
petitioner as well as the payment of repair expenses. As aptly
ruled by the RTC and the CA, however, the evidence
presented by petitioner failed to preponderantly establish
negligence on the part of the respondents.
While petitioner may have proven the fact of its payment of
the expenses for the repair of Chams vehicle through the
testimony of its Assistant Vice-President and other supporting
receipts and documents, it fell short in proving that the
damage caused on said vehicle was due to the fault of the
respondents.
As correctly held by the RTC and the CA, the Traffic Accident
Investigation Report cannot be given probative weight.
Section 44 of Rule 130 provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in official records Entries in official records
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
Moreover, for the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be
admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated, the following requisites must be present:
x x x (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it
was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or
other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information.
Regrettably, in this case, petitioner failed to prove the third
requisite cited above. As correctly noted by the courts below,
while the Traffic Accident Investigation Report was exhibited
as evidence, the investigating officer who prepared the same
was not presented in court to testify that he had sufficient
knowledge of the facts therein stated, and that he acquired
them personally or through official information. Neither was
there any explanation as to why such officer was not
presented. We cannot simply assume, in the absence of
proof, that the account of the incident stated in the report
was based on the personal knowledge of the investigating
officer who prepared it.
Thus, while petitioner presented its assured to testify on the
events that transpired during the vehicular collision, his lone
testimony, unsupported by other preponderant evidence,
fails to sufficiently establish petitioners claim that
respondents negligence was, indeed, the proximate cause of
the damage sustained by Chams vehicle.
It bears stressing, as the courts below have explained, that
subrogation is ultimately the substitution of one person in the
place of another with reference to a lawful claim or right, so
that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other
in relation to a debt or claim, including its remedies or
securities. The rights to which the subrogee succeeds are the
same as, but not greater than, those of the person for whom
he is substituted, that is, he cannot acquire any claim,
security or remedy the subrogor did not have. In other words,
a subrogee cannot succeed to a right not possessed by the
subrogor. A subrogee, in effect, steps into the shoes of the
insured and can recover only if the insured likewise could
have recovered.
Hence, before We can sustain petitioners argument that its
right to be reimbursed for the repair is by operation of law
upon mere proof of payment of the insurance claim, a
determination of the liability of respondents vis-a-viz the
assured in the vehicular collision must first be made, for
petitioner cannot acquire any claim, security or remedy its
assured did not have. Considering, however, the insufficiency
of preponderant evidence attributing negligence on
respondents resulting in the damage sustained by the
assureds vehicle, it will be unfair to hold respondents liable
for the same, payment by petitioner of its costs,
notwithstanding.
CASE NO. 5
G.R. No. 190178, February 12, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v.
FELIMON PATENTES Y ZAMORA, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
The Prosecutions Case
AAA boarded a bus for Bansalan, Davao City, to visit and
bring medicines to her sick grandmother. While seated at the
rear portion of the bus, appellant suddenly sat next to her. It
was the second time AAA met appellant; the first time was
on 4 December 1998, when appellant persistently courted
her. She only knew appellant as he was a friend of her
brother.
After a brief conversation, appellant suddenly showed her his
bolo, covered by a red scabbard tucked in his right side while
he held a red steel pipe with Arabic markings, which he used
to threaten to kill AAA should AAA disobey him. Appellant
then accompanied AAA to her grandmothers place and
returned to Davao City proper by bus. As they walked around,
appellant placed his right hand on AAAs shoulder. Appellant
also held AAAs right hand, which covers her mouth with a
handkerchief.
Upon reaching Davao City, they rode a jeepney to Sasa and
alighted at a nearby convenience store. Upon arrival, a man
gave something to appellant, which he immediately placed
inside his pocket. Appellant then brought AAA to his house in
Hacienda Heights, Davao City, where his parents, sister,
brotherinlaw, nephews and nieces live.
Upon entering the house, appellant dragged AAA to a room
upstairs and tied her to a sewing machine. Appellant then
started to smoke something, which he also forced AAA to
inhale, causing AAA to feel light, weak and dizzy. This
prevented AAA from fighting back as appellant removed
AAAs clothes. Doffed of his own clothes, appellant mounted
her and inserted his penis into her vagina.
The following day, 6 December 1998, appellant again forced
AAA to inhale the smoke from his cigarette, causing her to
feel weak and dizzy as appellant had carnal knowledge of
AAA.
On 7 December 1998, appellant again had carnal knowledge
of AAA using threats, force and intimidation, causing bruises
on AAAs arms.
On 8 December 1998, while appellant was sleeping beside
AAA, AAA slowly got up to escape. However, AAAs attempt,
while feeble, woke up appellant. Appellant then punched her
in the stomach, causing AAA to lose consciousness. When
AAA gained a little strength, appellant again mauled her and
raped her again.
On 9 December 1998, after AAA took a bath, appellant raped
AAA while pointing a bolo to her neck.
On 10, 11 and 12 December 1998, appellant raped AAA while
threatening her with bodily harm. He also threatened to kill
her family, in case she tells anyone of her ordeal.
On 13 December 1998, to free herself from her predicament,
AAA convinced appellant that she will marry him. Appellant
agreed. Appellants mother accompanied AAA to the latters
house to discuss the marital plans with AAAs family.
Surprised by the marital plans, AAAs mother asked for a
private moment with AAA. In their conversation, AAA
confessed how appellant forcibly took her to his house on 5
December 1998 and raped her for more than a week. AAAs
mother then accompanied AAA to report her ordeal to the
police, where AAA was examined by a doctor, Dr. Samuel
Cruz, the City Health Officer of Davao City.
Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report, he
noted the following observations about AAA: (1) contusion on
the breast caused by a kiss mark; (2) hymen was intact and
can readily admit a normalsized erect male penis without
sustaining any injury; and (3) vaginal canal was negative for
spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot tell whether
it was AAAs first sexual intercourse as the vagina was not
injured but had healed lacerations.
The AccusedAppellants Defense
On 5 December 1998, pursuant to their previous agreement,
appellant accompanied AAA to Bansalan to visit and bring
medicines to AAAs grandmother. After going around Davao
City, they went to his house at about 7:00 p.m. Appellant
then offered to bring AAA to her house but the latter refused,
insisting that she wanted to live with appellant because she
was fed up with her mother, who often called her buntog or
prostitute.
AAA stayed in appellants house together with the latters
parents, sister, brotherinlaw, nephews and nieces. AAA
slept in the same room with appellant and had consented
sexual intercourse. Throughout AAAs stay, she was free to
roam around the house and even helped in the household
chores. Pursuant to their marital plans, AAAs grandfather
went to appellants house on 7 December 1998. As a result,
they agreed to set the wedding date on 27 May 1999.
Appellants mother also went to AAAs house to discuss the
marital plans on 14 December 1998. However, AAAs mother
rejected the marriage proposal because of appellants social
standing.
Leonora Gerondio (Gerondio), appellants neighbor, testified
that she first met AAA in appellants house on 5 December
1998. The following day, Gerondio again saw AAA when she
went to appellants house. Appellant told her that he will
marry AAA. Since then, Gerondio saw AAA everyday from 7
to 11 December 1998, cleaning the surroundings, doing the
laundry, and walking around the vicinity. AAA even visited
her house and talked about AAA and appellants marital
plans. In her observation, AAA and appellant acted like a
couple. Gerondio also accompanied appellants mother to
AAAs house to discuss AAA and appellants marital plans.
However, AAAs mother rejected the marriage proposal.
Wilma Enriquez (Enriquez), a common friend of AAA and
appellant, testified that between 5 to 12 December 1998, she
went twice to appellants house upon AAAs invitation to talk
about the couples marital plans.
During trial, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses: (1) AAA, private complainant herself; (2) Dr.
Samuel Cruz; (3) PO1 Lennie Ronquillo; (4) private
complainants mother; and (5) Julie Dayaday.
On the other hand, the defense presented: (1) Felimon
Patentes, accusedappellant himself; (2) Leonora Gerondio;
(3) Wilma Enriquez; and (4) Francisca Patentes.
After trial, the lower court found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with
Rape and seven (7) counts of Rape.
Aggrieved, appellant elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial
court with modification. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED as to the
conviction of appellant FELIMON PATENTES for one (1) count
of Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of eight
(8) counts of Rape and as to the imposition upon him of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the eight (8)
offenses. His civil liability, however, is hereby MODIFIED as
follows:
The appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court on
the matter of credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
According to the appellate court, AAAs account of her
ordeal in the hands of appellant was straightforward, firm,
candid and consistent. Notwithstanding the rigid, lengthy and
rigorous crossexamination by the defense, AAA remained
steadfast in her narration of the details of her harrowing
experience. A thorough reading of the transcript shows that
AAAs testimony bears the earmarks of truth and credibility. 6
Hence, this appeal.
The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are:
(1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2)
said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or
intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12
years of age or is demented.7 In the case at bar, appellant
never denied having carnal knowledge of AAA. The only
matter, thus, to be resolved by this Court is whether
appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using
threats, force or intimidation, or that AAA was deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or was under 12 years of
age or is demented.
Appellant argues that if AAA really was raped for more than
an entire week, it is perplexing why she did not escape, or
even seek the help of the neighbors despite several
opportunities to do so.8 Appellant further alleges that AAAs
failure to escape and her helping in the household chores in
appellants house prove that she was not raped and that they
had consensual sexual intercourse.9
About this position, the appellate court noted and reasoned
that, appellant threatened AAA with harm in the event that
she told anyone of what happened between them. The
lingering fear instilled upon AAA is understandable
considering that appellant was always armed with a bolo and
was constantly showing it to AAA. The possibility of him
making good his threat was not at all remote and the fear for
her life remained palpable.10
Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to similar
situations dissimilarly. There is no standard form of behavior
when one is confronted by a shocking incident as the
workings of the human mind when placed under emotional
stress are unpredictable.11 Nevertheless, the Court must be
guided by established principles.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following
principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to
disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may
be innocent; (2) inasmuch as only two persons are usually
involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3)
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. 12 So long as the
private complainants testimony meets the test of credibility,
the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. 13
Following these legal precepts, AAAs testimony, placed side
by side with the prosecutions evidence, must stand the test
of credibility.
1. Absence of external signs or physical injuries does not
negate the commission of rape since proof of injuries is not
an essential element of the crime.14 And, it is also a precept
that physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks
more eloquently than all witnesses put together. 15 In the case
at bar, the prosecution failed to present any scintilla of proof
to support its claim. In fact, contrary to the prosecutions
claim that AAA was dragged, tied, mauled, slapped and
boxed, the medical certificate revealed no telltale sign of the
prosecutions allegations. It has to be noted that the medical
examination was conducted the day after AAAs supposed
escape from appellant. As shown by the medical certificate,
AAA had no external signs of physical injuries, save for a kiss
mark, to wit:16
EXTRAGENITAL PHYSICAL INJURY:
Contusion, reddish purple, breast, right side, lowerinner
quadrant, 2.0x1.0 cm. xxx
CONCLUSIONS:
1. The above physical injury was noted on the body of the
subject, age of which is consistent with the alleged date of
infliction.
2. That under normal conditions without subsequent
complications and unless a deeper involvement might be
present but which is not clinically apparent at the time of
examination, said injury will require medical attendance of
not more than seven (7) days from date of infliction.
3. Hymen intact and its orifice, wide as to allow complete
penetration by an averagesized male organ in erection
without causing hymenal injury. 17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2. The timehonored test in determining the value of the
testimony of a witness is its compatibility with human
knowledge, observation and common experience of man. 18
Thus, whatever is repugnant to the standards of human
knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible
and must lie outside judicial cognizance. 19
As culled from the records, AAA lived with appellants family
for eight (8) days in the same house where appellants
parents, sister, brotherinlaw, nephews and nieces also
lived. AAA even called appellants mother, mama. As
argued by the defense, the members of the appellants
family could have noticed that she was being forced and
raped by the accused if the accusations were really true. 20
Indeed, it is incompatible with human experience to keep a
sex slave for eight (8) days in a house where the abusers
entire family, including the abusers minor nephews and
nieces live.
When appellant and AAA arrived in the formers house, they
were greeted by appellants father. If AAAs account were
true that appellant dragged her to a room upstairs and then
tied her to a sewing machine, appellants father could have
noticed and reacted to the obvious violence. To say the least,
he would have talked to the appellant about the deed.
Instead, and incredibly, appellants mother went to AAAs
house to propose marriage contrary to the common
experience.
Contrary to the prosecutions claim that AAA only saw
appellant on 4 December 1998, a day before the alleged
commission of the crime, it was stipulated that AAA knew
appellant as appellant was a neighbor and friend of AAAs
brother.21 Furthermore, appellants mother was the midwife
who assisted AAAs housemaid in giving birth. 22
For several days that AAA had been missing, which would
have caused worry and anxiety among AAAs family
members, AAAs father, instead of reporting the matter to
police authorities, went to appellants house to discuss AAA
and appellants marital plans on 7 December 1998. 25 Clearly,
this is contrary to human logic and experience, and
inconsistent with the prosecutions claim.
3. The conduct of the victim immediately following the
alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance in establishing
the truth or falsity of the charge of rape. 26 In the case at bar,
the actuations of AAA after the alleged rape is totally
uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. It is contrary to
normal human behavior for AAA to willingly go with her
abusers mother, and worse, to live with her abusers entire
family in one roof for eight (8) days sans any attempt to
escape.
It goes against the grain of human experience for a woman
who has been robbed of her honor and chastity not to seize
an opportunity to escape from the clutches of her
malefactor.27 Instead of escaping from her abuser, AAA
visited appellants neighbor.28 Even if AAA had several
opportunities to share her ordeal to be rescued by her friend,
Wilma, AAA inexplicably failed and instead described the
details of her marital plans. What is truly exceptional,
however, is the testimony of AAA that she visited her
grandmother during the period of her alleged abduction.
Despite inconsistencies in her testimony as shown in the
TSN, AAA admitted the visit to her grandmother: 29
We are mindful that appellants bare invocation of the
sweetheart theory cannot alone stand. It must be
corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence.
Usually, these are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or
credible testimonies of those who know the lovers. 30 There is
such corroboration in this case. To support its sweetheart
theory, the defense presented appellant and AAAs common
friend, Enriquez, who attested to the veracity of appellants
claim:31
Appellants neighbor, Gerondio, corroborated the testimony: 32
A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, which means a moral certainty
that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the
prosecution.33 In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to
discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the
truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal
knowledge of AAA against her will using threats, force or
intimidation.
The testimony of the offended party in crimes against
chastity should not be received with precipitate credulity for
the charge can easily be concocted.34 Courts should be wary
of giving undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially
where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim whose
charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and
after the rape is open to conflicting interpretations. 35 While
judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation
that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they
should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to
render justice based on the law.36
The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private
complainant have created reasonable doubt in Our mind. In
view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of
innocence in favor of appellant must be upheld considering
that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of the
quantum of proof to support a conviction.37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, finding appellant FELIMON PATENTES y
ZAMORA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Forcible
Abduction with Rape, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA is ACQUITTED on the
ground of reasonable doubt. His immediate release from
confinement is hereby ordered unless he is being detained
for some other charge.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CASE NO. 6
Ricardo Atienza and Alfredo Castro vs People of the
Philippines
Gr No. 188694
February 12, 2014
Facts:
Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision
of the CA, affirming the decision of RTC Manila which found
Petitioners Atienza and Castro guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public
Document.
Petitioners are CA employees: budget officer and utility
worker, respectively. On March 20, 1995, Juanito Atibula
(Atibula), a custodian of the CA Original Decisions, was
invited by Castro to Atienzas birthday party where he was
introduced to a certain Dario who asked for his help in
locating a CA decision in a particular case. (FERNANDO CASE)
They found said case in Vol 260 of the CA Original
Decisions. Dario perused said document and also scanned
Vol. 265. In the following days, Dario approached Atibula and
requested the latter to insert a decision dated Sep 26 1968 in
one of the Volumes but Atibula refused. Atienza thereafter
offered him P50,000 in exchange for Vol 260 but he also
refused.
Atibula subsequently discovered that Vol. 266 was
missing which he reported to his superiors immediately.
Several days later, a certain Nelson de Castro, also a CA
employee, handed Atibula a gift-wrapped package which
turned out to be the missing Vol. 266. De Castro claimed that
it was Castro who asked him to do so.
The contents of the returned Vol. 266 were reviewed
by Atibula and it was found that there were new documents
inserted therein: CA decisions and resolutions supposedly for
the FERNANDO CASE. Upon Atibulas comparison, it was
found that the duplicate original decisions did not bear such
promulgations. Upon the NBI investigation that ensued, it
was found that Vol. 266 has indeed been altered and the
signatures of the CA Justices therein have been forged.
Ultimately, a complaint was filed by the NBI to the
Office of the Ombudsman implicating Atienza, Castro and
Dario of the Crimes of Falsification of Public Document and
Robbery under the RPC. Thereafter, corresponding
informations were filed before the RTC and the petitioners
pleaded not guilty while Dario remained at large.
Atienza denied having anything to do with the crimes
and he averred that he was away from the office during the
months in question due to work-related duties as budget and
liason officer. Castro on the other hand, did not make any
efforts to refute the charges against him.
 RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt and there is
conspiracy. The previous events that conspired between the
petitioners and Atibula prove their guilt. CA: affirmed RTCs
decision. Although there was no direct evidence, Atibulas
and the NBIs testimonies along with other circumstances are
sufficient for a conviction. CA: Atienzas defense is self-
serving and cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence.
Issue:
Are the circumstantial evidence sufficient to warrant a
conviction
Held:
NO.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral
facts and circumstances from which the main fact in issue
may be inferred based on reason and common experience. It
is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial
evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which
leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person.
Stated differently, the test to determine whether or not the
circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the
accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven must
be consistent with each other and that each and every
circumstance must be consistent with the accuseds guilt and
inconsistent with his innocence.
Firstly, the Court found no evidence to link Castro to
the crimes charged. Affidavits, although acknowledged
before a notary public, are considered hearsay evidence of
the affiant was not presented in court to testify thereon and
to give the adverse party a chance to cross-examine him.
Nelson de Castro, who averred in his sworn statement that it
was Castro who asked him to deliver the gift-wrapped
package to Atibula was not presented in court during trial.
Secodly, Atienzas guilt is likewise questionable.
Atibulas testimony states that the former attempted to bribe
him to take out Vol. 260 but then the controversy arose from
a different document: Vol 266. This discrepancy on the very
subject matter of the crimes dilutes the strength of the
evidence required for a conviction. According to the court,
the attempted bribery constituted proof of motive which is
not sufficitent to support a conviction, no matter how strong.
Criminal conviction rests on the strength of the
evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness or even
absence of defense. If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and
the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does
not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction. Accordingly, there being no
circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a conviction, the
Court hereby acquits petitioners, without prejudice, however,
to any subsequent finding on their administrative liability in
connection with the incidents in this case.
CASE NO. 7
G.R. No. 179535, June 09, 2014
JOSE ESPINELI A.K.A. DANILO ESPINELI, Petitioner, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 Factual Antecedents
On June 24, 1997, an Information
charging petitioner with the crime of murder was filed before
the RTC,9 the accusatory portion of which reads as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That on or about the 15th day of December, 1996 in the
Municipality of Imus, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, together with one (1) Sotero Paredes and
three (3) other unidentified persons, whose real names,
identities and whereabouts are still unknown, said Sotero
Paredes having been earlier charged with the same offense,
and is now undergoing trial before Branch 90, of the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite, then armed with firearms, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent
to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and taking
advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shoot one
Alberto Berbon y Downie with the use of said firearms,
thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds on
his head and different parts of his body which caused his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of said Alberto Berbon y Downie.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
Petitioner was arrested on July 1, 1997 and when arraigned
on July 7, 1997 with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea
of not guilty.11cralawred
The facts show that in the early evening of December 15,
1996, Alberto Berbon y Downie (Alberto), a 49-year old
Senior Desk Coordinator of the radio station DZMM, was shot
in the head and different parts of the body in front of his
house in Imus, Cavite by unidentified malefactors who
immediately fled the crime scene on board a waiting car.
Meanwhile, the group of Atty. Orly Dizon (Atty. Dizon) of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) arrested and took into
custody one Romeo Reyes (Reyes) for the crime of Illegal
Possession of Deadly Weapon. Reyes confided to the group
of Atty. Dizon that he was willing to give vital information
regarding the Berbon case. In due course, NBI Agent Dave
Segunial (NBI Agent Segunial) interviewed Reyes on February
10, 1997 and reduced his statement into writing whereby
Reyes claimed that on December 15, 1996, he saw petitioner
and Sotero Paredes (Paredes) board a red car while armed
with a .45 caliber firearm and armalite, respectively; and that
petitioner told Paredes that ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng
bukas yang si Berbon.12 Subsequently, Reyes posted bail
and was released on February 14, 1997. Thenceforth, he
jumped bail and was never again heard of. NBI Agent
Segunial testified on these facts during the trial.
The victims widow, Sabina Berbon (Sabina) likewise
testified. According to her, sometime in the third week of
February 1997 Reyes sought financial help so he could
transfer his family to the province and protect them from any
untoward consequence that may result from his giving
information to the NBI regarding the death of Sabinas
husband. Sabina gave him the total amount of P1,500.00
and promised to help him in applying for the witness
protection program. This was affirmed on the witness stand
by Sabinas brother, Bartolome Pakingan. After that,
however, Reyes never came back.
Another prosecution witness, Rodolfo Dayao (Rodolfo),
testified that he sold his red Ford Escort car to three persons
who came to his residence in the afternoon of September 1,
1996. He later identified the said car from the photographs
presented to him by the police officers.
Dr. Ludivino J. Lagat (Dr. Lagat), the NBI Medico-Legal Officer
who conducted a post-mortem examination on Alberto,
declared in his Autopsy Report that the victim suffered
multiple gunshot wounds in the head and body. He also
stated that based on the size of the gunshot wounds or
entrance, high-powered guns were used in the killing.
Petitioner, on the other hand, did not adduce evidence for his
defense. Instead, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence 13 without
leave of court. As no action whatsoever was taken thereon
by the trial court, petitioner just moved that the case be
deemed submitted for decision.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision14 dated August 31, 1999, the trial court
adjudged petitioner guilty of murder,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused JOSE ESPINELI
a.k.a. DANILO Danny Espineli, is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing the crime of Murder as
charged. He is, therefore, sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, and is likewise ordered to pay the
heirs of Alberto Berbon y Downie, the civil indemnity of
P50,000.00, and actual and compensatory damages in the
total amount of P135,000.00 as funeral expenses (Exhibit
H), interment fee of P8,360.00 (Exhibit C), medical
expenses in the total amount of P1,519.45 (Exhibit[s] D,
D-1 and D-2) and for the contract fees of Memorial Park
Care the amount of P15,700.00 (Exhibit E).
Furthermore, considering that he is a high risk prisoner, his
transfer to the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa City, Metro
Manila, is immediately ordered.
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioner seasonably appealed his conviction before this
Court. Pursuant, however, to the Courts pronouncement in
People v. Mateo,16 the case was ordered transferred to the CA
for appropriate action and disposition through a Resolution 17
dated March 22, 2006.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision18 promulgated on July 6, 2007, the CA affirmed
with modification the findings of the trial court. It
ratiocinated that since none of the prosecution witnesses saw
how the killing of the victim was perpetrated, the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be
appreciated. Neither can nighttime serve as an aggravating
circumstance as the time of the commission of the crime was
not even alleged in the Information. In view thereof, the CA
found petitioner guilty only of homicide instead of murder.
The decretal portion of the appellate courts Decision
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is
hereby DISMISSED. The appealed Decision dated August 31,
1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-
appellant is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide and is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In all other respects, the said decision STANDS.
In the service of his sentence, accused-appellant shall be
credited in full with the period of his preventive
imprisonment.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.19
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 20
which the CA denied in its Resolution 21 dated September 14,
2007.
Hence, this Petition.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner posits that the CA should not have affirmed the
Decision of RTC as the latter
erred:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. x x x [in admitting, considering and giving] probative
value to Exhibit A, the Sinumpaang Salaysay of
[Reyes] because [he] was not presented in court to
 confirm, affirm and authenticate the contents of his
sworn statement. It resulted in the denial of
petitioners constitutional right to confront and cross-
examine his accusers.22cralawred
2. x x x [in convicting] the [petitioner] based on
unproven, inadmissible circumstantial
evidence.23cralawred
3. x x x in not acquitting the petitioner for failure of the
prosecution to prove [his guilt] beyond reasonable
doubt x x x.24
In sum, petitioner anchors his quest for the reversal of his
conviction on the alleged erroneous admission in evidence of
the Sinumpaang Salaysay25 of Reyes for being hearsay and
inadmissible. He avers that the said sworn statement should
not have been given probative value because its contents
were neither confirmed nor authenticated by the affiant.
Thus, all circumstances emanating from or included in the
sworn statement must be totally brushed aside as lacking
any evidentiary and probative value. Petitioner emphasizes
that as found by the courts below, there was no direct
evidence linking him to the crime; therefore, he wants this
Court to review the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence
upon which his conviction was based as he believes that the
same failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing respondent People of the Philippines, concurs
with the petitioner and recommends his acquittal. 26 It is also
of the view that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden
of proving petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Truly, direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not
the only basis from which a court may draw its finding of
guilt.27 The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on
circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which indirectly
proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-
finder draws from the evidence established. 28 Under Section
4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence
would be sufficient to convict the offender if i) there is more
than one circumstance; ii) the facts from which the inference
is derived are proven; and iii) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.29 All the circumstances must be
consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus, conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided
that the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points
to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty
person.30cralawred
In this case, the circumstances found by the CA as forming
an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that petitioner, to the exclusion of all others, is
the guilty person are the following:
1. In the morning of December 15, 1996, petitioner was
heard telling his co-accused Sotero Paredes (Sotero) ayaw
ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon before boarding
a red car. Sotero was holding an armalite rifle while
petitioner was armed with a .45 caliber pistol;
2. The said red car was identified or recognized by
prosecution witness Rodolfo to be the same car he had sold
to Sotero for P10,000.00 in September 1996;
3. The victim Alberto was fatally shot later in the day
(December 15, 1996) by unidentified gunmen who thereafter
immediately fled riding a red car; and
4. Post-mortem examination of the victims body showed
that he sustained multiple gunshot wounds, the nature,
severity and characteristics of which indicate that they were
inflicted using high-powered guns, possibly an armalite rifle
and .22 caliber pistol.31cralawred
The records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual
killing of Alberto. Thus the courts below were forced to
render their verdict of conviction on circumstantial evidence
as sanctioned under Section 4, Rule 133 32 of the Rules of
Court. The central issue now confronting this Court is
whether the prosecution has amply proved by circumstantial
evidence petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The circumstantial evidence relied upon
by the Court of Appeals sufficiently support
petitioners conviction.
The Court has carefully scrutinized the evidence presented in
this case in the light of the standards discussed above and
finds the foregoing circumstantial evidence sufficient to
support a judgment of conviction. Several reasons deserve
our acceptance of the circumstances upon which petitioners
conviction was based, to wit:
First, NBI Agent Segunial testified that he had investigated
Reyes and reduced the latters statement into writing
declaring, among others, that in the morning of December
15, 1996, he (Reyes) overheard petitioner telling Sotero
Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon and saw
them armed with .45 caliber pistol and an armalite,
respectively, before boarding a red car. The CA gave weight
to Reyes sworn statement in this
wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The probative value of Romeo Reyes sworn statement as to
the words spoken by appellant to his co-accused Sotero
Paredes in the morning of December 15, 1996 cannot be
disputed. x x x33
Petitioner takes vigorous exception to the said findings,
insisting that the said sworn statement belongs to the
category of hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible. He
asserts that its contents were never confirmed or
authenticated by Reyes, thus, it lacks probative value.
The Court is unconvinced.
The hearsay evidence rule as provided under Section 36,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal
knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in
whole or in part on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to
produce. However, while the testimony of a witness
regarding a statement made by another person given for the
purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the
statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the
purpose of placing the statement on the record is merely to
establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such
statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a
statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such
statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply
and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact,
evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary
but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in
issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of
such a fact.34 This is known as the doctrine of independently
relevant statements.35cralawred
In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that
while he was investigating Reyes, the latter confided to him
that he (Reyes) heard petitioner telling Sotero Ayaw ko nang
abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon and that he saw the two
(petitioner and Sotero) armed with a .45 caliber pistol and an
armalite, respectively, before boarding a red car, cannot be
regarded as hearsay evidence. This is considering that NBI
Agent Segunials testimony was not presented to prove the
truth of such statement but only for the purpose of
establishing that on February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a
sworn statement containing such narration of facts. This is
clear from the offer of the witness oral testimony. 36
Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted that
he is incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes
statement.37 Verily then, what the prosecution sought to be
admitted was the fact that Reyes made such narration of
facts in his sworn statement and not necessarily to prove the
truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in
the nature of an independently relevant statement where
what is relevant is the fact that Reyes made such statement
and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a
case, the statement of the witness is admissible as evidence
and the hearsay rule does not apply.38 Moreover, the written
statement of Reyes is a notarized document having been
duly subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Cesar A. Bacani, a
supervising agent of the NBI. As such, it may be presented in
evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the due
execution of this instrument or document involved pursuant
to Section 30 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. As held in
Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza,39 a notarized document enjoys a
prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution
which must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
Here, no clear and convincing evidence was presented by
petitioner to overcome such presumption. Clearly, therefore,
the CA did not err in its appreciation of Reyes sworn
statement as testified to by NBI Agent Segunial.
Second, the identification and recognition through
photograph by Rodolfo of the 1971 Ford Escort red colored
car as the same car he had sold to Sotero in September 1996
clearly and convincingly prove that it was the very same red
car used in the killing of Alberto on December 15, 1996.
Third, Alberto was shot and killed on December 15, 1996 and
the gunmen immediately fled the scene riding a red car
which was identified as the same car previously sold by
Rodolfo to Sotero.
Fourth, though the testimony of Dr. Lagat was limited to the
post-mortem examination of the cadaver of Alberto, his
findings that the victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds
and that the same were caused by high-powered guns,
served as corroborative evidence and contributed in a
significant way in establishing the level of proof that the law
requires in convicting petitioner.
Lastly, petitioners escape from detention on August 26, 1998
while the case was pending can also be considered as
another circumstance since it is a strong indication of his
guilt.
All told, this Court finds the concordant combination and
cumulative effect of the alleged established circumstances,
which essentially were the same circumstances found by the
trial court and the appellate court, to have satisfied the
requirement of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
Indeed, the incriminating circumstances, when taken
together, constitute an unbroken chain of events enough to
arrive at the conclusion that petitioner was responsible for
the killing of the victim.
Besides, it is [a]n established rule in appellate review x x x
that the trial courts factual findings, including its assessment
of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of
their testimonies, as well as the conclusions drawn from the
factual findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive
effect. These factual findings and conclusions assume
greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA, 40 as in this
case.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Petition is
hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 6, 2007 and
Resolution dated September 14, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02252 are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that petitioner JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO
DANNY ESPINELI is further ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim ALBERTO BERBON y DOWNIE P50,000.00 as moral
damages as well as interest on all the damages assessed at
the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.
CASE NO. 8 Cause of death is Stab wound of the chest.3

Ricardo Medina, Jr. y Oriel v. People of the On April 4, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig
Philippines,G.R. No. 161308, January 15, 2014. City charged Randolf with homicide.4 The information was
amended with leave of court to include Ricardo as a co-
This case concerns the fatal stabbing of Lino Mulinyawe
conspirator,
(Lino) .The stabbing was preceded by a fight during a
basketball game between Ross Mulinyawe, Linos son, and
The Defense claimed that it was Lino who had attacked
Ronald Medina, the younger brother of Ricardo and Randolf.
Ricardo with a knife, and that Lino had accidentally stabbed
In that fight, Ronald had hit Ross with a piece of stone.
himself by falling frontward and into his own knife.
Hearing about the involvement of his brother in the fight,
Randolf rushed to the scene and sent Ronald home. Ross was
Judgment of the RTC
brought to the hospital for treatment. Once Lino learned that
his son had sustained a head injury inflicted by one of the
In its judgment rendered on January 31, 2001,6 the RTC
Medinas, he forthwith went towards the house of the Medinas
acquitted Randolf but convicted Ricardo of homicide. It found
accompanied by his drinking buddies, Jose Tapan and Abet
no evidence of conspiracy between Randolf and Ricardo
Menes. He had a bread knife tucked in the back, but his
because their actions appeared to be independent and
companions were unarmed. Along the way, Lino encountered
separate from each other and did not show that they had
Randolf whom he confronted about the fight. The two of
mounted a joint attack against Lino. It rejected Ricardos
them had a heated argument. Although Randolf tried to
defense that the fatal stab wound of Lino had been self-
explain what had really happened between Ross and Ronald,
inflicted, ratiocinating that:
Lino lashed out at Randolf and gripped the latters hand.
Tapan almost simultaneously punched Randolf in the face.
The fatal wound of the deceased is: stab wound, left
Lino, already holding the knife in his right hand, swung the
mamary [sic] region, measuring 3.6 by 1.4 cm, 5.5 cm from
knife at Randolf who was not hit. Randolf retreated towards
the anterior midline, 12 cm deep, directed posteriorwards,
the store and took two empty bottles of beer, broke the
downwards, and medialwards, thru the 4th left intercostal
bottles and attacked Lino with them. Arriving at the scene,
space, piercing the pericardial sac and left ventricle. (See
Ricardo saw what was happening, and confronted Lino. A
Exh. J).
commotion ensued between them. Ricardo entered their
house to get a kitchen knife and came out. Lino made a Randolf Medina testified that Lino Mulinyawe attacked him
thrust at Ricardo but failed to hit the latter, who then stabbed with a knife held with his right hand. The trajectory of the
Lino on the left side of his chest, near the region of the heart. stab wound sustained by Lino Mulinyawe at his left mammary
Lino fell face down on the ground. After that, Ricardo walked region as shown by the Medico Legal Report and Medico
away, while Randolf threw the broken bottles at the fallen Legal Examination on the cadaver of the deceased (Exhs. J
Lino. and L) is incompatible and inconsistent with the defense of
the accused that when Mulinyawe was making a thrust, he
.
fell frontward and accidentally stabbed himself.
If the knife was held with the right hand of Lino Mulinyawe,
the stab wound would not have been from the anterior
midline, 12 cm deep, directed posteriorwards, downwards,
and medialwards, thru the 4th left intercostal space, piercing
the pericardial sac and left ventricle. The trajectory of the
stab wound would have been leftward and upward the body
of the deceased if he really fell frontward upon it.7 (Emphasis
supplied)
The RTC disposed and decreed:
WHEREFORE, postulates considered, this Court ACQUITS
Randolf Medina for insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt
of the charge of homicide against him.
However, the evidence of the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt the GUILT of the accused Ricardo Medina,
Jr. y Oriel for homicide and he is hereby sentenced with a
penalty of imprisonment of Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8)
Months and One (1) day to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4)
Months of reclusion temporal in its medium period there
being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance (Art.
64, par. 1, Revised Penal Code).
The widow Marivi Mulinyawe is hereby awarded the amount
of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as actual damages
and the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages, payable by Ricardo Medina, Jr. y Oriel.
The bonds posted by both accused are hereby cancelled.
SO ORDERED.8
Decision of the CA
Ricardo appealed, but the CA affirmed his conviction with
modification of the penalty and the civil liability under the
decision promulgated on July 7, 2003,9 to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is
hereby DISMISSED and the decision appealed from in
Criminal Case No. 112091 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that accused-appellant Ricardo Medina, Jr.
y Oriel is hereby instead sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day
to prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and that the award of actual damages is hereby
reduced from Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) to
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) is further granted as death
indemnity in addition to the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
After his motion for reconsideration was denied on November
21, 2003,10 Ricardo appealed to the Court.
Issues
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS FACTUAL FINDING
THAT THE [PETITIONER] STABBED LINO MULINYAWE IN SPITE
OF THE FACT THAT:
1. THE PROSECUTION WITHHELD THE PRESENTATION
OF THE ACTUAL KNIVES DURING THE HEARING OF THE
 CASE WHICH PRESENTATION AND BLOOD ANALYSIS
ON THE TWO KNIVES COULD HAVE PROVEN THAT LINO
MULINYAWE FELL ON HIS OWN KNIFE.
2. THE MEDICO-LEGAL TESTIMONY CORROBORATED
THE FACT THAT LINO MULINYAWE FELL ON HIS OWN
KNIFE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ADOPTING THE
TRIAL COURTS OPINION THAT THE FATAL WOUND COULD
NOT HAVE BEEN SELF-INFLICTED WHICH WAS THE DIRECT
OPPOSITE OF THE OPINION OF THE ONLY MEDICO-LEGAL
EXPERT PRESENTED WHO POSITIVELY TESTIFIED THAT THE
FATAL WOUND CAN POSSIBLY BE SELF-INFLICTED.
The non-identification and non-presentation of the weapon
actually used in the killing did not diminish the merit of the
conviction primarily because other competent evidence and
the testimonies of witnesses had directly and positively
identified and incriminated Ricardo as the assailant of Lino.
Hence, the establishment beyond reasonable doubt of
Ricardos guilt for the homicide did not require the production
of the weapon used in the killing as evidence in court, for in
arriving at its findings on the culpability of Ricardo the trial
court clearly looked at, considered and appreciated the
entirety of the record and the evidence. For sure, the weapon
actually used was not indispensable considering that the
finding of guilt was based on other evidence proving his
commission of the crime.
CASE NO. 9
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE
RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013
AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,
SANDIGANBAYAN
September 23, 2014
Per Curiam
FACTS: When the Pork Barrel Scam broke the news in 2013,
incriminating evidence surfaced implicating Associate Justice
of the Sandiganbayan Gregory Ong. Multiple sworn
statements and verbal testimonies of Marina Sula pointed out
that Ong had visited the office of key Pork Barrel Scam player
Janet Lim Napoles. A photo published by Rappler showed
Senator Jinggoy Estrada, Napoles and Ong together in a
party. Ong explained himself in a letter to CJ Sereno, saying
that the photo was taken in one of Sen. Estradas birthday
parties and it would have been rude of him not to pose with
other guests. He categorically stated that he did not attend
any event hosted by Napoles during or after she had a case
(the Kevlar cases) in the Sandiganbayan in which she was
acquitted.
Sereno then requested the court En Banc to conduct an
investigation motu proprio under this Court's power of
administrative supervision over members of the judiciary and
members of the legal profession. Ong filed a comment saying
that the testimony of Sula was merely heresay and that what
Napoles told her was simply to convince the people helping
her that their cases would be fixed and may not have been
true. As to Sulas testimony that Ong visited Napoles office,
Ong clarified that he struck uyp a conversation with Napoles
during Senator Esrtradas party regarding the miraculous
healing power of the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene
of Quiapo and that Napoles had a way to help Ong access
the statue in order to help him with his Prostate Cancer
(theyre both devotees). Because of this, he wanted to
personally thank Napoles and that was the occasion when he
went to her office and that in that time she no longer had any
pending case with the Sandiganbayan.
Upon the court finding possible transgressions to the New
Code of Judicial Conduct, they Re-docketed the case and
assigned it to retired SC Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez
for investigation. She examined the statements made by
Benhur Luy during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
investigations pointing out that because he is Napoles
second cousin, she divulged to him, prior to the release of
the Kevlar case decision, that her contact in the
Sandiganbayan was Ong. He also testified that he kept
ledgers showing that Napoles spent a total of P100M in the
Snadiganbayan when she gave various amounts to different
people during the pendency of the case and to Ong in
particular after which, she was already confident that she
would be acquitted. He also testified to a transaction
between Ong and Napoles regaring P25.5M that they wanted
to put into an account so that it would accrue 13% interest
and that he personally prepared the checks used for this
transaction. Justice Sandoval Gutierrez also examined the
statements made by Sula, an employee of JLN corporation in
charge of formation of corporations, applying for licenses and
the like. She corroborated the testimony of Benhur Luy and
reiterated her previous testimony on Napoles promisisng her
that a TRO would be iussued in thew case investigating the
PDAF case. She said that every time Napoles talked to her
and the other employees, she would say that Justice Ong will
help her in the Kevlar case. Sula likewise testified that
Napoles told her and the other employees that she will fix
(aayusin) the "PDAF case" in the Sandiganbayan.
In his defense, Ong denied that he ever met Napoles prior to
or during the pendency of the Kevlar case, denied that he
received any money from Napoles, that the Kevlar case was
decided based on the merits, he never had any transactions
with Napoles, he only visited her office for the purpose of
thanking her for that Black Nazarene thing, and that the
whistleblowers testimonies were conflicting and lack
credibility.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez evaluated and concluded that the
testimonies of Benhur Luy and Marina Sula, because they
were only denied and in no way challenged or refuted by Ong
via adverse testimony, were not lies. Ong did not present
Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula and he
failed to consider that his testimony is likewise hearsay. He
should have presented Msgr. Ramirez and Napoles as
witnesses to support his claim regarding their role which
enabled him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. His
act of visitng Napoles office is unquestionably disgraceful
and renders him morally unfit as a member of the Judiciary
and unworthy of the privileges the law confers on him.
Dishonesty violates Canon 2 ( 1 and 2) on Integrity of the
same Code providing in part that judges must ensure that
their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the
people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary and further
constitutes gross misconduct in violation of Canon 4 on
Propriety of the same Code. Section 1 provides that judges
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all of their activities.
In the end of her investigation report, Justice Sandoval-
Gutierrez recommended that Ong be found guilty of gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service
WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits.
RULING: The SC adopts the findings, conclusions and
recommendations of the Investigating Justice which are well-
supported by the evidence on record.
It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating
magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by
reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment
of the witnesses as they testified. The rule which concedes
due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of
credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal
cases applies a
fortiori to administrative cases. In particular, we concur with
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of
Luy and Sula, and disagree with respondent's claim that
these witnesses are simply telling lies about his association
with Napoles.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong
behavior; while "gross" has been defined as "out of all
measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct
as is not to be excused." Ongs association with Napoles
during the pendency of the Kevlar case resulting in her
acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct.
In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e.,
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied
when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent
is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.
The testimonies of Luy and Sula, considering that they were
employees of Napoles privy to her daily business and
personal activities and that she occasionally updated them
on developments regarding the case, were able to provide
substantial evidence.
Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform
an act in connection with the performance of official duties in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received.
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove. The complainant must present a panoply of
evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what
is imputed against Ong connotes a grave misconduct, the
quantum of proof required should be more than substantial.
Concededly, the evidence in this case is insufficient to
sustain the bribery and corruption charges against Ong.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any
corrupt act by the respondent, we find credible evidence of
his association with Napoles.
Ongs act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on
two occasions was grossly improper and violated Section 1,
Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. A
judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be
impartial and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this
appearance. The SCs previous pronouncements have
enjoined judges to avoid association or socializing with
persons who have pending cases before their court.
Caneda v. Alaan: "A judicial office traces a line around his
official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay for
occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which
he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the
performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether
in his public or private life. He must conduct himself in a
manner that gives no ground for reproach."
In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer
pending when improper acts were committed by the judge.
Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the
termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts
which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution.
In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that
respondent's purported reason for visiting Napoles in her
office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo
parish priest were not presented as witnesses despite her
suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other hand,
Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of respondent's
meeting with Napoles at her office appears to be the more
plausible and truthful version. The Court finds that
respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even
before the administrative complaint was filed against him
motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3
(Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity
or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray." Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture
of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the
government service.
DISPOSITIVE: Court finds Ong GUILTY of GROSS
MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, for which he is
hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with
prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the government including government-
owned or -controlled corporations.