Rem Arteche Digest 1

1 Remedial Law Review for Atty.
Tranquil by Jason Arteche
Filing Fees
Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation vs. Formaran, G.R. No. 175914,
February 10, 20091
Minute Digest
In order to resolve the issue of whether petitioner paid the correct amount of docket fees, it is
necessary to determine the true nature of its Complaint. The dictum adhered to in this jurisdiction is
that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the body of the pleading or Complaint
itself, rather than by its title or heading. However, the Court finds it necessary, in ascertaining the true
nature of the civil case, to take into account significant facts and circumstances beyond the Complaint
of petitioner, facts and circumstances which petitioner failed to state in its Complaint but were
disclosed in the preliminary proceedings before the court a quo.
Petitioner persistently avers that its Complaint is primarily for the annulment of the Deeds of
Absolute Sale. Based on the allegations and reliefs in the Complaint alone, one would get the
impression that the titles to the subject real properties still rest with petitioner; and that the interest of
respondents Tan and Obiedo in the same lies only in the Deeds of Absolute Sale sought to be
annulled.
What petitioner failed to mention in its Complaint was that respondents Tan and Obiedo already had
the Memorandum of Agreement, which clearly provided for the execution of the Deeds of Absolute
Sale, registered on the TCTs over the five parcels of land, then still in the name of petitioner. After
respondents Tan and Obiedo had the Deeds of Absolute Sale notarized 2006 and presented the same
to Register of Deeds, they were already issued TCTs over the real properties in question, in their own
names. Respondents Tan and Obiedo have also acquired possession of the said properties, enabling
them, by petitioners own admission, to demolish the improvements thereon.
Petitioner deliberately avoided raising issues on the title and possession of the real properties that may
lead the Court to classify its case as a real action. No matter how fastidiously petitioner attempts to
conceal them, the allegations and reliefs it sought in its Complaint appears to be ultimately a real
action, involving as they do the recovery by petitioner of its title to and possession of the five parcels
of land from respondents Tan and Obiedo.
A real action is one in which the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property; or, as indicated in what
is now Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery
of possession of real property.
A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action would still be
determined in accordance with the value of the real property involved therein; the only difference is in
what constitutes the acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for cases involving real
properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value, would now be using the
fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the
same.
In sum, the Court finds that the true nature of the action instituted by petitioner against respondents is
the recovery of title to and possession of real property. It is a real action necessarily involving real
property, the docket fees for which must be computed in accordance with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, as amended.
1
Just look at the ultimate relief sought. If the relief sought will involve transfer of title, then considered a real
action. If none, the action is considered incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Feel free to use and share this digest with anyone who needs it
Dont ask me anymore, Ill just say Yes J
2 Remedial Law Review for Atty. Tranquil by Jason Arteche
Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. vs. Security Bank Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 176339, January
10, 2011
Facts
The Sps. Lim (Lims) took out a loan from Security Bank secured by a building and the lot on which it
stands. Later, the Bank offered to lease the property to the Lims through Do-All Metals. Do-All
Metals and the Bank executed a document giving the Bank the right to pre-terminate the lease and
DMI the right of first refusal.
Afterwards, the Bank decided to pre-terminate the lease and Do-All Metals exercised its right of first
refusal. While negotiations were ongoing, the Bank posted security guards at the building preventing
the Lims from using the same and retrieving the movable items left inside the building. The Lims then
filed suit.
During the case, the RTC directed the Bank to allow Do-All Metals and the Lims to enter the building
and get the things they left there. The latter claimed, however, that on entering the building, they were
unable to find the movable properties they left there. In a supplemental complaint, Do-All Metals and
the Lims alleged that the Bank surreptitiously took such properties, resulting in additional actual
damages to them of over P27 million.
The Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning among other things the RTCs
authority to grant damages considering plaintiffs failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental
complaint.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate plaintiffs supplemental
complaint against the Bank considering their failure to pay the filing fees on the amounts of damages
they claim in it.
Held
The Supplemental Complaint is deemed not filed.
What the Lims failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC
acquired jurisdiction over Lims action from the moment they filed their original complaint
accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the same. The Lims non-payment of the
additional filing fees due on their additional claims didnt divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already
had over the case.
Next, an after-judgment lien, which implies that payment depends on a successful execution of the
judgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or where the court
has discretion to fix the amount of the award. None of these circumstances obtain in this case. Here,
the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages that the Lims sought
against the Bank.2
A supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint
need to be paid upon its filing. The rules dont require the court to make special assessments in cases
of supplemental complaints.
Lastly, it isnt for a party to the case or even for the trial court to waive the payment of the additional
filing fees due on the supplemental complaint. Only the Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the
payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions are embodied in its rules.
2
After-lien judgement applies if the court awarded a relief not prayed for or different from the prayed for and
when the filing fees paid are insufficient because the plaintiff relied in good faith on the clerk of courts
assessment.
Philippine First Insurance vs. First Logistics, G.R. No. 165147, July 9, 2008
Minute Digest
Petitioners invoke the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals that a
pleading which does not specify in the prayer the amount sought shall not be admitted or shall
otherwise be expunged, and that the court acquires jurisdiction only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee.
Pyramid, on the other hand, insists on the application of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v.
Asuncion3 and subsequent rulings relaxing the Manchester ruling by allowing payment of the docket
fee within a reasonable time, in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period,
where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the prescribed docket
fee.
Indeed, Pyramid captioned its complaint as one for specific performance and damages even if it was,
as the allegations in its body showed, seeking in the main the collection of its claims-sums of money
representing losses the amount of which it, by its own admission, knew. And, indeed, it failed to
specify in its prayer in the complaint the amount of its claims/damages. When Pyramid amended its
complaint, it still did not specify, in its prayer, the amount of claims/damages it was seeking.
Pyramids following justification for omitting to specify in the prayer of its complaint the amount of its
claims/damages, viz:
While respondent knew its losses and alleged them in the body of the Complaint, it was not aware
of the extent of petitioners respective liability under the two insurance policies. The allegation of
respondents losses, albeit, without repeating them in its prayer for relief was not motivated by an
intention to mislead, cheat or defraud the Court. It just left the matter of liability arising from two
separate and distinct Insurance Policies covering the same insurable risk for the trial courts
determination, hence, respondent came up with an action for specific performance
The salient allegations of Pyramids complaint show and as priorly stated, they constitute, in the main,
an action for collection of its claims it admittedly knew. Assuming arguendo that Pyramid has other
claims the amounts of which are yet to be determined by the trial court, the rule established in
Manchester that was embodied in this Courts Circular No. 7-88 issued on March 24, 1988, as
modified by the Sun Insurance ruling, still applies. Consider this Courts pronouncement bearing on
the matter in Ayala Corporation v. Madayag:
Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the [Sun Insurance] ruling of this Court
wherein it stated that where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified,
3
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which
shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may
also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. (NOTE: No filing fees for compulsory counterclaims).
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his
duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
the same has been left for the determination of the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment by considering it to mean that where in the body and prayer of the
complaint there is a prayer xxx the amount of which is left to the discretion of the Court, there is no
need to specify the amount being sought, and that any award thereafter shall constitute a lien on the
judgment.
While it is true that the determination of certain damages x x x is left to the sound discretion of the
court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis
of which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate
docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are
left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate
as to the amount thereof.
Benjamin Bautista v. Shirley Unangast, G.R. No. 173002, July 4, 20084

Minute Digest
On the first issue, petitioner contends that respondents Petition for Relief to Be Able to Appeal
Judgment, which paved the way for the allowance of respondents appeal of the RTC decision, was
filed within the prescriptive period but the proper docket fees for it were belatedly paid. He thus posits
that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over said petition. Having no jurisdiction, the RTC could not
have allowed respondents to appeal.
On this issue, respondent counters that the belated payment of proper docket fees was not due to their
fault but to the improper assessment by the Clerk of Court. Respondent asserts the ruling of the CA
that the court may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if there is a justifiable reason for
the failure to pay the correct amount. Moreover, respondent argues that petitioner failed to contest the
RTC Order dated February 21, 2004 that allowed the payment of supplementary docket fees.
Petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration or a petition for certiorari to the higher court to
question said order.
We agree with respondents. Their failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees was due to a
justifiable reason.
Payment of the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional. Nevertheless, as this Court ruled in Aranas v.
Endona, the strict application of the jurisdictional nature of the above rule on payment of appellate
docket fees may be mitigated under exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of justice.
As early as 1946, in Segovia v. Barrios, the Court ruled that where an appellant in good faith paid less
than the correct amount for the docket fee because that was the amount he was required to pay by the
clerk of court, and he promptly paid the balance, it is error to dismiss his appeal because (e)very
citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows
his duties and performs them in accordance with law. To penalize such citizen for relying upon said
officer in all good faith is repugnant to justice.
4
Filing fees are mandatory and jurisdictional in appeals. Insufficient payment of filing fees will result in non-
perfection of appeal (unless there was good faith as a reason for failing to pay correct filing fees).
Chua v. Executive Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, 20135

Minute Digest
Thus, We come to the focal issue of whether the Executive Judge of the MeTC committed grave
abuse of discretion, in light of the facts and circumstances herein obtaining, in refusing petitioners
request of paying filing fees on a per case basis.
We answer in the affirmative. We grant the petition.
In proposing to pay filing fees on a per case basis, petitioner was not trying to evade or deny his
obligation to pay for the filing fees for all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 filed before the
MeTC. He, in fact, acknowledges such obligation. He, in fact, admits that he is incapable of fulfilling
such obligation in its entirety.
Rather, what petitioner is asking is that he at least be allowed to pursue some of the cases, the filing
fees of which he is capable of financing. Petitioner manifests that, given his current financial status,
he simply cannot afford the filing fees for all the forty (40) BP Blg. 22 cases.
We see nothing wrong or illegal in granting petitioners request.
First. The Executive Judge erred when she treated the entire P540,668.00 as one indivisible
obligation, when that figure was nothing but the sum of individual filing fees due for each count of
violation of BP Blg. 22 filed before the MeTC. Granting petitioners request would not constitute a
deferment in the payment of filing fees, for the latter clearly intends to pay in full the filing fees of
some, albeit not all, of the cases filed.
Filing fees, when required, are assessed and become due for each initiatory pleading filed. In criminal
actions, these pleadings refer to the information filed in court.
In the instant case, there are a total of forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 that was filed
before the MeTC. And each of the forty (40) was, in fact, assessed its filing fees, individually, based
on the amount of check one covers. Under the rules of criminal procedure, the filing of the forty (40)
counts is equivalent to the filing of forty (40) different informations, as each count represents an
independent violation of BP Blg. 22. Filing fees are, therefore, due for each count and may be paid for
each count separately.
Second. In an effort to justify her refusal of petitioners request, the Executive Judge further argues
that since all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 were brought about by a single complaint
filed before the OCP and are now consolidated before the court, the payment of their filing fees
should be made for all or none at all.
That all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 all emanated from a single complaint filed in the
OCP is irrelevant. The fact remains that there are still forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 that
were filed before the MeTC and, as a consequence, forty (40) individual filing fees to be paid.
Neither would the consolidation of all forty (40) counts make any difference. Consolidation unifies
criminal cases involving related offenses only for purposes of trial. Consolidation does not transform
the filing fees due for each case consolidated into one indivisible fee.
Third. Allowing petitioner to pay for the filing fees of some of the forty (40) counts of violation of BP
Blg. 22 filed before the MeTC, will concededly result into the absolute non-payment of the filing fees
5
In criminal cases, filing fees are not paid for actual damages (paid only in moral, temperate, etc). However, in
BP 22 cases filing fees are paid for ALL the damages claimed.
of the rest. The fate of the cases which filing fees were not paid, however, is already the concern of
the MeTC.
IN RE: EXEMPTION OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION FROM PAYMENT

OF FILING/ DOCKET FEES, [ A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, March 10, 2010
Minute Digest
The National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks clarification from the Court on whether or not it is
exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeal bonds and supersedeas bonds.
Section 22 of Rule 141 reads:
Sec. 22. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are
exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this rule. Local government units and government-
owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charters are not exempt from paying
such fees. (emphasis supplied)
Section 70 of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), on privatization
of NPC assets, expressly states that the NPC shall remain as a national government-owned and
controlled corporation.
Thus, NPC is not exempt from payment of filing fees.
The non-exemption of NPC is further fortified by the promulgation on February 11, 2010 of A.M. No.
08-2-01-0, In re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees. In said case, the Court, citing Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, stressed that the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure; and that the power to promulgate
these rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress and the Executive.
Unicapital v. Consing, 20136

Minute Digest
Neither should Consing, Jr.s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to the dismissal of his
complaint. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the complaint
does not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint provided that the fees are paid within a
reasonable period. Consequently, Unicapital, et al.s insistence that the stringent rule on non-payment
of docket fees enunciated in the case of Manchester Development Corporation v. CA should be
applied in this case cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that Consing, Jr. intended to defraud
the government by his failure to pay the correct amount of filing fees. As pronounced in the case of
Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Melicor:
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-
payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee
is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.
Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to
defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
Indeed, while the Court acknowledges Unicapital, et al.'s apprehension that Consing, Jr.'s "metered"
claim for damages to the tune of around P2,000,000.00 per month may balloon to a rather huge
amount by the time that this case is finally disposed of, still, any amount that may by then fall due
shall be subject to assessment and any additional fees determined shall constitute as a lien against the
judgment as explicitly provided under Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules.
6
Filing fees if not paid in full in good faith can still be paid within the applicable prescriptive and reglementary
period. However, if non-payment was due to bad faith (i.e. fraud) the complaint will be dismissed.
Proton Pilipinas v. Banque Nacional de Paris, G.R. No. 151242, June 15, 20057
Minute Digest
Citing Administrative Circular No. 11-94, petitioners argue that BNP failed to pay the correct docket
fees as the said circular provides that in the assessment thereof, interest claimed should be included.
There being an underpayment of the docket fees, petitioners conclude, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case.
Additionally, petitioners point out that the clerk of court, in converting BNPs claims from US dollars
to Philippine pesos, applied the wrong exchange rate of US $1 = P43.00, the exchange rate on
September 7, 1998 when the complaint was filed having been pegged at US $1 = P43.21. Thus, by
petitioners computation, BNPs claim as of August 15, 1998 was actually P70,096,714.72, not
P69,756,045.66.
Furthermore, petitioners submit that pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 7, the complaint should
have been dismissed for failure to specify the amount of interest in the prayer.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that it had paid the filing fee which was assessed by the clerk
of court, and that there was no violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 because the amount of
damages was clearly specified in the prayer. Moreover, respondent posits that the amount of
US$1,544,984.40 represents not only the principal but also interest and other related charges that had
accrued as of August 15, 1998. Respondent goes even further by suggesting that in light of Tacay v.
Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte where the Supreme Court held,
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on
the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs.8
it made an overpayment.
When the complaint in this case was filed in 1998, however, as correctly pointed out by petitioners,
Rule 141 had been amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94. The clerk of court should thus
have assessed the filing fee by taking into consideration the total sum claimed, inclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs, or the stated value of the
property in litigation. Respondents and the Court of Appeals reliance then on Tacay was not in order.
Respecting the Court of Appeals conclusion that the clerk of court did not err when he applied the
exchange rate of US $1 = P43.00 in the absence of any office guide of the rate of exchange which said
court functionary was duty bound to follow, [hence,] the rate he applied is presumptively correct, the
same does not lie. In the case at bar, petitioners have adequately proven with documentary evidence
that the exchange rate when the complaint was filed on September 7, 1998 was US $1 = P43.21.
In fine, the docket fees paid by respondent were insufficient.
With respect to petitioners argument that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case in
light of the insufficient docket fees, the same does not lie.
True, in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, hence, it
concluded that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
7
Interest accrues from the moment a cause of action arises. Filing fees on interest are to be paid up until date of
filing.
8
Take note, this ruling is with respect only to filing fees, for purposes of jurisdiction exclude interest.
It bears emphasis, however, that the ruling in Manchester was clarified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
(SIOL) v. Asuncion when this Court held that in the former there was clearly an effort to defraud the
government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, whereas in the latter the plaintiff demonstrated
his willingness to abide by paying the additional fees as required.
In the case at bar, respondent merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court that turned
out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing
what respondent must pay within the prescriptive period, failing which the complaint merits
dismissal.
Parenthetically, in the complaint, respondent prayed for accrued interest subsequent to August 15,
1998 until fully paid. The complaint having been filed on September 7, 1998, respondents claim
includes the interest from August 16, 1998 until such date of filing.
Respondent did not, however, pay the filing fee corresponding to its claim for interest from August
16, 1998 until the filing of the complaint on September 7, 1998. As priorly discussed, this is required
under Rule 141, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94, which was the rule applicable at
the time. Thus, as the complaint currently stands, respondent cannot claim the interest from August
16, 1998 until September 7, 1998, unless respondent is allowed by motion to amend its complaint
within a reasonable time and specify the precise amount of interest petitioners owe from August 16,
1998 to September 7, 1998 and pay the corresponding docket fee therefor.
With respect to the interest accruing after the filing of the complaint, the same can only be determined
after a final judgment has been handed down. Respondent cannot thus be made to pay the
corresponding docket fee therefor. Pursuant, however, to Section 2, Rule 141, as amended by
Administrative Circular No. 11-94, respondent should be made to pay additional fees which shall
constitute a lien in the event the trial court adjudges that it is entitled to interest accruing after the
filing of the complaint.
In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag, in interpreting the third rule laid down in Sun Insurance regarding
awards of claims not specified in the pleading, this Court held that the same refers only to damages
arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
Request of National Committee on Legal Aid to Exempt Legal Aid Clients from Paying Filing
and Docket Fees, A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, August 28, 2009
Minute Digest9
Means test; (a) This test shall be based on the following criteria: (i) the applicant and that of his
immediate family must have a gross monthly income that does not exceed an amount double the
monthly minimum wage of an employee in the place where the applicant resides and (ii) he does not
own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than Three
Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos.
Merit test. The merit test seeks to ascertain whether or not the applicants cause of action or his
defense is valid and chances of establishing the same appear reasonable.
9
Different tests
1. To get IBP as counsel Check IPB charter (Means & Merit test) (Also qualifies under the courts eyes
automatically because uses the same test).
2. To get PAO as counsel Check PAO guidelines.
3. To qualify under the eyes of the court Check Rule 141 Sec.19 or Rule 3 Sec. 2.
Take note that the filing fees and other lawful fees to be paid are considered as a lien on the judgement.
Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi re exemption form legal and filing fees of the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc., A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC
Minute Digest
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if
the foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged people.
The clear intent and precise language of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party litigant
may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation
invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a
juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as
incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of
their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal
and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.
That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people is of no
moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a persons poverty,
a condition that only a natural person can suffer.
There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the request for exemption in favor of a juridical
person. For one, extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent
and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation
requirements), particularly by corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of
the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too time-
consuming and wasteful for the courts.
Jurisdiction
Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, August 16, 200410
Facts
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married. A year later, respondent gave birth
to a baby girl. However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife.
Whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving
her daughter in the care of the househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways.
Respondent left the family home with her daughter without notifying her husband.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this
was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then
went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not
find them there and the barangay office issued a certification that respondent was no longer residing
there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular phone bills showing calls from
different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed
another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of
habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family
courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980).
Issue
Whether or not the CA can issue the writ of habeas corpus.
Held
Can issue.11
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that
revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving
family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole
court that can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently
cannot be construed any other way.
We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving
individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals
who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot
seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the
10
Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over ordinary civil actions. Ordinary civil actions require a cause of
action that are handled only by the trial court.
11
A writ of habeas corpus is enforceable in the judicial region of the court and NOT limited to its territorial
jurisdiction.
case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of
recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act
of 1997.
We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further,
it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible
since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of
habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be
read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is
at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-
SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.
Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving
custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to
which the Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if
so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a
Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be
found for hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent
jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.
Bernabe L. Navida, et al. v. Hon. Teodoro A. Dizon et al., G.R. No. 125078, May 30, 2011
Facts
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by
citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought
damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP),
a chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The
Texas Court conditionally dismissed the cases..
Later, a total of 336 plaintiffs from General Santos filed a Joint Complaint in the RTC of General
Santos City. Navida, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to
the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They
claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970s up to the early
1980s when they used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or when they
resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. Navida, et al., claimed that their
illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of each of the defendant companies in that
they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing products.
According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said products, which the
defendant companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the formers health and
well-being.
Another joint complaint for damages was filed in Davao City. The complaint was similar to the one
filed in General Santos City.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing Civil
Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, respectively, for lack of jurisdiction.
Held
Yes.
The claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the total amount sought in the complaints
is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have
jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City, as both claims by NAVIDA,
et al., and ABELLA, et al., fall within the purview of the definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC
under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of action of
plaintiff claimants a quasi-delict.
As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point
to the acts and/or omissions of the defendant companies in manufacturing, producing, selling, using,
and/or otherwise putting into the stream of commerce, nematocides which contain DBCP, without
informing the users of its hazardous effects on health and/or without instructions on its proper use and
application.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict
which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with
individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls
within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered
resulted from their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations located in
the Philippines or while they were residing within the agricultural areas also located in the
Philippines. The factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of
action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines. The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC
of Davao City obviously have reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases.
It was, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et al.,
and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial
boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in containers,
their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of
commerce, and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act complained
of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal civil actions, such
as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and tried in
the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of the
Philippines, either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific areas where they
were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo
wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for damages. Third, the
testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers, family
members and other members of the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines.
Considering the great number of plaintiff claimants involved in this case, it is not far-fetched to
assume that voluminous records are involved in the presentation of evidence to support the claim of
plaintiff claimants. Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that the alleged cause of
action of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., against the defendant companies for damages
occurred in the Philippines, demonstrate that, apart from the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC
of Davao City having jurisdiction over the subject matter in the instant civil cases, they are, indeed,
the convenient fora for trying these cases.
Pua v. Citibank, G.R. 180064, September 16, 201312

Facts
Petitioners filed before the RTC a Complaint for declaration of nullity of contract and sums of money
with damages against respondent. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they had been depositors
of Citibank Binondo Branch (Citibank Binondo). Chingyee Yau (Yau), Vice-President of Citibank
Hongkong, came to the Philippines to sell securities to Jose. Yau offered and sold to petitioners
numerous securities. Later on, petitioners discovered that the securities sold to them were not
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and that the terms and conditions
covering the subscription were not likewise submitted to the SEC for evaluation, approval, and
registration. Asserting that respondents actions are in violation of Republic Act No.8799, entitled the
"Securities Regulation Code" (SRC), they assailed the validity of the subscription agreements and the
terms and conditions thereof for being contrary to law and/or public policy.
For its part, respondent filed a motion to dismiss alleging, inter alia, that petitioners complaint should
be dismissed outright for violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It pointed out that the
merits of the case would largely depend on the issue of whether or not there was a violation of the
SRC, in particular, whether or not there was a sale of unregistered securities. In this regard,
respondent contended that the SRC conferred upon the SEC jurisdiction to investigate compliance
with its provisions and thus, petitioners complaint should be first filed with the SEC and not directly
before the RTC.
The RTC denied respondents motion to dismiss. It noted that petitioners complaint is for declaration
of nullity of contract and sums of money with damages and, as such, it has jurisdiction to hear and
decide upon the case even if it involves the alleged sale of securities. It ratiocinated that the legal
questions or issues arising from petitioners causes of action against respondent are more appropriate
for the judiciary than for an administrative agency to resolve.
Dissatisfied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA reversed and set aside
the RTCs Orders and dismissed petitioners complaint for violation of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. The CA agreed with respondents contention that since the case would largely depend on
the issue of whether or not the latter violated the provisions of the SRC, the matter is within the
special competence or knowledge of the SEC. Citing the case of Baviera v. Paglinawan (Baviera), the
CA opined that all complaints involving violations of the SRC should be first filed before the SEC.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction.
Held
Has jurisdiction.
At the outset, the Court observes that respondent erroneously relied on the Baviera ruling to support
its position that all complaints involving purported violations of the SRC should be first referred to
the SEC. A careful reading of the Baviera case would reveal that the same involves a criminal
prosecution of a purported violator of the SRC, and not a civil suit such as the case at bar. The
pertinent portions of the Baviera ruling thus read:
A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must first
be referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
12
An intra-corporate dispute is not a case incapable of pecuniary estimation, should be based on the value of the
shares of stock.
matters of fact. Hence, all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations
should be filed with the SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint to
the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1 earlier quoted.
We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner committed a fatal procedural lapse when he filed his
criminal complaint directly with the DOJ. Verily, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the DOJ in
dismissing petitioners complaint.
Records show that petitioners complaint constitutes a civil suit for declaration of nullity of contract
and sums of money with damages, which stemmed from respondents alleged sale of unregistered
securities, in violation of the various provisions of the SRC and not a criminal case such as that
involved in Baviera.
In this light, when the Court ruled in Baviera that "all complaints for any violation of the [SRC] x x x
should be filed with the SEC," it should be construed as to apply only to criminal and not to civil suits
such as petitioners complaint.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that cases falling under Section 57 of the SRC, which pertain to
civil liabilities arising from violations of the requirements for offers to sell or the sale of securities, as
well as other civil suits under Sections 56, 58, 59, 60, and 61 of the SRC shall be exclusively brought
before the regional trial courts. Likewise, it is equally revelatory that no SRC provision of similar
import is found in its sections governing criminal suits; quite the contrary, the SRC states that
criminal cases arising from violations of its provisions should be first referred to the SEC.
Therefore, based on these considerations, it stands to reason that civil suits falling under the SRC are
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts and hence, need not be first filed
before the SEC, unlike criminal cases wherein the latter body exercises primary jurisdiction.
All told, petitioners' filing of a civil suit against respondent for purported violations of the SRC was
properly filed directly before the RTC.
Celia S. Vda. De Herrera v. Emelita bernardo, et al., G.R. No. 170251, June 01, 2011.
Facts
Respondents filed a complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) against Alfredo Herrera (Alfredo) for interference, disturbance, unlawful claim,
harassment and trespassing over a portion of a parcel of land.
Respondents claimed that said parcel of land was originally owned by their predecessor-in-interest,
Crisanto Bernardo, and was later on acquired by Crisanto S. Bernardo.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that the subject property was bought by Alfredo's father from a
certain Domingo Villaran. Upon the death of Alfredo's father, Alfredo inherited the lot.
The COSLAP ruled that respondents have a rightful claim over the subject property. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the
resolution of the COSLAP. The CA ruled that the COSLAP has exclusive jurisdiction over the present
case and, even assuming that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the land dispute of the parties
herein, petitioner is already estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction because petitioner failed to
raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction before the COSLAP and he actively participated in the
proceedings before the said body.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner is estopped from questioning COSLAPs jurisdiction.
Held
Not estopped.
The COSLAP is an administrative body established as a means of providing a mechanism for the
expeditious settlement of land problems among small settlers, landowners and members of the
cultural minorities to avoid social unrest.
In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents' complaint.
Respondents' cause of action before the COSLAP pertains to their claim of ownership over the subject
property, which is an action involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein,
the jurisdiction of which is vested with the Regional Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts
depending on the assessed value of the subject property.
Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the
decision rendered, are null and void.
Respondents allegation that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP
by reason of laches does not hold water. Petitioner is not estopped from raising the jurisdictional
issue, because it may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel. The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court
does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such
jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties.
In Regalado v. Go, the Court held that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine
to apply, thus:
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked
to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited
case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been
raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to
assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss
filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of
the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the
jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication
on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it
finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.
The factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar that would justify the
application of estoppel by laches against the petitioner. Here, petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the
COSLAP when she appealed the case to the CA and at that time, no considerable period had yet
elapsed for laches to attach. Therefore, petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
COSLAP. Additionally, no laches will even attach because the judgment is null and void for want of
jurisdiction.
Herald Black Dacasin v. Sharon del Mundo Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 05, 2010
Facts
Herald, American, and Sharon, Filipino, were married in Manila and they have one daughter,
Stephanie. Later, Sharon sought and obtained from an Illinois court a divorce decree against
petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded
to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement
purposes.
Afterwards, both parties executed in Manila a contract for Stephanies joint custody. The parties
chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Sharon
undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
Later, Herald sued Sharon in the RTC of Makati City to enforce the Agreement. Herald alleged that in
violation of the Agreement, Sharon exercised sole custody over Stephanie. Sharon sought the
complaints dismissal for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois courts retention
of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of Heralds suit and enforce the
Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child.
Held
The RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Heralds suit but not to enforce the Agreement that is void.
Law confers subject matter jurisdiction. At the time Herald filed his suit in the RTC, statutory law
vests on RTCs exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An
action for specific performance, such as Heralds suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody,
belongs to this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, Herald went to the right court.
Indeed, the RTCs refusal to entertain Heralds suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but
on its thinking that the Illinois courts divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is
unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and
sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution. Heralds suit seeks the enforcement
not of the various provisions of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child
custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois courts so-called retained jurisdiction.
Far East Bank v. Shemberg, G.R. No.163878, December 12, 2006

Facts
Shemberg entered into several credit transactions with FEBTC secured by several real estate
mortgages. The mortgage contract provided for an acceleration clause upon failure to pay the loan
when due. Shemberg failed to pay the loans upon maturity causing FEBTC to foreclose the mortgage.
Respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Injunction,
Damages, Annulment of Promissory Notes, Documents, and Contracts against petitioner. The
complaint alleges that prior to 1998, respondents obtained credit accommodations from petitioner.
The latter required respondents representatives to sign standard pre-printed bank forms in fine print.
Respondents complied since they trusted petitioner. However, it tuned out that petitioners employees
filled the blanks with false and inaccurate entries. Respondents deny and dispute the genuineness and
due execution of the documents.
Issue
Whether or not an action for cancellation of mortgage is capable of pecuniary estimation.
Held
Incapable of pecuniary estimation
On the first issue, petitioner contends that in real actions, the assessed value of the property or if there
is none, the estimated value thereof, must be alleged in the complaint, and shall serve as the basis for
computing the fees. Nowhere in the complaint in the Civil Case did respondents allege the assessed
values of their realties. Hence, there is no adequate basis for computing the proper filing fees. It
necessarily follows that the fees paid are deficient. The trial court, therefore, did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case.
Respondents counter that a perusal of the complaint shows that the suit primarily involves
cancellation of mortgages, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Consequently, petitioners
contention that there is a deficiency in the payment of docket fees is without merit.
A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed fees. Under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 180, Regional Trial Courts have sole, exclusive, and original jurisdiction to hear, try,
and decide all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
The test for determining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
thus: Ascertain the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If the action is primarily for
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation. Whether the
trial court has jurisdiction would depend upon the amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is only
incidental or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
Here, the primary reliefs prayed for are the cancellation of the real estate and chattel mortgages for
want of consideration. Where the issue involves the validity of a mortgage, the action is one incapable
of pecuniary estimation.
Since respondents paid the docket fees, as computed by the clerk of court, consequently, the trial
court acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Sabitsana v. Muertegi, 201313

Facts
Alberto Garcia (Garcia) executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale in favor of respondent Juanito
Muertegui (Juanito) over a parcel of unregistered land (the lot).
Juanitos father Domingo Muertegui, Sr. (Domingo Sr.) and brother Domingo Jr. took actual
possession of the lot.
Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, petitioner Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. (Atty.
Sabitsana), through a notarized deed of absolute sale. The sale was registered with the Register of
Deeds. Although Domingo Jr. and Sr. paid the real estate taxes, Atty. Sabitsana also paid real property
taxes.
When Domingo Sr. passed away, his heirs applied for registration and coverage of the lot under the
Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Atty. Sabitsana opposed the application, claiming
that he was the true owner of the lot. He asked that the application for registration be held in abeyance
until the issue of conflicting ownership has been resolved.
Juanito, through his attorney-in-fact Domingo Jr., filed a Civil Case for quieting of title and
preliminary injunction, against herein petitioners Atty. Sabitsana and his wife, Rosario, claiming that
they bought the lot in bad faith and are exercising acts of possession and ownership over the same,
which acts thus constitute a cloud over his title. The Complaint prayed, among others, that the
Sabitsana Deed of Sale, the August 24, 1998 letter, and TD No. 5327 be declared null and void and of
no effect; that petitioners be ordered to respect and recognize Juanitos title over the lot; and that
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses be awarded to him.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners asserted that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval,
Biliran did not have jurisdiction over the case, which involved title to or interest in a parcel of land the
assessed value of which is merely P1,230.00.
Issue
Held
Has jurisdiction.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners assert that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case. They argue that since the
assessed value of the lot was a mere P1,230.00, jurisdiction over the case lies with the first level
courts. Petitioners thus conclude that the Decision in Civil Case No. B-1097 is null and void for lack
of jurisdiction.
Respondents Arguments
Respondent, on the other hand, counters that a suit for quieting of title is one whose subject matter is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title.
On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be
instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63
13
Quieting of title cases go to the RTC only (because it is akin to a Petition for Declaratory Relief).
of the Rules of Court, an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be
brought in the appropriate RTC.
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners August 24, 1998
letter-opposition to respondents application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a cloud from
being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed the Civil Case to obtain a declaration of his
rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction
of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.
Spouses Manila v. Spouses Manza, G.R. No. 163602, September 07, 2011
Facts
The controversy stemmed from an action for ejectment filed by the respondents spouses against the
petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). The facts as summarized by the said court are
as follows:
Ederlinda Gallardo leased two (2) parcels of land to Eulogia Manila.
The contract of lease expired but the lessee continued in possession of the property despite a formal
demand letter to vacate the same and pay the rental arrearages. Defendant claimed that no rental fee is
due because she allegedly became the owner of the property at the time she communicated to the
plaintiff her desire to exercise the option to buy the said property.
Their disagreement was later brought to the Barangay for conciliation but the parties failed to reach a
compromise, hence the present action.
The MeTC ruled in favor of respondents.
Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which reversed the MeTC. The RTC decision
became final and executory on November 18, 1994.
On December 22, 1998, respondents filed a petition for annulment of the RTC decision in the CA.
Respondents assailed the RTC for ordering them to sell their property to petitioners arguing that said
courts appellate jurisdiction in ejectment cases is limited to determining who is entitled to the
physical possession of real property and the only judgment it can render in favor of the defendant is to
recover his costs, which judgment is conclusive only on the issue of possession and does not affect the
ownership of the land. They contended that the sale of real property by one party to another may be
ordered by the RTC only in a case for specific performance falling under its original exclusive
jurisdiction, not in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in an ejectment case.
The CA granted the petition, annulled the RTC decision and reinstated the MeTC decision.
Issue
Whether or not the petition for annulment of judgment is proper.
Held
Improper.
In any event, the petition for annulment was based not on fraudulent assurances or negligent acts of
their counsel, but on lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners assail the CA in holding that the RTC decision is void because it granted a relief
inconsistent with the nature of an ejectment suit and not even prayed for by the respondents in their
answer. They contend that whatever maybe questionable in the decision is a ground for assignment of
errors on appeal or in certain cases, as ground for a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
and not as ground for its annulment.
On the other hand, respondents assert that the CA, being a higher court, has the power to adopt,
reverse or modify the findings of the RTC in this case. They point out that the CA in the exercise of
its sound discretion found the RTCs findings unsupported by the evidence on record which also
indicated that the loss of ordinary remedies of appeal, new trial and petition for review was not due to
the fault of the respondents.
We agree with the petitioners.
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. In a petition for annulment
of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional
discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction.
There is no dispute that the RTC is vested with appellate jurisdiction over ejectment cases decided by
the MeTC, MTC or MCTC. We note that petitioners attack on the validity of the RTC decision
pertains to a relief erroneously granted on appeal, and beyond the scope of judgment provided in
Section 6 (now Section 17) of Rule 70. We have held that although it was proper for the RTC, on
appeal in the ejectment suit, to delve on the issue of ownership and receive evidence on possession de
jure, it cannot adjudicate with semblance of finality the ownership of the property to either party by
ordering the cancellation of the TCT.
In this case, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in deciding the appeal of respondents when,
instead of simply dismissing the complaint and awarding any counterclaim for costs due to the
defendants (petitioners), it ordered the respondents-lessors to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor
of the petitioners-lessees. This cannot be done in an ejectment case where the only issue for resolution
is who between the parties is entitled to the physical possession of the property.
Such erroneous grant of relief to the defendants on appeal, however, is but an exercise of jurisdiction
by the RTC. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the
exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered
therein. The ground for annulment of the decision is absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court
should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
Thus, while respondents assailed the content of the RTC decision, they failed to show that the RTC
did not have the authority to decide the case on appeal.
The CA therefore erred in annulling the November 18, 1994 RTC decision on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction as said court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners appeal.
EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, PETITIONER, V. BRITISH AIRWAYS, G.R. No. 171092,

March 15, 2010
Facts
Petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages against respondent British Airways
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. She alleged that she took respondents flight
from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. Once on board, she allegedly requested Julian
Halliday (Halliday), one of the respondents flight attendants, to assist her in placing her hand-carried
luggage in the overhead bin. However, Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her, and even
sarcastically remarked that If I were to help all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have a broken
back!
Petitioner further alleged that when the plane was about to land in Rome, Italy, another flight
attendant, Nickolas Kerrigan (Kerrigan), singled her out from among all the passengers in the
business class section to lecture on plane safety. Allegedly, Kerrigan made her appear to the other
passengers to be ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and in need of lecturing on the safety rules and
regulations of the plane. Affronted, petitioner assured Kerrigan that she knew the planes safety
regulations being a frequent traveler. Thereupon, Kerrigan allegedly thrust his face a mere few
centimeters away from that of the petitioner and menacingly told her that We dont like your attitude.
Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to respondents ground manager and demanded an
apology. However, the latter declared that the flight stewards were only doing their job.
Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for damages. Summons, together with a copy of the complaint,
was served on the respondent through Violeta Echevarria, General Manager of Euro-Philippine
Airline Services, Inc.
Respondent, by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of
lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent. Respondent alleged that only
the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for
damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention. Likewise, it was alleged that the case must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent because the summons was
erroneously served on Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc. which is not its resident agent in the
Philippines,
Issue
Held
RTC has no jurisdiction.
The Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country.
It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country.
The Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct
occurred, was between the United Kingdom and Italy, which are both signatories to the
Warsaw Convention.
Thus, when the place of departure and the place of destination in a contract of carriage are situated
within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an international
carriage. The High Contracting Parties referred to herein were the signatories to the Warsaw
Convention and those which subsequently adhered to it.
In the case at bench, petitioners place of departure was London, United Kingdom while her place of
destination was Rome, Italy. Both the United Kingdom and Italy signed and ratified the Warsaw
Convention. As such, the transport of the petitioner is deemed to be an international carriage within
the contemplation of the Warsaw Convention.
Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant case, then the jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action is governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before:
1. The court where the carrier is domiciled;

2. The court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
3. The court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or
4. The court of the place of destination.
In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London, United
Kingdom with London as its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and second
jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in the United
Kingdom. In the passenger ticket and baggage check presented by both the petitioner and respondent,
it appears that the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule,
the petitioner has the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the
petitioner and respondent aver that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly
designated given the routing presented in the said passenger ticket and baggage check. Accordingly,
petitioner may bring her action before the courts of Rome, Italy. We thus find that the RTC of Makati
correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner.
It is thus settled that allegations of tortious conduct committed against an airline passenger during
the course of the international carriage do not bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw
Convention.
Respondent, in seeking remedies from the trial court through special appearance of counsel, is
not deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Petitioner argues that respondent has effectively submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court
when the latter stated in its Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration that Defendant [is
at a loss] x x x how the plaintiff arrived at her erroneous impression that it is/was Euro-Philippines
Airlines Services, Inc. that has been making a special appearance since x x x British Airways x x x
has been clearly specifying in all the pleadings that it has filed with this Honorable Court that it is the
one making a special appearance.
In refuting the contention of petitioner, respondent cited La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of
Appeals where we held that even if a party challenges the jurisdiction of the court over his person, as
by reason of absence or defective service of summons, and he also invokes other grounds for the
dismissal of the action under Rule 16, he is not deemed to be in estoppel or to have waived his
objection to the jurisdiction over his person.
This issue has been squarely passed upon in the recent case of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, where we
reiterated our ruling in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals.
In this case, the special appearance of the counsel of respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss and
other pleadings before the trial court cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of the said trial court. We hence disagree with the contention of the petitioner and rule that there was
no voluntary appearance before the trial court that could constitute estoppel or a waiver of
respondents objection to jurisdiction over its person.
Heirs of Santiago Nisperos v. Nisperos-Ducusin, 2013

Facts
The instant case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioners with the DARAB alleging the
following antecedents:
The parcel of land subject of the instant case was acquired by Santiago Nisperos, the predecessor of
petitioners, during his lifetime.
When Santiago and his wife Estefania died, they were survived by their nine children: The heirs of
Santiago, petitioners herein, claim that the subject property was occupied, controlled and tilled by all
nine children of Santiago.
During the time when Maria and Cipriana were overseeing the property, Maria took respondent
Marissa Nisperos-Ducusin, a daughter of their cousin Purita, as her ward and raised her like her own
child.
A Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT) over the subject property was executed between Maria
and Cipriana as landowners, and respondent, who was then only 17 years old, as farmer-beneficiary.
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) was issued to respondent by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) over the subject property.
Alleging fraud on the part of respondent which petitioners claim to have discovered only in August
2001, petitioners filed a complaint with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO).
Unfortunately, no settlement between petitioners and respondent was reached prompting the MARO
to issue a Certificate to File Action.
Petitioners filed with the DARAB a complaint for annulment of documents and damages against
respondent.
The DARAB ruled against petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the CA.
The appellate court rendered the assailed decision dismissing the petition for review and upholding
the DARAB decision. It ruled that the Regional Adjudicator acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it held that the subject property was no longer covered by our agrarian laws because of the
retention rights of petitioners. The CA held that retention rights, exclusion of a property from CARP
coverage and the qualification and disqualification of agrarian reform beneficiaries are issues not
cognizable by the Regional Adjudicator and the DARAB but by the DAR Secretary. The appellate
court nevertheless held that petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving that fraud attended
the execution of the VLT. It also agreed with the DARAB that considering a certificate of title was
already issued in favor of respondent, the same became indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time
petitioners instituted the case in January 2002, and thus may no longer be judicially reviewed.
Issue
Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction.
Held
The complaint should have been lodged with the Office of the DAR Secretary and not with the
DARAB.
It is not enough that the controversy involves the cancellation of a CLOA (Certificates of Land
Ownership Award) registered with the Land Registration Authority for the DARAB to have
jurisdiction. What is of primordial consideration is the existence of an agrarian dispute between the
parties.
This Court held that there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties for the DARAB to have
jurisdiction over a case.
In the instant case, petitioners, as supposed owners of the subject property, did not allege in their
complaint that a tenancy relationship exists between them and respondent. In fact, in their complaint,
they described respondent as a "ward" of one of the co-owners, Maria, who is "not a bona fide
beneficiary, she being not engaged in farming because she was still a minor" at the time the VLT was
executed.
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government

agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material
allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or
complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an
action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties
where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action.
Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel
does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of
the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing the
issue, especially where the DARABs lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or
petition.
Considering that the allegations in the complaint negate the existence of an agrarian dispute among
the parties, the DARAB is bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same as it is the DAR
Secretary who has authority to resolve the dispute raised by petitioners.
What the PARAD should have done is to refer the complaint to the proper office. Likewise, if a case
covered by Section 3 herein is filed before any office other than the DARAB, the concerned DAR
official shall refer the case to the DARAB for resolution within the same period provided herein.
While it is true that the PARAD and the DARAB (which was upheld by the CA) thoroughly discussed
in their respective decisions the issues pertaining to the validity of the VLT and the OCT/CLOA
issued to respondent, the fact that they are bereft of jurisdiction to resolve the same prevents this
Court from resolving the instant petition on its merits. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
allow a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. To assume the power is to short-
circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. The DAR must be given a
chance to correct its administrative and procedural lapses in the issuance of the CLOA. Moreover, it is
in a better position to resolve the particular issue at hand, being the agency possessing the required
expertise on the matter and authority to hear the same.
Dy v. Bibat-Palamos, 2013
Facts
Petitioner Ernesto Dy (petitioner) and his wife, Lourdes Dy (Lourdes), were the proprietors of
Limchia Enterprises which was engaged in the shipping business. Limchia Enterprises obtained a loan
from Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation (respondent) to fund its acquisition of M/V Pilar-I,
a cargo vessel.
Due to financial losses suffered when M/V Pilar-I was attacked by pirates, Spouses Dy failed to make
the scheduled payments as required in their promissory note. After receiving several demand letters
from respondent, Spouses Dy applied for the restructuring of their loan. Meanwhile, Lourdes issued
several checks to cover the remainder of their loan but the same were dishonored by the bank,
prompting respondent to institute a criminal complaint for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.
Lourdes appealed to respondent with a new proposal to update their outstanding loan obligations.
Respondent filed the Complaint and Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Preferred Ship
Mortgage. The RTC ordered the seizure of M/V Pilar-I and turned over its possession to respondent.
Respondent transferred all of its rights, title to and interests, as mortgagee, in M/V Pilar-I to Colorado
Shipyard Corporation (Colorado).
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Spouses Dy, ruling that they had not yet defaulted on their
loan because respondent agreed to a restructured schedule of payment. There being no default, the
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage on M/V Pilar-I was premature. The RTC ordered that the vessel be
returned to Spouses Dy. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), with the modification that
Spouses Dy be ordered to reimburse the respondent for repair and dry docking expenses while the
vessel was in the latters possession. On appeal, the Court promulgated its Decision upholding the
findings of the CA but deleting the order requiring Spouses Dy to reimburse respondent.
Consequently, petitioner filed a motion for execution of judgment with the RTC. In the intervening
period, Colorado informed the RTC that M/V Pilar-I, which was in its possession, had sustained
severe damage and deterioration and had sunk in its shipyard because of its exposure to the elements.
For this reason, it sought permission from the court to cut the sunken vessel into pieces, sell its parts
and deposit the proceeds in escrow.
Petitioner insisted that he had the right to require that the vessel be returned to him in the same
condition that it had been at the time it was wrongfully seized by respondent or, should it no longer be
possible, that another vessel of the same tonnage, length and beam similar to that of M/V Pilar-I be
delivered. Colorado, however, responded that the vessel had suffered severe damage and deterioration
that refloating or restoring it to its former condition would be futile, impossible and very costly; and
should petitioner persist in his demand that the ship be refloated, it should be done at the expense of
the party adjudged by the court to pay the same.
The RTC granted the motion for execution but denied petitioners prayer for the return of M/V Pilar-I
in the same state in which it was taken by respondent. The petitioners appealed to the SC.
Issue
Whether or not the direct appeal from the RTC to the SC is proper.
Held
Proper.
Hierarchy of Courts; Direct Resort To The Supreme Court Justified
Petitioner argues that his situation calls for the direct invocation of this Courts jurisdiction in the
interest of justice. Moreover, as pointed out by the RTC, what is involved is a judgment of this Court
which the lower courts cannot modify. Hence, petitioner deemed it proper to bring this case
immediately to the attention of this Court. Lastly, petitioner claims that the present case involves a
novel issue of law that is, whether in an action to recover, a defendant in wrongful possession of the
subject matter in litigation may be allowed to return the same in a deteriorated condition without any
liability.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the petition should have been filed with the CA,
following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It pointed out that petitioner failed to state any special or
important reason or any exceptional and compelling circumstance which would warrant a direct
recourse to this Court.
Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is improper because the
Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily
perform its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its docket. Nonetheless, the
invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain
instances on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as
1. When dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public policy;
2. When demanded by the broader interest of justice;
3. When the challenged orders were patent nullities; or
4. When analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified the
immediate and direct handling of the case.
This case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Justice demands that
this Court take cognizance of this case to put an end to the controversy and resolve the matter which
has been dragging on for more than twenty (20) years. Moreover, in light of the fact that what is
involved is a final judgment promulgated by this Court, it is but proper for petitioner to call upon its
original jurisdiction and seek final clarification.
Smart Communications v. Aldecoa, 2013

Facts
Petitioner entered into a contract of lease with Florentino Sebastian in which the latter agreed to lease
to the former a piece of vacant lot. Petitioner immediately constructed and installed a cellular base
station on the leased property. Inside the cellular base station is a communications tower. Around and
close to the cellular base station are houses, hospitals, clinics, and establishments, including the
properties of respondents.
Respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint against petitioner for abatement of nuisance and
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
The RTC issued its Order granting petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing
respondents Complaint.
Respondents filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court declared the cellular base
station of petitioner a nuisance that endangered the health and safety of the residents of Barangay
Vira, Roxas, Isabela because: (1) the locational clearance granted to petitioner was a nullity due to the
lack of approval by majority of the actual residents of thebarangay and a barangay resolution
endorsing the construction of the cellular base station; and (2) the sound emission of the generator at
the cellular base station exceeded the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
standards.
Issue
Whether or not the regular courts can take jurisdiction over the issue of the validity of petitioners
locational clearance.
Held
The Petition is partly meritorious. While the Court agrees that the Court of Appeals should not have
taken cognizance of the issue of whether the locational clearance for petitioners cellular base station
is valid, the Court will still not reinstate the RTC Order granting petitioners Motion for Summary
Judgment and entirely dismissing the Civil Case. The issues of (1) whether petitioners cellular base
station is a nuisance, and (2) whether the generator at petitioners cellular base station is, by itself,
also a nuisance, ultimately involve disputed or contested factual matters that call for the presentation
of evidence at a full-blown trial.
On the finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioners locational clearance for its cellular base
station is a nullity.
Based on the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and its corollary doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, it was premature for the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of and rule upon the issue
of the validity or nullity of petitioners locational clearance for its cellular base station.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction were
explained at length by the Court in Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals, as follows:
The Court in a long line of cases has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it
is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within
the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power
of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly,
absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
In fact, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure
to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. The
underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the
administrative body, or grievance machinery, is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the
same correctly.
The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) is the planning, regulatory, and quasi-
judicial instrumentality of government for land use development. In the exercise of its mandate to
ensure rational land use by regulating land development, it issued HLURB Resolution No.R-626,
series of 1998, Approving the Locational Guidelines for Base Stations of Cellular Mobile Telephone
Service, Paging Service, Trunking Service, Wireless Loop Service and Other Wireless
Communication Services (HLURB Guidelines).
There is no showing that respondents availed themselves of the afore-mentioned administrative

remedies prior to instituting the Civil Case before the RTC. While there are accepted exceptions to the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
respondents never asserted nor argued any of them. Thus, there is no cogent reason for the Court to
apply the exceptions instead of the general rule to this case.
Ordinarily, failure to comply with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction will result in the dismissal of the case for lack of cause of action.
However, the Court herein will not go to the extent of entirely dismissing the Civil Case. The Court
does not lose sight of the fact that respondents Complaint in the Civil Case is primarily for abatement
of nuisance; and respondents alleged the lack of HLURB requirements for the cellular base station,
not to seek nullification of petitioners locational clearance, but to support their chief argument that
said cellular base station is a nuisance which needs to be abated.
The issue of whether or not the locational clearance for said cellular base station is valid is actually
separate and distinct from the issue of whether or not the cellular base station is a nuisance; one is not
necessarily determinative of the other. While the first is within the primary jurisdiction of the HLURB
and, therefore, premature for the courts to rule upon in the present case, the latter is within the
jurisdiction of the courts to determine but only after trial proper.
Cause of Action (Rule 2)

Mindanao Terminal v. Phoenix Assurance, G.R. No. 162467, May 8, 2009
Facts
Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (Del Monte) contracted petitioner Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage
Service, Inc. (Mindanao Terminal), a stevedoring company, to load and stow a shipment of bananas
and pineapples belonging to Del Monte Fresh Produce International, Inc. (Del Monte Produce) into
the vessel M/V Mistrau. Del Monte Produce insured the shipment with private respondent. It was
discovered upon discharge that some of the cargo was in bad condition. Del Monte Produce filed a
claim for the damages to its shipment from respondent. A check was sent to Del Monte Produce; Del
Monte Produce then issued a subrogation receipt to respondent.
Respondent instituted an action for damages against Mindanao Terminal in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). After trial, the RTC held Mindanao Terminal cannot be held liable for whatever happened to
the cargoes after it had loaded and stowed them. It was further held that Phoenix and McGee had no
cause of action against Mindanao Terminal because the latter, whose services were contracted by Del
Monte, a distinct corporation from Del Monte Produce, had no contract with the assured Del Monte
Produce.
Phoenix and McGee appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC. It further held that even with the absence of a contractual relationship between
Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte Produce, the cause of action of Phoenix and McGee could be
based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Issue
Whether or not Phoenix and McGee have a cause of action against Mindanao Terminal.
Held
Have a cause of action.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint filed by Phoenix and McGee against
Mindanao Terminal, from which the present case has arisen, states a cause of action. The present
action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the negligent and careless loading and stowing of the
cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Even assuming that both Phoenix and McGee have only
been subrogated in the rights of Del Monte Produce, who is not a party to the contract of service
between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte, still the insurance carriers may have a cause of action in
light of the Courts consistent ruling that the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.
In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract. In the present case, Phoenix and McGee are not suing for damages for injuries arising from
the breach of the contract of service but from the alleged negligent manner by which Mindanao
Terminal handled the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Despite the absence of contractual
relationship between Del Monte Produce and Mindanao Terminal, the allegation of negligence on the
part of the defendant should be sufficient to establish a cause of action arising from quasi-delict.
Dolores Macaslang v. Renato Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, May 30, 201114
Facts
The respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the MTCC, alleging that the [petitioner]
sold to [respondents] a residential house and that the [petitioner] requested to be allowed to live in the
house with a promise to vacate as soon as she would be able to find a new residence. They further
alleged that despite their demand after a year, the petitioner failed or refused to vacate the premises.
Despite the due service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the petitioner did not file her
answer. The MTCC declared her in default upon the respondents motion to declare her in default.
Thereafter, the MTCC rendered judgment against her.
The petitioner appealed to the RTC. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action as the evidence showed that there was no demand to vacate made upon the petitioner
The respondents appealed to the CA, assailing the RTCs decision for disregarding the allegations in
the complaint in determining the existence or non-existence of a cause of action. The CA reversed and
set aside the RTCs decision and reinstated the MTCCs decision in favor of the respondents.
Issue
Whether or not there was failure to state a cause of action.
Held
No failure.
The RTC opined that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the evidence showed that
there was no demand to vacate made upon the petitioner. The CA disagreed.
We concur with the CA.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following:
1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff;
2. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant about
the termination of the latters right of possession;
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
its enjoyment; and
4. Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property on the defendant,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of action or not, only the facts alleged in the
complaint are considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint
based on the facts alleged and the prayer asked for. Only ultimate facts, not legal conclusions or
evidentiary facts, are considered for purposes of applying the test.
Based on its allegations, the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
Yet, even as we rule that the respondents complaint stated a cause of action, we must find and hold
that both the RTC and the CA erroneously appreciated the real issue to be about the complaints failure
to state a cause of action. It certainly was not so, but the respondents lack of cause of action. Their
erroneous appreciation expectedly prevented the correct resolution of the action.
14
SCA of unlawful detainer requires a cause of action. Further, RTC can touch on issue of ownership (but only
for the purposes of determining possession).
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other. On
the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a
ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action
refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading.
Justice Regalado, a recognized commentator on remedial law, has explained the distinction:
xxx What is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to state a cause of action which is provided in Sec. 1(g) of
Rule 16. This is a matter of insufficiency of the pleading. Sec. 5 of Rule 10, which was also included as the last
mode for raising the issue to the court, refers to the situation where the evidence does not prove a cause of
action. This is, therefore, a matter of insufficiency of evidence. Failure to state a cause of action is different from
failure to prove a cause of action. The remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the
remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in
this section. The procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of action, by timely
objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted.
If the allegations of the complaint do not state a cause of action, the complaint becomes vulnerable to
a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Evidently, it is not the lack or
absence of a cause of action that is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint but the fact that the
complaint states no cause of action. Failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest
stages of an action through a motion to dismiss, but lack of cause of action may be raised at any time
after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of the stipulations, admissions, or evidence
presented.
Philip Turner, et al. v. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 157479, November 24, 201015
Facts
The petitioners held shares of stock of the respondent. The respondent decided to amend its articles of
incorporation to remove the stockholders pre-emptive rights to newly issued shares of stock. Feeling
that the corporate move would be prejudicial to their interest as stockholders, the petitioners voted
against the amendment and demanded payment of their shares. The respondent found the fair value of
the shares demanded by the petitioners unacceptable and that the payment could be made only if the
respondent had unrestricted retained earnings in its books to cover the value of the shares, which was
not the case. The disagreement on the valuation of the shares led the parties to constitute an appraisal
committee. Subsequently, the petitioners demanded payment based on the valuation of the appraisal
committee. Respondent refused the petitioners demand, explaining that pursuant to the Corporation
Code, the dissenting stockholders exercising their appraisal rights could be paid only when the
corporation had unrestricted retained earnings to cover the fair value of the shares, but that it had no
retained earnings at the time of the petitioners demand.
Upon the respondents refusal to pay, the petitioners sued the respondent for collection and damages in
the RTC. The petitioners filed their motion for partial summary judgment. The respondent opposed
the motion for partial summary judgment, stating that the determination of the unrestricted retained
earnings should be made at the end of the fiscal year of the respondent, and that the petitioners did not
have a cause of action against the respondent.
The RTC granted the petitioners motion for partial summary judgment. Subsequently, the RTC issued
a writ of execution.
Aggrieved, the respondent commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA. Upon the
respondents application, the CA issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining the petitioners,
and their agents and representatives from enforcing the writ of execution. By then, however, the writ
of execution had been partially enforced. The TRO lapsed without the CA issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent the execution. Thereupon, the sheriff resumed the enforcement of
the writ of execution. The CA promulgated its assailed decision granting the petition.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner had a cause of action.
Held
Petitioners cause of action was premature.
That the respondent had indisputably no unrestricted retained earnings in its books at the time the
petitioners commenced the Civil Case proved that the respondents legal obligation to pay the value of
the petitioners shares did not yet arise. Thus, the CA did not err in holding that the petitioners had no
cause of action, and in ruling that the RTC did not validly render the partial summary judgment.
The civil case was dismissible from the beginning for being without any cause of action.
The RTC concluded that the respondents obligation to pay had accrued by its having the unrestricted
retained earnings after the making of the demand by the petitioners. It based its conclusion on the fact
that the Corporation Code did not provide that the unrestricted retained earnings must already exist at
the time of the demand.
15
An original complaint that states no cause of action cannot be cured by an amendment/supplement.
Amendment fact existing at the time of the original complaint. Supplement fact existing only after the filing
of the original complaint.
The RTCs construal of the Corporation Code was unsustainable, because it did not take into account
the petitioners lack of a cause of action against the respondent. In order to give rise to any obligation
to pay on the part of the respondent, the petitioners should first make a valid demand that the
respondent refused to pay despite having unrestricted retained earnings. Otherwise, the respondent
could not be said to be guilty of any actionable omission that could sustain their action to collect.
Neither did the subsequent existence of unrestricted retained earnings after the filing of the complaint
cure the lack of cause of action. The petitioners right of action could only spring from an existing
cause of action. Thus, a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured by an
amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action during the
pendency of the action.
Even the fact that the respondent already had unrestricted retained earnings more than sufficient to
cover the petitioners claims (when they filed their motion for partial summary judgment) did not
rectify the absence of the cause of action at the time of the commencement of the Civil Case. The
motion for partial summary judgment, being a mere application for relief other than by a pleading,
was not the same as the complaint in the Civil Case. Thereby, the petitioners did not meet the
requirement of the Rules of Court that a cause of action must exist at the commencement of an action,
which is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court.
Chua v. Metrobank, et al, G. R. No.182311, August 19, 2009

Facts
Petitioners obtained from respondent Metrobank a loan, which was secured by a real estate mortgage
(REM). Having failed to fully pay their obligations, petitioners entered into a Debt Settlement
Agreement with respondent. When petitioners still failed to pay their loans, respondent Metrobank
sought to extra-judicially foreclose the REM constituted on the subject properties.
Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Preliminary Injunction and Damages against respondents.
The auction sale, however, proceeded and a Certificate of Sale was accordingly issued to respondent
Metrobank as the highest bidder of the foreclosed properties.
The RTC denied petitioners application for injunction on the ground that the sale of the foreclosed
properties rendered the same moot and academic. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
When RTC failed to take any action on said Motion, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and remanded the case for further
proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of respondents with finality.
Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for Damages against respondents
Petitioners sought in their Complaint the award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages against the
respondents for making it appear that an auction sale of the subject properties took place, as a result of
which, the prospective buyers of the said properties lost their interest and petitioner.
Petitioners filed with RTC a Motion to Consolidate seeking the consolidation of Civil Case, the action
for damages pending before said court, with Civil Case, the injunction case that was being heard
before RTC. Respondents filed with RTC an Opposition to Motion to Consolidate with Prayer for
Sanctions, praying for the dismissal of the Complaint for Damages on the ground of forum shopping.
The RTC granted the Motion to Consolidate. Respondents filed a motion raising the ground of forum
shopping. RTC granted the motion.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC-Branch.
Issue
Whether or not there was forum shopping.
Held
There was forum shopping.
Forum shopping exists when a party repeatedly avails himself of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in
or already resolved adversely by some other court.
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways:

1. Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia);
2. Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous
case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and
3. Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting
of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res
judicata).
In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioners failed to state in the Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping in Civil Case 2 the existence of Civil Case 1. Petitioners committed forum shopping by
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, although with different prayers.
Forum shopping occurs although the actions seem to be different, when it can be seen that there is a
splitting of a cause of action. A single act or omission can violate various rights at the same time, as
when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations.
However, where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of
the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person.
Petitioners would like to make it appear that Civil Case No. 1 was solely concerned with the
nullification of the auction sale and certification of sale, while Civil Case 2 was a totally separate
claim for damages. Yet, a review of the records reveals that petitioners also included an explicit claim
for damages. There is no question that the claims of petitioners for damages in Civil Case 2 and Civil
Case No. 1 are premised on the same cause of action, i.e., the purportedly wrongful conduct of
respondents in connection with the foreclosure sale of the subject properties.
At first glance, said claims for damages may appear different. In Civil Case 1, the damages
purportedly arose from the bad faith of respondents in offering the subject properties at the auction
sale at a price much lower than the assessed fair market value of the said properties. On the other
hand, the damages in Civil Case No. 2, allegedly resulted from the backing out of prospective buyers,
who had initially offered to buy the subject properties, because respondents made it appear that the
said properties were already sold at the auction sale. Yet, it is worthy to note that petitioners quoted
closely similar values for the subject properties in both cases, against which they measured the
damages they supposedly suffered.
Petitioners contention that the outcome of Civil Case 2 will not determine that of Civil Case 1 does
not justify the filing of separate cases. Even if it were assumed that the two cases contain two separate
remedies that are both available to petitioners, these two remedies that arose from one wrongful act
cannot be pursued in two different cases.
Moreover, petitioners admitted in their Motion to Consolidate that both cases shared the same parties,
the same central issue, and the same subject property
If the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent case shall be dismissed
without prejudice, on the ground of either litis pendentia or res judicata. However, if the forum
shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed
with prejudice.. In this case, petitioners did not deliberately file Civil Case No. 2 for the purpose of
seeking a favorable decision in another forum. Otherwise, they would not have moved for the
consolidation of both cases. Thus, only Civil Case 2 is dismissed and the hearing of Civil Case No. 1
will be continued.
Catalina Chu, et al. v. Spouses Fernando and Trinidad Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185, September
12, 2011
Facts
Spouses Chus executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage involving their five parcels of
land in favor of Trinidad N. Cunanan (Cunanan). The parties further stipulated that the ownership of
the lots would remain with the Chus as the vendors and would be transferred to Cunanan only upon
complete payment of the total consideration and compliance with the terms of the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage.
Cunanan was able to transfer the title of the five lots to her name without the knowledge of the Chus,
and to borrow money with the lots as security without paying the balance of the purchase price to the
Chus. She later transferred two of the lots to Spouses Carloses. As a result, the Chus caused the
annotation of an unpaid vendors lien on the lots. Nonetheless, Cunanan still assigned the remaining
three lots to Cool Town Realty.
The Chus commenced Civil Case in the RTC to recover the unpaid balance from Spouses Cunanans
and the annulment of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and of the TCTs issued pursuant
to the deed, and to recover damages. They impleaded Cool Town Realty and Development
Corporation (Cool Town Realty).
Considering that the Carloses had meanwhile sold the two lots to Benelda Estate Development
Corporation (Benelda Estate), the Chus further amended the complaint to implead Benelda Estate as
additional defendant. In due course, Benelda Estate filed its answer with a motion to dismiss. After
the RTC denied its motion to dismiss, Benelda Estate assailed the denial on certiorari in the CA,
which annulled the RTCs denial and dismissed Civil Case as against Benelda Estate. This Court
upheld the CA.
The Chus, the Cunanans, and Cool Town Realty entered into a compromise agreement. The RTC
approved the compromise agreement.
Thereafter, the petitioners brought another suit against the Carloses and Benelda Estate seeking the
cancellation of the TCTs of the two lots in the name of Benelda Estate. The petitioners amended their
complaint to implead the Cunanans as additional defendants. The respondents moved to dismiss the
amended complaint based on (a) forum shopping; (b) res judicata, and (c) failure to state a cause of
action. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
The Cunanans filed a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the RTCs denial of their motion to
dismiss and motion for reconsideration. The CA promulgated its decision, granting the petition for
certiorari and nullifying the challenged orders of the RTC.
Issue
Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of splitting a single cause of action.
Held
Guilty.
Apparently, the petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to enforce or rescind
the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a
single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions
upon them.
The petitioners were not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage and to prosecute piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon
which a special relief was sought under the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, and then to
leave the rest to be presented in another suit; otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. Their
splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective was to avoid unduly
burdening the dockets of the courts. Their contravention of the policy merited the dismissal of Civil
Case on the ground of bar by res judicata.
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The former judgment must be final;
2. It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties;
3. It must be a judgment on the merits; and
4. There must be between the first and second actions [Identity of parties, (ii) identity of the
subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action].
The first requisite was attendant. Civil Case No. G-1936 was already terminated under the
compromise agreement, for the judgment, being upon a compromise, was immediately final and
unappealable. As to the second requisite, the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action in Civil
Case No. G-1936 for the enforcement or rescission of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage,
which was an action whose subject matter was not capable of pecuniary estimation. That the
compromise agreement explicitly settled the entirety of Civil Case No. G-1936 by resolving all the
claims of the parties against each other indicated that the third requisite was also satisfied.
But was there an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action between Civil Case
No.G-1936 and Civil Case No. 12251?
There is identity of parties when the parties in both actions are the same, or there is privity between
them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. The requirement of the
identity of parties was fully met, because the Chus, on the one hand, and the Cunanans, on the other
hand, were the parties in both cases along with their respective privies. The fact that the Carloses and
Benelda Estate, defendants in Civil Case No. 12251, were not parties in the compromise agreement
was inconsequential, for they were also the privies of the Cunanans as transferees and successors-in-
interest. It is settled that the absolute identity of parties was not a condition sine qua non for res
judicata to apply, because a shared identity of interest sufficed. Mere substantial identity of parties, or
even community of interests between parties in the prior and subsequent cases, even if the latter were
not impleaded in the first case, was sufficient.
As to identity of the subject matter, both actions dealt with the properties involved in the deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage. Identity of the causes of action was also met, because Case No. G-1936
and Civil Case No. 12251 were rooted in one and the same cause of action the failure of Cunanan to
pay in full the purchase price of the five lots subject of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage.
In other words, Civil Case No. 12251 reprised Civil Case No. G-1936, the only difference between
them being that the petitioners alleged in the former that Benelda Estate was not also a purchaser for
value and in good faith.
In fine, the rights and obligations of the parties vis--vis the five lots were all defined and governed by
the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, the only contract between them. That contract was
single and indivisible, as far as they were concerned. Consequently, the Chus could not properly
proceed against the respondents in Civil Case No. 12251, despite the silence of the compromise
agreement as to the Carloses and Benelda Estate, because there can only be one action where the
contract is entire, and the breach total, and the petitioners must therein recover all their claims and
damages. The Chus could not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make that single
cause of action the basis of several suits.
NM Rothschild & Sons (AUSTRALIA) Limited, v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company,

G.R. No. 175799, November 28, 2011
Facts
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint against petitioner praying for a
judgment declaring the loan and hedging contracts between the parties void for being contrary to
Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and for damages.
Petitioner filed a Special Appearance With Motion to Dismiss praying for the dismissal of the
Complaint on the following grounds: (a) the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner due to the defective and improper service of summons; (b) the Complaint failed to state a
cause of action and respondent does not have any against petitioner; (c) the action is barred by
estoppel; and (d) respondent did not come to court with clean hands.
The trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner sought redress via a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, petitioner filed the present petition. Arguing against the ruling of the
appellate court, petitioner insists that (a) an order denying a motion to dismiss may be the proper
subject of a petition for certiorari; and (b) the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in not
finding that it had not validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and that the plaintiff had no cause
of action.
Respondent, on the other hand, posits that: (a) the present Petition should be dismissed for not being
filed by a real party in interest and for lack of a proper verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping; (b) the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that certiorari was not the proper remedy; and (c)
the trial court correctly denied petitioners motion to dismiss.
Issue
Whether or not the complaint is defective because of a lack of cause of action.
Held
Not defective.
Issues more properly ventilated during the trial of the case
As correctly ruled by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the alleged absence of a cause of
action (as opposed to the failure to state a cause of action), the alleged estoppel on the part of
petitioner, and the argument that respondent is in pari delicto in the execution of the challenged
contracts, are not grounds in a Motion to Dismiss. Rather, such defenses raise evidentiary issues
closely related to the validity and/or existence of respondents alleged cause of action and should
therefore be threshed out during the trial.
As regards the allegation of failure to state a cause of action, while the same is usually available as a
ground in a Motion to Dismiss, said ground cannot be ruled upon in the present Petition without going
into the very merits of the main case.
To sustain a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for
relief does not exist and not only that the claim was defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain.
The trial court held that the Complaint in the case at bar contains all the three elements of a cause of
action, i.e., it alleges that: (1) plaintiff has the right to ask for the declaration of nullity of the Hedging
Contracts for being null and void and contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines; (2)
defendant has the corresponding obligation not to enforce the Hedging Contracts because they are in
the nature of wagering or gambling agreements and therefore the transactions implementing those
contracts are null and void under Philippine laws; and (3) defendant ignored the advice and intends to
enforce the Hedging Contracts by demanding financial payments due therefrom.
The rule is that in a Motion to Dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material
allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiff's complaint. However, this principle of
hypothetical admission admits of exceptions. Thus, in Tan v. Court of Appeals, we held:
The flaw in this conclusion is that, while conveniently echoing the general rule that averments in the complaint
are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of a motion to dismiss grounded on the failure to state a
cause of action, it did not take into account the equally established limitations to such rule, i.e., that a motion to
dismiss does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud; nor allegations of legal conclusions; nor an
erroneous statement of law; nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor mere conclusions of
law; nor allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice; nor matters of evidence; nor
surplusage and irrelevant matter; nor scandalous matter inserted merely to insult the opposing party; nor to
legally impossible facts; nor to facts which appear unfounded by a record incorporated in the pleading, or by a
document referred to; and, nor to general averments contradicted by more specific averments. A more judicious
resolution of a motion to dismiss, therefore, necessitates that the court be not restricted to the consideration of
the facts alleged in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Courts may consider other facts
within the range of judicial notice as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence which the courts are bound to take
into account, and they are also fairly entitled to examine records/documents duly incorporated into the
complaint by the pleader himself in ruling on the demurrer to the complaint.
In the case at bar, respondent asserts in the Complaint that the Hedging Contracts are void for being
contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code. Respondent claims that under the Hedging Contracts,
despite the express stipulation for deliveries of gold, the intention of the parties was allegedly merely
to compel each other to pay the difference between the value of the gold at the forward price stated in
the contract and its market price at the supposed time of delivery.
Whether such an agreement is void is a mere allegation of a conclusion of law, which therefore cannot
be hypothetically admitted. Quite properly, the relevant portions of the contracts sought to be
nullified, as well as a copy of the contract itself, are incorporated in the Complaint. The determination
of whether or not the Complaint stated a cause of action would therefore involve an inquiry into
whether or not the assailed contracts are void under Philippine laws. This is, precisely, the very issue
to be determined in Civil Case No. 05-782. Indeed, petitioners defense against the charge of nullity of
the Hedging Contracts is the purported intent of the parties that actual deliveries of gold be made
pursuant thereto. Such a defense requires the presentation of evidence on the merits of the case. An
issue that requires the contravention of the allegations of the complaint, as well as the full ventilation,
in effect, of the main merits of the case, should not be within the province of a mere Motion to
Dismiss. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied the Motion to Dismiss on this ground.
Pua v. Citibank, N.A., 2013 (SEC jurisdiction)

Facts
Petitioners filed before the RTC a Complaint for declaration of nullity of contract and sums of money
with damages against respondent. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they had been depositors
of Citibank Binondo Branch (Citibank Binondo). Chingyee Yau (Yau), Vice-President of Citibank
Hongkong, came to the Philippines to sell securities to Jose. Yau offered and sold to petitioners
numerous securities. Later on, petitioners discovered that the securities sold to them were not
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and that the terms and conditions
covering the subscription were not likewise submitted to the SEC for evaluation, approval, and
registration. Asserting that respondents actions are in violation of Republic Act No.8799, entitled the
"Securities Regulation Code" (SRC), they assailed the validity of the subscription agreements and the
terms and conditions thereof for being contrary to law and/or public policy.
For its part, respondent filed a motion to dismiss alleging, inter alia, that petitioners complaint should
be dismissed outright for violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It pointed out that the
merits of the case would largely depend on the issue of whether or not there was a violation of the
SRC, in particular, whether or not there was a sale of unregistered securities. In this regard,
respondent contended that the SRC conferred upon the SEC jurisdiction to investigate compliance
with its provisions and thus, petitioners complaint should be first filed with the SEC and not directly
before the RTC.
The RTC denied respondents motion to dismiss. It noted that petitioners complaint is for declaration
of nullity of contract and sums of money with damages and, as such, it has jurisdiction to hear and
decide upon the case even if it involves the alleged sale of securities. It ratiocinated that the legal
questions or issues arising from petitioners causes of action against respondent are more appropriate
for the judiciary than for an administrative agency to resolve.
Dissatisfied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA reversed and set aside
the RTCs Orders and dismissed petitioners complaint for violation of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. The CA agreed with respondents contention that since the case would largely depend on
the issue of whether or not the latter violated the provisions of the SRC, the matter is within the
special competence or knowledge of the SEC. Citing the case of Baviera v. Paglinawan (Baviera), the
CA opined that all complaints involving violations of the SRC should be first filed before the SEC.
Issue
Held
Has jurisdiction.
At the outset, the Court observes that respondent erroneously relied on the Baviera ruling to support
its position that all complaints involving purported violations of the SRC should be first referred to
the SEC. A careful reading of the Baviera case would reveal that the same involves a criminal
prosecution of a purported violator of the SRC, and not a civil suit such as the case at bar. The
pertinent portions of the Baviera ruling thus read:
A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must first
be referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact. Hence, all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations
should be filed with the SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint to
the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1 earlier quoted.
We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner committed a fatal procedural lapse when he filed his
criminal complaint directly with the DOJ. Verily, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the DOJ in
dismissing petitioners complaint.
Records show that petitioners complaint constitutes a civil suit for declaration of nullity of contract
and sums of money with damages, which stemmed from respondents alleged sale of unregistered
securities, in violation of the various provisions of the SRC and not a criminal case such as that
involved in Baviera.
In this light, when the Court ruled in Baviera that "all complaints for any violation of the [SRC] x x x
should be filed with the SEC," it should be construed as to apply only to criminal and not to civil suits
such as petitioners complaint.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that cases falling under Section 57 of the SRC, which pertain to
civil liabilities arising from violations of the requirements for offers to sell or the sale of securities, as
well as other civil suits under Sections 56, 58, 59, 60, and 61 of the SRC shall be exclusively brought
before the regional trial courts. Likewise, it is equally revelatory that no SRC provision of similar
import is found in its sections governing criminal suits; quite the contrary, the SRC states that
criminal cases arising from violations of its provisions should be first referred to the SEC.
Therefore, based on these considerations, it stands to reason that civil suits falling under the SRC are
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts and hence, need not be first filed
before the SEC, unlike criminal cases wherein the latter body exercises primary jurisdiction.
All told, petitioners' filing of a civil suit against respondent for purported violations of the SRC was
properly filed directly before the RTC.
Joinder of cause of actions
1. Action for recovery of title and possession

a. Possession is in defendant - can be joined because possession is a natural consequence of
ownership
b. Possession is in a 3rd person can be joined because defendant is indispensable party and
3rd person is necessary party
2. Action for recovery of title and ejectment suit cannot be joined and must be in 2 separate
actions
3. Action for declaratory relief and unconstitutionality can be joined
4. Quieting of title and expropriation cannot be joined
5. If the action lies in different venues and jurisdictions file ONLY in the RTC where venue and
jurisdiction lies (Sec. 5(c)).
a. SPECIAL RULE If the claims in ALL the cause of actions are principally for the
recovery of money the aggregate of the amount claimed shall be the basis of jurisdiction
(totality of claims rule).
Parties (Rule 3)
Philip Go, et al. v. Distinction Properties Development, G.R. No. 194024, April 25, 2012
Facts
Petitioners are owners of condominium units in Phoenix Heights Condominium. Respondent is a real
estate developer, engaged in the development of condominium projects, among which was the
Phoenix Heights Condominium. Petitioner Pacifico Lim, one of the incorporators and the then
president of DPDCI, executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions (MDDR) of Phoenix
Heights Condominium. Thereafter, Phoenix Heights Condominium Corporation (PHCC) was
formally organized and incorporated. DPDCI turned over to PHCC the ownership and possession of
the condominium units, except for two saleable commercial units/spaces. Although used by PHCC,
DPDCI was assessed association dues for these two units. PHCC approved a settlement offer from
DPDCI for the set-off of the latters association dues arrears with the assignment of title over certain
areas and their conversion into common areas. With the conformity of PHCC, DPDCIs application for
alteration (conversion of unconstructed 22 storage units and units from saleable to common areas)
was granted by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
Petitioners, as condominium unit-owners, filed a complaint before the HLURB against DPDCI for
unsound business practices and violation of the MDDR. They alleged that DPDCI committed
misrepresentation in their circulated flyers and brochures as to the facilities or amenities that would be
available in the condominium and failed to perform its obligation to comply with the MDDR.
The HLURB rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. It held as invalid the agreement entered into
between DPDCI and PHCC for the reason that it was not approved by the majority of the members of
PHCC as required under the MDDR. It stated that DPDCIs defense, that the brochure was a mere
draft, was against human experience and a convenient excuse to avoid its obligation to provide the
facility of the project. The HLURB further stated that the case was not a derivative suit but one which
involved contracts of sale of the respective units between the complainants and DPDCI, hence, within
its jurisdiction.
Aggrieved, DPDCI filed with the CA its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. The CA rendered the
assailed decision which disposed of the case in favor of DPDCI. The CA held that jurisdiction over
PHCC, an indispensable party, was neither acquired nor waived by estoppel. It held that, in any event,
the action should be dismissed because the absence of PHCC, an indispensable party, rendered all
subsequent actuations of the court void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even as to those present.
Issue
Whether or not PHCC is an indispensable party.
Held
An indispensable party.
As it is clear that the acts being assailed are those of PHHC, this case cannot prosper for failure to
implead the proper party, PHCC.
An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter
that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. It is
"precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be dismissed.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present." When an
indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed. The burden of procuring
the presence of all indispensable parties is on the plaintiff.
From all indications, PHCC is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded, either as a
plaintiff or as a defendant, in the complaint filed before the HLURB as it would be directly and
adversely affected by any determination therein. To belabor the point, the causes of action, or the acts
complained of, were the acts of PHCC as a corporate body. Note that in the judgment rendered by the
HLURB, the dispositive portion in particular, DPDCI was ordered (1) to pay 998,190.70, plus
interests and surcharges, as condominium dues in arrears and turnover the administration office to
PHCC; and (2) to refund to PHCC 1,277,500.00, representing the cost of the deep well, with
interests and surcharges. Also, the HLURB declared as illegal the agreement regarding the conversion
of the 22 storage units and Units GF4-A and BAS, to which agreement PHCC was a party.
Evidently, the cause of action rightfully pertains to PHCC. Petitioners cannot exercise the same
except through a derivative suit. In the complaint, however, there was no allegation that the action
was a derivative suit. In fact, in the petition, petitioners claim that their complaint is not a derivative
suit. For a derivative suit to prosper, it is required that the minority stockholder suing for and on
behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint that he is suing on a derivative cause of action
on behalf of the corporation and all other stockholders similarly situated who may wish to join him in
the suit. It is a condition sine qua non that the corporation be impleaded as a party because not only is
the corporation an indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it must be served with
process.
Without PHCC as a party, there can be no final adjudication of the HLURBs judgment. The CA was,
thus, correct in ordering the dismissal of the case for failure to implead an indispensable party.
Macawadib v. Philippine National Police Directorate

Facts
Petitioner was a police officer with the rank of Police Senior Superintendent. Pursuant to the
provisions of the "Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990," the Chief of
Directorial Staff of the Philippine National Police (PNP) issued General Order No. 1168, enumerating
the names of commissioned officers who were subject to compulsory retirement on various dates.
Among the names included in the said Order was that of petitioner, who was supposed to retire on
January 11, 2002, as the files of the PNP Records Management Division indicate that he was born on
January 11, 1946.
Petitioner filed an application for late registration of his birth with the Municipal Civil Registrar's
Office of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. In the said application, petitioner swore under oath that he was
born on January 11, 1956. The application was, subsequently, approved.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Correction of Entry in the Public Service Records
regarding the Birth Date. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
Respondent filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the CA, seeking to nullify the above-
mentioned Decision of the RTC on the ground that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over
the PNP, "an unimpleaded indispensable party. The CA granted the petition.
Issue
Whether or not the PNP is an indispensable party.
Held
An indispensable party.
In his first assigned error, petitioner contends that respondent is not an indispensable party. The Court
is not persuaded. On the contrary, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that it is the integrity and
correctness of the public records in the custody of the PNP, National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service Commission (CSC) which are involved and which would be
affected by any decision rendered in the petition for correction filed by herein petitioner. The
aforementioned government agencies are, thus, required to be made parties to the proceeding. They
are indispensable parties, without whom no final determination of the case can be had.
In the instant case, there is a necessity to implead the PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC because they stand
to be adversely affected by petitioner's petition which involves substantial and controversial
alterations in petitioner's service records. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), if petitioner's service is extended by ten years, the government, through the
PNP, shall be burdened by the additional salary and benefits that would have to be given to petitioner
during such extension. Thus, aside from the OSG, all other agencies which may be affected by the
change should be notified or represented as the truth is best ascertained under an adversary system of
justice.
As the above-mentioned agencies were not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the
proceedings, the decision of the trial court granting petitioner's prayer for the correction of entries in
his service records, is void. As mentioned above, the absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.
Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, July
05, 2011
Facts
Just read the original.
Issue
Whether or not the supervisory Group, AMBALA and their respective leaders are real parties-in-
interset.
Held
They are real parties-in-interest.
Supervisory Group, AMBALA and their respective leaders are real parties-in-interest
HLI would deny real party-in-interest status to the purported leaders of the Supervisory Group and
AMBALA who filed the revocatory petitions before the DAR. As HLI would have it, Galang, the
self-styled head of AMBALA, gained HLI employment in June 1990 and, thus, could not have been a
party to the SDOA executed a year earlier. As regards the Supervisory Group, HLI alleges that
supervisors are not regular farmworkers, but the company nonetheless considered them FWBs under
the SDOA as a mere concession to enable them to enjoy the same benefits given qualified regular
farmworkers. However, if the SDOA would be canceled and land distribution effected, so HLI claims,
the supervisors would be excluded from receiving lands as farmworkers other than the regular
farmworkers who are merely entitled to the "fruits of the land."
The SDOA no less identifies "the SDP qualified beneficiaries" as "the farmworkers who appear in the
annual payroll, inclusive of the permanent and seasonal employees, who are regularly or periodically
employed by [HLI]." Galang, per HLIs own admission, is employed by HLI, and is, thus, a qualified
beneficiary of the SDP; he comes within the definition of a real party-in-interest.
The same holds true with respect to the Supervisory Group whose members were admittedly
employed by HLI and whose names and signatures even appeared in the annex of the SDOA. Being
qualified beneficiaries of the SDP, Suniga and the other 61 supervisors are certainly parties who
would benefit or be prejudiced by the judgment recalling the SDP or replacing it with some other
modality to comply with RA 6657.
Even assuming that members of the Supervisory Group are not regular farmworkers, but are in the
category of "other farmworkers" mentioned in Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, thus only
entitled to a share of the fruits of the land, as indeed Fortich teaches, this does not detract from the
fact that they are still identified as being among the "SDP qualified beneficiaries." As such, they are,
thus, entitled to bring an action upon the SDP. At any rate, the following admission made by Atty.
Gener Asuncion, counsel of HLI, during the oral arguments should put to rest any lingering doubt as
to the status of protesters Galang, Suniga, and Andaya:
Justice Bersamin: x x x I heard you a while ago that you were conceding the qualified farmer beneficiaries of
Hacienda Luisita were real parties in interest?
Atty. Asuncion: Yes, Your Honor please, real party in interest which that question refers to the complaints of
protest initiated before the DAR and the real party in interest there be considered as possessed by the farmer
beneficiaries who initiated the protest.
Further, under RA 6657, farmer-leaders are expressly allowed to represent themselves, their fellow
farmers or their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR.
Clearly, the respective leaders of the Supervisory Group and AMBALA are contextually real parties-
in-interest allowed by law to file a petition before the DAR or PARC.
This is not necessarily to say, however, that Galang represents AMBALA, for as records show and as
HLI aptly noted, his "petisyon" filed with DAR did not carry the usual authorization of the individuals
in whose behalf it was supposed to have been instituted. To date, such authorization document, which
would logically include a list of the names of the authorizing FWBs, has yet to be submitted to be part
of the records.
Metrobank v. Rural Bank of Gerona, G.R. No. 159097, July 05, 2010
Facts
The Central Bank and the RBG entered into an agreement providing that RBG shall facilitate the loan
applications of farmers-borrowers under the Central Bank-International Bank for Reconstruction and
Developments (IBRDs). The RBG opened a special savings account with Metrobank. As the
depository bank of RBG, Metrobank was designated to receive the credit advice released by the
Central Bank representing the proceeds of the IBRD loan of the farmers-borrowers; Metrobank, in
turn, credited the proceeds to RBGs special savings account for the latters release to the farmers-
borrowers.
The Central Bank released a credit advice in Metrobanks favor and accordingly credited Metrobanks
demand deposit account, for the account of RBG. More than a month after RBG had made the above
withdrawals from its account with Metrobank, the Central Bank issued debit advices, reversing all the
approved IBRD loans. The Central Bank implemented the reversal by debiting from Metrobanks
demand deposit account the amount corresponding to all three IBRD loans.
Upon receipt of the debit advices, Metrobank, in turn, debited the amounts from RBGs special savings
account. Metrobank, however, claimed that these amounts were insufficient to cover all the credit
advices that were reversed by the Central Bank. To collect this amount, it filed a complaint for
collection of sum of money against RBG before the RTC.
The RTC ruled for Metrobank, finding that legal subrogation had ensued.
On appeal, the CA noted that this was not a case of legal subrogation under Article 1302 of the Civil
Code. Nevertheless, the CA recognized that Metrobank had a right to be reimbursed of the amount it
had paid and failed to recover, as it suffered loss in an agreement that involved only the Central Bank
and the RBG. It clarified, however, that a determination still had to be made on who should reimburse
Metrobank. Noting that no evidence exists why the Central Bank reversed the credit advices it had
previously confirmed, the CA declared that the Central Bank should be impleaded as a necessary
party so it could shed light on the IBRD loan reversals. Thus, the CA set aside the RTC decision, and
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings after the Central Bank is impleaded as a
necessary party.
Issue
Whether or not the Central Bank is a necessary party.
Held
Not a necessary party.
A basic first step in resolving this case is to determine who the liable parties are on the IBRD loans
that the Central Bank extended. The Terms and Conditions of the IBRD shows that the farmers-
borrowers to whom credits have been extended are primarily liable for the payment of the borrowed
amounts. The loans were extended through the RBG that also took care of the collection and of the
remittance of the collection to the Central Bank. RBG, however, was not a mere conduit and collector.
While the farmers-borrowers were the principal debtors, RBG assumed liability under the Project
Terms and Conditions by solidarily binding itself with the principal debtors to fulfill the obligation.
How RBG profited from the transaction is not clear from the records and is not part of the issues
before us, but if it delays in remitting the amounts due, the Central Bank imposed a 14% per annum
penalty rate on RBG until the amount is actually remitted. The Central Bank was further authorized to
deduct the amount due from RBGs demand deposit reserve should the latter become delinquent in
payment.
Based on these arrangements, the Central Banks immediate recourse, therefore should have been
against the farmers-borrowers and the RBG; thus, it erred when it deducted the amounts covered by
the debit advices from Metrobanks demand deposit account. Under the Project Terms and Conditions,
Metrobank had no responsibility over the proceeds of the IBRD loans other than serving as a conduit
for their transfer from the Central Bank to the RBG once credit advice has been issued. Thus, we
agree with the CAs conclusion that the agreement governed only the parties involved the Central
Bank and the RBG. Metrobank was simply an outsider to the agreement. Our disagreement with the
appellate court is in its conclusion that no legal subrogation took place; the present case, in fact,
exemplifies the circumstance contemplated under paragraph 2, of Article 1302 of the Civil Code.
As discussed, Metrobank was a third party to the Central Bank-RBG agreement, had no interest
except as a conduit, and was not legally answerable for the IBRD loans. Despite this, it was
Metrobanks demand deposit account, instead of RBGs, which the Central Bank proceeded against, on
the assumption perhaps that this was the most convenient means of recovering the cancelled loans.
That Metrobanks payment was involuntarily made does not change the reality that it was Metrobank
that effectively answered for RBGs obligations.
Was there express or tacit approval by RBG of the payment enforced against Metrobank? After
Metrobank received the Central Banks debit advices, it (Metrobank) accordingly debited the amounts
it could from RBGs special savings account without any objection from RBG. These instances are all
indicative of RBGs approval of Metrobanks payment of the IBRD loans. That RBGs tacit approval
came after payment had been made does not completely negate the legal subrogation that had taken
place.
Article 1303 of the Civil Code states that subrogation transfers to the person subrogated the credit
with all the rights thereto appertaining, either against the debtor or against third persons. As the entity
against which the collection was enforced, Metrobank was subrogated to the rights of Central Bank
and has a cause of action to recover from RBG the amounts it paid to the Central Bank, plus 14% per
annum interest.
Under this situation, impleading the Central Bank as a party is completely unnecessary. We note that
the CA erroneously believed that the Central Banks presence is necessary in order to shed light on the
matter of reversals made by it concerning the loan applications of the end users and to have a
complete determination or settlement of the claim. In so far as Metrobank is concerned, however, the
Central Banks presence and the reasons for its reversals of the IBRD loans are immaterial after
subrogation has taken place; Metrobanks interest is simply to collect the amounts it paid the Central
Bank. Whatever cause of action RBG may have against the Central Bank for the unexplained
reversals and any undue deductions is for RBG to ventilate as a third-party claim; if it has not done so
at this point, then the matter should be dealt with in a separate case that should not in any way further
delay the disposition of the present case that had been pending before the courts since 1980.
Constantino v. Heirs of Pedro Constantino

Facts
This involves a controversy over a parcel of land claimed to be part of an estate which needed to be
proportionally subdivided among heirs. Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for the
nullification of a document denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman." In the said
complaint, respondents alleged that petitioners asserted their claim of ownership over a parcel of land
to the exclusion of respondents who are occupying a portion thereof. Upon verification, respondents
learned that a Tax Declaration in the name of petitioner was unlawfully issued, which in effect
canceled Tax Declaration in the name of their ancestor. The issuance of the new tax declaration was
allegedly due to the execution of a simulated, fabricated and fictitious document denominated as
"Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman," wherein the petitioners misrepresented themselves as the sole
and only heirs of Pedro Sr.
Petitioners alleged that the respondents have no cause of action against them considering that the
respondents lawful share over the estate, had already been transferred to them as evidenced by the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver, executed by Angelo Constantino, Maria Constantino
(mother of respondent Asuncion), Arcadio Constantino and Mercedes Constantino, all heirs. In the
said deed, respondents adjudicated unto themselves to the exclusion of other heirs, the parcel of land
by misrepresenting that they were "the only legitimate heirs of Pedro Sr. Thus, petitioners claimed
that in the manner similar to the assailed "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman," they asserted their
rights and ownership over the subject lot without damage to the respondents.
In essence, petitioners position was that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver was
acquiesced in by the other heirs, including the petitioners, on the understanding that the respondent
would no longer share and participate in the settlement and partition of the remaining lot covered by
the " Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman."
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioners. Although, plaintiffs-heirs, including
Asuncion Laquindanum and Josefina Cailipan, are not parties or signatories to the "Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver" they are successors-in-interest. They are considered "privies" to said deed,
and are bound by said extrajudicial settlement. In other words, they are "PRIVIES IN ESTATE".
Consequently, plaintiffs are now estopped from claiming otherwise. They are estopped to share in the
real property subject matter of this case. In fine, they are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for.
Not convinced, the respondents appealed the afore quoted decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The
CA ruled in favor of the respondents declaring that the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" they
executed covering the lot was not part of the estate. Thus, the CA went on to state that the respondents
did not adjudicate the lot unto themselves to the exclusion of all the other heirs, the adjudication in the
document entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver pertains to a different property and is valid
absent any evidence to the contrary.
Issue
Whether or not respondents are privies to Maria Laquindanum.
Held
They are privies.
On this note, We agree with the trial court that respondents are "privies" to Maria Laquindanum. By
the term "privies" is meant those between whom an action is deemed binding although they are not
literally parties to the said action. Privity in estate denotes the privity between assignor and assignee,
donor and donee, grantor and grantee, joint tenant for life and remainderman or reversioner and their
respective assignees, vendor by deed of warranty and a remote vendee or assignee. A privy in estate is
one, it has been said, who derives his title to the property in question by purchase; one who takes by
conveyance."
In fine, respondents, as successors-in-interest, derive their right from and are in the same position as
their predecessor in whose shoes they now stand. As such successors, respondents situation is
analogous to that of a transferee pendente lite illustrated in Santiago Land Development Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, reiterating Fetalino v. Sanz where this Court held:
As such, he stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor in interest, the original defendant, and is bound by
the proceedings had in the case before the property was transferred to him. He is a proper, but not an
indispensable, party as he would, in any event, have been bound by the judgment against his predecessor.
Thus, any condition attached to the property or any agreement precipitating the execution of the Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which was binding upon Maria Laquindanum is applicable to
respondents who merely succeeded Maria.
Cagato v. Almonte
Facts
This case stemmed from an action for annulment of deeds of sale, cancellation of title and damages
filed by petitioner against respondents. A homestead patent over the property was issued in favor of
Juan Gatchalian. Cagatao claimed that Gatchalian sold the lotto Delfin Manzulin (Manzulin).
Manzulin allegedly executed a private written document transferring ownership over the property to
his son-in-law, Cagatao. The latter then occupied and cultivated the land until the Fernandez Siblings
attempted to take possession of the lot, thereby prompting him to file the subject complaint before the
RTC.
The respondents, on the other hand, contended that the Spouses Fernandez purchased the property
from Almonte and Aguilar. To protect their interest, Spouses Fernandez once again bought the same
property from Emmaculada Carlos (Carlos), believed to be the owner of the lot by virtue of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT).
The RTC ruled that Cagataos evidence was insufficient to prove his ownership over the land in
question because Manzulin never acquired a lawful title to the property from his predecessor,
Gatchalian. The transfer to Manzulin was null and void. As to the supposed conveyance of the lot
from Manzulin to Cagatao, it could not have been valid because the document alleged to be a deed of
sale was a private document which did not conclusively establish his (Cagataos) right to the property
because of the requirement in contract law that the transmission of rights over an immovable property
must be contained in a public document. The RTC, after noting that Cagatao had no valid title, ruled
that his claim of possession could not prevail over the claim of ownership by Spouses Fernandez as
evidenced by a certificate of title. Accordingly, it upheld the validity of the deed of sale between
Spouses Fernandez and Carlos. It, however, nullified the transfer from Spouses Fernandez to
Fernandez Siblings because Avelina herself admitted that she and her husband never signed the deed
of sale which transferred ownership to their children. Finally, the RTC sustained the validity of TCT
in the name of Carlos, theorizing that someone must have applied for an original certificate of title
from which the said title was derived.
Aggrieved, Cagatao elevated the case to the CA. The CA partly granted his petition and modified the
decision of the RTC. The ownership of the land remained with Gatchalian by virtue of the homestead
patent in his name, and neither the alleged transfer to Manzulin nor the theory of abandonment of the
RTC could divest him of said title. In addition, the CA invalidated the deed of sale between Carlos
and Spouses Fernandez. It also considered as void the sale of the same property by Almonte to
Spouses Fernandez and observed that neither the latter nor the Fernandez siblings invoked this
transaction as the basis of their claim. Although the CA declared that Cagataos claim of ownership
could not be recognized, it nevertheless ruled that his possession could not be disturbed because only
the true owner could challenge him for possession of the subject property.
The respondents moved for a reconsideration of the CA decision. The CA reversed itself when it ruled
that the deed of sale between Carlos and Spouses Fernandez could not be declared null and void,
especially because Carlos was not impleaded as a party in the case. It, however, stressed that
Cagataos possession of the subject property should be respected. Any party, including the
respondents, who would like to assert their claim of ownership or a better right over the lot should
assert their right in an appropriate action in court against him.
Issue
Whether or not the deed of sale between Carlos and Sps. Fernandez can be declared null and void.
Held
Cannot be declared null and void.
The validity of TCT No. 12159-A cannot be attacked collaterally; Carlos is an indispensable party.
From the arguments of Cagatao, it is clear that he is assailing the validity of the title of Carlos over
the land in question. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states that "a certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law." An attack on the validity of the title is considered to be a collateral attack
when, in an action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the said action, an attack is made
against the judgment granting the title. Cagataos original complaint before the RTC was for the
cancellation of TCT No. T-249437 in the name of the Fernandez Siblings and the nullification of the
deeds of sale between the Fernandez Siblings and Spouses Fernandez, and the earlier one between the
latter and Almonte and Aguilar. Nowhere in his complaint did Cagatao mention that he sought to
invalidate TCT No. 12159-A. It was only during the course of the proceedings, when Spouses
Fernandez disclosed that they had purchased the property from Carlos, that Cagatao thought of
questioning the validity of TCT No. 12159-A.
Although the CA correctly ruled that the transfer from Gatchalian to Manzulin was invalid, the
existence of a valid Torrens title in the name of Carlos which has remained unchallenged before the
proper courts has made irrelevant the issue of whether Gatchalian and his successors-in-interest
should have retained ownership over the property. This is pursuant to the principle that a Torrens title
is irrevocable and its validity can only be challenged in a direct proceeding.
Moreover, Carlos, as the registered owner of the lot whose title Cagatao seeks to nullify, should have
been impleaded as an indispensable party. It is clear in this case that Cagatao failed to include Carlos
in his action for the annulment of TCT No. 12159-A. Basic is the rule in procedural law that no man
can be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger and strangers to a case cannot be bound
by a judgment rendered by the court. It would be the height of injustice to entertain an action for the
annulment of Carlos title without giving her the opportunity to present evidence to support her claim
of ownership through title. In addition, it is without question a violation of the constitutional
guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
Thus, should Cagatao wish to question the ownership of the subject lot of Carlos and Spouses
Fernandez, he should institute a direct action before the proper courts for the cancellation or
modification of the titles in the name of the latter two. He cannot do so now because it is tantamount
to a collateral attack on Carlos title, which is expressly prohibited by law and jurisprudence.
Legaspi Towers 300 v. Amelia Muer, et al., G.R. No. 170783, June 18, 2012
Facts
Pursuant to the by-laws of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., petitioners, the incumbent Board of Directors,
set the annual meeting of the members of the condominium corporation and the election of the new
Board of Directors. The Committee on Elections of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., however, found most
of the proxy votes, at its face value, irregular, thus, questionable; and for lack of time to authenticate
the same, petitioners adjourned the meeting for lack of quorum. However, the group of respondents
challenged the adjournment of the meeting. Respondents pushed through with the scheduled election
and were elected as the new Board of Directors and officers of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of Elections with Prayers for the lssuance
of Temporary Restraining Orders and Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages against
respondents with the RTC of Manila. Before respondents could file an Answer to the original
Complaint, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint, which was admitted by the RTC. Before
respondents could submit an Answer to the Amended Complaint, petitioners again filed an Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Second Amended Complaint and for the lssuance of Ex-Parte Temporary
Restraining Order Effective only for Seventy-Two (72) Hours.
Respondents filed a Comment on the Motion to Amend Complaint, praying that the name of Legaspi
Towers 300, Inc., as party-plaintiff in the Second Amended Complaint, be deleted as the said
inclusion by petitioners was made without the authority of the current Board
The RTC denied petitioners' motion to amend complaint to implead Legaspi Towers 300, Inc. as
plaintiff.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for lack of merit. It held that RTC Judge De Castro did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners' Motion To Admit Second Amended Complaint. The Court of Appeals
stated that petitioners complaint sought to nullify the election of the Board of Directors held on April
2, 2004, and to protect and enforce their individual right to vote. The appellate court held that as the
right to vote is a personal right of a stockholder of a corporation, such right can only be enforced
through a direct action; hence, Legaspi Towers 300, Inc. cannot be impleaded as plaintiff in this case.
Issue
Whether or not the second amended complaint is an improper derivative suit.
Held
Improper derivative suit.
Petitioners state that the Court of Appeals seems to be under the impression that the action instituted
by them is one brought forth solely by way of a derivative suit. They clarified that the petitioners
intended the Second Amended Complaint as a direct suit by the corporation joined in by the
petitioners to protect and enforce their common rights. Petitioners contend that Legaspi Towers 300,
Inc. is a real party-in- interest as it stands to be affected the most by the controversy, because it
involves the determination of whether or not the corporations by-laws was properly carried out in the
meeting, when despite the adjournment of the meeting for lack of quorum, the elections were still
conducted.
Petitioners argument is unmeritorious.
The Court notes that in the Amended Complaint, petitioners as plaintiffs stated that they are the
incumbent reconstituted Board of Directors of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., and that defendants, herein
respondents, are the newly-elected members of the Board of Directors; while in the Second Amended
Complaint, the plaintiff is Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., represented by petitioners as the allegedly
incumbent reconstituted Board of Directors of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc.
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Second Amended Complaint is meant to be a
derivative suit filed by petitioners in behalf of the corporation. The Court of Appeals stated in its
Decision that petitioners justified the inclusion of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc. as plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 0410655 by invoking the doctrine of derivative suit, as petitioners specifically argued.
In short, the amendment of the complaint [to include] Legaspi Towers 300, Inc. was done in order to
protect the interest and enforce the right of the Legaspi [Towers 300,] Inc. to be administered and
managed [by petitioners] as the duly constituted Board of Directors. This is no different from and may
in fact be considered as a DERIVATIVE SUIT instituted by an individual stockholder against those
controlling the corporation but is being instituted in the name of and for the benefit of the corporation
whose right/s are being violated.
Is a derivative suit proper in this case?
A derivative suit must be differentiated from individual and representative or class suits. Since it is
the corporation that is the real party-in-interest in a derivative suit, then the reliefs prayed for must be
for the benefit or interest of the corporation. When the reliefs prayed for do not pertain to the
corporation, then it is an improper derivative suit.
The requisites for a derivative suit are as follows:

1. The party bringing suit should be a shareholder as of the time of the act or transaction
complained of, the number of his shares not being material;
2. He has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., has made a demand on the board of
directors for the appropriate relief but the latter has failed or refused to heed his plea; and
3. The cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the wrongdoing or harm having
been, or being caused to the corporation and not to the particular stockholder bringing the
suit.
In this case, petitioners, as members of the Board of Directors of the condominium corporation before
the election in question, filed a complaint against the newly-elected members of the Board of
Directors, questioning the validity of the election.
As stated by the Court of Appeals, petitioners complaint seek to nullify the said election, and to
protect and enforce their individual right to vote. Petitioners are the injured party, whose rights to vote
and to be voted upon were directly affected by the election of the new set of board of directors. The
party-in-interest are the petitioners as stockholders, who wield such right to vote. The cause of action
devolves on petitioners, not the condominium corporation, which did not have the right to vote.
Hence, the complaint for nullification of the election is a direct action by petitioners, who were the
members of the Board of Directors of the corporation before the election, against respondents, who
are the newly-elected Board of Directors. Under the circumstances, the derivative suit filed by
petitioners in behalf of the condominium corporation in the Second Amended Complaint is
improper.
Republic of the Philippines v. Agunoy, G.R. No. 155394. February 17, 2005.
Facts
Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. filed his application for Free Patent covering two parcels of land with the
Bureau of Lands. He was issued Free Patent by the Director of Lands. The Register of Deeds issued
the corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT). The heirs of Eusebio Perez, represented by
Francisca Perez, caused the annotation on the said OCT of an adverse claim in their favor over a
portion of the property. The said heirs of Eusebio Perez filed a formal protest with the Bureau of
Lands alleging that the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No-P4522 had been adjudicated
as private property of said protestant. The Bureau of Lands ascertained that Free Patent No. 314450
and its corresponding OCT No. P-4522 were improperly and fraudulently issued.
Upon the death of the wife of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., the heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition with Sale in favor of Joaquin Sangabol. Joaquin Sangabol sold the property to Fortunato
Para and Virginia P. Jimenez. The adverse claim of Francisca Perez, et al. annotated at the back of the
OCT was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija.
In the Regional Trial Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed the complaint in this case
against several defendants, among whom are the herein respondents. Petitioner Republic alleged, inter
alia, as follows:
30. Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 were procured by
defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation since the property in question
(Lots 1341 and 1342) at the time the patent and the title were issued was already adjudicated as private property
of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, respectively. Consequently, the then Bureau of Lands, now
Lands Management Bureau, no longer had any jurisdiction and control over the same. xxx xxx.
31. The fraudulent acts and misrepresentation of defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. had misled the then Bureau of
Lands in issuing said patent. Since the property in question was no longer a disposable public land, Free Patent
No. 314450 and its corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 issued to defendant Gregorio
Agunoy, Sr. are null and void and should be cancelled. Moreover, Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. has not occupied and
cultivated the land in the manner and for the length of time required by law.
Eventually, the trial court rendered judgment for the Republic.
Therefrom, the spouses Eduardo Dee and Arcelita Marquez-Dee and the Rural Bank of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija went to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed and set aside the appealed decision
of the trial court.
Issue
Whether or not the Republic is a real party-in-interest.
Held
Not a real party-in-interest.
To begin with, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner Republic is not the real party-in-
interest in this case.
The very complaint in this case, supra, filed by petitioner Republic before the trial court unmistakably
alleges that at the time Free Patent No. 31445 and its corresponding Original Certificate of Title No.
P-45222 were issued to Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., the property in question (Lots 1341 and 1342) xxx was
already adjudicated as private property of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, and that
at that time, the property in question was no longer a disposable public land.
With the very admissions by the petitioner itself in its basic pleading that Lots No. 1341 and 1342 are
already private properties of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, and are, therefore,
no longer disposable public land over which the then Bureau of Lands, now Lands Management
Bureau, no longer had any jurisdiction and control, we are simply at a loss to understand how
petitioner Republic can still profess to be the real party-in-interest in this case, and insists that the
disputed properties are still part of the public domain. If ever, the real party-in-interest could be none
other than the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, but certainly not the petitioner.
Then, too, it is striking to note that even as the complaint is basically one for reversion of private
property to the mass of public domain, petitioner did not implead either the heirs of Eusebio Perez or
that of Valeriano Espiritu. Without doubt, if our decision hereon were to be in favor of petitioner, the
real beneficiary thereof is not the State. And because, as no less admitted by the petitioner, the lands
subject of this case are no longer part of the public domain, the nullification of Agunoys Free Patent
would not result in the reversion of the lands subject thereof to the mass of public land. And the
government, not being the real party-in-interest, is without personality to institute reversion
proceedings. So it is that in an earlier case, we had an occasion to say:
There is no merit in petitioners' contention that only the State may bring an action for reconveyance of the lots
in dispute. To reiterate, Lot 2344 is a private property in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the Santiago family. The nullification of its free patent and title would not therefore result in its reversion to
the public domain. Hence, the State, represented by the Solicitor General, is not the real party in interest.
Juana Complex I Homeowners Association v. Fil-Estate Land, Inc. G.R. No. 152272, March 05,
201216
Facts
Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana
Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions (collectively referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted a
complaint for damages, in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters and
motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La Paz
Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc. (Fil-Estate), Fil-estate Ecocentrum Corporation (FEEC), La Paz
Housing & Development Corporation (La Paz), and Warbird Security Agency and their respective
officers (collectively referred as Fil-Estate, et al.).
The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular commuters and motorists who constantly
travelled towards the direction of Manila and Calamba; that they used the entry and exit toll gates of
South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by passing through right-of-way public road known as La Paz
Road; that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years; that Fil-estate excavated,
broke and deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass
through the said road; that La Paz Road was restored by the residents to make it passable but Fil-
estate excavated the road again; that JCHA reported the matter to the Municipal Government and the
Office of the Municipal Engineer but the latter failed to repair the road to make it passable and safe to
motorists and pedestrians; that the act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road caused damage,
prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious hours to them, to the commuters and
motorists because traffic was re-routed to narrow streets that caused terrible traffic congestion and
hazard; and that its permanent closure would not only prejudice their right to free and unhampered use
of the property but would also cause great damage and irreparable injury.
Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint was, among others, improperly
filed as a class suit. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
Not satisfied, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA. The CA
rendered the decision partially granting the petition. The CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently
stated a cause of action when JCHA, et al. alleged in their complaint that they had been using La Paz
Road for more than ten (10) years and that their right was violated when Fil-Estate closed and
excavated the road. It sustained the RTC ruling that the complaint was properly filed as a class suit as
it was shown that the case was of common interest and that the individuals sought to be represented
were so numerous that it was impractical to include all of them as parties. The CA, however, annulled
the WPI for failure of JCHA, et al. to prove their clear and present right over La Paz Road. The CA
ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for a full-blown trial on the merits.
Issue
Whether or not the class suit is proper.
Held
With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as a class suit, the Court finds the
opposition without merit.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:

1. The subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;
2. The parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and
3. The parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and
can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
16
Test of a class suit: Are their interests common? Diverging?
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. As
succinctly stated by the CA:
The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to
be of common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals have filed
manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the suit and
claiming that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of
petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by
private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be named
individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in Bian,
Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.
Sylvia Banda v. Eduardo R. Ermita G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010
Facts
The present controversy arose from a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378, issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (President
Arroyo). Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on their own behalf and on behalf of
all their co-employees at the National Printing Office (NPO).
President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the
printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. Pursuant to Executive
Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing
services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services
offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered
by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation in the General Appropriations
Act to its income.
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO,
petitioners now challenge its constitutionality.
Issue
Whether or not this is a proper class suit.
Held
Improper.
Before proceeding to resolve the substantive issues, the Court must first delve into a procedural
matter. Since petitioners instituted this case as a class suit, the Court, thus, must first determine if the
petition indeed qualifies as one.
Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the assailed
Executive Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor General, as
counsel for respondents, who pointed out that there were about 549 employees in the NPO. The 67
petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO employees whom they claimed to
represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an Affidavit of Desistance, while one
signed a letter denying ever signing the petition, ostensibly reducing the number of petitioners to 34.
We note that counsel for the petitioners challenged the validity of the desistance or withdrawal of
some of the petitioners and insinuated that such desistance was due to pressure from people close to
the seat of power. Still, even if we were to disregard the affidavit of desistance filed by some of the
petitioners, it is highly doubtful that a sufficient, representative number of NPO employees have
instituted this purported class suit. A perusal of the petition itself would show that of the 67
petitioners who signed the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, only 20 petitioners
were in fact mentioned in the jurat as having duly subscribed the petition before the notary public. In
other words, only 20 petitioners effectively instituted the present case.
Indeed, we observed that an element of a class suit or representative suit is the adequacy of
representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class,
the court must consider
1. Whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members
of the class;
2. The proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total membership of the class; and
3. Any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.
Where the interests of the plaintiffs and the other members of the class they seek to represent are
diametrically opposed, the class suit will not prosper.
It is worth mentioning that a Manifestation of Desistance, to which the previously mentioned

Affidavit of Desistance was attached, was filed by the President of the National Printing Office
Workers Association (NAPOWA). The said manifestation expressed NAPOWAs opposition to the
filing of the instant petition in any court. Even if we take into account the contention of petitioners
counsel that the NAPOWA President had no legal standing to file such manifestation, the said
pleading is a clear indication that there is a divergence of opinions and views among the members of
the class sought to be represented, and not all are in favor of filing the present suit. There is here an
apparent conflict between petitioners interests and those of the persons whom they claim to represent.
Since it cannot be said that petitioners sufficiently represent the interests of the entire class, the instant
case cannot be properly treated as a class suit.
Napere v. Barbarona, G.R. No. 160426, January 31, 2008.17

Facts
Respondent Amando Barbarona is the registered owner of Lot No. 3177. Lot No. 3176 in the name of
Anacleto Napere, adjoins said lot on the northeastern side. After Anacleto died, his son, Juan Napere,
and the latters wife, herein petitioner, planted coconut trees on certain portions of the property with
the consent of his co-heirs.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that the spouses Napere, their relatives and hired laborers, by
means of stealth and strategy, encroached upon and occupied the northeastern portion of Lot No.
3177; that the Naperes harvested the coconut fruits thereon, appropriated the proceeds thereof, and,
despite demands, refused to turn over possession of the area.
While the case was pending, Juan Napere died. Their counsel informed the court of Juan Naperes
death, and submitted the names and addresses of Naperes heirs.
The RTC rendered a Decision against the estate of Juan Napere.
Petitioner appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing, inter alia, that the judgment of the
trial court was void for lack of jurisdiction over the heirs who were not ordered substituted as party-
defendants for the deceased.
The CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC Decision. The appellate court held that failure to
substitute the heirs for the deceased defendant will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment in
a case which survives the death of such party.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC decision is void for lack of jurisdiction over the heirs of Juan Napere.
Held
Decision is valid.
When a party to a pending case dies and the claim is not extinguished by such death, the Rules require
the substitution of the deceased party by his legal representative or heirs. In such case, counsel is
obliged to inform the court of the death of his client and give the name and address of the latters legal
representative.
The complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages is an action that survives the
death of the defendant. Notably, the counsel of Juan Napere complied with his duty to inform the
court of his clients death and the names and addresses of the heirs. The trial court, however, failed to
order the substitution of the heirs. Nonetheless, despite this oversight, we hold that the proceedings
conducted and the judgment rendered by the trial court are valid.
The Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform the
court of the death of his client, such that no substitution is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings
and the judgment rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The trial courts
jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the party.
Mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not sufficient ground to nullify a trial courts decision.
The party alleging nullity must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.
Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of
due process. Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not
17
30 days from the FACT of death (not knowledge or etc.).
represented by any legal representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the
resulting judgment therein.
Formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in
the case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased. In such case, there is really no violation of
the right to due process.
In light of these pronouncements, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court and the
judgment rendered therein because the petitioner, who was, in fact, a co-defendant of the deceased,
actively participated in the case. The records show that the counsel of Juan Napere and petitioner
continued to represent them even after Juans death. Hence, through counsel, petitioner was able to
adequately defend herself and the deceased in the proceedings below. Due process simply demands an
opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not denied petitioner.
Sumaljap v. Spouses Literato, G.R. No. 149787, June 18, 2008

Facts
Josefa D. Maglasang (Josefa) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a complaint for the nullity of
the deed of sale of real property purportedly executed between her as vendor and the respondent
spouses as vendees. The complaint alleged that this deed of sale is spurious. Josefa was the sister of
Menendez Maglasang Literato (Menendez). They were two (2) of the six (6) heirs who inherited equal
parts of the property. Another Civil Case was filed by Menendez with the RTC for the declaration of
the inexistence of lease contract, recovery of possession of land, and damages against the petitioner
and Josefa after the RTC dismissed the respondent spouses counterclaim in the first civil case.
Josefa died during the pendency of the Civil Cases. Atty. Zenen A. Puray (Atty. Puray) - the
petitioners and Josefas common counsel - asked the RTC that he be given an extended period within
which to file a formal notice of death and substitution of party. The RTC granted the motion. Atty.
Puray filed with the RTC a notice of death and substitution of party, praying that Josefa be substituted
by the petitioner. The submission alleged that prior to Josefas death, she executed a Quitclaim Deed in
favor of Remismundo D. Maglasang who in turn sold this property to the petitioner. Menendez,
through counsel, objected to the proposed substitution, alleging that Atty. Puray filed the notice of
death and substitution of party beyond the thirty-day period. She recommended instead that Josefa be
substituted by the latters full-blood sister, Michaeles Maglasang Rodrigo (Michaeles).
The RTC denied Atty. Purays motion for substitution and instead ordered the appearance of
Michaeles as representative of the deceased Josefa.
The petitioner went to the CA on a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition.
Issue
Whether or not the substitution is valid.
Held
Not valid.
Application of the Governing Rule.
Survival of the pending action
The criteria for determining whether an action survives the death of a plaintiff or petitioner was
elucidated upon in Bonilla v. Barcena:
. . . The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage
sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally
property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action
which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected
being incidental. . . .
Since the question involved in these cases relate to property and property rights, then we are dealing
with actions that survive.
Duty of Counsel under the Rule.
The duty of counsel under the aforecited provision is to inform the court within thirty (30) days after
the death of his client of the fact of death, and to give the name and address of the deceaseds legal
representative or representatives. Incidentally, this is the only representation that counsel can
undertake after the death of a client as the fact of death terminated any further lawyer-client
relationship.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the counsel for Josefa did in fact notify the lower court,
although belatedly, of the fact of her death.
This notification, although filed late, effectively informed the lower court of the death of litigant
Josefa Maglasang so as to free her counsel of any liability for failure to make a report of death under
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. In our view, counsel satisfactorily explained to the lower
court the circumstances of the late reporting, and the latter in fact granted counsel an extended period.
The timeliness of the report is therefore a non-issue.
The reporting issue that goes into the core of this case is whether counsel properly gave the court the
name and address of the legal representative of the deceased that Section 16, Rule 3 specifies. We
rule that he did not. Significantly, the person now the present petitioner - that counsel gave as
substitute was not one of those mentioned under Section 16, Rule 3. Rather, he is a counterclaim co-
defendant of the deceased whose proferred justification for the requested substitution is the transfer to
him of the interests of the deceased in the litigation prior to her death.
Under the circumstances, both the lower court and the CA were legally correct in not giving effect to
counsels suggested substitute.
First, the petitioner is not one of those allowed by the Rules to be a substitute. Section 16, Rule 3
speaks for itself in this respect.
Second, as already mentioned above, the reason for the Rule is to protect all concerned who may be
affected by the intervening death, particularly the deceased and her estate. We note in this respect that
the Notice that counsel filed in fact reflects a claim against the interest of the deceased through the
transfer of her remaining interest in the litigation to another party.
Third, counsel has every authority to manifest to the court changes in interest that transpire in the
course of litigation. Thus, counsel could have validly manifested to the court the transfer of Josefas
interests in the subject matter of litigation pursuant to Section 19, Rule 3. But this can happen only
while the client-transferor was alive and while the manifesting counsel was still the effective and
authorized counsel for the client-transferor, not after the death of the client when the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated.
The Heirs as Legal Representatives.
The CA correctly harked back to the plain terms of Section 16, Rule 3 in determining who the
appropriate legal representative/s should be in the absence of an executor or administrator. The
second paragraph of the Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, is clear - the heirs
of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment
of an executor or administrator. Our decisions on this matter have been clear and unequivocal.
We likewise said in Gochan v. Young:

For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances recognized the heirs as
proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed by the court.
When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as
the proper representatives of the deceased.
Josefas death certificate shows that she was single at the time of her death. The records do not show
that she left a will. Therefore, her heirs are her surviving siblings and the children of her deceased
sister who should be her legal representatives. Menendez, although also a sister, should be excluded
for being one of the adverse parties in the cases before the RTC.
Memoracion Cruz v. Oswaldo Z. Cruz, G.R. No. 173292, September 01, 2010 18
Facts
Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court a Complaint against her son, defendant-
appellee Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages. Memoracion claimed
that during her union with her common-law husband (deceased) Architect Guido M. Cruz, she
acquired a parcel of land; that she discovered that the title to the said property was transferred by
appellee and the latters wife in their names by virtue of a Deed of Sale; that the said deed was
executed through fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and simulation, hence, null and void.
After Memoracion finished presenting her evidence in chief, she died. Through a Manifestation,
Memoracions counsel, Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court of the fact of such death,
evidenced by a certificate thereof.
For his part, appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the plaintiffs reconveyance
action is a personal action which does not survive a partys death, and (2) to allow the case to continue
would result in legal absurdity whereby one heir is representing the defendant [and is a] co-plaintiff in
this case.
The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice to the prosecution thereof in the proper estate
proceedings.
Memoracions son-heir, Edgardo Z. Cruz, manifested to the trial court that he is retaining the services
of Atty. Neri for the plaintiff.
Thereafter, Edgardo Cruz, as an heir of Memoracion Cruz, filed a notice of appeal in behalf of the
deceased plaintiff, signed by Atty. Neri, but the appeal was dismissed by Judge Mindaro-Grulla,
[stating that] the proper remedy being certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On appellants
motion for reconsideration, Judge Lucia Pena Purugganan granted the same, stating that the remedy
under the circumstances is ordinary appeal.
Petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz, represented by Edgardo Z. Cruz, filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Review. The CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the RTC decision.
Issue
Whether or not the action survives the petitioners death.
Held
Survives.
The Petition for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages survived the death of petitioner
If the case affects primarily and principally property and property rights, then it survives the death of
the plaintiff or petitioner. A Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real Property is one
relating to property and property rights, and therefore, survives the death of the petitioner.
Accordingly, the instant case for annulment of sale of real property merits survival despite the death
of petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz.
The CA erred in affirming RTCs dismissal of the Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance and Damages
18
Purely personal means only that person can perform the obligation.
Sec. 20 Rule 3 is a special rule on money claims and the defendant dies. In such a case, the estate substitutes for
the defendant. In all other cases, the heirs/executor/administrator substitutes for the defendant.
If the action survives despite death of a party, it is the duty of the deceaseds counsel to inform the
court of such death, and to give the names and addresses of the deceaseds legal representatives. The
deceased may be substituted by his heirs in the pending action.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel of the deceased, or the legal representative fails to
appear within a specified period, it is the duty of the court where the case is pending to order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased.
In the instant case, petitioner died. Her counsel notified the trial court of such death.
Respondent moved to dismiss the case alleging that it did not survive Memoracions death. The RTC
granted the motion to dismiss. We rule that it was error for the RTC to dismiss the case. As mentioned
earlier, the petition for annulment of deed of sale involves property and property rights, and hence,
survives the death of petitioner Memoracion. What the RTC could have done was to require Edgardo
Cruz to appear in court and substitute Memoracion as party to the pending case, pursuant to Section
16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and established jurisprudence.
We note that Edgardo Cruz filed with the RTC a Manifestation, stating that he is retaining the services
of Atty. Roberto T. Neri.
We consider such Manifestation, signed by Memoracions heir, Edgardo Cruz, and retaining Atty.
Neris services as counsel, a formal substitution of deceased Memoracion by her heir, Edgardo Cruz. It
also needs mention that Oswaldo Cruz, although also an heir of Memoracion, should be excluded as a
legal representative in the case for being an adverse party therein.
Heritage Park Management v. CIAC, G.R. No. 148133, October 8, 2008

Facts
The petitioner, Public Estates Authority (PEA), was designated by the Bases Conversion
Development Authority to develop the first class memorial park known as the Heritage Park. Relative
thereto, PEA engaged the services of herein private respondent. Due to delays, the contract period was
extended. Among the causes of delay was PEAs inability to deliver to EDC 45 hectares of the
property landscaping due to the existence of squatters and a public cemetery. Thus, EDC instituted a
Complaint with the CIAC seeking to collect from PEA damages arising from its delay in the delivery
of the entire property for landscaping.
PEA executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of herein petitioner Heritage Park Management
Corporation (Heritage).
Thereafter, Heritage filed a petition with the CA for prohibition/injunction with prayer for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) against the CIAC and EDC from further proceeding
with, resolving, and rendering an award in CIAC. Allegedly, Heritage has complete control, custody,
and authority over the Heritage Park Project funds and has never submitted itself and the funds to the
CIACs arbitral jurisdiction. Subsequently, the CA, by Resolution issued the TRO Heritage prayed for.
Previously, however, the CIAC already finished the hearing of the case and the same was already
submitted for decision one day before the filing of the petition with the CA. Thereafter, the Decision
in CIAC Case was promulgated in favor of EDC. PEA and EDC both appealed to the CA. The cases
were consolidated. The CA then denied due course to the petitions. Thus, PEA filed an appeal with
this Court. This Court affirmed the CA.
Meanwhile, private respondent filed with the CIAC a Motion Ex-Parte to Promulgate Decision,
arguing that the 60-day period of effectivity of the TRO (issued by the CA) had already lapsed. The
CIAC issued a Notice of Award.
It is against the foregoing factual backdrop that the CA issued the assailed decision denying and
accordingly dismissing the petition. In said decision, the CA reasoned that considering the petition
prayed that the CIAC be prohibited from further acting on the case and that the CIAC had rendered a
Decision thereon, the petition had become moot and academic, there being nothing more to prohibit
or enjoin.
Issues
Whether or not petitioner is an indispensable party.
Held
Not an indispensable party.
Petitioner claims that it is an indispensable party to the proceedings before the CIAC as the assignee
of the PEA of the latters rights, interests, and obligations in the Heritage Park Project. Thus, its non-
inclusion in the proceedings before the CIAC deprived the latter of jurisdiction over the case. Heritage
argues that it is in possession and control over the funds of the Heritage Park Project which EDC is
targeting with its complaint before the CIAC.
Such contention is bereft of merit.
It must be remembered that when the case was originally filed by EDC before the CIAC, PEA had not
yet transferred its rights and obligations over the Project to Heritage. Thus, by impleading PEA as
respondent, the CIAC had jurisdiction over the case at that time. Heritage, however, claims that when
PEA transferred its rights and obligations over the Project to Heritage, the CIAC lost its jurisdiction.
In other words, Heritage alleges that a court may lose jurisdiction over a case based on the subsequent
actions of the parties. This is unacceptable.
The settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated. Certainly, it would be the height of injustice to allow parties
that disagree with the decision of a judicial tribunal to annul the same through the expedient of
transferring their interests or rights involved in the case.
Moreover, Heritage is mistaken when it claims that it is an indispensible party to the case and that it
was not included in the case before the CIAC. Being a transferee of the interests of PEA over the
Project during the pendency of the case before the CIAC, it is bound by the proceedings in like
manner as PEA.
This Court has declared in a number of decisions that a transferee pendente lite stands in exactly the
same position as its predecessor-in-interest, the original defendant, and is bound by the proceedings
had in the case before the property was transferred to it. It is a proper but not an indispensible party as
it would in any event be bound by the judgment against his predecessor. This would follow even if it
is not formally included as a defendant through an amendment of the complaint.
Verily, the non-inclusion of Heritage in the proceedings before the CIAC is of no moment as the
Rules of Court specifically allows the proceedings to proceed with the original parties while binding
the transferee.
William Genato v. Benjamin Bayhon, G.R. No. 171035, August 24, 200919
Facts
This is a consolidated case stemming from two civil cases filed before the Regional Trial Court.
Civil Case No. Q-90-7012

Respondents filed an action before the RTC. In their Complaint, respondents sought the declaration of
nullity of a dacion en pago allegedly executed by respondent Benjamin Bayhon in favor of petitioner
William Ong Genato. Respondent Benjamin Bayhon alleged that he obtained from the petitioner a
loan, that to cover the loan, he executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over his property.
Respondent further alleged that he filed a separate proceeding for the reconstitution of TCT before the
RTC. Petitioner William Ong Genato filed an Answer in Intervention in the said proceeding and
attached a copy of an alleged dacion en pago covering said lot. Respondent assailed the dacion en
pago as a forgery alleging that neither he nor his wife, who had died 3 years earlier, had executed it.
Civil Case No. Q-90-7551

Petitioner William Ong Genato filed an action for specific performance, before the RTC. In his
Complaint, petitioner alleged that respondent obtained a loan from him. Petitioner alleged further that
respondent failed to pay the loan and executed a dacion en pago in favor of the petitioner. Petitioner
further averred that despite demands, respondent refused to execute the requisite documents to
transfer to him the ownership of the lot subject of the dacion en pago. Petitioner prayed, inter alia, for
the court to order the respondent to execute the final deed of sale and transfer of possession of the said
lot.
Decision of the Consolidated Cases

The two cases were consolidated and transferred to the RTC. The trial court rendered its Decision. It
found that respondent obtained a loan from the petitioner. With respect to the dacion en pago, the trial
court held that the parties have novated the agreement. It deduced the novation from the subsequent
payments made by the respondent to the petitioner. All payments were made after the purported
execution of the dacion en pago. The trial court likewise found that at the time of the execution of the
real estate mortgage, the wife of respondent, Amparo Mercado, was already dead. It held that the
property covered by TCT No. 38052 was owned in common by the respondents and not by
respondent Benjamin Bayhon alone. It concluded that the said lot could not have been validly
mortgaged by the respondent alone; the deed of mortgage was not enforceable and only served as
evidence of the obligation of the respondent. In sum, the trial court upheld the respondents liability to
the petitioner and ordered the latter to pay.
Appeal to the Court of Appeals

Respondents appealed before the Court of Appeals. Respondent Benjamin Bayhon died while the case
was still pending decision. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the trial court. The
Court of Appeals held that the real estate mortgage and the dacion en pago were both void. The
appellate court ruled that at the time the real estate mortgage and the dacion en pago were executed,
or on July 3, 1989 and October 21, 1989, respectively, the wife of respondent Benjamin Bayhon was
already dead. Thus, she could not have participated in the execution of the two documents. The
appellate court struck down both the dacion en pago and the real estate mortgage as being simulated
or fictitious contracts pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals held further
that while the principal obligation is valid, the death of respondent Benjamin Bayhon extinguished it.
The heirs could not be ordered to pay the debts left by the deceased.
Issue
Whether or not respondents death extinguished the obligation.
19
Even if there is already judgment and the case is on appeal Rule 3 still applies because the action is still
pending. However, if there is already a final and executory judgment then Rule 39 Sec. 7 applies.
Held
Did not extinguish.
We now go to the ruling of the appellate court extinguishing the obligation of respondent. As a
general rule, obligations derived from a contract are transmissible
The loan in this case was contracted by respondent. He died while the case was pending before the
Court of Appeals. While he may no longer be compelled to pay the loan, the debt subsists against his
estate. No property or portion of the inheritance may be transmitted to his heirs unless the debt has
first been satisfied. Notably, throughout the appellate stage of this case, the estate has been amply
represented by the heirs of the deceased, who are also his co-parties.
The procedure in vindicating monetary claims involving a defendant who dies before final judgment
is governed by Rule 3, Section 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to this provision,
petitioners remedy lies in filing a claim against the estate of the deceased respondent.
Algura v. LGU of the City of Naga, G.R. No. 150135, October 30, 2006
Facts
Spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura filed a Verified Complaint for damages against
the Naga City Government and its officers, arising from the alleged illegal demolition of their
residence and boarding house and for payment of lost income derived from fees paid by their
boarders. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants, to
which petitioner Antonio Alguras Pay Slip was appended, showing a gross monthly income of PhP
10,474.00 and a net pay of PhP 3,616.99 monthly. Also attached to the motion was a Certification
issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Naga City, which stated that petitioners had no property
declared in their name for taxation purposes. Finding that petitioners motion to litigate as indigent
litigants was meritorious, The RTC granted petitioners plea for exemption from filing fees.
As a result of respondent Naga City Governments demolition of a portion of petitioners house, the
Alguras allegedly lost a monthly income of PhP 7,000.00 from their boarders rentals. With the loss of
the rentals, the meager income from Lorencita Alguras sari-sari store and Antonio Alguras small take
home pay became insufficient for the expenses of the Algura spouses and their six (6) children for
their basic needs including food, bills, clothes, and schooling, among others.
Respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of Filing Fees. They
asserted that in addition to the more than PhP 3,000.00 net income of petitioner Antonio Algura, who
is a member of the Philippine National Police, spouse Lorencita Algura also had a mini-store and a
computer shop on the ground floor of their residence. Also, respondents claimed that petitioners
second floor was used as their residence and as a boarding house, from which they earned more than
PhP 3,000.00 a month.
The RTC issued an Order disqualifying petitioners as indigent litigants on the ground that they failed
to substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of legal fees and to comply with the third
paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Court directing them to pay the requisite
filing fees.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court gave petitioners the opportunity to
comply with the requisites laid down in Section 18, Rule 141, for them to qualify as indigent litigants.
Petitioners submitted their Compliance attaching the affidavits of petitioner Lorencita Algura and
Erlinda Bangate, to comply with the requirements of then Rule 141, Section 18 of the Rules of Court
and in support of their claim to be declared as indigent litigants.
In her Affidavit, petitioner Lorencita Algura claimed that the demolition of their small dwelling
deprived her of a monthly income amounting to PhP 7,000.00. She, her husband, and their six (6)
minor children had to rely mainly on her husbands salary as a policeman which provided them a
monthly amount of PhP 3,500.00, more or less. Also, they did not own any real property as certified
by the assessors office of Naga City. More so, according to her, the meager net income from her small
sari-sari store and the rentals of some boarders, plus the salary of her husband, were not enough to
pay the familys basic necessities.
To buttress their position as qualified indigent litigants, petitioners also submitted the affidavit of
Erlinda Bangate, who attested under oath, that she personally knew spouses Antonio Algura and
Lorencita Algura, who were her neighbors; that they derived substantial income from their boarders;
that they lost said income from their boarders rentals when the Local Government demolished part of
their house because from that time, only a few boarders could be accommodated; that the income
from the small store, the boarders, and the meager salary of Antonio Algura were insufficient for their
basic necessities like food and clothing, considering that the Algura spouses had six (6) children; and
that she knew that petitioners did not own any real property.
The RTC denied the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC ratiocinated that the pay slip of
Antonio F. Algura showed that the GROSS INCOME or TOTAL EARNINGS of plaintiff Algura
[was] Php 10,474.00 which amount [was] over and above the amount mentioned in the first paragraph
of Rule 141, Section 18 for pauper litigants residing outside Metro Manila. Said rule provides that the
gross income of the litigant should not exceed PhP 3,000.00 a month and shall not own real estate
with an assessed value of PhP 50,000.00. The trial court found that, in Lorencita S.J. Alguras May 13,
2000 Affidavit, nowhere was it stated that she and her immediate family did not earn a gross income
of PhP 3,000.00.
Issue
Whether or not petitioners are indigent litigants.
Held
Since this Court is not a trier of facts, it will have to remand the case to the trial court to determine
whether petitioners can be considered as indigent litigants using the standards set in Rule 3, Section
21.
It can be readily seen that the rule on pauper litigants was inserted in Rule 141 without revoking or
amending Section 21 of Rule 3, which provides for the exemption of pauper litigants from payment of
filing fees. Thus, on March 1, 2000, there were two existing rules on pauper litigants; namely, Rule 3,
Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 18.
Undoubtedly, petitioners do not own real property and so the property requirement is met. However
with respect to the income requirement, it is clear that the gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00 of
petitioner Antonio F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of Lorencita Algura when combined, were
above the PhP 1,500.00 monthly income threshold prescribed by then Rule 141, Section 16 and
therefore, the income requirement was not satisfied. The trial court was therefore correct in
disqualifying petitioners Alguras as indigent litigants.
Unrelenting, petitioners however argue in their Motion for Reconsideration that the rules have been
relaxed by relying on Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure which authorizes
parties to litigate their action as indigents if the court is satisfied that the party is one who has no
money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his
family. The trial court did not give credence to this view of petitioners and simply applied Rule 141
but ignored Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent Party.
The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 are still valid and enforceable rules
on indigent litigants. Instead of declaring that Rule 3, Section 21 has been superseded and impliedly
amended by Section 18 and later Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court finds that the two rules can and
should be harmonized. When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall
scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the applicant to determine if the
applicant complies with the income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of
Rule 141. If the trial court finds that the applicant meets the income and property requirements, the
authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right.
However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would set a
hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. In that hearing, the adverse
party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after
which the trial court will rule on the application depending on the evidence adduced. In addition,
Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant of such
authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly
discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court determines after
hearing, that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property,
the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If
payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment of
prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.
Thus, the trial court should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the Alguras after
their affidavits and supporting documents showed that petitioners did not satisfy the twin
requirements on gross monthly income and ownership of real property under Rule 141. Instead of
disqualifying the Alguras as indigent litigants, the trial court should have called a hearing as required
by Rule 3, Section 21 to enable the petitioners to adduce evidence to show that they didnt have
property and money sufficient and available for food, shelter, and basic necessities for them and their
family.
Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary
and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is
mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then
the application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the indigency test under
Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for
exemption.
Venue (Rule 4)
Briones v. CA, G.R. 204444, January 14, 2015
Facts
The instant case arose from a filed by Virgilio C. Briones (Briones) for Nullity of Mortgage Contract,
Promissory Note, Loan Agreement, Foreclosure of Mortgage, Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT), and Damages against Cash Asia before the RTC of Manila.
In his complaint, Briones alleged that he is the owner of the subject property, and that his sister
informed him that his property had been foreclosed and a writ of possession had already been issued
in favor of Cash Asia. Upon investigation, Briones discovered that: (a) he purportedly executed a
promissory note, loan agreement, and deed of real estate mortgage covering the subject property
(subject contracts) in favor of Cash Asia in order to obtain a loan from the latter; and (b) since the said
loan was left unpaid, Cash Asia proceeded to foreclose his property. In this relation, Briones claimed
that he never contracted any loans from Cash Asia as he has been living and working in Vietnam. He
further claimed that he only went back to the Philippines to spend the holidays with his family, and
that during his brief stay in the Philippines, nobody informed him of any loan agreement entered into
with Cash Asia. Essentially, Briones assailed the validity of the foregoing contracts claiming his
signature to be forged.
For its part, Cash Asia filed a Motion to Dismiss praying for the outright dismissal of Brioness
complaint on the ground of improper venue. In this regard, Cash Asia pointed out the venue
stipulation in the subject contracts stating that all legal actions arising out of this notice in connection
with the Real Estate Mortgage subject hereof shall only be brought in or submitted to the jurisdiction
of the proper court of Makati City. In view thereof, it contended that all actions arising out of the
subject contracts may only be exclusively brought in the courts of Makati City, and as such, Brioness
complaint should be dismissed for having been filed in the City of Manila.
In response, Briones filed an opposition, asserting, inter alia, that he should not be covered by the
venue stipulation in the subject contracts as he was never a party therein. He also reiterated that his
signatures on the said contracts were forgeries.
The RTC denied Cash Asias motion to dismiss for lack of merit. In denying the motion, the RTC
opined that the parties must be afforded the right to be heard in view of the substance of Brioness
cause of action against Cash Asia as stated in the complaint.
The CA annulled the RTC Orders, and accordingly, dismissed Brioness complaint without prejudice
to the filing of the same before the proper court in Makati City. It held that the RTC gravely abused
its discretion in denying Cash Asias motion to dismiss, considering that the subject contracts clearly
provide that actions arising therefrom should be exclusively filed before the courts of Makati City
only. As such, the CA concluded that Brioness complaint should have been dismissed outright on the
ground of improper venue, this, notwithstanding Brioness claim of forgery.
Issue
Whether or not the CA was correct in dismissing the case.
Held
In conclusion, the CA patently erred and hence committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
Brioness complaint on the ground of improper venue.
The Court finds that the CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering the outright dismissal of
Brioness complaint against Cash Asia, without prejudice to its re-filing before the proper court in
Makati City.
Based therefrom, the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of
personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the
election of the plaintiff. As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils. instructs that
the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce another venue where actions arising from
such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.
In this relation, case law likewise provides that in cases where the complaint assails only the terms,
conditions, and/or coverage of a written instrument and not its validity, the exclusive venue
stipulation contained therein shall still be binding on the parties, and thus, the complaint may be
properly dismissed on the ground of improper venue. Conversely, therefore, a complaint directly
assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should not be bound by the exclusive venue
stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue. To be
sure, it would be inherently consistent for a complaint of this nature to recognize the exclusive venue
stipulation when it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the instrument in which such stipulation is
contained.
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in nature,
considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of Makati
City. However, it must be emphasized that Brioness complaint directly assails the validity of the
subject contracts, claiming forgery in their execution. Given this circumstance, Briones cannot be
expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as his compliance therewith would mean an
implicit recognition of their validity. Hence, pursuant to the general rules on venue, Briones properly
filed his complaint before a court in the City of Manila where the subject property is located.
In conclusion, the CA patently erred and hence committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
Brioness complaint on the ground of improper venue.
San Miguel Corporation v. Monasterio, G.R. No. 151037, June 23, 2005
Facts
Petitioner SMC entered into an Exclusive Warehouse Agreement (hereafter EWA for brevity) with
SMB Warehousing Services (SMB). The agreement likewise contained a stipulation on venue of
actions, to wit:
26. GENERAL PROVISIONS
...
b. Should it be necessary that an action be brought in court to enforce the terms of this Agreement or the duties
or rights of the parties herein, it is agreed that the proper court should be in the courts of Makati or Pasig, Metro
Manila, to the exclusion of the other courts at the option of the COMPANY.
Respondent Monasterio, a resident of Naga City, filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20.
In his Complaint, Monasterio claimed P900,600 for unpaid cashiering fees. He alleged that aside
from rendering service as warehouseman, he was given the additional task of cashiering in SMCs
sales offices for which he was promised a separate fee. Monasterio demanded warehousing fees,
cashiering fees, as well as exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
SMC filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. SMC contended that respondents
money claim for alleged unpaid cashiering services arose from respondents function as warehouse
contractor thus the EWA should be followed and thus, the exclusive venue of courts of Makati or
Pasig, Metro Manila is the proper venue as provided under paragraph 26(b) of the Exclusive
Warehouse Agreement. SMC cites in its favor Section 4(b) in relation to Section 2 of Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court allowing agreement of parties on exclusive venue of actions.
Respondent filed an Opposition contending that the cashiering service he rendered for the petitioner
was separate and distinct from the services under the EWA. Hence, the provision on venue in the
EWA was not applicable to said services. Hence, respondent insists that in accordance with Section 2
of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court the venue should be in Naga City, his place of residence.
The Regional Trial Court, of Naga City, issued an Order denying petitioners motion to dismiss. The
court held that the services agreed upon in said contract is limited to warehousing services and the
claim of plaintiff in his suit pertains to the cashiering services rendered to the defendant, a
relationship which was not documented, and is certainly a contract separate and independent from the
exclusive warehousing agreements.
Petitioner elevated the controversy to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action for
certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the RTC Naga City for denying its motion to
dismiss and subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals found respondents claim
for cashiering services inseparable from his claim for warehousing services, thus, the venue stipulated
in the EWA is the proper venue. However, the Court of Appeals noted that prior to the filing of
SMCs petition, respondent Monasterio filed an amended complaint to which SMC filed an answer.
Thus, the Court of Appeals dismissed San Miguels petition for certiorari, stating that the case was
already moot and academic.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC of Naga City erred in denying the motion to dismiss filed by SMC alleging
improper venue.
Held
Did not err.
On disputes relating to the enforcement of the rights and duties of the contracting parties, the venue
stipulation in the EWA should be construed as mandatory. Nothing therein being contrary to law,
morals, good custom or public policy, this provision is binding upon the parties. The EWA stipulation
on venue is clear and unequivocal, thus it ought to be respected.
However, we note that the cause of action in the complaint filed by the respondent before the RTC of
Naga was not based on the EWA, but concern services not enumerated in the EWA. Records show
also that previously, respondent received a separate consideration for the cashiering service he
rendered to SMC. Moreover, in the amended complaint, the respondents cause of action was
specifically limited to the collection of the sum owing to him for his cashiering service in favor of
SMC. He already omitted petitioners non-payment of warehousing fees. Thus, given the
circumstances of this case now before us, we are constrained to hold that it would be erroneous to
rule, as the CA did, that the collection suit of the respondent did not pertain solely to the unpaid
cashiering services but pertain likewise to the warehousing services.
Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties thereto when the suit
relates to breach of the said contract. But where the exclusivity clause does not make it necessarily all
encompassing, such that even those not related to the enforcement of the contract should be subject to
the exclusive venue, the stipulation designating exclusive venues should be strictly confined to the
specific undertaking or agreement. Otherwise, the basic principles of freedom to contract might work
to the great disadvantage of a weak party-suitor who ought to be allowed free access to courts of
justice.
Restrictive stipulations are in derogation of the general policy of making it more convenient for the
parties to institute actions arising from or in relation to their agreements. Thus, the restriction should
be strictly construed as relating solely to the agreement for which the exclusive venue stipulation is
embodied. Expanding the scope of such limitation on a contracting party will create unwarranted
restrictions which the parties might find unintended or worse, arbitrary and oppressive.
Moreover, since convenience is the raison detre of the rules on venue, venue stipulation should be
deemed merely permissive, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves the parties
convenience. Contrawise, the rules mandated by the Rules of Court should govern. Accordingly, since
the present case for the collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent is a personal action, we
find no compelling reason why it could not be instituted in the RTC of Naga City, the place where
plaintiff resides.
Having settled the issue on venue, we need not belabor the issue of whether SMCs petition has
become moot.
URC v. Albert Lim, G.R. NO. 154338, October 05, 2007

Facts
The present controversy stemmed from a contract of sale between Universal Robina Corporation,
petitioner, and Albert Lim, respondent. Pursuant to the contract, petitioner sold to respondent grocery
products. After tendering partial payments, respondent refused to settle his obligation despite
petitioners repeated demands.
Thus, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, a complaint against respondent for
a sum of money.
The trial court issued an Order dismissing the complaint motu proprio on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and improper venue, thus:
The case is misplaced with respect to jurisdiction and venue. There is not even a remote connection by the
parties to Quezon City, where this Regional Trial Court sits, the plaintiff corporation has principal office at
Pasig City and the defendant is, as provided in the complaint, from Laoag City.
Accordingly, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration together with an amended complaint
alleging that the parties agreed that the proper venue for any dispute relative to the transaction is
Quezon City. The trial court granted the motion and admitted petitioners amended complaint.
However, the trial court, still unsure whether venue was properly laid, issued an Order directing
petitioner to file a memorandum of authorities on whether it can file a complaint in Quezon City.
Subsequently, the trial court again issued an Order dismissing the complaint on the ground of
improper venue, thus:
It appears that there is no connection whatsoever between Quezon City and the parties. Plaintiffs official place
of business is in Pasig whereas the defendants residence is stated to be in Laoag City both stipulated in the
Complaint. The filing is based on the stipulation at the back of the delivery receipt that venue shall be in Quezon
City --- which is not even stated in the Complaint nor admitted to have been signed by the defendant.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. But it was dismissed due to
petitioners failure to attach thereto an explanation why copies of the petition were not served by
personal service but by registered mail.
Besides, after a restudy of the facts, law and jurisprudence, as well as the dispositions already contained in the
assailed Resolutions of public respondent, we find the present petition for certiorari to be patently without
merit, and the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
Issue
Whether or not the court may motu proprio a case on the ground of improper venue.
Held
May not dismiss.
The fundamental issue being raised is whether the trial court may dismiss motu proprio petitioners
complaint on the ground of improper venue.
Clearly, in personal actions, the plaintiff may commence an action either in the place of his or her
residence or the place where the defendant resides. However, the parties may agree to a specific venue
which could be in a place where neither of them resides.
Corollarily, Section 1, Rule 9 of the same Rules provides for the instances when the trial court may
motu proprio dismiss a claim.
Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. The court may only dismiss an action motu proprio in
case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata and prescription. Therefore, the
trial court in this case erred when it dismissed the petition motu proprio. It should have waited for a motion to
dismiss or a responsive pleading from respondent, raising the objection or affirmative defense of improper
venue, before dismissing the petition.
Implicit from the provision is that improper venue not impleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the
answer is deemed waived. Thus, a court may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of
improper venue as it is not one of the grounds wherein the court may dismiss an action motu proprio
on the basis of the pleadings.
In the instant case, respondent, despite proper service of summons, failed to file an answer and was
thus declared in default by the trial court. Verily, having been declared in default, he lost his standing
in court and his right to adduce evidence and present his defense, including his right to question the
propriety of the venue of the action.
Irene Marcos Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154096, August 22, 200820
Facts
Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto and his business associates (Benedicto Group) organized Far East
Managers and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and Universal Equity Corporation (UEC), respectively. As
petitioner Irene Marcos-Araneta would later allege, both corporations were organized pursuant to a
contract whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his name as trustees to the shares of stocks of FEMII
and UEC with the obligation to hold in trust and for the benefit of Irene. Irene demanded the
reconveyance of said stockholdings, but the Benedicto Group refused to oblige. Irene thereupon
instituted before the RTC two similar complaints for conveyance of shares of stock, accounting and
receivership against the Benedicto Group. The first covered the UEC shares and the second sought the
recovery to the FEMII shares.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case based on, among others, that venue was improperly
laid. Upon Benedicto's motion, both cases were consolidated. Benedicto and Francisca presented the
Joint Affidavits of household staff at the Marcos' Mansion in Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte and
that Irene did not maintain residence in said place as she in fact only visited the mansion twice in
1999; that she did not vote in Batac in the 1998 national elections; and that she was staying at her
husband's house in Makati City. Irene presented her PhP 5 community tax certificate (CTC) issued in
Curimao, Ilocos Norte to support her claimed residency in Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The RTC dismissed both complaints, stating that these partly constituted "real action," and that Irene
did not actually reside in Ilocos Norte, and, therefore, venue was improperly laid. From the above
order, Irene interposed a Motion for Reconsideration. Pending resolution of her motion for
reconsideration, Irene filed a Motion (to Admit Amended Complaint), attaching therewith a copy of
the Amended Complaint in which the names of Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin
appeared as additional plaintiffs. As stated in the amended complaint, the added plaintiffs, all from
Ilocos Norte, were Irene's new trustees.
The RTC denied Irene's motion for reconsideration aforementioned, but deferred action on her motion
to admit amended complaint. The RTC admitted the amended complaint. The RTC predicated its
order on the following premises:
(2) The inclusion of additional plaintiffs, one of whom was a Batac, an Ilocos Norte resident, in the amended
complaint setting out the same cause of action cured the defect of improper venue.
(3) Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4 allow the filing of the amended complaint in question
in the place of residence of any of Irene's co-plaintiffs.
Julita and Francisca went to the CA via a petition for certiorari. The CA rendered a Decision, setting
aside the assailed RTC orders and dismissing the amended complaints.
Issue
Whether or not the venue was proper.
Held
Improper.
Fourth Issue: Private Respondents did not Waive Improper Venue
Petitioners maintain that Julita and Francisca were effectively precluded from raising the matter of
improper venue by their subsequent acts of filing numerous pleadings. To petitioners, these pleadings,
taken together, signify a waiver of private respondents' initial objection to improper venue.
20
Residence under the RoC refers to actual residence
This contention is without basis and, at best, tenuous. Where the defendant failed to either file a
motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue or include the same as an affirmative defense, he
is deemed to have waived his right to object to improper venue. In the case at bench, Benedicto and
Francisca raised at the earliest time possible, meaning "within the time for but before filing the answer
to the complaint," the matter of improper venue. They would thereafter reiterate and pursue their
objection on venue, first, in their answer to the amended complaints and then in their petition for
certiorari before the CA. Any suggestion, therefore, that Francisca and Benedicto or his substitutes
abandoned along the way improper venue as ground to defeat Irene's claim before the RTC has to be
rejected.
Fifth Issue: The RTC Has No Jurisdiction on the Ground of Improper Venue
Subject Civil Cases are Personal Actions
It is the posture of Julita and Francisca that the venue was in this case improperly laid since the suit in
question partakes of a real action involving real properties located outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the RTC in Batac.
This contention is not well-taken.
In the instant case, petitioners are basically asking Benedicto and his Group, as defendants a quo, to
acknowledge holding in trust Irene's purported 65% stockownership of UEC and FEMII, inclusive of
the fruits of the trust, and to execute in Irene's favor the necessary conveying deed over the said 65%
shareholdings. In other words, Irene seeks to compel recognition of the trust arrangement she has with
the Benedicto Group. The fact that FEMII's assets include real properties does not materially change
the nature of the action, for the ownership interest of a stockholder over corporate assets is only
inchoate as the corporation, as a juridical person, solely owns such assets. It is only upon the
liquidation of the corporation that the stockholders, depending on the type and nature of their
stockownership, may have a real inchoate right over the corporate assets, but then only to the extent
of their stockownership.
The amended complaint is an action in personam, it being a suit against Francisca and the late
Benedicto (now represented by Julita and Francisca), on the basis of their alleged personal liability to
Irene upon an alleged trust. They are not actions in rem where the actions are against the real
properties instead of against persons. We particularly note that possession or title to the real properties
of FEMII and UEC is not being disputed, albeit part of the assets of the corporation happens to be real
properties.
Interpretation of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3; and Sec. 2 of Rule 4
We point out at the outset that Irene, as categorically and peremptorily found by the RTC after a
hearing, is not a resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte, as she claimed. Accordingly, Irene cannot, in a
personal action, contextually opt for Batac as venue of her reconveyance complaint. As to her, Batac,
Ilocos Norte is not what Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court adverts to as the place "where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides" at the time she filed her amended complaint. That
Irene holds CTC issued in Batac, Ilocos Norte and in which she indicated her address as Brgy. Lacub,
Batac, Ilocos is really of no moment. Let alone the fact that one can easily secure a basic residence
certificate practically anytime in any Bureau of Internal Revenue or treasurer's office and dictate
whatever relevant data one desires entered, Irene procured CTC and appended the same to her motion
for reconsideration following the RTC's pronouncement against her being a resident of Batac.
Petitioners, in an attempt to establish that the RTC in Batac, Ilocos Norte is the proper court venue,
asseverate that Batac, Ilocos Norte is where the principal parties reside.
Pivotal to the resolution of the venue issue is a determination of the status of Irene's co-plaintiffs in
the context of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4.
Venue is Improperly Laid
There can be no serious dispute that the real party-in-interest plaintiff is Irene. As self-styled
beneficiary of the disputed trust, she stands to be benefited or entitled to the avails of the present suit.
It is undisputed too that petitioners Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin, all from
Ilocos Norte, were included as co-plaintiffs in the amended complaint as Irene's new designated
trustees. As trustees, they can only serve as mere representatives of Irene.
Upon the foregoing consideration, the resolution of the crucial issue of whether or not venue had
properly been laid should not be difficult.
Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one plaintiff in a personal action
case, the residences of the principal parties should be the basis for determining proper venue. Before
the RTC in Batac, Irene stands undisputedly as the principal plaintiff, the real party-in-interest. The
subject civil cases ought to be commenced and prosecuted at the place where Irene resides.
Principal Plaintiff not a Resident in Venue of Action
As earlier stated, no less than the RTC in Batac declared Irene as not a resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte.
Withal, that court was an improper venue for her conveyance action.
The Court can concede that Irene's three co-plaintiffs are all residents of Batac, Ilocos Norte. But it
ought to be stressed in this regard that not one of the three can be considered as principal party-
plaintiffs included as they were in the amended complaint as trustees of the principal plaintiff. As
trustees, they may be accorded the right to prosecute a suit, but only on behalf of the beneficiary who
must be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest. In the
final analysis, the residences of Irene's co-plaintiffs cannot be made the basis in determining the
venue of the subject suit. This conclusion becomes all the more forceful considering that Irene herself
initiated and was actively prosecuting her claim against Benedicto, his heirs, assigns, or associates,
virtually rendering the impleading of the trustees unnecessary.
And this brings us to the final point. Irene was a resident during the period material of Forbes Park,
Makati City. She was not a resident of Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte, although jurisprudence has it
that one can have several residences, if such were the established fact. The Court will not speculate on
the reason why petitioner Irene, for all the inconvenience and expenses she and her adversaries would
have to endure by a Batac trial, preferred that her case be heard and decided by the RTC in Batac. On
the heels of the dismissal of the original complaints on the ground of improper venue, three new
personalities were added to the complaint doubtless to insure, but in vain as it turned out, that the case
stays with the RTC in Batac.
Heirs of the Late Flaviano Maglasang v. Manila Banking Corporation, 2013

Facts
Sps.Maglasang obtained a credit line from respondent which was secured by a real estate mortgage
located in Ormoc City and the Municipality of Kananga, Province of Leyte. After Flaviano Maglasang
(Flaviano) died intestate, his widow Salud Maglasang (Salud) and their surviving children, instituted
probate proceedings. The probate court, issued a Notice to Creditors for the filing of money claims
against Flavianos estate. Accordingly, as one of the creditors of Flaviano, respondent notified the
probate court of its claim. The probate court terminated the proceedings with the surviving heirs
executing an extra-judicial partition. The loan obligations owed by the estate to respondent, however,
remained unsatisfied due to respondents certification that Flavianos account was undergoing a
restructuring. Nonetheless, the probate court expressly recognized the rights of respondent under the
mortgage executed by the Sps. Maglasang, specifically, its "right to foreclose the same within the
statutory period."
Respondent proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage covering the Sps. Maglasangs
properties and emerged as the highest bidder at the public auction. There, however, remained a
deficiency on Sps. Maglasangs obligation to respondent. Thus, respondent filed a suit to recover the
deficiency against the estate of Flaviano, his widow Salud and petitioners.
The RTC (formerly, the probate court) rendered a Decision directing the petitioners to pay
respondent. The RTC found that it was shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that petitioners, after
the extra-judicial foreclosure of all the properties mortgaged, still have an outstanding obligation in
the amount and as of the date as above-stated.
Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the case to the CA on appeal. The CA denied the petitioners appeal
and affirmed the RTCs Decision. At the outset, it pointed out that the probate court erred when it
closed and terminated the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 1604-0 without first satisfying the claims of
the creditors of the estate in particular, respondent. As a consequence, respondent was not able to
collect from the petitioners and thereby was left with the option of foreclosing the real estate
mortgage. Further, the CA held that Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules does not apply to the present case
since the same does not involve a mortgage made by the administrator over any property belonging to
the estate of the decedent. According to the CA, what should apply is Act No. 3135 which entitles
respondent to claim the deficiency amount after the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage of Sps. Maglasangs properties.
Issue
Whether or not the extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject properties was null and void, not having
been conducted in the capital of the Province of Leyte in violation of the stipulations in the real estate
mortgage contract.
Held
Not null and void.
As a final point, petitioners maintain that the extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject properties was
null and void since the same was conducted in violation of the stipulation in the real estate mortgage
contract stating that the auction sale should be held in the capital of the province where the properties
are located, i.e., the Province of Leyte.
The Court disagrees.
As may be gleaned from the records, the stipulation under the real estate mortgage executed by Sps.
Maglasang which fixed the place of the foreclosure sale at Tacloban City lacks words of exclusivity
which would bar any other acceptable for a wherein the said sale may be conducted, to wit:
It is hereby agreed that in case of foreclosure of this mortgage under Act 3135, the auction sale shall be held at
the capital of the province if the property is within the territorial jurisdiction of the province concerned, or shall
be held in the city if the property is within the territorial jurisdiction of the city concerned;
Case law states that absent such qualifying or restrictive words to indicate the exclusivity of the
agreed forum, the stipulated place should only be as an additional, not a limiting venue. As a
consequence, the stipulated venue and that provided under Act No. 3135 can be applied alternatively.
In particular, Section 2 of Act No. 3135 allows the foreclosure sale to be done within the province
where the property to be sold is situated, viz.:
SEC. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province which the property sold is situated; and in
case the place within said province in which the sale is to be made is subject to stipulation, such sale shall be
made in said place or in the municipal building of the municipality in which the property or part thereof is
situated.
In this regard, since the auction sale was conducted in Ormoc City, which is within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Province of Leyte, then the Court finds sufficient compliance with the above-cited
requirement.
All told, finding that the extra-judicial foreclosure subject of this case was properly conducted in
accordance with the formalities of Act No. 3135,the Court upholds the same as a valid exercise of
respondent's third option under Section 7, Rule 86. To reiterate, respondent cannot, however, file any
suit to recover any deficiency amount since it effectively waived its right thereto when it chose to
avail of extra-judicial foreclosure as jurisprudence instructs.
Aceron v. Spouses Ang, G.R. 186993, August 22, 2012

Facts
Spouses Alan and Em Ang (respondents) obtained a loan from Theodore and Nancy Ang
(petitioners). However, despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to pay the petitioners.
Petitioners, who were then residing in Los Angeles, California, United States of America (USA),
executed their respective Special Powers of Attorney in favor of Attorney Eldrige Marvin B. Aceron
(Atty. Aceron) for the purpose of filing an action in court against the respondents. Atty. Aceron, in
behalf of the petitioners, filed a Complaint for collection of sum of money with the RTC of Quezon
City against the respondents.
The respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint filed by the petitioners on the grounds of
improper venue and prescription. Insisting that the venue of the petitioners action was improperly
laid, the respondents asserted that the complaint against them may only be filed in the court of the
place where either they or the petitioners reside. They averred that they reside in Bacolod City while
the petitioners reside in Los Angeles, California, USA. Thus, the respondents maintain, the filing of
the complaint against them in the RTC of Quezon City was improper.
The RTC of Quezon City denied the respondents motion to dismiss. Thus:
Attached to the complaint is the Special Power of Attorney x x x which clearly states that plaintiff Nancy Ang
constituted Atty. Eldrige Marvin Aceron as her duly appointed attorney-in-fact to prosecute her claim against
herein defendants. Considering that the address given by Atty. Aceron is in Quezon City, hence, being the
plaintiff, venue of the action may lie where he resides.
The respondents then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. The CA rendered the herein Decision,
which annulled and set aside the Orders of the RTC of Quezon City and, accordingly, directed the
dismissal of the complaint filed by the petitioners. The CA held that the complaint below should have
been filed in Bacolod City and not in Quezon City. Thus:
As maybe clearly gleaned from the foregoing, the place of residence of the plaintiffs attorney-in-fact is of no
moment when it comes to ascertaining the venue of cases filed in behalf of the principal since what should be
considered is the residence of the real parties in interest, i.e., the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be.
Residence is the permanent home the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to
return. Residence is vital when dealing with venue. Plaintiffs, herein private respondents, being residents of Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A., which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of Philippine courts, the case should
have been filed in Bacolod City where the defendants, herein petitioners, reside. Since the case was filed in
Quezon City, where the representative of the plaintiffs resides the trial court should have dismissed the case for
improper venue.
Issue
Whether or not the venue is proper.
Held
Improper.
The petitioners complaint should have been filed in the RTC of Bacolod City, the court of the place
where the respondents reside, and not in RTC of Quezon City.
The petitioners complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents is a personal action
as it primarily seeks the enforcement of a contract.
However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be
filed in the court of the place where the defendant resides. There can be no election as to the venue of
the filing of a complaint when the plaintiff has no residence in the Philippines. In such case, the
complaint may only be filed in the court of the place where the defendant resides.
Here, the petitioners are residents of Los Angeles, California, USA while the respondents reside in
Bacolod City. Applying the foregoing principles, the petitioners complaint against the respondents
may only be filed in the RTC of Bacolod City the court of the place where the respondents reside.
The petitioners, being residents of Los Angeles, California, USA, are not given the choice as to the
venue of the filing of their complaint.
Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error when it annulled and set aside the orders of the
RTC of Quezon City and consequently dismissed the petitioners complaint against the respondents
on the ground of improper venue.
Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below; thus, his residence is immaterial to the
venue of the filing of the complaint.
Contrary to the petitioners claim, Atty. Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners, is
not a real party in interest in the case below. It is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest
in the case below as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was
merely appointed by the petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and
prosecuting the complaint against the respondents. Such appointment, however, does not mean that he
is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in interest.
Being merely a representative of the petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal capacity does not have
the right to file the complaint below against the respondents. He may only do so, as what he did, in
behalf of the petitioners the real parties in interest. To stress, the right sought to be enforced in the
case below belongs to the petitioners and not to Atty. Aceron. Clearly, an attorney-in-fact is not a real
party in interest.
The petitioners reliance on Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to support their conclusion that
Atty. Aceron is likewise a party in interest in the case below is misplaced. Nowhere in the rule cited is
it stated or, at the very least implied, that the representative is likewise deemed as the real party in
interest.
Summary Procedure (RSP)

Macadangdang v. Gaviola, G.R. No. 156809, March 4, 2009
Facts
Atty. Oswaldo Macadangdang (Atty. Macadangdang), acting as administrator of the Estate of
petitioner, filed an action for Unlawful Detainer with Damages against respondents. Respondents
were occupying, by mere tolerance, land in the name of the late Felomina G. Macadangdang,
The MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the appeal for respondents failure to file an appeal
memorandum.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial. The RTC denied respondents motion for
reconsideration. The RTC ruled that it no longer had jurisdiction over the motion after the dismissal
of respondents appeal.
Respondents filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals set aside
the Order and remanded the case to the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that a distinction should be
made between failure to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period and failure to file the
appeal memorandum within the period granted by the appellate court. The Court of Appeals ruled that
failure to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period would result to failure of the appellate
court to obtain jurisdiction over the appealed decision. Thus, the assailed decision would become final
and executory upon failure to move for reconsideration. On the other hand, failure to file the appeal
memorandum within the period granted by the appellate court would only result to abandonment of
appeal, which could lead to its dismissal upon failure to move for its reconsideration. Thus, the RTC
erred in denying respondents motion for reconsideration on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Issue
Whether or not the RSP apply before the RTC.
Held
Does not apply.
Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred when it allowed the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before the RTC. Petitioners allege that the case stemmed from an unlawful detainer
case where the Rules on Summary Procedure apply. Petitioners allege that under the Rules on
Summary Procedure, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners also allege that
due to the mandatory character of Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
RTC correctly dismissed the appeal. Petitioners also pointed out that respondents Motion for
Reconsideration/New Trial was neither verified nor accompanied by affidavits of merit as required
under Section 2, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Applicability of the Rules on Summary Procedure
Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases falls on the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Since the case before the the MTCC was an unlawful detainer case, it was governed by the Rules on
Summary Procedure. The purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to prevent undue delays in
the disposition of cases and to achieve this, the filing of certain pleadings is prohibited, including the
filing of a motion for reconsideration.
However, the motion for reconsideration that petitioners allege to be a prohibited pleading was filed
before the RTC acting as an appellate court. The appeal before the RTC is no longer covered by the
Rules on Summary Procedure. The Rules on Summary Procedure apply before the appeal to the RTC.
Hence, respondents motion for reconsideration filed with the RTC is not a prohibited pleading.
Republic v. Sunvar Reality Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194880, June 20, 2012
Facts
Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power Corporation (NPC) are
registered co-owners of several parcels of land. The main subject matter of the instant Petition is one
of these four parcels of land. Petitioners leased the four parcels of land, including the subject property,
to the Technology Resource Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI). TRCFI consequently subleased a
majority of the subject property to respondent Sunvar through several sublease agreements (the
sublease agreements). Respondent Sunvar wrote to Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation
(PDAF) as successor of TRCFI. Respondent expressed its desire to exercise the option to renew the
sublease over the subject property and proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal period of
another 25 years. Petitioner NPC notified PDAF of the formers decision not to renew the contract of
lease. Hence, petitioners recovered from PDAF all the rights over the subject property and the three
other parcels of land. Thereafter, petitioner Republic transferred the subject property to the PMO for
disposition. Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to occupy the property. Respondent Sunvar
again refused to vacate the property and continued to occupy it.
Petitioners filed the Complaint for unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Makati City. Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter (was already accion publiciana). The MeTC denied the Motion to Dismiss.
Respondent later on filed its Answer. Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for
ejectment, respondent Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City to
assail the denial by the MeTC of respondents Motion to Dismiss. In answer to the Rule 65 Petition of
respondent, petitioners placed in issue the jurisdiction of the RTC and reasoned that the Rules on
Summary Procedure expressly prohibited the filing of a petition for certiorari against the interlocutory
orders of the MeTC. Hence, they prayed for the outright dismissal of the certiorari Petition of
respondent Sunvar.
The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that extraordinary circumstances called for an
exception to the general rule on summary proceedings.
The RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition and directed the MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for unlawful
detainer for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC reasoned that the one-year period for the filing of an
unlawful detainer case was reckoned from the expiration of the main lease contract and the sublease
agreements on 31 December 2002. Petitioners should have then filed an accion publiciana with the
RTC in 2009, instead of an unlawful detainer suit.
Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition filed by petitioners.
Issue
Whether or not the rule 65 petition before the RTC is proper.
Held
Improper.
Propriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary Proceedings
Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory
order issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading. The prohibition is plain
enough, and its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage. The RTC should have dismissed outright
respondent Sunvars Rule 65 Petition, considering that it is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners have
already alerted the RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for the dismissal of the certiorari
Petition. Yet, the RTC not only refused to dismiss the certiorari Petition, but even proceeded to hear
the Rule 65 Petition on the merits.
Respondent Sunvars reliance on Bayog v. Natino and Go v. Court of Appeals to justify a certiorari
review by the RTC owing to "extraordinary circumstances" is misplaced. In both cases, there were
peculiar and specific circumstances that justified the filing of the mentioned prohibited pleadings
under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure conditions that are not availing in the case of
respondent Sunvar.
In Bayog, Magdato, an illiterate farmer, received the Summons from the MCTC to file his answer
within 10 days, he was stricken with pulmonary tuberculosis and was able to consult a lawyer in San
Jose, Antique only after the reglementary period. Hence, when the Answer of Magdato was filed three
days after the lapse of the 10-day period, the MCTC ruled that it could no longer take cognizance of
his Answer and, hence, ordered his ejectment from Bayogs land. When his house was demolished in
January 1994, Magdato filed a Petition for Relief with the RTC-San Jose, Antique, claiming that he
was a duly instituted tenant in the agricultural property, and that he was deprived of due process.
Bayog, the landowner, moved to dismiss the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the RTC, since a petition for relief from judgment covering a summary proceeding was a
prohibited pleading. In resolving the Rule 65 Petition, we ruled that although a petition for relief from
judgment was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the Court
nevertheless allowed the filing of the Petition pro hac vice, since Magdato would otherwise suffer
grave injustice and irreparable injury.
On the other hand, in Go v. Court of Appeals, the Court was confronted with a procedural void in the
Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that justified the resort to a Rule 65 Petition in the RTC. In that
case, the preliminary conference in the subject ejectment suit was held in abeyance by the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City until after the case for specific performance involving the
same parties shall have been finally decided by the RTC. The affected party appealed the suspension
order to the RTC. In response, the adverse party moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it
concerned an interlocutory order in a summary proceeding that was not the subject of an appeal. The
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and subsequently directed the MTCC to proceed with the hearing
of the ejectment suit, a ruling that was upheld by the appellate court. In affirming the Decisions of the
RTC and CA, the Supreme Court allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory
order in an ejectment suit, considering that the affected party was deprived of any recourse to the
MTCCs erroneous suspension of a summary proceeding.
Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar, the factual circumstances in these two cases are not
comparable with respondents situation, and our rulings therein are inapplicable to its cause of action
in the present suit. No circumstances similar to the situation of the agricultural tenant-lessee in Bayog
are present to support the relaxation of the general rule in the instant case. Respondent cannot claim to
have been deprived of reasonable opportunities to argue its case before a summary judicial
proceeding.
Moreover, there exists no procedural void akin to that in Go v. Court of Appeals that would justify
respondents resort to a certiorari Petition before the RTC. When confronted with the MeTCs adverse
denial of its Motion to Dismiss in the ejectment case, the expeditious and proper remedy for
respondent should have been to proceed with the summary hearings and to file its answer. Indeed, its
resort to a certiorari Petition in the RTC over an interlocutory order in a summary ejectment
proceeding was not only prohibited. The certiorari Petition was already a superfluity on account of
respondents having already taken advantage of a speedy and available remedy by filing an Answer
with the MeTC.
Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its claim of extraordinary circumstances that would
constrain this Court to apply the exceptions obtaining in Bayog and Go.
Banares v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000

Facts
Petitioners were the accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa filed by the private respondents. The
cases were assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II. After the petitioners
were arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty, they filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned
cases on the ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure of the parties to
undergo conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo,
Rizal.
The municipal trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss on the ground that
they failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral of the cases to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It added that such failure to invoke non-referral of the case to the Lupon
amounted to a waiver by petitioners of the right to use the said ground as basis for dismissing the
cases.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, claiming that nowhere in
the Revised Rules of Court is it stated that the ground of prematurity shall be deemed waived if not
raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss.
The municipal trial court issued an Order dismissing the sixteen criminal cases against petitioners
without prejudice, pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
More than two months later, private respondents through counsel, filed a motion to revive the
abovementioned criminal cases against petitioners, stating that the requirement of referral to the
Lupon for conciliation had already been complied with.
The municipal trial court issued an Order granting private respondents' motion to revive.
Petitioners thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, a petition for certiorari,
injunction and prohibition assailing the Order of the municipal trial court.
The regional trial court rendered the assailed decision denying the petition for certiorari, injunction
and prohibition, stating as follows:
Evaluating the allegations contained in the petition and respondents' comment thereto, the Court regrets that it
cannot agree with the petitioner (sic). As shown by the records the 16 criminal cases were dismissed without
prejudice at the instance of the petitioners for failure of the private respondent to comply with the mandatory
requirement of PD 1508. Since the dismissal of said cases was without prejudice, the Court honestly believes
that the questioned order has not attained finality at all.
Issue
Whether or not the rule on finality of judgment applies to cases under RSP.
Held
Applies.
Equally erroneous is private respondents' contention that the rules regarding finality of judgments
under the Revised Rules of Court do not apply to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Private respondents claim that Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure allows the revival of cases which were dismissed for failure to submit the same
to conciliation at the barangay level, as required under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the
Local Government Code.
There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports private respondents' view. Section 18
merely states that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed
without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived only after the
dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required under the Local
Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere motion
even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has
lapsed.
Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure expressly provides that the Rules of Court
applies suppletorily to cases covered by the former.
The rules regarding finality of judgments also apply to cases covered by the rules on summary
procedure.
The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression of petitioners and the municipal
trial court that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation as required under the Local
Government Code of 1991 may be raised in a motion to dismiss even after the accused has been
arraigned.
It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the
law is not jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a
motion to dismiss. The Court notes that although petitioners could have invoked the ground of
prematurity of the causes of action against them due to the failure to submit the dispute to Lupon prior
to the filing of the cases as soon as they received the complaints against them, petitioners raised the
said ground only after their arraignment.
However, while the trial court committed an error in dismissing the criminal cases against petitioners
on the ground that the same were not referred to the Lupon prior to the filing thereof in court although
said ground was raised by them belatedly, the said order may no longer be revoked at present
considering that the same had already become final and executory, and as earlier stated, may no
longer be annulled by the Municipal Trial Court, nor by the Regional Trial Court or this Court.
Angelina Soriente v. Estate of Arsenio Concepcion, G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 200921
Facts
Respondent Nenita S. Concepcion established that she was the registered owner of the lot occupied by
petitioner Angelina Soriente. Respondent allowed and tolerated the occupancy of the lot by petitioner,
who was already staying on the property. Petitioner was allowed to stay on the lot for free, but on a
temporary basis until such time that Concepcion and/or his family needed to develop the lot.
Respondent initiated steps to develop the lot, but petitioners occupancy of the lot prevented them
from pursuing their plan. Verbal demands to vacate the lot was made on petitioner. Petitioner pleaded
for time to transfer to another place, but she never left. Respondent, filed a complaint for conciliation
proceedings before the barangay at the instance of respondent. However, the parties did not reach a
settlement, which resulted in the issuance of a Certificate to File Action. Respondent sent petitioner a
demand letter demanding that she peacefully surrender the property and extending financial assistance
for her relocation. Despite receipt of the demand letter, petitioner did not vacate the premises.
Respondent filed against petitioner a Complaint for unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial
Court. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 17973. Petitioner Soriente, as a defendant in
the lower court, did not file a separate Answer, but affixed her signature to the Answer filed by
defendant Alfredo Caballero in another ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case No. 17974, which was
filed by respondent against Caballero. Hence, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Render
Judgment under Section 7, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure for Sorientes
failure to file an Answer to the Complaint. Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Render
Judgment.
The trial court denied the Motion to Render Judgment. It stated that the allegations of the Complaint
in Civil Case No. 17973 and 17974 are similar, the only substantial difference being the time when
defendants occupied the subject property allegedly through tolerance. The trial court believed that in
signing the Answer filed in Civil Case No. 17974, Soriente intended to adopt the same as her own, as
both defendants Caballero and Soriente had a common defense against plaintiffs (respondents)
separate claim against them. The trial court denied the Motion to Render Judgment in the interest of
justice and considered that the two cases, including Civil Case No. 17932 against Severina Sadol, had
been consolidated.
Pursuant to Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, the trial court set a
preliminary conference. In the scheduled preliminary conference, only plaintiffs (respondents)
counsel and defendants Severina Sadol and Alfredo Caballero were present. A representative of
defendant (petitioner) Angelina Soriente appeared, but failed to submit a Special Power of Attorney
authorizing her to enter into a compromise agreement. In view of the absence of defendant Angelina
Soriente or her authorized representative, plaintiffs (respondents) counsel moved that the case be
submitted for decision, and that he be given 15 days within which to submit his position paper.
The trial court granted the motion of plaintiffs (respondents) counsel and considered the case against
defendant (petitioner) Angelina Soriente submitted for decision in accordance with Section 7 of the
Rules on Summary Procedure. The trial court rendered a Decision holding that respondent established
by preponderance of evidence that she was entitled to the relief prayed for. The RTC affirmed the trial
courts Decision.
Issue
Whether or not Section 7 of the RSP applies.
Held
Does not apply.
21
This is a case of quasi-consolidation where the cases are consolidated only for purposes of joint trial.
Lastly, petitioner contends that the lower court erred in deciding this case in accordance with Section
7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Petitioner asserts that considering that the cases against her, defendants Caballero and Sadol were
consolidated, and she and defendant Caballero signed and filed one common Answer to the
Complaint, thus, pleading a common defense, the trial court should not have rendered judgment on
her case based on Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure when she failed to
appear in the preliminary conference.
The contention lacks merit.
The Court notes that the ejectment case filed by respondent against petitioner was docketed in the trial
court as Civil Case No. 17973, the case against Alfredo Caballero was docketed as Civil Case No.
17974, while the case against Severina Sadol was docketed as Civil Case No. 17932. These cases
were consolidated by the trial court.
Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, if a sole defendant shall fail to
appear in the preliminary conference, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with
Section 6 of the Rule, that is, the court shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged
in the Complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. However, "[t]his Rule (Sec. 7) shall not
apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action, who had pleaded a
common defense, shall appear at the preliminary conference." Petitioner claims that the preceding
provision applies to her as a defendant, since the ejectment cases were consolidated by the trial court,
and she and Caballero filed the same Answer to the Complaint; hence, the trial court should not have
rendered judgment against her when she failed to appear in the preliminary conference.
The Court holds that the italicized provision above does not apply in the case of petitioner, since she
and Caballero were not co-defendants in the same case. The ejectment case filed against petitioner
was distinct from that of Caballero, even if the trial court consolidated the cases and, in the interest of
justice, considered the Answer filed by Caballero in Civil Case No. 17974 as the Answer also of
petitioner since she affixed her signature thereto.
Considering that petitioner was sued in a separate case for ejectment from that of Caballero and
Sadol, petitioners failure to appear in the preliminary conference entitled respondent to the rendition
of judgment by the trial court on the ejectment case filed against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case
No. 17973, in accordance with Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
Pleadings (Rules 6 to 8)
Cosco Philippines Shipping v. Kemper Insurance Company, G.R. No. 179488, April 23, 201222
Facts
Respondent is a foreign insurance company based in Illinois, United States of America (USA) with no
license to engage in business in the Philippines, as it is not doing business in the Philippines, except in
isolated transactions; while petitioner is a domestic shipping company organized in accordance with
Philippine laws. Respondent insured the shipment of imported frozen boneless beef (owned by
Genosi, Inc.), which was loaded at a port in Brisbane, Australia, for shipment to Genosi, Inc. (the
importer-consignee) in the Philippines. However, upon arrival at the Manila port, a portion of the
shipment was rejected by Genosi, Inc. by reason of spoilage arising from the alleged temperature
fluctuations of petitioner's reefer containers. Thus, Genosi, Inc. filed a claim against both petitioner
shipping company and respondent Kemper Insurance Company. Respondent paid the claim of Genosi,
Inc. (the insured). Respondent then made demands upon petitioner, but the latter failed and refused to
pay the said amount.
Hence, respondent filed a Complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages against petitioner before the
trial court. During the pre-trial proceedings, respondent's counsel proffered and marked its exhibits,
while petitioner's counsel manifested that he would mark his client's exhibits on the next scheduled
pre-trial. However, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the same was filed by one
Atty. Rodolfo A. Lat, who failed to show his authority to sue and sign the corresponding certification
against forum shopping. It argued that Atty. Lat's act of signing the certification against forum
shopping was a clear violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The trial court granted petitioner's Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the case without prejudice, ruling
that it is mandatory that the certification must be executed by the petitioner himself, and not by
counsel. Since respondent's counsel did not have a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to act on its
behalf, hence, the certification against forum shopping executed by said counsel was fatally defective
and constituted a valid cause for dismissal of the complaint.
On appeal by respondent, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court's order. The CA ruled that the
required certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory and that the same must be signed by the
plaintiff or principal party concerned and not by counsel; and in case of corporations, the physical act
of signing may be performed in behalf of the corporate entity by specifically authorized individuals.
However, the CA pointed out that the factual circumstances of the case warranted the liberal
application of the rules and, as such, ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Issue
Whether or not Atty. Lat was properly authorized by respondent to sign the certification against forum
shopping on its behalf.
Held
Not properly authorized.
The certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties. If, for any reason,
the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly
authorized. With respect to a corporation, the certification against forum shopping may be signed for
and on its behalf, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts
22
If the pleading is for an appeal be careful because when you find out you lack a CNFS the reglementary
period for appeal may have already lapsed. In practice, notice of denial from the courts for lack of CNFS is
received after the reglementary period.
required to be disclosed in such document. Only individuals vested with authority by a valid board
resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping on behalf of a corporation. We also
required proof of such authority to be presented. The petition is subject to dismissal if a certification
was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatory's authority.
In the present case, since respondent is a corporation, the certification must be executed by an officer
or member of the board of directors or by one who is duly authorized by a resolution of the board of
directors; otherwise, the complaint will have to be dismissed. The lack of certification against forum
shopping is generally not curable by mere amendment of the complaint, but shall be a cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping
signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is
authorized to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation. There is no proof that respondent, a
private corporation, authorized Atty. Lat, through a board resolution, to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping on its behalf. Accordingly, the certification against forum
shopping appended to the complaint is fatally defective, and warrants the dismissal of respondent's
complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages against petitioner.
While there were instances where we have allowed the filing of a certification against non-forum
shopping by someone on behalf of a corporation without the accompanying proof of authority at the
time of its filing, we did so on the basis of a special circumstance or compelling reason. Moreover,
there was a subsequent compliance by the submission of the proof of authority attesting to the fact
that the person who signed the certification was duly authorized.
In China Banking Corporation v. Mondragon International Philippines, Inc., We reversed the CA and
said that the case be decided on the merits despite the failure to attach the required proof of authority,
since the board resolution which was subsequently attached recognized the pre-existing status of the
bank manager as an authorized signatory.
In Abaya Investments Corporation v. Merit Philippines, we took into consideration the merits of the
case and to avoid a re-litigation of the issues and further delay the administration of justice, since the
case had already been decided by the lower courts on the merits. Moreover, Abaya's authority to sign
the certification was ratified by the Board.
Contrary to the CA's finding, the Court finds that the circumstances of this case do not necessitate the
relaxation of the rules. There was no proof of authority submitted, even belatedly, to show subsequent
compliance with the requirement of the law. Neither was there a copy of the board resolution or
secretary's certificate subsequently submitted to the trial court that would attest to the fact that Atty.
Lat was indeed authorized to file said complaint and sign the verification and certification against
forum shopping, nor did respondent satisfactorily explain why it failed to comply with the rules. Thus,
there exists no cogent reason for the relaxation of the rule on this matter.
Moreover, the SPA submitted by respondent allegedly authorizing Atty. Lat to appear on behalf of the
corporation, in the pre-trial and all stages of the proceedings, signed by Brent Healy, was fatally
defective and had no evidentiary value. It failed to establish Healy's authority to act in behalf of
respondent, in view of the absence of a resolution from respondent's board of directors or secretary's
certificate proving the same.
Respondent's allegation that petitioner is estopped by laches from raising the defect in respondent's
certificate of non-forum shopping does not hold water. Since Atty. Lat was not duly authorized by
respondent to file the complaint and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, the
complaint is considered not filed and ineffectual, and, as a necessary consequence, is dismissable due
to lack of jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with the RTC the same did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent. Since the court has no jurisdiction over the
complaint and respondent, petitioner is not estopped from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction,
even at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. This is so because the issue of jurisdiction may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
The factual setting attendant in Sibonghanoy is not similar to that of the present case so as to make it
fall under the doctrine of estoppel by laches. Here, the trial court's jurisdiction was questioned by the
petitioner during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, and it cannot be said that considerable length
of time had elapsed for laches to attach.
Iglesia ni Kristo v. Ponferrada, G.R. No. 168943, October 27, 2006

Facts
Alicia, Alfredo, Roberto, Enrique and Susan, all surnamed Santos, and Sonia Santos-Wallin,
represented by Enrique G. Santos, filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and/or Accion
Reinvindicatoria before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), defendant
therein. Plaintiffs alleged therein that, during his lifetime, Enrique Santos was the owner of a parcel of
land. He died and was survived by his wife, Alicia Santos, and other plaintiffs, who were their
children. Plaintiffs learned that defendant was claiming ownership over the property based on TCT.
They insisted that TCT were not among the titles issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and
even if the Register of Deeds issued said titles, it was contrary to law. Plaintiffs had the property
fenced but defendant deprived them of the final use and enjoyment of their property. As gleaned from
the caption of the complaint, plaintiffs appear to be the heirs of Enrique Santos, represented by
Enrique G. Santos. The latter signed the Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping
Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs complain based on, among others, plaintiffs failure to
faithfully comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Defendant asserted that the case involved more than one plaintiff but the verification
and certification against forum shopping incorporated in the complaint was signed only by Enrique
Santos. Although the complaint alleges that plaintiffs are represented by Enrique Santos, there is no
showing that he was, indeed, authorized to so represent the other plaintiffs to file the complaint and to
sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Thus, plaintiffs failed to comply with
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court denied defendants motion to dismiss. It declared that since Enrique Santos was one of
the heirs, his signature in the verification and certification constitutes substantial compliance with the
Rules.
Unsatisfied, defendant, as petitioner, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction before the CA. The CA
rendered the assailed decision dismissing the petition, holding that the RTC did not commit grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners motion to
dismiss. The certification signed by one with respect to a property over which he shares a common
interest with the rest of the plaintiffs (respondents herein) substantially complied with the Rules.
Issue
Whether or not the verification and CNFC is defective.
Held
Not defective.
The purpose of verification is simply to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition (or
complaint) have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This
requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does
not necessarily render it fatally defective. Indeed, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional
requirement.
The issue in the present case is not the lack of verification but the sufficiency of one executed by only
one of plaintiffs. The verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the
present case, only one of the heirs-plaintiffs, who has sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the petition (complaint), signed the verification attached to it. Such
verification is deemed sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative.
The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification against forum shopping. The
general rule is that the certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only
one of them is insufficient. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the
contents of the certification.
The substantial compliance rule has been applied by this Court in a number of cases: Cavile v. Heirs
of Cavile, where the Court sustained the validity of the certification signed by only one of petitioners
because he is a relative of the other petitioners and co-owner of the properties in dispute; Heirs of
Agapito T. Olarte v. Office of the President of the Philippines, where the Court allowed a certification
signed by only two petitioners because the case involved a family home in which all the petitioners
shared a common interest; Gudoy v. Guadalquiver, where the Court considered as valid the
certification signed by only four of the nine petitioners because all petitioners filed as co-owners pro
indiviso a complaint against respondents for quieting of title and damages, as such, they all have joint
interest in the undivided whole; and Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto, where the Court sustained the
certification signed by only one of the spouses as they were sued jointly involving a property in which
they had a common interest.
It is noteworthy that in all of the above cases, the Court applied the rule on substantial compliance
because of the commonality of interest of all the parties with respect to the subject of the controversy.
Applying the doctrines laid down in the above cases, we find and so hold that the CA did not err in
affirming the application of the rule on substantial compliance. Respondents herein who are plaintiffs
in the case below have a common interest over the property being the heirs of the late Enrique Santos,
the alleged registered owner of the subject property. Consequently, as one of the heirs and principal
party, the lone signature of Enrique G. Santos in the verification and certification is sufficient for the
RTC to take cognizance of the case. The commonality of their interest gave Enrique G. Santos the
authority to inform the RTC on behalf of the other plaintiffs therein that they have not commenced
any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, and that there is no other
pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Hence, the RTC
correctly denied the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner.
Considering that at stake in the present case is the ownership and possession over a prime property in
Quezon City, the apparent merit of the substantive aspects of the case should be deemed as a special
circumstance or compelling reason to allow the relaxation of the rule.
Indeed, this Court strictly applied the rules on verification and certification against forum shopping as
in the cases of Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman and Tolentino v. Rivera. However, in both cases,
the commonality of interest between or among the parties is wanting. In Loquias, the co-parties were
being sued in their individual capacities as mayor, vice mayor and members of the municipal board.
In Tolentino, the lone signature of Tolentino was held insufficient because he had no authority to sign
in behalf of the Francisco spouses. In such case, the Court concluded that Tolentino merely used the
spouses names for whatever mileage he thought he could gain. It is thus clear from these cases that
the commonality of interest is material in the relaxation of the Rules.
Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Jocelyn Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011
Facts
Petitioner is engaged in the business of transportation and the franchise owner of a bus. Quirino C.
Cabanilla (Cabanilla) is employed as a regular bus driver of petitioner. Later, respondents husband,
Quintin Catubig, Jr. (Catubig), was on his way home from Dumaguete City riding in tandem on a
motorcycle with his employee, Teddy Emperado (Emperado). Catubig was the one driving the
motorcycle. While trying to overtake another vehicle by crossing over to the opposite lane, Catubig
collided with the bus. Both Catubig and Emperado died. Cabanilla was charged criminally but the
case was dismissed. Thereafter, respondent filed before the RTC a Complaint for Damages against
petitioner, seeking damages for the death of her husband, Catubig, based on Article 2180, in relation
to Article 2176, of the Civil Code. Respondent alleged that petitioner is civilly liable because the
latters employee driver, Cabanilla, was reckless and negligent in driving the bus that collided with
Catubigs motorcycle.
Petitioner, in its Answer with Counterclaim, contended that the proximate cause of the vehicular
collision, was the sole negligence of Catubig when he imprudently overtook another vehicle at a curve
and traversed the opposite lane of the road. As a special and affirmative defense, petitioner asked for
the dismissal of respondents complaint for not being verified and/or for failure to state a cause of
action, as there was no allegation that petitioner was negligent in the selection or supervision of its
employee driver.
The RTC promulgated its Decision favoring petitioner. The RTC ruled that the proximate cause of the
collision of the bus and motorcycle was the negligence of the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig. The
RTC, moreover, was convinced through the testimony of Maypa, the Administrative and Personnel
Manager of the Dumaguete branch of petitioner, that petitioner had exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employee drivers, including Cabanilla.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision, the appellate court held that both
Catubig and Cabanilla were negligent in driving their respective vehicles.. The Court of Appeals also
brushed aside the defense of petitioner that it exercised the degree of diligence exacted by law in the
conduct of its business. Maypa was not in a position to testify on the procedures followed by
petitioner in hiring Cabanilla as an employee driver considering that Cabanilla was hired a year before
Maypa assumed his post at the Dumaguete branch of petitioner.
Issue
Whether or not the lack of verification is a fatal defect.
Held
Not fatal.
Petitioner asserts that respondents complaint for damages should be dismissed for the latters failure to
verify the same. The certification against forum shopping attached to the complaint, signed by
respondent, is not a valid substitute for respondents verification that she has read the pleading and that
the allegations therein are true and correct of her personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
Petitioner cited jurisprudence in which the Court ruled that a pleading lacking proper verification is
treated as an unsigned pleading, which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court.
We find no procedural defect that would have warranted the outright dismissal of respondents
complaint.
Respondent filed her complaint for damages against petitioner when the 1964 Rules of Court was still
in effect. On July 1, 1997, the new rules on civil procedure took effect. The foregoing provision was
carried on, with a few amendments, as Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The same
provision was again amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10, which became effective on May 1, 2000. It now
reads:
SEC. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are
true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on information and belief or upon
knowledge, information and belief, or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
The 1997 Rules of Court, even prior to its amendment by A.M. No. 00-2-10, clearly provides that a
pleading lacking proper verification is to be treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal
effect. However, it also just as clearly states that [e]xcept when otherwise specifically required by law
or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. No such law or rule
specifically requires that respondents complaint for damages should have been verified.
Although parties would often submit a joint verification and certificate against forum shopping, the
two are different.
In the case before us, we stress that as a general rule, a pleading need not be verified, unless there is a
law or rule specifically requiring the same. Examples of pleadings that require verification are:
1. All pleadings filed in civil cases under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure;
2. Petition for review from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court raising only questions of law
under Rule 41, Section 2;
3. Petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42,
Section 1;
4. Petition for review from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, Section 5;
5. Petition for review before the Supreme Court under Rule 45, Section 1;
6. Petition for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions under Rule 47, Section 4;
7. Complaint for injunction under Rule 58, Section 4;
8. Application for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 58, Section 4;
9. Application for appointment of a receiver under Rule 59, Section 1;
10. Aplication for support pendente lite under Rule 61, Section 1;
11. Petition for certiorari against the judgments, final orders or resolutions of constitutional commissions
under Rule 64, Section 2;
12. Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65, Sections 1 to 3;
13. Petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 1;
14. Complaint for expropriation under Rule 67, Section 1;
15. Petition for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 4, all from the 1997 Rules of Court;
16. All complaints or petitions involving intra-corporate controversies under the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies;
17. Complaint or petition for rehabilitation and suspension of payment under the Interim Rules on
Corporate Rehabilitation; and (
18. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages as
well as petition for summary proceedings under the Family Code.
In contrast, all complaints, petitions, applications, and other initiatory pleadings must be accompanied
by a certificate against forum shopping, first prescribed by Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which
took effect on April 1, 1994, then later on by Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court. It is not
disputed herein that respondents complaint for damages was accompanied by such a certificate.
In addition, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a formal, not
jurisdictional, requirement, and mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged
are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation. When circumstances
warrant, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict
compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served
Korean Technologies v. Alberto Lerma, G.R. No. 143581, January 7, 2008

Facts
Petitioner Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. (KOGIES) is a Korean corporation which is engaged in the
supply and installation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Cylinder manufacturing plants, while
private respondent Pacific General Steel Manufacturing Corp. (PGSMC) is a domestic corporation.
PGSMC and KOGIES executed a Contract whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder
Manufacturing Plant in Carmona, Cavite. The contract was executed in the Philippines. The contract
and its amendment stipulated that KOGIES will ship the machinery and facilities necessary for
manufacturing LPG cylinders for which PGSMC would pay. KOGIES would install and initiate the
operation of the plant for which PGSMC bound itself to pay. PGSMC entered into a Contract of Lease
with Worth Properties, Inc. (Worth) for use of Worths property to house the LPG manufacturing
plant. However, after the installation of the plant, the initial operation could not be conducted as
PGSMC encountered financial difficulties affecting the supply of materials, thus forcing the parties to
agree that KOGIES would be deemed to have completely complied with the terms and conditions of
the contract. For the remaining balance PGSMC issued two postdated checks.
When KOGIES deposited the checks, these were dishonored for the reason PAYMENT STOPPED.
PGSMC informed KOGIES that PGSMC was canceling their Contract on the ground that KOGIES
had altered the quantity and lowered the quality of the machineries and equipment it delivered to
PGSMC, and that PGSMC would dismantle and transfer the machineries, equipment, and facilities
installed in the Carmona plant. KOGIES instituted an Application for Arbitration before the Korean
Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB) in Seoul, Korea pursuant to Art. 15 of the Contract as
amended.
KOGIES filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against PGSMC before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). In its complaint, KOGIES alleged that PGSMC had initially admitted that the checks that
were stopped were not funded but later on claimed that it stopped payment of the checks for the
reason that their value was not received as the former allegedly breached their contract by altering the
quantity and lowering the quality of the machinery and equipment installed in the plant and failed to
make the plant operational although it earlier certified to the contrary. Likewise, KOGIES averred that
PGSMC violated Art. 15 of their Contract, as amended, by unilaterally rescinding the contract without
resorting to arbitration. KOGIES also asked that PGSMC be restrained from dismantling and
transferring the machinery and equipment installed in the plant which the latter threatened to do.
PGSMC filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim asserting that it had the full right to
dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment because it had paid for them in full as
stipulated in the contract; that KOGIES was not entitled to the PhP 9,000,000 covered by the checks
for failing to completely install and make the plant operational; and that KOGIES was liable for
damages amounting to PhP 4,500,000 for altering the quantity and lowering the quality of the
machineries and equipment. Moreover, PGSMC averred that it has already paid PhP 2,257,920 in rent
(covering January to July 1998) to Worth and it was not willing to further shoulder the cost of renting
the premises of the plant considering that the LPG cylinder manufacturing plant never became
operational.
The RTC issued an Order denying the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. And finally, the
RTC held that Art. 15 of the Contract as amended was invalid as it tended to oust the trial court or any
other court jurisdiction over any dispute that may arise between the parties. KOGIES prayer for an
injunctive writ was denied. The trial court issued an Order (1) granting PGSMCs motion for
inspection; (2) denying KOGIES motion for reconsideration of the July 23, 1998 RTC Order; and (3)
denying KOGIES motion to dismiss PGSMCs compulsory counterclaims as these counterclaims fell
within the requisites of compulsory counterclaims.
KOGIES filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration granting inspection of the plant and denying
dismissal of PGSMCs compulsory counterclaims. At the same time, KOGIES filed before the Court
of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari seeking annulment of the RTC Orders and praying for the
issuance of writs of prohibition, mandamus, and preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC and
PGSMC from inspecting, dismantling, and transferring the machineries and equipment in the
Carmona plant, and to direct the RTC to enforce the specific agreement on arbitration to resolve the
dispute.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and declared the arbitration clause against public
policy
The CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the RTC Orders and dismissing the petition for
certiorari filed by KOGIES. The CA found that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing
the assailed Orders.
On the issue of nonpayment of docket fees and non-attachment of a certificate of non-forum shopping
by PGSMC, the CA held that the counterclaims of PGSMC were compulsory ones and payment of
docket fees was not required since the Answer with counterclaim was not an initiatory pleading. For
the same reason, the CA said a certificate of non-forum shopping was also not required.
Issue
Whether or not docket fees are necessary for compulsory counterclaims.
Held
Unnecessary.
The rules on the payment of docket fees for counterclaims and cross claims were amended effective
August 16, 2004.
KOGIES strongly argues that when PGSMC filed the counterclaims, it should have paid docket fees
and filed a certificate of non-forum shopping, and that its failure to do so was a fatal defect.
We disagree with KOGIES.
As aptly ruled by the CA, the counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim dated July 17, 1998 in accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the Answer with Counterclaim was
filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, A compulsory counterclaim or a cross-
claim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained therein.
On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against
KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We
stress, however, that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-
2-04-SC, docket fees are now required in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims.
As to the failure to submit a certificate of forum shopping, PGSMCs Answer is not an initiatory
pleading that requires a certification against forum shopping under Sec. 5 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a responsive pleading, hence, the courts a quo did not commit
reversible error in denying KOGIES motion to dismiss PGSMCs compulsory counterclaims.
Filipinas Textile v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119800, November 12, 2003
Facts
SIHI instituted a Complaint for the collection against herein petitioners Filtex and Villanueva. In its
Complaint, SIHI alleged that Filtex applied for domestic letters of credit to finance the purchase of
various raw materials for its textile business. Finding the application to be in order, SIHI issued
domestic letters of credit authorizing suppliers to value on SIHI such drafts as may be drawn by said
corporations against Filtex. Filtex used these domestic letters of credit to cover its purchase of various
textile materials from Indo-Phil, Texfiber and Polyamide.
Villanueva executed a comprehensive surety agreement, whereby he guaranteed, jointly and severally
with Filtex, the full and punctual payment at maturity to SIHI of all the indebtedness of Filtex. The
essence of the comprehensive surety agreement was that it shall be a continuing surety until such time
that the total outstanding obligation of Filtex to SIHI had been fully settled. Because of Filtexs failure
to pay its outstanding obligation despite demand, SIHI filed a Complaint praying that the petitioners
be ordered to pay.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, Filtex interposed special and affirmative defenses, i.e., the
provisions of the trust receipts, as well as the comprehensive surety agreement, do not reflect the true
will and intention of the parties, full payment of the obligation, and lack of cause of action. The
petitioners, however, failed to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
actionable documents upon which the Complaint was based.
The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment holding Filtex and Villanueva jointly and severally
liable to SIHI. Dissatisfied, Filtex and Villanueva filed an Appeal, primarily contending that they have
fully paid their indebtedness to SIHI and asserting that the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts
and comprehensive surety agreement upon which the Complaint is based are inadmissible in evidence
supposedly because of non-payment of documentary stamp taxes as required by the Internal Revenue
Code.
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals debunked the petitioners contention that the letters of
credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive surety agreement are inadmissible in evidence
ruling that the petitioners had in effect, admitted the genuineness and due execution of said documents
because of their failure to have their answers placed under oath, the complaint being based on
actionable documents in line with Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The appellate court also
ruled that there remained an unpaid balance for which Filtex and Villanueva are solidarily liable.
Issue
Whether or not the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive surety agreement
are admissible in evidence despite the absence of documentary stamps thereon as required by the
Internal Revenue Code.
Held
We rule in the affirmative.
As correctly noted by the respondent, the Answer with Counterclaim and Answer, of Filtex and
Villanueva, respectively, did not contain any specific denial under oath of the letters of credit, sight
drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive surety agreement upon which SIHIs Complaint was based,
thus giving rise to the implied admission of the genuineness and due execution of these documents.
In Benguet Exploration, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the admission of the
genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears admits
that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority;
that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party
relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a
seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.
Moreover, under Section 173 of the Internal Revenue Code the liability for payment of the stamp
taxes is imposed on the person making, signing, issuing, accepting, or transferring the document. As
correctly pointed out by SIHI, Filtex was the issuer and acceptor of the trust receipts and sight drafts,
respectively, while the letters of credit were issued upon its application. On the other hand, Villanueva
signed the comprehensive surety agreement. Thus, being among the parties obliged to pay the
documentary stamp taxes, the petitioners are estopped from claiming that the documents are
inadmissible in evidence for non-payment thereof.
Interestingly, the petitioners questioned the admissibility of these documents rather belatedly, at the
appeal stage even. Their respective answers to SIHIs Complaint were silent on this point. The rule is
well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention
of the trial court need not, and ordinarily will not, be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process.
Hence, the petitioners can no longer dispute the admissibility of the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust
receipts and comprehensive surety agreement. However, this does not preclude the petitioners from
impugning these documents by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of
limitations, estoppel and want of consideration.
Borra v. CA, September 9, 2013

Facts
Petitioners filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration two
separate complaints. RAB Case No.06-09-10698-97 was filed against herein private respondent alone,
while RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97 impleaded herein private respondent and a certain Fela
Contractor as respondents. Petitioners asked that they be recognized and confirmed as regular
employees of herein private respondent and sought for payment of unpaid wages, holiday pay,
allowances, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, moral and exemplary damages. Respondent
filed a Motion to Consolidate the above mentioned cases, but the Labor Arbiter denied the said
Motion.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss RAB Case No. 06-09-0698-97 on the ground of res judicata.
Private respondent cited an earlier decided case entitled "Humphrey Perez, et al. v. Hawaiian
Philippine Co. et al." (Perez case) and docketed as RAB Case No.06-04-10169-95, which was an
action for recovery of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay, and it includes herein
petitioners among the complainants and herein private respondent and one Jose Castillon (Castillon)
as respondents. Private respondent contended that the Perez case, which has already become final and
executory, as no appeal was taken there from, serves as a bar to the litigation of RAB Case No. 06-09-
10698-97, because it was ruled therein that petitioners are not employees of private respondent but of
Castillon. The Labor Arbiter granted private respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioners appealed to the NLRC which set aside the Order of the Labor Arbiter, reinstated the
complaint in RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97 and remanded the same for further proceedings.
Private respondent appealed to the CA. The CA rendered judgment, affirming the Decision of the
NLRC and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court. This Court
rendered its Decision denying the petition and affirming the Decision of the CA. Quoting with
approval, the assailed Decision of the CA, this Court held, thus:
We, thus resolve to dismiss the complaint against respondent Hawaiian, who as we have found in an earlier
pronouncement has no employer-employee relations with the complainant, let alone, any privity of relationship,
except for the fact that it is the depository of sugar where the sugar of the planters and traders are hauled by the
workers of the contractor, like respondent herein Fela Contractor/Jardinico.
In the meantime, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97 holding
that there is no employer-employee relations between private respondent and petitioners. No appeal
was taken from the above quoted Decision. Thus, the same became final and executory. As a
consequence of the finality of the Decision in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97, herein private
respondent again filed a Motion to Dismiss RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97 on the ground, among
others, of res judicata. Private respondent contended that the final and executory Decision of the
Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97, which found no employer-employee relations
between private respondent and petitioners, serves as a bar to the further litigation of RAB Case No.
06-09-10698-97.
The Labor Arbiter denied private respondent's Motion to Dismiss. Private respondent then filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. The CA granted the petition.
Issue
Held
No forum shopping.
At the outset, the underlying question which has to be resolved in both RAB Case Nos. 06-09-10698-
97 and 06-09-10699-97, before any other issue in these cases could be determined, is the matter of
determining petitioners' real employer. As earlier mentioned, this issue has already been settled. In the
already final and executory decision of the Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No.06-09-10699-97, it was
ruled therein that no employer-employee relationship exists between private respondent and
petitioners because the latter's real employer is Fela Contractor. Thus, insofar as the question of
employer and employee relations between private respondent and petitioners is concerned, the final
judgment in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97 has the effect and authority of res judicata by
conclusiveness of judgment.
Hence, there is no point in determining the main issue raised in RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97, i.e.,
whether petitioners may be considered regular employees of private respondent, because, in the first
place, they are not even employees of the latter. As such, the CA correctly held that the Labor Arbiter
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying private respondent's motion to dismiss RAB Case No.
06-09-10698-97.
The question that follows is whether private respondent is guilty of forum shopping, considering that
it already filed a motion to dismiss RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97 in 1998? The Court answers in the
negative.
Forum-shopping can be committed in three ways:

1. By filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia);
2. Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata);
and
3. By filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting
of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res
judicata).
More particularly, the elements of forum-shopping are:

1. Identity of parties or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions;
2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
3. Identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
In the instant case, there can be no forum shopping, because the grounds cited by private respondent
in its motions to dismiss filed in 1998 and in the present case are different. In 1998, the motion to
dismiss is based on the argument that the final and executory decision in the Perez case serves as res
judicata and, thus, bars the re-litigation of the issue of employer-employee relations between private
respondent and petitioners. In the instant case, private respondent again cites res judicata as a ground
for its motion to dismiss. This time, however, the basis for such ground is not Perez but the final and
executory decision in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97. Thus, the relief prayed for in private
respondent's motion to dismiss subject of the instant case is founded on totally different facts and
issues.
Sy Tiong v. Sy Chim, G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 200923

Facts
These consolidated petitions involving the same parties. although related, dwell on different issues.
The civil action for accounting and damages pending before the RTC Manila seeks the issuance of an
order compelling the Spouses Sy to render a full, complete and true accounting of all the amounts,
proceeds and fund paid to, received and earned by the corporation and to restitute it such amounts,
proceeds and funds which the Spouses Sy have misappropriated. The criminal cases, on the other
hand, charge that the Spouses Sy were illegally prevented from getting inside company premises and
from inspecting company records, and that Sy Tiong Shiou falsified the entries in the GIS,
specifically the Spouses Sys shares in the corporation.
Juanita Tan, corporate treasurer of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the corporation) submitted a letter to the
Board stating that the control, supervision and administration of all corporate funds were exercised by
Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy (Spouses Sy), corporate president and assistant treasurer,
respectively. Juanita Tan disclosed that Felicidad Chan Sy did not make cash deposits to any of the
corporations banks thus the total bank remittances for the past years were less than reflected in the
corporate financial statements, accounting books and records. The Board hired the accounting firm
Banaria, Banaria & Company. The accounting firm attributed to the Spouses Sy unaccounted receipts
and disbursements.
A demand letter was subsequently served on the Spouses Sy. On the same date, the children of the
Spouses Sy allegedly stole from the corporation cash, postdated checks and other important
documents. After the incident, the Spouses Sy allegedly transferred residence and ceased reporting to
the corporation. Thereupon, the corporation filed a criminal complaint for robbery against the Spouses
Sy.
Meanwhile, the corporation filed its Amended Complaint for Accounting and Damages against the
Spouses Sy before the RTC Manila, praying for a complete and true accounting of all the amounts
paid to, received and earned by the company and for the restitution of the said amount. The complaint
also prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and or preliminary injunction to restrain Sy Chim
from calling a stockholders meeting on the ground of lack of authority.
By way of Answer, the Spouses Sy averred that Sy Chim was a mere figurehead and Felicidad Chan
Sy merely performed clerical functions, as it was Sy Tiong Shiou and his spouse, Juanita Tan, who
have been authorized by the corporations by-laws to supervise, control and administer corporate
funds, and as such were the ones responsible for the unaccounted funds. The Spouses Sy filed their
Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint, praying that their attached Third Party Complaint be
allowed and admitted against Sy Tiong Shiou and his spouse. In the said third-party complaint, the
Spouses Sy accused Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan as directly liable for the corporations claim for
misappropriating corporate funds.
The trial court granted the motion for leave to file the third-party complaint, and forthwith directed
the issuance of summons against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan. Their counsel allegedly discovered
that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan were not furnished with the copies of several pleadings, as well
as a court order, which resulted in their having been declared in default for failure to file their answer
to the third-party complaint; thus, they opted not to file a motion for reconsideration anymore and
instead filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan. The appellate court
declared that a third-party complaint is not allowed under the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing
Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (Interim Rules), it not being included in the
exclusive enumeration of allowed pleadings under Section 2, Rule 2 thereof. Moreover, even if such a
23
This case is an intra-corporate dispute
pleading were allowed, the admission of the third-party complaint against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita
Tan still would have no basis from the facts or the law and jurisprudence. The Court of Appeals also
ruled that the respondent judge committed a manifest error amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
admitting the third-party complaint and in summarily declaring Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan in
default for failure to file their answer within the purported reglementary period. The Court of Appeals
set aside the trial courts Order admitting the third-party complaint, as well as the Order, declaring Sy
Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan in default for failure to file their answer. The trial court was further
ordered to dismiss the third-party complaint without prejudice to any action that the corporation may
separately file against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan.
Issue
Whether or not the 3rd party complaint should be admitted.
Held
Admitted.
Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy argue before this Court that a third-party complaint is not excluded or
prohibited by the Interim Rules, and that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that their third- party
complaint is not actionable because their action is not in respect of the corporations claims. They add
that the disallowance of the third-party complaint will result in multiplicity of suits.
The third-party complaint should be allowed.
Rule 1, Sec. 8. Prohibited pleadings.The following pleadings are prohibited:

1. Motion to dismiss;
2. Motion for a bill of particulars;
3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of judgment or order, or for re-opening of trial;
4. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper, except those filed due to
clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath; and
5. Motion for postponement and other motions of similar intent, except those filed due to clearly
compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath.
Rule 2, Sec.2. Pleadings allowed.The only pleadings allowed to be filed under these Rules are the complaint,
answer, compulsory counterclaims or cross-claims pleaded in the answer, and the answer to the counterclaims
or cross-claims.
There is a conflict, for while a third-party complaint is not included in the allowed pleadings, neither
is it among the prohibited ones. Nevertheless, this conflict may be resolved by following the well-
entrenched rule in statutory construction, that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context.
This spirit and intent can be gleaned from Sec. 3, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules, which reads:
Sec. 3. Construction.These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a
just, summary, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.
Now, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a
person not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponents claim. It is actually a complaint
independent of, and separate and distinct from the plaintiffs complaint. In fact, were it not for Rule 6,
Section 11 of the Rules of Court, such third-party complaint would have to be filed independently and
separately from the original complaint by the defendant against the third-party defendant.
Jurisprudence is consistent in declaring that the purpose of a third-party complaint is to avoid circuitry
of action and unnecessary proliferation of law suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation all
the matters arising from one particular set of facts.
It thus appears that the summary nature of the proceedings governed by the Interim Rules, and the
allowance of the filing of third-party complaints is premised on one objectivethe expeditious
disposition of cases. Moreover, following the rule of liberal interpretation found in the Interim Rules,
and taking into consideration the suppletory application of the Rules of Court under Rule 1, Sec. 2 of
the Interim Rules, the Court finds that a third-party complaint is not, and should not be prohibited in
controversies governed by the Interim Rules. The logic and justness of this conclusion are rendered
beyond question when it is considered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan are not complete strangers
to the litigation as in fact they are the moving spirit behind the filing of the principal complaint for
accounting and damages against the Spouses Sy.
The Court also rules that the third-party complaint of the Spouses Sy should be admitted.
A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for a third-party claim be
found to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other substantive
right. The bringing of a third-party defendant is proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the
defendant or both for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although the
third-party defendants liability arises out of another transaction. The defendant may implead another
as third-party defendant: (a) on an allegation of liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief; (b) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party
defendant to the plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the
defendant.
In determining the sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the allegations in the original complaint
and the third-party complaint must be examined. A third-party complaint must allege facts which
prima facie show that the defendant is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief
from the third-party defendant.
The complaint alleges that the Spouses Sy, as officers of the corporation, have acted illegally in
raiding its corporate funds, hence they are duty bound to render a full, complete and true accounting
of all the amounts, proceeds and funds paid to, received and earned by the corporation since 1993 and
to restitute to the corporation all such amounts, proceeds, and funds which they took and
misappropriated for their own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff and its
stockholders. On the other hand, in the third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy claim that it is Sy Tiong
Shiou and Juanita Tan who had full and complete control of the day-to day operations and complete
control and custody of the funds of the corporation, and hence they are the ones liable for any
shortfall or unaccounted difference of the corporations cash account. Thus, Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan should render a full, complete and true accounting of all the amounts, proceeds, funds
paid to, received and earned by the corporation since 1993, including the amount attributed to the
Spouses Sy in the complaint for accounting and damages. In their prayer, the Spouses Sy moved that
Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan be declared as directly and solely liable in respect of the
corporations claim for accounting and damages, and that in the event that they, the Spouses Sy, are
adjudged liable to the corporation, Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan be ordered to pay all amounts
necessary to discharge their liability to the corporation by way of indemnity or reimbursement.
The allegations in the third-party complaint impute direct liability on the part of Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan to the corporation for the very same claims which the corporation interposed against the
Spouses Sy. It is clear therefore that the Spouses Sys third-party complaint is in respect of the
plaintiff corporations claims, and thus the allowance of the third-party complaint is warranted.
PTA of St. Matthew Academy v. Metrobank, G.R.No. 176518, March 2, 2010

Facts
The spouses Denivin Ilagan and Josefina Ilagan (spouses Ilagan) applied for and were granted a loan
by the [Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.] secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over parcels of land.
Upon default, an extrajudicial foreclosure was conducted with [Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.]
being the highest bidder x x x and for which a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor. During the
period of redemption, the respondent Bank filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession docketed as LRC Case No. 6438. The St. Mathew Christian Academy of Tarlac, Inc. filed
a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for Restraining Order against the respondent Bank and the
Provincial Sheriff of Tarlac. The Judge issued a Joint Decision in LRC Case No. 6438 and Special
Civil Action No. 9793, the contents of which are x x x as follows:
There is also no violation on the proscription on forum shopping. What is important is that, there is really no
other case between the parties involving the same subject matter.
In fine, St. Mathew is not really a third person. It is bound by the writ of possession issued by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the writ of possession issued by this Court dated April 22, 2005 is hereby affirmed, Civil Case
No. 9793 is dismissed. No costs.
Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration of the said Joint Decision, herein petitioners filed
a Motion for Leave to file Petition in Intervention in Special Civil Action No. 9793, which was
granted by the trial court. However, in a subsequent Order the trial court reversed its earlier Order by
ruling that petitioners intervention would have no bearing on the issuance and implementation of the
writ of possession. Thus, it directed that the writ be implemented by placing respondent Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company (MBTC) in physical possession of the property. Without filing a motion for
reconsideration, petitioners assailed the trial courts Order through a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition before the CA. However, said petition was dismissed by the CA for lack of merit in its
assailed Decision. It held thus:
Considering that in this case the writ of possession had already been issued x x x petitioners remedy was to
file x x x a petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled. Instead, petitioners filed the
instant Petition for Certiorari.
Moreover, no motion for reconsideration of the said Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession was
filed neither was there any motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order of 7 December 2005 prior to the
institution of the instant Petition for Certiorari to afford the respondent Court an opportunity to correct its
alleged error. The rule is that certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration
is filed before the respondent tribunal to allow it to correct its imputed error. While there are exceptions to the
rule, none has been invoked by petitioners.
Hence, petitioners filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue
Whether or not the lack of authority to sign the CNFS is fatal.
Held
Not fatal.
The lack of authority to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping attached to the Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Possession was an insignificant lapse.
Petitioners further claim that the lack of authority to sign the certificate on non-forum shopping
attached to the Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Possession rendered the same worthless and
should be deemed as non-existent. MBTC asserts otherwise, citing Spouses Arquiza v. Court of
Appeals where we held that an application for a writ of possession is a mere incident in the
registration proceeding which is in substance merely a motion, and therefore does not require such a
certification.
Petitioners contention lacks basis. In Green Asia Construction and Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, where the issue of validity of the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping was
questioned in an application for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, we held that:
x x x it bears stressing that a certification on non-forum shopping is required only in a complaint or a petition
which is an initiatory pleading. In this case, the subject petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by
private respondent is not an initiatory pleading. Although private respondent denominated its pleading as a
petition, it is more properly a motion. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its
form or the title given by the party executing it, but its purpose. The purpose of a motion is not to initiate
litigation, but to bring up a matter arising in the progress of the case where the motion is filed.
It is not necessary to initiate an original action in order for the purchaser at an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property to acquire possession. Even if the application for the writ of possession
was denominated as a "petition", it was in substance merely a motion. Indeed, any insignificant lapse
in the certification on non-forum shopping filed by the MBTC did not render the writ irregular. After
all, no verification and certification on non-forum shopping need be attached to the motion.
Hence, it is immaterial that the certification on non-forum shopping in the MBTCs petition was
signed by its branch head. Such inconsequential oversight did not render the said petition defective in
form.
Abbot Laboratories v. Alcaraz, 2013

Facts
Petitioner Abbott Laboratories, Philippines (Abbott) published in a major broadsheet newspaper of its
need for a Regulatory Affairs Manager. Alcaraz showed interest and submitted her application.
Abbott formally offered Alcaraz the position. In Abbotts offer sheet. it was stated that Alcaraz was to
be employed on a probationary basis. She accepted the said offer. Alcaraz signed an employment
contract which stated, inter alia, that she was to be placed on probation for a period of six (6) months.
During Alcarazs pre-employment orientation, petitioner briefed her on her duties and responsibilities
and was also given copies of Abbotts Code of Conduct and Probationary Performance Standards and
Evaluation (PPSE) and Performance Excellence Orientation Modules (Performance Modules) which
she had to apply in line with her task of evaluating the Hospira ALSU staff. Later, Alcaraz was called
to a meeting with Walsh and Terrible where she was informed that she failed to meet the
regularization standards for the position of Regulatory Affairs Manager. Thereafter, Walsh and
Terrible requested Alcaraz to tender her resignation, else they be forced to terminate her services.
Gonzales told her that Walsh and Terrible already announced to the whole Hospira ALSU staff that
Alcaraz already resigned due to health reasons. Walsh, Almazar, and Bernardo personally handed to
Alcaraz a letter stating that her services had been terminated. Alcaraz felt that she was unjustly
terminated from her employment and thus, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against
Abbott and its officers
The LA dismissed Alcarazs complaint for lack of merit. The LA rejected Alcarazs argument that she
was not informed of the reasonable standards to qualify as a regular employee considering her
admissions that she was briefed by Almazar on her work during her pre-employment orientation
meeting and that she received copies of Abbotts Code of Conduct and Performance Modules which
were used for evaluating all types of Abbott employees.
Alcaraz filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC rendered
a Decision, annulling and setting aside the LAs ruling. The NLRC reversed the findings of the LA
and ruled that there was no evidence showing that Alcaraz had been apprised of her probationary
status and the requirements which she should have complied with in order to be a regular employee.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Pending resolution of the First
CA Petition, Alcaraz moved for the execution of the NLRCs Decision before the LA, which
petitioners strongly opposed. The LA denied the said motion which was, however, eventually
reversed on appeal by the NLRC. Due to the foregoing, petitioners filed another Petition for Certiorari
with the CA assailing the propriety of the execution of the NLRC decision.
With regard to the First CA Petition, the CA, affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and held that the latter
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed. The CA
likewise denied the Second CA Petition and ruled that the NLRC was correct in upholding the
execution of the NLRC Decision. Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. While the
petitioners motion for reconsideration was pending, Alcaraz again moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution before the LA. Petitioners received the LAs order granting Alcarazs motion for execution
which they in turn appealed to the NLRC through a Memorandum of Appeal on the ground that the
implementation of the LAs order would render its motion for reconsideration moot and academic.
Meanwhile, petitioners motion for reconsideration of the CAs Resolution in the Second CA Petition
was denied.
Incidentally, Alcaraz also alleges that petitioners were guilty of forum shopping when they filed the
Second CA Petition pending the resolution of their motion for reconsideration of the CAs Decision
i.e., the decision in the First CA Petition. She also contends that petitioners have not complied with
the certification requirement when they failed to disclose in the instant petition the filing of the
Memorandum of Appeal filed before the NLRC.
Issue
Held
There was no forum shopping.
At the outset, it is noteworthy to mention that the prohibition against forum shopping is different from
a violation of the certification requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. In Sps. Ong
v. CA, the Court explained that:
x x x The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the certification requirement should
by now be too elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the certification against forum
shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is a
difference in the treatment between failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the
prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing
them. The former constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or
initiatory pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and
for direct contempt. x x x.
As to the first, forum shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same
parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. It exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
In this case, records show that, except for the element of identity of parties, the elements of forum
shopping do not exist. Evidently, the First CA Petition was instituted to question the ruling of the
NLRC that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed. On the other hand, the Second CA Petition pertains to the
propriety of the enforcement of the judgment award pending the resolution of the First CA Petition
and the finality of the decision in the labor dispute between Alcaraz and the petitioners. Based on the
foregoing, a judgment in the Second CA Petition will not constitute res judicata insofar as the First
CA Petition is concerned. Thus, considering that the two petitions clearly cover different subject
matters and causes of action, there exists no forum shopping.
As to the second, Alcaraz further imputes that the petitioners violated the certification requirement
under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court by not disclosing the fact that it filed the Memorandum
of Appeal before the NLRC in the instant petition.
Records show that the issues raised in the instant petition and those in the Memorandum of Appeal
filed with the NLRC likewise cover different subject matters and causes of action. In this case, the
validity of Alcarazs dismissal is at issue whereas in the said Memorandum of Appeal, the propriety
of the issuance of a writ of execution was in question.
Thus, given the dissimilar issues, petitioners did not have to disclose in the present petition the filing
of their Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC. In any event, considering that the issue on the
propriety of the issuance of a writ of execution had been resolved in the Second CA Petition which
in fact had already attained finality the matter of disclosing the Memorandum of Appeal is now
moot and academic.
Permanent Savings Bank v. Velarde, G.R. No. 140608, September 23, 2004
Facts
In a complaint for sum of money filed before the Regional Trial Court, petitioner Permanent Savings
and Loan Bank sought to recover from respondent Mariano Velarde, the sum of P1,000,000 based on
a loan obtained by respondent from petitioner bank, evidenced by the following: (1) promissory note;
(2) loan release sheet; and (3) loan disclosure statement. Petitioner bank sent a letter of demand to
respondent. Despite receipt of said demand letter, respondent failed to settle his account.
In his Answer, respondent disclaims any liability on the instrument, thus:

2. The allegations in par. 2, Complaint, on the existence of the alleged loan of P1-Million, and the purported
documents evidencing the same, only the signature appearing at the back of the promissory note, Annex "A"
seems to be that of herein defendant. However, as to any liability arising therefrom, the receipt of the said
amount of P1-Million shows that the amount was received by another person, not the herein defendant. Hence,
no liability attaches and as further stated in the special and affirmative defenses that, assuming the promissory
note exists, it does not bind much less is there the intention by the parties to bind the herein defendant. In other
words, the documents relative to the loan do not express the true intention of the parties.
Respondents Answer also contained a denial under oath, which reads:

I, MARIANO Z. VELARDE, of age, am the defendant in this case, that I caused the preparation of the
complaint and that all the allegations thereat are true and correct; that the promissory note sued upon, assuming
that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not
truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses;
After petitioner bank rested its case, respondent, instead of presenting evidence, filed with leave of
court his demurrer to evidence, alleging the grounds that:
(a) PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE ITS CASE BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
(b) THE CAUSE OF ACTION, CONCLUDING ARGUENTI THAT IT EXISTS, IS BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION AND/OR LACHES.
The trial court found merit in respondents demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint
including respondents counterclaims.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint in its Decision. The appellate court found that petitioner failed to present any evidence to
prove the existence of respondents alleged loan obligations, considering that respondent denied
petitioners allegations in its complaint. It also found that petitioner banks cause of action is already
barred by prescription.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules Court.
Issue
Whether or not the document was specifically denied under oath.
Held
Not specifically denied.
It was the trial courts opinion that:

The mere presentation of supposed documents regarding the loan, but absent the testimony of a competent
witness to the transaction and the documentary evidence, coupled with the denial of liability by the defendant
does not suffice to meet the requisite preponderance of evidence in civil cases. The documents, standing alone,
unsupported by independent evidence of their existence, have no legal basis to stand on. They are not competent
evidence. Such failure leaves this Court without ample basis to sustain the plaintiffs cause of action and other
reliefs prayed for. The loan document being challenged. (sic) Plaintiff did not exert additional effort to
strengthen its case by the required preponderance of evidence. On this score, the suit must be dismissed.
The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial courts finding and affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint, viz.:
The bank should have presented at least a single witness qualified to testify on the existence and execution
of the documents it relied upon to prove the disputed loan obligations of Velarde. This falls short of the
requirement that (B)efore any private writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity
must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the writing executed; (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the
handwriting of the maker; or (c) By a subscribing witness.
It is not true, as the Bank claims, that there is no need to prove the loan and its supporting papers as Velarde has
already admitted these. Velarde had in fact denied these in his responsive pleading. And consistent with his
denial, he objected to the presentation of Marquez as a witness to identify the Exhibits of the Bank, and objected
to their admission when these were offered as evidence. Though these were grudgingly admitted anyway, still
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.
A reading of respondents Answer, however, shows that respondent did not specifically deny that he
signed the loan documents. What he merely stated in his Answer was that the signature appearing at
the back of the promissory note seems to be his. Respondent also denied any liability on the
promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein, and the loan documents do
not express the true intention of the parties. Respondent reiterated these allegations in his "denial
under oath," stating that "the promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine
signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real
intention of the parties as stated in the defenses "
Respondents denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. The
defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or
fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by
fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such
a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the
instrument upon a ground not affecting either.
In fact, respondents allegations amount to an implied admission of the due execution and
genuineness of the promissory note. The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a
document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the
document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it
was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the
document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment,
or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Also, it effectively eliminated any defense
relating to the authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that the document was spurious,
counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the signatures
appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized.
Clearly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that respondent specifically
denied petitioners allegations regarding the loan documents, as respondents Answer shows that he
failed to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note and
its concomitant documents. Therefore, respondent is deemed to have admitted the loan documents and
acknowledged his obligation with petitioner; and with respondents implied admission, it was not
necessary for petitioner to present further evidence to establish the due execution and authenticity of
the loan documents sued upon.
Respondent claims that he did not receive the net proceeds in the amount of P988,333.00 as stated in
the Loan Release Sheet dated September 23, 1983. The document, however, bears respondents
signature as borrower. Res ipsa loquitur. The document speaks for itself. Respondent has already
impliedly admitted the genuineness and due execution of the loan documents. No further proof is
necessary to show that he undertook the obligation with petitioner. "A person cannot accept and reject
the same instrument."
S.C. Megaworld Construction v. Parada, 2013

Facts
S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation (petitioner) bought electrical lighting
materials from Genlite Industries, a sole proprietorship owned by Engineer Luis U. Parada
(respondent), for its Read-Rite project in Canlubang, Laguna. The petitioner was unable to pay for the
above purchase on due date, but blamed it on its failure to collect under its sub-contract with the
Enviro Kleen Technologies, Inc. (Enviro Kleen). It was however able to persuade Enviro Kleen to
agree to settle its above purchase, but after paying the respondent P250,000.00. Enviro Kleen stopped
making further payments, leaving an outstanding balance of P816,627.00. It also ignored the various
demands of the respondent, who then filed a suit in the RTC to collect from the petitioner the said
balance. The petitioner in its answer denied liability, claiming that it was released from its
indebtedness to the respondent by reason of the novation of their contract, which, it reasoned, took
place when the latter accepted the partial payment of Enviro Kleen in its behalf, and thereby
acquiesced to the substitution of Enviro Kleen as the new debtor in the petitioners place.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent.
On appeal to the CA, the petitioner maintained that the trial court erred in ruling that no novation of
the contract took place through the substitution of Enviro Kleen as the new debtor. But for the first
time, it further argued that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint for failure of the
respondent to implead Genlite Industries as a proper party in interest.
In dismissing the appeal, the CA noted that the petitioner in its answer below raised only the defense
of novation, and that at no stage in the proceedings did it raise the question of whether the suit was
brought in the name of the real party in interest. Moreover, the appellate court found from the sales
invoices and receipts that the respondent is the sole proprietor of Genlite Industries, and therefore the
real party-plaintiff.
On motion for reconsideration, the petitioner raised for the first time the issue of the validity of the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the complaint. The CA denied the
said motion for lack of merit.
Issue
Whether or not the issue on the validity of the verification and CNFS can be brought for the first time
on appeal.
Held
The verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the complaint is not a jurisdictional but a
formal requirement, and any objection as to non-compliance therewith should be raised in the
proceedings below and not for the first time on appeal.
It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the
proceedings below.
Through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), the respondent authorized Engr. Leonardo A. Parada
(Leonardo), the eldest of his three children, to perform the following acts in his behalf: a) to file a
complaint against the petitioner for sum of money with damages; and b) to testify in the trial thereof
and sign all papers and documents related thereto, with full powers to enter into stipulation and
compromise. Incidentally, the respondent, a widower, died of cardio-pulmonary arrest, survived by
his legitimate children. They have since substituted him in this petition, per the Resolution of the
Supreme Court. Also, Luis, Jr. and Lalaine Parada executed an SPA authorizing their brother
Leonardo to represent them in the instant petition.
In the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the complaint in Civil Case,
Leonardo was attorney-in-fact of his father.
In this petition, the petitioner reiterates its argument before the CA that the above verification is
invalid, since the SPA executed by the respondent did not specifically include an authority for
Leonardo to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, thus rendering the
complaint defective.
The petitioners argument is untenable. The petitioner failed to reckon that any objection as to
compliance with the requirement of verification in the complaint should have been raised in the
proceedings below, and not in the appellate court for the first time. Verification is a formal, not a
jurisdictional requisite.
The question of forum shopping cannot be raised in the CA and in the Supreme Court, since such an
issue must be raised at the earliest opportunity in a motion to dismiss or a similar pleading. The high
court even warned that [i]nvoking it in the later stages of the proceedings or on appeal may result in
the dismissal of the action x x x.
Moreover, granting that Leonardo has no personal knowledge of the transaction subject of the
complaint below, Section 4 of Rule 7 provides that the verification need not be based on the verifiers
personal knowledge but even only on authentic records. Sales invoices, statements of accounts,
receipts and collection letters for the balance of the amount still due to the respondent from the
petitioner are such records. There is clearly substantial compliance by the respondents attorney-in-
fact with the requirement of verification.
Lastly, it is well-settled that a strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of substantial justice may be served. It is clear that the present controversy must be resolved on
its merits, lest for a technical oversight the respondent should be deprived of what is justly due him.
Default (Rule 9)
Anuncacion v. Bocanegra, G.R. No. 152496, July 30, 2009
Facts
Petitioners filed before the RTC a complaint for Quieting of Title and Cancellation of TCT. The
complaint averred that defendants (respondents) may be served with summons and legal processes
through Atty. Rogelio G. Pizarro, Jr. The summons, together with the copies of the complaint, were
then served on Atty. Pizarro. The record shows that before the filing of the said complaint, Atty.
Pizarro wrote a demand letter on behalf of respondents and addressed to petitioner German
Anunciacion, among others, demanding that they vacate the land owned by his clients (respondents),
who needed the same for their own use.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action. A
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Reply to the Comment on the Motion to Dismiss was filed by
respondents, alleging an additional ground that petitioners failed to pay the required filing fee.
Thereafter, respondents filed a Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Manifestation citing the
following grounds:
1. That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party.
2. That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.
3. That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
The trial court sustained the respondents and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the
persons of respondents as defendants. The trial court ruled as follows:
In the case at bar Atty. Pizarro, Jr., has not been shown to be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, or any of
the above for the action to be allowed to be defended by a representative.
The fact that Atty. Pizarro, Jr., was the lawyer of the defendants in the demand letters do not per se make him
their representative for purposes of the present action. To this effect, service on lawyer of defendant is an invalid
service of summons.
The presentation of all objections then available as was done by the movants subserves the omnibus motion rule
and the concomitant policy against multiplicity of suits.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, seeking the nullification of the
RTC Orders on the ground that the said orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion. The CA
dismissed the petition upon finding that there was no waiver of the ground of lack of jurisdiction on
the part of respondents in the form of voluntary appearance. Although the grounds alleged in the two
(2) earlier Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss were lack of cause of action and
failure to pay the required filing fee, the filing of the said motions did not constitute a waiver of the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on their persons as defendants. The CA then concluded that there was
no voluntary appearance on the part of respondents/defendants despite the filing of the aforesaid
motions. The CA also rejected petitioners contention that the service made to Atty. Rogelio Pizarro,
Jr. was deemed service upon respondents/defendants,
Issue
Whether or not the motion to dismiss should be granted.
Held
Accordingly, the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing the petition and affirming the challenged
orders of the RTC which dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the respondents who were the defendants.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss with only one ground, i.e., that the pleading asserting the claim
states no cause of action.
The filing of the above-mentioned Motion to Dismiss, without invoking the lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the respondents, is deemed a voluntary appearance on the part of the respondents under
the aforequoted provision of the Rules. The same conclusion can be drawn from the filing of the
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Reply to the Comment on the Motion to Dismiss which alleged
as an additional ground for the dismissal of petitioners complaint, the failure of plaintiffs to pay the
required filing fee again but failed to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court over the person
of the respondents.
It was only in respondents Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss that respondents for the first time
raised the courts lack of jurisdiction over their person as defendants on the ground that summons were
allegedly not properly served upon them. The filing of the said Second Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss did not divest the court of its jurisdiction over the person of the respondents who had earlier
voluntarily appeared before the trial court by filing their motion to dismiss and the supplemental
motion to dismiss. The dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the respondents after they had voluntarily appeared before the trial court clearly constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the RTC.
Quite apart from their voluntary appearance, respondents Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and
Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss were clearly in violation of Rule 15, Section 8 in relation to
Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules.
Applying the foregoing rules, respondents failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over their
persons in their very first motion to dismiss was fatal to their cause. They are already deemed to have
waived that particular ground for dismissal of the complaint. The trial court plainly abused its
discretion when it dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendants. Under the Rules, the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded
in the motion to dismiss or answer, are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence
of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment
or by statute of limitations.
We likewise cannot approve the trial courts act of entertaining supplemental motions to dismiss which
raise grounds that are already deemed waived.
Although the CA correctly observed that Atty. Pizarro, as the lawyer of the respondents in the demand
letters, does not per se make him their representative for purposes of the present action, a scrutiny of
the record shows that the address of Atty. Pizarro and Atty. Norby Caparas, Jr., (the counsel who
eventually entered his appearance for respondents) is the same. This circumstance leads us to believe
that respondents belated reliance on the purported improper service of summons is a mere
afterthought, if not a bad faith ploy to avoid answering the complaint.
Martinez v. Republic, G.R. No. 160895, October 30, 2006

Facts
Petitioner Jose R. Martinez (Martinez) filed a petition for the registration in his name of three (3)
parcels of land. Martinez alleged that he had purchased lots from his uncle, whose predecessors-in-
interest were traceable up to the 1870s. It was claimed that Martinez had remained in continuous
possession of the lots; that the lots had remained unencumbered; and that they became private
property through prescription pursuant to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Martinez
further claimed that he had been constrained to initiate the proceedings because the Director of the
Land Management Services had failed to do so despite the completion of the cadastral survey of
Cortes, Surigao del Sur.
The case was docketed as Land Registration Case and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was furnished a copy of the petition. The trial court set the case
for hearing and directed the publication of the corresponding Notice of Hearing in the Official
Gazette. The OSG, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, opposed the petition.
Despite the opposition filed by the OSG, the RTC issued an order of general default, even against the
Republic of the Philippines. This ensued when during the hearing of even date, no party appeared
before the Court to oppose Martinezs petition.
The RTC rendered a Decision concluding that Martinez and his predecessors-in-interest had been for
over 100 years in possession characterized as continuous, open, public, and in the concept of an
owner. The RTC thus decreed the registration of the three (3) lots in the name of Martinez.
From this Decision, the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal which was approved by the RTC.
The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision, reversing the RTC and instead ordering the
dismissal of the petition for registration. In light of the opposition filed by the OSG, the appellate
court found the evidence presented by Martinez as insufficient to support the registration of the
subject lots. The Court of Appeals concluded that the oral evidence presented by Martinez merely
consisted of general declarations of ownership, without alluding to specific acts of ownership
performed by him or his predecessors-in-interest. It likewise debunked the documentary evidence
presented by Martinez, adjudging the same as either inadmissible or ineffective to establish proof of
ownership.
No motion for reconsideration appears to have been filed with the Court of Appeals by Martinez, who
instead directly assailed its Decision before this Court through the present petition.
Issue
Whether the OSG could have still appealed the RTC decision after it had been declared in default.
Held
Can still appeal.
We note at the onset that the OSG does not impute before this Court that the RTC acted improperly in
declaring public respondent in default, even though an opposition had been filed to Martinezs petition.
Strangely, the OSG did not challenge the propriety of the default order, whether in its appeal before
the Court of Appeals or in its petition before this Court. It would thus be improper for the Court to
make a pronouncement on the validity of the default order since the same has not been put into issue.
Nonetheless, we can, with comfort, proceed from same apparent premise of the OSG that the default
order was proper or regular.
The juridical utility of a declaration of default cannot be disputed. By forgoing the need for
adversarial proceedings, it affords the opportunity for the speedy resolution of cases even as it
penalizes parties who fail to give regard or obedience to the judicial processes. The extent to which a
party in default loses standing in court has been the subject of considerable jurisprudential debate.
It cannot be escaped that the old provisions expressly guaranteeing the right of a defendant declared in
default to appeal the adverse decision was not replicated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Should
this be taken as a sign that under the 1997 Rules a defaulted defendant no longer has the right to
appeal the trial court decision, or that the Lim Toco doctrine has been reinstated? If post-1997
jurisprudence and the published commentaries to the 1997 Rules were taken as an indication, the
answer should be in the negative. The right of a defaulted defendant to appeal remains extant.
By 1997, the doctrinal rule concerning the remedies of a party declared in default had evolved into a
fairly comprehensive restatement as offered in Lina v. Court of Appeals:
1. The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a
motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious
defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18)
2. If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but
before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under
Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
3. If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he
may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
4. He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to
the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec.
2, Rule 41)
The fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Yet even after
that provisions deletion under the 1997 Rules, the Court did not hesitate to expressly rely again on the
Lina doctrine, including the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal from the judgment
rendered against him.
We are hard-pressed to find a published view that the enactment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
accordingly withdrew the right, previously granted under the 1964 Rules, of a defaulted defendant to
appeal the judgment by default against him. Neither is there any provision under the 1997 Rules
which expressly denies the defaulted defendant such a right. If it is perplexing why the 1997 Rules
deleted the previous authorization under the old Section 2, Rule 41 (on subject of appeal), it is
perhaps worth noting that its counterpart provision in the 1997 Rules, now Section 1, Rule 41, is
different in orientation even as it also covers subject of appeal. Unlike in the old provision, the bulk of
the new provision is devoted to enumerating the various rulings from which no appeal may be
taken, and nowhere therein is a judgment by default included. A declaration therein that a defaulted
defendant may still appeal the judgment by default would have seemed out of place.
If it cannot be made any clearer, we hold that a defendant party declared in default retains the right to
appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material
allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior
filing of a motion to set aside the order of default. We reaffirm that the Lim Toco doctrine, denying
such right to appeal unless the order of default has been set aside, was no longer controlling in this
jurisdiction upon the effectivity of the 1964 Rules of Court, and up to this day.
Dico v. Vizcaya Management Corporation, 201324

Facts
Celso Dico was the registered owner of Lot No. 486 of the Cadiz Cadastre. Lot No. 486 was adjacent
to Lot No. 29-B and Lot No. 1412, both also of the Cadiz Cadastre. Respondent Vizcaya Management
Corporation (VMC) was the registered owner of Lot No. 29-B, also of the Cadiz Cadastre. VMC
likewise claimed to be the owner of Lot No. 1412 also of the Cadiz Cadastre. Lot Nos. 1426-B, and
1426-C, appear to be registered in the names of Eduardo Lopez and Cesar Lopez, who had earlier
formed VMC. VMC, then newly formed, caused the consolidation and subdivision of Lot No. 29-B,
Lot No. 1412, Lot No. 1426-B, and Lot No. 1426-C. VMC proceeded to develop the Don Eusebio
Subdivision project under a consolidation-subdivision plan.
VMC filed against the Dicos a complaint for unlawful detainer in the City Court of Cadiz (Civil Case
No. 649). The City Court of Cadiz rendered its decision in favor of VMC, ordering the Dicos to
demolish the concrete water gate or sluice gate (locally known as trampahan). Inasmuch as the Dicos
did not appeal, the decision attained finality.
The Dicos commenced an action for the annulment and cancellation of the titles of VMC (Civil Case
No. 180-C), impleading VMC, the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, and
the Director of the Bureau of Lands. The Dicos amended the complaint. They averred, among others,
that they were the registered owners of Lot No. 486 and the possessors-by-succession of Lot No. 1412
and Lot No. 489; that VMC had land-grabbed a portion of their Lot No. 486 allegedly brought about
by the expansion of Cristina Village Subdivision; and that they had filed free patent applications in
the Bureau of Lands for Lot No. 1412 and Lot No. 489. They prayed that the possession of Lot No.
486, Lot No. 1412, and Lot No. 489 be restored to them; and that the judgment in Civil Case No. 649
be annulled.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Dicos.
The CA reversed the RTC.
Issue
Whether or not prescription can be raised as a defense even if not pleaded in the motion to dismiss.
Held
Can be raised.
The Dicos contend that the CA erred in holding that prescription and/or laches already barred them
from asserting their right; in accepting the theory of VMC that the consolidation of Lot No. 1246-B
and Lot No. 1246-C had resulted from a merely typographical error; in reversing the decision of the
RTC despite its finding that VMC had committed land grabbing; and in reversing the RTC based on
non-existing evidence that was contradicted by the evidence on records.
The CA observed that even granting that fraud intervened in the issuance of the transfer certificates of
title, and even assuming that the Dicos had the personality to demand the reconveyance of the
affected property on the basis of implied or constructive trust, the filing of their complaint for that
purpose only on May 12, 1986 proved too late for them.
That observation was correct and in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Verily, the reckoning point for purposes of the Dicos demand of reconveyance based on fraud was
their discovery of the fraud. Such discovery was properly pegged on the date of the registration of the
24
CA raised the issue on prescription motu proprio. Under Rule 9 Sec. 1 a court can dismiss motu proprio
based on prescription, res judicata, prescription, lack of JD over SM.
transfer certificates of title in the adverse parties names, because registration was a constructive
notice to the whole world. The long period of 29 years that had meanwhile lapsed from the issuance
of the pertinent transfer certificate of title on September 30, 1934 (the date of recording of TCT No.
RT-9933 [16739] in the name of the Lopezes) or on November 10, 1956 (the date of recording of
TCT No. T- 41835 in VMCs name) was way beyond the prescriptive period of 10 years.
And, lastly, the insistence of the Dicos that prescription could not be used by the CA to bar their
claim for reconveyance by virtue of VMCs failure to aver them in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer was unwarranted.
We agree with VMC's contention to the contrary. Although defenses and objections not pleaded in a
motion to dismiss or in an answer are deemed waived, it was really incorrect for the Dicos to insist
that prescription could not be appreciated against them for that reason. Their insistence was contrary
to Section l, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
Under the rule, the defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata,
and prescription of action may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on
appeal, except that the objection to the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be barred by
laches.
Heirs of Medrano v. Estanislao De Vera, G.R. No. 165770, August 09, 2010
Facts
This case concerns a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of
Flaviana De Gracia (Flaviana). Flaviana died intestate, leaving her half-sisters Hilaria Martin-Paguyo
(Hilaria) and Elena Martin-Alvarado (Elena) as her compulsory heirs. Hilaria and Elena, by virtue of
a private document denominated Tapno Maamoan ti Sangalobongan, waived all their hereditary
rights to Flavianas land in favor of Francisca Medrano (Medrano). When Hilaria and Elena died,
some of their children affirmed the contents of the private document executed by their deceased
mothers. To that end, they executed separate Deeds of Confirmation of Private Document and
Renunciation of Rights in favor of Medrano. Due to the refusal of the other children to sign a similar
renunciation, Medrano filed a Complaint for quieting of title, reconveyance, reformation of
instrument, and/or partition with damages. The case was filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Respondent Estanislao D. De Vera (De Vera) filed an Answer with Counterclaim. De Vera presented
himself as the real party-in-interest on the ground that some of the named defendants had executed a
Deed of Renunciation of Rights in his favor. Medrano filed a Motion to Expunge Answer with
Counterclaim of Estanislao D. De Vera and to Declare Defendants in Default. The trial court
disagreed with Medranos argument and admitted De Veras Answer with Counterclaim. In the same
Order, the court declared the named defendants in default for not answering the complaint despite
valid service of summons. Medranos response to the aforesaid order was two-fold. With regard to the
order declaring the named defendants in default, Medrano filed a Motion to Set Reception of
Evidence. She argued that she could present evidence ex parte against the defaulting defendants on
the ground that she presented alternative causes of action against them in her complaint. Her cause of
action on the basis of acquisitive prescription can be raised solely against the defaulting original
defendants. As for the order admitting De Veras Answer with Counterclaim, Medrano filed a Motion
for Reconsideration. She asked the court to order De Vera to file a pleading-in-intervention so that he
could be properly named as a defendant in the case. The trial court resolved to grant Medranos
Motion to Set Reception of Evidence. The trial court granted Medranos motion and set aside its Order
which admitted De Veras Answer with Counterclaim. Citing Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the court
ordered De Vera to file a pleading-in-intervention so that he could be recognized as a party-defendant.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC ruled in favor of Medrano. De Vera filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that he was
an indispensable party who was not given an opportunity to present his evidence in the case. De Veras
motion was denied for lack of merit. The court noted that De Vera had no legal personality to file a
motion for reconsideration because he did not file a pleading-in-intervention. The trial court explained
it would have allowed De Vera to present his evidence in the case had he complied with the courts
order to file a pleading-in-intervention.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
De Vera argued in his Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the CA that the trial court erred in
declaring the defendants in default and sought a writ compelling the trial court to try the case anew.
He insisted that he stepped into the shoes of the defendants with regard to the subject property by
virtue of the quitclaim that the defendants executed in his favor. Thus, the trial court should have
considered the defendants as properly substituted by De Vera when he filed his Answer.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court agreed with De Vera. The CA held that the trial court gravely abused its discretion
by allowing Medrano to present her evidence ex parte while De Veras personality to participate in the
case still remained unresolved. The premature ex parte presentation of evidence rendered a pleading-
in-intervention moot and academic. The CA pointed out that the trial court should have exercised its
authority to order the substitution of the original defendants instead of requiring De Vera to file a
pleading-in-intervention. This is allowed under Rule 3, Section 19 of the Rules of Court. Since a
transferee pendente lite is a proper party to the case, the court can order his outright substitution for
the original defendants. The appellate court then ordered the case remanded to the trial court to afford
De Vera an opportunity to present his evidence.
Issue
Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in refusing to allow De Vera to participate
in the case and requiring him to file a motion to intervene.
Held
We sustain the CAs ruling that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in refusing to allow De
Vera to participate in the case and requiring him to file a motion to intervene.
The trial courts approach is seriously flawed because De Veras interest is not independent of or
severable from the interest of the named defendants. De Vera is a transferee pendente lite of the
named defendants (by virtue of the Deed of Renunciation of Rights that was executed in his favor
during the pendency of Civil Case). His rights were derived from the named defendants and, as
transferee pendente lite, he would be bound by any judgment against his transferors under the rules of
res judicata. Thus, De Veras interest cannot be considered and tried separately from the interest of the
named defendants.
It was therefore wrong for the trial court to have tried Medranos case against the named defendants
(by allowing Medrano to present evidence ex parte against them) after it had already admitted De
Veras answer. What the trial court should have done is to treat De Vera (as transferee pendente lite) as
having been joined as a party-defendant, and to try the case on the basis of the answer De Vera had
filed and with De Veras participation. As transferee pendente lite, De Vera may be allowed to join the
original defendants under Rule 3, Section 19.
The provision gives the trial court discretion to allow or disallow the substitution or joinder by the
transferee. Discretion is permitted because, in general, the transferees interest is deemed by law as
adequately represented and protected by the participation of his transferors in the case. There may be
no need for the transferee pendente lite to be substituted or joined in the case because, in legal
contemplation, he is not really denied protection as his interest is one and the same as his transferors,
who are already parties to the case.
While the rule allows for discretion, the paramount consideration for the exercise thereof should be
the protection of the parties interests and their rights to due process. In the instant case, the
circumstances demanded that the trial court exercise its discretion in favor of allowing De Vera to join
in the action and participate in the trial.
Thus, the default of the original defendants should not result in the ex parte presentation of evidence
because De Vera (a transferee pendente lite who may thus be joined as defendant under Rule 3,
Section 19) filed an answer. The trial court should have tried the case based on De Veras answer,
which answer is deemed to have been adopted by the non-answering defendants.
To proceed with the ex parte presentation of evidence against the named defendants after De Veras
answer had been admitted would not only be a violation of Rule 9, Section 3(c), but would also be a
gross disregard of De Veras right to due process. This is because the ex parte presentation of evidence
would result in a default judgment which would bind not just the defaulting defendants, but also De
Vera, precisely because he is a transferee pendente lite. This would result in an anomaly wherein De
Vera would be bound by a default judgment even if he had filed an answer and expressed a desire to
participate in the case.
We note that under Rule 3, Section 19, the substitution or joinder of the transferee is upon motion,
and De Vera did not file any motion for substitution or joinder. However, this technical flaw may be
disregarded for the fact remains that the court had already admitted his answer and such answer was
on record when the ex parte presentation of evidence was allowed by the court. Because De Veras
answer had already been admitted, the court should not have allowed the ex parte presentation of
evidence.
Given the Courts finding that the ex parte presentation of evidence constituted a violation of due
process rights, the trial courts judgment by default cannot bind De Vera. A void judgment cannot
attain finality and its execution has no basis in law. The case should be remanded to the trial court for
trial based on De Veras answer and with his participation.
Aquino v. Aure, G.R. No. 153567, February 18, 2008

Facts
The subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land. Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc.
(Aure Lending) filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino before the MeTC. In their Complaint,
Aure and Aure Lending alleged that they acquired the subject property from Aquino and her husband
Manuel (spouses Aquino) by virtue of a Deed of Sale. Aure claimed that after the spouses Aquino
received substantial consideration for the sale of the subject property, they refused to vacate the same.
The MeTC rendered a Decision in the Civil Case in favor of Aquino and dismissed the Complaint for
ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process,
among other grounds. The MeTC observed that Aure and Aquino are residents of the same barangay
but there is no showing that any attempt has been made to settle the case amicably at the barangay
level. The MeTC further observed that Aure Lending was improperly included as plaintiff in Civil
Case for it did not stand to be injured or benefited by the suit. Finally, the MeTC ruled that since the
question of ownership was put in issue, the action was converted from a mere detainer suit to one
incapable of pecuniary estimation which properly rests within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the dismissal of the Complaint on the same ground that the dispute was
not brought before the Barangay Council for conciliation before it was filed in court. The RTC
stressed that the barangay conciliation process is a conditio sine qua non for the filing of an ejectment
complaint involving residents of the same barangay, and failure to comply therewith constitutes
sufficient cause for the dismissal of the action. The RTC likewise validated the ruling of the MeTC
that the main issue involved in Civil Case is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the
RTC.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, reversing the MeTC and RTC Decisions and remanding
the case to the MeTC for further proceedings and final determination of the substantive rights of the
parties. The appellate court declared that the failure of Aure to subject the matter to barangay
conciliation is not a jurisdictional flaw and it will not affect the sufficiency of Aures Complaint since
Aquino failed to seasonably raise such issue in her Answer. The Court of Appeals further ruled that
mere allegation of ownership does not deprive the MeTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment case for
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations advanced
by the plaintiff in his complaint. Hence, mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment
case will not oust the MeTC of its summary jurisdiction over the same.
Issue
whether or not the non-recourse to the barangay conciliation process is a jurisdictional flaw that
warrants the dismissal of the ejectment suit filed with the MeTC.
Held
No.
There is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation before Aure and Aure Lending instituted Civil Case.
Aquino posits that failure to resort to barangay conciliation makes the action for ejectment premature
and, hence, dismissible. She likewise avers that this objection was timely raised during the pre-trial
and even subsequently in her Position Paper submitted to the MeTC.
We do not agree.
It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section 412 of
the Local Government Code on barangay is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies -- the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the
controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to
a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that
non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction that the court has otherwise acquired over the
subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the
MeTC over Civil Case after having submitted herself voluntarily thereto. We have scrupulously
examined Aquinos Answer before the MeTC in Civil Case and there is utter lack of any objection on
her part to any deficiency in the complaint which could oust the MeTC of its jurisdcition.
By Aquinos failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the Complaint, she is deemed to have
already acquiesced or waived any defect attendant thereto. Consequently, Aquino cannot thereafter
move for the dismissal of the ejectment suit for Aure and Aure Lendings failure to resort to the
barangay conciliation process, since she is already precluded from doing so. The fact that Aquino
raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue of
non-recourse to barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer.
It is clear and categorical in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court that failure to raise
defenses and objections in a motion to dismiss or in an answer is deemed a waiver thereof. Thus,
although Aquinos defense of non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 is meritorious,
procedurally, such defense is no longer available for failure to plead the same in the Answer as
required by the omnibus motion rule.
Neither could the MeTC dismiss Civil Case motu proprio. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide
only three instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, and that is when the
pleadings or evidence on the record show that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause; or (3) where
the action is barred by a prior judgment or by a statute of limitations. Thus, it is clear that a court may
not motu proprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with the requirement for barangay
conciliation, this ground not being among those mentioned for the dismissal by the trial court of a
case on its own initiative.
Republic v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. 161657, October 04, 2007

Facts
In directly invoking the Courts original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari and
prohibition, without challenge from any of the respondents, the Republic gave as justification therefor
the fact that the case involves an over TWO BILLION PESO judgment against the State, allegedly
rendered in blatant violation of the Constitution, law and jurisprudence.
By any standard, the case indeed involves a colossal sum of money which, on the face of the assailed
decision, shall be the liability of the national government or, in fine, the taxpayers. This consideration,
juxtaposed with the constitutional and legal questions surrounding the controversy, presents special
and compelling reasons of public interests why direct recourse to the Court should be allowed, as an
exception to the policy on hierarchy of courts.
At the core of the litigation is a lot once covered in the name of the herein private respondent Tarcila
Laperal Mendoza (Mendoza), married to Perfecto Mendoza. The lot is situated near the Malacaang
Palace complex. On this lot, hereinafter referred to as the Arlegui property, now stands the
Presidential Guest House which was home to two (2) former Presidents of the Republic and now
appears to be used as office building of the Office of the President.
Mendoza filed a suit with the RTC of Manila for reconveyance and the corresponding declaration of
nullity of a deed of sale and title against the Republic, the Register of Deeds of Manila and one Atty.
Fidel Vivar. In her complaint, Mendoza essentially alleged being the owner of the disputed Arlegui
property which the Republic forcibly dispossessed her.
Answering, the Republic set up, among other affirmative defenses, the States immunity from suit.
The intervening legal tussles are not essential to this narration. What is material is that in an Order the
RTC dismissed Mendozas complaint. On a petition for certiorari, however, the Court of Appeals
(CA) reversed the trial courts assailed orders and remanded the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings. On appeal, this Court, sustained the CAs reversal action.
Mendoza filed a Motion for Leave of Court to file a Third Amended Complaint with a copy of the
intended third amended complaint thereto attached. The RTC, in open court and in the presence of the
Republics counsel, admitted the third amended complaint, ordered the Republic to file its answer and
set a date for pre-trial.
In her adverted third amended complaint for recovery and reconveyance of the Arlegui property,
Mendoza sought the declaration of nullity of a supposed deed of sale in the name of the Republic.
The Republic, represented by the OSG, filed a Motion for Extension (With Motion for Cancellation of
scheduled pre-trial). In it, the Republic manifested its inability to simply adopt its previous answer
and, accordingly, asked that it be given a period of thirty (30) days within which to submit an Answer.
The deadline came and went, but no answer was filed. Twice, the OSG moved again for a 30-day
extension. The filing of the last two motions for extension proved to be an idle gesture, however,
since the trial court had meanwhile issued an order declaring the petitioner Republic as in default and
allowing the private respondent to present her evidence ex-parte.
Eventually, the trial court rendered a judgment by default for Mendoza and against the Republic.
Subsequently, the Republic moved for, but was denied, a new trial per order of the trial court. Denied
also was its subsequent plea for reconsideration.
Issue
Whether or not the order of default was proper.
Held
Proper.
Deprivation of procedural due process is obviously the petitioners threshold theme. Due process, in its
procedural aspect, guarantees in the minimum the opportunity to be heard. Grave abuse of discretion,
however, cannot plausibly be laid at the doorstep of the respondent judge on account of his having
issued the default order against the petitioner, then proceeding with the hearing and eventually
rendering a default judgment. For, what the respondent judge did hew with what Section 3, Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court prescribes and allows in the event the defending party fails to seasonably file a
responsive pleading.
While the ideal lies in avoiding orders of default, the policy of the law being to have every litigated
case tried on its full merits, the act of the respondent judge in rendering the default judgment after an
order of default was properly issued cannot be struck down as a case of grave abuse of discretion.
Under the premises, the mere issuance by the trial court of the order of default followed by a
judgment by default can easily be sustained as correct and doubtless within its jurisdiction. Surely, a
disposition directing the Republic to pay an enormous sum without the trial court hearing its side does
not, without more, vitiate, on due procedural ground, the validity of the default judgment. The
petitioner may have indeed been deprived of such hearing, but this does not mean that its right to due
process had been violated. For, consequent to being declared in default, the defaulting defendant is
deemed to have waived his right to be heard or to take part in the trial. The handling solicitors simply
squandered the Republics opportunity to be heard. But more importantly, the law itself imposes such
deprivation of the right to participate as a form of penalty against one unwilling without justification
to join issue upon the allegations tendered by the plaintiff.
Amendment and Supplement (Rule 10)

PAGCOR vs. Lopez25
Facts
PAGCOR filed the instant administrative complaint against Judge Romulo A. Lopez of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila seeking his dismissal from the service for alleged gross ignorance of the
law and for his disbarment for such ignorance, violation of the lawyers oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
PAGCOR entered into an Agreement with FILGAME and BELLE Jai-Alai Corporation (BELLE) for
the resumption of the Jai-Alai operations in the country. The Office of the President of the Philippines
issued a Memorandum directing immediate steps to close down all PAGCOR facilities and outlets in
Jai-Alai, on-line bingo and internet casino gaming. The DILG caused the closure of the Jai-Alai main
fronton. Thus, FILGAME and BELLE filed the case for Specific Performance and Injunction with
prayer for Damages and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against PAGCOR, DILG and Secretary Alfredo Lim. This Court rendered a decision in the cases,
entitled, Raoul B. Del Mar vs. PAGCOR, BELLE and FILGAME and Federico S. Sandoval II and
Michael T. Defensor vs. PAGCOR, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Respondents PAGCOR, Belle Jai-Alai Corporation and Filipinas
Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation are enjoined from managing, maintaining and operating jai-alai
games, and from enforcing the agreement entered into by them for that purpose.
Consequently, FILGAME and BELLE filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint with the trial
court where the cause of action was changed, i.e., from Specific Performance to Recovery of Sum of
Money, inasmuch as plaintiffs could no longer ask for specific performance of their agreement with
complainant since the Court had declared the agreement without force and effect. Thus, FILGAME
and BELLE sought to recover their pre-operating expenses and/or investments. Respondent issued an
Order admitting the amended complaint and directing complainant and DILG to file their answer.
Complainant filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that the trial court had
not acquired jurisdiction over the case for failure of the plaintiffs to pay the prescribed docket fees
considering that the docket fee originally paid was only P1,212.00. It claimed that the amended
complaint, which sought recovery of the P1,562,145,661.87 should have docket fees of
P15,775,903.68. Respondent issued an Order denying complainants motion to dismiss and directed it
to file its answer. Complainant then filed its Answer with compulsory counterclaim. FILGAME and
BELLE manifested their intention to file a Motion for Summary Judgment which they subsequently
filed. Respondent rendered his decision by way of Summary Judgment in favor of FILGAME and
BELLE where complainant was ordered to return and pay.
Complainant filed its notice of appeal which was subsequently withdrawn. Complainant filed with the
Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the respondents decision by
way of summary judgment for having been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion.
Complainant filed the present administrative case charging respondent with gross ignorance of the
law and for violations of the Lawyers Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility. In a Resolution
we deferred action on this complaint until the final resolution of the petition for certiorari filed before
the CA. A judgment by compromise agreement was rendered by the CA in the certiorari case filed
with it and an entry of judgment was subsequently made.
25
General order of default default in in rem proceedings where there are no defendants and the court issues a
notice to the whole world to appear before it and file their answer.
Complainant charges respondent for gross ignorance of the law and procedure in (1) admitting the
amended complaint of plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE in Civil Case No. 00-99133 despite the fact
that (a) the amended complaint is a total change of theory of the case; and (b) that the required filing
fees for the amended complaint were not paid; and (2) in rendering summary judgment (a) despite the
fact that respondent found the existence of 13 factual issues to be resolved; (b) without conducting a
hearing on the motion for summary judgment; (c) based on the alleged implied admission rather than
on the personal knowledge of witnesses and other affiants; and (d) despite the fact that plaintiffs were
estopped from denying the existence of these 13 issues raised in the pre-trial order.
In a Resolution the Court referred the case to Justice Noel G. Tijam of the CA for investigation, report
and recommendation. The Investigating Justice submitted his Report recommending the dismissal of
the administrative and the disbarment complaint against respondent for patent lack of merit
Issue
Whether or not there was gross ignorance of the law.
Held
The Court finds no gross ignorance of law committed by respondent when he admitted the amended
complaint notwithstanding that such amended complaint substantially altered the cause of action of
plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE.
The original complaint filed by the plaintiffs was for specific performance and injunction with prayer
for damages and for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction against complainant while the amended
complaint was for recovery of sum of money. Such amendment to the original complaint was filed by
plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE after the Supreme Court decision declared that complainant could
not enter into a joint agreement with other corporations to operate the Jai-Alai, and that the
Agreement entered into between complainant and the plaintiffs is null and void. However, since
plaintiffs had provided funds for complainants pre-operating expenses and working capital, plaintiffs
had to file an amended complaint which seeks the recovery of their expenses. Although the amended
complaint substantially changed the cause of action of plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE, the
admission thereof by respondent is allowed under Section 3, Rule 10 and jurisprudence.
The Court also finds that respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he admitted
the amended complaint despite the non-payment by plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE of additional
docket fees on the amended complaint. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion, the Court laid
down the rules on the payment of docket fees as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment
of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is
paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no
case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by
the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be
the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee.
Respondent is correct in ruling that the court had jurisdiction over the amended complaint as it had
acquired jurisdiction over the case when the original complaint was filed and the corresponding
docket fee was paid thereon. Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional
requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of
the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Respondent also stated in the same order that this Court in the Sun Insurance case had further
declared that any additional filing (docket) fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment and that it shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee provided that the cause of action has not prescribed.
Thus, the unpaid additional docket fees should be considered as a lien on the judgment even though
plaintiffs had specified the amount of P1,562,145,661.87 in the prayer of the amended complaint.
Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction for non-payment of additional docket fees is deemed abandoned as
there was neither a motion for reconsideration nor a petition questioning such Order filed by
complainant. In fact, when the amended complaint was admitted and respondent directed complainant
to file its answer, the latter filed its Answer with compulsory counterclaim and without questioning
the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground of insufficient payment of docket fees. Complainant
even invoked the courts authority when it asked for affirmative relief on its counterclaim, thus it is
estopped from challenging the courts jurisdiction.
Moreover, as observed by the Investigating Justice, it is too late in the day to invoke lack of
jurisdiction because the civil case decided by the respondent which was elevated on appeal to the CA
has become final and executory when complainant voluntarily entered into a compromise agreement
in the CA. Thus, the issues raised in the petition for certiorari were not actually resolved. Thus, it
becomes necessary for the Court to determine in the present administrative case whether or not
respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent, after the entry of judgment on the compromise agreement, directed plaintiffs BELLE and
FILGAME to cause the computation of the additional docket on the amended complaint, of which the
Clerk of Court of Manila is directed to collect. Plaintiffs paid the amount of P1,058,732.48. However,
it appeared that based on the affidavit of the collecting agent, she assessed the docket fees based on
the judgment on the compromise which was presented to her by the plaintiffs and not on the amended
complaint as stated in the respondents Order, thus docket fees collected were still insufficient. If the
amount of docket fees paid is insufficient considering the amount of the claim, the clerk of court of
the lower court involved or his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency
assessment, thus it is no longer the fault of respondent when there was a mistake in the assessment.
However, when the matter was brought to the attention of respondent by complainant in its sur-
rejoinder in this administrative complaint, respondent called the attention of the clerk of court where
she was asked to recompute the same so that proper order can be issued. Respondent, issued another
Order based on the compliance report submitted by the Clerk of Court that plaintiffs have still to pay
the amount of P14,717,171.19 based on the claim in the amended complaint by directing the plaintiffs
to pay within 15 days from receipt. These actuations of respondent are in accordance with the Sun
Insurance case.
Asean Pacific v. City of Urdaneta, G.R. No. 162525, September 23, 2008
Facts
This case stemmed from a Complaint for annulment of contracts with prayer for preliminary
prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining order filed by respondent Waldo C. Del Castillo, in
his capacity as taxpayer, against respondents City of Urdaneta and Ceferino J. Capalad doing business
under the name JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented by
Ronilo G. Goco and Asean Pacific Planners Construction and Development Corporation (APPCDC)
represented by Cesar D. Goco.
Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five contracts for
the preliminary design, construction and management of a four-storey twin cinema commercial center
and hotel involving a massive expenditure of public funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a
loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). For minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid
P95 million. Del Castillo also claimed that all the contracts are void because the object is outside the
commerce of men. The object is a piece of land belonging to the public domain and which remains
devoted to a public purpose as a public elementary school. Additionally, he claimed that the contracts,
from the feasibility study to management and lease of the future building, are also void because they
were all awarded solely to the Goco family.
After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City and filed an
Omnibus Motion with prayer to (1) withdraw Urdaneta Citys Answer; (2) drop Urdaneta City as
defendant and be joined as plaintiff; (3) admit Urdaneta Citys complaint; and (4) conduct a new pre-
trial. Urdaneta City allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate legal
representation caused its inability to file the necessary pleadings in representation of its interests.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) admitted the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm and
granted the withdrawal of appearance of the City Prosecutor. It also granted the prayer to drop the city
as defendant and admitted its complaint for consolidation with Del Castillos complaint, and directed
the defendants to answer the citys complaint.
The RTC denied reconsideration. It also granted Capalads motion to expunge all pleadings filed by
Atty. Sahagun in his behalf. Capalad was dropped as defendant, and his complaint filed by Atty.
Jorito C. Peralta was admitted and consolidated with the complaints of Del Castillo and Urdaneta
City. The RTC also directed APP and APPCDC to answer Capalads complaint.
Aggrieved, APP and APPCDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition on the following grounds: (1) defective verification and certification of
non-forum shopping, (2) failure of the petitioners to submit certified true copies of the RTCs assailed
orders as mere photocopies were submitted, and (3) lack of written explanation why service of the
petition to adverse parties was not personal.
Issue
Whether or not Urdaneta City is estopped from reversing admissions in its answer
Held
Not estopped.
On the third point, petitioners claim that Urdaneta City is estopped to reverse admissions in its
Answer that the contracts are valid and, in its pre-trial brief, that the execution of the contracts was in
good faith.
We disagree. The court may allow amendment of pleadings.
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected to at the trial
on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings
to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the
ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. Objections need not even arise in this case since
the Pre-trial Order already defined as an issue whether the contracts are valid.
Thus, what is needed is presentation of the parties evidence on the issue. Any evidence of the city for
or against the validity of the contracts will be relevant and admissible. Note also that under Section 5,
Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them to conform to the evidence.
In addition, despite Urdaneta Citys judicial admissions, the trial court is still given leeway to consider
other evidence to be presented for said admissions may not necessarily prevail over documentary
evidence, e.g., the contracts assailed. A partys testimony in open court may also override admissions
in the Answer.
As regards the RTCs order admitting Capalads complaint and dropping him as defendant, we find the
same in order. Capalad insists that Atty. Sahagun has no authority to represent him. Atty. Sahagun
claims otherwise. We note, however, that Atty. Sahagun represents petitioners who claim that the
contracts are valid. On the other hand, Capalad filed a complaint for annulment of the contracts.
Certainly, Atty. Sahagun cannot represent totally conflicting interests. Thus, we should expunge all
pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in behalf of Capalad.
Relatedly, we affirm the order of the RTC in allowing Capalads change of attorneys, if we can
properly call it as such, considering Capalads claim that Atty. Sahagun was never his attorney.
Tiu v. PBCOM, G.R. No. 151932, August 19, 2009

Facts
Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI), represented by herein petitioners, applied for a real estate loan
with the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM) to fund its purified water distribution
business. PBCOM required all the members of the Board of Directors of AWRI to become sureties.
All copies of the Surety Agreement, except two, were kept by PBCOM. Of the two copies kept by the
notary public, one copy was retained for his notarial file and the other was sent to the Records
Management and Archives Office. Thereafter, AWRI informed the bank of its desire to surrender
and/or assign in its favor, all the present properties of the former to apply as dacion en pago for
AWRIs existing loan obligation to the bank. PBCOM sent a reply denying the request. PBCOM sent a
letter to petitioners demanding full payment of its obligation to the bank. Its demands having
remained unheeded, PBCOM instructed its counsel to file a complaint for collection against
petitioners.
Petitioners filed their Answer. It alleged, among other things, that they were not personally liable on
the promissory notes, because they signed the Surety Agreement in their capacities as officers of
AWRI. They claimed that the Surety Agreement attached to the complaint as Annexes were falsified,
considering that when they signed the same, the words In his personal capacity did not yet appear in
the document and were merely intercalated thereon without their knowledge and consent. In support
of their allegations, petitioners attached to their Answer a certified photocopy of the Surety
Agreement by the Records Management and Archives Office showing that the words In his personal
capacity were not found at the foot of page two of the document where their signatures appeared.
Because of this development, PBCOMs counsel searched for and retrieved the file copy of the Surety
Agreement. The notarial copy showed that the words In his personal capacity did not appear on
page two of the Surety Agreement. Petitioners counsel then asked PBCOM to explain the alteration
appearing on the agreement. PBCOM subsequently discovered that the insertion was ordered by the
bank auditor. It alleged that when the Surety Agreement was inspected by the bank auditor, he called
the attention of the loans clerk as to why the words In his personal capacity were not indicated
under the signature of each surety, in accordance with bank standard operating procedures. The
auditor then ordered Mr. Cabahug to type the words In his personal capacity below the second
signatures of petitioners. However, the notary public was never informed of the insertion.
PBCOM then filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim with Motion for Leave of Court to Substitute
Annex A of the Complaint, wherein it attached the duplicate original copy retrieved from the file of
the notary public. PBCOM also admitted its mistake in making the insertion and explained that it was
made without the knowledge and consent of the notary public. PBCOM, invoking a liberal application
of the Rules, emphasized that the motion incorporated in the pleading can be treated as a motion for
leave of court to amend and admit the amended complaint pursuant to Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules
of Court. The RTC allowed the substitution of the altered document with the original Surety
Agreement.
Aggrieved, petitioners sought recourse before the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioners claimed that the RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction inallowing PBCOM to substitute
the altered copy of the Surety Agreement with the duplicate original notarial copy thereof considering
that the latters cause of action was solely and principally founded on the falsified document marked as
Annexes A to A-2. The CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
Issue
Whether or not the substitution of the document can be allowed.
Held
As to the substitution of the earlier surety agreement that was annexed to the complaint with the
original thereof, this Court finds that the RTC did not err in allowing the substitution.
With respect to PBCOMs right to amend its complaint, including the documents annexed thereto,
after petitioners have filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically allows
amendment by leave of court.
The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the
amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that
it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment
substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is
sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and
in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined, and the
case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of
a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made before the trial of the case, thereby
giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in submitting the altered
surety agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part to have submitted it in
the first place instead of the original agreement. It also admitted that, through inadvertence, the copy
that was attached to the complaint was the copy wherein the words IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY were inserted to conform to the banks standard practice. This alteration was made
without the knowledge of the notary public. PBCOMs counsel had no idea that what it submitted was
the altered document, thereby necessitating the substitution of the surety agreement with the original
thereof, in order that the case would be judiciously resolved.
The original surety agreement is the best evidence that could establish the parties respective rights and
obligations. In effect, the RTC merely allowed the amendment of the complaint, which consequently
included the substitution of the altered surety agreement with a copy of the original.
Moreover, contrary to petitioners contention, they could not be prejudiced by the substitution since
they can still present the substituted documents, Annexes A to A-2, as part of the evidence of their
affirmative defenses. The substitution did not prejudice petitioners or delay the action. On the
contrary, it tended to expedite the determination of the controversy. Besides, the petitioners are not
precluded from filing the appropriate criminal action against PBCOM for attaching the altered copy of
the surety agreement to the complaint. The substitution of the documents would not, in any way, erase
the existence of falsification, if any. The case before the RTC is civil in nature, while the alleged
falsification is criminal, which is separate and distinct from another. Thus, the RTC committed no
reversible error when it allowed the substitution of the altered surety agreement with that of the
original.
Biglang Awa v. Philippine Trust Company, G.R. NO. 158998, March 28, 2008
Facts
Petitioners, together with their mother, Encarnacion Cleofas Vda. de Biglang-Awa (Encarnacion),
filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of deeds, cancellation of titles, reconveyance and recovery
with damages before the RTC against Roberth B. Tolentino (Tolentino), Philippine Trust Co.
(respondent) and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In the complaint, petitioners and Encarnacion
alleged that they are the legitimate owners of eight parcels of land. Petitioners averred that without the
knowledge and consent of Encarnacion and through fraudulent manipulations, misrepresentations and
the use of falsified documents, Tolentino succeeded in having four of the eight subject parcels of land,
which are in the name of Encarnacion, encumbered by way of mortgage to secure a loan made by
Tolentino with respondent; that using fraudulent manipulations, misrepresentations and use of
falsified documents, Tolentino was able to secure in his name new Torrens titles over all the eight
subject parcels of land. Subsequently, petitioners caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on
all the titles registered in the name of Tolentino.
Tolentino filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Ligaya (petitioner) of lack capacity to sue in
behalf of the other plaintiff, and that she has no cause of action considering that she has sold her
property to Tolentino. Encarnacion filed a Notice of Dismissal claiming that the subject complaint
was filed without her permission and/or conformity; that the four parcels of land, titled under her
name, and which formed part of the subject matter of the said complaint, were solely her own; and
that she freely and satisfactorily sold them to Tolentino.
Respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim praying that the complaint be dismissed
for failure to state a cause of action against it, and for failure of Encarnacion to verify and certify the
complaint against it.
The RTC issued an Order:

The action therefore, insofar as plaintiff Encarnacion Cleofas vda. De Biglang-Awa only and all the defendants
are concerned, is DISMISSED with prejudice. Let her name be deleted from the caption of the complaint.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and to Admit Attached
Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint seek to implead Encarnacion petitioner and a sister
Liwayway Biglang-Awa (Liwayway) as party defendants. Petitioners contend that they, together with
Encarnacion and Liwayway are co-owners, pro-indiviso, of the subject parcels of land; that through
manipulations and misrepresentations, Tolentino, Encarnacion and Liwayway were able to secure a
partition of and titles over the disputed properties.
The RTC issued a Resolution pertinent portions of which read as follows:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the court resolves to:
xxx
3) grant the [respondent's] motion to dismiss; and
4) deny [petitioners'] motion for leave to amend complaint.
The dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the commencement of any appropriate action
that may be initiated by the proper party plaintiffs against the proper defendant or defendants.
Tolentino, filed a Motion for Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens. The RTC issued an Order
denying Tolentinos Motion for cancellation of notice of Lis Pendens.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA contending that the RTC is guilty of grave abuse
of discretion when it denied the motion for cancellation of the notices of lis pendens. Petitioners also
filed a petition for certiorari. The issue raised in the said petition is whether the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it granted Tolentino's motion to dismiss and denied petitioner's motion for
leave to admit amended complaint. However, the case was dismissed by the CA. Meanwhile, the CA
promulgated the presently assailed Decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Order dated August 14, 2001 insofar as it denied the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. It is ordered that the
notice of lis pendens be immediately canceled.
Issue
Whether or not amendment should be allowed.
Held
Denied.
With respect to petitioners' right to amend their Complaint, after respondent had filed its answer. This
Court held that where some but not all of the defendants have answered, plaintiffs may amend their
complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering
defendants, but not as to claims asserted against the other defendants.
In the present case, prior to petitioners' filing of their Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and to
Admit Attached Amended Complaint, respondent already filed its Answer with Counterclaim. Hence,
since respondent had already filed its answer, it follows that petitioners may no longer amend their
complaint against the former as a matter of right. They may do so only upon leave of court which they
did by filing their Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint.
The denial of petitioners' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint on the ground that the amendment
drastically altered the causes of action of the parties plaintiffs and parties defendants between and
among themselves is erroneous.
Nonetheless, the Court finds that the RTC correctly denied petitioners' Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint, although for a different reason.
In their original complaint, petitioners claim that the properties were owned exclusively by
Encarnacion. There was no mention whatsoever that Encarnacion's titles over these parcels of land
were obtained through fraud or any other illegal means. However, in their Amended Complaint,
where petitioners sought to make Encarnacion and Liwayway as defendants, they subsequently seek
the nullification of Encarnacion's titles over the abovementioned parcels of land by alleging that
petitioners together with Encarncacion and Liwayway are co-owners of all the subject that and the
titles thereto were obtained on the basis of falsified subdivision agreements and subdivision plans.
It should be noted, however, that the basis of the Order and Resolution of the trial court, both of
which had already become final and executory, is its finding that the four parcels of land were
exclusively owned by Encarnacion. Since the Order and the Resolution of the RTC had already
become final and executory, petitioners are already precluded from claiming otherwise. If petitioners
are permitted to amend their complaint they would, in effect, alter a factual conclusion of the RTC
which it used as its basis. Settled is the rule that a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law; and whether it will be made by
the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The only exceptions to this rule are the
correction of (1) clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to
any party, and (3) void judgments. None of these exceptions are present in the instant case.
Moreover, the RTC already dismissed the Complaint filed by petitioners for lack of jurisdiction over
the action because petitioners failed to pay the appropriate docket fees. Petitioners did not appeal this
ruling of the RTC. In any case, such order of dismissal had already become final and executory
pending resolution of the present petition. On this basis, the Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is
rendered moot.
Bill of Particulars (Rule 12)

Baritua v. Mercader, G.R. No. 136048, January 23, 2001
Facts
The original complaint was filed against JB Lines, Inc. [Petitioner JB Lines, Inc.] filed a motion to
dismiss complaint, to strike out false-impertinent matters therefrom, and/or for bill of particulars on
the primary grounds that [respondents] failed to implead Jose Baritua as an indispensable party and
that the cause of action is a suit against a wrong and non-existent party. [Respondents] filed an
opposition to the said motion and an amended complaint.
The trial court denied the aforesaid motion and admitted the amended complaint of [respondents]
impleading Jose Baritua and alleged the following:
1. The late Dominador Mercader is a [b]usinessman mainly engaged in the buy and sell of dry
goods in Laoang, N. Samar. He buys his goods from Manila and bring[s] them to Laoang,
Northern Samar for sale at his store located in the said locality;
2. Sometime on March 16, 1983, the late Dominador Mercader boarded [petitioners'] bus No.
142 with Plate No. 484 EU at [petitioners'] Manila Station/terminal, bound for Brgy. Rawis,
Laoang Northern Samar as a paying passenger;
3. At that time, Dominador Mercader had with him as his baggage, assorted goods (i.e. long
pants, short pants, dusters, etc.) which he likewise loaded in [petitioners'] bus;
4. The late Dominador Mercader was not able to reach his destination considering that on March
17, 1983 at Beily (Bugco) Bridge, Barangay Roxas, Mondragon, Northern Samar, while he
was on board [petitioners'] bus no. 142 with Plate No. 484 EU, the said bus fell into the river
as a result of which the late Dominador Mercader died. x x x.
5. The accident happened because [petitioners'] driver negligently and recklessly operated the
bus at a fast speed in wanton disregard of traffic rules and regulations and the prevailing
conditions then existing that caused [the] bus to fall into the river.'
"[Respondents] then filed a motion to declare [petitioners] in default which motion was opposed by
[petitioners]. [Respondents] withdrew the said motion prompting the trial court to cancel the
scheduled hearing of the said motion to declare [petitioners] in default.
The RTC, after due trial, rendered the aforesaid assailed Decision.
"WHEREFORE, on preponderance of evidence, judgment is for [herein respondents] and against [herein
petitioners], ordering the latter to pay the former
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's award of monetary damages in favor of respondents,
except the amount of Dominador Mercader's lost earnings, which it reduced to P798,000. It held that
petitioners failed to rebut the presumption that in the event a passenger died or was injured, the carrier
had acted negligently. Petitioners, it added, presented no sufficient proof that they had exercised
extraordinary diligence.
Issue
Whether or not the CA erred when it passed sub silencio on the trial court's failure to rule frontally on
their plea for a bill of particulars.26
Held
Did not err.
Motion for a Bill of Particulars
26
On the nature of the damages respondent prayed for.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred when it passed sub silencio on the trial court's failure
to rule frontally on their plea for a bill of particulars.
We are not impressed. It must be noted that petitioners' counsel manifested in open court his desire to
file a motion for a bill of particulars. The RTC gave him ten days from March 12, 1985 within which
to do so. He, however, filed the aforesaid motion only on April 2, 1985 or eleven days past the
deadline set by the trial court. Moreover, such motion was already moot and academic because, prior
to its filing, petitioners had already filed their answer and several other pleadings to the amended
Complaint.
Reyes v. RTC of Makati, G.R. No. 165744, August 11, 2008

Facts
Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo C. Reyes (Rodrigo) are two of the four children of the spouses
Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia, Oscar, and Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of
Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith), a domestic corporation established by their family. Pedro died
in 1964, while Anastacia died in 1993. Although Pedros estate was judicially partitioned among his
heirs sometime in the 1970s, no similar settlement and partition appear to have been made with
Anastacias estate, which included her shareholdings in Zenith. Anastacia owned 136,598 shares of
Zenith; Oscar and Rodrigo owned 8,715,637 and 4,250 shares, respectively. Zenith and Rodrigo filed
a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Oscar,.
The complaint stated that it is "a derivative suit initiated and filed by the complainant Rodrigo C.
Reyes to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION
which are now or formerly in the control, custody, and/or possession of respondent [herein petitioner
Oscar] and to determine the shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that
were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated [by Oscar] for himself [and] which were not collated
and taken into account in the partition, distribution, and/or settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouses, for which he should be ordered to account for all the income from the time he took these
shares of stock, and should now deliver to his brothers and sisters their just and respective shares."
In his Answer with Counterclaim, Oscar denied the charge that he illegally acquired the shares of
Anastacia Reyes. He asserted, as a defense, that he purchased the subject shares with his own funds
from the unissued stocks of Zenith, and that the suit is not a bona fide derivative suit because the
requisites therefor have not been complied with. He thus questioned the SECs jurisdiction to
entertain the complaint because it pertains to the settlement of the estate of Anastacia Reyes.
When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799 took effect, the SECs exclusive and original jurisdiction over
cases enumerated in Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A was transferred to the RTC
designated as a special commercial court. The records of Rodrigos SEC case were thus turned over to
the RTC.
Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit; and that it is not a bona
fide derivative suit as it partakes of the nature of a petition for the settlement of estate of the deceased
Anastacia that is outside the jurisdiction of a special commercial court. The RTC denied the motion in
part and declared:
A close reading of the Complaint disclosed the presence of two (2) causes of action, namely: a) a derivative suit
for accounting of the funds and assets of the corporation which are in the control, custody, and/or possession of
the respondent [herein petitioner Oscar] with prayer to appoint a management committee; and b) an action for
determination of the shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes allegedly taken by
respondent, its accounting and the corresponding delivery of these shares to the parties brothers and sisters. The
latter is not a derivative suit and should properly be threshed out in a petition for settlement of estate.
Accordingly, the motion is denied. However, only the derivative suit consisting of the first cause of action will
be taken cognizance of by this Court.
Oscar thereupon went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus and prayed
that the RTC Order be annulled and set aside and that the trial court be prohibited from continuing
with the proceedings. The appellate court affirmed the RTC Order and denied the petition.
Issue
Whether or not the allegations of fraud were averred with particularity.
Held
Not averred.
Fraudulent Devices and Schemes
Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats are largely
conclusions of law that, without supporting statements of the facts to which the allegations of fraud
refer, do not sufficiently state an effective cause of action. Fraud and mistake are required to be
averred with particularity in order to enable the opposing party to controvert the particular facts
allegedly constituting such fraud or mistake.
Tested against these standards, we find that the charges of fraud against Oscar were not properly
supported by the required factual allegations. While the complaint contained allegations of fraud
purportedly committed by him, these allegations are not particular enough to bring the controversy
within the special commercial courts jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate facts, but are
mere conclusions of law: how and why the alleged appropriation of shares can be characterized as
"illegal and fraudulent" were not explained nor elaborated on.
Not every allegation of fraud done in a corporate setting or perpetrated by corporate officers will
bring the case within the special commercial courts jurisdiction. To fall within this jurisdiction, there
must be sufficient nexus showing that the corporations nature, structure, or powers were used to
facilitate the fraudulent device or scheme. Contrary to this concept, the complaint presented a reverse
situation. No corporate power or office was alleged to have facilitated the transfer of the shares;
rather, Oscar, as an individual and without reference to his corporate personality, was alleged to have
transferred the shares of Anastacia to his name, allowing him to become the majority and controlling
stockholder of Zenith, and eventually, the corporations President. This is the essence of the
complaint read as a whole and is particularly demonstrated under the following allegations:
5. The complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes discovered that by some manipulative scheme, the shareholdings of their
deceased mother, Doa Anastacia C. Reyes, shares of stocks and [sic] valued in the corporate books at
P7,699,934.28, more or less, excluding interest and/or dividends, had been transferred solely in the name of
respondent. By such fraudulent manipulations and misrepresentation, the shareholdings of said respondent
Oscar C. Reyes abruptly increased to P8,715,637.00 [sic] and becomes [sic] the majority stockholder of Zenith
Insurance Corporation, which portion of said shares must be distributed equally amongst the brothers and sisters
of the respondent Oscar C. Reyes including the complainant herein.
xxxx
9.1 The shareholdings of deceased Spouses Pedro Reyes and Anastacia C. Reyes valued at P7,099,934.28 were
illegally and fraudulently transferred solely to the respondents [herein petitioner Oscar] name and installed
himself as a majority stockholder of Zenith Insurance Corporation [and] thereby deprived his brothers and
sisters of their respective equal shares thereof including complainant hereto.
In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts does not constitute a
ground for dismissal since such defect can be cured by a bill of particulars. In cases governed by
the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, however, a bill of particulars
is a prohibited pleading. It is essential, therefore, for the complaint to show on its face what are
claimed to be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant wishes to invoke the courts
special commercial jurisdiction.
We note that twice in the course of this case, Rodrigo had been given the opportunity to study the
propriety of amending or withdrawing the complaint, but he consistently refused. The courts function
in resolving issues of jurisdiction is limited to the review of the allegations of the complaint and, on
the basis of these allegations, to the determination of whether they are of such nature and subject that
they fall within the terms of the law defining the courts jurisdiction. Regretfully, we cannot read into
the complaint any specifically alleged corporate fraud that will call for the exercise of the courts
special commercial jurisdiction. Thus, we cannot affirm the RTCs assumption of jurisdiction over
Rodrigos complaint on the basis of Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148154, December 17, 200727

Facts
The administration of then President Corazon C. Aquino successively sued former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos (Mrs. Marcos), and their
alleged cronies or dummies before the anti-graft court to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth that
they amassed during the former president's 20-year rule. Roman A. Cruz, Jr. (Cruz) is the alleged
crony in this case. The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through the Office of
the Solicitor General, filed a Complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages alleging that Cruz and the Marcoses stole public assets and invested them in several
institutions here and abroad. Specifically, Cruz allegedly purchased, in connivance with the Marcoses,
assets whose values are disproportionate to their legal income. The court ordered that alias
summonses be served on the Marcoses who were then in exile in Hawaii. Cruz filed his answer ad
cautelam. The alias summonses on the Marcoses were served at 2338 Makiki Heights, Honolulu,
Hawaii. The Marcoses, however, failed to file an answer and were accordingly declared in default by
the anti-graft court.
Mrs. Marcos filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, which was granted by the anti-graft court.
Mrs. Marcos filed her answer (such order affected only Mrs. Marcos). After pre-trial briefs had been
filed by Cruz, the PCGG, and Mrs. Marcos, the court directed former President Marcos' children to
appear before it or it will proceed with pre-trial and subsequent proceedings. Respondent (Bongbong
Marcos) filed a Motion for Leave to File a Responsive Pleading as executor of his late father's estate.
The PCGG opposed the motion, citing as ground the absence of a motion to set aside the default order
or any order lifting the default status of former President Marcos. The court granted respondent's
motion. Respondent asked for three extensions totaling 35 days to file an answer. The court granted
the motions. But instead of filing an answer, respondent filed a Motion For Bill of Particulars, praying
for clearer statements of the allegations which he called "mere conclusions of law, too vague and
general to enable defendants to intelligently answer."
The PCGG opposed the motion. The anti-graft court, however, upheld respondent, explaining that the
allegations against former President Marcos were vague, general, and were mere conclusions of law.
It pointed out that the accusations did not specify the ultimate facts of former President Marcos'
participation in Cruz's alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, effectively preventing respondent
from intelligently preparing an answer.
Issue
Whether or not the motion for bill of particulars should be allowed.
Held
Allowed.
1st issue (not relevant to topic): While it is true that there was no positive act on the part of the court
to lift the default order because there was no motion nor order to that effect, the anti-graft court's act
of granting respondent the opportunity to file a responsive pleading meant the lifting of the default
order on terms the court deemed proper in the interest of justice. It was the operative act lifting the
default order and thereby reinstating the position of the original defendant whom respondent is
representing, founded on the court's discretionary power to set aside orders of default.
As to the propriety of the granting of the motion for a bill of particulars, we find for respondent as the
allegations against former President Marcos appear obviously couched in general terms. They do not
cite the ultimate facts to show how the Marcoses acted "in unlawful concert" with Cruz in illegally
27
In a Bill of Particulars (as well as in a motion to dismiss) do not include the day that caused the interruption in
counting the period to be removed from the reglementary period.
amassing assets, property and funds in amounts disproportionate to Cruz's lawful income, except that
the former President Marcos was the president at the time.
In his motion for a bill of particulars, respondent wanted clarification on the specific nature, manner
and extent of participation of his father in the acquisition of the assets cited above under Cruz;
particularly whether former President Marcos was a beneficial owner of these properties; and the
specific manner in which he acquired such beneficial control.
Also, respondent wanted to know the specific nature, manner, time and extent of support,
participation and collaboration of his father. Respondent likewise asked, what is the specific amount
of damages demanded?
The 1991 Virata-Mapa Doctrine prescribes a motion for a bill of particulars, not a motion to dismiss,
as the remedy for perceived ambiguity or vagueness of a complaint for the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth, which was similarly worded as the complaint in this case. That doctrine provided protective
precedent in favor of respondent when he filed his motion for a bill of particulars.
While the allegations as to the alleged specific acts of Cruz were clear, they were vague and unclear
as to the acts of the Marcos couple who were allegedly "in unlawful concert with" the former. There
was no factual allegation in the original and expanded complaints on the collaboration of or on the
kind of support extended by former President Marcos to Cruz in the commission of the alleged
unlawful acts constituting the alleged plunder. All the allegations against the Marcoses, aside from
being maladroitly laid, were couched in general terms. The alleged acts, conditions and circumstances
that could show the conspiracy among the defendants were not particularized and sufficiently set forth
by petitioner.
That the late president's co-defendants were able to file their respective answers to the complaint does
not necessarily mean that his estate's executor will be able to file an equally intelligent answer, since
the answering defendants' defense might be personal to them.
Phrases like "in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers with
grave and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws,"
"unjust enrichment," "embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth," "arrogated
unto himself all powers of government," are easy and easy to read; they have potential media
quotability and they evoke passion with literary flair, not to mention that it was populist to flaunt
those statements in the late 1980s. But they are just that, accusations by generalization. Motherhood
statements they are, although now they might be a politically incorrect expression and an affront to
mothers everywhere, although they best describe the accusations against the Marcoses in the case at
bar.
The facile verbosity with which the legal counsel for the government flaunted the accusation of
excesses against the Marcoses in general terms must be soonest refurbished by a bill of particulars, so
that respondent can properly prepare an intelligent responsive pleading and so that trial in this case
will proceed as expeditiously as possible. To avoid a situation where its pleadings may be found
defective, thereby amounting to a failure to state a cause of action, petitioner for its part must be given
the opportunity to file a bill of particulars. Thus, we are hereby allowing it to supplement its pleadings
now, considering that amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally allowed especially before
trial.
Lastly, the allowance of the motion for a more definite statement rests with the sound discretion of the
court. As usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed
unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous order. This Court has been
liberal in giving the lower courts the widest latitude of discretion in setting aside default orders
justified under the right to due process principle. Plain justice demands and the law requires no less
that defendants must know what the complaint against them is all about.
Estardante v. People, G.R. Nos. 156851-55, February 18, 2008

Facts
Petitioner was the school principal of the Ramon Torres National High School (RTNHS). A group of
concerned RTNHS teachers sent an undated letter to the Schools Division of Bago City (Schools
Division) attaching a list of 15 irregularities allegedly committed by the petitioner, which the private
complainants requested to be investigated. Two complaints were eventually filed by private
complainants against petitioner with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman-Visayas).
The Ombudsman-Visayas forwarded the complaint to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Bago City
(City Prosecutor) for preliminary investigation, pursuant to the Ombudsman Act of 1989. The City
Prosecutor served the petitioner with a subpoena requiring her to submit her counter-affidavit.
Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed before the City Prosecutor a Motion for Bill of
Particulars with Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavit. In the Motion for Bill of
Particulars, petitioner alleged that there were no specific criminal charges that were stated in the
subpoenas. Thus, petitioner insisted that she cannot intelligently prepare her counter-affidavit unless
the criminal charges and the laws she violated are specified.
The City Prosecutor issued an Order attaching the private complainants Bill of Particulars. Petitioner
filed her counter-affidavit limiting herself only to the charges specified in the Bill of Particulars.
Thereafter, the City Prosecutor referred the case back to the Ombudsman-Visayas. The latter found
sufficient grounds to hold petitioner liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
and filed before the RTC the corresponding Informations. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation before the RTC. The RTC ruled against the petitioner.
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner maintains that when
the five Informations for the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 were filed by the
Ombudsman-Visayas, her right to due process was violated; and that the Ombudsman-Visayas in
effect went beyond the Bill of Particulars filed by the private complainants. The RTC denied the
Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue
Whether or not a motion for bill of particulars is allowed in cases before the Ombudsman.
Held
Not allowed.
On the first assigned error, petitioner insists that the Ombudsman-Visayas should have limited the
charges filed against her to the crimes mentioned in the Bill of Particulars, and that the filing of the
Informations charging her with crimes different from those specified in the Bill of Particulars violates
her right to due process.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that a bill of particulars is not allowed by
Administrative Order No. 7, entitled Rules of Procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman (A.O. No.
7); and that therefore the Ombudsman cannot be bound by the Bill of Particulars submitted by private
complainants.
The Court agrees with the OSG. Clearly, the act of the prosecutor in granting the petitioners Motion
for Bill of Particulars is an act contrary to the express mandate of A.O. No. 7.
The Court finds the argument of petitioner that when the City Prosecutor was deputized by the
Ombudsman-Visayas to conduct the preliminary investigation, any action taken therein is, in effect,
an action of the Ombudsman, who is bound by the act of the City Prosecutor in granting the Motion
for Bill of Particulars, and is not tenable. Section 31 of R.A. No. 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of
1989 expressly provides that those designated or deputized to assist the Ombudsman shall be under
his supervision and control. Indubitably, when the City Prosecutor is deputized by the Office of the
Ombudsman, he comes under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman which means that he is
subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify the prosecutors
decision.
Consequently, in the present case, petitioner has no valid basis for insisting that the Ombudsman-
Visayas must be bound by the erroneous act of the City Prosecutor in granting petitioners Motion for
Bill of Particulars. Laws and jurisprudence grant the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to
reverse or nullify the acts of the prosecutor pursuant to its power of control and supervision over
deputized prosecutors. Hence, it was within the prerogative of the Ombudsman-Visayas not to
consider the Bill of Particulars submitted by the private complainants.
This brings the Court to the second assigned error.
Petitioner claims that her right to due process was violated when the Ombudsman-Visayas filed the
Informations charging her with violations of R.A. No. 3019, which went beyond the charges specified
in the Bill of Particulars. Petitioner further argues that since there were no criminal charges stated in
the subpoenas served on her, she was not properly informed of the nature of the crime which she was
supposed to answer in her counter-affidavit.
While the Bill of Particulars is not allowed under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman and therefore should not be the basis for determining what specific criminal charges
should be filed against herein petitioner, it behooves the Ombudsman to accord the petitioner her
basic rights to due process in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.
In a preliminary investigation, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the petitioners
basic due process rights, such as the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits,
and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting
documents in her defense,
After a thorough examination of the records, the Court does not find the subpoenas and the alleged
documents served on her. Absent the subpoenas and the documents attached to the subpoenas, how
could it be intelligently determined whether she was fully apprised of the acts complained of and
imputed to her; whether she was given the opportunity to submit an appropriate counter-affidavit to
the charges; and whether the charges in the five Informations filed against petitioner were based on
the same acts complained of and stated in the subpoena and the documents attached thereto?
While there is no rule that the initial complaint filed against an accused with the prosecutors office
should specifically state the particular law under which he is being charged, it is a basic elementary
rule that the complaint should specifically allege the criminal acts complained of, so as to enable the
accused to prepare his answer or counter-affidavit accurately and intelligently.
The determination of the issue whether the criminal charges were indeed alleged or specified in the
subpoenas and in the documents attached thereto, is a factual issue and therefore outside the province
of this Court. It is a well-settled rule that the Supreme Court is not the proper venue in which to
consider a factual issue, as it is not a trier of facts.
In resolving the question whether petitioner was denied due process, the RTC or this Court cannot
rely on the disputable presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. The RTC
should have required the petitioner to submit the subpoenas and the attached documents served on her
to enable it to examine the same and resolve whether the petitioners right to be informed was violated.
It was only upon ascertaining this fact that the RTC could have validly determined whether petitioner
was denied due process.
Service and Filing (Rule 13)

Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169122, February 2, 2010
Facts
Before he died, Julio Domingo (Julio) allegedly executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of
land in favor of Marcelinos wife, Carmelita Mananghaya (Mananghaya). Agapita and Ana Domingo,
and the heirs of the Domingos filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against
Marcelino and Mananghaya for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale. The Domingos alleged
that Julios signature in the deed was forged. The RTC held that Julios signature in the Deed of
Absolute Sale was forged; thus, the deed was void. The RTC ordered Marcelino and Mananghaya to
deliver possession of the property to the Domingos. Marcelino and Mananghaya appealed the
Decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. The Decision became
final and executory. Thus, the RTC issued a writ of execution. The Domingos gained possession of
the property.
Marcelino filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) a petition praying that he be declared
the tenant-beneficiary of the property. The DAR granted Marcelinos petition, placed the property
under the coverage of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, and named Marcelino as one of the tenant-
beneficiaries. Agapita Domingo (Agapita) filed a motion for reconsideration. Marcelino reentered and
retook possession of the property. The Domingos filed before the RTC a motion to cite Marcelino in
contempt, and for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. The RTC granted the motion. Marcelino
filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. The RTC denied Marcelinos motion for
reconsideration.
The DAR granted Agapitas motion for reconsideration. The DAR held that the property was not
covered by RA No. 6657 because it was less than five hectares.
Marcelino filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Marcelino alleged that the RTC
had no jurisdiction to order him to deliver possession of the property to the Domingos and that the
RTC gravely abused its discretion in finding him in contempt. The Court of Appeals dismissed
outright Marcelinos petition. The Court of Appeals held that: This petition for certiorari faces outright
dismissal for three (3) fundamental reasons, namely:
1. There is no written explanation to justify service by mail in lieu of the preferred mode of
personal service, this in violation of Section 11, Rule 13, of the [Rules of Court] x x x. Net
result: The petition is deemed NOT filed.
2. The following copies of pertinent pleadings and orders that would support the allegations in
the petition have not been attached thereto as annexes,
3. The prayer for temporary restraining order failed to manifest willingness to post the necessary
injunctive bond, in violation of Section 4, Rule 58.
Marcelino filed a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied the motion. The Court of
Appeals held that Marcelinos failure to file a written explanation to justify service by mail in lieu of
the preferred mode of personal service is an absolutely insurmountable obstacle to the success of this
motion for reconsideration. Marcelino filed another motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
held that, We cannot accept the motion for reconsideration for the reason that a second motion for
reconsideration of a final order is a prohibited pleading.
Issue
Whether or not the CA committed GAD
Held
Did not commit GAD
Marcelino alleges that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the 21 March
2005 petition. He states that:
While it is true that petitioner failed to incorporate a written explanation to justify service by mail in lieu of the
preferred mode of personal service in his Petition, it was grave abuse of discretion for public respondent Court
of Appeals to dismiss his Petition on this ground. x x x [L]itigations should be decided as much as possible on
their merits rather than technicalities x x x.
x x x Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is merely directory and it is incumbent upon the
court to use its discretion in determining whether substantial justice will be served (or rights unjustifiably
prejudiced) if it resolves to dismiss a petition because of non-compliance with a mere directory rule.
The petition is unmeritorious. Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court is mandatory.
Liberal application of procedural rules is allowed only when two requisites are present: (1) there is a
plausible explanation for the non-compliance, and (2) the outright dismissal would defeat the
administration of justice. In Tible & Tible Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings and Loan Association, the
Court held that the two pre-requisites for the relaxation of the rules are: (1) justifiable cause or
plausible reason for non-compliance; and (2) compelling reason to convince the court that outright
dismissal of the petition would seriously impair the orderly administration of justice. Both requisites
are lacking in the present case.
Romulo v. Peralta, G.R. No. 165665, January 31, 2007

Facts
While we could have dismissed this petition outright for violation of the principle of hierarchy of
courts, however, we opted to resolve the same in the interest of speedy administration of justice.
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 253, providing for an open skies policy
in the aviation industry. Pursuant to this E.O. the Diosdado Macapagal International Airport at Clark
Field, Pampanga and the Subic Bay International Airport at Subic, Zambales were opened to
international air cargo transportation providers and foreign airlines. The PAL Employees Association
(PALEA), the National Labor Union (NLU), and the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU),
as legitimate labor organizations representing the bulk of workers in the local aviation industry, herein
respondents, filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction, assailing the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 253.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing petitioners, filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of cause of action. The OSG served by registered mail a copy of its motion upon Atty. Froilan M.
Bacungan, counsel for petitioners (now respondent labor unions). The trial court issued an Order
denying the OSGs motion to dismiss, thus:
In the absence of proof of transmittal by registered mail of a copy of the subject Motion to Dismiss, addressed
to the petitioners counsel, pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the subject Motion to Dismiss dated April 5, 2004 from the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby
DENIED.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration. Attached thereto is a photocopy of the registry return
receipt. But this motion was denied by the trial court, thus:
In the absence of any indication on the photocopy of the registry return receipt (Annex A, Motion for
Reconsideration dated May 17, 2004) that it was, in fact a copy of the Motion to Dismiss dated April 25, 2004
from the Office of the Solicitor General as supposedly addressed to petitioners counsel (Sapida v. Villanueva,
48 SCRA 19, 23, 27, 29-30 [1972]), the Office of the Solicitor Generals Motion for Reconsideration dated May
17, 2004 is hereby DENIED.
The OSG again filed a motion for reconsideration. Attached thereto are the following: (1) a certified
photocopy of the OSGs original registry return receipt No. 4096; (2) a certified photocopy of page
374, Official Records Book of the OSG Docket Division; and (3) the affidavit of Josephine S.
Masangkay-Bayongan, Records Officer III, OSG Docket Division, stating that the mail matter sent by
the OSG to Atty. Bacungan on April 6, 2004 was, in fact, a copy of the motion to dismiss the petition
in Civil Case No. 04-109201 dated April 5, 2004.
The trial court denied the OSGs second motion for reconsideration, thus:
In view of the judicial admission on the face of the Motion for Reconsideration, particularly paragraph 2
thereof to the effect that a copy of the Motion to Dismiss was received by the petitioners counsel only on April
20, 2004 after the slated hearing thereof on April 16, 2004, consistent with the caveat under Section 4, Rule 15
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 23, 2004 from the Office of the
Solicitor General is hereby DENIED.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC erred.
Held
The RTC did not err.
Petitioners alleged that in denying their motion to dismiss, respondent trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion. In the instant case, there is no dispute that Atty. Bacungan, counsel for respondent
labor unions, received a copy of the OSGs motion to dismiss four (4) days after it was set for hearing.
Petitioners insist though that they sent a copy of their motion to him by registered mail on April 6,
2004.
It is clear that where service of a pleading is by registered mail, proof of such service consists of the
following: (1) an affidavit of the person mailing the pleading containing a full statement of the date,
place, and manner of service; and (2) the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.
We recall that in their first motion for reconsideration, petitioners attached thereto only a photocopy
of the registry return receipt. The trial court declared it could not determine on its face whether the
registered matter was actually a copy of the motion to dismiss.
In Cayetano v. Cayetano, we held that actual knowledge of a decision cannot be attributed to the
addressee of a registered matter where there is no showing that the registry notice itself contains any
indication that the registered matter is a copy of the decision or that the registry notice refers to the
case being ventilated. Then, in Sapida v. Villanueva, citing Cayetano, we ruled that we could not
justly attribute to respondents actual knowledge of the order of denial of their motion for new trial
through registered mail because there is no showing that the registry notice itself or the envelope or
the return card for that matter contained any indication or annotation that the registered matter was
indeed and in fact a copy of the said order.
Anent the affidavit of Josephine S. Masangkay-Bayongan, she stated that On April 6, 2004, I caused
to be served by registered mail a copy of a Motion to Dismiss dated April 5, 2004 in Civil Case No.
04-109021 Clearly, she merely directed that the motion be served by registered mail. She did not
actually post the motion by registered mail. The rule requires that the affidavit must be executed by
the person mailing the motion.
In sum, the registry return receipt does not indicate that what was mailed to Atty. Bacugan, counsel
for respondent labor unions, was a copy of petitioners motion to dismiss; and that Bayongans affidavit
shows she was not the one who mailed such copy. It follows that in dismissing the motion to dismiss
on the ground that a copy thereof was not validly served upon private respondents counsel, respondent
judge acted pursuant to the Rules.
Spouses Topacio v. Banco Filipino, G.R. No. 157644, November 17, 2010
Facts
The petitioners obtained a loan from the respondent. To secure the loan, the petitioners executed a real
estate mortgage in favor of the respondent. The petitioners failed to pay the loan, prompting the
respondent to file a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage. To satisfy the obligation, the
Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan sold the mortgaged property at public auction, where the respondent
emerged as the highest bidder. Respondent filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession
over the mortgaged property before the Regional Trial Court. The RTC granted the petition.
The writ of possession was not implemented because the petitioners filed with the RTC a petition to
set aside the auction sale and the writ of possession (with application for a temporary restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction). More than two years after the filing of the Answer and the
Reply, and after a series of postponements at the instance of both parties, then Presiding Judge
Teresita D. Capulong issued an Order dismissing the respondents petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession on the ground of failure to prosecute. No copy of the Order was served on the respondent.
Nearly six (6) years later, the respondent filed a Motion to Clarify the Order of dismissal. In the same
motion, the respondent likewise moved for the issuance of an alias writ of possession. The RTC made
a clarification that the Order of Dismissal refers to the dismissal of the main case for issuance of a
writ of possession. In that same Order, the RTC denied the respondents motion for the issuance of an
alias writ of possession. Respondent moved for the reconsideration of the Order. The RTC
reconsidered and set aside the Order and granted the respondents prayer for the issuance of an alias
writ of possession. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the Order and prayed that the
implementation of the alias writ of possession be held in abeyance.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order for the issuance of
an alias writ of possession in favor of the respondent. The RTC ruled that the Order of Dismissal was
granted on a technicality and that [t]he ground of failure to prosecute is manifestly unfounded. The
RTC held that the Dismissal Order cannot be considered a dismissal on the merits as it was founded
not on a substantial ground but on a technical one.
The petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction (petition) before the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA denied the petitioners petition and affirmed in toto the RTC. The CA found that the Order of
the RTC does not amount to a dismissal on the merits as it was based on purely technical grounds. It
noted that the records show that the respondent was not furnished a copy of the Dismissal Order;
hence, the case cannot be deemed to be final with respect to the respondent. The CA also agreed with
the RTCs conclusion that the delay in the resolution of the case cannot be solely attributed to the
respondent and did not warrant its outright dismissal.
The CA held that an independent action for the revival of the writ of possession need not be filed in
order to enforce the writ of possession issued on December 12, 1983 since Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court applies only to civil actions and not to special proceedings.
Issue
Whether or not res judicata applies.
Held
Does not apply.
Applicability of Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: the first is "bar by prior judgment" under
paragraph (b) of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, and the second is "conclusiveness of
judgment" under paragraph (c) thereof.
The petitioners claim that res judicata under the first concept applies in the present case because all of
the elements thereof are present. In response, the respondent argues that res judicata did not set in as
the judgement was not yet final.
We agree with the respondent.
The December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order never attained finality as it was not properly served
As a rule, judgments are sufficiently served when they are delivered personally, or through registered
mail to the counsel of record, or by leaving them in his office with his clerk or with a person having
charge thereof. After service, a judgment or order which is not appealed nor made subject of a motion
for reconsideration within the prescribed 15-day period attains finality.
In Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. v. Rodriguez, the Court ruled that the Resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission, denying the respondents motion for reconsideration, cannot be
deemed to have become final and executory as there is no conclusive proof of service of the said
resolution. In the words of the Court, there was no proof of actual receipt of the notice of the
registered mail by the respondents counsel. Based on these findings, the Court concluded that the CA
properly acquired jurisdiction over the respondents petition for certiorari filed before it; in the
absence of a reckoning date of the period provided by law for the filing of the petition, the Court
could not assume that it was improperly or belatedly filed.
Similarly, in Tomawis v. Tabao-Cudang, the Court held that the decision of the Regional Trial Court
did not become final and executory where, from the records, the respondent had not received a copy
of the resolution denying her motion for reconsideration. The Court also noted that there was no
sufficient proof that the respondent actually received a copy of the said Order or that she indeed
received a first notice. Thus, the Court concluded that there could be no valid basis for the issuance of
the writ of execution as the decision never attained finality.
In the present case, we note that the Dismissal Order cannot be deemed to have become final and
executory in view of the absence of a valid service, whether personally or via registered mail, on the
respondents counsel. We note in this regard that the petitioners do not dispute the CA finding that the
records failed to show that the private respondent was furnished with a copy of the said order of
dismissal[.] Accordingly, the Dismissal Order never attained finality.
Atlantic Erectors v. Herbal Cove, G.R. No. 148568, March 20, 2003
Facts
Respondent and [petitioner] entered into a Construction Contract whereby the former agreed to
construct four (4) units of [townhouses]. The contract period is 180 days. [Petitioner] claimed that the
said period was not followed due to reasons attributable to [respondent]. [Respondent], however,
denied such claim and instead pointed to [petitioner] as having exceeded the 180 day contract period
aggravated by defective workmanship and utilization of materials which are not in compliance with
specifications.
[petitioner] filed a complaint for sum of money with damages with the Regional Trial Court.
[petitioner] filed a notice of lis pendens on titles TCTs nos. T-30228, 30229, 30230, 30231 and
30232.
[respondent] filed a Motion to Dismiss [petitioners] Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure
to state a cause of action. They claimed [that] the Makati RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case because the parties Construction Contract contained a clause requiring them to
submit their dispute to arbitration. The RTC dismissed the Complaint as against [respondent] for
[petitioners] failure to comply with a condition precedent to the filing of a court action which is the
prior resort to arbitration.
[Petitioner] filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent filed a Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis
Pendens. It argued that the notices of lis pendens are without basis because [petitioners] action is a
purely personal action to collect a sum of money and recover damages and x x x does not directly
affect title to, use or possession of real property.
The RTC granted the Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens. [Petitioner] filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was granted and reinstated the notices of lis pendens. Thus:
1. The Court finds no merit in plaintiffs contention that in dismissing the above-entitled case for lack of
jurisdiction, and at the same time granting defendant Herbal Coves motion to cancel notice of lis pendens, the
Court [took] an inconsistent posture. As correctly argued by defendant Herbal Cove, a notice of lis pendens
serves only as a precautionary measure or warning to prospective buyers of a property that there is a pending
litigation involving the same. The Court notes that when it issued the Order of 30 July 1998 lifting the notice of
lis pendens, there was as yet no appeal filed by plaintiff. Subsequently, on 10 September 1998, after a notice of
appeal was filed by plaintiff on 4 September 1998, the Branch Clerk of Court was ordered by the Court to
elevate the entire records of the above-entitled case to the Court of Appeals. It therefore results that the above-
entitled case is still pending. After a careful consideration of all matters relevant to the lis pendens, the Court
believes that justice will be better served by setting aside the Order of 30 July 1998.
Thereafter, Respondent Herbal Cove filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari.
Setting aside the Orders of the RTC, the CA reinstated the Order granting Herbal Coves Motion to
Cancel the Notice of Lis Pendens. According to the appellate court, the re-annotation of those notices
was improper for want of any legal basis. The CA opined that the Complaint filed by petitioner was
intended purely to collect a sum of money and to recover damages. The appellate court ruled that the
Complaint did not aver any ownership claim to the subject land or any right of possession over the
buildings constructed thereon. It further declared that absent any claim on the title to the buildings or
on the possession thereof, the notices of lis pendens had no leg to stand on.
Issue
Whether or not the notice of lis pendens is proper.
Held
Improper.
As a general rule, the only instances in which a notice of lis pendens may be availed of are as follows:
1. An action to recover possession of real estate;
2. An action for partition; and
3. Any other court proceedings that directly affect the title to the land or the building thereon or
the use or the occupation thereof.
4. Additionally, this Court has held that resorting to lis pendens is not necessarily confined to
cases that involve title to or possession of real property. This annotation also applies to suits
seeking to establish a right to, or an equitable estate or interest in, a specific real property; or
to enforce a lien, a charge or an encumbrance against it.
Apparently, petitioner proceeds on the premise that its money claim involves the enforcement of a
lien. Since the money claim is for the nonpayment of materials and labor used in the construction of
townhouses, the lien referred to would have to be that provided under Article 2242 of the Civil Code.
This provision describes a contractors lien over an immovable propert.
However, a careful examination of petitioners Complaint, as well as the reliefs it seeks, reveals that
no such lien or interest over the property was ever alleged. The Complaint merely asked for the
payment of construction services and materials plus damages, without mentioning -- much less
asserting -- a lien or an encumbrance over the property. Verily, it was a purely personal action and a
simple collection case. It did not contain any material averment of any enforceable right, interest or
lien in connection with the subject property.
As it is, petitioners money claim cannot be characterized as an action that involves the enforcement of
a lien or an encumbrance, one that would thus warrant the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens.
Indeed, the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the complaint.
Even assuming that petitioner had sufficiently alleged such lien or encumbrance in its Complaint, the
annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens would still be unjustified, because a complaint for collection
and damages is not the proper mode for the enforcement of a contractors lien. In J.L. Bernardo
Construction v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained the concept of a contractors lien under Article
2242 of the Civil Code and the proper mode for its enforcement as follows:
1. Articles 2241 and 2242 of the Civil Code enumerates certain credits which enjoy preference with
respect to specific personal or real property of the debtor. Specifically, the contractors lien claimed by
the petitioners is granted under the third paragraph of Article 2242 which provides that the claims of
contractors engaged in the construction, reconstruction or repair of buildings or other works shall be
preferred with respect to the specific building or other immovable property constructed.
2. However, Article 2242 finds application when there is a concurrence of credits, i.e., when the same
specific property of the debtor is subjected to the claims of several creditors and the value of such
property of the debtor is insufficient to pay in full all the creditors. In such a situation, the question of
preference will arise, that is, there will be a need to determine which of the creditors will be paid ahead
of the others. Fundamental tenets of due process will dictate that this statutory lien should then only be
enforced in the context of some kind of a proceeding where the claims of all the preferred creditors
may be bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency proceedings.
Clearly then, neither Article 2242 of the Civil Code nor the enforcement of the lien thereunder is
applicable here, because petitioners Complaint failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. Nowhere
does it show that respondents property was subject to the claims of other creditors or was insufficient
to pay for all concurring debts. Moreover, the Complaint did not pertain to insolvency proceedings or
to any other action in which the adjudication of claims of preferred creditors could be ascertained.
St. Mary of the Woods School v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati, G.R.No. 174290,
January 20, 2009
Facts
Petitioner SMWSI is an educational institution. It is the current registered owner of the three parcels
of land (subject properties). Petitioner Marcial P. Soriano is the President of petitioner SMWSI.
Private respondent Hilario P. Soriano, on the other hand, is one of the siblings of petitioner Marcial P.
Soriano. The consolidated cases presently before this Court originated from the Complaint filed by
the private respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Assignment, Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCTs registered in the name of petitioner SMWSI. In
his Complaint, private respondent alleged that during the marriage of his parents the couple acquired
both real and personal properties, including the subject properties. The Soriano couple allegedly
executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of ODC (Oro Development Corporation) involving the
subject properties to pay for Tomas Q. Sorianos subscription of stocks in the said corporation. Tomas
Q. Soriano died intestate. Thereafter, ODC executed in favor of petitioner SMWSI a Deed of Sale
over the subject property. By virtue of the sale, petitioner SMWSI acquired ownership and title over
the particular property.
Private respondent claimed that several years after his father Tomas Q. Sorianos death, he discovered
that the latters signature in the Deed of Assignment in favor of ODC was a forgery. Meanwhile, by
reason of the pendency of Civil Case, a Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated on TCTs in the name of
ODC. Defendants filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss.
The RTC issued an Order dismissing the private respondents Complaint.

WHEREFORE, finding merits on the [M]otion to [D]ismiss filed by [herein petitioners, et al.] and in the
prayer set forth in the [A]nswer of defendants Josefina P. Soriano and Rosario P. Soriano-Villasor, the dismissal
of this case is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by [private respondent] Hilario P. Soriano
is dismissed because it asserts no cause of action and the claim or demand set forth in the [private respondents]
pleading has been waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, and that a condition precedent for filing the
claim has not been complied with.
Petitioners, et al., filed with the RTC a Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens annotated on the titles
covering the subject properties. Private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. Meanwhile, the RTC
issued its Order granting the Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens filed by petitioners.
As mentioned in the case, the notice of lis pendens can be cancelled if it is not necessary to protect the interest
of the party who caused it to be recorded. In this case, the [herein private respondents] interest should be
considered on whether the notice of lis pendens should be cancelled or not. As it is the Court believes that the
cancellation is proper in this case. [private respondent] Hilario P. Soriano has no interest to be protected insofar
as the subject properties are concerned because of his acknowledgment that he already received his share in the
estate of Tomas Soriano.
Private respondent filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of Lis
Pendens on the TCTs of the subject properties given that there was yet no final judgment of dismissal
of his Complaint, as its dismissal had been duly appealed. Petitioners, et al., filed a Motion to Dismiss
Appeal on the ground that the issues in the appeal are and can only be questions of law, the appellate
jurisdiction over which belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting private respondents Motion to
Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of Lis Pendens on the TCTs of the subject properties. The Court of
Appeals ruled that although the RTC found that private respondent had no interest to be protected by
the Notice of Lis Pendens, since the appellate court already acquired jurisdiction over the case, it was
the latter which must ascertain the propriety of canceling the Notice of Lis Pendens upon proper
motion and hearing. On the same day, the Court of Appeals also issued a separate Resolution denying
petitioners, et al.s, Motion to Dismiss Appeal of private respondent. According to the appellate court,
private respondent raised both questions of fact and law in his appeal; hence, the ground for the
dismissal of the appeal relied upon by the petitioners, et al., was untenable.
Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in granted the motion to reinstate notice of lis pendens
Held
Granting arguendo that the present special civil action for certiorari can be given due course, the
Court still finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in granting
private respondents Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of Lis Pendens.
Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a
court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until
final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended:
1. To keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is
terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation; and
2. To announce to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a
warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that
he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.
Considering that the dismissal of private respondents Complaint by the RTC was appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which Complaint refers to the properties that bear the annotations of lis pendens,
and such properties therefore are irrefragably still the subject matter of litigation, the appellate court
rightly saw the need for giving notice to the public of such a fact. The necessity becomes even more
compelling considering that petitioner SMWSI had already entered into transactions with third parties
involving the subject properties.
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to entertain the issue on the notice of lis pendens,
we adhere to the Court of Appeals ratiocination, thus:
However, as the dismissal of this case by the lower court has been appealed to us, we now have jurisdiction
over the case.
The doctrine of lis pendens is based on consideration of public policy and convenience, under the view that once
a court has taken cognizance of a controversy, it should be impossible to interfere with the consummation of the
judgment by any ad interim transfer, encumbrance, or change of possession.
Now that the case is pending before us on appeal, there is no certainty as to the outcome of the case. There is a
need to warn the whole world that a particular property is in litigation, serving as a warning that the one who
acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation
over said property.
Although the lower court made a finding that [herein private respondent] Hilario has no interest to be protected
by the annotation of the notice of the pendency of the case as we now have jurisdiction over the case, we have to
ascertain for ourselves the propriety of canceling the annotation of the notice of lis pendens upon proper motion
and hearing.
Vicente v. Avera, G.R. No. 169970, January 20, 2009

Facts
Jovencio Rebuquiao was the registered owner of the property in dispute. Rebuquiao executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners over the property in dispute. Respondent Delia Soledad Avera
alleges that Jose Rebuquiao, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney granted to him by Jovencio
Rebuquiao, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in favor of Roberto
Domingo, Averas spouse at the time, and herself.
Avera filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the RTC. In this case, Avera
asserted exclusive ownership over the property in dispute. A notice of lis pendens was inscribed on
TCT No. 34351.
The RTC rendered a Decision declaring the marriage of Avera and Domingo void and ordering the
property acquired during their cohabitation to be put in the custody of Avera, including the property
in dispute. After the decision became final and executory, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution.
Pursuant to the Writ of Execution, respondent Ronberto Valino, in his capacity as Sheriff IV of the
RTC served a Notice to Vacate on petitioners. Petitioners filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim
before the RTC.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
before the RTC to enjoin Sheriff Valino from implementing the alias writ of execution. The RTC
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered making the writ of preliminary injunction PERMANENT.
It held that petitioners were entitled to permanent injunction considering the following: (1) it is
undisputed that petitioners are the registered owners of the subject property, which certificate of title
confers upon them conclusive ownership of the property; and (2) the writ of execution issued in the
JDRC case could only be issued against a party to the action, and thus not to the petitioners.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. The CA held that petitioners are
bound by the outcome of the marriage anullment case, because the annotation of the notice of lis
pendens was ahead of petitioners registration of the deed of sale. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the CA denied.
Issue
Whether or not injunction should be granted.
Held
Injunction should be granted.
The core issue in the case at bar is whether injunction lies in favor of the petitioners to prevent the
respondents from interfering in the exercise of their rights over the property in dispute.
We find merit in the petition.
As the registered owners and actual possessors of the property in question, petitioners have a clear
legal right to the property in dispute. It was erroneous for respondents to assail the deed of sale
executed in favor of petitioners, because this constitutes a collateral attack on petitioners TCT.
Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 prohibits a collateral attack on a Torrens title. This Court has held that a
petition which, in effect, questioned the validity of a deed of sale for registered land constitutes a
collateral attack on a certificate of title. In the case at bar, respondents allegation, that the deed of
sale executed in favor of petitioners does not exist, clearly constitutes a collateral attack on a
certificate of title.
Petitioners title to the property in dispute is not subject to the outcome of the litigation covered by the
notice of lis pendens. A purchaser of the property affected by the notice of lis pendens is deemed to
have constructive notice of the pendency of the action only from the time of filing such notice. Thus,
a notice of lis pendens affects a transferee pendente lite, who by virtue of the notice, is bound by any
judgment, which may be rendered for or against the transferor, and his title is subject to the results of
the pending litigation.
A notice of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien. It serves to
protect the real rights of the registrant while the case involving such rights is pending resolution.
While the notice of lis pendens remains on a certificate of title, the registrant could rest secure that he
would not lose the property or any part of it during the litigation. Once a notice of lis pendens has
been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land involved would have to be subject
to the outcome of the litigation. For this reason, the Court has pronounced that a "purchaser who buys
registered land with full notice of the fact that it is in litigation between the vendor and a third party
stands in the shoes of his vendor and his title is subject to the incidents and result of the pending
litigation."
In the case at bar, the notice of lis pendens does not affect petitioners title to the property in dispute.
A notice of lis pendens concerns litigation between a transferor and a third party, where the transferee
who acquires land with a notice of lis pendens annotated on the corresponding certificate of title
stands in the shoes of his predecessor and in which case the transferees title is subject to the results of
the pending litigation. The notice of lis pendens does not concern litigation involving Rebuquiao, who
transferred his title to the property in dispute to petitioners, and his title. The notice of lis pendens
pertains to the JDRC case, an action for nullity of the marriage between Avera and Domingo. Since
Rebuquiaos title to the property in dispute is not subject to the results of the JDRC case, petitioners
title to the same property is also not subject to the results of the JDRC case.
Aberca et al. v. Ver, et al., G.R. No. 166216, March 14, 2012 ]
Facts
Several suspected subversives who were arrested and detained by the military filed a complaint for
damages with the Regional Trial Court against Gen. Fabian Ver, then AFP Chief of Staff, and his
subordinate officers. In their complaint, the plaintiff-appellees alleged that they were arrested and
detained by Task Force Makabansa, a composite group of various intelligence units of the AFP, on
the strength of defective search warrants; that while under detention and investigation, they were
subjected to physical and psychological harm, torture and other brutalities to extort from them
confessions and other information that would incriminate them; and that by reason thereof, they
suffered actual and moral damages.
Defendants-appellants, through their counsel, the then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza, filed a
motion to dismiss. The trial court granted defendants-appellants motion to dismiss and ordered the
case dismissed. Plaintiffs-appellees went to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, the so-called EDSA revolution took place. As a
result, the defendants-appellants lost their official positions and were no longer in their respective
office addresses as appearing in the record. The Supreme Court rendered a decision annulling and
setting aside the assailed orders and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Plaintiffs-appellees filed a motion praying that defendants-appellants be required to file their answer.
However, the record as reconstituted did not show who are the lawyers of the defendants-appellants
considering that Estelito Mendoza, who had represented them in his capacity as Solicitor General, was
no longer holding that position. Furthermore, defendants-appellants were also no longer occupying
the positions they held at the time the complaint was filed. Thus, in an order plaintiffs-appellees were
directed to report to the trial court the addresses and whereabouts of defendants-appellants so that
they could be properly notified. Instead of complying with the order, plaintiffs-appellees filed a
motion to declare defendants-appellants in default. The trial court denied plaintiffs-appellees motion
to declare defendants-appellants in default, emphatically pointing out that defendants-appellants were
not duly notified of the decision of the Supreme Court. In the same order, the trial court directed
plaintiffs-appellees to comply with the order with a warning that the case [would] be archived and
eventually dismissed if plaintiffs-appellees failed to furnish to the court the addresses of defendants-
appellants. For failure of the plaintiffs-appellees to comply with the orders, the trial court dismissed
the case without prejudice. Subsequently, however, the trial court set aside the order of dismissal and
reinstated the case. It also approved plaintiffs-appellees request to serve the notice to file answer or
responsive pleading by publication. In a compliance plaintiffs-appellees informed the trial court that
the notice was published in the Tagalog newspaper BALITA.
No answer was filed by defendants-appellants within the period stated in the notice. On motion of
plaintiffs-appellees, the trial court declared defendants-appellants in default and directed plaintiffs-
appellees to present their evidence ex-parte. The RTC handed down a decision in favor of the
petitioners.
Subsequently, respondents filed their Omnibus Motion praying as follows: 1) that the order of default
be reversed and set aside; 2) that the decision be reversed and set aside; 3) that the entire proceedings
be declared null and void; and 4) that they be given fifteen (15) days from notice to file answer to the
complaint and present their evidence.
The Omnibus Motion were denied by the RTC. Aggrieved, the said respondents elevated their case to
the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the RTC decision and ordering the case
remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. The CA ruled, among others, that the RTC committed
four (4) errors in declaring the respondents in default and proceeding to hear the case. The RTC
committed its first error when it abandoned the proper modes of service of notices, orders, resolutions
or judgments as the petitioners failed to comply with its order directing them to report the addresses
and whereabouts of the respondents so that they could be properly notified. The second error was the
failure of the RTC to avail of substituted service after failing to effect personal service or service by
mail. It perpetrated its third error when it authorized service by publication after dismissing the case
for failure of the petitioners to furnish the current addresses of the respondents. The CA reasoned out
that there was nothing in the rules which would authorize publication of a notice of hearing to file
answer and for what was authorized to be published were summons and final orders and judgments.
The fourth error was committed when the respondents were declared in default because they were not
duly notified and, therefore, were denied due process.
Not satisfied, the petitioners come to this Court praying for the reversal and setting aside of the CA
decision.
Issue
Whether the constitutional right to procedural due process was properly observed or was unacceptably
violated in this case when the respondents were declared in default for failing to file their answer
within the prescribed period and when the petitioners were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte.
Held
Violated.
In the case at bench, the respondents were completely deprived of due process when they were
declared in default based on a defective mode of service of notice to file answer by publication. The
rules on service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers were not strictly
followed in declaring the respondents in default. The Court agrees with the CA that the RTC
committed procedural lapses in declaring the respondents in default and in allowing the petitioners to
present evidence ex-parte.
A review of the records discloses that after the Court rendered its Decision annulling the RTC orders
and ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings, the RTC issued an order
directing the petitioners to report the addresses and whereabouts of the respondents so that they would
be properly notified of the proceedings.
Instead of complying with the RTCs directive to report the respondents addresses and whereabouts,
the petitioners filed a motion to declare the respondents in default. The RTC denied the petitioners
default motion because the respondents were not duly notified of the Decision of this Court and the
OSG no longer wanted to represent them. The RTC likewise ordered the petitioners to comply with its
Order, otherwise, the case would be archived and eventually dismissed. The RTC denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case without prejudice.
Surprisingly, the RTC issued set aside its Order and reinstated the case. It directed the petitioners,
among others, to cause the publication of a notice on the respondents to file answer or responsive
pleading. After the petitioners complied with the publication requirements, the RTC issued the order
declaring the respondents in default and directing the petitioners to present evidence ex-parte.
As correctly observed by the CA, the RTCs Order was an attempt to serve a notice to file answer on
the respondents by personal service and/or by mail. These proper and preferred modes of service,
however, were never resorted to because the OSG abandoned them when the petitioners failed to
comply with the RTC order requiring them to report the addresses and whereabouts of the
respondents. Nevertheless, there was still another less preferred but proper mode of service available
substituted service - which is service made by delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof of
failure of both personal service and service by mail. Unfortunately, this substitute mode of service
was not resorted to by the RTC after it failed to effect personal service and service by mail. Instead,
the RTC authorized an unrecognized mode of service under the Rules, which was service of notice to
file answer by publication.
In view of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the case, the RTC should have instead directed the
petitioners to exert diligent efforts to notify the respondents either personally or by registered mail. In
case the preferred modes were impractical, the Court should have required the petitioners to at least
report in writing why efforts exerted towards personal service or service by mail failed. In other
words, a convincing proof of an impossibility of personal service or service by mail to the
respondents should have been shown first. The RTC, thus, erred when it ruled that the publication of a
notice to file answer to the respondents substantially cured the procedural defect equivalent to lack of
due process. The RTC cannot just abandon the basic requirement of personal service and/or service by
mail.
At any rate, the Court is of the view that personal service to the respondents was practicable under the
circumstances considering that they were well-known persons who used to occupy high government
positions.
To stress, the only modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other
papers allowed by the rules are personal service, service by mail and substituted service if either
personal service or service by mail cannot be made. Nowhere under this rule is service of notice to
file answer by publication is mentioned, much less recognized.
Furthermore, the Court would like to point out that service by publication only applies to service of
summons stated under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court where the methods of service of summons in
civil cases are: (1) personal service; (2) substituted service; and (3) service by publication. Similarly,
service by publication can apply to judgments, final orders and resolutions as provided under Section
9, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.
FEU-NRMF v. FEU-NRMF AFW, G.R. No. 168362, October 16, 2006

Facts
Petitioner FEU-NRMF is a medical institution duly organized and existing under the Philippine laws.
On the other hand, respondent union is a legitimate labor organization and is the duly recognized
representative of the rank and file employees of petitioner FEU-NRMF. Petitioner FEU-NRMF and
respondent union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that will expire on 30 April
1996. In view of the forthcoming expiry, respondent union, sent a letter-proposal to petitioner FEU-
NRMF stating therein their economic and non-economic proposals for the negotiation of the new
CBA. Petitioner FEU-NRMF flatly rejected respondent unions demands and proposed to maintain the
same provisions of the old CBA. Respondent union filed a Notice of Strike before NCMB-NCR on
the ground of bargaining deadlock.
Before the strike was conducted, respondent union offered a skeletal force of nursing and health
personnel who will man the hospitals operation for the duration of the strike. For reasons unknown to
respondent union, however, petitioner FEU-NRMF failed or refused to accept the offer. For its part,
petitioner FEU-NRMF, filed a Petition for the Assumption of Jurisdiction or for Certification of
Labor Dispute with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Secretary of Labor
granted the petition and thus assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute, thereby prohibiting any
strike or lockout whether actual or impending, and enjoining the parties from committing any acts
which may exacerbate the situation.
Francisco Escuadra, the NLRC process server, certified that, on 5 September 1996 at around 4:00
P.M., he attempted to serve a copy of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order to the union officers but
since no one was around at the strike area, he just posted copies of the said Order at several
conspicuous places within the premises of the hospital.
Claiming that they had no knowledge that the Secretary of Labor already assumed jurisdiction over
the pending labor dispute as they were not able to receive a copy of the Assumption of Jurisdiction
Order, striking employees continued holding a strike. Subsequently, petitioner FEU-NRMF filed a
case before the NLRC, contending that respondent union staged the strike in defiance of the
Assumption of Jurisdiction Order; hence, it was illegal.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision declaring the strike illegal and dismissing the union officers
for conducting the strike in defiance of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order. Aggrieved, the
respondent union filed a Partial Appeal before the NLRC.
The NLRC handed down a Resolution affirming in toto the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and, thus,
upheld the illegality of the strike and loss of employment status of the union officers. The NLRC
found that during the conciliation proceedings before the NCMB-NCR, the union officers admitted
that they were aware that the Secretary of Labor issued an Assumption of Jurisdiction Order which
enjoined the strike they were conducting. There was, therefore, an utter defiance of the said Order,
making the strike illegal. The union officers dismissal is thus warranted.
Consequently, the respondent union brought a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court
of Appeals seeking to annul the NLRC Resolution affirming the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the Petition and reversing the assailed Resolution as
they were made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
appellate court found that no personal service was validly effected by the process server that could
bind the striking employees.
Issue
Whether or not the service of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order was validly effected by the
process server so as to bind the respondent union and hold them liable for the acts committed
subsequent to the issuance of the said Order.
Held
Not validly affected.
The certification/proof of service of the process server, Francisco A. Escuadra, dated 6 September
1996, reads:
This is to certify that on September 5, 1996 at around 4:00 P.M., I attempted to serve a copy of the Order of
Assumption of Jurisdiction issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, to the officials of the FEU-
NRMF Employees Association-AFL.
Since none of the officials of the said union was available to receive a copy of the said Order, I posted copies of
the same at several conspicuous places within the premises of Far Eastern University Nicanor Reyes Medical
Foundation (FEU-NRMF).
It can be inferred from the foregoing that the process server resorted to posting the Order when
personal service was rendered impossible since the striking employees were not present at the strike
area. This mode of service, however, is not sanctioned by either the NLRC Revised Rules of
Procedure or the Revised Rules of Court.
Under the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, service of copies of orders should be made by the
process server either personally or through registered mail. However, due to the urgent nature of the
Assumption of Jurisdiction Order and the public policy underlying the injunction carried by the
issuance of the said Order, service of copies of the same should be made in the most expeditious and
effective manner, without any delay, ensuring its immediate receipt by the intended parties as may be
warranted under the circumstances. Accordingly, in this case, personal service is the proper mode of
serving the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order. It is also provided under the same rules that in special
circumstances, service of summons may be effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court.
Let it be recalled that the process server merely posted copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order
in conspicuous places in the hospital. Such posting is not prescribed by the rules, nor is it even
referred to when the said rules enumerated the different modes of effecting substituted service, in case
personal service is impossible by the absence of the party concerned.
Applying this principle in the case at bar, presumption of receipt of the copies of the Assumption of
Jurisdiction Order could not be lightly inferred from the circumstances considering the adverse effect
in case the parties failed to heed to the injunction directed by such Order. There must be a clear and
unmistakable proof that the requirements prescribed by the Rules in the manner of effecting personal
or substituted service had been faithfully complied with. Merely posting copies of the Assumption of
Jurisdiction Order does not satisfy the rigid requirement for proper service outlined by the above
stated rules. Needless to say, the manner of service made by the process server was invalid and
irregular. Respondent union could not therefore be adjudged to have defied the said Order since it was
not properly apprised thereof. Accordingly, the strike conducted by the respondent union was valid
under the circumstances.
Republic v. BPI, 2013

Facts
The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) filed with the RTC a case for expropriation
against portions of the properties of Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and of Bayani Villanueva
(Villanueva) for the construction of the Zapote-Alabang Fly-Over. Neither BPI nor Villanueva
objected to the propriety of the expropriation; hence, the trial court constituted a Board of
Commissioners to determine the just compensation. The trial court in its Decision set the fair market
value at P40,000.00 per square meter. The acting branch clerk of court issued a Certification.
The Decision dated 25 November 1998 in this case has become FINAL, EXECUTORY and
UNAPPEALABLE considering that the Office of the Solicitor General failed to file any Notice of Appeal or
Motion for Reconsideration despite receipt of a copy thereof.
Meanwhile, BPI filed a Motion for Partial New Trial to determine the just compensation of its
building, which was not included in the Decision that fixed the just compensation for the parcels of
land. In the motion, BPI claimed that its motion was timely filed since it received a copy of the
Decision on 01 December 1998. The trial court granted partial new trial in an Order dated 06 January
1999. Due to the failure of counsel for petitioner, despite notice, to appear during the scheduled
hearing for the determination of the just compensation of the building, the trial court allowed BPI to
present its evidence ex-parte. The trial court held that just compensation for the building was due and
ordered petitioner to pay BPI the amount of P2,633,000.00. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration
on the ground that the proceeding fixing the just compensation of the building is null and void for not
complying with the mandatory procedure set forth in Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
After due hearing, the trial court granted petitioners motion for reconsideration and ordered that the
Decision be set aside and vacated. Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion objecting to the
propriety of paying just compensation for BPIs building and praying that BPIs claim for additional
just compensation be denied. The trial court denied petitioners motion and ruled that the demolition
of the old building of BPI can be construed as a consequential damage suffered by BPI as a result of
the expropriation. Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the trial court:
However, there is no showing, that defendant-appellee through its counsel received a copy of the trial courts
decision on a definite date. No official return nor affidavit of the party serving the decision was attached to the
records of the case. Neither was the presence of a registry receipt issued by the mailing office nor a registry
return card containing the date of receipt of the decision be found among its records. Since there was no
showing as to the exact date of receipt of defendant-appellee of the said decision, the running of the period of 15
days within which to file a motion for new trial did not begin to run. Therefore, the filing of defendant-appellee
of a motion for partial new trial on December 16, 1998 was never delayed but timely filed thus preventing the
decision dated November 25, 1998 from attaining finality as against them. Moreover, We find the admission of
defendant-appellee in its brief filed on June 2, 2005, that it received a copy of the trial courts decision on
December 1, 1998, sufficient to comply with the requirement of a written admission of a party served with a
judgment as provided in Sec. 13 of Rule 13, of the Rules of Civil Procedure. It should also be noted that the
certification issued by Edgar Allan C. Morante, the acting clerk of court, as to the finality of judgment as of
December 11, 1998 will not stand against defendant-appellee because the 15-day period to file an appeal will
only start to commence upon the receipt of the decision which is on December 1, 1998.
Issue
Whether the trial courts Decision dated 25 November 1998 had become final and executory before
BPI filed its motion for partial new trial.
Held
Had not become final and executory.
On whether BPIs motion for partial new trial was filed out of time
Petitioner contends that the trial courts Decision dated 25 November 1998 had already become final
and executory as of 11 December 1998, as stated in the Certification issued by the acting branch clerk
of court. On the other hand, BPI asserts that its motion for partial new trial filed on 16 December
1998 was timely filed because it received a copy of the Decision on 01 December 1998.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the 25 November 1998 Decision did
not become final and executory for BPI on 11 December 1998. It argues that the appellate court erred
in reckoning the 15-day reglementary period from a mere admission of the date of receipt by BPI.
Petitioner further argues that the Certification issued by the acting branch clerk of the trial court
enjoys a presumption of regularity and that BPI had not been able to overcome the presumption. Both
the trial and appellate courts found that BPIs motion for partial new trial was filed on time.
A perusal of the Certification reveals that it certifies that the 25 November 1998 Decision had already
become final, executory and unappealable as to petitioner:
The Decision in this case dated November 25, 1998 has become FINAL, EXECUTORY and
UNAPPEALABLE as of December 11, 1998 considering that the Office of the Solicitor General failed to
file any Notice of Appeal or Motion for Reconsideration despite receipt of a copy thereof on November 26,
1998. This certification is being issued upon the request of Atty. Jansen Rodriguez for whatever legal purpose it
may serve.
There can be no other reading of this certificate that would be supported by the record. A careful
review of the record shows the absence of any proof that the Decision of 25 November 1998 was
served upon BPI. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly held that absent any proof of service to BPI
of the Decision, the period of 15 days within which to file its motion for partial new trial did not begin
to run against BPI. However, BPIs admission that it received a copy of the Decision on 01 December
1998 is binding on it, and was correctly considered by the Court of Appeals as the reckoning date to
count the 15-day period.
Summons (Rule 14)

Cada vs. Time Saver28
Facts
The Petition at bar stemmed from a Complaint filed before the NLRC by petitioner against
respondents for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salary, nonpayment of overtime pay, holiday pay,
premium pay for holiday and rest day pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA,
separation pay and attorneys fees. Respondent TSL is a sole proprietorship engaged in the laundry
business. Respondent Perez is the owner/proprietor of TSL. Petitioner alleged that she was employed
by the respondents as Presser. While she was working on 7 May 2003, the management called her
attention for quarreling with her co-employee. Without giving her an opportunity to explain and
defend her side, petitioner was sent home and prevented to work further, compelling her to file the
Complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents. Respondents failed to appear for the entire
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter heard the case ex parte directing the
petitioner to file her position paper. On the basis of the petitioners position paper, the case was
submitted for decision.
In its Decision dated 16 March 2004, the Labor Arbiter ruled:

WHEREFORE, finding complainant to have been illegally dismissed, she is entitled to payment of separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement as aforestated and backwages. Accordingly, respondents Time Saver Laundry and
Leslie Perez are hereby ordered to pay complainant.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC essentially arguing that they were denied due process on the
ground of improper service of summons and that the monetary award in favor of petitioner was
without basis. The NLRC issued its Resolution sustaining the finding of the Labor Arbiter that
petitioner was illegally dismissed.
The NLRC did not give credence to respondents argument that they were denied due process:
The issue interposed by the [respondents] that their right to due process was denied in the discernment of the
present dispute is now rendered moot and academic as We give (sic) them the opportunity to explain and be
heard through the judicious resolution of the substantive merits of this case. The party who has had ample
opportunity to present its side of the controversy not only before the Labor Arbiter but also the NLRC on
appeal, it cannot interpose lack of due process for what the fundamental law abhors is simply the absolute
absence of opportunity to be heard.
Thereafter, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and held that respondent Perez was
indeed denied due process based on the following ratiocination:
As above-quoted, service of summons in cases before the Labor Arbiters shall be served on the parties
personally or by registered mail, provided that in special circumstances, service of summons may be effected in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court. In this case, since [herein respondent] Leslie
Perez is the sole proprietor of Time Saver Laundry, service of summons must be made to her personally or by
registered mail. The bailiff chose to serve the summons personally upon [respondent Perez]. However, said
service of summons was invalid as it was not personally received by [respondent Perez] herself. The records
show that the summons was received by one Alfredo Perez on June 7, 2003. It appears that Alfredo Perez is a
co-employee of [herein petitioner]. x x x. Considering that there was no proper service of summons upon
[respondent Perez], the Labor Arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction over his (sic) person. Perforce, the
proceedings conducted and the decision rendered is nugatory and without effect. The lack of proper service of
summons clearly deprived [respondent Perez] of her right to due process of law. She should have been afforded
her day before the labor arbiter. She was deprived of her right to be heard and to present evidence which are
essential ingredients of due process of law. While it is true that the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC are not bound
by technical rules of evidence and procedure, such should not be interpreted so as to dispense with the
fundamental and essential right of every person to due process of law.
28
The plaintiff is expected to coordinate with the sheriff in serving the summons. Plaintiff cannot just file and
pay the filing fees. Otherwise, the court will dismiss the case based on failure to prosecute.
Issue
Whether or not there had been improper service of summons upon respondent Perez which renders
the judgment by the NLRC against her null and void.
Held
We rule in the negative.
The NLRC Rules provide notices or summonses shall be served on the parties to the case personally.
The same rule allows under special circumstances, that service of summons may be effected in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.
Following the explicit language of the NLRC Rules, service of summons on respondent Perez should
be made personally. But was personal service of summons practicable? Conversely, was substituted
service of summons justified? Obviously, in this case, personal service of summons was not
practicable. By respondent Perezs own admission, she was out of town during the entire proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter. Given this admission, she would be unable to personally receive the
summons and later the notices from the Labor Arbiter. Thus, even if the bailiff would return at some
other time to personally serve the summons on respondent Perez, it would still yield the same result.
To proceed with personal service of summons on respondent Perez who unequivocally admits that she
was out of town during the entire proceedings before the Labor Arbiter would not only be impractical
and futile - it would be absurd. While we are not unmindful of the NLRC rules which state that
service of summons should be made personally, considering the circumstances in the instant case, we
find that service of summons at TSL, respondent Perezs place of business, amounts to substantial
compliance with the Rules. In the fairly recent case of Scenarios v. Vinluan, service of summons by
registered mail at therein petitioners place of business was considered valid. This Court declared in
the said case that technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied in quasi-judicial proceedings;
only substantial compliance is required. That the summons was served in the premises of therein
petitioners office was enough to convince the court that the service of said processes was completed
and resultantly, the requirement of notice has been served.
In quasi-judicial proceedings before the NLRC and its arbitration branch, procedural rules governing
service of summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance thereof is sufficient. The
constitutional requirement of due process with respect to service of summons only exacts that the
service of summons be such as may reasonably be expected to give the notice desired. Once the
service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the requirement of justice is
answered, the traditional notion of fair play is satisfied, due process is served.
It has not escaped our attention the respondents denial of receipt of the notices from the Labor
Arbiter, yet they were able to receive a copy of the Labor Arbiters decision and file a timely appeal
with the NLRC.
Indeed, respondents were able to seek the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the Labor Arbiter
when they seasonably filed their appeal before the NLRC. A party who has availed himself of the
opportunity to present his position cannot claim to have been denied due process. Despite such
opportunity, respondents failed to convincingly establish that their defense is meritorious.
We must emphasize that even though respondents did not participate in the proceedings before the
Labor Arbiter, they were eventually able to argue their case on appeal before the NLRC. In their
appeal, respondents had the opportunity to substantiate with evidence their claim that they did not
receive the summons and notices from the Labor Arbiter, and that petitioner was not illegally
dismissed.
Necessarily, respondents contention that they were denied due process because of improper service of
summons and notices is devoid of merit. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an

opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is
absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard; hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process
where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at
all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.
Pascual v. Pascual, G.R. No. 171916, December 4, 2009

Facts
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction with Damages before the RTC against respondent. The process server, in his
Return of Service, reported, among others that:
The undersigned Process Server of this Honorable Court went at defendant's given address at No. 4 Manikling
St., Talayan Village, Quezon City on May 20, 2002 to serve the summons and copy of the Complaint together
with the annexes thereto in connection with the above-entitled case.
At the time of the service of the said summons, the defendant was not at her home and only her maid was there
who refused to receive the said summons [in spite] of the insistence of the undersigned.
The following day, the undersigned went back at defendant's residence to have her receive the subject
summons but again the above defendant was not at her house.
Thereafter, an alias summons was issued by the RTC and the following report was submitted:
The undersigned, on May 29, 2002, made a 3rd attempt to serve the alias summons issued by the Hon. Court
relative with the above-entitled case at the given address of the defendant.
The undersigned, accompanied by the barangay officials of the said place, proceeded at defendant's residence
but the undersigned was not permitted to go inside her house and was given information by her maid that the
defendant was not there.
The defendant's car was parked inside her house and inquiries/verification made on her neighbors revealed that
the defendant was inside her house at the time of service of said summons and probably did not want to show-
up when her maid informed her of undersigned's presence.
Subsequently, the process server returned with the following report, stating that a substituted service
was effected:
This is to certify that on the 14th day of August, 2002, I personally went at Dr. Lourdes Pascual's residence at
#4 Manikling Street, Talayan Village, Quezon City, to serve the copy of the Summons dated August 12, 2002,
together with a copy of the Complaint and its annexes thereto.
Defendant Dr. Lourdes Pascual was out during the time of service of the said summons and only her housemaid
was present. The undersigned left a copy of the same to the latter who is at the age of reason but refused to sign
the same.
For failure of the respondent to file a responsive pleading, petitioner, filed a Motion to Declare
Defendant in Default to which the petitioner filed an Opposition/Comment to Plaintiff's Motion to
Declare Defendant in Default claiming that she was not able to receive any summons and copy of the
complaint. The RTC declared respondent in default and allowed petitioner to file his evidence ex-
parte. Consequently, the RTC found in favor of the petitioner. Respondent then filed a Motion to Set
Aside Order of Default with the argument of non-service of summons upon her. This was denied by
the RTC and on the same day, a Certificate of Finality and Entry of Judgment was issued.
Aggrieved, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court which was granted by the same Court
Petitioner comes now to this Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Issue
Whether or not there was a proper and valid substituted service of summons, the resolution of which,
will determine whether jurisdiction was indeed acquired by the trial court over the person of the
petitioner.
Held
No proper summons.
This Court gave an in-depth discussion as to the nature and requisites of substituted service in
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, et al. We can break down this section into the following requirements to
effect a valid substituted service:
Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served
promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. One month from the issuance of summons can be
considered reasonable time with regard to personal service on the defendant. For substituted service
of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the
summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. Several attempts means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least
two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only
then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure
must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service,
the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or
house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify substituted service..
A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or residence, it should be left with a
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. The sheriff must therefore determine if the
person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipients
relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the
receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the
defendant of said receipt of summons.
A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendants office or regular place of business, then it should
be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted
service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the
president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the
obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from
inaction on the summons.
Petitioner contends that there was a valid substituted service of summons as shown in not one, but
three Officer's Return. He points out that the absence in the officer's return of a statement about the
impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service was invalid. He adds
that proof of prior attempts to serve personally can be deduced from the other returns when there are
several in a series of officer's returns all tending to establish the impossibility of personal service upon
the respondent. However, the said argument of the petitioner is merely a plain deduction that veers
away from the well-established requisite that the officer must show that the defendant cannot be
served promptly, or that there was an impossibility of prompt service. A cursory reading of the three
Officer's Returns does not show any compliance with the said requisite. The Return of Service
inadequately states:
At the time of service of the said summons, the defendant was not at her home and only her maid was there
who refused to receive the said summons [in spite] of the insistence of the undersigned.
The following day, May 21, 2002, the undersigned went back at defendant's residence to have her receive the
subject summons but again the above defendant was not at her house.
proceeded at defendant's residence but the undersigned was not permitted to go inside her house and was given
information by her maid that the defendant was not there.
The defendant's car was parked inside her house and inquiries/verification made on her neighbors revealed that
the defendant was inside her house at the time of service of said summons and probably did not want to show-
up when her maid informed her of undersigned's presence.
Defendant Dr. Lourdes Pascual was out during the time of service of the said summons and only her housemaid
was present. The undersigned left a copy of the same to the latter who is at the age of reason but refused to sign
the same.
The Return of Summons does not show or indicate the actual exertion or any positive steps taken by
the officer or process server in serving the summons personally to the defendant. At best, the Return
merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information was
verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the
attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such
efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of
summons.
Petitioner further states that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
must be applied to the present case. The said argument, however, is only meritorious, provided that
there was a strict compliance with the procedure for serving a summons. In the absence of even the
barest compliance with the procedure for a substituted service of summons outlined in the Rules of
Court, the presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions does not apply.
Applying the above disquisitions, the jurisdiction over the person of the respondent was never vested
with the RTC, because the manner of substituted service by the process server was apparently invalid
and ineffective. As such, there was a violation of due process.
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006

Facts
Petitioner is the defendant in a Civil Case for Filing, Recognition and/or Enforcement of Foreign
Judgment. Respondent Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign courts judgment rendered by the
United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America for wrongful death of
deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence officials of the Philippines allegedly
under the command, direction, authority, supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of
defendant Manotoc. The trial court issued a Summons addressed to petitioner at Alexandra
Condominium Corporation or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig
City. The Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz,
an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit mentioned earlier. When petitioner failed
to file her Answer, the trial court declared her in default.
Petitioner, by special appearance of counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons. The
grounds to support the motion were: (1) the address of defendant indicated in the Complaint
(Alexandra Homes) was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of business as provided in
Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was
neither a representative, employee, nor a resident of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the
Rules on personal and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident of
Singapore; and (5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.
The trial court rejected Manotocs Motion to Dismiss on the strength of its findings that her residence,
for purposes of the Complaint, was Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig,
Metro Manila, based on the documentary evidence of respondent Trajano. The trial court relied on the
presumption that the sheriffs substituted service was made in the regular performance of official duty,
and such presumption stood in the absence of proof to the contrary. Undaunted, Manotoc filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals.
The CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. The court a quo adopted the findings of
the trial court that petitioners residence was at Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco
Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, which was also the residence of her husband, as shown by the
testimony of Atty. Robert Swift and the Returns of the registered mails sent to petitioner. Thus,
according to the CA, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over petitioner as there was a valid
substituted service pursuant to Section 8, Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court.
Issue
Whether or not there was valid service of summons.
Held
Valid.
Requirements for Substituted Service
Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served
promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. One month from the issuance of summons can be
considered reasonable time with regard to personal service on the defendant. For substituted service
of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the
summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. Several attempts means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least
two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only
then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure
must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service,
the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or
house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify substituted service..
A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or residence, it should be left with a
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. The sheriff must therefore determine if the
person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipients
relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the
receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the
defendant of said receipt of summons.
A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendants office or regular place of business, then it should
be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted
service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the
president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the
obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from
inaction on the summons.
Let us examine the full text of the Sheriffs Return, which reads:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons with
complaint and annexes issued by this Honorable Court in the above entitled case, personally upon the defendant
IMELDA IMEE MARCOS-MANOTOC located at Alexandra Condominium Corpration [sic] or
Alexandra Homes E-2 Room 104 No. 29 Merlaco [sic] Ave., Pasig, Metro-Manila at reasonable hours of
the day but to no avail for the reason that said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or
premises. That on the 15th day of July, 1993, substituted service of summons was resorted to in accordance with
the Rules of Court in the Philippines leaving copy of said summons with complaint and annexes thru [sic] (Mr)
Macky de la Cruz, caretaker of the said defendant, according to (Ms) Lyn Jacinto, Receptionist and Telephone
Operator of the said building, a person of suitable age and discretion, living with the said defendant at the given
address who acknowledged the receipt thereof of said processes but he refused to sign.
Invalid Substituted Service in the Case at Bar
A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of material data on
the serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid
reason cited in the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal
service has become impossible or unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of on many
occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons. The pertinent facts and circumstances
on the efforts exerted to serve the summons personally must be narrated in the Return. It cannot be
determined how many times, on what specific dates, and at what hours of the day the attempts were
made. Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be assailed, as in the present case,
by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the
service of summons be described with more particularity in the Return or Certificate of Service.
Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioners address in the Complaint, it has not been shown that
respondent Trajano or Sheriff Caelas, who served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to
locate petitioner. Certainly, the second paragraph of the Complaint only states that respondents were
informed, and so [they] allege about the address and whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to
substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through
more direct means. More so, in the case in hand, when the alleged petitioners residence or house is
doubtful or has not been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal service to have
been pursued persistently.
The Court rules in the case at bar that the narration of the efforts made to find the defendant and the
fact of failure written in broad and imprecise words will not suffice. The facts and circumstances
should be stated with more particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at personal
service, dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of occupants of the
alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be included in the Return to satisfactorily show
the efforts undertaken. That such efforts were made to personally serve summons on defendant, and
those resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt personal service.
In this case, the Sheriffs Return lacks information as to residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky
de la Cruz, aside from the sheriffs general assertion that de la Cruz is the resident caretaker of
petitioner as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist and telephone operator of
Alexandra Homes. It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the
condominium unit considering that a married woman of her stature in society would unlikely hire a
male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the petitioners allegation that Macky de la Cruz is not
her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to have additional information in the Return
of Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruzs refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong
indication that he did not have the necessary relation of confidence with petitioner.
Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid substituted service, the proceedings held
before the trial court perforce must be annulled.
The court a quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. It
reasons out that [t]he certificate of service by the proper officer is prima facie evidence of the facts set
out herein, and to overcome the presumption arising from said certificate, the evidence must be clear
and convincing.
The Court acknowledges that this ruling is still a valid doctrine. However, for the presumption to
apply, the Sheriffs Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally serve
the summons and that said efforts failed. These facts must be specifically narrated in the Return. To
reiterate, it must clearly show that the substituted service must be made on a person of suitable age
and discretion living in the dwelling or residence of defendant. Otherwise, the Return is flawed and
the presumption cannot be availed of.
Sansio v. Mogol, G.R. No. 177007, July 14, 2009

Facts
Petitioner Sansio Philippines, Inc. is a domestic corporation that is engaged in the business of
manufacturing and selling appliances and other related products. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum
of Money and Damagesagainst respondent spouses Mogol before the MeTC. At the request of herein
petitioner, the process server of the MeTC served the summons and the copy of the complaint on
respondent spouses Mogol at the courtroom of the MeTC. Respondent spouses were in the said
premises, as they were waiting for the scheduled hearing of the criminal cases filed by petitioner
against respondent Alicia Mogol for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Upon being so informed
of the summons and the complaint, respondent spouses Mogol referred the same to their counsel, who
was also present in the courtroom. The counsel of respondent spouses Mogol took hold of the
summons and the copy of the complaint and read the same. Thereafter, he pointed out to the process
server that the summons and the copy of the complaint should be served only at the address that was
stated in both documents, i.e., at 1218 Daisy St., Employee Village, Lucena City, and not anywhere
else. The counsel of respondent spouses Mogol apparently gave back the summons and the copy of
the complaint to the process server and advised his clients not to obtain a copy and sign for the same.
As the process server could not convince the respondent spouses Mogol to sign for the
aforementioned documents, he proceeded to leave the premises of the courtroom.
The process server of the MeTC of Manila issued a Return on Service of Summons, declaring that:
This is to certify that on October 3, 2000, the undersigned tried to serve a copy of the Summons issued by the
Court in the above-entitled case together with a copy of Complaint upon defendant Leodegario Mogol[,] Jr. and
Alicia Mogol doing business under the name/style of Mr. Homes Appliance (sic) at MTC (sic) Branch 24
Ongpin (sic) (courtroom) as requested by plaintiff counsel, but failed for the reason that they refused to received
(sic) with no valid reason at all.
The original and duplicate copies of the Summons are hereby respectfully returned, (sic) UNSERVED.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default. Petitioner averred that the summons
and the copy of the complaint were already validly served upon the respondent spouses Mogol at the
courtroom of the MeTC which they refused to accept for no valid reason at all. From the date of said
service up to the time of the filing of the above-stated motion, respondent spouses Mogol had yet to
file any responsive pleading. Petitioner, thus, prayed that judgment be rendered against respondent
spouses Mogol, and that the relief prayed for in its Complaint be granted.
Through a special appearance of their counsel, respondent spouses Mogol filed an Opposition to the
Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default. They reiterated that the service should have been
effected at the respondent spouses residential address, as stated in the summons and the copy of the
complaint.
The MeTC declared the respondents in default. The MeTC ruled that Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court does not specify where service is to be effected. Respondent spouses Mogol were validly
served with summons and a copy of the complaint. For failing to file any responsive pleading before
the lapse of the reglementary period therefor, the Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default filed by
petitioner was declared to be meritorious.
Respondent spouses Mogol filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Injunction before the
RTC of Manila. The RTC dismissed the petition. The RTC of Manila held that Section 6, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court does not mandate that summons be served strictly at the address provided by the
plaintiff in the complaint. Therefore, it did not matter much that the summons and the copy of the
complaint in this case were served inside the courtroom of the MeTC instead of the address at 1218
Daisy St., Employee Village, Lucena City.
Respondent spouses Mogol appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA granted the petition.
We hold that there was no valid service of summons upon the [respondent] Mogol spouses in Civil Case No.
167879. As stated earlier, the process server failed to effect personal service of summons against the
[respondent] Mogol spouses at the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24, because the latter refused to
receive it, arguing that the same should be served at their residence, and not anywhere else. In this case, the
process servers Return of Service of Summons states, in clear and unequivocal terms, that: The original and
duplicate copies of the Summons are hereby returned, UNSERVED. From the foregoing, We hold that the
Mogol spouses were never in actual receipt of the summons in Civil Case 167879. Perforce, the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over them. Stated otherwise, the trial court is not left with any other remedy in case the
defendant refuses to receive and sign for his receipt of the summons, as in this case. Unfortunately, however,
after the incident at the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24, there was no longer any further effort on
the part of the trial court to serve anew the summons, together with a copy of the complaint, upon the Mogol
spouses.
Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages
In the interregnum, petitioner presented its evidence ex parte in the main case. The MeTC adjudged
that petitioner had sufficiently established its entitlement to the grant of the reliefs prayed for in its
Complaint. Respondent spouses Mogol appealed to the RTC of Manila.
The RTC affirmed in toto the Decision of the MeTC. Thereafter, respondent spouses Mogol no longer
filed any appeal on the above Decision of the RTC. Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review,
questioning the rulings of the Court of Appeals.
Issue
Held
In fine, we rule that jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was validly
acquired by the MeTC, Branch 25 in this case. For their failure to file any responsive pleading to the
Complaint filed against them, in violation of the order of the said court as stated in the summons,
respondent spouses Mogol were correctly declared in default.
In the instant case, the Court finds that there was already a valid service of summons in the persons of
respondent spouses Mogol. To recapitulate, the process server presented the summons and the copy of
the complaint to respondent spouses at the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila. The latter immediately
referred the matter to their counsel, who was present with them in the aforesaid courtroom. At the
express direction of his clients, the counsel took the summons and the copy of the complaint, read the
same, and thereby informed himself of the contents of the said documents. Ineluctably, at that point,
the act of the counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of receiving the summons and the copy of the
complaint already constituted receipt on the part of his clients, for the same was done with the latters
behest and consent. Already accomplished was the operative act of handing a copy of the summons to
respondent spouses in person. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol
was already acquired by the MeTC of Manila. That being said, the subsequent act of the counsel of
respondent spouses of returning the summons and the copy of the complaint to the process server was
no longer material.
Furthermore, the instruction of the counsel for respondent spouses not to obtain a copy of the
summons and the copy of the complaint, under the lame excuse that the same must be served only in
the address stated therein, was a gross mistake. Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not
require that the service of summons on the defendant in person must be effected only at the latters
residence as stated in the summons. On the contrary, said provision is crystal clear that, whenever
practicable, summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant; or if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Nothing more is required. As correctly held by the
RTC, the service of the copy of the summons and the complaint inside the courtroom of the MeTC of
Manila, Branch 24 was the most practicable act under the circumstances, and the process server need
not wait for respondent spouses Mogol to reach their given address before he could serve on the latter
the summons and the copy of the complaint. Due to the distance of the said address, service therein
would have been more costly and would have entailed a longer delay on the part of the process server
in effecting the service of the summons.
Much more important than considerations of practicality, however, is the fact that respondent spouses
Mogol based their case on a wrong appreciation of the above-stated provisions of the Rules of Court.
Respondent spouses Mogol principally argue that Section 6 of Rule 14 cannot be singled out without
construing the same with Section 7.
Said arguments must fail, for they have no leg to stand on.
The service of summons to be done personally does not mean that service is possible only at the
defendants actual residence. It is enough that the defendant is handed a copy of the summons in
person by anyone authorized by law. This is distinct from substituted service. There was already a
valid service of summons in the persons of respondent spouses Mogol in the courtroom of the MeTC
of Manila, Branch 24, when their counsel, upon their explicit instructions, received and read the same
on their behalf. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the fact that the summons was returned
to the process server and respondent spouses Mogul subsequently declined to sign for them did not
mean that the service of summons in the persons of respondent spouses was a failure, such that a
further effort was required to serve the summons anew. A tender of summons, much less, a
substituted service of summons, need no longer be resorted to in this case.
As to the reliance of the Court of Appeals on the second paragraph of the Return on Service of
Summons stating that the original and duplicate copies of the Summons were returned UNSERVED,
the Court finds the same utterly misplaced. A simple reading of the first paragraph of the Return on
Service of Summons, which contains the circumstances surrounding the service of the summons on
the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol, manifestly reveals that the summons and the copy of
the complaint were already validly served on the said respondents. They merely refused to receive or
obtain a copy of the same.
Although We find lamentable the apparently erroneous statement made by the process server in the
aforesaid second paragraph an error that undoubtedly added to the confusion of the parties to this case
the same was, nonetheless, a mere conclusion of law, which does not bind the independent judgment
of the courts. Indeed, it cannot be said that because of such a statement, respondent spouses Mogol
had the right to rely on said return informing them that the summons had been unserved, thus
justifying their non-filing of any responsive pleading.
Republic v. Glasgow, G.R. No. 170281, January 18, 2008

Facts
The Republic filed a complaint in the RTC for civil forfeiture of assets (with urgent plea for issuance
of temporary restraining order [TRO] and/or writ of preliminary injunction) against the bank deposits
maintained by Glasgow in CSBI. The case was filed pursuant to RA 9160 (the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001). Summons to Glasgow was returned unserved as it could no longer be found
at its last known address. The Republic filed a verified omnibus motion for (a) issuance of alias
summons and (b) leave of court to serve summons by publication. The trial court directed the issuance
of alias summons. However, no mention was made of the motion for leave of court to serve summons
by publication.
The trial court archived the case allegedly for failure of the Republic to serve the alias summons. The
Republic filed an ex parte omnibus motion to (a) reinstate the case and (b) resolve its pending motion
for leave of court to serve summons by publication. The trial court ordered the reinstatement of the
case and directed the Republic to serve the alias summons on Glasgow and CSBI within 15 days.
However, it did not resolve the Republics motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.
The Republic (through the Office of the Solicitor General [OSG]) received a copy of the sheriffs
return stating that the alias summons was returned unserved as Glasgow was no longer holding office
at the given address and left no forwarding address. Meanwhile, the Republics motion for leave of
court to serve summons by publication remained unresolved. Thus, the Republic filed a manifestation
and ex parte motion to resolve its motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.
The OSG received a copy of Glasgows Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Special Appearance). It
alleged that (1) the court had no jurisdiction over its person as summons had not yet been served on it;
(2) the complaint was premature and stated no cause of action as there was still no conviction for
estafa or other criminal violations implicating Glasgow and (3) there was failure to prosecute on the
part of the Republic. The Republic opposed Glasgows motion to dismiss. It contended that its suit was
an action quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was not a prerequisite to
confer jurisdiction on the court.
The trial court issued the assailed order. It dismissed the case. Raising questions of law, the Republic
filed this petition.
Issue
Whether or not service of summons may be made by publication
Held
May be made.
Service Of Summons May Be By Publication
The rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem. While that case involved forfeiture
proceedings under RA 1379, the same principle applies in cases for civil forfeiture under RA 9160, as
amended, since both cases do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture
of the properties either acquired illegally or related to unlawful activities in favor of the State.
As an action in rem, it is a proceeding against the thing itself instead of against the person. In actions
in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to conferring
jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless,
summons must be served upon the defendant in order to satisfy the requirements of due process. For
this purpose, service may be made by publication as such mode of service is allowed in actions in rem
and quasi in rem.
In this connection, Section 8, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 8. Notice and manner of service.

1. The respondent shall be given notice of the petition in the same manner as service of summons under
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and the following rules:
a. The notice shall be served on respondent personally, or by any other means prescribed in Rule
14 of the Rules of Court;
b. The notice shall contain: (i) the title of the case; (ii) the docket number; (iii) the cause of
action; and (iv) the relief prayed for; and
c. The notice shall likewise contain a proviso that, if no comment or opposition is filed within
the reglementary period, the court shall hear the case ex parte and render such judgment as
may be warranted by the facts alleged in the petition and its supporting evidence.
2. Where the respondent is designated as an unknown owner or whenever his whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication of the notice of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for
such time as the court may order. In the event that the cost of publication exceeds the value or amount
of the property to be forfeited by ten percent, publication shall not be required. (emphasis supplied)
Palma v. Galvez, G.R.No. 165273, March 10, 201029

Facts
Petitioner Leah Palma filed with the RTC an action for damages against the Philippine Heart Center
(PHC), Dr. Danilo Giron and Dr. Bernadette O. Cruz, alleging that the defendants committed
professional fault, negligence and omission for having removed her right ovary against her will, and
losing the same and the tissues extracted from her during the surgery; and that although the specimens
were subsequently found, petitioner was doubtful and uncertain that the same was hers as the label
therein pertained that of somebody else. Defendants filed their respective Answers. Petitioner
subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint, praying for the inclusion of
additional defendants who were all nurses at the PHC. Thus, summons were subsequently issued to
them.
The RTC's process server submitted his return of summons stating that the alias summons, together
with a copy of the amended complaint and its annexes, were served upon private respondent thru her
husband Alfredo Agudo, who received and signed the same as private respondent was out of the
country.
Counsel of private respondent filed a Notice of Appearance and a Motion for Extension of Time to
File Answer stating that he was just engaged by private respondent's husband as she was out of the
country and the Answer was already due.
Private respondent's counsel filed a Motion for Another Extension of Time to File Answer, and
stating that while the draft answer was already finished, the same would be sent to private respondent
for her clarification/verification before the Philippine Consulate in Ireland; thus, the counsel prayed
for another 20 days to file the Answer.
Private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction
over her as she was not properly served with summons, since she was temporarily out of the country;
that service of summons on her should conform to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC issued its assailed Order granting private respondent's motion to dismiss. It found that while
the summons was served at private respondent's house and received by respondent's husband, such
service did not qualify as a valid service of summons on her as she was out of the country at the time
the summons was served, thus, she was not personally served a summons; and even granting that she
knew that a complaint was filed against her, nevertheless, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
her person as she was not validly served with summons; that substituted service could not be resorted
to since it was established that private respondent was out of the country, thus, Section 16, Rule 14
provides for the service of summons on her by publication.
Issue
Whether or not the summons was valid.
Held
Valid.
Now on the merits, the issue for resolution is whether there was a valid service of summons on private
respondent. Private respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of the Philippines at
the time of the service of summons; thus, service of summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule
29
On MTD the remedy depends on the ground of MTD. If without prejudice to re-filing - -refile or 65, if with
prejudice (F,H,I) appeal.
Service of summons on domestic juridical entity
1. Domestic corporations/GOCC under CorpCode/Local subsidiaries /Corp under foreign investments act
(i.e. those operating within export processing zones even with majority foreign ownership).
14 of the Rules of Court. The RTC found that since private respondent was abroad at the time of the
service of summons, she was a resident who was temporarily out of the country; thus, service of
summons may be made only by publication.
Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words may and also, it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of
summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-
resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of
the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to:
1. Substituted service set forth in section 7 ( formerly Section 8), Rule 14;
2. Personal service outside the country, with leave of court;
3. Service by publication, also with leave of court; or
4. In any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Substituted service of summons under the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suit in
personam against residents of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom is the normal method of
service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court over such defendant. Considering that
private respondent was temporarily out of the country, the summons and complaint may be validly
served on her through substituted service.
We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the
summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the
country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left
with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with
the rules regarding the service of summons is as important as the issue of due process as that of
jurisdiction.
In this case, the Sheriff's Return stated that private respondent was out of the country; thus, the service
of summons was made at her residence with her husband, Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt
thereof. Alfredo was presumably of suitable age and discretion, who was residing in that place and,
therefore, was competent to receive the summons on private respondent's behalf.
Notably, private respondent makes no issue as to the fact that the place where the summons was
served was her residence, though she was temporarily out of the country at that time, and that Alfredo
is her husband. In fact, in the notice of appearance and motion for extension of time to file answer
submitted by private respondent's counsel, he confirmed the Sheriff's Return by stating that private
respondent was out of the country and that his service was engaged by respondent's husband. In his
motion for another extension of time to file answer, private respondent's counsel stated that a draft of
the answer had already been prepared, which would be submitted to private respondent, who was in
Ireland for her clarification and/or verification before the Philippine Consulate there. These
statements establish the fact that private respondent had knowledge of the case filed against her, and
that her husband had told her about the case as Alfredo even engaged the services of her counsel.
In addition, we agree with petitioner that the RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of
private respondent when the latter's counsel entered his appearance on private respondent's behalf,
without qualification and without questioning the propriety of the service of summons, and even filed
two Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer. In effect, private respondent, through counsel,
had already invoked the RTCs jurisdiction over her person by praying that the motions for extension
of time to file answer be granted. We have held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief,
such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment,
and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court. When private respondent earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to
secure affirmative relief in her motions for additional time to file answer, she voluntarily submitted to
the jurisdiction of the RTC and is thereby estopped from asserting otherwise.
Acance v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159699, March 16, 2005

Facts
Rrespondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) an amended complaint against petitioners.
The amended complaint sought to annul the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Jesus
P. Acance and Waiver of Rights executed by Jesulito, Manuel and Nestor, all surnamed Acance, and
their mother Angela. In seeking to nullify the extra-judicial settlement of estate executed by the
Acance siblings and their TCT Nos. 4365 and 4366, the Quijano siblings alleged that the subject real
properties are conjugal properties of Angela and Vernier because these were acquired by Angela
during the subsistence of her first marriage with Vernier. As such, they (the Quijano siblings) have a
valid right to succeed over the said properties as the lawful and compulsory heirs of Angela and
Vernier.
The Quijano siblings impugned the validity of the extra-judicial settlement claiming that the signature
of Angela thereon was a forgery or that she affixed the same without her free volition because at the
time of its execution, she was already senile. In any case, Angelas purported waiver of her rights over
the subject properties in favor of her children with Jesus (Acance siblings) and excluding her children
with Vernier (Quijano siblings) is against the law.
Upon motion of the respondents (the Quijano siblings and their spouses), as plaintiffs therein, the
court a quo issued an order declaring the petitioners (the Acance siblings and their spouses), as
defendants therein, in default for their failure to file an answer to the amended complaint.
Petitioner Rosalino Acance, as attorney-in-fact and administrator of the subject properties, filed with
the court a quo a Motion to Lift/Set Aside Order of Default. Upon learning about Civil Case he filed
therein a Motion to Represent Defendants however, petitioner Rosalino found out that his motion was
not included in the court calendar for that day. Since there was no action on his motion, he had the
impression that the court a quo needed time to determine other jurisdictional requirements
considering that the petitioners are American citizens and non-residents of the Philippines.
Petitioner Rosalino further alleged that he had not received a copy of the complaint. The only
pleading he received pertaining to the case was that of the motion to declare the petitioners in default
and setting the hearing thereon. At the said hearing, the respondents motion was granted and the
petitioners were declared in default.
The court a quo denied the motion to lift the order of default. It explained that the petitioners are all
residing abroad but the real properties subject of the complaint are situated in Muntinlupa City.
Accordingly, upon motion, they were deemed served with the summons and the amended complaint
through publication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation in Muntinlupa City, where the
properties are located, and nationwide. The petitioners had sixty (60) days from the last publication
within which to file their answer. However, they failed to do so.
.
Forthwith, the petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the court a quo in denying their motion to lift the default order. The
appellate court rendered the assailed Resolution dismissing outright the petition for certiorari for
failure of the petitioners to file a motion for reconsideration with the court a quo.
Issue
Held
No valid service of summons.
In this case, the court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the petitioners in default
without showing that there was full compliance with the requirements for extraterritorial service of
summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioners are citizens of the United States and residents thereof. Further, the suit against them
involves real property wherein the petitioners, as defendants therein, have an interest. These facts
clearly warranted extraterritorial service of summons in accordance with Section 15, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court.
However, as will be shown shortly, the service of summons in this case is defective. There was no
showing that copies of the summons and the amended complaint were duly served at the petitioners
last known correct address by registered mail, as a complement to the publication pursuant to Section
15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and in compliance with the court a quos Order granting the
respondents motion for leave to serve summons by publication.
The respondents alleged that they had caused copies of the Amended Complaint and Summons and
the Order to be sent by registered mail to the Acances known addresses in the United States. In their
Compliance filed with the court a quo, the respondents averred that a copy of the summons and order
of the court together with a copy of the amended complaint had been sent to each of the three (3)
defendants in their respective addresses by registered mail all sent from the Makati City Branch Post
Office. However, except for this bare allegation, the corresponding registry receipts or copies thereof
were not presented to show compliance with the rules.
Further, there was likewise non-compliance with Section 19, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court relating to
the proof of service by publication.
While the respondents claimed that they had complied with the service of summons by publication in
a newspaper of general circulation, it does not appear that they had presented to the court a quo the
affidavit of the printer, his foreman, or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising
manager of the Remate, where the publication was allegedly made, to prove such service by
publication. Neither did they present an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and
order of publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the petitioners by registered mail to
their last known addresses.
The failure to strictly comply correctly with the requirements of the rules regarding the mailing of
copies of the summons and the order for its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons.
Cabigao v. Nery, 2013

Facts
This resolves the administrative complaint filed by Atty. Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao (complainant
against Sheriff Neptali Angelo V. Nery Nery, Sheriff III of the Metropolitan Trial Court MeTC).
The complainant is the counsel of Vision Automotive Technology, Inc. (Vision Automotive), the
plaintiff in a Civil Case which was then pending before the MeTC. The complainant sent a letter-
complaint to the Presiding Judge of the MeTC alleging that Nery called Vision Automotive and asked
for money to cover the transportation expenses in serving the summons to the defendant in New
Manila, Quezon City.
He claimed that Vision Automotive deposited the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) in the
account of Nery with the Land Bank of the Philippines. However, despite receipt of the money
deposited by Vision Automotive, Nery still failed to serve the summons to the defendant. The
complainant furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with a copy of his letter-
complaint.
Nery denied that he asked for money from Vision Automotive. He averred that the Civil Case was
raffled to their branch; that a month after it was filed, Vision Automotive has yet to coordinate with
him as regards the service of summons to the defendant. He admitted having called a representative of
Vision Automotive, but clarified that he only did so to request Vision Automotive to defray the
transportation expenses for the service of summons as it was burdensome to withdraw the amount of
P1,000.00 from the Sheriffs Trust Fund. He claimed that it was the representative of Vision
Automotive who insisted on depositing the amount of P1,000.00 in his bank account to defray the
expenses in serving the summons on the defendant.
The OCA issued its evaluation and recommendation on the case.

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:
1. the instant complaint against Neptali Angelo V. Nery, Sheriff, Branch 30, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila,
be DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter; and
2. respondent Nery be found GUILTY of less serious dishonesty and be FINED in an amount equivalent to his
six (6) months salary to be paid to the Court within thirty (30) days from notice.
Issue
Whether or not what the sheriff did was proper.
Held
Improper.
After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court adopts the findings and recommendation
of the OCA albeit with modification as regards the sanction to be imposed. Summons to the defendant
in a case shall forthwith be issued by the clerk of court upon the filing of the complaint and the
payment of the requisite legal fees. Once issued by the clerk of court, it is the duty of the sheriff,
process server or any other person serving court processes to serve the summons to the defendant
efficiently and expeditiously. Failure to do so constitutes simple neglect of duty, which is the failure
of an employee to give ones attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty
resulting from carelessness or indifference.
It took Nery more than two months to serve the summons to the defendant from the time the same
was raffled to their branch.
Explaining the delay in the service of the summons, Nery claims that Vision Automotive, from the
time it deposited the P1,000.00 in his bank account, no longer coordinated with him as regards the
service of the summons. Nerys reasoning is flawed. The supposed lack of coordination on the part of
Vision Automotive would not hinder the service of the summons to the defendant. To stress, once
issued by the clerk of court, it becomes the duty of the sheriff, process server or any other person
serving court processes to promptly serve the summons on the defendant in a case.
There being no sufficient justification for his delay in serving the summons on the defendant in the
said case, Nery clearly disregarded his duty to promptly serve the summons on the defendant and
should thus be held liable for simple neglect of duty.
It is likewise improper for Nery to ask and actually receive money from Vision Automotive, even if
the money would be used to defray the expenses in serving the summons to the defendant. "Sheriffs
are not allowed to receive any payments from the parties in the course of the performance of their
duties. They cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from the parties without observing the
proper procedural steps."
Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, outlines the
procedure to be observed in defraying the actual travel expenses in serving summons, viz:
Sec. 10. Sheriffs, Process Servers and other persons serving processes.
a. For serving summons and copy of complaint, for each defendant, Two Hundred (P200.00) Pesos;
b. x x x x
In addition to the fees hereinabove fixed, the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos shall be deposited
with the Clerk of Court upon filing of the complaint to defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process
server or other court-authorized persons in the service of summons, subpoena and other court processes that
would be issued relative to the trial of the case. In case the initial deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos is
not sufficient, then the plaintiff or petitioner shall be required to make an additional deposit. The sheriff, process
server or other court authorized person shall submit to the court for its approval a statement of the estimated
travel expenses for service of summons and court processes. Once approved, the Clerk of Court shall release the
money to said sheriff or process server. After service, a statement of liquidation shall be submitted to the court
for approval. After rendition of judgment by the court, any excess from the deposit shall be returned to the party
who made the deposit.
Accordingly, the plaintiff in a case is required to deposit the amount of P1,000.00 with the clerk of
court, which would be used to defray the actual travel expenses in serving the summons. The sheriff,
process server or any other person authorized to serve court processes would then submit to the court
a statement of estimated travel expenses for the service of the summons. Once the court approves the
statement of estimated travel expenses, the clerk of court shall release the money to the sheriff,
process server or any other person authorized to serve court processes.
Nery failed to follow the foregoing procedure and, instead, opted to ask Vision Automotive to defray
the actual travel expenses that would be incurred in serving the summons to the defendant. His failure
to strictly comply with the provisions of Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court warrants the
imposition of disciplinary measure. Considering that Nery demanded from Vision Automotive only
the amount needed to actually defray his actual travel expenses, the Court agrees with the OCA that
he should be held administratively liable for less serious dishonesty.
Motions (Rule 15)

Republic v. Peralta, G.R. No. 150327, June 18, 2003
Facts
Respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of real property with the
Regional Trial Court against the defendants Republic of the Philippines, the Regional Executive
Director of Region XI of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the
Conservation Officer in said region. Officers of the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) caused the
construction of a big concrete building on said portion of the property; Benedictos lawyer wrote a
letter to the BFD demanding that it vacate the said portion of his property on which the building was
constructed but said letter was ignored; Benedicto did not give his assent to the requests of the
aforenamed government officials despite which they still caused the construction of the building; the
plaintiffs demanded that the defendants vacate the property but the latter refused. The plaintiffs
prayed that after due proceedings judgment be rendered in their favor and that the defendants be
ordered to vacate the subject property and pay the plaintiffs damages and litigation expenses.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants finding and declaring
that the property occupied by the defendants was part of the plaintiffs property. The RTC ordered the
defendants to vacate the property, restore possession thereof to the plaintiffs and remove all the
improvements thereon made by them.
On May 30, 1997, five days before the expiration of the period to file an appeal, the defendants filed,
through registered mail, a motion for the reconsideration of the RTC decision. On June 11, 1997, the
RTC issued ex parte an order expunging the said motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was
a mere scrap of paper for failure of the defendants to incorporate any notice of hearing as required by
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Unaware of the June 11, 1997 Order of the RTC, the
defendants filed on July 14, 1997 a Manifestation with Notice of Hearing on Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 7, 1997 appending thereto a notice of hearing of their May 30, 1997
Motion for Reconsideration.
In the meantime, on July 18, 1997, the defendants received a copy of the June 11, 1997 Order of the
trial court expunging their motion for reconsideration. On July 22, 1997, the defendants filed their
notice of appeal from the decision of the court. The plaintiffs, for their part, filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal of the defendants on the ground that their May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration was a
mere scrap of paper; hence, the motion did not toll the running of the reglementary period for appeal.
Thus, the defendants allegedly failed to perfect their appeal from the decision of the court within the
reglementary period. On August 11, 1997, the RTC received the defendants notice of appeal.
The RTC issued an order giving due course to the defendants appeal declaring that they still had a
period of five days from July 18, 1997 when they received a copy of the order expunging their notice
of appeal or until July 23, 1997 within which to perfect their appeal from the June 11, 1997 Order.
However, the RTC issued an ex parte order dismissing the defendants appeal on its finding that in
light of jurisprudence brought to its attention, they failed to perfect their appeal within the
reglementary period.
Thereafter, the defendants, now the petitioners, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari. The CA rendered its decision denying due course and dismissing the petition for certiorari.
The appellate court held that petitioners May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC
decision did not comply with Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, as amended; hence, a mere
scrap of paper which did not toll the running of the reglementary period for appeal. Thus, the RTC
decision had already become final and executory. According to the appellate court, the RTC did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioners appeal therein. As such, they were
not entitled to a writ of certiorari. The CA further held that the petitioners, through the negligence of
the OSG, failed to perfect their appeal. The CA opined that to nullify the title of respondents over the
subject property, the petitioners should have instituted a petition for reversion, and not a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended.
Issue
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration was defective.
Held
Defective.
The Court agrees with the CA that the OSG was negligent when it filed the defective motion for
reconsideration.
In this case, the petitioners, through the OSG, received on May 20, 1997 the decision of the RTC;
hence, they had until June 4, 1997 within which to file their motion for reconsideration or for a new
trial or to perfect their appeal from said adverse decision. Although the petitioners filed the motion for
reconsideration dated May 30, 1997 within the reglementary period, said motion failed to comply
with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The records show that there is no proof that the respondents were
actually served with a copy of said motion, as required by Section 10, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG did not bother to file an amended motion for reconsideration containing the requirements of
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG offered no valid justification for its failure to comply with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court except the self-serving claim of Solicitor Evaristo M. Padilla that his omission was
sheer inadvertence, caused by heavy pressure of work in preparing numerous pleadings and in the
almost daily attendance in court for naturalization cases and those for nullity of marriage, among
others. Other than the barefaced allegations of Solicitor Padilla, he offered no specific details as to
what pleadings he prepared and the hearings he attended which prevented him from complying with
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, if Solicitor Padilla was able to prepare
within the reglementary period the May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration, he offered no valid
justification for his failure to incorporate in said motion or append thereto a simple one-paragraph
notice of hearing which could have been accomplished in a few minutes. What is so nettlesome is that
the May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners was signed not only by Solicitor Padilla
but also by Assistant Solicitor General Aurora P. Cortes. Even if Solicitor Padilla, through his
negligence, failed to incorporate in said motion for reconsideration the requisite notice of hearing, the
Assistant Solicitor General should have noticed the omission before she affixed her signature thereon
and sought the immediate rectification thereof by Solicitor Padilla before said motion was filed. She
did not. She offered no valid explanation for her faux pas either. The general rule is that the clients are
bound by the mistakes and negligence of their counsel.
Trite to state, this Court is impelled to do so anew in this case. The CA cannot be faulted for ruling
that having lost their right of appeal through the negligence of the OSG the petitioners are not entitled
to a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, prescinding from all the foregoing, this Court grants not only petitioners plea that it
suspend its own rule on the perfection of appeals but also directs the reopening of the trial of the case
for the parties to adduce their respective evidence. The Court excepts this case from the said rule in
the interest of justice, to avert a grave miscarriage of justice to the State through the negligence of the
OSG.
What is involved in this case is a portion of land consisting of no less than 145,682 square meters or
less than fifteen hectares which they claim is part of the Mt. Apo National Park as shown by the
relocation survey of the panel of commissioners. The case is one of public interest. If the aforesaid
property is, indeed, part of the forest reserve as claimed by the petitioners but their right to adduce
their evidence is foreclosed by the dismissal of the present petition, the said property would be forever
lost to the prejudice of the State.
Preysler v. Manila Southcoast, G.R. No. 171872, June 28, 2010

Facts
Petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) a complaint for forcible entry against
respondent Manila Southcoast Development Corporation (respondent). The disputed land in the name
of petitioner, is also within the property covered by TCT in the name of respondent.
The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate the disputed land. Respondent
appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC reversed the MTC decision and dismissed
petitioners complaint.
Petitioner received the RTC Decision on 9 February 2004 and thereafter filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was set for hearing on 26 February 2004. Petitioner sent a copy of the Motion
for Reconsideration to respondents counsel by registered mail on 23 February 2004. During the 26
February 2004 scheduled hearing of the motion, the RTC judge reset the hearing to 2 April 2004
because the courts calendar could not accommodate the hearing of the motion. All the parties were
notified of the schedule for the next hearing.
Meanwhile, it was only on 3 March 2004, or 6 days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004,
that respondents counsel received a copy of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The rescheduled
hearing on 2 April 2004 was again reset on 7 May 2004 because the RTC judge was on official leave.
The 7 May 2004 hearing was further reset to 6 August 2004. After the hearing, respondent filed its
Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August 2004, claiming that non-compliance with the three-day notice rule
did not toll the running of the period of appeal, which rendered the decision final.
The RTC issued an Order, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for failure to appeal within
the 15 days reglementary period and declaring the Decision as final and executory. The RTC ruled
that petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was fatally flawed for failure to observe the three-day
notice rule. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the Order. The RTC dismissed
the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration and
Omnibus Motion for petitioners alleged failure to observe the three-day notice rule.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals held that the three-day notice rule
under Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is mandatory and non-compliance
therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma. As found by the RTC, petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration dated 12 February 2004 was received by respondent only on 3 March 2004, or six
days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that all
violations of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 which render the purpose of the notice of hearing of the
motion nugatory are deemed fatal.
Issue
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration is defective.
Held
Not defective.
In upholding the RTC Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
relied mainly on petitioners alleged violation of the notice requirements under Sections 4, 5, and 6,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper
where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party
and has not deprived the court of its authority.
This Court has indeed held time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court, mandatory is the requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply
with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and
does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is
not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding
surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the
arguments in the motion before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the
right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.
A close perusal of the records reveal that the trial court gave petitioner ten days within which to
comment on respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner filed its Opposition to the Motion on
November 26, 2001. In its 14-page Opposition, it not only pointed out that the Motion was defective
for not containing a notice of hearing and should then be dismissed outright by the court; it also
ventilated its substantial arguments against the merits of the Motion and of the Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration. Notably, its arguments were recited at length in the trial courts January 8, 2002
Joint Resolution. Nevertheless, the court proceeded to deny the Motions on the sole ground that they
did not contain any notice of hearing.
The requirement of notice of time and hearing in the pleading filed by a party is necessary only to
apprise the other of the actions of the former. Under the circumstances of the present case, the
purpose of a notice of hearing was served.
In this case, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the three-day notice rule.
However, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that although respondent received petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration six days after the scheduled hearing, the said hearing was reset three (3)
times with due notice to the parties. Thus, it was only more than five months after respondent
received a copy of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, that the motion was heard by the RTC.
Clearly, respondent had more than sufficient time to oppose petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
In fact, respondent did oppose the motion when it filed its Motion to Dismiss. In view of the
circumstances of this case, we find that there was substantial compliance with procedural due process.
Instead of dismissing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration based merely on the alleged procedural
lapses, the RTC should have resolved the motion based on the merits.
Furthermore, the RTC likewise erred in dismissing petitioners Omnibus Motion for allegedly failing
to comply with the three-day notice requirement. The RTC found that the notice of hearing of
petitioners Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12 November 2004 was received by
respondent on 9 November 2004. The RTC held that the service of the notice of hearing was one day
short of the prescribed minimum three days notice.
We disagree. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that [e]very written motion required to be heard and the
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other
party at least three (3) days before the date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the
hearing on shorter notice. Thus, the date of the hearing should be at least three days after receipt of
the notice of hearing by the other parties. In this case, the petitioners Omnibus Motion was set for
hearing on 12 November 2004. Thus, to comply with the notice requirement, respondent should have
received the notice of the hearing at least three days before 12 November 2004, which is 9 November
2004. Clearly, respondents receipt on 9 November 2004 (Tuesday) of the notice of hearing of the
Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12 November 2004 (Friday), was within the required
minimum three-days notice.
Bacelonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143440, February 11, 143440

Facts
Private respondents Victorino and Olivia Bolos filed a complaint for damages against herein
petitioners including Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cario before the Regional Trial Court. The case
stemmed from a vehicular accident, involving a tamaraw-type school shuttle service vehicle and a 6 x
6 Isuzu cargo truck, that occurred along Aurora Blvd. in Quezon City on February 3, 1993 resulting in
the untimely demise of private respondents daughter, Jemelee Bolos. Jemelee was on board the school
shuttle service vehicle that used to transport her from Marikina City to St. Bridget School in Quezon
City.
Petitioners-spouses Graciano, Sr. and Serena Bacelonia were named defendants in the said complaint
for damages as owners/operators of the school shuttle service that figured in the accident. Graciano
Bacelonia, Jr. was the driver thereof. The other defendants therein, Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel
Cario were the owner and the driver of the cargo truck, respectively.
Meanwhile, it appears that, prior to the filing of the complaint for damages by the private respondents,
herein petitioners filed a complaint for damages arising from the said accident against their co-
defendants with the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioners and their co-defendants entered into a
compromise agreement that led to the dismissal of the complaint.
Petitioners filed a motion to be dropped as defendants therefrom on the ground that a compromise
agreement had already been entered into by the parties.
The trial court resolved to deny the motion of the petitioners to be dropped as defendants.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and set the date of hearing thereof on February 15,
2000 at 8:30 oclock in the morning. On the same day, January 31, 2000, the petitioners also filed a
separate motion to cancel the hearing for the presentation of evidence for the defense earlier
scheduled on February 3, 2000 so that their motion for reconsideration, scheduled for hearing on
February 15, 2000, may not be rendered moot and academic. The motion to cancel hearing was itself
scheduled to be heard on February 3, 2000.
During the scheduled hearing for the initial presentation of evidence of the defense on February 3,
2000, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners for lack of merit. The
petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari maintaining
that they were not accorded their right to due process when their motion for reconsideration was
denied by the trial court prior to its scheduled hearing on February 15, 2000.
However, the petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for being premature and for lack of
merit. The appellate court explained that the questioned order of the trial court was interlocutory and
could not be assailed in a petition for certiorari and that, moreover, res judicata did not apply insofar
as the claim in the current civil case was concerned.
Issue
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration was defective.
Held
Defective.
At any rate, and to finally dispose of the instant controversy, we rule that the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed the petition for the reason that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
It should be noted that the motion for reconsideration of the trial courts resolution on January 10,
2000 was filed by the petitioners on January 31, 2000. The date and time of hearing thereof was set by
the petitioners on February 15, 2000 at 8:30 oclock in the morning. In this connection, Rule 15,
Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court on motions provides:
Section 5. Notice of hearing.- The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall
specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the
motion.
It is clear then that the scheduled hearing of the said motion for reconsideration was beyond the
period specified by the Revised Rules of Court which was not later than ten (10) days after the filing
of the motion, or no later than February 10, 2000. Significantly, the above provision of Rule 15,
Section 5 uses the mandatory term must in fixing the period within which the motion shall be
scheduled for hearing. A motion that fails to religiously comply with the mandatory provision of Rule
15, Section 5 is pro forma and presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of
the court.
The mandatory character of Rule 15, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court becomes specially
significant in this case, considering the claim of the private respondents that the petitioners have been
engaging in dilatory tactics, an imputation not without factual basis. They moved to cancel the
scheduled hearing for the initial presentation of their evidence already scheduled on February 3, 2000
ostensibly to give way to oral arguments in support of their motion for reconsideration which, as
above discussed, was pro forma. By their actuations, it can be conclusively presumed that the
petitioners had no other intention but to delay the proceedings.
Besides, the petitioners cannot validly invoke violation of due process to question the trial courts
denial of their motion for reconsideration. It should be pointed out that the motion to cancel the
scheduled hearing on February 3, 2000 filed on January 31, 2000 by the petitioners was itself
scheduled to be heard on February 3, 2000 which latter date, incidentally, was previously set by the
trial court for reception of defendants evidence. Admittedly, the petitioners were present during the
hearing on said date to argue on the merits of their motion to cancel. On the same occasion, the
private respondents objected to the motion to cancel the hearing on February 3, 2000, arguing that no
compelling reason existed to grant the said pending motion; they proposed instead that petitioners
avail of the said setting to argue their motion for reconsideration.
Despite the denial by the trial court of their motion to cancel, and a subsequent directive for them to
argue their motion for reconsideration on February 3, 2000, the petitioners chose to ignore the same.
The petitioners thus had only themselves to blame for not having been heard on their motion for
reconsideration.
Motion to Dismiss (Rule 16)

Heirs of Loreto Maramag v. Maramag, G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 200930
Facts
The case stems from a petition filed against respondents with the Regional Trial Court for revocation
and/or reduction of insurance proceeds for being void and/or inofficious, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. The petition alleged that: (1) petitioners
were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while respondents were Loretos
illegitimate family; (2) Eva de Guzman Maramag (Eva) was a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in
the killing of the latter, thus, she is disqualified to receive any proceeds from his insurance policies
from Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation
(Grepalife); (3) the illegitimate children are entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the legitimate
children, thus, the proceeds released to Odessa and those to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha
Angelie were inofficious and should be reduced; and (4) petitioners could not be deprived of their
legitimes, which should be satisfied first.
In answer, respondents admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and Odessa,
Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children; that when it ascertained that Eva was not
the legal wife of Loreto, it disqualified her as a beneficiary and divided the proceeds among Odessa,
Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, as the remaining designated beneficiaries. Insular alleged that the
complaint or petition failed to state a cause of action insofar as it sought to declare as void the
designation of Eva as beneficiary, because Loreto revoked her designation as such in Policy No.
A001544070 and it disqualified her in Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as it sought to declare as
inofficious the shares of Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, considering that no settlement of
Loretos estate had been filed nor had the respective shares of the heirs been determined. Insular
further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies designating the children of Loreto
with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.
As the whereabouts of Eva, Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were not known to petitioners,
summons by publication was resorted to. Still, the illegitimate family of Loreto failed to file their
answer. Hence, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, declared them in default in its Order.
The trial court issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss incorporated in the answer of defendants Insular Life and Grepalife is
granted with respect to defendants Odessa, Karl Brian and Trisha Maramag. The action shall proceed with
respect to the other defendants Eva Verna de Guzman, Insular Life and Grepalife.
Insular and Grepalife filed their respective motions for reconsideration, arguing, in the main, that the
petition failed to state a cause of action. The trial court issued a Resolution, disposing, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by defendants
Grepalife and Insular Life are hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the portion of the Resolution of this Court
dated 21 September 2004 which ordered the prosecution of the case against defendant Eva Verna De Guzman,
Grepalife and Insular Life is hereby SET ASIDE, and the case against them is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
In granting the motions for reconsideration of Insular and Grepalife, the trial court considered the
allegations of Insular that Loreto revoked the designation of Eva in one policy and that Insular
disqualified her as a beneficiary in the other policy such that the entire proceeds would be paid to the
illegitimate children of Loreto with Eva pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code. It ruled that it
is only in cases where there are no beneficiaries designated, or when the only designated beneficiary
30
As a general rule a MTD can be filed only before filing the answer. An exception is on the grounds of res
judicata, litis pendentia, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, prescription.
An actual case: motion to dismiss was filed based on lack of jurisdiction over the person. The trial court instead
issued an alias summons. Proper? Yes.
is disqualified, that the proceeds should be paid to the estate of the insured. As to the claim that the
proceeds to be paid to Loretos illegitimate children should be reduced based on the rules on legitime,
the trial court held that the distribution of the insurance proceeds is governed primarily by the
Insurance Code, and the provisions of the Civil Code are irrelevant and inapplicable.
Petitioners appealed the Resolution to the CA, but it dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
holding that the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action involved a pure question of law. The appellate court also noted that petitioners did not file
within the reglementary period a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts Resolution; thus, the
said Resolution had already attained finality.
Issue
Whether or not the motion to dismiss was properly granted.
Held
Proper.
The grant of the motion to dismiss was based on the trial courts finding that the petition failed to state
a cause of action. When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground, the ruling thereon should be
based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must resolve the issue on the strength of
such allegations, assuming them to be true. The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on
whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can render a
valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. This is the general
rule.
However, this rule is subject to well-recognized exceptions, such that there is no hypothetical
admission of the veracity of the allegations if:
1. The falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;
2. Such allegations are legally impossible;
3. The allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;
4. By the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or
5. There is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties or in the
course of the hearings related to the case.
In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are the
legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by
Insular and Grepalife. It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a
favorable judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance
contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of the Insurance
Code states:
SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose
name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy.
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either
the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of
the policy. The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to
benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or
indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are not
entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal
obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in
one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment considering that the
designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loretos insurance policies remains valid.
Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by
the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the
prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons
based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated
beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated
any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that
the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.
UCPB v. Beluso, G.R. No. 159912, August 17, 2007

Facts
UCPB granted the spouses Beluso a Promissory Notes Line under a Credit Agreement whereby the
latter could avail from the former credit of up to a maximum amount of P1.2 Million pesos. The
spouses Beluso constituted, other than their promissory notes, a real estate mortgage over parcels of
land as additional security for the obligation. The spouses Beluso, however, failed to make any
payment of the foregoing amounts. UCPB demanded that the spouses Beluso pay their total obligation
but the spouses Beluso failed to comply therewith. UCPB foreclosed the properties mortgaged by the
spouses Beluso to secure their credit line.
The spouses Beluso filed a Petition for Annulment, Accounting and Damages against UCPB with the
RTC of Makati City. The RTC ruled in favor of the spouses Beluso, disposing of the case as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the interest rate used by [UCPB] void and
the foreclosure and Sheriffs Certificate of Sale void. [UCPB] is hereby ordered to return to [the spouses Beluso]
the properties subject of the foreclosure; to pay [the spouses Beluso] the amount of P50,000.00 by way of
attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of suit. [The spouses Beluso] are hereby ordered to pay [UCPB] the sum of
P1,560,308.00.
UCPB appealed the RTC Decision with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated March 23, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
65, Makati City in Civil Case No. 99-314 is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that defendant-
appellant UCPB is not liable for attorneys fees or the costs of suit.
UCPB thus filed the present petition, submitting the following issues for our resolution:
Issue
Held
Denied.
UCPB had earlier moved to dismiss the petition (originally Case No. 99-314 in RTC, Makati City) on
the ground that the spouses Beluso instituted another case (Civil Case No. V-7227) before the RTC of
Roxas City, involving the same parties and issues. UCPB claims that while Civil Case No. V-7227
initially appears to be a different action, as it prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or injunction to stop foreclosure of spouses Belusos properties, it poses issues which are similar
to those of the present case. To prove its point, UCPB cited the spouses Belusos Amended Petition in
Civil Case No. V-7227, which contains similar allegations as those in the present case. The RTC of
Makati denied UCPBs Motion to Dismiss Case No. 99-314 for lack of merit. Petitioner UCPB raised
the same issue with the Court of Appeals, and is raising the same issue with us now.
Even if we assume for the sake of argument, however, that only one cause of action is involved in the
two civil actions, namely, the violation of the right of the spouses Beluso not to have their property
foreclosed for an amount they do not owe, the Rules of Court nevertheless allows the filing of the
second action. Civil Case No. V-7227 was dismissed by the RTC of Roxas City before the filing of
Case No. 99-314 with the RTC of Makati City, since the venue of litigation as provided for in the
Credit Agreement is in Makati City.
Rule 16, Section 5 bars the refiling of an action previously dismissed only in the following instances:
SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal.Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based on
paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim. (n)
SECTION 1. Grounds.Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds;
and
When an action is dismissed on the motion of the other party, it is only when the ground for the
dismissal of an action is found in paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) that the action cannot be refiled. As
regards all the other grounds, the complainant is allowed to file same action, but should take care that,
this time, it is filed with the proper court or after the accomplishment of the erstwhile absent condition
precedent, as the case may be.
UCPB, however, brings to the attention of this Court a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
spouses Beluso on 15 January 1999 with the RTC of Roxas City, which Motion had not yet been
ruled upon when the spouses Beluso filed Civil Case No. 99-314 with the RTC of Makati. Hence,
there were allegedly two pending actions between the same parties on the same issue at the time of the
filing of Civil Case No. 99-314 on 9 February 1999 with the RTC of Makati. This will still not change
our findings. It is indeed the general rule that in cases where there are two pending actions between
the same parties on the same issue, it should be the later case that should be dismissed. However, this
rule is not absolute.
In the case at bar, Civil Case No. V-7227 before the RTC of Roxas City was an action for injunction
against a foreclosure sale that has already been held, while Civil Case No. 99-314 before the RTC of
Makati City includes an action for the annulment of said foreclosure, an action certainly more proper
in view of the execution of the foreclosure sale. The former case was improperly filed in Roxas City,
while the latter was filed in Makati City, the proper venue of the action as mandated by the Credit
Agreement. It is evident, therefore, that Civil Case No. 99-314 is the more appropriate vehicle for
litigating the issues between the parties, as compared to Civil Case No. V-7227. Thus, we rule that the
RTC of Makati City was not in error in not dismissing Civil Case No. 99-314.
Manila Banking v. University of Baguio, G.R. No. 159189, February 21, 2007
Facts
Petitioner Manila Banking Corporation granted a P14 million credit line to respondent University of
Baguio, Inc. for the construction of additional buildings and purchase of new equipment. On behalf of
the university, then Vice-Chairman Fernando C. Bautista, Jr. executed a continuing suretyship
agreement. However, Bautista, Jr. diverted the net proceeds of the loan. He endorsed and delivered
the four checks representing the net proceeds to respondent Group Developers, Inc. (GDI) The loan
was not paid.
The bank filed a complaint for a sum of money with application for preliminary attachment against
the university, Bautista, Jr. and his wife Milagros, before the RTC. Five years later, the bank amended
the complaint and impleaded GDI as additional defendant.
In the amended complaint, the bank alleged that it was unaware and did not approve the diversion of
the loan to GDI; that it granted the loan without collateral upon the universitys undertaking that it
would construct new buildings; and that GDI connived with the university and Bautista, Jr. in
fraudulently contracting the debt.
The bank and GDI executed a deed of dacion en pago. The dacion en pago was for a consideration of
P78 million and in full settlement of the loan.
The trial court dismissed the third-party complaint against the heirs of Vicente G. Puyat for being
premature since the banks cause of action was against the university as a dummy of GDI. The trial
court also dismissed the case as to Fernando Bautista, Jr. and his wife upon Fernandos death. The trial
court further ruled that the universitys motion to implead GDI as third-party defendant, and GDIs
motions to dismiss the amended complaint and cross-claim, had been mooted by the dacion en pago.
The university moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds that: (1) there was no more
cause of action against it since the loan had been settled by GDI; and (2) the bank failed to prosecute
the action for an unreasonable length of time. The trial court denied the motion since the matters
relied upon by the university were evidentiary in nature.
The trial court resolved GDIs motion to resolve the motions to dismiss and defer pre-trial; expunged
from the record the deed of dacion en pago; and reinstated GDIs motions to dismiss the amended
complaint and cross-claim on the ground that no compromise agreement was submitted for its
approval.
The university filed a manifestation with motion for reconsideration of the Order denying the
universitys motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The university argued that the grounds for its
motion to dismiss were not evidentiary as the deed of dacion en pago and the banks judicial
admission thereof were on record. The trial court ruled that the bank had no cause of action against
the defendants because its claim for a sum of money had been paid through the dacion en pago. The
trial court noted that the bank even admitted the settlement. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, defendant [respondent herein] University of Baguios Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint is herein GRANTED and this complaint for collection of sum of money is herein
DISMISSED.
Issue
Whether or not the motion to dismiss was properly granted.
Held
Improper.
In essence, the issue for our resolution is, did the trial court err in dismissing the amended complaint,
without trial, upon motion of respondent university?
A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action is filed by the defendant after the plaintiff has
presented his evidence on the ground that the latter has shown no right to the relief sought. While a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections which can be ventilated before the
beginning of the trial, a motion to dismiss under Rule 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rested his case.
In this case, the universitys motion to dismiss the amended complaint was improper under Rule 16
because it was filed after respondent university filed its responsive pleading, its Answer. Also, the
motions merit could not be determined based solely on the allegations of the initiatory pleading, the
amended complaint, since the motion was based on the deed of dacion en pago, which was not even
alleged in the complaint. And since the deed of dacion en pago had been expunged from the record,
the trial court erred in its finding of payment and lack of cause of action based on the deed. In fact,
just three months before it dismissed the amended complaint, the trial court had even noted petitioner
counsels manifestation regarding the parties initial efforts to enter into a dacion en pago but not based
on the previous offer made but on a new proposal involving new properties and urged them to pursue
further settlement discussions.
In addition, the motion alleged that petitioner had no more cause of action or lacked a cause of action
against the university. That motion was a motion to dismiss under Rule 33 in the nature of demurrer
to evidence and would be proper only after petitioner had presented its evidence and rested its case. In
the case at bar, there had been no presentation of evidence yet and petitioner had not rested its case.
Therefore, the Order properly denied the motion to dismiss for being improper under either Rule 16 or
33.
The trial court had also made a premature statement in its Omnibus Order that the dacion en pago
settled the loan and the case, even as it also stated that respondent university was used as a dummy of
GDI. If indeed there was fraud, considering the uncollateralized loan, its diversion, nonpayment,
absence of demand although overdue, and the dacion en pago where title of the property accepted as
payment cannot be transferred, the fraud should be uncovered to determine who are liable to pay the
loan.
Corales v. Republic, 2013

Facts
Petitioner Corales was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for three (3)
consecutive terms. In his first term as local chief executive, petitioner Corales appointed petitioner Dr.
Angeles to the position of Municipal Administrator.
Following an audit on various local disbursements, Maximo Andal (Andal), the Provincial State
Auditor of Laguna, issued an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) addressed to petitioner
Corales. The aforesaid AOM, in sum, states that: 1) petitioner Dr. Angeles appointment as Municipal
Administrator (during the second and third terms of petitioner Corales) was without legal basis for
having been repeatedly denied confirmation by the Sangguniang Bayan; 2) petitioner Dr. Angeles can
be considered, however, as a de facto officer entitled to the emoluments of the office for the actual
services rendered; 3) nonetheless, it is not the Municipality of Nagcarlan that should be made liable to
pay for petitioner Dr. Angeles salary; instead, it is petitioner Corales, being the appointing authority;
and 5) in view thereof, it is recommended that an appropriate Notice of Disallowance be issued for the
payment of salary expenses incurred without legal basis by the Municipality of Nagcarlan in the
aforestated amount.
Instead of submitting his comment/reply thereon, petitioner Corales, together with petitioner Dr.
Angeles, opted to file a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against Andal and the then members
of the Sangguniang Bayan before the RTC. Petitioners sought, by way of prohibition, to require the
Office of the Provincial Auditor, through Andal, to recall its AOM and to eventually desist from
collecting reimbursement from petitioner Corales for the salaries paid to and received by petitioner
Dr. Angeles for the latters services as Municipal Administrator. Petitioners similarly sought, by way
of mandamus, to compel the then members of the Sangguniang Bayan, as a collegial body, to recall
its Resolutions denying confirmation to petitioner Dr. Angeles appointment as Municipal
Administrator and in their stead to confirm the validity and legitimacy of such appointment.
In its turn, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on Andals behalf, who was impleaded in his
official capacity, filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
grounded on lack of cause of action, prematurity and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Petitioners petition should be dismissed, as petitioner Corales has no cause of action against Andal -
his resort to judicial intervention is premature and he even failed to avail himself of, much less
exhaust, the administrative remedies available to him. The trial court denied the said Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that Andal was merely a nominal party.
Respondent Republic, as represented by COA, as represented by Andal, consequently filed a Petition

for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision
granting respondents Petition for Certiorari, thereby annulling and setting aside the RTC Orders and,
accordingly, dismissing petitioners Petition for Prohibition with the court a quo.
x x x We agree with the OSGs contention that the [herein respondent Republic], herein represented by the
COA and specifically by Andal in the latters capacity as Provincial State Auditor of Laguna, is not merely a
nominal party to the petition for prohibition. x x x. That the [respondent] naturally has an interest in the
disposition/disbursement of said public funds as well as in the recovery thereof should the ongoing investigative
audit confirm the illegality thereof cannot be gainsaid. Rather than a mere nominal party, therefore, the
[respondent] is an indispensable party to the petition for prohibition and may thus seek its dismissal, given that
under the attendant facts there is a yet no actual case or controversy calling for [therein] respondent courts
exercise of its judicial power.
Issue
Whether or not a rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail a denial of a motion to dismiss.
Held
Proper remedy.
In their futile attempt to convince this Court to rule in their favor, petitioners aver that by filing a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, respondent Republic, in essence, admitted
all the material averments and narration of facts stated in the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus.
As such, there is no longer any question of fact to speak of and what remains is a pure question of
law. The judgment, therefore, of the trial court denying the Motion to Dismiss is no longer subject to
any appeal or review by the Court of Appeals. Instead, it is already appealable and reviewable by this
Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where only pure questions of law may be raised and dealt
with. This is in line with the pronouncement in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of
Appeals (China Road Case). The Court of Appeals should have dismissed respondent Republics
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for being an improper and inappropriate
mode of review.
Petitioners above argument is misplaced.
China Road Case is not at all applicable in the case at bench. Therein, the Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint was granted. As the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final, as distinguished from
an interlocutory order, the proper remedy was an appeal in due course. Thus, this Court in China
Road Case held that:
x x x Applying the test to the instant case, it is clear that private respondent raises pure questions of law which
are not proper in an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, but should be raised by way of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.
We agree with private respondent that in a motion to dismiss due to failure to state a cause of action, the trial
court can consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence on record. However in so
doing, the trial court does not rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely includes such documents
in the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding of lack of cause of action based on these documents
would not involve a calibration of the probative value of such pieces of evidence but would only limit itself to
the inquiry of whether the law was properly applied given the facts and these supporting documents. Therefore,
what would inevitably arise from such a review are pure questions of law, and not questions of fact.
In the case at bench, however, the Motion to Dismiss was denied. It is well-entrenched that an order
denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of
a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.
Therefore, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss is not appealable, not
even via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The only remedy for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss is a
special civil action for certiorari showing that such denial was made with grave abuse of discretion..
Taking into consideration all the foregoing, this Court finds no reversible error on the part of the
Court of Appeals in reversing the Orders of the court a quo and consequently dismissing petitioners
Petition for Prohibition filed thereat.
National Housing Authority v. Baello, 2013

Facts
Pedro Baello (Pedro) and Nicanora Baello (Nicanora) filed an application for registration of a parcel
of land with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, covering the land they inherited from their
mother, Esperanza Baello.
The CFI of Rizal rendered its decision confirming the title of the applicants to the land in question.
The CFI of Rizal awarded the land to Pedro and Nicanora, pro indiviso. The Republic of the
Philippines, through the Director of the Bureau of Lands, did not appeal. The decision became final
and executory.
During the martial law regime, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 569
creating a committee to expropriate the Dagat-Dagatan Lagoon and its adjacent areas, including the
Baello and Rodriguez properties. The government wanted to develop the properties into an
industrial/commercial complex and a residential area for the permanent relocation of families affected
by the Tondo Foreshore Urban Renewal Project Team.
Thereafter, a truckload of fully-armed military personnel entered the Baello property and ejected the
family caretaker at gunpoint. The soldiers demolished the two-storey residential structure and
destroyed the fishpond improvements on the Baello property. The NHA then took possession of the
Baello and Rodriguez properties. The Baello and Rodriguez heirs, for fear of losing their lives and
those of their families, decided to remain silent and did not complain. The NHA executed separate
conditional contracts to sell subdivision lots in favor of chosen beneficiaries who were awarded 620
lots from the Baello property and 275 lots from the Rodriguez property.
After the EDSA People Power Revolution, the heirs of Baello executed an extrajudicial partition of
Pedros estate, which included the Baello property. The NHA filed an action for eminent domain
against the heirs of Baello and Rodriguez before the Regional Trial Court. The RTC dismissed the
complaint on the ground of res judicata and lack of cause of action. The NHA appealed to the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of the RTC. The NHA filed a petition for review
before this Court. This Court denied due course to the petition on the ground that the Court of
Appeals did not commit any reversible error in affirming the order of the RTC.
The NHA filed a complaint for nullity of OCT issued in the names of Pedro and Nicanora. The case
was raffled to the RTC. The RTC dismissed the complaint on grounds of estoppel and res judicata and
because the issue on the legal nature and ownership of the property covered by OCT No. (804) 53839
was already barred by a final judgment. The NHA appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Again, the NHA went to this Court to assail the decision of
the Court of Appeals. This Court denied the NHAs petition for lack of merit. The Court ruled that
NHAs action was barred by the decision of the CFI of Rizal in LRC Case No. 520. This Court held
that the NHA was already barred from assailing the validity of OCT No. (804) 53839 and its
derivative titles based on judicial estoppel.
Meanwhile, respondents filed an action for Recovery of Possession and Damages against the NHA
and other respondents. The Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision in favor of respondents. The
trial court ruled that the dismissal of NHAs complaint for expropriation and for declaration of nullity
of OCT No. (804) 53839 in the names of Pedro and Nicanora left NHA with no right to hold
possession of respondents property which was admittedly a part of Pedros land. The trial court ruled
that this Court already declared respondents as the bona fide owners of the land and as such, their
right to possession and enjoyment of the property becomes indisputable.
The NHA appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the
NHAs appeal. The Court of Appeals took judicial notice of the rulings of this Court in the earlier
cases.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the main issue raised by the NHA, that is, the alleged nullity of OCT
No. (804) 53839 from which respondents derived their title, was already resolved by this Court in
G.R. No. 143230. This Court already declared in G.R. No. 143230 that the NHA was judicially
estopped from assailing OCT No. (804) 53839.
Issue
Whether or not res judicata applies.
Held
Applies.
The doctrine of res judicata has been explained as follows:

The rule is that when material facts or questions, which were in issue in a former action and were admitted or
judicially determined are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions become
res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies
regardless of the form of the latter.
Jurisprudence expounds that the concept of res judicata embraces two aspects. The first, known as
"bar by prior judgment," or "estoppel by verdict," is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The second, known
as "conclusiveness of judgment," otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendent, ordains that
issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between
the same parties involving a different cause of action. x x x.
The Court explained further:

Conclusiveness of judgment does not require identity of the causes of action for it to work. If a particular point
or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular
point or question, a former judgment between the same parties will be final and conclusive in the second if that
same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit; but the adjudication of an issue in the first
case is not conclusive of an entirely different and distinct issue arising in the second. Hence, facts and issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same
parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of action.
In this case, the NHAs petition is barred by conclusiveness of judgment which states that -
x x x any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and
their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the
same.
We sustain the Court of Appeals in ruling that the main issue raised by the NHA, which it alleged in
its Answer before the trial court, is the validity of OCT No. (804) 53839. The validity of OCT No.
(804) 53839 had long been settled by this Court in G.R. No. 143230. In that case, the Court ruled that
the action to annul OCT No. (804) 53839 was barred by the decision in LRC Case No. 520. The Court
noted that the Republic did not oppose Pedro and Nicanoras application for registration in LRC Case
No. 520, and neither did it appeal the decision. OCT No. (804) 53839 was issued by the Register of
Deeds in 1959 and the Republic did not file any action to nullify the CFIs decision until the NHA
filed a complaint for nullity of OCT No. (804) 53839 on 5 November 1993, the case which was the
origin of G.R. No. 143230. As pointed out by this Court in G.R. No. 143230, the NHA was already
barred from assailing OCT No. (804) 53839 and its derivative titles.
Unicapital v. Consing, 2013

Facts
Consing, Jr., an investment banker, and his mother, Cecilia Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), obtained an
P18,000,000.00 loan from Unicapital. The said loan was secured by Promissory Notes and a Real
Estate Mortgage. Prior to these transactions, Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI), a real estate company, was
already interested to develop the subject property into a residential subdivision. In this regard, PBI
entered into a joint venture agreement with Unicapital. In view of the foregoing, the loan and
mortgage over the subject property was later on modified into an Option to Buy Real Property and,
after further negotiations, Dela Cruz decided to sell the same to Unicapital and PBI. For this purpose,
Dela Cruz appointed Consing, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact.
However, even before URI and PBI were able to have the titles transferred to their names, Juanito Tan
Teng (Teng) and Po Willie Yu (Yu) informed Unicapital that they are the lawful owners of the subject
property and that Dela Cruzs title thereto was a mere forgery. Based on this finding, PBI and
Unicapital sent separate demand letters to Dela Cruz and Consing, Jr., seeking the return of the
purchase price they had paid for the subject property.
Consing, Jr. filed a complaint, denominated as a Complex Action for Declaratory Relief and later
amended to Complex Action for Injunctive Relief (Consing, Jr.s complaint) before the RTC against
Unicapital, URI, PBI, Martirez, PBI General Manager Mariano Martinez (Martinez), Dela Cruz and
Does 1-20, docketed as SCA. In his complaint, Consing, Jr. claimed that
1. The incessant demands/recovery efforts made upon him by Unicapital and PBI to return to them the
purchase price they had paid for the subject property constituted harassment and oppression which
severely affected his personal and professional life.
2. He also averred that he was coerced to commit a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as Unicapital and
PBI, over threats of filing acase against him, kept on forcing him to issue a post-dated check in the
amount sought to be recovered, notwithstanding their knowledge that he had no funds for the same.
3. Likewise, Consing, Jr. added that Unicapital and PBIs representatives were" speaking of him in a
manner that was inappropriate and libelous,"
For their part, Unicapital, URI, and Martirez (Unicapital, et al.) filed separate Motions to Dismiss
Consing, Jr.s complaint (Unicapital, et al.s motion to dismiss) on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action, considering that: (a) no document was attached against which Consing, Jr. supposedly
derived his right and against which his rights may be as certained; (b) the demands to pay against
Consing, Jr. and for him to tender post-dated checks to cover the amount due were well within the
rights of Unicapital as an unpaid creditor, as Consing, Jr. had already admitted his dealings with them;
(c) the utterances purportedly constituting libel were not set out in the complaint; and (d) the laws
supposedly violated were not properly identified.
The RTC denied the above mentioned motions to dismiss, holding that Consing, Jr.s complaint
sufficiently stated a cause of action for tort and damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code. It
ruled that where there is abusive behavior, a complainant, like Consing, Jr., has the right to seek
refuge from the courts. Aggrieved, they elevated the denial of their motions to dismiss before the CA
via a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The CA rendered a Joint Decision holding that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
RTC in refusing to dismiss Consing, Jr.'s complaint. Anent the substantive issues of the case, the CA
concurred with the RTC-Pasig City that Consing Jr.'s complaint states a cause of action. It found that
Unicapital and PBI, et al.s purportedly abusive manner in enforcing their claims against Consing, Jr.
was properly constitutive of a cause of action as the same, if sufficiently proven, would have
subjected him to "defamation of his name in business circles, the threats and coercion against him to
reimburse the purchase price, fraud and falsification and breach of fiduciary obligation." Hence,
Consing, Jr.s complaint was principally one for damages over which the RTC has jurisdiction, and,
in turn, there lies no misjoinder of causes of action.
The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. No. 192073
On the other hand, Unicapital filed a complaint for sum of money with damages against Consing, Jr.
and Dela Cruz before the RTC. PBI also filed a complaint for damages and attachment against
Consing, Jr. and Dela Cruz before the RTC also predicated on the same set of facts as above narrated.
For his part, Consing, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss which was, however,. Thereafter, he filed a
Motion for Consolidation (motion for consolidation) of Civil Case No. 99-1418 with his own initiated
SCA No. 1759. The RTC-Makati City dismissed Consing, Jr.s motion for consolidation. Hence, he
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA rendered a Decision56 sustaining the Orders dated
July 16, 2007 and September 4, 2007 of the RTC-Makati City which denied Consing, Jr.s motion for
consolidation.
Issue
Held
Denied.
Propriety of the denial of Unicapital, et al.s motion to dismiss and ancillary issues.
In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.s complaint properly states a cause of action since the
allegations there insufficiently bear out a case for damages under Articles 19 and 26 of the Civil
Code.
Records disclose that Consing, Jr.s complaint contains allegations which aim to demonstrate the
abusive manner in which Unicapital and PBI, et al. enforced their demands against him. Among
others, the complaint states that Consing, Jr. "has constantly been harassed and bothered by Unicapital
and PBI, et al.; x x x besieged by phone calls from them; x x x has had constant meetings with them
variously, and on a continuing basis, such that he is unable to attend to his work as an investment
banker." In the same pleading, he also alleged that Unicapital and PBI, et al.s act of "demanding a
postdated check knowing fully well that he does not have the necessary funds to cover the same, nor
is he expecting to have them is equivalent to asking him to commit a crime under unlawful coercive
force." Accordingly, these specific allegations, if hypothetically admitted, may result into the
recovery of damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code which states that "every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith."
Likewise, Consing, Jr.s complaint states a cause of action for damages under Article 26 of the Civil
Code
Records reveal that Consing, Jr., in his complaint, alleged that "he has come to discover that
Unicapital and PBI, et al. are speaking of him in a manner that is inappropriate and libelous; and that
they have spread their virulent version of events in the business and financial community such that he
has suffered and continues to suffer injury upon his good name and reputation which, after all, is the
most sacred and valuable wealth he possesses - especially considering that he is an investment
banker." In similar regard, the hypothetical admission of these allegations may result into the recovery
of damages pursuant to Article 26, and even Article2219(10), of the Civil Code.
Corollary thereto, Unicapital, et al.s contention that the case should be dismissed on the ground that
it failed to set out the actual libelous statements complained about cannot be given credence. These
incidents, as well as the specific circumstances surrounding the manner in which Unicapital and PBI,
et al. pursued their claims against Consing, Jr. may be better ventilated during trial. It is a standing
rule that issues that require the contravention of the allegations of the complaint, as well as the full
ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, should not be within the province of a mere
motion to dismiss, as in this case. Hence, as what is only required is that the allegations furnish
adequate basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the Court in view of the above-stated
reasons finds that the RTC-Pasig Citys denial of Unicapital, et al.s motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion which would
necessitate the reversal of the CAs ruling. Verily, for grave abuse of discretion to exist, the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.79 This the Court does not
perceive in the case at bar.
Brown Araneta v. Araneta, 2013

Facts31
Juan Ignacio Araneta and Michelle Brown-Araneta were married in Vegas. They bore 2 daughters
namely Ara and Ava. The spouses separated after 7 years. During the separation, the daughters
remained in Michelles custody. Juan filed a Petition for Custody in the Makati RTC against Michelle
and her mother claiming that they have completely barred him from seeing his daughters.
Pending the Petition for Custody, Michelle filed a Petition for Protection Order in the RTC of
Muntinlupa claiming that Juan had committed sexual, psychological, and economic abuse on her and
their daughters. In this petition, it was stated that there was a pending case in the Makati RTC for the
custody of the children. Muntinlupa thereafter granted the TPO.
Later, Juan filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition with Prayer to Lift TPO in the Makati RTC on the
ground of litis pendentia and forum shopping since the Makati RTC is competent to grant the very
same reliefs sought by Michelle in the Petition for Protection Order. The RTC ruled partly in favor of
Michelle and partly in favor of Juan. So both parties appealed.
In the CA, Michelle was found guilty of forum shopping.
Hence, this petition. Michelle contends that there was no forum shopping when she filed her Petition
for Protection Order in Muntinlupa while the Petition for Custody was still pending in Makati.
Issue
Held
There was forum shopping.
Was there forum shopping? Did petitioner forum shop?
An indicium of the presence of, or the test for determining whether a litigant violated the rule against,
forum shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other case.
Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil suit, refers to that situation wherein another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action
becomes vexatious and unnecessary. For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurring
requisites must be present:
1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;
2. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and
3. The identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the
other.
Considering the above doctrinal pronouncements on forum shopping, We find all the badges of this
deplorable, docket-clogging practice present in this case.
As a result or in anticipation of an adverse ruling of the Makati RTC, petitioner sought the favorable
opinion of the Muntinlupa RTC.
31
Facts are summarized from Roco digests. NOT SUFFICIENT FOR RECIT.
The Makati RTC, in the custody case, made of record that she was not inclined to issue a protection
order in favor of Michelle because she did not bother to appear in Court and that the allegations
against Juan Ignacio cannot, per se, prevent him from exercising visitation rights over his children.
After this adverse ruling, Michelle sought the favorable opinion of the Muntinlupa RTC by filing an
independent Petition for Protection Order.
The cases have identical parties
Clearly, the Petition for Custody and the Petition for Protection Order have the same parties who
represent the same interests. The fact that Avaand Ara, who are parties in the Petition for Protection
Order, are not impleaded in the Petition for Custody is of no moment because they are precisely the
very subjects of the Petition for Custody and their respective rights are represented by their mother,
Michelle. In a long line of cases on forum shopping, the Court has held that absolute identity of the
parties is not required, it being enough that there is substantial identity of the parties or at least such
parties represent the same interests in both actions. It does not matter, as here, that in the Petition for
Custody, Juan Ignacio is the petitioner and Michelle is the respondent while in the Petition for
Protection Order, their roles are reversed. That a party is the petitioner in one case and at the same
time, the respondent in the other case does not, without more, remove the said cases from the ambit of
the rules on forum shopping.
The rights asserted and reliefs prayed for are based on the same facts
Further, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 08-023 are practically based on the
same facts and are so intertwined with that in SP. PROC. Case No. 6543, such that any judgment
rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which party is successful, will amount to res judicata. In
the custody case, Juan Ignacio mainly asserted his right, as father, to visit his children and enjoy joint
custody over them. He prayed for a judgment granting him joint custody, or alternatively, permanent
visitation rights over Ava and Ara.
Michelles answer and motion for issuance of protection order in the custody case contained
allegations of psychological, sexual, emotional and economic abuse she and her children suffered at
the hands of Juan Ignacio to defeat his asserted right to have joint custody over Ava and Ara and as
argument that the grant of visitation rights in his favor will not be in the best interest of the children.
These allegations of abuse were in substance the very same ones she made in her Petition for
Protection Order.
Juan Ignacios rights and reliefs prayed for are dependent on and, to be sure, would be predicated on
the question of whether or not granting him the desired custody or at least visitations rights over the
children are in their best interest. In deciding this issue, the Makati RTC will definitely have to reckon
with and make a finding on Michelles allegations of psychological, sexual, emotional and economic
abuse.
Similarly, the Muntinlupa RTC must necessarily consider and make a determination based on the very
same facts and allegations on whether or not Michelle shall be entitled to the relief she prayed for in
her own petition, in particular, a permanent protection order against Juan Ignacio.
Elements of litis pendentia are present and any judgment in the pending cases would amount to res
judicata
Any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which party is successful, would amount
to res judicata. Consider: If the Makati RTC were to grant Juan Ignacios petition for custody, this
would necessarily mean that it would be in the best interest of the children if he were allowed to visit
and spend time with them and that granting Juan Ignacio visitation rights would not pose any danger
or threat to the children.
On the other hand, a grant by the Muntinlupa RTC of Michelles prayer for a permanent protection
order would presuppose at the minimum that it would be to the childrens best interest if Juan Ignacio
is directed to keep away from them, necessary implying that he is unfit even to visit Araand Ava.
Conversely, if Juan Ignacios Petition for Custody were denied, then it would mean that the Makati
RTC gave weight and credence to Michelles allegations of abuse and found them to be in the best
interest of the children to bar Juan Ignacio from visiting them. Thus, the Muntinlupa RTC should have
no ground to deny Michelles Petition for Protection Order pending before it.
Dismissals by the Plaintiff (Rule 17)

Limaco v. Gakuen, G.R.No. 158245, June 30, 200532
Facts
Petitioners Miguelito, Rogelio, Jr., and Isidro, all surnamed Limaco, are the registered owners of three
(3) parcels of agricultural land. Petitioners, as vendors, entered into a Contract of Sale with
respondent Shonan Gakuen Children's House Philippines, Inc. as vendee, over the subject lots, for the
consideration of P12,531,720.00. Pursuant to the contract, respondent corporation paid the down
payment of P1,200,000.00. However, it refused to remit any monthly installment due to petitioners'
failure to obtain a clearance and/or approval of the sale of the subject land from the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR).
Petitioners responded by informing respondent that they were ready to finalize the transaction in
accordance with the legal opinion of the DAR which stated that the subject properties should first be
donated by the tenant farmers to the municipality of Bay, Laguna, which, in turn, would donate them
to respondent. Thereafter, the DAR will order the Registry of Deeds of Laguna to register the subject
land in the name of respondent corporation. Respondent informed petitioners that the scheme
proposed in the DAR Opinion was "far from acceptable."
Respondent corporation requested the return of its P1,200,000.00 down payment. As petitioners did
not acquiesce, respondent, filed a complaint for rescission with damages with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). The the RTC of Makati dismissed the complaint for rescission. As a countermove,
petitioners and the tenant farmers of the property, as plaintiffs, filed the instant case for specific
performance with the RTC.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, respondent alleged by way of affirmative defense that "[s]pecific
performance is not possible because the defendant (respondent) had already bought another property
which is untenanted, devoid of any legal complications and now converted from agricultural to non-
agricultural purpose in accordance with DAR Administrative Order No. 15." The counterclaim states:
1. That in view of the failure of the plaintiff-landowners to comply with the Contract of Sale, the same should
be rescinded, and they should be ordered to refund the sum of P1,200,000.00 paid by the defendant under the
Contract of Sale with bank rate of interest per annum from date of receipt until fully repaid;
2. That also by reason thereof, the project of the defendant has been delayed for seven months for which reason
said plaintiff-landowners should be liable for damages amounting to P500,000.00 to the defendant, with the
same rate of interest;
3. That because of the plaintiffs' refusal to comply with the demand to refund the amount paid by the defendant,
it was constrained to engage the services of the undersigned counsel not only to recover the amount paid but to
defend itself against the vexatious, malicious, unfounded, and unjustified complaint of the plaintiff, for which it
agreed to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P75,000.00 of which P30,000.00 had already been paid, plus
P1,000.00 appearance fee for each day he is in attendance in this case.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint considering respondent's special defense that
specific performance was no longer possible. They prayed that their complaint and respondent's
counterclaim be ordered withdrawn or dismissed, arguing that respondent's counterclaim would have
no leg to stand on as it was compulsory in nature. It appears that sometime during trial on the merits,
the parties were able to agree on a compromise in which petitioners were to return only fifty percent
(50%) of the down payment amounting to P600,000.00. Unfortunately, petitioners only remitted
P487,000.00 to respondent, leaving a balance of P113,000.00 which petitioners failed to settle. Thus,
the trial of the case proceeded. The trial court denied petitioners' motion.
32
Evidence in chief under Rule 17 Sec. 3 means direct examination but this has been modified by JAR.
The trial court rendered a decision where petitioners were obliged to remit to respondent the balance
of P113,000.00 from the P600,000.00 demanded by respondent but cannot demand more than said
balance.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering plaintiffs-landowners to pay defendant the aforesaid
sum of P113,000.00 with legal interests thereon from the filing of the Complaint.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which found the appeal partially meritorious. The
CA held that pursuant to the principle against unjust enrichment, petitioners should return to
respondent the balance of the P1,200,000.00 down payment in the amount of P713,000.00, with legal
interest. It reasoned that the compromise agreement between the parties was cancelled when
petitioners reneged on their obligation to remit the full balance of the agreed amount. It also noted that
the compromise agreement submitted to the court was not binding for not having been signed by the
petitioners.
Issue
Whether or not respondents counterclaim should be dismissed.
Held
Not dismissed.
Petitioners submit that the CA erred in not dismissing respondent's compulsory counterclaim. They
point out that on July 9, 1996, they filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint. They contend that with the
withdrawal of their complaint, respondent's compulsory counterclaim for the return of P1,200,000.00
had no leg to stand on pursuant to Section 2, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court.
They maintain that respondent's counterclaim is "inextricably linked and utterly dependent upon
petitioners' complaint and from its very nature, it cannot 'remain pending for independent adjudication
by the court.'"
Petitioners' arguments fail to impress.
There are two ways by which an action may be dismissed upon the instance of the plaintiff. First,
dismissal is a matter of right when a notice of dismissal is filed by the plaintiff before an answer or a
motion for summary judgment has been served on him by the defendant. Second, dismissal is
discretionary on the court when the motion for the dismissal of the action is filed by the plaintiff at
any stage of the proceedings other than before service of an answer or a motion for summary
judgment. While the dismissal in the first mode takes effect upon the mere notice of plaintiff without
need of a judicial order, the second mode requires the authority of the court before dismissal of the
case may be effected. This is so because in the dismissal of an action, the effect of the dismissal upon
the rights of the defendant should always be taken into consideration.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that petitioners filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint after
respondent already filed its answer with counterclaim. In fact, the reason for their motion for
withdrawal was the special defense of respondent in its answer that substitution was no longer
possible as it already bought another property in lieu of the subject lots under the contract. It is,
therefore, inexplicable how petitioners could argue that their complaint was successfully withdrawn
upon the mere filing of a Motion to Withdraw Complaint when they themselves alleged in this
petition that "[p]rivate respondent objected to [the] withdrawal and the Trial Court sustained the
objection."
More important, the old Rules of Court provided that "[i]f a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be
dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court. What may invariably remain for independent adjudication are
permissive counterclaims as compared to compulsory counterclaims which generally necessitate a

simultaneous adjudication with the complaint itself. In the case at bar, respondent's counterclaim is
compulsory in nature, hence, cannot remain for independent adjudication.
Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago, G.R. No. 170354, June 30, 2006

Facts
Petitioner Eduardo Pinga was named as one of two defendants in a complaint for injunction filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) by respondent Heirs of German Santiago, represented by Fernando
Santiago. The Complaint alleged in essence that petitioner and co-defendant Vicente Saavedra had
been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent, cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting
the fruits of the coconut trees therein. Respondents prayed that petitioner and Saavedra be enjoined
from committing acts of depredation on their properties, and ordered to pay damages.
By July of 2005, the trial of the case had not yet been completed. Moreover, respondents, as plaintiffs,
had failed to present their evidence. Plaintiffs counsel on record failed to appear, sending in his stead
a representative who sought the postponement of the hearing. Counsel for defendants (who include
herein petitioner) opposed the move for postponement and moved instead for the dismissal of the
case. The RTC noted that it was obvious that respondents had failed to prosecute the case for an
unreasonable length of time, in fact not having presented their evidence yet. On that ground, the
complaint was dismissed. At the same time, the RTC allowed defendants to present their evidence ex-
parte.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order, opting however not to seek that their
complaint be reinstated, but praying instead that the entire action be dismissed and petitioner be
disallowed from presenting evidence ex-parte. Respondents claimed that the order of the RTC
allowing petitioner to present evidence ex-parte was not in accord with established jurisprudence.
They cited cases, particularly City of Manila v. Ruymann and Domingo v. Santos, which noted those
instances in which a counterclaim could not remain pending for independent adjudication.
The RTC promulgated an order granting respondents Motion for Reconsideration and dismissing the
counterclaim, citing as the only ground therefor that there is no opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration of the [respondents]. Notably, respondents filed an Opposition to Defendants Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration, wherein they argued that the prevailing jurisprudential rule is that
compulsory counterclaims cannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiffs cause of action, and a
conversu, the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaims.
The matter was elevated to this Court directly by way of a Petition for Review under Rule 45 on a
pure question of law.
Issue
Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the compulsory
counterclaim.
Held
No.
On a prefatory note, the RTC, in dismissing the counterclaim, did not expressly adopt respondents
argument that the dismissal of their complaint extended as well to the counterclaim. Instead, the RTC
justified the dismissal of the counterclaim on the ground that there is no opposition to [plaintiffs]
Motion for Reconsideration [seeking the dismissal of the counterclaim]. This explanation is hollow,
considering that there is no mandatory rule requiring that an opposition be filed to a motion for
reconsideration without need for a court order to that effect; and, as posited by petitioner, the failure
to file an opposition to the Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is definitely not one among the
established grounds for dismissal [of the counterclaim].
The express qualification in the current provision now is that the dismissal of the complaint due to the
plaintiffs fault, as in the case for failure to prosecute, is without prejudice to the right of the defendant
to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or separate action. This stands in marked contrast to the
provisions under Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court which were superseded by the 1997
amendments. Evidently, the old rule was silent on the effect of such dismissal due to failure to
prosecute on the pending counterclaims. Jurisprudence construing the previous Rules was hardly
silent on the matter.
On the general effect of the dismissal of a complaint, regardless of cause, on the pending
counterclaims, previous jurisprudence laid emphasis on whether the counterclaim was compulsory or
permissive in character. In instances wherein the plaintiff seeks the dismissal of the complaint, if a
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendants objection unless the counterclaim can
remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.
Then in 1993, a divided Court ruled in BA Finance that the dismissal of the complaint for
nonappearance of plaintiff at the pre-trial, upon motion of the defendants, carried with it the dismissal
of their compulsory counterclaim. The Court reiterated the rule that a compulsory counterclaim
cannot remain pending for independent adjudication by the court as it is auxiliary to the proceeding in
the original suit and merely derives its jurisdictional support therefrom.
We hold that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the
complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the
counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to
the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim. The dismissal of a complaint due to fault of the
plaintiff is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute any pending counterclaims of
whatever nature in the same or separate action. We confirm that BA Finance and all previous rulings
of the Court that are inconsistent with this present holding are now abandoned.
Accordingly, the RTC clearly erred when it ordered the dismissal of the counterclaim, since Section 3,
Rule 17 mandates that the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of the defendant
to prosecute the counterclaim in the same or separate action. If the RTC were to dismiss the
counterclaim, it should be on the merits of such counterclaim. Reversal of the RTC is in order, and a
remand is necessary for trial on the merits of the counterclaim.
More often than not, the allegations that form the counterclaim are rooted in an act or omission of the
plaintiff other than the plaintiffs very act of filing the complaint. Moreover, such acts or omissions
imputed to the plaintiff are often claimed to have occurred prior to the filing of the complaint itself.
The only apparent exception to this circumstance is if it is alleged in the counterclaim that the very act
of the plaintiff in filing the complaint precisely causes the violation of the defendants rights. Yet even
in such an instance, it remains debatable whether the dismissal or withdrawal of the complaint is
sufficient to obviate the pending cause of action maintained by the defendant against the plaintiff.
Thus, the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition
of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim
itself and not on the survival of the main complaint.
Pre-Trial (Rule 18)

Diaz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149749, July 25, 2006
Facts
Petitioner Agapita Diaz operated a common carrier, a Tamaraw FX taxi plying the route of Cagayan
de Oro City to any point in Region 10. Petitioners taxi, driven by one Arman Retes, was moving at an
excessive speed when it rammed into the rear portion of a Hino cargo truck owned by private
respondent Teodoro Lantoria and driven by private respondent Rogelio Francisco. As a result, nine
passengers of the taxi died including Sherly Moneo.
The heirs of Sherly Moneo filed with the Regional Trial Court an action for breach of contract of
carriage and damages against petitioner and her driver, Arman Retes. Petitioner filed a third-party
complaint against private respondents Teodorio Lantoria and Rogelio Francisco.
The pre-trial conference was initially set on July 11, 1998 but was reset to July 30, 1998 for petitioner
and her counsels failure to appear despite due notice. Registry receipt number 04364 showed that
notice had been sent to petitioners counsel, Atty. Cipriano Lupeba. On scheduled date, petitioner and
her counsel again failed to appear, prompting the court to allow private respondents to present
evidence ex parte.
More than seven months after the conclusion of private respondents ex parte presentation of evidence,
petitioner filed a motion for leave to present evidence on her defense and third-party complaint. The
trial court denied this. The trial court rendered a decision holding petitioner and Arman Retes jointly
and severally liable to pay private respondent heirs of Sherly Moneo P50,000 for her death, P50,000
as moral damages, P20,000 as exemplary damages and P20,000 as attorneys fees.
On appeal, the trial courts decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial courts
decision denying petitioners motion for leave to present evidence on her defense and third-party
complaint.
Held
No.
First, Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court states that:

The notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on the party who has no counsel. The counsel served with
such notice is charged with the duty of notifying the party represented by him.
Petitioner was represented by Atty. Cipriano Lupeba to whom the notice was sent. It was incumbent
on the latter to advise petitioner accordingly. His failure to do so constituted negligence which bound
petitioner.
Further, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 18 read:

Sec. 4. Appearance of Parties. It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The
non-appearance of the party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefore or if a representative shall
appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative
modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear. The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next
preceding section shall be cause for the dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present
his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
Consequently, it was no error for the trial court to allow private respondents to present their evidence
ex parte when petitioner and her counsel failed to appear for the scheduled pre-trial conference.
Alcaraz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152202, G.R. No. 152202, July 28, 2006
Facts
Private respondent, Equitable Credit Card Network, Inc. (Equitable) issued a credit card, Equitable
Visa Gold International Card to petitioner Crisostomo Alcaraz. The petitioner through the use of the
said credit card secured cash advances and purchased goods and services on credit with private
respondent Equitables affiliated merchant establishments. Thus, the petitioner accumulated unpaid
credit with private respondent and despite the receipt of several demand letters, failed to pay his
outstanding obligations.
In its complaint before the lower court, private respondent Equitable sought the payment of the
accumulated outstanding balance.
The petitioner admitted he had made use of the credit card issued in his name by private respondent
Equitable, but contested the amount of his liability.
After several postponements of the pretrial conference, the trial court declared petitioner Alcaraz as in
default upon motion of private respondent Equitable and allowed the latter to present its evidence ex
parte. After the private respondents presentation of evidence, the court ruled in favor of private
respondent Equitable. It, however, rejected private respondent Equitables claim for liquidated and
exemplary damages. Petitioner Alcaraz filed a Motion for New Trial which was denied. The petitioner
elevated the case to the appellate court.
The Court of Appeals partially affirmed the decision of the trial court by reducing the award.
Issue
Whether or not there was GAD in not granting the postponement of the pre-trial conference.
Held
No.
Petitioner Alcaraz laments that the trial court did not postpone and reschedule the pretrial conference
on February 23, 1999 despite the manifestation of petitioners wife that petitioner Alcaraz suffered a
stroke which rendered him paralyzed while Atty. Ben Ibuyan, the petitioners counsel, suffered from a
lingering gall bladder ailment. Instead, upon motion of private respondent Equitable, the trial court
declared the petitioner as in default and allowed the private respondent to present its evidence ex-
parte.
With regard to the first issue, while it is true that private respondent Equitable and inclement weather
have on occasion caused the postponement of the pretrial conference, the repeated resetting of the
pretrial conference was primarily due to the petitioner.
As to the reasons proffered by the petitioners wife at the pretrial conference, we agree with the
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In the case at bar, both petitioner Alcaraz and his
counsel did not appear at the scheduled pretrial. Instead, it was the petitioners wife alone who made
the verbal manifestation on behalf of her husband and his counsel while presenting an unverified
medical certificate on the latters behalf. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the records
are bereft of any medical certificate, verified or unverified, in the name of petitioner Alcaraz to
establish the cause of his absence at the pretrial conference. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner
Alcaraz and Atty. Ibuyans absence on the February 23, 1999 pretrial conference is due to justifiable
causes, the petitioner is represented by a law firm and not by Atty. Ibuyan alone. As such, any of the
latters partners or associates could have appeared before the court and participate in the pretrial or at
least make the proper motion for postponement if necessary.
The disallowance of a motion for postponement is not sufficient to show arbitrariness and partiality of
the trial court. As this Court ruled in the case of Gochan v. Gochan, to wit:
. . . . A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. Parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right to assume that their motions
would be granted. Thus, they must be prepared on the day of the hearing.
Given this rule, the question of the correctness of the denial of respondents requests for
postponements was addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Dicdican. His action thereon cannot be
disturbed by appellate courts in the absence of any clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in
a denial of substantial justice. Since there was no such finding with regard to the disallowance of the
requests for postponement, the CA [Court of Appeals] cannot overturn the decision of the judge.
Much less can it assume his bias and partiality based merely on the denial of the requests for
postponement.
Macasaet v.Macasaet, G.R. No. 154391, September 30, 2004

Facts
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario Macasaet are first-
degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents, and Teresita is his wife.
The parents filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) an ejectment suit against the
children. Respondents alleged that they were the owners of two (2) parcels of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-78521 and T-103141, situated at Banay-banay, Lipa City;
that by way of a verbal lease agreement, Ismael and Teresita occupied these lots in March 1992 and
used them as their residence and the situs of their construction business; and that despite repeated
demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of P500 per week.
The MTCC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises. It opined that
Ismael and Teresita had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement, but by tolerance
of Vicente and Rosario. As their stay was by mere tolerance, petitioners were necessarily bound by an
implied promise to vacate the lots upon demand.
On appeal, the regional trial court (RTC) upheld the findings of the MTCC.
The parties filed with the CA separate Petitions for Review, which were later consolidated.

The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts that Ismael and Teresita had been occupying the
subject lots only by the tolerance of Vicente and Rosario. Thus, possession of the subject lots by
petitioners became illegal upon their receipt of respondents letter to vacate it.
Issue
Whether or not the rules on ejectment allow a representative to substitute for a partys personal
appearance.
Held
Yes.
Second Issue: Appearance at the Preliminary Conference
Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires the appearance of the plaintiff and the defendant
during the preliminary conference. On the basis of this provision, petitioners claim that the MTCC
should have dismissed the case upon the failure of respondents to attend the conference. However,
petitioners do not dispute that an attorney-in-fact with a written authorization from respondents
appeared during the preliminary conference. The issue then is whether the rules on ejectment allow a
representative to substitute for a partys personal appearance.
Unless inconsistent with Rule 70, the provisions of Rule 18 on pretrial applies to the preliminary
conference. Under Section 4 of this Rule, the nonappearance of a party may be excused by the
showing of a valid cause; or by the appearance of a representative, who has been fully authorized in
writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and
to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.
Section 4 of Rule 18 may supplement Section 8 of Rule 70. Thus, the spirit behind the exception to
personal appearance under the rules on pretrial is applicable to the preliminary conference. If there are
valid reasons or if a representative has a special authority, a partys appearance may be waived. As
petitioners are challenging only the applicability of the rules on pretrial to the rule on preliminary
conference, the written authorization from respondents can indeed be readily considered as a special
authorization.
Chingkoe v. Republic, 2013

Facts
This petition stemmed from two collection cases filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
represented by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In the first
Complaint for collection of money and damages, entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Bureau of Customs v. Chiat Sing Cardboard Inc. (defendant and third party plaintiff) v. Filstar
Textile Industrial Corporation, Faustino T Chingkoe (third party defendants).
The Republic alleged that Chiat Sing Cardboard Inc. (Chiat Sing), a corporation that imports goods to
the Philippines, secured in 1997 fake and spurious tax credit certificates from Filstar Textile Industrial
Corporation (Filstar), amounting to six million seventy-six thousand two hundred forty-six pesos (PhP
6,076,246). It claimed that Chiat Sing utilized the fraudulently-acquired tax credit certificates to settle
its customs duties and taxes on its importations. BOC initially allowed the use of the said tax credit
certificates, but after investigation, discovered that the same were fake and spurious. Despite due
demand, Chiat Sing failed and refused to pay the BOC the amount of the tax credit certificates,
exclusive of penalties, charges, and interest.
After an Order of consolidation was issued, the two cases were jointly heard before the RTC. The pre-
trial for the consolidated cases was initially set on January 9, 2006, but come said date, the report of
the mediation (from the PMC) has yet to be submitted; hence, on the motion of the counsel of
defendant Chiat Sing, the pre-trial was canceled and rescheduled to February 15, 2006.
On February 15, 2006, the PMC reported that the proceedings are still continuing; thus, the trial court,
on motion of the same counsel for Chiat Sing, moved for the re-setting of the pre-trial to March 17,
2006.
During the March 17, 2006 pre-trial setting, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing
the Republic, failed to appear. The trial court ordered a postponement of the pre-trial to April 19,
2006.
Come the April 19, 2006 hearing, despite having received a copy of the March 17, 2006 Order, the
OSG again failed to appear. The trial court warned the plaintiffs Republic and BOC that if no
comment is submitted and if they fail to appear during the pre-trial set on May 25, 2006, the court will
be constrained to go along with the motion for the dismissal of the case.
The scheduled May 25, 2006 hearing, however, did not push through, since the trial court judge went
on official leave. The pre-trial was again reset to June 30, 2006.
During the June 30, 2006 pre-trial conference, the OSG again failed to attend. The trial court judge
issued an Order resetting the pre-trial to July 14, 2006.
At the hearing conducted on July 14, 2006, the respective counsels of the defendants were present.
Notwithstanding the warning of the judge given during the previous hearing, that their failure to
appear will result in the dismissal of the cases, neither the OSG nor the BOC attended the hearing.
Thus, as moved anew by the respective counsels of the three defendants, the trial court issued an
Order dismissing the case.
As recourse, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, alleging that the
trial court judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the two cases.
The CA granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. In reversing
the RTC Order, the CA ruled that the case, being a collection case involving a huge amount of tax
collectibles, should not be taken lightly. It also stated that it would be the height of injustice if the
Republic is deprived of due process and fair play. Finally, it took "judicial notice of the fact that the
collection of customs duties and taxes is a matter imbued with public interest, taxes being the
lifeblood of the government and what we pay for civilized society."
Issue
Whether or not dismissal was proper.
Held
Proper.
Dismissal due to the fault of respondent
Even going into the merits of the case, however, We find the trial courts dismissal of the case to be in
order. As it were, the trial court amply gave respondent sufficient notice and opportunity to attend the
pre-trial conference, but despite this, it neglected its duty to prosecute its case and attend the
scheduled pre-trial hearings. Hence, the trial court cannot be faulted for dismissing the case.
This Court finds that the dismissal of the case by the trial court was due to the fault and negligence of
respondent. There is clear negligence and laxity on the part of both the BOC and OSG in handling this
case on behalf of the Republic. Despite several re-settings of the hearing, either or both counsels
failed to attend the pre-trial conference, without giving a justifiably acceptable explanation of their
absence. This utter neglect of its duty to attend the scheduled hearings is what led the trial court to
ultimately dismiss the cases. In finding that the dismissal by the trial court is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion, the CA committed reversible error.
The records bear out that the pre-trial conference has been reset for six times, for various reasons.
It is fairly obvious that the trial court gave the Republic, through the OSG and the BOC, every
opportunity to be present during the pre-trial conference. The hearings had to be reset six times due to
various reasons, but not once was the OSG and BOC properly represented. Too, not once did the OSG
and BOC offer a reasonable explanation for their absence during the hearings. Despite the express
warning by the trial court during the penultimate setting on June 30, 2006, the OSG and BOC still
failed to attend the next scheduled setting.
Despite the leeway and opportunity given by the trial court, it seemed that the OSG and BOC did not
accord proper importance to the pre-trial conference. Pre-trial, to stress, is way more than simple
marking of evidence. Hence, it should not be ignored or neglected, as the counsels for respondent had.
The inevitable conclusion in this case is that the trial court was merely following the letter of Sec. 5,
Rule I 8 of the Rules of Court in dismissing the case. Thus, the CA committed grave and reversible
error in nullifying the Order of dismissal. The trial court had every reason to dismiss the case, not
only due to the Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants, but because the Rules of Court itself says
so.
In view, however, of the huge amount of tax collectibles involved, and considering that taxes are the
"lifeblood of the government," the dismissal of the case should be without prejudice.
LBL Industries v. City of Lapu-Lapu, 2013

Facts
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land. Respondent City of Lapu-Lapu (respondent)
filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court seeking to expropriate the land for its road opening
project
Upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration, respondent took possession of and utilized the property. Petitioner filed its
Answer, accompanied by a Secretary's Certificate. Meanwhile, petitioner interposed a Motion to
Conduct Joint Survey and Set Case for Pre-trial.
Meantime, the RTC issued two Orders directing the issuance of a writ of possession. The branch clerk
of court, however, failed to comply with any of the orders.
A year later, petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that respondent failed to
prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time as provided for under Section 3, Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court. According to petitioner, respondent has yet to move for the setting of the case for pre-
trial and it had done nothing to ensure compliance with the Orders for the issuance of the writ of
execution. Respondent opposed the motion, explaining that the reason for the delay was that it is
awaiting the RTC's resolution on the motion filed by petitioner for the conduct of a joint survey and
for the setting of the case for pre-trial.
Denying the motion to dismiss, the RTC ruled that respondent cannot be faulted for the alleged delay
in prosecuting the case as, indeed, petitioner's motion for the conduct of a joint survey and for the
setting of the case for trial had not yet been resolved. And as an additional reason for its action, the
RTC cited the non-observance of the three (3)-day notice rule noting that the motion to dismiss was
received by the plaintiff on January 31, 2008, but the motion was set for hearing on the following day,
or on February 1, 2008.
The RTC attributed the fault to its branch clerk of court for failing to comply with its twin orders
directing the issuance of a writ of possession.
Petitioner went to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
The CA dismissed the petition owing to the following infirmities:

absence of a board resolution evincing the authority of Roberto Sison, petitioner's Chief Operating Officer, to
represent it in the case.
Issue
Whether or not there was failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time.
Held
None.
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for respondent's failure to
prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 18 and Sec. 3, Rule
17 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to set the case for pre-trial
after the last pleading is served and filed. With this in mind, We have, in several cases, ruled that the
plaintiffs omission to promptly move that the case be set for pre-trial is a ground for the dismissal of
the complaint due to his fault, particularly for failing to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17.
The parties, as well as the courts below, however, failed to consider that the afore-quoted Sec. 1 of
Rule 18 had already been superseded by A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, which took effect on August 16,
2004, Item 1.2 of which states:
If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch [Clerk of Court] shall issue a notice
of pre-trial.
Thus, the present rule is that if the plaintiff fails to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial within five
(5) days from the filing of a reply, the duty to set the case for pre-trial falls upon the branch clerk of
court. However, this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently.
For a plaintiff, as herein respondent, to be excused from its burden to promptly prosecute its case, it
must convince the court that its failure to do so was due to justifiable reasons. If the neglect is
justified, then a dismissal of the case on said ground is not warranted.
A consideration of the events that transpired in the said expropriation case readily shows that the
delay cannot solely be attributed to respondent City of Lapu Lapu but is in fact due to the failure of
the branch clerk of court to set the case for pre-trial pursuant to A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, as well as the
trial court's delay in resolving petitioner's Motion to Conduct Joint Survey and Set the Case for Pre-
Trial. We find good reason to believe respondent's assertion that it acted in good faith when it did not
move to set the case for pre-trial, since petitioner already moved for the pre-trial setting. Another
motion from respondent can be simply repetitive of petitioner's earlier motion.
The Court, however, is mindful of petitioner's predicament that the delay in the resolution of the
expropriation case and respondent's continued occupation and enjoyment of the subject property for
more than half a decade is extremely disadvantageous and prejudicial to said corporation without any
payment of just compensation. To prevent further damage to petitioner, the trial court is directed to
immediately resolve petitioner's Motion to Conduct Joint Survey, set the case for pre-trial, and take all
appropriate measures to expedite the resolution of said case.
Intervention (Rule 19)

Looyuko v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102696, July 12, 2001
Facts
Disputed in these consolidated cases is a house and lot located in Mandaluyong, Rizal (now
Mandaluyong City), previously owned by the Spouses Tomas and Linda Mendoza. Bitterly contesting
the property are the spouses various creditors as well as the creditors alleged assignee. One set of
creditors includes Albert Looyuko and Jose Uy. Their lawyer, Atty. Victoria Cuyos, has also
annotated her attorneys lien over the property. Antonia Gutang and her children David and Elizabeth,
who have substituted their father, comprise another set. Both sets of creditors rest their claim upon
separate levies on execution and their supposed purchase of the property at public auction. The facts
are as follows:
Spouses Tomas and Linda Mendoza executed a mortgage over the subject property in favor of FGU
Insurance Corporation. As the spouses failed to satisfy the obligation secured by the mortgage, FGU
filed an action (Civil Case No. 82-9760) with the RTC against said spouses. The latter filed an
Answer but failed to appear during the pre-trial. Consequently, the Spouses Mendoza were declared
as in default and evidence were received ex-parte. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of FGU
FGU filed a motion for partial reconsideration, pointing out that the action was not for a sum of
money but for foreclosure of mortgage. The RTC issued an Order granting FGUs motion. No appeal
was taken from the above Order and the same subsequently became final and executory. The Manila
RTC issued a writ of execution. The deputy sheriff in a public bidding sold the parcel of land to FGU,
the highest bidder.
Before the new TCT could be issued, however, the Spouses Gutang filed a motion for intervention
and to set aside the judgment of the RTC, alleging that they are the new registered owners of the
property. The RTC allowed the motion for intervention, holding that the failure of FGU to implead
the Spouses in the action for foreclosure deprived the latter of due process. The RTC thus set aside its
Decision and all orders issued subsequent and related thereto. Looyuko et al. filed a motion for
intervention, which the RTC granted.
FGU filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals, arguing that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Spouses Gutangs motion for
intervention since the RTC decision, as amended, was already final and executory.
The Court of Appeals received an Urgent Motion by Juan Uy, Alberto Looyuko and their counsel,
Atty. Cuyos, praying for leave to file a motion for intervention. They alleged that they were
attachment creditors of the spouses Tomas and Linda Mendoza whose property was and subsequently
carried over to TCT in the name of the Spouses Gutang. The court issued a resolution allowing
Looyuko et al.s motion for intervention.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the action before the RTC was not actually an action for foreclosure
but one for collection of a sum of money. The court also affirmed the order of the RTC allowing
intervention, thus:
The Court, both from the factual, procedural and substantive points, finds that respondent court had just and
valid reasons to allow the private respondents to intervene in the case. Had it denied the intervention, the
execution in satisfaction of the money judgment against the judgment debtors, would be violative of section 15
of Rule 30. Petitioner did not include private respondents as well as movants-intervenors, both of whom hold
liens on the same property. Even under this aspect, respondent court should not be faulted for allowing private
respondents to intervene, considering its reason that intervention was permitted pending appeal "in order to
avoid injustice" which must have impelled the respondent court to allow the intervention.
Looyuko et al. thus filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before this Court,
contending in the main that the failure of FGU to implead them as defendants in Civil Case No. 82-
9760 deprived them of due process. Consequently, the entire proceedings conducted before the RTC
should have been declared void.
FGU, for its part, filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. FGU contends that the Court
of Appeals erred in characterizing Civil Case as an action for a sum of money, and not one for
foreclosure of mortgage, and in allowing the intervention of the Spouses Gutang and Looyuko et al. in
the proceedings before the trial court.
Issue
Whether or not the motion for intervention filed by the Spouses Gutang and Looyuko et al. in Civil
Case No. 82-9760 was proper considering that the case was already final and executory.
Held
Improper.
The rule requires that a motion for intervention should be made "before or during a trial." The present
Rules have clarified that the motion should be filed "any time before rendition of judgment."
In the present case, the motions for intervention were filed after judgment had already been rendered,
indeed when the case was already final and executory. Certainly, intervention can no longer be
allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment. Where the main action ceases to exist, there is
no pending proceeding wherein the intervention may be based. Here, there is no more pending
principal action wherein the Spouses Gutang and Looyuko et al. may intervene.
In exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by
the trial court. In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, intervention was allowed even when the
petition for review of the assailed judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.
Recently in Mago vs. Court of Appeals, the Court granted intervention despite the case having
become final and executory.
It must be noted, however, that in both these cases, the intervenors were indispensable parties. This is
not so in the case at bar.
Section 1, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court requires all persons having or claiming an interest in the
premises subordinate in right to that of the holder of the mortgage be made defendants in the action
for foreclosure. The requirement for joinder of the person claiming an interest subordinate to the
mortgage sought to be foreclosed, however, is not mandatory in character but merely directory, in the
sense that failure to comply therewith will not invalidate the foreclosure proceedings. A subordinate
lien holder is a proper, even a necessary, but not an indispensable, party to a foreclosure proceeding.
The Spouses Gutang make a lot of needless hair-splitting by arguing that cases applying the above
principles are not on all fours with the one at bar. They persistently cling to the notion that as
purchasers in the execution sale, they stepped into the shoes of the Spouses Gutang and have become,
in legal contemplation, the mortgagors of the property. Consequently, their intervention should be
allowed.
This contention is utterly devoid of merit. Subordinate lien holders like the Spouses Gutang and
Looyuko et al. acquire only a lien upon the equity of redemption vested in the mortgagor, and their
rights are strictly subordinate to the superior lien of the mortgagee.
The failure of the mortgagee to join the subordinate lien holders as defendants in the foreclosure suit
did not have the effect of nullifying the foreclosure proceeding, but kept alive the equity of
redemption acquired by the purchasers in their respective execution sales.
Limpo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124582, July 16, 2000

Facts
Petitioner Reggie Christi S. Limpo (Regina Christi Schaetzchen Limpo) and Bong Diaz (Maria
Lourdes Gamir Diaz) were acquitted of nine counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. She and
her co-accused were likewise acquitted of seven counts of estafa. But petitioner and Diaz jointly were
held severally liable to private respondent Veronica Gonzales, complainant in the two criminal cases,
in the decision rendered October 28, 1991 by the Regional Trial Court.
The decision became final and executory. Private respondent filed a motion for the enforcement of the
civil liability, whereupon the trial court issued a writ of execution. Consequently, the sheriff levied
upon two (2) parcels of land registered in the name of petitioner. At the auction sale subsequently
held, the properties were sold to private respondent as the highest bidder. As petitioner failed to
redeem the properties, a final deed of sale was executed in favor of private respondent.
To consolidate her ownership over the two (2) parcels of land, private respondent demanded from
petitioner the surrender of her owners copy of TCT. Petitioner, however, failed to do so, whereupon
private respondent filed a petition to compel petitioner to surrender her owners duplicate certificates
of title.
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence adduced by the herein petitioner to be sufficient to warrant the relief
prayed for under the aforesaid law, the respondent Reggie Christi Limpo is hereby directed to surrender the said
owners duplicate copies of TCT No. T-30395 and T-30396 to the Register of Deeds at Malolos, Bulacan. In the
event that she failed or refused to do so, the said public officer is hereby ordered to cancel or annul the same and
in lieu thereof, issue new copies of certificates of title in the name of herein petitioner, Veronica R. Gonzales,
with the proper notations as provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
The decision became final and executory. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan cancelled
TCT in the name of petitioner and, in lieu thereof, issued TCT in the name of private respondent.
Because of petitioners refusal to vacate the premises, private respondent filed a petition for issuance
of a writ of possession. A writ of possession was issued commanding the sheriff to place private
respondent in possession of the properties in question.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to stop the sheriff from implementing the writ of possession. The
court denied petitioners motion for lack of merit. Petitioner, thereupon filed a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals and obtained from it a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement
of the alias writ of possession until further orders. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision, now
the subject of this petition for review on certiorari, dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari.
The question for decision is whether a writ of possession may be issued ex parte under Rule 39, 35 of
the Rules of Court.
Issue
Whether or not intervention by the Spouses Bulaong may be allowed.
Held
No.
While this case was pending deliberation in this Court, the spouses Anselmo and Precilla Bulaong
filed a motion for leave to intervene. It appears that the RTC ordered the cancellation of TCT in the
name of private respondent Veronica Gonzales and the execution of a deed of sale covering the lands
in question in favor of the spouses Bulaong; and the issuance to the latter of new titles upon payment
by them of P275,000.00 to private respondent Veronica Gonzales representing the judgment debt of
petitioner in Criminal Cases. It appears further that from the decision, both the spouses Bulaong and
private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals where the case is now pending.
In their motion for intervention, the spouses Bulaong allege that the Limpos (presumably the family
of herein petitioner Reggie Christi Limpo) mortgaged the lands in question to them for P4.3 million,
delivering to them for this purpose the owners duplicates of TCT; that as the originals of the titles in
the Register of Deeds of Malolos, Bulacan had been destroyed by fire in 1987, they filed a petition for
reconstitution of the same, resulting in the issuance of TCT which were later cancelled when, in their
place, TCT in the name of petitioner were issued; that the spouses found out "to their consternation . .
. several entries with various erasures and superimpositions appear[ing] in the pages of the
encumbrance of TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396;" that "the position, placing, and the number of
entries favored spouses Bulaong, while the dates of entries . . . indicate advantage on the part of
Gonzales"; that the mortgage lien of the spouses Bulaong was annotated on the reconstituted titles on
March 1, 1993; that on August 22, 1993, the mortgage was foreclosed and the properties covered by it
were sold for P4.3 million to the spouses Bulaong as highest bidders. The spouses Bulaong pray that
"the conflict between the rights of spouses Bulaong as mortgagees for P4.3 million . . . as against the
entry in the primary book for the P275,000.00 judgment claim of [private respondent] Gonzales . . . be
resolved."
Intervention cannot be allowed at this late stage of this case. Intervention may be granted only where
its allowance will not unduly delay or prejudice the rights of the original parties to a case. Generally,
it will be allowed "before rendition of judgment by the trial court,. After trial and decision in a case,
intervention can no longer be permitted. Certainly it cannot be allowed on appeal without unduly
delaying the disposition of the case and prejudicing the interest of the parties.
Indeed, there is no justification for granting the motion for the intervention of the spouses Bulaong
which they filed only after the appeal in this case had already been submitted for resolution, when
they could have done so earlier. Notice of the levy on execution in Criminal Case was entered in the
primary entry book of the Register of Deeds of Malolos, Bulacan and were later annotated on the
owners duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-249639 and T-249641. Although the spouses Bulaong claim
that said owners duplicate copies of the titles were "clean" when the Limpos mortgaged the properties
to them, they nonetheless admit that when the titles in the name of petitioner Reggie Christi Limpo
were issued shortly after, they contained the notice of levy on execution in Criminal Case. They,
therefore, had notice of private respondents claims over the properties in question.
On December 16, 1994, private respondent filed a petition to compel petitioner, as registered owner,
to surrender her owners copy of TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396. Assuming that the spouses Bulaong
were until then without knowledge of the sale of the properties to private respondent, they could not
have remained unaware of the claim of private respondent. After all, they admit they were then in
possession of the owners copy of TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396.
The result of all this is that the spouses Bulaong, knowing private respondents interest in the
properties in conflict with theirs, could have sought to intervene much earlier and not only now on
appeal. It took them nearly five years when private respondent filed a petition for issuance of a writ of
possession, before filing their motion for leave to intervene in this case. Such delay amounts to laches
and justifies the denial of their motion. Allowance of intervention at this late stage would unduly
delay the resolution of the appeal as trial would be conducted anew to allow the spouses Bulaong to
present evidence in support of their claim of ownership.
Asian Terminals v. Ricafort, G.R. No. 166901, October 27, 2006

Facts
Republic Act (RA) No. 8506 took effect and provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to
import, cause the importation of, register, cause the registration of, use or operate any vehicle with its
steering wheel right hand side thereof in any highway, street or road, whether private or public, or at
the national or local x x x.
Respondents are duly-licensed importers of vehicles. They imported 72 secondhand right-hand drive
buses from Japan. When the shipment arrived, the District Collector of Customs impounded the
vehicles and ordered them stored at the warehouse of the Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI). The District
Collector of Customs issued Warrants of Distraint against the shipment and set the sale at public
auction.
The importers filed a complaint with the RTC of Paranaque City, against the Secretary of Finance,
Customs Commissioner, and the Chief Executive of the Societe Generale de Surillee, for replevin
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary and mandatory injunction and damages. The RTC
granted the application for a writ of replevin on a bond of P12,000,000.00. The importers were able to
take possession of the vehicles over the objections of ATI.
ATI filed a Third-Party Claim over the shipment, alleging that it had a lien over the vehicles for
accumulated and unpaid storage and arrastre charges, and wharfage dues. It prayed that the vehicles
be returned and remain with it until payment of said dues.
Before the court could resolve the motions, plaintiffs filed a Motion/Notice to Dismiss/Withdraw
Complaint against the officials of the Bureau of Customs and Department of Finance, on the ground
that said defendants had agreed to the implementation of the writ of replevin issued by the court on
condition that plaintiffs pay the taxes, dues, and other charges on the importation amounting to
P7,528,635.00 to the government and that plaintiffs had paid the said amount.
ATI filed a Motion for Intervention and for Admission of its Complaint-in-Intervention, alleging that
it had a lien on the vehicles.
The court issued an Order dismissing the complaint on the following grounds:
This Court has no jurisdiction over the case. The Court of Tax Appeals exercises exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review the ruling of the Commissioner in seizure and confiscation cases and that power is to the
exclusion of the Court of First Instance which may not interfere with the Commissioners decisions.
ATI filed a motion for clarification of the order, alleging that the court failed to resolve its motion. It
also pleaded for the court to admit its Complaint-in-Intervention. The RTC issued its Order
dismissing the Complaint-in-Intervention.
The Complaint-in-Intervention of Intervenor - ATI is likewise dismissed, it being only an accessory to the
principal case.
While it recognized the arguments of ATI, the court held that its rights could be fully protected in a
separate proceeding. It declared that the subject buses were under custodia legis by virtue of the writ
of replevin it had issued. However, due to the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint, the subject buses
have to be returned to the person who was in custody prior to the implementation of the writ.
ATI filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.
The CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The appellate court ruled that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by respondents. Under the Customs and Tarriff
Code, the Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings had the exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions relating on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable
goods. The RTC had no review powers over such proceedings; it is the Court of Tax Appeals under
RA No. 1125. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the main case, it was also bereft of authority to
hear the third-party claim or the complaint-in-intervention filed by ATI. The appellate court ruled that
intervention was not an independent proceeding but merely an ancillary and supplemental one, which,
in the nature of things, is subordinate to the main proceeding unless otherwise provided for by statute
or by the Rules of Court. The general rule is that an intervention is limited to the field of litigation
open to the original parties. The RTC had dismissed the main action; thus, there was no more
principal proceeding in which petitioner ATI may intervene.
Issue
Whether or not intervention is proper.
Held
Improper.
The RTC cannot be faulted for dismissing petitioners complaint-in-intervention. Considering that it
had no jurisdiction over respondents action and over the shipment subject of the complaint, all
proceedings before it would be void. The RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
complaint-in-intervention and act thereon except to dismiss the same. Moreover, considering that
intervention is merely ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation and never an independent
action, the dismissal of the principal action necessarily results in the dismissal of the complaint-in-
intervention. Likewise, a court which has no jurisdiction over the principal action has no jurisdiction
over a complaint-in-intervention. Intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of
competent jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of intervention is governed by jurisdiction of the main action.
Salas Jr. v. Aguila, 2013

Facts
Petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. (Salas) and respondent Eden Villena Aguila (Aguila) were married.
Aguila gave birth to their daughter, Joan Jiselle. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling.
Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their daughter.
Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage (petition) citing psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they "have no conjugal
properties whatsoever." The RTC declared the nullity of the marriage of Salas and Aguila (RTC
Decision). The RTC Decision further provides for the "dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains, if any."
Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that she discovered: (a) two 200-square-meter parcels
of land; and (b) a 108-square-meter parcel of land (collectively, "Discovered Properties"). The
registered owner of the Discovered Properties is "Juan S.Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas." The
manifestation was set for hearing on 21 September 2007. However, Salas notice of hearing was
returned unserved with the remark, "RTS Refused To Receive."
Salas filed a Manifestation with Entry of Appearance requesting for an Entry of Judgment of the RTC
Decision since no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed and no conjugal property was
involved.
The hearing for Aguilas manifestation ensued, with Aguila, her counsel and the state prosecutor
present. During the hearing, Aguila testified that someone informed her of the existence of the
Discovered Properties. Thereafter, she verified the information and secured copies of TCTs of the
Discovered Properties. When asked to clarify, Aguila testified that Rubina C. Salas (Rubina) is Salas
common-law wife.
The RTC ruled in favor of Aguila.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises being considered, the petitioner and the respondent are hereby directed to
partition between themselves by proper instruments of conveyance the [Discovered Properties].
The RTC found that the Discovered Properties are among the conjugal properties to be partitioned
and distributed between Salas and Aguila.
Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that: (1) she is Rubina Cortez, a widow and
unmarried to Salas; (2) the Discovered Properties are her paraphernal properties; (3) Salas did not
contribute money to purchase the Discovered Properties as he had no permanent job in Japan; (4) the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her as she was not a party in the case; and (5) she authorized her
brother to purchase the Discovered Properties but because he was not well-versed with legal
documentation, he registered the properties in the name of "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C.
Salas."
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Salas. The RTC found that Salas failed to
prove his allegation that Aguila transferred the Waived Properties to third persons. The RTC
emphasized that it cannot go beyond the TCTs, which state that Salas is the registered owner of the
Discovered Properties. The RTC further held that Salas and Rubina were at fault for failing to correct
the TCTs, if they were not married as they claimed.
Hence, Salas filed an appeal with the CA.
The CA affirmed the order of the RTC. The CA ruled that Aguilas statement in her petition is not a
judicial admission. The CA pointed out that the petition was filed on 7 October 2003, but Aguila
found the Discovered Properties only on 17 April 2007 or before the promulgation of the RTC
decision. Thus, the CA concluded that Aguila was palpably mistaken in her petition and it would be
unfair to punish her over a matter that she had no knowledge of at the time she made the admission.
The CA also ruled that Salas was not deprived of the opportunity to refute Aguilas allegations in her
manifestation, even though he was not present in its hearing. The CA likewise held that Rubina
cannot collaterally attack a certificate of title.
Issue
Whether or not intervention is proper.
Held
Improper.
On both Salas and Rubinas contention that Rubina owns the Discovered Properties, we likewise find
the contention unmeritorious. The TCTs state that "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas" is the
registered owner of the Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of
the ownership of the land referred to, because there is a strong presumption that it is valid and
regularly issued. The phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered
owner. Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute the ownership of the Discovered Properties in his
opposition to the manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that Salas supported Rubinas
statement that she owns the Discovered Properties.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the Discovered Properties, she
has no right to intervene in this case.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through the couples joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the
present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for nullity of
marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of
the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership. Accordingly,
the partition of the Discovered Properties as ordered by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but
on the basis of co-ownership and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
Smart Communications v. Aldecoa

Facts
Petitioner entered into a contract of lease with Florentino Sebastian in which the latter agreed to lease
to the former a piece of vacant lot. Petitioner immediately constructed and installed a cellular base
station on the leased property. Inside the cellular base station is a communications tower. Around and
close to the cellular base station are houses, hospitals, clinics, and establishments, including the
properties of respondents.
Respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint against petitioner for abatement of nuisance and
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
The RTC issued its Order granting petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing
respondents Complaint.
Respondents filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court declared the cellular base
station of petitioner a nuisance that endangered the health and safety of the residents of Barangay
Vira, Roxas, Isabela because: (1) the locational clearance granted to petitioner was a nullity due to the
lack of approval by majority of the actual residents of the barangay and a barangay resolution
endorsing the construction of the cellular base station; and (2) the sound emission of the generator at
the cellular base station exceeded the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
standards.
Issue
Whether or not court intervention is proper.
Held
Improper.
On the finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioners locational clearance for its cellular base
station is a nullity, based on the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and its corollary
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it was premature for the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of and
rule upon the issue of the validity or nullity of petitioners locational clearance for its cellular base
station.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction were
explained at length by the Court in Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals, as follows:
The Court in a long line of cases has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it
is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within
the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power
of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly,
absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without its practical and legal reasons. Indeed,
resort to administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and provides for speedier disposition of controversies.
Our courts of justice for reason of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency every
opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.
xxxx
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
We have held that while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbridled exploitation of our resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establishes the basic
rule that the court will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of
such agencies.
In fact, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure
to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. The
underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the
administrative body, or grievance machinery, is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the
same correctly.
In the case of Republic v. Lacap, we expounded on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies and the related doctrine of primary jurisdiction in this wise:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the
means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to
decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such
administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
There is no showing that respondents availed themselves of the administrative remedies prior to
instituting Civil Case before the RTC. While there are accepted exceptions to the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, respondents never
asserted nor argued any of them. Thus, there is no cogent reason for the Court to apply the exceptions
instead of the general rule to this case.
Ordinarily, failure to comply with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction will result in the dismissal of the case for lack of cause of action.
However, the Court herein will not go to the extent of entirely dismissing Civil Case. The Court does
not lose sight of the fact that respondents Complaint in Civil Case is primarily for abatement of
nuisance; and respondents alleged the lack of HLURB requirements for the cellular base station, not
to seek nullification of petitioners locational clearance, but to support their chief argument that said
cellular base station is a nuisance which needs to be abated. The issue of whether or not the locational
clearance for said cellular base station is valid is actually separate and distinct from the issue of
whether or not the cellular base station is a nuisance; one is not necessarily determinative of the other.
While the first is within the primary jurisdiction of the HLURB and, therefore, premature for the
courts to rule upon in the present case, the latter is within the jurisdiction of the courts to determine
but only after trial proper.
Subpoena (Rule 21)

Collado v. Bravo, A.M.-P-99-1377, April 10, 200133
Facts
Complainant Lorena O. Collado charged respondent Teresita G. Bravo, Clerk of Court of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) with Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service.
Complainant alleged that she received through priority mail a subpoena from the MTC directing her
to appear before the said court at 2:00 P.M., July 14, 1997. The subpoena was duly signed by
respondent in her capacity as Clerk of Court.
Upon arriving at the MTC, complainant talked to respondent. When complainant asked for copies of
the complaint and other details of the case, respondent replied that no complaint had been filed and
her intention in issuing the subpoena was to allow a certain Perla Baterina, the labor recruiter of
complainants son, Emmanuel Collado, to talk to complainant.
Complainant claimed that she felt humiliated, harassed, and experienced extreme nervousness as a
result of respondents issuance of the subpoena.
In her answer respondent admitted issuing the subpoena. She claimed, however, that it was done with
good intentions since she only acceded to the urgent request of the spouses Rogelio and Perla Baterina
who came to her office on July 7, 1997, airing their grievances against complainant. Respondent
averred that her only purpose in issuing the subpoena was to enable complainant and Baterinas to
settle their differences.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the complaint be docketed as an
administrative matter and respondent be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for Grave
Misconduct with a Warning that the commission of a similar act would merit a more serious penalty.
Issue
Whether or not the subpeona was properly issued.
Held
No.
Respondents act of issuing the subpoena to complainant was evidently not directly or remotely
connected with respondents judicial or administrative duties. It appears that she merely wanted to act
as a mediator or conciliator in the dispute between complainant and the Baterinas, upon the request of
the latter.
Respondent as Clerk of Court is primarily tasked with making out and issuing all writs and processes
issuing from the court. She should have known or ought to know what a subpoena is. Absent any
proceedings, suit, or action commenced or pending before a court, a subpoena may not issue. In this
case, respondent knew there was no case filed against complainant. Neither had complainant
commenced any proceeding against the Baterinas for whose benefit the subpoena was issued.
Respondent, then, had absolutely neither the power nor the authority nor the duty to issue a subpoena
to the complainant.
Perusal of the subpoena she issued to complainant shows that the form used was the one used in
criminal cases, giving complainant the impression that her failure to appear would subject her to the
33
Not bound thereby witness is not qualified or would fall under a privilege.
penalty of law, and that the subpoena was issued with the trial courts sanction. We find, therefore, that
respondent was using without authority some element of state coercion against complainant who was
understandably compelled to heed the contents of the subpoena resulting in her humiliation. Such
naked abuse of authority by complainant could not be allowed to pass without appropriate sanction.
Accordingly, this Court has no recourse but to agree with the recommendation of the OCA that
respondent be disciplined and fined.
Roco v. Contreras, G.R. No. 158275, June 28, 2005

Facts
Petitioner Domingo Roco was engaged in the business of buying and selling dressed chicken. He
purchased his supply of dressed chicken from private respondent Cals Poultry Supply Corporation
(Cals Corporation, for short), a domestic corporation controlled and managed by one Danilo Yap. As
payment for his purchases, petitioner drew five (5) checks payable to Cals Corporation against his
account with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB).
Cals Corporation deposited the checks in its account with PCIB but the bank dishonored them for
having been drawn against a closed account. Thereafter, Cals Corporation filed criminal complaints
against petitioner for violation of Batas Pambasa Blg. 22 (BP 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing
Checks Law. After preliminary investigation, five (5) informations for violation of BP 22 were filed
against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC).
Thereupon, trial of the criminal cases proceeded. After the prosecution rested, the MTCC declared the
cases submitted for decision on account of petitioners failure to adduce evidence in his behalf. Later,
the same court rendered a judgment of conviction against petitioner. Therefrom, petitioner went on
appeal to the Regional Trial Court, contending that he was unlawfully deprived of his right to due
process when the MTCC rendered judgment against him without affording him of the right to present
his evidence. Agreeing with the petitioner, the RTC vacated the MTCC decision and remanded the
cases to it for the reception of petitioners evidence.
During the pendency of the remanded cases, petitioner filed with the MTCC a Request for Issuance of
Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum, requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap,
both of Cals Corporation or their duly authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court and to
bring with them certain documents, records and books of accounts for the years 1993-1999.
The MTCC issued an order granting petitioners aforementioned request and accordingly directed the
issuance of the desired subpoenas. The prosecutors requested the order be reconsidered.
The MTCC denied petitioners request on the following grounds: (a) the requested documents, book
ledgers and other records were immaterial in resolving the issues posed before the court; and (b) the
issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delay the hearing of the criminal cases.
Petitioner then went to the RTC on a petition for certiorari with plea for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Judge Contreras
.
The RTC denied due course to and dismissed the petition for petitioners failure to show that Judge
Contreras committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Undaunted, petitioner went on appeal via certiorari to the Court of Appeals.
The CA dismissed the petition and accordingly affirmed the impugned resolutions of the RTC.
Issue
Whether or not the subpeona should be granted.
Held
Not granted.
Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum, it must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be
produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court, and that the
precise book, paper or document containing such evidence has been so designated or described
that it may be identified.
Going by established precedents, it thus behooves the petitioner to first prove, to the satisfaction of
the court, the relevancy and the definiteness of the books and documents he seeks to be brought before
it.
Admittedly, the books and documents that petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated and
described in his request with definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore,
is satisfied in this case.
It is, however, in the matter of relevancy of those books and documents to the pending criminal cases
that petitioner miserably failed to discharge his burden.
Here, petitioner would want it appear that the books and documents subject of his request for
subpoena duces tecum are indispensable, or, at least, relevant to prove his innocence. The Court
disagrees.
Based on the records below and as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner had been
issued by Cals Corporation with temporary receipts in the form of yellow pad slips of paper
evidencing his payments, which pad slips had been validated by the corporation itself. Clear it is,
then, that the production of the books and documents requested by petitioner are not indispensable to
prove his defense of payment. In the words of the appellate court:
The Petitioner admitted, when he testified in the Regional Trial Court, that he had been issued temporary
receipts in the form of yellow pad slips of paper, by the Private Respondent, for his payments which were all
validated by the Private Respondent. Even if the temporary receipts issued by the Private Respondent may not
have been the official receipts for Petitioners payments, the same are as efficacious and binding on the Private
Respondent as official receipts issued by the latter.
We do not find any justifiable reason, and petitioner has not shown any, why this Court must have to
disbelieve the factual findings of the appellate court. In short, the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
or ad testificandum to compel the attendance of Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap of Cals Corporation
or their duly authorized representatives, to testify and bring with them the records and documents
desired by the petitioner, would serve no purpose but to further delay the proceedings in the pending
criminal cases.
Besides, the irrelevancy of such books and documents would appear on their very face thereof, what
the fact that the requested Audited Income Statements, Audited Balance Sheets, Income Tax Returns,
etc. pertained to the years 1994 to 1999 which could not have reflected petitioners alleged payment
because the subject transaction happened in 1993. Again, we quote from the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals:
The checks subject of the criminal indictments against the Petitioner were drawn and dated in 1993. The
Petitioner has not demonstrated the justification, for the production of the books/records for 1994, and onwards,
up to 1999. Especially so, when the Informations against the Petitioner, for violations of BP 22, were filed,
with the Trial Court, as early as 1994.
We are inclined to believe, along with that court, that petitioner was just embarking on a fishing
expedition to derail the placid flow of trial.
With the above, it becomes evident to this Court that petitioners request for the production of books
and documents referred to in his request are nakedly calculated to merely lengthen the proceedings in
the subject criminal cases, if not to fish for evidence. The Court deeply deplores petitioners tactics and
will never allow the same.
Deposition (Rules 23 ti 29)

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Jose Africa, Imelda Marcos, et al. G.R. No. 152375, December 13,
201134
Facts
The petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa,
Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce
Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio (collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan.
PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-controlled board of directors was elected.

Later, the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special stockholders meeting wherein another set
of board of directors was elected. As a result, two sets of ETPI board and officers were elected.
Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan (Civil Case 0130) seeking to nullify
the Orders of the PCGG. These Orders directed Africa:
[T]o account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting rights on the
sequestered shares in the special stockholders meeting to be held on August 12, 1991, from representing himself
as a director, officer, employee or agent of ETPI, and from participating, directly or indirectly[,] in the
management of ETPI.
In the meantime, the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130, among
others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter as the main case and the former merely an incident.
During the pendency of PCGGs petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with this Court a Very
Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders Meeting for [the] Sole Purpose of
Increasing [ETPIs] Authorized Capital Stock (Urgent Petition). In the proceedings to resolve the
Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and treasurer-in-trust of
ETPI) was taken at the petitioners instance and after serving notice of the deposition-taking on the
respondents by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General
Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London, England.
The notice stated that [t]he purpose of the deposition is for [Bane] to identify and testify on the facts
set forth in his affidavit x x x so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of [the petitioner] and/or
establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of [ETPIs] Class A stock in support of
the [Urgent Petition]. The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the Bane deposition in
evidence in the main case of Civil Case No. 0009. On the scheduled deposition date, only Africa was
present and he cross-examined Bane.
Civil Case No. 0009
In the Pre-Trial Brief the petitioner offered to present the following witnesses:
WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THEIR TESTIMONIES

Maurice V. Bane representative of Cable and Wireless Limited (C & W) at the time ETPI was organized. x
Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition
34
Deposition not allowed because no identity of parties and matter and no opportunity to cross-examine. Cases
remained separate.
The petitioner filed a Motion (1st motion) to admit the Bane deposition. The Sandiganbayan ruled as
follows:
Wherefore, the [petitioners] Motion x x x is partly denied insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the
testimonies on oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud as part of its evidence in Civil Case
No. 0009 for the reason that said deponents according to the [petitioner] are not available for cross-
examination in this Court by the [respondents].
The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of
Evidence. Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its offered exhibits.
Rectifying the omission, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice (2nd
motion). The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners 2nd motion:
On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the ordinary formal offer of
exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity to raise objection on grounds provided by law.
Definitely, it is not under Article (sic) 129 on judicial notice.
The petitioner filed its 3rd Motion, seeking once more the admission of the Bane depositionThe
Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners 3rd motion.
Issue
Whether or not the Bane deposition should be admitted.
Held
No.
Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23
of the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also
requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance with the rules on evidence. By reading Rule 23
in isolation, the petitioner failed to recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a deposition
under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on evidence under Section 47, Rule 130. In
determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition, therefore, reliance cannot be given on one
provision to the exclusion of the other; both provisions must be considered. This is particularly true
in this case where the evidence in the prior proceeding does not simply refer to a witness testimony in
open court but to a deposition taken under another and farther jurisdiction.
A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and Section 47, Rule 130 of
the same Rules is their mutual reference to depositions.
These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on evidence and
therefore should not be confused with the general provisions on deposition under Rule 23 of the Rules
of Court. In other words, even if the petitioner complies with Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on the use
of depositions, the observance of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court cannot simply be
avoided or disregarded.
Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case No. 0130, for
purposes of this very same case. Thus, what the petitioner established and what the Sandiganbayan
found, for purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to the circumstances laid down under
Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that imposes further requirements in the use of
depositions in a different case or proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the deposition under
Section 4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as compliance with Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the
same deposition as hearsay, unless the requisites for its admission under this rule are observed. The
aching question is whether the petitioner complied with the latter rule.
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for the admission of a
testimony or deposition given at a former case or proceeding.
1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;

2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative;
3. Involving the same parties;
4. Relating to the same matter;
5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
IV (c). Unavailability of witness
For the admission of a former testimony or deposition, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
simply requires, inter alia, that the witness or deponent be deceased or unable to testify. On the other
hand, in using a deposition that was taken during the pendency of an action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court provides several grounds that will justify dispensing with the actual testimony of the
deponent in open court and specifies, inter alia, the circumstances of the deponents inability to attend
or testify, as follows:
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment[.] [emphases ours]
The phrase unable to testify appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules of Court refers to a
physical inability to appear at the witness stand and to give a testimony. Hence notwithstanding the
deletion of the phrase out of the Philippines, which previously appeared in Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, absence from jurisdiction - the petitioners excuse for the non-presentation of Bane in
open court - may still constitute inability to testify under the same rule. This is not to say, however,
that resort to deposition on this instance of unavailability will always be upheld. Where the
deposition is taken not for discovery purposes, but to accommodate the deponent, then the
deposition should be rejected in evidence.
Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the course of a former proceeding between the
parties to a case on trial, this testimony alone is not a ground for its admission in evidence. The
witness himself, if available, must be produced in court as if he were testifying de novo since his
testimony given at the former trial is mere hearsay. The deposition of a witness, otherwise available,
is also inadmissible for the same reason.
Indeed, the Sandiganbayans reliance on the Bane deposition in the other case (Civil Case No. 0130) is
an argument in favor of the requisite unavailability of the witness. For purposes of the present case
(Civil Case No. 0009), however, the Sandiganbayan would have no basis to presume, and neither can
or should we, that the previous condition, which previously allowed the use of the deposition, remains
and would thereby justify the use of the same deposition in another case or proceeding, even if the
other case or proceeding is before the same court. Since the basis for the admission of the Bane
deposition, in principle, being necessity, the burden of establishing its existence rests on the party who
seeks the admission of the evidence. This burden cannot be supplanted by assuming the continuity of
the previous condition or conditions in light of the general rule against the non-presentation of the
deponent in court.
Jonathan Land Oil v. Mangudadatu, G.R. No. 155010, August 16, 2004
Facts
Respondent-Spouses Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) a Complaint for damages against Petitioner Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. (JLI).
Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective Pretrial Briefs. Trial proceeded without the
participation of petitioner, whose absence during the pretrial, had led the trial court to declare it in
default. Petitioner received a copy of the RTCs Decision, it filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial
and Change of Venue. This was denied by the trial court.
Petitioner received a copy of a Writ of Execution. Alleging that it had yet to receive a copy of an
Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of
Execution. Petitioner attached the Affidavits of Attys. Mario and Peligro attesting that they had not
yet received a copy of the Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial.
By reason of the immediate threat to implement the Writ of Execution, it filed with the CA a Petition
for Prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Writ until the resolution of the Motion to
Quash.
Petitioner received a copy of respondents Vigorous Opposition (Re: Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of
Execution, and its Supplement). Attached to this pleading were two separate Certifications supposedly
issued by the postmaster of Tacurong City, affirming that the Order denying the Motion for New Trial
had been received by petitioners two previous counsels of record.
Petitioner personally served counsel for respondents a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral
Examination of Attys. Mario and Peligro. The Deposition was intended to prove that petitioner had
not received a copy of the Order denying the Omnibus Motion for New Trial.
The deposition-taking proceeded as scheduled -- at the Business Center Conference Room of the
Mandarin Oriental Hotel in Makati City -- before Atty. Ana Peralta-Nazareno, a notary public acting
as deposition officer. At 12:00 noon of the same day, respondents sent petitioner a fax message via
JRS Express, advising it that they had filed a Motion to Strike Off from the records the Notice to Take
Deposition; and asking it not to proceed until the RTC would have resolved the Motion, a copy of
which it eventually received later in the day, at 3:10 p.m.
Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution denying the Petition for Prohibition.
Petitioner received a copy of the RTCs Resolution denying the Motion to Quash.
Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, seeking to hold in abeyance the
RTC Resolution and the Writ of Execution. Petitioner alleged that since it had not received the Order
denying its Motion for New Trial, the period to appeal had not yet lapsed. It thus concluded that the
judgment, not being final, could not be the subject of a writ of execution.
The CA issued the assailed Decision denying JLIs Petition. It ruled that petitioner could no longer
avail itself of a deposition under Rule 23 of Rules of Court, since trial had already been terminated.
The appellate court also opined that the alleged error committed by the trial court -- when the latter
disregarded two witnesses oral depositions -- was an error of judgment not reviewable by certiorari or
prohibition. Finally, it ruled that between the denial of a lawyer and the certification of a postmaster,
the latter would prevail.
Issue
Whether or not the taking of deposition is proper.
Held
Proper.
The appellate court supposedly erred, too, in declaring that the taking of the depositions of petitioners
witnesses was improper. We agree with this contention.
Deposition Pending Action
The Rules of Court and jurisprudence do not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a mode
of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken
even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the
witness stand.
Thus, [d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or
convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no
prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. There can be no valid objection to
allowing them during the process of executing final and executory judgments, when the material
issues of fact have become numerous or complicated.
Depositions are allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining
witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge. Depositions are
allowed, provided they are taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court (that is, with
leave of court if the summons have been served, without leave of court if an answer has been
submitted); and provided, further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule
23, Rules of Court).
The Rules of Court vests in the trial court the discretion to order whether a deposition may be taken or
not under specified circumstances that may even differ from those the proponents have intended.
When a deposition does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause
material injury to the adverse party, its taking should not be allowed.
Safeguards Available
The Rules of Court provides adequate safeguards to ensure the reliability of depositions. The right to
object to their admissibility is retained by the parties, for the same reasons as those for excluding
evidence if the witness were present and had testified in court; and for errors and irregularities in the
deposition. As a rule, depositions should be allowed, absent any showing that taking them would
prejudice any party.
Use of Depositions
The present case involved a circumstance that fell under Section 4(c)(2) of Rule 23 -- the witnesses of
petitioner in Metro Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place of hearing.
Petitioner offered the depositions in support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for
the purpose of proving that the trial courts Decision was not yet final. As previously explained,
despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition can still be properly taken.
We note, however, that the RTC did not totally disregard petitioners depositions. The trial court
considered and weighed -- against all other evidence -- that its Order denying the Motion for New
Trial filed by petitioner had not been received by the latters counsels. Despite their depositions,
petitioner failed to prove convincingly its denial of receipt.
Sales v. Sabino, G.R. No. 133154, December 9, 2005

Facts
In the Regional Trial Court (RTC), herein respondent Cyril A. Sabino filed an amended complaint for
damages against, among others, herein petitioner Jowel Sales, driver of the vehicle involved in the
accident which ultimately caused the death of respondents son, Elbert.
Before any responsive pleading could be filed, respondent, as plaintiff a quo, notified the defendants
that he will take the deposition of one Buaneres Corral before the Clerk of Court, RTC.
The deposition on oral examination of Buaneres Corral was taken before the Clerk of Court, in the
presence and with the active participation of petitioners counsel, Atty. Roldan Villacorta, who even
lengthily cross-examined the deponent. In the course of trial, respondent had the deposition of
Buaneres Corral marked as her Exhibits DD and EE, with submarkings.
Upon conclusion of her evidentiary presentation, respondent made a Formal Offer of Exhibits, among
which are Exhibits DD and EE. Likewise offered in evidence as Exhibit BB is a certification from the
Bureau of Immigration attesting to the departure for abroad of Buaneres Corral via Flight No. PR 658.
Petitioner opposed the admission of Exhs. DD and EE and even asked that they be expunged from the
records on the ground that the jurisdictional requirements for their admission under Section 4, Rule 23
of the Rules of Court, infra, were not complied with. He also downplayed the evidentiary value of
Exhibit BB for reasons he would repeat in this petition.
The trial court admitted, among other evidence, respondents Exhibits DD, EE and BB. Petitioner went
on certiorari to the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
in admitting in evidence the deposition in question (Exhibits DD and EE).
As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in the herein assailed decision upheld the trial
court and effectively denied due course to and dismissed petitioners recourse, explaining, inter alia,
that petitioners active participation, through counsel, during the taking of subject deposition and
adopting it as his own exhibits, has thereby estopped him from assailing the admissibility thereof as
part of respondents evidence.
Issue
Whether or not the use of deposition is justified.
Held
Justified.
It is petitioners posture that none of the conditions exists in this case to justify the admission in
evidence of respondents Exhibits DD and EE. Hence, it was error for the appellate court to have
upheld the admission thereof by the trial court. Discounting the probative value of the certification
from the Bureau of Immigration (Exh. BB) that deponent Buaneres Corral departed for abroad on
May 28, 1996, petitioner argues that said certification merely proves the fact of Corral having left the
country on the date therein mentioned. It does not, however, establish that he has not returned since
then and is unavailable to be present in court to personally testify.
While depositions may be used as evidence in court proceedings, they are generally not meant to be a
substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Stated a bit differently, a
deposition is not to be used when the deponent is at hand. Indeed, any deposition offered during a trial
to prove the facts therein set out, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court,
may be opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay. However, depositions may be used without
the deponent being called to the witness stand by the proponent, provided the existence of certain
conditions is first satisfactorily established. Five (5) exceptions for the admissibility of a deposition
are listed in Section 4, Rule 23, supra, of the Rules of Court. Among these is when the witness is out
of the Philippines.
The trial court had determined that deponent Bueneres Corral was abroad when the offer of his
deposition was made. This factual finding of absence or unavailability of witness to testify deserves
respect, having been adequately substantiated. As it were, the certification by the Bureau of
Immigration Exh. BB- provides that evidentiary support. Accordingly, the attribution of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court must be struck down. It has been said to be customary for
courts to accept statements of parties as to the unavailability of a witness as a predicate to the use of
depositions. Had deponent Buaneres Corral indeed returned to the Philippines subsequent to his
departure via Flight No. PR 658, petitioner could have presented evidence to show that such was the
case. As it is, however, the petitioner does not even assert the return as a fact, only offering it as a
possibility since no contrary proof had been adduced.
Given the foregoing perspective, the second issue of whether or not petitioner is estopped from
objecting to the use of Corrals deposition as part of respondents evidence is really no longer
determinative of the outcome of this case, and need not detain us long. Suffice it to state that, as a
rule, the inadmissibility of testimony taken by deposition is anchored on the ground that such
testimony is hearsay, i.e., the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the
deponent at the time his testimony is offered. But as jurisprudence teaches, it matters not that
opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the
opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time the testimonial evidence is
actually presented against him during the trial or hearing. In fine, the act of cross-examining the
deponent during the taking of the deposition cannot, without more, be considered a waiver of the right
to object to its admissibility as evidence in the trial proper. In participating, therefore, in the taking of
the deposition, but objecting to its admissibility in court as evidence, petitioner did not assume
inconsistent positions. He is not, thus, estopped from challenging the admissibility of the deposition
just because he participated in the taking thereof.
Lest it be overlooked, Section 29, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, no less, lends support to the
conclusion just made. In gist, it provides that, while errors and irregularities in depositions as to
notice, qualifications of the officer conducting the deposition, and manner of taking the deposition are
deemed waived if not objected to before or during the taking of the deposition, objections to the
competency of a witness or the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony may be made for
the first time at the trial and need not be made at the time of the taking of the deposition, unless they
could be obviated at that point.
While perhaps a bit anti-climactic to state at this point, certiorari will not lie against an order
admitting or rejecting a deposition in evidence, the remedy being an appeal from the final judgment.
For this singular reason alone, the appellate court could have had already dismissed herein petitioners
invocation of its certiorari jurisdiction.
Rosete v. Lim, June 8, 2006, G.R. No. 136051

Facts
Respondents Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim filed before the RTC a Complaint for Annulment, Specific
Performance with Damages against AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS),
Espreme Realty and Development Corporation (Espreme Realty), Alfredo P. Rosete, Maj. Oscar
Mapalo, Chito P. Rosete, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), and Register of Deeds of the Province
of Mindoro Occidental. It asked, among other things, that the Deed of Sale executed by AFP-RSBS
covering certain parcels of lands in favor of Espreme Realty and the titles thereof under the name of
the latter be annulled; and that the AFP-RSBS and Espreme Realty be ordered to execute the
necessary documents to restore ownership and title of said lands to respondents, and that the Register
of Deeds be ordered to cancel the titles of said land under the name of Espreme Realty and to transfer
the same in the names of respondents.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action or suit and that venue has been improperly laid. The Motions to Dismiss filed by
all the defendants were denied.
Petitioners manifested that they filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in the Court of Appeals
challenging the trial courts Orders that denied their Motions to Dismiss and Reconsideration,
respectively. They likewise informed the trial court that they filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit
Answers Ex Abudanti Cautela.
Respondents filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination giving notice that they will
cause the deposition of petitioners Oscar Mapalo and Chito Rosete.
Petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion and Objection to Take Deposition Upon Oral
Examination. They argued that the deposition may not be taken without leave of court as no answer
has yet been served and the issues have not yet been joined since their Answer was filed ex abudanti
cautela, pending resolution of the Petition for Certiorari challenging the orders that denied their
Motions to Dismiss and for Reconsideration.
The lower court denied petitioners motion and objection to take deposition upon oral examination,
and scheduled the taking thereof.
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the
Orders of the lower court.
Issue
Whether or not deposition should be with leave of court.
Held
No.
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the taking of their oral depositions should not
be allowed without leave of court as no answer has yet been served and the issues have not yet been
joined because their answers were filed ex abudanti cautela pending final resolution of the petition for
certiorari challenging the trial courts Orders that denied their motions to dismiss and for
reconsideration.
Once an answer has been served, the testimony of a person, whether a party or not, may be taken by
deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. In the case before us, petitioners contend
they have not yet served an answer to respondents because the answers that they have filed with the
trial court were made ex abudanti cautela. In other words, they do not consider the answers they filed
in court and served on respondents as answers contemplated by the Rules of Court on the ground that
same were filed ex abudanti cautela.
We find petitioners contention to be untenable. Ex abudanti cautela means out of abundant caution or
to be on the safe side. An answer ex abudanti cautela does not make their answer less of an answer. A
cursory look at the answers filed by petitioners shows that they contain their respective defenses.
Petitioners, knowing fully well the effect of the non-filing of an answer, filed their answers despite the
pendency of their appeal with the Court of Appeals on the denial of their motion to dismiss.
Petitioners argument that the issues of the case have not yet been joined must necessarily fail in light
of our ruling that petitioners have filed their answers although the same were made ex abudanti
cautela.
We cannot also sustain petitioners contention that the lower court erred when it said that the joinder of
issues is not required in order that Section 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure may be
availed of. Under said section, a deposition pending action may be availed of: (1) with leave of court
when an answer has not yet been filed but after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or
property subject of the action, or (2) without leave of court after an answer to the complaint has been
served. In the instant case, the taking of the deposition may be availed of even without leave of court
because petitioners have already served their answers to the complaint.
International v. Ley Construction, G.R. NO. 147143, March 10, 2006

Facts
Respondent Ley Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court against petitioner Hyatt Industrial
Manufacturing Corporation (Hyatt) claiming that Hyatt reneged in its obligation to transfer 40% of
the pro indiviso share of a real property in Makati in favor of LCDC despite LCDCs full payment of
the purchase price; and that Hyatt failed to develop the said property in a joint venture, despite
LCDCs payment of 40% of the pre-construction cost. LCDC filed an amended complaint impleading
Princeton Development Corporation (Princeton) as additional defendant claiming that Hyatt sold the
subject property to Princeton in fraud of LCDC. LCDC filed a second amended complaint adding as
defendant, Yu He Ching (Yu), President of Hyatt, alleging that LCDC paid the purchase price to
Hyatt through Yu.
Responsive pleadings were filed and LCDC filed notices to take the depositions of Yu; Pacita Tan
Go, Account Officer of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC); and Elena Sy, Finance
Officer of Hyatt. Hyatt also filed notice to take deposition of Manuel Ley, President of LCDC, while
Princeton filed notice to take the depositions of Manuel and Janet Ley.
The RTC ordered the deposition-taking to proceed.
At the scheduled deposition of Elena Sy, Hyatt and Yu prayed that all settings for depositions be
disregarded and pre-trial be set instead, contending that the taking of depositions only delay the
resolution of the case. The RTC agreed and on the same day ordered all depositions cancelled and
pre-trial to take place
On the scheduled date of the pre-trial, LCDC filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings Due to
Pendency of Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The petition, which sought to annul the
Orders of the RTC.
Meanwhile, pre-trial proceeded at the RTC as scheduled and with the refusal of LCDC to enter into
pre-trial, Hyatt, Yu and Princeton moved to declare LCDC non-suited which the RTC granted ruling
that after all, what the parties would like to elicit from these deponents would probably be elicited at
the pre-trial conference, and, reiterated the order setting this case for pre-trial conference.
This Court denied plaintiffs motion to suspend proceedings and ordered plaintiff to enter into pre-trial
conference. Plaintiff refused. Before this Court denied plaintiffs motion to suspend, this Court gave Plaintiff two
(2) options: enter into a pre-trial conference, advising plaintiff that what it would like to obtain at the deposition
may be obtained at the pre-trial conference, thus expediting early termination of this case; and, terminate the
pre-trial conference and apply for deposition later on. Plaintiff insisted on suspension of the pre-trial conference
alleging that it is not ready to enter into pre-trial conference in view of the petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals. Defendants insisted that pre-trial conference proceed as scheduled, manifesting their readiness to
enter into a pre-trial conference.
WHEREFORE, for failure of plaintiff to enter into pre-trial conference without any valid reason, plaintiffs
complaint is dismissed. Defendants counterclaims are likewise dismissed.
LCDC went to the CA on appeal. The CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal meritorious, this case is remanded to the court a quo
for further hearing and directing the latter to allow the deposition taking without delay.
The CA reasoned that: LCDC complied with Section 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which expressly sanctions depositions as a mode of discovery without leave of court after the answer
has been served; to unduly restrict the modes of discovery during trial would defeat the very purpose
for which it is intended which is a pre-trial device, and at the time of the trial, the issues would
already be confined to matters defined during pre-trial; the alleged intention of expediting the
resolution of the case is not sufficient justification to recall the order to take deposition as records
show that the delay was brought about by postponement interposed by both parties and other legal
antecedents that are in no way imputable to LCDC alone; deposition-taking, together with the other
modes of discovery are devised by the rules as a means to attain the objective of having all the facts
presented to the court; the trial court also erred in dismissing the complaint as LCDC appeared during
the pre-trial conference and notified it of the filing of a petition before the CA; such is a legitimate
justification to stall the pre-trial conference, as the filing of the petition was made in good faith in
their belief that the court a quo erred in canceling the deposition scheduled for no apparent purpose.
Issue
Whether or not deposition should be allowed.
Held
Allowed.
On the second issue, the Court finds that the CA was correct in remanding the case to the RTC and
ordering the deposition-taking to proceed.
As correctly observed by the CA, LCDC complied with the rules of court as it made its notice to take
depositions after the answers of the defendants have been served. LCDC having complied with the
rules then prevailing, the trial court erred in canceling the previously scheduled depositions.
While it is true that depositions may be disallowed by trial courts if the examination is conducted in
bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject of the
inquiry, or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains
of privilege, such circumstances, however are absent in the case at bar.
The RTC cites the delay in the case as reason for canceling the scheduled depositions. While speedy
disposition of cases is important, such consideration however should not outweigh a thorough and
comprehensive evaluation of cases, for the ends of justice are reached not only through the speedy
disposal of cases but more importantly, through a meticulous and comprehensive evaluation of the
merits of the case. Records also show that the delay of the case is not attributable to the depositions
sought by LCDC but was caused by the many pleadings filed by all the parties including petitioners
herein.
The argument that the taking of depositions would cause unnecessary duplicity as the intended
deponents shall also be called as witnesses during trial, is also without merit.
The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute good cause to justify
the courts order that his deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is
one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court during the trial. But the
same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.
It also does not escape this Courts attention that the trial court, before dismissing LCDCs complaint,
gave LCDC two options: (a) enter into a pre-trial conference, advising LCDC that what it would like
to obtain at the deposition may be obtained at the pre-trial conference, thus expediting early
termination of the case; and (b) terminate the pre-trial conference and apply for deposition later on.
The trial court erred in forcing LCDC to choose only from these options and in dismissing its
complaint upon LCDCs refusal to choose either of the two.
The information LCDC seeks to obtain through the depositions of Elena Sy, the Finance Officer of
Hyatt and Pacita Tan Go, an Account Officer of RCBC, may not be obtained at the pre-trial
conference, as the said deponents are not parties to the pre-trial conference.
In this case, the information sought to be obtained through the depositions of Elena and Pacita are
necessary to fully equip LCDC in determining what issues will be defined at the pre-trial. Without
such information before pre-trial, LCDC will be forced to prosecute its case in the dark --- the very
situation which the rules of discovery seek to prevent. Indeed, the rules on discovery seek to make
trial less a game of blind mans bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed
to the fullest practicable extent.
San Luis v. Rojas, G.R. 159127, March 3, 2008

Facts
Berdex International, Inc. (private respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for a
sum of money against petitioner alleging that: it is a foreign corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the United States of America with principal office in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.; it
is maintaining the present action only to enforce its rights by virtue of an isolated transaction with
petitioner; in June 1997, petitioner received from it certain amounts of money which were meant
partly as advances or loan and partly for the purchase of 40% shares in both Seanet and Seabest
Corporations, however, not a single share in those corporations was transferred to private respondent
by petitioner and the shares were retained by the latter; the parties then agreed to treat all the
payments/advances made by private respondent to petitioner as the latter's loan; petitioner proposed
the payment of the loan within a period of three years, which proposal was accepted by private
respondent with the agreement that in case of non-payment of any installment on their due dates, the
entire amount shall become due and demandable; petitioner later refused to sign a formal contract of
loan; petitioner confirmed such loan to private respondent's auditors on August 8, 2000; and he had
only paid US$20,000.00 and no further payment was made despite repeated demands. Private
respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay the amount of US$150,335.75 plus interest until
fully paid and attorney's fees.
The pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was subsequently set for trial.
Private respondent filed a MOTION (To Authorize Deposition-Taking Through Written

Interrogatories) alleging that initial presentation of its evidence is set on May 3, 2002; that however,
all of its witnesses are Americans who reside or hold office in the USA; that one of the witnesses is
already of advanced age and travel to the Philippines may be extremely difficult if not dangerous; and
there is a perceived danger to them in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2002;
that written interrogatories are ideal in this case since the factual issues are already very few; that such
mode of deposition-taking will save precious judicial and government time and will prevent needless
delays in the case.
The RTC granted private respondent's Motion, as it found the same appropriate and sanctioned by the
rules on deposition-taking.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The CA dismissed the petition.
Issue
Whether or not deposition can be allowed.
Held
Allowed.
While herein petitioner prays that the CA be ordered to give due course to the petition for certiorari
filed before it and to remand the case to the CA for proper disposition, the Court opts to resolve the
sole issue raised in the present petition which is a pure question of law, i.e., whether Section 1, Rule
23 of the Rules of Court allows a non-resident foreign corporation the privilege of having all its
witnesses, all of whom are foreigners, to testify through deposition upon written interrogatories taken
outside the Philippines to prove an oral contract, in order to avoid further delay.
Unequivocally, the rule does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can avail of deposition.
The fact that private respondent is a non-resident foreign corporation is immaterial. The rule clearly
provides that the testimony of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or
written interrogatories, at the instance of any party.
In Dasmarias Garments, Inc. v. Reyes we upheld the right of plaintiff during the trial stage of the case
to present its evidence by deposition of its witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction in lieu of their oral
examination in court.
Petitioner insists that Dasmarias does not constitute a precedent in the instant case as the facts are
substantially different; to wit: (1) in Dasmarias, plaintiff filed a motion to take deposition through
written interrogatories of two witnesses abroad after it had already presented its first witness, while in
the present case, private respondent will not present a single witness to testify in court but only the
witnesses depositions; (2) in Dasmarias, the existence of the contract involved was not in issue at all,
while in the present case, petitioner denied the existence of the alleged contract of loan and private
respondent has not presented any documentary evidence to support its claim.
We do not agree.
The situation in Dasmarias is the same as in the instant case since in both cases, it was already during
the trial stage that the deposition through written interrogatories was sought to be taken. It does not
matter whether one witness for the plaintiff had already testified since the Dasmarias ruling did not
make such testimony in court a condition to grant the deposition of the two other witnesses. Also, in
Dasmarias, the plaintiff sued defendant to recover a certain sum of money which was the same as in
the instant case as private respondent was suing petitioner for collection of sum of money.
Petitioner claims that the right to take depositions upon written interrogatories in lieu of oral
testimony in open court would result in grave injustice to him, as private respondent is seeking to
establish the existence of an oral contract which requires stricter standard in proving the same.
We find such argument untenable.
While there are limitations to the rules of discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without
leave and without judicial intervention, such limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the
examination is being conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress
the person subject to the inquiry; or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon
the recognized domains of privilege.
Philippine Computer Solutions v. Jose Hernandez, G.R. 168776, July 17, 2007
Facts
Petitioner was incorporated for the purpose of providing general computer services in the Philippines.
Its incorporators, who are also its stockholders, are Ralph Bergen (Bergen), Rizalito Condol (Condol),
Josephine Fugoso (Fugoso), Norma Potot (Potot), and Adorina Lisama (Lisama). Alleging that its
corporate name was being unlawfully used in unauthorized business transactions both here in the
Philippines and overseas, petitioner filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a
Complaint against Condol and Lisama, together with Winefrida Manzo (Manzo), private respondent
in this petition, and Condol International Incorporated (Condol International), a corporation organized
under Philippine Laws and is engaged in similar business as that of the petitioner.
The Complaint alleged that Condol previously withdrew his participation in the business of petitioner
but continued to remain as an incorporator and shareholder thereof. Petitioner subsequently
discovered that Condol had been engaging or is continuously engaged in business in its behalf both in
the Philippines and abroad. Condol was acting as the purported corporate president and Manzo as the
alleged corporate secretary/treasurer of petitioner.
An investigation of the records with the SEC showed that Condol, Lisama and Manzo executed a
Trustees Certificate where they made it appear that petitioner created a Board of Trustees where they
were appointed as members, and that petitioners Amended Articles of Incorporation was approved by
2/3 of the members and majority of the Board of Trustees at a meeting held on 22 January 1996 at
petitioners principal office. The stipulations in the Trustees Certificate are false and fraudulent
inasmuch as petitioner is a stock corporation governed by a Board of Directors.
Of the four defendants named in the SEC complaint, only Manzo filed an Answer as well as a Motion
to Dismiss the Complaint. It appears that the SEC failed to serve summons on the rest of the
defendants since they can no longer be found in their respective last known addresses.
Before petitioner could serve summons by publication, Republic Act No. 8799, which transferred
jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies to the regular courts, took effect. Consequently, the
pending dispute was transferred to the RTC.
Meanwhile, petitioner served written interrogatories upon Manzo. After initially objecting thereto, the
latter filed her answer and, likewise, moved for the resolution of her pending Motion to Dismiss.
For their failure to file an Answer notwithstanding valid service of summons by publication,
petitioner filed a Motion to Declare the non-participating defendants in default. It also filed a Motion
dated 16 September 2003 for the Issuance of a Commission to take the deposition in Australia of a
corporate officer of PeopleSoft Australia regarding the details of the foreign corporations transactions
with defendants; as well as that of Bergen, one of petitioners incorporators and stockholders, who was
then in the United States.
The trial court denied Manzos Motion to Dismiss and granted petitioners Motion to Declare in
Default Condol, Lisama and Condol International. The trial court, however, denied petitioners Motion
for the Issuance of a Commission.
The trial court clarified that for purposes, therefore, of reckoning the limited period to avail of any of
the modes of discovery under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure governing intra-
corporate controversies, there is deemed to have been a joinder of issues as of 3 July 2002 or
immediately after the period for the respondents to file their Answer has lapsed. Petitioner, therefore,
had until 18 July 2002 or fifteen days from the joinder of issues to avail of any of the modes of
discovery. Having filed the motion to take deposition on 16 September 2003, the same was clearly
beyond the 15-day period allowed by Rule 3, Section 1 of the Interim Rules on Intra-Corporate
Controversies.
From this Order of the RTC, petitioner sought recourse before the Court of Appeals by way of a
Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.
As earlier adverted to, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition and affirmed the Order of the RTC.
Rationalizing its decision, the Court of Appeals stressed that the issues in the case had been joined as
early as 3 July 2002, immediately after the lapse of the reglementary period for the other defendants
to file their respective answers. Though no responsive pleading was filed, petitioner had 15 days
therefrom or until 18 July 2003 within which to serve written interrogatories on its witnesses abroad.
Its failure to take full advantage of its right to secure the testimonies of its witnesses by deposition
when it had the opportunity to do so negates the allegation of denial of due process.
Issue
Whether or not written interrogatories should be allowed.
Held
Issue moot and academic.
This Court notes that during the pendency of the instant Petition the trial court already rendered a
Decision in the main case, SEC Case. Petitioner alleges that it had filed a Petition for Review with the
Court of Appeals which is still pending before said court at this time. It is not disputed that a Decision
in the main case, SEC Case, has already been rendered. While the Court of Appeals has yet to act on
petitioners Petition for Review, it is this Courts view that the issue has become moot and academic.
It must be emphasized that the underlying reason for the instant Petition is to allow the petitioner to
take the depositions of its witnesses, Mr. Ralph Bergen and any of the responsible officers of
Peoplesoft Australia.
From a quick reference to the Decision of the trial court in SEC Case, it is readily apparent that the
trial court had already granted the prayer of petitioner in its Complaint. In other words, petitioner
prevailed in the court a quo. As can be seen from the complaint of the petitioner and the RTC
decision, the underlying prayer of the petitioner in its Complaint had been granted in the decision of
the trial court. In a very real sense, therefore, the RTC has already granted what the petitioner had
asked for in its Complaint.
Even more, during the hearings before the trial court, Mr. Ralph Bergen had already personally
testified, hence, foregoing any need for taking his deposition.
Considering the trial courts Decision in SEC Case and the personal testimony of Bergen before the
trial court, this Court finds that the issue of whether a commission should be issued for the taking of
depositions of petitioners witnesses has indeed become moot.
Furthermore, the Order dated 8 December 2003 of the trial court denying petitioners motion to take
deposition is an interlocutory order.
Since a Decision has already been rendered by the trial court in SEC Case, then the Order of the same
court denying petitioners motion to take deposition, being an interlocutory order, should have been
included and raised in the petition for review filed by the petitioner before the Court of Appeals.
Manguerra v. Risos, G.R. No. 152643, August 28, 2008

Facts
Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of
Cebu. The case arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by
respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known
as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document. Hence, the criminal case.
Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly
confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to
stay in Manila for further treatment.
Respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in Criminal Case No. CBU-52248 on
the ground of prejudicial question. They argued that Civil Case which was an action for declaration of
nullity of the mortgage, should first be resolved. The RTC granted the aforesaid motion.
This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action for certiorari before the CA seeking the
nullification of the RTC orders. The case remains pending before the appellate court to date.
The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters deposition. He explained the need to
perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age, which limited her
freedom of mobility.
The RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcions deposition be taken before the Clerk of
Court of Makati City. The court ratiocinated that procedural technicalities should be brushed aside
because of the urgency of the situation, since Concepcion was already of advanced age.
Aggrieved, respondents assailed the RTC orders in a special civil action for certiorari before the CA.
The CA rendered a Decision favorable to the respondents.

The examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter provision, said the
appellate court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119,
Concepcions deposition should have been taken before the judge or the court where the case is pending, which
is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the
RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.
Issue
Whether or not deposition should be allowed.
Held
No.
On the more important issue of whether Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies to the instant case, we
rule in the negative.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the
judge. This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide
for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are
adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal
proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure allow the
conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the
petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Petitioners contend that
Concepcions advanced age and health condition exempt her from the application of Section 15, Rule
119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the application of Rule 23 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The contention does not persuade.
The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at
once the ground which places her squarely within the coverage of the same provision. Undoubtedly,
the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional
examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused
be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after
reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the
same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.
At this point, a query may thus be posed: in granting Concepcions motion and in actually taking her
deposition, were the above rules complied with? The CA answered in the negative. The appellate
court considered the taking of deposition before the Clerk of Court of Makati City erroneous and
contrary to the clear mandate of the Rules that the same be made before the court where the case is
pending. Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall be made
before the court where the case is pending.
Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant case, because the rules on civil procedure
apply suppletorily to criminal cases. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the
situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his
deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending.
Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules. We find no necessity to depart from,
or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made elsewhere, the accused
may not be able to attend, as when he is under detention. More importantly, this requirement ensures
that the judge would be able to observe the witness deportment to enable him to properly assess his
credibility. This is especially true when the witness testimony is crucial to the prosecutions case.
Pajarilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163515, October 31, 2008

Facts
Private respondent Thomas T. Kalangeg filed with the RTC of Bontoc, Mt. Province a complaint for a
sum of money with damages against petitioner Isidro T. Pajarillaga.
Since the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement, trial on the merits ensued. At the next
scheduled hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared despite notice. Upon private
respondents motion, the trial court allowed him to present his witnesses subject to petitioners cross-
examination on the next scheduled hearing. But when the case was called on that date, petitioner and
his counsel were again absent. Upon private respondents motion, the trial court declared petitioner to
have waived his right of cross-examination and allowed private respondent to make a formal offer of
evidence.
The trial court admitted all the exhibits formally offered by private respondent. It also scheduled
petitioners presentation of evidence.
Petitioner moved to reset the hearing. The trial court granted his motion and reset the hearing.
On the next hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel again appeared. Nonetheless, the trial court
reset the case for the presentation of petitioners evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Deposition of the Defendant Upon Written
Interrogatories on the grounds that: (1) petitioner resides in Manila which is more than four hundred
(400) kilometers from Bontoc, Mt. Province; and (2) petitioner is suffering from an illness which
prohibits him from doing strenuous activities.
The trial court denied petitioners motion, in this wise:

Considering that the above-entitled case has been pending since November 24, 1995, and hearings thereof have
been delayed almost always at the instance of the defendant, the latters motion for leave of Court to take said
defendants deposition upon written interrogatories at this late stage of the proceedings is hereby denied.
Wherefore, in the interest of justice defendant is granted one more chance to adduce his evidence on
February 18, 1998, at 8:30 oclock in the morning. Otherwise, he shall be deemed to have waived his
right thereto.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Court. In affirming the trial courts orders, the appellate court ruled that: First, the
denial of petitioners motion was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion since the trial court gave
petitioner full opportunity to present his evidence. Second, petitioners motion came much too late in
the proceedings since private respondent has already rested his case. Third, the medical certificate
which petitioner submitted to validate his allegation of illness merely contained a remark that the
patient is advised to avoid strenuous activity. It did not state that the travel from Manila to Mt.
Province for the scheduled hearings was too strenuous to endanger petitioners health. Fourth, the
threats to petitioners life by private respondents relatives were belatedly alleged only in his motion for
reconsideration.
Issue
Whether or not written interrogatories is proper.
Held
No.
There is nothing in the Rules of Court or in jurisprudence which restricts a deposition to the sole
function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited
purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent
being actually called to the witness stand. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the
period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition exists against the taking of depositions after pre-trial.
There can be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and executory
judgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or complicated.
Such being the case, there is really nothing objectionable, per se, with petitioner availing of this
discovery measure after private respondent has rested his case and prior to petitioners presentation of
evidence. To reiterate, depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action,
whenever necessary or convenient.
But when viewed vis the several postponements made by petitioner for the initial presentation of his
evidence, we are of the view that his timing is, in fact, suspect. The records before us show that
petitioner stopped attending the hearings after private respondent presented his first witness.
Petitioner offered no excuse for his and his counsels absences. Moreover, the trial court has set four
(4) hearing dates for the initial presentation of his evidence. But he merely moved for its resetting
without invoking the grounds which he now presents before us.
Besides, even as we scrutinize petitioners arguments, we think that he has not sufficiently shown an
exceptional or unusual case for us to grant leave and reverse the trial and appellate courts.
In this case, petitioner invokes distance and illness to avail of the discovery measure. We agree with
private respondent that the matter of distance could have been settled had petitioner requested for a
change of venue earlier in the proceedings. Petitioner has attended the pre-trial and the hearing where
private respondent presented his first witness. He need not await his turn to present evidence before
realizing the great inconvenience caused by the enormous distance between his place of residence and
the place of hearing.
Nor are we inclined to accept petitioners claim of illness. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals,
the medical certificate submitted by petitioner merely contained a remark that the patient is advised to
avoid strenuous activity. It was not alleged that the travel from Manila to Mt. Province for the
scheduled hearings was too strenuous to endanger petitioners health.
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the threats to petitioners life by private respondents
relatives appear to be a mere afterthought since it was raised only in petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts denial of his motion for leave. We also note that the incident which
gave rise to the alleged threats took place prior to the pre-trial. Surely, petitioner could have informed
the trial court of this incident had there been truth to, and serious implication of, his allegation.
Here, we find the protracted delay in the litigation at petitioners instance coupled with the belated and
unsubstantiated allegations of illness and threats to petitioners life, more than sufficient reasons for
the trial court to deny petitioners motion.
Dulay v. Dulay, G.R. No. 158857, November 11, 2005

Facts
In a complaint for recovery of his bank deposit with prayer for a writ of attachment and damages,
Rodrigo S. Dulay, a naturalized American citizen, alleged that upon his petition, his brother
Godofredo S. Dulay, Sr. and nephew Pfeger R. Dulay immigrated to the United States of America.
The two stayed with him in his house. Godofredo, however, decided to return to the Philippines
because he could not endure the weather. Pfeger stayed behind to take care of Rodrigo. Having
nurtured affection, love and trust for his nephew Pfeger, Rodrigo opened a trust account with the
Bank of Boston naming Pfeger as trustee thereof. Five months later, Pfeger left Rodrigos house
allegedly to join his girlfriend in California. Rodrigo learned only later that Pfeger actually went back
to the Philippines. Pfeger returned to the United States but after a brief stay returned again to the
Philippines where he went on a spending binge. Upon knowing this, Rodrigo verified the status of his
account with the Bank of Boston, and to his shock and dismay discovered that Pfeger had already
emptied the account. Rodrigo additionally claimed that Pfeger used the money from said account to
buy several vehicles, loan money to several people, open bank accounts for his siblings, and buy a
house and lot and jewelry for his wife. Whatever was left of the account was allegedly transferred to
Pfegers father, Godofredo.
Rodrigo filed a petition for the issuance of letters rogatory in order to get the depositions of several
witnesses residing abroad. Petitioners, on the other hand, moved to be allowed to file cross-
examination questions to respondents written interrogatories, which the trial court granted. In an order
the trial court stated:
These are petitions for letters Rogatory respectively praying that this Court order the Clerk of Court to issue
any order requiring the Clerk of Court in Boston Ma., USA to conduct the examination of the following parties:
1. Mr. Rodrigo S. Dulay of 38 Claremont St. Malden, Ma., USA, and
2. Manager or authorized representative of the Bank of Boston, Ma., USA and for the above-named
persons to answer the attached questions (direct and cross) attached to each petition, and for the Clerk
of Court of Boston to forward the same questions and answers as soon as the same were already
properly answered.
As it turned out, however, the depositions could not be taken before the Clerk of Court of
Massachusetts, but were taken instead before a notary public in New York.
Rodrigo submitted to the trial court his answers to the interrogatories and cross interrogatories of
petitioners given before a notary public in the United States. The trial court directed respondent to
have the written and cross interrogatories taken by the notary public authenticated by the consulate.
Thus, respondent filed a motion to withdraw the answers so that he could have them authenticated by
a Philippine consul in the United States.
Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion, praying that the written interrogatories be declared inadmissible
and reiterating their prayer for the dismissal of the complaint. Anent the objection to the admission of
the answers to the written interrogatories, the trial court stated that the deposition taken before the
Notary Public from New York, whose authority was duly certified by the Philippine Consul in New
York, substantially complied with the Rules of Court. The trial court ordered the admission of the
assailed documents.
Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, petitioners filed before the Court of
Appeals an original action for certiorari. The appellate court dismissed the petition, finding that the
questioned depositions were accomplished in substantial compliance with the Rules of Court.
According to the Court of Appeals, Rodrigo could not be faulted for the incidental delays in the
proceedings, which were after all caused by the refusal of the American tribunal which brushed aside
the letters rogatory issued by the trial court. Putting premium on merit rather than on technicality, the
Court of Appeals held that laxity in the application of the procedure is not
tantamount to laxity in the rendition of justice when equitable circumstances exist to warrant the
same.
Issue
Whether or not the letters rogatory should be admitted.
Held
Admitted.
While the letters rogatory issued by the trial court specifically directed the Clerk of Court of Boston to
take the depositions needed in the case, it became impossible to follow the directive since the Clerk of
Court of Boston merely brushed it aside and refused to cooperate. Respondent cannot be faulted for
the resultant delay brought about by this circumstance. Neither can the trial court be faulted for
allowing the admission of the depositions taken not in strict adherence to its original directive, nor for
directing the petitioner to have the depositions authenticated. Obviously, it was not within the trial
courts power, much less the respondents to force the Clerk of Court of Boston to have the deposition
taken before it. It would be illogical and unreasonable to expect respondent to comply with the letters
rogatory without the cooperation of the very institution or personality named in the letters rogatory
and requested to examine the witnesses. After all, while a court had the authority to entertain a
discovery request, it is not required to provide judicial assistance thereto. This reality was recognized
by the trial court when it ordered respondent to have the questioned depositions authenticated by the
Philippine consulate. Indeed, refusing the allowance of the depositions in issue would be going
directly against the purpose of taking the depositions in the first place, that is, the disclosure of facts
which are relevant to the proceedings in court.
More importantly, the Court finds that respondent substantially complied with the requirements for
depositions taken in foreign countries.
In our jurisdiction, depositions in foreign countries may be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines; (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters
rogatory; or (c) before any person authorized to administer oaths as stipulated in writing by the
parties.
While letters rogatory are requests to foreign tribunals, commissions are directives to officials of the
issuing jurisdiction. Generally, a commission is an instrument issued by a court of justice, or other
competent tribunal, directed to a magistrate by his official designation or to an individual by name,
authorizing him to take the depositions of the witnesses named therein, while a letter rogatory is a
request to a foreign court to give its aid, backed by its power, to secure desired information.
Commissions are taken in accordance with the rules laid down by the court issuing the commission,
while in letters rogatory, the methods of procedure are under the control of the foreign tribunal.
Leave of court is not required when the deposition is to be taken before a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines and
the defendants answer has already been served. However, if the deposition is to be taken in a foreign
country where the Philippines has no secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul or consular agent, it may be taken only before such person or officer as may be appointed by
commission or under letters rogatory.
In the instant case, the authentication made by the consul was a ratification of the authority of the
notary public who took the questioned depositions. The deposition was, in effect, obtained through a
commission, and no longer through letters rogatory. It must be noted that this move was even
sanctioned by the trial court. With the ratification of the depositions in issue, there is no more
impediment to their admissibility.
Besides, the allowance of the deposition can not be said to have caused any prejudice to the adverse
party. They were given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses through their cross
interrogatories, which were in turn answered by the deponents. Save for the complaint of delay in the
proceedings, petitioners were unable to point out any injury they suffered as a result of the trial courts
action.
Jaravata v. Karolus, G.R. No. 154988, June 21, 2007

Facts
The case stemmed from an action for reconveyance and declaration of nullity of titles and damages
filed by petitioner before the RTC alleging that she is the lawful owner and actual occupant of a
parcel of land.
In her complaint, it was narrated that as early as 1950, petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, continuous, open, and public possession in the concept of an owner. In addition to the
uninterrupted physical possession, petitioner averred that she had planted and cultivated the subject
parcels of land and had declared the same for taxation purposes. Sometime in 1992, petitioner
discovered that her relatives, herein respondents, fraudulently and illegally secured titles over the
land.
Respondents filed a third-party complaint against Rudegelio D. Tacorda, petitioners counsel.
Petitioner served upon the respondents and their counsel two separate and different sets of written
interrogatories. Respondents filed their objection to the written interrogatories. Tacorda likewise
served upon respondents and their counsel separate and different sets of written interrogatories. The
RTC denied the objections interposed by the respondents and allowed petitioners written
interrogatories.
Respondents filed a manifestation and compliance attaching their answers thereto to the written
interrogatories.
Petitioner filed a joint omnibus motion primarily to compel the respondents to fully and completely
answer their written interrogatories.
The RTC declared respondents in default in accordance with Rule 29, Section 3 (c) of the Revised
Rules of Court for their failure to fully answer the written interrogatories in the principal action, and
for their refusal to answer the written interrogatories in the third-party complaint.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a notice of appeal before the CA. Disposing of the appeal, the CA
reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC erred in rendering a judgment by default.
Held
Yes.
The petition has merit.
The CA rightly held that the court a quo erred in rendering a judgment by default against the
defendants for refusal or failure to answer written interrogatories, without first requiring an
application by the proponent to compel an answer. This is the requisite procedure under Section 1 of
Rule 29 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals erred in proceeding to decide the case on the merits since there
was as yet no trial or presentation of evidence in the court a quo. Petitioners prayer to affirm the trial
courts December 18, 1997 default decision does not mean that there was a trial. The decision of the
trial court was based on constructive admissions by the defendants of the allegations of the plaintiff
due to the courts application of the sanction for not answering the written interrogatories. In reversing
the application of the sanction, the CA should have given the parties a chance to substantiate by
evidence their respective claims at the trial court. This is particularly true with respect to the plaintiffs
claim of physical possession for more than 30 years, regarding which the CA said that clear and
convincing evidence was required but wanting. This is because the wrong procedure followed by the
trial court effectively aborted a trial and presentation of evidence.
Zepeda v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 172175, October 9, 2006

Facts
Spouses Expedito and Alice Zepeda filed a complaint for nullification of foreclosure proceedings and
loan documents with damages against respondent Chinabank before the Regional Trial Court. They
alleged that they obtained a loan from respondent secured by a Real Estate Mortgage.
Petitioners subsequently encountered difficulties in paying their loan obligations hence they requested
for restructuring which was allegedly granted by Chinabank. Hence, they were surprised when
respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the subject property where it emerged as the highest
bidder. Respondent bank was issued a Provisional Certificate of Sale and upon petitioners failure to
redeem the property, ownership was consolidated in its favor.
According to petitioners, the foreclosure proceedings should be annulled for failure to comply with
the posting and publication requirements. They also claimed that they signed the Real Estate
Mortgage and Promissory Note in blank and were not given a copy and the interest rates thereon were
unilaterally fixed by the respondent.
Respondent banks motion to dismiss was denied, hence it filed an answer with special affirmative
defenses and counterclaim. It also filed a set of written interrogatories with 20 questions.
The trial court denied Chinabanks affirmative defenses for lack of merit as well as its motion to
expunge the complaint for being premature. The trial court reiterated its denial of Chinabanks
affirmative defenses in its Order and directed the Clerk of Court to set the pre-trial conference for the
marking of the parties documentary evidence.
Aggrieved, respondent bank filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which was granted by the
Court of Appeals. It held that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the two assailed
Orders. It ruled that compelling reasons warrant the dismissal of petitioners complaint because they
acted in bad faith when they ignored the hearings set by the trial court to determine the veracity of
Chinabanks affirmative defenses; they failed to answer Chinabanks written interrogatories; and the
complaint states no cause of action.
Issue
Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for failure to answer the written interrogatories.
Held
No.
Anent the second issue, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals ruling that the complaint should be
dismissed for failure of petitioners to answer respondent banks written interrogatories.
It should be noted that respondent bank filed a motion to expunge the complaint based on Section 3(c)
of Rule 29.
As we have explained in Arellano v. Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, the consequences

enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only apply where the party upon whom the written
interrogatories is served, refuses to answer a particular question in the set of written interrogatories
and despite an order compelling him to answer the particular question, still refuses to obey the order.
In the instant case, petitioners refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not just a
particular question. Clearly then, respondent bank should have filed a motion based on Section 5 and
not Section 3(c) of Rule 29. Section 5 of Rule 29.
Due to respondent banks filing of an erroneous motion, the trial court cannot be faulted for ruling that
the motion to expunge was premature for lack of a prior application to compel compliance based on
Section 3.
This Court has long encouraged the availment of the various modes or instruments of discovery as
embodied in Rules 24 to 29 of the Rules of Court.
The imposition of sanctions under Section 5 is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus, in
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, we held:
The matter of how, and when, the above sanctions should be applied is one that primarily rests on the sound
discretion of the court where the case pends, having always in mind the paramount and overriding interest of
justice. For while the modes of discovery are intended to attain the resolution of litigations with great
expediency, they are not contemplated, however, to be ultimate causes of injustice. It behooves trial courts to
examine well the circumstances of each case and to make their considered determination thereafter.
Sime Darby v. NLRC, G.R. No. 148021, December 6, 2006

Facts
Sime Darby Employees Association (the Union) submitted its proposal to Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc.
(the Company) for the remaining two (2) years of their then existing Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA). The company gave its counter-proposal, but the parties failed to reach a mutual
settlement. Thus, the company declared a deadlock in the negotiations. Subsequently, the company
sought the intervention of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Such action did not sit
well with the union, which objected to the deadlock.
The company filed a Notice of Lockout on the ground of deadlock in the collective bargaining
negotiations. The company declared and implemented a lockout. The Union filed a complaint for
illegal lockout before the DOLE-NLRC.
Meanwhile, the stockholders of the company approved the sale of the companys tire manufacturing
assets and business operation. The company individually served notices of termination to all the
employees, including the individual petitioners.
On account of the lockout, the employees were barred from entering company premises, and were
only allowed to enter to get their personal belongings and their earned benefits.
Petitioners filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal before the DOLE. Petitioners filed a complaint for
Unfair Labor Practice (ULP). The cases for illegal dismissal, illegal lockout and unfair labor practice
were then consolidated and eventually assigned to Labor Arbiter Enrico Portillo.
The labor arbiter rendered his Decision in the consolidated cases, dismissing for lack of merit
petitioners complaints against the company for illegal lockout, illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice.
Petitioners appealed the labor arbiters Decision to the NLRC. Said appeal, however, was dismissed
for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the Decision of the NLRC.
Issue
Whether or not the Request for Admission should be deemed admitted.
Held
No.
The submission that petitioners Request for Admission should have been deemed admitted in their
favor after respondents had failed to file a sworn reply or objection thereto cannot be sustained.
Petitioners claim that respondents, instead of filing an answer under oath, filed an unsworn
reply/objection thereto. Thus, the admissions should be deemed admitted in their favor.
Petitioners Request for Admission does not fall under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. A review of said
Request for Admission shows that it contained matters which are precisely the issues in the
consolidated cases, and/or irrelevant matters; for example, the reasons behind the lockout, the
companys motive in the CBA negotiations, lack of notice of dismissal, the validity of the release and
quitclaim, etc. Rule 26 as a mode of discovery contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and
tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a pleading. That is its primary function. It
does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings.
Otherwise stated, petitioner's request constitutes an utter redundancy and a useless, pointless process
which the respondent should not be subjected to.
Manzano v. Despalidares, G.R.No. 148786, December 16, 2004

Facts
Respondent Luz Despabiladeras obtained on credit from petitioner Roger Manzano various
construction materials which she used in her construction project at the Camarines Sur Polytechnic
Colleges (CSPC).
By petitioners claim, he delivered to respondent construction materials payable upon respondents

initial collection from CSPC.
Respondent having paid the amount of only P130,000.00 exclusive of interest, despite receipt of
payments from CSPC, petitioner filed a complaint against her for sum of money with damages before
the Regional Trial Court.
Issues having been joined, the case was set for pre-trial.
After the pre-trial, the trial judge issued the following order:
At this pre-trial conference, there is no dispute that the plaintiff delivered and defendant received certain
construction materials but the defendant does not agree on the cost claimed by the plaintiff. Wherefore, it is
mutually agreed that the plaintiff shall submit an offer to stipulate showing an itemized list of construction
materials delivered to the defendant together with the cost claimed by the plaintiff within fifteen (15) days
furnishing copy thereof to the defendant who will state her objections if any, or comment therein within
the same period of time.
Instead of submitting an offer to stipulate, petitioner filed a Request for Admission.
No response to the Request for Admission was proffered by respondent until in the course of the trial
of the case respondent filed a list of items admitted to have been delivered and those not admitted,
noting therein that Deliveries admitted do not bear the actual price agreed [upon] or the specifications
requested, which filing the trial court noted in its order of even date.
Petitioner later filed a Motion for Partial Judgment and Execution alleging that substantial justice
would be served if partial judgment would issue (on the pleadings) in respect to those items admitted
to have been received by [respondent].
The trial court issued the following order:

Considering that the defendant, up to this time ha[s] not answered under oath the request for admission,
dated October 23, 1990, as prayed for by the counsel for the plaintiff, the facts requested to be admitted are
hereby confirmed. x x x Despite receipt of said request for admission, defendant did not answer the same, under
oath, consequently, defendant is deemed to have admitted that plaintiff delivered to her and she received the
goods delivered with the total value of P314,610.50 and that of the said total amount, she has paid only
P130,000.00.
The trial court found for petitioner.
The Court of Appeals set aside that of the trial court and dismissed petitioners complaint, holding as
follows:
If at all there was failure by the appellant to file a sworn statement denying the request for admission, it was
precisely because of the agreement by the parties during the pre-trial period that the appellant would only file a
comment, which she did by submitting a list of items, either admitting receipt of construction materials or
denying receipt thereof. Necessarily, the appellant could not have impliedly admitted the facts mentioned in the
request for admission. The Court even required the appellee to present evidence on the matters mentioned in the
request for admission, or on the issue concerning payment and the balance of the indebtedness. Aside from that,
the appellee was even allowed to present evidence on rebuttal. This is not to mention the fact that documents
showing payments, other than the P130,000.00, were admitted by the Court. If indeed the unpaid balance was
admitted, supposedly because of denial of the request for admission, then, necessarily the appellant should have
been prevented by the Court from presenting evidence contradicting such admissions.
Issue
Whether or not the Request for Admission is deemed admitted.
Held
Admitted.
The agreement of the parties during the pre-trial conference was that the [petitioner] shall submit an
offer to stipulate showing an itemized list of construction materials delivered to the [respondent]
together with the cost claimed by the [petitioner] within fifteen (15) days[,] furnishing copy thereof to
the [respondent] who will state her objections if any, or comment there[o]n within the same period of
time. In substantial compliance with said agreement, petitioner chose to instead file a request for
admission, a remedy afforded by a party under Rule 26.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 should not be disregarded, as in fact the trial court did not, when it
ordered respondent to file comment thereon, just because the parties mutually agreed that petitioner
submit an offer to stipulate.
For, as stated earlier, the request for admission is a remedy afforded any party after the issues had
been joined.
Respondent having failed to discharge what is incumbent upon her under Rule 26, that is, to deny
under oath the facts bearing on the main issue contained in the Request for Admission, she was
deemed to have admitted that she received the construction materials, the cost of which was indicated
in the request and was indebted to petitioner.
During the trial, however, petitioner admitted that aside from the P130,000.00 partial payment, he had
received a total of P122,000.00 (P97,000.00 plus P25,000.00). Respondent thus had a remaining
balance of P62,610.50.
Limos v. Spouses Odones, G.R. No.186979, August 11, 2011

Facts
Private respondents-spouses Francisco Odones and Arwenia Odones, filed a complaint for Annulment
of Deed, Title and Damages against petitioners Socorro Limos, Rosa Delos Reyes and Spouses
Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The complaint alleged that spouses Odones are the owners of a parcel of land located by virtue of an
Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale executed by the surviving grandchildren and heirs of
Donata Lardizabal in whom the original title to the land was registered.
It took a while before respondents decided to register the document of conveyance; and when they
did, they found out that the lands Original Certificate of Title (OCT) was cancelled and replaced by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of herein petitioners.
Respondents sought the cancellation of these new TCTs on the ground that the signatures of Donata
Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan in the Deed of Absolute Sale were forgeries.
In their answer, petitioners pleaded affirmative defenses, which also constitute grounds for dismissal
of the complaint. These grounds were: (1) failure to state a cause of action inasmuch as the basis of
respondents alleged title is void, since the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was not
published and it contained formal defects, the vendors are not the legal heirs of Donata Lardizabal,
and respondents are not the real parties-in-interest to question the title of petitioners, because no
transaction ever occurred between them; (2) non-joinder of the other heirs of Donata Lardizabal as
indispensable parties; and (3) respondents claim is barred by laches.
In their Reply, respondents denied the foregoing affirmative defenses, and insisted that the
Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was valid. They maintained their standing as owners of
the subject parcel of land and the nullity of the Absolute Deed of Sale, upon which respondents
anchor their purported title.
Thereafter, petitioners served upon respondents a Request for Admission.
Respondents failed to respond to the Request for Admission, prompting petitioners to file a Motion to
Set for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses, arguing that respondents failure
to respond or object to the Request for Admission amounted to an implied admission pursuant to
Section 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. As such, a hearing on the affirmative defenses had become
imperative because petitioners were no longer required to present evidence on the admitted facts.
The RTC denied the Motion and held that item nos. 1 to 4 in the Request for Admission were earlier
pleaded as affirmative defenses in petitioners Answer, to which respondents already replied. Hence, it
would be redundant for respondents to make another denial. The trial court further observed that item
nos. 5, 6, and 7 in the Request for Admission were already effectively denied by the Extrajudicial
Succession of Estate and Sale appended to the complaint and by the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Amadeo
Razalan attached to respondents Reply.
Petitioners elevated this incident to the CA by way of a special civil action for certiorari, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the impugned resolution and order.
The CA dismissed the petition ruling that the affirmative defenses raised by petitioners were not
indubitable, and could be best proven in a full-blown hearing.
Issue
Whether or not the Request for Admission is deemed admitted.
Held
No.
As correctly observed by the trial court, the matters set forth in petitioners Request for Admission
were the same affirmative defenses pleaded in their Answer which respondents already traversed in
their Reply. The said defenses were likewise sufficiently controverted in the complaint and its
annexes. In effect, petitioners sought to compel respondents to deny once again the very matters they
had already denied, a redundancy, which if abetted, will serve no purpose but to delay the proceedings
and thus defeat the purpose of the rule on admission as a mode of discovery which is to expedite trial
and relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of
which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.
Verily then, if the trial court finds that the matters in a Request for Admission were already admitted
or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or
deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and
thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26.
In this case, the redundant and unnecessarily vexatious nature of petitioners Request for Admission
rendered it ineffectual, futile, and irrelevant so as to proscribe the operation of the implied admission
rule in Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. There being no implied admission attributable to
respondents failure to respond, the argument that a preliminary hearing is imperative loses its point.
Moreover, jurisprudence has always been firm and constant in declaring that when the affirmative
defense raised is failure to state a cause of action, a preliminary hearing thereon is unnecessary,
erroneous, and improvident.
Solidbank v. Gateway Electronics, G.R. No. 164805, April 30, 2008

Facts
Gateway Electronics Corporation (Gateway) obtained from Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank) loans
to be used as working capital for its manufacturing operations. The loans were covered by promissory
notes.
To secure the loans Gateway assigned to Solidbank the proceeds of its Back-end Services Agreement
with Alliance Semiconductor Corporation (Alliance).
Gateway failed to comply with its loan obligations. Solidbank filed a Complaint for collection of sum
of money against Gateway.
Solidbank filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents on the basis of an information
received from Mr. David Eichler, Chief Financial Officer of Alliance, that Gateway has already
received from Alliance the proceeds/payment of the Back-end Services Agreement.
The pertinent portions of the motion read:

The originals, duplicate originals and copies of all documents pertaining to, arising from, in connection with
or involving the Back-end Services Agreement of defendant GEC and Alliance Semiconductors;
The originals, duplicate originals and copies of all books of account, financial statements, receipts, checks,
vouchers, invoices, ledgers and other financial/accounting records and documents pertaining to or
evidencing financial and money transactions arising from, in connection with or involving the Back-end
Services Agreement of defendant GEC and Alliance Semiconductors; and
The trial court issued an Order granting the motion for production and inspection of documents.
Solidbank filed a motion for issuance of a show cause order for Gateways failure to comply with the
Order of the trial court.
The trial court issued an Order setting the production and inspection of documents in the premises of
Gateway. Gateway presented the invoices representing the billings sent by Gateway to Alliance in
relation to the Back-end Services Agreement.
Solidbank was not satisfied with the documents produced by Gateway. Thus, Solidbank filed a motion
to cite Gateway and its responsible officers in contempt for their refusal to produce the documents.
The trial court issued an Order denying the motion to cite Gateway for contempt. However, the trial
court chastised Gateway for exerting no diligent efforts to produce the documents evidencing the
payments received by Gateway from Alliance in relation to the Back-end Services Agreement.
However, as no diligent effort was shown to have been exerted by defendant GEC to produce the documents
enumerated in the Order dated January 30, 2001, this Court hereby orders, in accordance with Sec. 3(a), Rule 29
of the Rules of Court, that the matters regarding the contents of the documents sought to be produced but which
were not otherwise produced by GEC, shall be taken to be established in accordance with plaintiffs claim, but
only for the purpose of this action.
Gateway filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA rendered a Decision nullifying the Orders of the trial court. The CA ruled that both the
Motion for Production of Documents failed to comply with the provisions of Section 1, Rule 27 of the
Rules of Court. It further held that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that
the matters regarding the contents of the documents sought to be produced but which were not
produced by Gateway shall be deemed established in accordance with Solidbanks claim.
Issue
Whether or not the matters of the documents to be produced are deemed admitted.
Held
No.
In the case at bench, Gateway assigned to Solidbank the proceeds of its Back-end Services Agreement
with Alliance in PN Nos. 97-375 and 97-408. By virtue of the assignment, Gateway was obligated to
remit to Solidbank all payments received from Alliance under the agreement. In this regard,
Solidbank claims that they have received information from the Chief Financial Officer of Alliance
that Gateway had already received payments under the agreement. In order to ascertain the veracity of
the information, Solidbank availed of the discovery procedure under Rule 27. The purpose of
Solidbanks motion is to compel Gateway to produce the documents evidencing payments received
from Alliance in connection with the Back-end Services Agreement.
Solidbank was able to show good cause for the production of the documents. It had also shown that
the said documents are material or contain evidence relevant to an issue involved in the action.
However, Solidbanks motion was fatally defective and must be struck down because of its failure to
specify with particularity the documents it required Gateway to produce. Solidbanks motion for
production and inspection of documents called for a blanket inspection. Solidbanks request for
inspection of all documents pertaining to, arising from, in connection with or involving the Back-end
Services Agreement was simply too broad and too generalized in scope.
Furthermore, Solidbank, being the one who asserts that the proceeds of the Back-end Services
Agreement were already received by Gateway, has the burden of proof in the instant case.
The trial court held that as a consequence of Gateways failure to exert diligent effort in producing the
documents subject of the Order, the matters regarding the contents of the documents sought to be
produced but which were not produced by Gateway, shall be considered as having been established in
accordance with Solidbanks claim.
We hold that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the aforesaid Order. It is
not fair to penalize Gateway for not complying with the request of Solidbank for the production and
inspection of documents, considering that the documents sought were not particularly described.
Gateway and its officers can only be held liable for unjust refusal to comply with the modes of
discovery if it is shown that the documents sought to be produced were specifically described,
material to the action and in the possession, custody or control of Gateway.
Neither can it be said that Gateway did not exert effort in complying with the order for production and
inspection of documents since it presented the invoices representing the billings sent by Gateway to
Alliance in relation to the Back-end Services Agreement. Good faith effort to produce the required
documents must be accorded to Gateway, absent a finding that it acted willfully, in bad faith or was at
fault in failing to produce the documents sought to be produced.
Trial, Trial by Commissioners, Hearings and

Consolidation (Rules 30 to 32)
Lourdez de Castro v. Crispino de Castro, G.R. No. 172198, June 16, 2009
Facts
Petitioner Ma. Lourdes C. De Castro and private respondent Crispino De Castro, Jr. were married.
Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage before the RTC. For
failure of petitioner to file her Answer to the petition and upon motion of private respondent, the case
was set for hearing and private respondent testified. Further, he presented psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia
Albaran, as an expert witness. He then rested his case, with no opposition from the public prosecutor.
The RTC annulled the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to file an Omnibus Motion seeking a new trial or reconsideration
of the Decision. The trial court granted the omnibus motion. In the Order, petitioner was required to
submit a question-and-answer form affidavit which would constitute her direct testimony. Further, the
cross-examination of petitioner and her witnesses was scheduled.
The trial court reset the hearing to August 21, 2002 as there was no return of the notice sent to private
respondent and his counsel.
On August 21, 2002, petitioner started her direct testimony. However, considering the length of her
testimony, the continuance of her direct examination was set on October 2, 2002.
On September 30, 2002, private respondent moved to reset the October 2, 2002 hearing to November
13, 2002, due to his trip to Europe.
On November 8, 2002, private respondent again moved to reset the November 13, 2002 hearing to
December 11, 2002 or at the earliest possible date as the calendar of the trial court would allow, for
the reason that his counsel was out of the country for important personal reasons and cannot attend the
hearing.
During the hearing on December 11, 2002, petitioner's counsel moved for its cancellation because of
the absence of petitioner who was at that time attending a very urgent business meeting in connection
with her volunteer work for Bantay Bata. The hearing was reset to February 6, 2003. However, the
records reveal that no hearing was conducted on said date.
On the next hearing of February 20, 2003, petitioner's counsel again moved for the resetting of the
hearing to March 27, 2003
On March 27, 2003, the hearing was reset to April 10, 2003 because the Presiding Judge was on
official leave.
On April 10, 2003, the hearing was again reset to May 8, 2003, by agreement of the parties.
On May 8, 2003, the hearing was likewise reset to July 25, 2003 because of the absence of counsel of
both petitioner and private respondent.
During the hearing on July 25, 2003, petitioner's counsel moved to reset the hearing because of the
absence of petitioner who was then in the U.S. helping her daughter in taking care of her newborn
baby. The trial court then ordered the resetting of the hearing to August 20, 2003 for the last time.
In the hearing on August 20, 2003, counsel for petitioner again requested that it be cancelled and reset
due to the unavailability of witnesses. Petitioner was still in the U.S. taking care of her newborn
grandchild, while Dr. Maria Cynthia Ramos-Leynes, who conducted a psychiatric evaluation on
petitioner, was likewise out of the country, attending a convention. The motion was denied by the trial
court.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of
Appeals, seeking to annul the Orders dated August 20, 2003 and December 12, 2003, for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion. Upon motion of petitioner, the trial court held in abeyance its
Order to file the formal offer of exhibits, pending resolution by the Court of Appeals of the petition
for certiorari.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
Issue
Whether or not the denial of the postponement is justified.
Held
Yes.
Petitioner argues that the lower courts erred in ruling that she waived her right to present further
evidence when she failed to appear at the hearing. She contends that in effect, she was declared in
default, which is violative of the state policy on marriage as a social institution and the due process
clause of the Constitution.
We disagree.
The instant case was set for hearing twelve times.
We take note of the fact that all motions for postponement by petitioner were made on the scheduled
hearing dates themselves. On the August 20, 2003 hearing, despite previous warning that no further
postponement would be allowed, petitioner still failed to appear. We agree with the Court of Appeals
when it pointed out that petitioner obviously knew in advance that she could not make it to the August
20, 2003 hearing. As of the last scheduled hearing of July 25, 2003, she was still out of the country.
The least that petitioner could have done was to instruct her counsel to make a timely representation
with the trial court by filing an early motion-manifestation for the resetting of the hearing. Between
July 25, 2003 and August 20, 2003 she had sufficient time to file one. Obviously, the warning by the
court of the consequence of another non-appearance in the hearing fell on deaf ears. After having
been granted numerous motions for postponement, petitioner cannot now claim that she was denied
due process.
In the case at bar, petitioner's excuse that she was still in the U.S. taking care of her newborn
grandchild, while her witness, Dr. Maria Cynthia Ramos-Leynes, who conducted a psychiatric
evaluation on her, was likewise out of the country, attending a convention was unjustified. These
reasons were not unavoidable and one that could not have been foreseen. The date of the trial was set
one month prior, and as of July 25, 2003, petitioner was in the U.S. Certainly, petitioner would know
in advance if she could make it to the August 20, 2003 hearing. Likewise, attending a convention is a
scheduled event, also something known in advance. It is the basic duty of a litigant to move for
postponement before the day of the hearing, so that the court could order its resetting and timely
inform the adverse party of the new date. This was not the case at bar for the subject motion was
presented only on the day of the trial without any justification. We thus hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion for postponement.
Consequently, we cannot strike down the trial courts following orders: (1) dated August 20, 2003,
which denied petitioners motion for postponement, and, instead, directed petitioner to submit her
formal offer of exhibits after the trial court considered her to have waived her right to present further
evidence; and (2) dated December 12, 2003, which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
These orders are not violative of the state policy on marriage as a social institution, for the trial judge
has the duty to resolve judicial disputes without unreasonable delay.
Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001

Facts
Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc., is engaged in the manufacture, the distribution and sale of beer; while
Petitioner Perla Zulueta is a dealer and an operator of an outlet selling the former's beer products. A
Dealership Agreement governed their contractual relations.
Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo a Complaint against respondent for
Breach of Contract, Specific Performance and Damages. The Complaint was grounded on the alleged
violation of the Dealership Agreement.
During the pendency of the Iloilo case, respondent filed with the Makati Regional Trial Court a
Complaint. The Complaint was for the collection of a sum of money representing the value of beer
products, which respondent had delivered to petitioner.
In view of the pendency of the Iloilo case, petitioner moved to dismiss the Makati case on the ground
that it had split the cause of action and violated the rule against the multiplicity of suits. The Motion
was denied.
Petitioner moved for the consolidation of the Makati case with the Iloilo case. Motion was granted.
Respondent filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari.
Setting aside the trial court's assailed Orders which consolidated the Iloilo and the Makati cases, the
CA ruled in this wise:
"There is no common issue of law or fact between the two cases. The issue in Civil Case No. 94-2110 is private
respondent's indebtedness for unpaid beer products; while in Civil Case No. 20341, it is whether or not
petitioner (therein defendant) breached its dealership contract with private respondent.
"Private respondent in her complaint aforequoted attempts to project a commonality between the two civil cases,
but it cannot be denied that her obligation to pay for the beer deliveries can exist regardless of any "stop
payment" order she made with regard to the checks. Thus, the rationale for consolidation, which is to avoid the
possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered."
Issue
Whether or not consolidation is proper.
Held
Yes.
Apart from procedural problems, respondent's cause is also afflicted with substantial defects. The CA
ruled that there was no common issue in law or in fact between the Makati case and the Iloilo case.
The former involved petitioner's indebtedness to respondent for unpaid beer products, while the latter
pertained to an alleged breach of the Dealership Agreement between the parties. We disagree.
True, petitioner's obligation to pay for the beer products delivered by respondent can exist regardless
of an alleged breach in the Dealership Agreement. Undeniably, however, this obligation and the
relationship between respondent and petitioner, as supplier and distributor respectively, arose from the
Dealership Agreement which is now the subject of inquiry in the Iloilo case. In fact, petitioner herself
claims that her obligation to pay was negated by respondent's contractual breach. In other words, the
non-payment -- the res of the Makati case -- is an incident of the Iloilo case.
Inasmuch as the binding force of the Dealership Agreement was put in question, it would be more
practical and convenient to submit to the Iloilo court all the incidents and their consequences. The
issues in both civil cases pertain to the respective obligations of the same parties under the Dealership
Agreement. Thus, every transaction as well as liability arising from it must be resolved in the judicial
forum where it is put in issue. The consolidation of the two cases then becomes imperative to a
complete, comprehensive and consistent determination of all these related issues.
Two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely related subject matters must be ordered
consolidated and jointly tried in court, where the earlier case was filed. The consolidation of cases is
proper when they involve the resolution of common questions of law or facts.
Indeed, upon the consolidation of the cases, the interests of both parties in the two civil cases will best
be served and the issues involved therein expeditiously settled. After all, there is no question on the
propriety of the venue in the Iloilo case.
Roque v. Magno, G.R. No. 138701, October 17, 2006

Facts
The spouses Roque Yu, Sr. and Asuncion Yu are the controlling stockholders of Leyte Lumber, a
business enterprise engaged in the sale of lumber, building and electrical supplies and other
construction materials. During his lifetime, Engr. Basilio G. Magno (Magno) entered into a verbal
agreement with Leyte Lumber through Roque Yu, Sr., whereby the latter agreed to supply Magno
with building materials he may need in his construction business. The success of Magno's business
gave birth to the Basilio G. Magno Construction and Development Enterprises, Inc. (BG Magno).
Owing to this fruitful relationship, the two (Roque Yu, Sr. and Magno) entered into a joint venture,
the Great Pacific Construction Company (GREPAC), with Yu as President and Magno as Vice
President.
Magno, for what he obtained from Leyte Lumber, paid either in cash or by check.
In the RTC of Tacloban City, the petitioners instituted two (2) separate complaints for sums of money
with damages and preliminary attachment against the respondents. One was Civil Case No. 5822,
raffled to Branch 8 of the court, instituted by Leyte Lumber against BG Magno and the Estate of
Basilio Magno, for construction materials claimed to have been obtained on credit by BG Magno, and
the other was Civil Case No. 5823, raffled to Branch 6, filed by the Yu spouses against BG Magno
and the Estate of Basilio Magno, to collect upon loans and advances allegedly made by the spouses to
BG Magno.
Branch 8 of the court rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 5822, in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiffs.
The two separate decisions of even date were penned by Judge Getulio M. Francisco, the presiding
judge of Branch 6 to which only Civil Case No. 5823 was raffled. In other words, Judge Francisco of
Branch 6 rendered the decision in Civil Case No. 5822 earlier raffled to and heard by Branch 8 of
which he was not the presiding judge. The parties did not move for a reconsideration of the two
decisions nor did they call the attention of Judge Francisco on the absence of an order for
consolidation of the two cases. Instead, they directly interposed their respective appeals to the CA.
In the CA, the two cases on appeal were consolidated. The CA rendered its questioned consolidated
decision dispositively reading, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
In Civil Case No. 5822, the appealed decision is MODIFIED by declaring that defendant B.G. Magno
Construction and Development Enterprises, Inc., made an overpayment.
In Civil Case No. 5823, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, defendant B.G.
Magno Construction and Development Enterprises, Inc. is ordered to pay plaintiffs.
Issue
Whether or not consolidation is proper.
Held
Proper.
The next logical questions are: Is the consolidation of the two cases (Civil Case Nos. 5822 and 5823)
a procedural step which the court a quo could have properly taken? Is it a remedy available within the
context of the surrounding circumstances?
We answer both questions in the affirmative. The two cases were filed just a few months apart; they
involve simple cases of collection of sums of money between identical parties and no other; the
respondents (as defendants therein) claim, in both cases, essentially the same defense, which is
overpayment; they cover the same period of transacting continuous business that spans four years;
they relate to simple issues of fact that are intimately related to each other; they entailed the
presentation of practically identical evidence and witnesses; in fact, a broad part of the evidence and
testimonies in one case was totally adopted or reproduced in the other by either or both parties. And
the trial court, being multi-sala courts, its Branches 6 and 8 possessed jurisdiction to try either or both
cases on their own.
In the instant case, respondent judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering the joint trial of the two
cases. There is no showing that such joint trial would prejudice any substantial right of petitioner.
Neither does the latter question the court's jurisdiction to try and decide the two cases.
Likewise, it became apparent that, after the commissioner filed his reports in court and the parties
their comments thereto, but before trial could commence, the claims and defenses of the parties in
Civil Case No. 5823 are covered by and may be threshed out by a consideration of the evidence
presented in Civil Case No. 5822 as well, which consisted mainly of the reports of the commissioner.
Based on the commissioners reports in the case pending in Branch 8 (Civil Case No. 5822), the
petitioners claims, including those in Branch 6, appear to have been paid; indeed, this is in essence the
defense of the respondents as set forth in their Answers to the two complaints. Yet, despite all these,
neither of the lawyers for the parties sought a consolidation of the two cases, which would otherwise
have been mandatory.
Inasmuch as the binding force of the Dealership Agreement was put in question, it would be more
practical and convenient to submit to the Iloilo court all the incidents and their consequences. The
issues in both civil cases pertain to the respective obligations of the same parties under the Dealership
Agreement. Thus, every transaction as well as liability arising from it must be resolved in the judicial
forum where it is put in issue. The consolidation of the two cases then becomes imperative to a
complete, comprehensive and consistent determination of all these related issues.
In fine, we declare the consolidation of the two cases to have been made with regularity.
Having given their assent to the consolidation of Civil Case Nos. 5822 and 5823, petitioners other
assignment of errors must fail. The evidence in each case effectively became the evidence for both,
and there ceased to exist any need for the deciding judge to take judicial notice of the evidence
presented in each case.
Mega Land v. C-E Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 156211, July 31, 2007
Facts
Petitioner Mega-Land Resources and Development Corporation and private respondent C-E
Construction Corporation were the disputants in a matter submitted for arbitration to public
respondent Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). The CIAC rendered a decision
ordering petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of around P18.6 Million, plus interest.
Before the CIAC, petitioner was represented by the Fajardo Law Offices. Petitioner, through Fajardo
Law Offices, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file a Petition for Review Under Rule 43.
However, petitioner, this time through its President and General Manager Sy Siong Lato (Sy), filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari Under Rule 43.
Unsurprisingly, this new motion for extension was assigned its own docket number.
The first case was raffled to the Court of Appeals Sixteenth Division. Despite the apparent
termination of services of the Fajardo Law Offices, no move was undertaken to withdraw or otherwise
disavow the motion earlier filed by that counsel. On the other hand, the second case was raffled to the
Court of Appeals Fifth Division. Both divisions of the Court of Appeals granted both motions for
extension.
In the meantime, petitioner secured the services of Atty. Richard S. Flores to represent it before the
Court of Appeals. Atty. Flores duly filed in behalf of petitioner a Motion for Second Extension of
Time to File Petition for Review with Formal Entry of Appearance.
The caption used in the new motion for extension, as prepared and filed by Atty. Flores is that of the
second case which was initiated by the motion filed by Sy in behalf of petitioner. The Special Third
Division granted the second motion for extension.
In the first case, no further pleading was filed by petitioner or the Fajardo Law Offices after the
granting of the initial motion for extension therein. Thus, the period within which to file the petition
in the first case elapsed on 20 July 2002. On the other hand, in the second case, two separate motions
for extension had been filed, the first by Sy in petitioners behalf and the second by Atty. Flores.
The act that animates this present case is the filing by Atty. Flores in behalf of petitioner, of a Petition
for Review assailing the Decision of the CIAC. The caption of the petition clearly states the docket
number as CA-G.R. SP No. 71485, that of the first case, or the same docket number under
which the earlier motion for extension filed by Fajardo Law Offices was docketed.
Unfortunately for petitioner, its right to file the Petition arose by virtue of the granting of the second
motion for extension in the second case. In contrast, petitioners right to file a petition in the first case
had expired before the actual filing of the petition under the docket number of the first case. As such,
the seemingly innocuous typographical error resulted in multiple deleterious consequences.
As such, the Resolution in the first case declared that [i]nasmuch as no motion for second extension of
time to file petition for review was received by this Court, the petition for review was, therefore, filed
beyond the prescribed period.
In the meantime, the second case held that [f]or failure of the petitioner to file the petition for review
within the extended period granted, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the appeal.
Issue
Whether or not consolidation is mandatory in the CA.
Held
No.
Thus, the filing of each motion for extension along with the corresponding full docket fees gives
rise to a separate case before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court that is accordingly docketed and
raffled for evaluation and eventual deliberation. If each of the cases involve the same petitioner, the
same respondents, and seek the extension of time to file a petition or appeal concerning the same
decision of the lower court or tribunal, then all the opportunity and dangers of forum shopping are
imminent. The evil itself would finally be actualized once a separate appeal or petition for each case is
actually filed.
Thus, even if forum-shopping had not yet been consummated, the steps undertaken by petitioner
herein may give rise to a prima facie indication that it was about to commit forum-shopping. Neither
would there have been any rational or legal justification for having filed two separate motions for
extension, as such steps are not oriented towards any valid legal outcome. Accordingly, a party who
commits such error in good faith has the obligation to correct the same upon becoming aware of the
anomaly.
That petitioner was under such an obligation in this case is inescapably evident. The fact that the
petition for review intended for filing in the second case bore instead the docket number of the first
case indicates that petitioner and its new counsel, Atty. Flores, knew of the first case earlier initiated
by Fajardo Law Offices. In short, at the time the petition was filed with the Court of Appeals,
petitioner had known that there were two similar cases involving the same parties and causes of
action.
There were a variety of options petitioner could have resorted to in order to rectify the anomaly. Upon
learning that there were actually two different cases pending before the Court of Appeals, petitioner
could have moved to withdraw either any of the motions for extension of time, so that there would be
only one case pending with the appellate court. It really would not matter if it were the first case or
the second case which was withdrawn, since either case was a viable vehicle for petitioners intended
appeal. Had petitioner done this at the onset, even if later the filed petition itself stated the wrong
docket number, the Court of Appeals could have easily recorded the pleading under the case that
remained in existence since it would anyway be incapable of filing the same under the records of a
case that had already been withdrawn..
But because petitioner was delinquent in ensuring that only one of the two cases remained extant, as
properly should be, the fiasco ensued merely from applying the correct legal procedures. Even as no
petition was timely filed in the first case after no second motion for extension was sought therein, said
case had not yet been closed and terminated upon the belated filing of the appeal. Since the appeal
was filed beyond the reglementary period, its dismissal was in accord with the rules of procedure. At
the same time, since no petition was filed at all in the second case despite the providential granting of
two successive motions for extension, the appeal was correctly dismissed. Had petitioner been
diligent enough to correct from the onset the anomalous circumstances, the twin embarrassments
would not have occurred.
Thus, petitioner is left to raising extremely weak and wholly unsupported arguments before us to
allow its cause of action a ghost of a chance. Contrary to petitioners claim, there was no obligation on
the part of the Sixteenth Division to forward the petition filed to the Third Division instead of
dismissing the same. The docket number indicated in the caption of that petition made it clear that the
same was addressed to the Sixteenth Division instead of the Third. Since both cases involved the
same parties and were pivoted on the same ruling of the CIAC, it could not have been indubitably
obvious that the misfiled petition actually pertained to a different case.
The only indication in the petition that it was intended for filing in a different case was the statement
therein that a second motion for extension had been previously filed, as it had been in the second case,
but not the first case. Yet even such fact would not have elicited the ineluctable conclusion on the part
of the Sixteenth Division that the petition had been misfiled under a wrong docket number. The more
plausible assumption for the appellate court, in fact, would be that petitioner was lying in order to
make it appear that the petition had been timely filed. After all, the Sixteenth Division at that point
would not have had basis to know of the existence of the second case, their information being limited
to the averments made by petitioner before the Sixteenth Division through its pleadings. And it was
only in the Motion for Reconsideration that the Sixteenth Division was first alerted to the existence of
the second case.
Petitioner now suggests that the duty to rectify the anomaly fell with the Sixteenth Division. The
notion is balderdash.
We have duly considered that perhaps this entire untidiness could have been avoided had the Court of
Appeals at the outset consolidated the two cases. Yet such consideration is ultimately of no moment
to petitioner. For one, under the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), there is no
mandatory obligation to consolidate related cases. The language utilized in Rule 3, Section 3 of the
RIRCA, which authorizes consolidation is cases, is merely directory in character, providing as it does:
[w]hen related cases are assigned to different Justices, they may be consolidated and assigned to one
Justice. More importantly perhaps, the consolidation of cases was never intended to cure the defect of
forum-shopping. If one litigant has filed multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause
of action, the consolidation of these suits is not the correct palliative. These suits should instead be
dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping.
Neri v. Sandiganbayan, 2013

Facts
Petitioner Romulo L. Neri (Neri) served as Director General of the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) during the administration of former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo.
In connection with what had been played up as the botched Philippine-ZTE National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project, the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB ), filed with the Sandiganbayan two (2)
criminal Informations, the first against Benjamin Abalos, for violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act
No. (RA) 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, docketed
as SB-10-CRM-0098 (People v. Abalos). The second Information against Neri, also for violation of
Sec. 3(h), RA 3019, in relation to Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, was docketed as SB-
10-CRM-0099 (People v. Neri).
In the ensuing trial in the Neri case following the arraignment and pre-trial proceedings, six (6)
individuals took the witness stand on separate dates to testify for the prosecution. Thereafter, the
prosecution twice moved for and secured continuance for the initial stated reason that the prosecution
is still verifying the exact address of its next intended witness and then that such witness cannot be
located at his given address.
In the meantime, a pre-trial conference was conducted in the Abalos case.
In SB-10-CRM-0099, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for its consolidation with SB-10-
CRM-0098 (People v. Abalos), SB-11-CRM-0467 (People v. Arroyo, et al.) and SB-11-0468 to 469
(People v. Arroyo). The stated reason proffered: to promote a more expeditious and less expensive
resolution of the controversy of cases involving the same business transaction. And in this regard, the
prosecution would later manifest that it would be presenting Yu Yong and Fan Yang, then president
and finance officer, respectively, of ZTE, as witnesses all in said cases which would entail a
substantive expense on the part of government if their testimonies are given separately.
Neri opposed and argued against consolidation.
The Sandiganbayan, agreeing with the position thus taken by the OSP, granted the consolidation of
SB-10-CRM-0099 with SB-10-CRM-0098,
Issue
Whether or not consolidation should be allowed.
Held
No.
The interrelated assignment of errors converged on the propriety, under the premises, of the
consolidation of SB-10-CRM-0099 with SB-10-CRM-0098.
While the assailed resolution is silent as to the resultant effect/s of the consolidation it approved, there
is nothing in the records to show that what the prosecution vied for and what the Fifth Division
approved went beyond consolidation for trial or joint trial.
Petitioner should now disabuse himself of the unfounded notion that what the Fifth Division intended
was a fusion into one criminal proceedings of the Abalos and Neri cases, where one is unidentifiable
from the other, or worse, where he will be tried as co-accused in the Abalos case.
This thus brings us to the question of whether a consolidation of trial, under the factual and legal
milieu it was ordered, is proper.
Jurisprudence has laid down the requisites for consolidation of trial. Joint trial is permissible "where
the actions arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend
largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to
be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the
substantial rights of any of the parties."
The inculpatory acts complained of, the particulars and specifications for each of the cases are
dissimilar, even though they were allegedly done in connection with the negotiations for and the
implementation of the NBN Project. Due to this variance, the prosecution witnesses listed in the pre-
trial order in the Neri case are also different from the list of the peoples witnesses lined up to testify
in the Abalos case, albeit some names appear in both the pre-trial orders.
A consolidation of the Neri case to that of Abalos would expose petitioner Neri to testimonies which
have no relation whatsoever in the case against him and the lengthening of the legal dispute thereby
delaying the resolution of his case.
What is more, there is a significant difference in the number of witnesses to be presented in the two
cases. In fact, the number of prosecution witnesses in the Neri case is just half of that in Abalos.
Awaiting the completion in due course of the presentation of the witnesses in Abalos would doubtless
stall the disposition of the case against petitioner as there are more or less thirty-five (35) prosecution
witnesses listed in People v. Abalos who are not so listed in People v. Neri.
Before the Sandigabayan and this Court, petitioner has harped and rued on the possible infringement
of his right to speedy trial should consolidation push through, noting in this regard that the Neri case
is on its advanced stage but with the prosecution unable to continue further with its case after
presenting six witnesses.
Petitioner's point is well-taken.
Clearly then, consolidation, assuming it to be proper owing to the existence of the element of
commonality of the lineage of the offenses charged contemplated in Sec. 22 of Rule 119, should be
ordered to achieve all the objects and purposes underlying the rule on consolidation, foremost of
which, to stress, is the swift dispensation of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties.
It should, however, be denied if it subverts any of the aims of consolidation. Ordering consolidation-
likely to delay the resolution of one of the cases, expose a party to the rigors of a lengthy litigation
and in the process undermine the accused's right to speedy disposition of cases-constitutes grave
abuse of discretion. Not lost on the Court of course and certainly not on the Sandiganbayan 's Fourth
Division is the resulting absurdity arising from the consolidation of trial where the accused (Neri) in
one case would be the prosecution's main witness in the other case.
Demurrer to Evidence
Radiowealth v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, July 6, 2000
People v. Cachola, G.R. No. 148712, January 21, 2004
Judgement on the Pleadings and Summary

Judgment (Rule 34 and 35)
Wood Technology v. Equitable Banking, G.R. 153867, February 17, 2005
Bascug v. Aranday, A.M.-RTJ 00-1591, April 11, 2002
Eland Phil. V. Garcia, G.R. No. 173289, February 17, 2010
Smart Communications v. Aldecoa, 2013
Judgment (Rule 36)

Consing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143584, March 10, 2004
Heirs of Valdez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163208, August 13, 2008
Intramuros Tennis v. PTA, G.R. No. 135630, September 26, 2000
Polymer Rubber Corporation v. Salamuding, 2013
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, 2013
Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial (Rule 37)

Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131094, May 16, 2005
Republic v. Peralta, G.R. No. 150327, June 18, 2003
People v. Odilao, April 14, 2004, G.R. No. 155451
Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005
Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130314, September 22, 1998
Petition for Relief from Judgment (Rule 38)

Alaban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.156021, September 23, 2005
Samartino v. Raon, G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002
Purcon v. MRM Philippines et al., G.R. No. 182718, September 26, 2008
Execution of Judgment (Rule 39)

Capa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160082, September 19, 2006
Doctrine
Based on Rule 39 and Rule 41, as long as the motion for execution pending appeal is filed within the
period for perfecting the appeal and prior to the transmittal of the records to the CA, the trial court
may order execution pending appeal upon good reasons to be stated in the Order granting execution
pending appeal. The RTC granted Capas motion for execution pending appeal and issued the writ of
execution commanding sheriff Belarmino to levy the properties of United Vismin.
Navaros v. Comelec, G.R. No. 157957, September 18, 2003

Doctrine
To grant execution pending appeal in election protest cases, the following requisites must concur:
1. There must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
2. There must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal; and
3. The order granting execution pending appeal must state the good reasons.
In a nutshell, the following constitute good reasons, and a combination of two or more of them will
suffice to grant execution pending appeal:
1. The public interest involved or the will of the electorate;
2. The shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and
3. The length of time that the election contest has been pending.
Execution of judgment pending appeal is available in election cases.
A supersedeas bond under Section 3 cannot fully protect the interests of the prevailing party in
election protest cases. It finds no application in election protest cases where judgments invariably
include orders which are not capable of pecuniary estimation such as the right to hold office and
perform its functions.
International School v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131109, June 29, 1999
Doctrine
Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights or
causes of action and reliefs sought. While there is an identity of parties in the appeal and in the
petition for review on certiorari filed before this Court, it is clear that the causes of action and reliefs
sought are unidentical, although petitioner ISM may have mentioned in its appeal the impropriety of
the writ of execution pending appeal under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. Clearly,
there can be no forum-shopping where in one petition a party questions the order granting the motion
for execution pending appeal, as in the case at bar, and, in a regular appeal before the appellate court,
the party questions the decision on the merits which finds the party guilty of negligence and holds the
same liable for damages therefor. After all, the merits of the main case are not to be determined in a
petition questioning execution pending appeal and vice versa. Hence, reliance on the principle of
forum-shopping is misplaced.
Thus, we held therein, and we so reiterate for purposes of the case at bar, that certiorari lies against an
order granting execution pending appeal where the same is not founded upon good reasons. Also, the
fact that the losing party had appealed from the judgment does not bar the certiorari action filed in
respondent court as the appeal could not be an adequate remedy from such premature execution.
That petitioner could have resorted to a supersedeas bond to prevent execution pending appeal, as
suggested by the two lower courts, is not to be held against him. The filing of such bond does not
entitle him to the suspension of execution as a matter of right. It cannot, therefore, be categorically
considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, no rule requires a losing party so
circumstanced to adopt such remedy in lieu or before availment of other remedial options at hand.
Furthermore, a rational interpretation of Section 3, Rule 39 should be that the requirement for a
supersedeas bond presupposes that the case presents a presumptively valid occasion for discretionary
execution. Otherwise, even if no good reason exists to warrant advance execution, the prevailing party
could unjustly compel the losing party to post a supersedeas bond through the simple expedient of
filing a motion for, and the trial court improvidently granting, a writ of execution pending appeal
although the situation is violative of Section 2, Rule 39. This could not have been the intendment of
the rule, hence we give our imprimatur to the propriety of petitioners action for certiorari in
respondent court.
Verily, a petition for certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the
same is not founded upon good reasons.
This brings us now to the question on the validity of the appellate courts ruling upholding the writ of
execution pending appeal.
The Court of Appeals accepted as `good reasons that ISMs appeal appears to be dilatory in view of its
virtual admission of fault when it adopted the project Code Red only after the death of plaintiffs-
spouses Torralbas son, and the delay of the case which already affected plaintiffs spouses Torralbas
financially.
For purposes only of determining the correctness of the writ of execution pending appeal, we cannot
see how the lower courts came upon the conclusion of virtual admission of fault or negligence by ISM
based on the exchange where ISMs swimming coach admitted that he read the school paper article
introducing Code Red. As correctly pointed out by ISM, the article was not an official statement of
the school, but merely an opinion of its author. Moreover, we cannot see how the statement of Mr.
Noli Reloj that he read the article on Code Red can be construed as an admission of liability by the
school. Clearly then, the conclusion of the lower courts that the appeal is dilatory based solely on the
foregoing exchange rests on shaky ground.
The next question to be resolved is whether or not the filing of a bond can be considered a good
reason to justify immediate execution under Section 2, Rule 39.
In fine, the rule is now settled that the mere filing of a bond by the successful party is not a good
reason for ordering execution pending appeal, as a combination of circumstances is the dominant
consideration which impels the grant of immediate execution, the requirement of a bond is imposed
merely as an additional factor, no doubt for the protection of the defendants creditor. Since we have
already ruled that the reason that an appeal is dilatory does not justify execution pending appeal,
neither does the filing of a bond, without anything more, justify the same. Moreover, ISM could not
be faulted for its withdrawal of its supersedeas bond inasmuch as the lower court granted the
execution pending appeal and rejected its offer of supersedeas bond.
Finally, we note that writ of execution pending appeal covered the moral and exemplary damages
adjudged by the lower court against ISM. In this regard, awards for moral and exemplary damages
cannot be the subject of execution pending appeal.
Manacop v. Equitable Bank, G.R. No. 162814, August 25, 2005

Doctrine
Anent petitioners fifth assigned error, we find that the Court of Appeals did not err in giving due
course and in granting the petitions. These certiorari petitions initiated by PhilFire and First Lepanto
were directed against the trial courts orders granting execution pending appeal and the concomitant
issuance of a writ of execution. The proper recourse to be taken from these orders is a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the same is not founded
upon good reasons. The fact that the losing party had also appealed from the judgment does not bar
the certiorari proceedings, as the appeal could not be an adequate remedy from such premature
execution. Additionally, there is no forum-shopping where in one petition a party questions the order
granting the motion for execution pending appeal and at the same time questions the decision on the
merits in a regular appeal before the appellate court. After all, the merits of the main case are not to be
determined in a petition questioning execution pending appeal and vice versa.
In the case at bar, petitioners insist that execution pending appeal is justified because respondent
insurance companies admitted their liabilities under the insurance contracts and thus have no reason to
withhold payment.
We are not persuaded. The fact that the insurance companies admit their liabilities is not a compelling
or superior circumstance that would warrant execution pending appeal. On the contrary, admission of
their liabilities and willingness to deliver the proceeds to the proper party militate against execution
pending appeal since there is little or no danger that the judgment will become illusory.
There is likewise no merit in petitioners contention that the appeals are merely dilatory because, while
the insurance companies admitted their liabilities, the matter of how much is owing from each of them
and who is entitled to the same remain unsettled. It should be noted that respondent insurance
companies are questioning the amounts awarded by the trial court for being over and above the
amount ascertained by the Office of the Insurance Commission. There are also three parties claiming
the insurance proceeds, namely: petitioners, Equitable Bank, and Lavine as represented by the group
of Chandru.
Besides, that the appeal is merely dilatory is not a good reason for granting execution pending appeal.
Lastly, petitioners assert that Lavines financial distress is sufficient reason to order execution pending
appeal. Borja is not applicable to the case at bar because its factual milieu is different. In Borja, the
prevailing party was a natural person who, at 76 years of age, may no longer enjoy the fruit of the
judgment before he finally passes away. Lavine, on the other hand, is a juridical entity whose
existence cannot be likened to a natural person. Its precarious financial condition is not by itself a
compelling circumstance warranting immediate execution and does not outweigh the long standing
general policy of enforcing only final and executory judgments.
Curata v. PPA, G.R. No. 154211, June 22, 2009

Doctrine
The Court rules that discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2 (a) of Rule 39
does not apply to eminent domain proceedings.
PPAs monies, facilities and assets are government properties. Ergo, they are exempt from execution
whether by virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal. PPA is a government instrumentality
charged with carrying out governmental functions through the management, supervision, control and
regulation of major ports of the country. It is an attached agency of the Department of Transportation
and Communication pursuant to PD 505.
An undeniable conclusion is that the funds of PPA partake of government funds, and such may not be
garnished absent an allocation by its Board or by statutory grant. If the PPA funds cannot be
garnished and its properties, being government properties, cannot be levied via a writ of execution
pursuant to a final judgment, then the RTC likewise cannot grant discretionary execution pending
appeal, as it would run afoul of the established jurisprudence that government properties are exempt
from execution. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. From the above discussion,
we find that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in its July 24, 2000 Order directing the
execution of the First Compensation Order (July 10, 2000 Order) pending appeal.
Garcia v. PAL, G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009

Doctrine
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor
Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the
wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. It
settles the view that the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement is immediately executory and the
employer has to either re-admit them to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to
their dismissal, or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to exercise the options in the
alternative, employer must pay the employees salaries.
Arcenas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150233, February 16, 2005

Doctrine
Even assuming that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the person of the Arcenas, still, the
judgment rendered by it is a nullity for the reason that the original judgment which was the subject of
the action for revival was substantially modified.
In Civil Case No. 35349, the judgment of the RTC ordered only Arcenas co-defendant Emilio Espino
to return the barge MV Sta. Lucia I to Jose de la Riva and to pay P48,000.00 a month as unrealized
profit from February 3, 1980 or until June 18, 1980. The said judgment absolved Arcenas from any
liability insofar as the barge is concerned but found him jointly liable to private respondent and
Antonio Sy, Sr., for moral and exemplary damages.
On the other hand, THE REVIVED JUDGMENT now subject of this case, substantially modified the
original judgment by directing Arcenas to pay private Dela Riva the sum of P171,022.00 representing
double the value of the barge; P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and 15% of the amount
recoverable by way of attorneys fees.
These new monetary awards can not be allowed since they were not adjudged in the original judgment
which had long become final and executory. For, it is a fundamental rule that when a final judgment
becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be
made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The only recognized exceptions are
the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void.
Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.
The PURPOSE OF THE ACTION FOR REVIVAL OF A JUDGMENT is not to modify the original
judgment subject of the action but is merely to give a creditor a new right of enforcement from the
date of revival. The rule seeks to protect judgment creditors from wily and unscrupulous debtors who,
in order to evade attachment or execution, cunningly conceal their assets and wait until the statute of
limitation sets in.
RCBC v. Serra, 2013

Infante v. Aran Builders, G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007
Josef v. Santos, G.R. No. 165060, November 27, 2008
D-Armoured Security v. Orpia, G.R. No. 151325, June 27, 2005
Caja v. Nanquil, A.M. P-04-1885, September 13, 2004
Zamora v. Villanueva, A.M. P-04-1898, July 28, 2008
Landrito v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133079, August 9, 2005
Marsmony Trading v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170515, May 6, 2010
Benitez v. Acosta, A.M. P-01-1473, March 27, 2001
St. Aviation Services v. Grand International Airways, G.R. No.140288, October 23, 2006
City Government of Makati v. Odena, 2013
Appeals/Original Actions in the Supreme Court and

Court of Appeals (Rule 40 to 56 except Rule 47)
Fernando v. Santamaria, G.R. No. 160730, December 10, 2004
Facts
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents Willibaldo Uy (Uy), Chua Ping Hian (Chua) and the
latters agent, Laureana P. Borres (Borres). She alleged that she obtained loans from Chua. As security
for said loans, she executed a real estate mortgage. Before the third loan could be released, she signed
a deed of absolute sale conveying the lot in favor of Chua upon the assurance of Borres that the deed
was a mere formality. However, she learned that her title over the property was cancelled and that a
new one was issued in the name of Chua.
Thereafter, Chua offered to sell back the property to petitioner for P10 million, which the latter
accepted. However, petitioner came to know that Chua sold the subject lot for P7 Million to Uy.
Petitioner filed a complaint on the following causes of action:

1. Annulment of the deeds of absolute sale over the subject lot in favor of Chua and Uy and the
cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of the latter;
2. Recovery from Borres of the amount of P200,000.00 which she allegedly gave as payment of
the real property taxes of the lot as well as the amount of P120,000.00 which Borres
unlawfully deducted from her third loan; and
3. Recovery of damages against all respondents.
Chua filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners action which is founded on fraud is
barred by prescription.
The trial court dismissed the complaint against all the respondents on the grounds of prescription,
ratification and abandonment of cause of action. It held that petitioner ratified Chuas act of selling the
lot to Uy by acknowledging that the latter is now the owner of the lot in her letter offering to
repurchase the same and to pay the incidental expenses of the sale.
Later, the trial court modified its order by reinstating the complaint insofar as the action for recovery
of sum of money against Borres is concerned.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals contending that her complaint seeks
to hold all respondents solidarily liable for the fraudulent conveyance of her property. She claimed
that the trial court cannot render several judgment and separate the liability of Borres with that of her
co-respondents. As such, appeal from the decision of the trial court can be perfected by the filing of a
notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the questioned order without need of submitting a
record on appeal.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition holding that the trial court validly rendered several
judgment because the liability of Borres in petitioners third cause of action is distinct from the
liability of the other respondents. To perfect an appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner must
file a record on appeal in addition to the notice of appeal.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner was able to perfect an appeal within the required period.
Held
No.
A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct from
that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of them could have been the subject of
separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect the other.
In the instant case, the trial court correctly applied the foregoing provision because the complaint was
filed against several defendants with respect to whom, rendition of several judgment is proper.
It is clear that the third cause of action for payment of the amounts of P200,000.00 and P120,000.00 is
directed only against Borres to the exclusion of Uy and Chua. Even if the trial court debunk
petitioners claim that respondents (including Borres) connived in defrauding her to convey the
property, the action against Borres for sum of money will still subsist because it is based on issues
which has nothing to do with the issue of fraud, i.e., whether Borres received the amount of
P120,000.00 and whether she has the obligation to pay the real estate taxes of the mortgaged lot. The
cause of action for collection of sum of money against Borres can thus proceed independently of the
dismissal of the action to hold her solidarily liable with Chua and Uy for the alleged fraudulent
conveyance of the lot (first, second and fourth causes of action of the complaint).
The doctrine laid down in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, is not
applicable to the instant case. Petitioners cause of action against Borres for collection of sum of
money is clearly severable from her action against the other respondents. Thus, rendition of several
judgment is proper.
Considering that no record on appeal was filed, the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the order of
the trial court dismissing her appeal for failure to perfect the same within the reglementary period.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. In instances where we applied a liberal interpretation of the rules on filing a
record on appeal, the parties although late, filed the required record on appeal. Such, however, is not
the case here because petitioner adamantly refused to file the required record on appeal.
Madrigal Transport v. Lapanday, G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004

Facts
Petitioner Madrigal Transport, Inc. (Madrigal) filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Subsequently, petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against
Respondents Lapanday Holdings Corporation (Lapanday), Macondray and Company, Inc.
(Macondray), and Luis P. Lorenzo Jr. before the RTC.
In the latter action, Madrigal alleged (1) that it had entered into a joint venture agreement with
Lapanday for the primary purpose of operating vessels to service the shipping requirements of Del
Monte Philippines, Inc.; (2) that it had done so on the strength of the representations of Lorenzo, in
his capacity either as chairman of the board or as president of Del Monte, Lapanday and Macondray;
(3) that Macondray had thereafter been appointed -- allegedly upon the insistence of Lapanday -- as
broker, for the purpose of securing charter hire contracts from Del Monte; (4) that pursuant to the
joint venture agreement, Madrigal had purchased a vessel by obtaining a bank loan; and (5) that
contrary to their representations and guarantees and despite demands, Lapanday and Lorenzo had
allegedly been unable to deliver those Del Monte charter hire contracts.
The insolvency court declared petitioner insolvent. Respondents Lapanday, Lorenzo and Macondray
filed their respective Motions to Dismiss the case pending before the RTC.
The RTC granted the Motion, for failure of the Complaint to state a cause of action. The RTC ruled
that the exclusive right to prosecute the actions belonged to the court-appointed assignee.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was later denied. Subsequently, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court ruled that since the main issue
in the instant case was purely legal, the Petition could be treated as one for review as an exception to
the general rule that certiorari was not proper when appeal was available. Respondents Lapanday and
Lorenzo challenged this ruling through a Motion for Reconsideration.
The appellate court issued the assailed Decision granting Respondents Lapanday and Lorenzos
Motion for Reconsideration and dismissing Madrigals Petition for Certiorari. The CA opined that an
order granting a motion to dismiss was final and thus the proper subject of an appeal, not certiorari.
Furthermore, even if the Petition could be treated as an appeal, it would still have to be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, according to the CA. The appellate court held that the issues raised by petitioner
involved pure questions of law that should be brought to the Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy.
Held
No.
Certiorari Not the Proper Remedy if Appeal Is Available

Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained.
Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially
if ones own negligence or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the
requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion.
Petitioner was ascribing errors of judgment, not jurisdiction, in its Petition for Certiorari filed with
the Court of Appeals. The issue raised there was the trial courts alleged error in dismissing the
Complaint for lack of cause of action. Petitioner argues that it could still institute the Complaint, even
if it had filed a Petition for Insolvency earlier. As petitioner was challenging the trial courts
interpretation of the law -- posing a question of law -- the issue involved an error of judgment, not of
jurisdiction. An error of judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is
not necessarily equivalent to grave abuse of discretion.
The Dismissal -- a Final Order
An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory because the
proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. Therefore the
remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.
Petitioner avers that Section 5 of Rule 16 bars the filing of an appeal when the dismissal is based on
lack of cause of action. It adds that Section 5 limits the remedy of appeal only to dismissals grounded
on prior judgments or on the statute of limitations, or to claims that have been extinguished or are
unenforceable. We find this interpretation absurd.
The provision is clear. Dismissals on the aforesaid grounds constitute res judicata. However, such
dismissals are still subject to a timely appeal. For those based on other grounds, the complaint can be
refiled. Section 5, therefore, confirms that an appeal is the remedy for the dismissal of an action.
Exception to the Rule Not Established by Petitioner
We are not unaware of instances when this Court has granted certiorari despite the availability of
appeal. Where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of appeal may not prove
adequate -- either in point of promptness or completeness, so that a partial if not a total failure of
justice could result -- a writ of certiorari may still be issued. Petitioner cites some of these exceptions
to justify the remedy it has undertaken with the appellate court, but these are not applicable to the
present factual milieu.
Petitioner availed of certiorari because the 15-day period within which to file an appeal had already
lapsed. Basic is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal.
As previously stressed, appeal -- not certiorari -- was the correct remedy to elevate the RTCs Order
granting the Motion to Dismiss. The appeal, which would have involved a pure question of law,
should have been filed with the Supreme Court.
BPI v. Sarabia Manor Hotel, 2013

Facts
Sarabia obtained a special loan package from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) in order to
finance the construction of a five-storey hotel building (New Building) for the purpose of expanding
its hotel business.
The foregoing debts were secured by real estate mortgages and a comprehensive surety agreement
signed by its stockholders. By virtue of a merger, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) assumed all of
FEBTCs rights against Sarabia.
Because of the delayed completion of the New Building, Sarabia incurred various cash flow
problems. Thus, it, filed, a Petition for corporate rehabilitation (rehabilitation petition) with prayer for
the issuance of a stay order before the RTC as it foresaw the impossibility to meet its maturing
obligations to its creditors when they fall due.
Finding Sarabias rehabilitation petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued a Stay
Order. Thereafter, BPI filed its Opposition.
After several hearings, the RTC gave due course to the rehabilitation petition and referred Sarabias
proposed rehabilitation plan to the Receiver for evaluation.
The RTC approved Sarabias rehabilitation plan as recommended by the Receiver, finding the same to
be feasible.
The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling with the modification of reinstating the surety obligations of
Sarabias stockholders to BPI as an additional safeguard for the effective implementation of the
approved rehabilitation plan. It held that the RTCs conclusions as to the feasibility of Sarabias
rehabilitation was well-supported by the companys financial statements, both internal and
independent, which were properly analyzed and examined by the Receiver.
Issue
Whether or not the Rule 45 is proper.
Held
No.
It is fundamental that a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
covers only questions of law. In this relation, questions of fact are not reviewable and cannot be
passed upon by the Court unless, the following exceptions are found to exist:
1. When the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures;
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
3. When there is a grave abuse of discretion;
4. When the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts;
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. When in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both parties;
7. When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
8. When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (i)
9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; and
10. When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record.
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is well-defined. A question of law
exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of
fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. This being
so, the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and the Court will not review them on
appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds BPIs petition to be improper and hence, dismissible as
the issues raised therein involve questions of fact which are beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for
review.
To elucidate, the determination of whether or not due regard was given to the interests of BPI as a
secured creditor in the approved rehabilitation plan partakes of a question of fact since it will require a
review of the sufficiency and weight of evidence presented by the parties among others, the various
financial documents and data showing Sarabias capacity to pay and BPIs perceived cost of money
and not merely an application of law. Therefore, given the complexion of the issues which BPI
presents, and finding none of the above-mentioned exceptions to exist, the Court is constrained to
dismiss its petition, and prudently uphold the factual findings of the courts a quo which are entitled to
great weight and respect, and even accorded with finality. This especially obtains in corporate
rehabilitation proceedings wherein certain commercial courts have been designated on account of
their expertise and specialized knowledge on the subject matter, as in this case.
In any event, even discounting the above-discussed procedural considerations, the Courts still finds
BPIs petition lacking in merit.
NAPOCOR v. Paderanga, G.R. No. 155065, July 28, 2005

Facts
To implement its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, the NPC filed before the Regional Trial Court a
complaint for expropriation of parcels of land.
A day after the complaint was filed NPC filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of writ of
possession of the lands.
Dilao filed her Answer with Counterclaim on April 19, 1996. Enriquez did not.
The RTC Danao, issued an Order granting NPCs motion for the issuance of writ of possession. It then
appointed a Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation.
The commissioners submitted their report to the trial court.
To the Commissioners Report, the NPC filed its Comment/Opposition assailing the correctness of the
appraisal.
The trial court rendered a decision on the complaint, adopting the commissioners recommended
appraisal of the land co-owned by Dilao and her siblings.
NPC filed a Notice of Appeal but the trial court denied the same for NPCs failure to file and perfect it
within the reglementary period, it having failed to file a record on appeal. To the Order, NPC filed a
motion for reconsideration, contending that a record on appeal was not required as the trial court
rendered judgment against all the defendants including Enriquez as shown, so it claimed, by the
dispositive portion of the decision referring to Petrona Dilao et al.
The trial court denied NPCs motion for reconsideration, clarifying that the reference to Petrona Dilao
et al. in the dispositive portion of its decision was meant to cover only Dilao and her co-owner-
siblings.
NPC subsequently filed before the trial court a petition for relief from the denial of its appeal on the
ground that its failure to file a record on appeal was due to honest mistake and excusable neglect, it
having believed that a record on appeal was not required in light of the failure of the other defendant,
Enriquez, to file an answer to the complaint.
The trial court denied NPCs petition for relief for lack of factual and legal basis.
NPC thereupon filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals with prayer for temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The appellate court, however, denied NPCs
petition, it holding that under Rule 41, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the filing of a
record on appeal is required in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals, as
in an action for expropriation in which the order determining the right of the plaintiff to expropriate
and the subsequent adjudication on the issue of just compensation may be the subject of separate
appeals.
Issue
Whether or not a record on appeal is required.
Held
Yes.
While admittedly a complaint for expropriation is not a special proceeding, the rules of court requires
the filing of a record on appeal in other cases of multiple or separate appeal.
Jurisprudential law, no doubt, recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in a complaint for
expropriation.
1. 1. There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not
of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take
the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it
finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So,
too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in
the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation
(or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.
2. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court
of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on
the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would
finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court
regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous
in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a
dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.
Thus, in Municipality of Bian, this Court held that in actions for eminent domain, since no less than
two appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty days
counted from notice thereof and not the ordinary period of fifteen days prescribed for actions in
general. As such, the complaint falls under the classification of other cases of multiple or separate
appeal where the law or these rules so require in above-quoted Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure in which a record on appeal is required to be filed and served.
State Investment v. Delta Motors, G.R. No. 144444

Facts
The present proceedings originated from an action for a sum of money filed with the RTC by State
Investment Trust, Inc. against Delta Motors Corporation. The RTC rendered a judgment by default,
ordering Delta to pay SITI. SITI moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. The RTC granted the
Motion.
Delta obtained a certified true copy of the RTC Decision. It asked the Court of Appeals to annul the
trial courts Decision on the ground that the summons had been served upon a person not authorized to
receive it; and prayed that judgment be rendered annulling/reversing or setting aside the Decision of
the [RTC] judge.
The CA rendered a Decision, declaring that the summons had been properly served upon Delta
through one Evel Torres, the Corporations vice president for finance, but that the RTC Judgment had
not attained finality.
Notably, the CA Decision was silent on the assailed RTC Order granting the execution. Delta then
appealed to this Court. However, its Petition was dismissed because of Deltas failure to present proof
that a copy of the Petition was served on the RTC.
Delta filed its Notice of Appeal with the RTC, which, however, dismissed it upon SITIs motion.
Thereafter, Delta filed a Petition for Certiorari assailing the RTC Order dismissing the Notice of
Appeal. The CA granted the Petition.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of [the RTC] dated June 3, 1992, dismissing the notice of appeal dated
November 6, 1991; and the order dated September 14, 1992 of the same court denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by [Delta], through counsel, are hereby SET ASIDE; and respondent court [is] hereby
ordered to ELEVATE the records of the case to the Court of Appeals, on appeal.
SITI elevated the CA ruling to this Court. This Court denied SITIs appeal and upheld the CA.
Later, SITI filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion asking for the issuance of an order of execution.
In opposing the Motion, Delta pointed out that the case had not attained finality because of its pending
appeal. The RTC nevertheless rendered the Order granting SITIs Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, Delta
challenged that Order on certiorari before the CA, which then annulled it in the present assailed
Decision.
The CA found that the RTC had acted without jurisdiction in granting petitioners Omnibus Motion.
The appellate court held that the lower courts action effectively allowed execution of the Decision
even when it had not yet become final and executory.
Issue
Whether or not the execution pending appeal is proper.
Held
No.
Petitioner asserts that the RTC acted correctly in issuing the Order directing the continuation of the
execution of the RTC Decision.
The following facts are relevant to the resolution of this issue:

1. The RTC Decision is the subject of the Notice of Appeal filed by respondent
2. The records of that case have not been actually elevated to the CA by the RTC.
3. Upon petitioners Omnibus Motion, the RTC issued the Order directing the sheriff to continue
with the execution of its Decision.
4. Before this Court in GR No. 110677, petitioner assailed the CA Decision directing the
elevation of the records. In our Decision, we affirmed the CA.
In the case at bar, the appeal filed by respondent was perfected on November 12, 1991, when it filed
its Notice of Appeal. Considering that it had already filed such Notice, and that the period of appeal
for petitioner had already expired, the RTC no longer had jurisdiction over the case. Hence, the trial
court acted improperly when it issued its Order granting petitioners Omnibus Motion. That Motion
was filed four years after this Court had affirmed the CA Decision directing the elevation of the
records on appeal. For having been issued without jurisdiction, the Order is plainly null and void.
Furthermore, the Order of execution was made without any statement of the special reason for its
issuance. The rule allowing execution pending appeal is strictly construed against the movant,
because courts look with disfavor upon any attempt to execute a judgment that has not acquired a
final character. An execution pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy, being more of the exception
rather than the rule. It is allowed only upon showing of good reasons by the movant. In the present
case, no reason has been shown for the issuance of the Order directing execution pending appeal.
Aguilar v. Comelec, G.R. No. 185140, June 30, 2009

Facts
In the barangay elections, petitioner Aguilar won the chairmanship over private respondent Insoy by
a margin of one vote. Not conceding his defeat, Insoy timely instituted a protest docketed as Election
Case in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). The MTC rendered its Decision finding Insoy, who, during
the revision garnered 265 votes as against Aguilars 264 votes, as the duly elected punong barangay.
The trial court consequently nullified the proclamation of Aguilar and directed him to vacate the
office.
Aggrieved, Aguilar filed his notice of appeal and paid to the trial court the appeal fee of P1,000.00 in
accordance with Rule 14, Sections 8 and 9 of the recently promulgated A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC or the
Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and
Barangay Officials.
When the COMELEC received the records elevated by the trial court, its First Division issued the first
assailed Order which pertinently reads:
Pursuant to Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provide for the payment of
appeal fee in the amount of P3,200.00 within the period to file the notice of appeal, and Section 9(a), Rule 22 of
the same Rules, which provides that failure to pay the correct appeal fee is a ground for the dismissal of the
appeal, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant appeal
for Protestant-Appellants (sic) failure to pay the appeal fee as prescribed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure
within the five-(5)-day reglementary period.
Adversely affected, Aguilar moved for reconsideration, arguing that the newly promulgated A.M. No.
07-4-15-SC only requires the payment of P1,000.00 as appeal fee. The COMELEC First Division,
however, issued the second assailed Order stating
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by protestee-appellant Jerry B. Aguilar, through registered mail
on 13 August 2008 and received by this Commission on 21 August 2008, seeking reconsideration of this
Commissions (First Division) Order dated 31 July 2008, this Commission (First Division) RESOLVES to
DENY the instant motion for movants (sic) failure to pay the complete P700.00 motion fee.
Unperturbed, Aguilar filed another motion for reconsideration, contending, among others, that the
order was null and void because it was issued in violation of the rule that motions for reconsideration
should be resolved by the COMELEC en banc. On October 6, 2008, the COMELEC First Division
issued the third assailed Order denying the same.
Issue
Whether or not the Comelecs dismissal is proper.
Held
No.
However, instead of remanding this case to the COMELEC en banc for appropriate action on
petitioners motion for reconsideration, we will resolve the propriety of the appeals dismissal,
considering the urgent need for the resolution of election cases, and considering that the issue has,
after all, been raised in this petition.
Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provide for the following procedure in the appeal
to the COMELEC of trial court decisions in election protests involving elective municipal and
barangay officials:
SEC. 8. Appeal. An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Commission on Elections, within five days
after promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served on
the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.
SEC. 9. Appeal fee. The appellant in an election contest shall pay to the court that rendered the decision an
appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal.
It should be noted from the afore-quoted sections of the Rule that the appeal fee of P1,000.00 is paid
not to the COMELEC but to the trial court that rendered the decision. Thus, the filing of the notice of
appeal and the payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee perfect the appeal, consonant with Sections 10
and 11 of the same Rule. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the records have to be transmitted to the
Electoral Contests Adjudication Department of the COMELEC within 15 days. The trial court may
only exercise its residual jurisdiction to resolve pending incidents if the records have not yet been
transmitted and before the expiration of the period to appeal.
With the promulgation of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, the previous rule that the appeal is perfected only
upon the full payment of the appeal fee, now pegged at P3,200.00, to the COMELEC Cash Division
within the period to appeal, as stated in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, no longer
applies.
It thus became necessary for the COMELEC to clarify the procedural rules on the payment of appeal
fees. For this purpose, the COMELEC issued on July 15, 2008, Resolution No. 8486, which the Court
takes judicial notice of.
The foregoing resolution is consistent with A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC and the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended. The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial courts decision in election contests
involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the
payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the court that rendered the decision within the five-day
reglementary period. The non-payment or the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of
P3,200.00 to the COMELEC Cash Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in
outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal. Following, Rule 22, Section 9(a) of the COMELEC
Rules, the appeal may be dismissed. And pursuant to Rule 40, Section 18 of the same rules, if the fees
are not paid, the COMELEC may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the
action or the proceeding. In such a situation, the COMELEC is merely given the discretion to dismiss
the appeal or not.
Accordingly, in the instant case, the COMELEC First Division, may dismiss petitioners appeal, as it
in fact did, for petitioners failure to pay the P3,200.00 appeal fee.
Be that as it may, the Court still finds that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion
in issuing the order dismissing petitioners appeal. The Court notes that the notice of appeal and the
P1,000.00 appeal fee were, respectively, filed and paid with the MTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
On that date, the petitioners appeal was deemed perfected. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486
clarifying the rule on the payment of appeal fees three months after the appeal was perfected. Yet,
barely two weeks after the issuance of Resolution No. 8486, the COMELEC First Division dismissed
petitioners appeal for non-payment to the COMELEC Cash Division of the additional P3,200.00
appeal fee.
Considering that petitioner filed his appeal months before the clarificatory resolution on appeal fees,
petitioners appeal should not be unjustly prejudiced by COMELEC Resolution No. 8486.
Cardona v. Amansec, G.R. No. 147216, April 15, 2004

Facts
Petitioner Rosalie Oderon Vda. de Cardona, filed a Complaint for Ejectment against Marcelino
Amansec with the Municipal Trial Court, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The
petitioner, the plaintiff therein, alleged, inter alia, that her son, Ronald Cardona was the owner of a
residential lot. Ronald Cardona died intestate and was survived by the petitioner, as his sole heir.
According to the petitioner, respondent Marcelino Amansec entered the property without authority
therefor and started erecting residential houses. The petitioner, thereafter, sent a formal demand letter,
for the respondent to vacate the property which the latter received. However, the respondent failed
and refused to vacate the property.
Meanwhile, the respondent filed a petition with the DARAB against Rosalie de Cardona, praying for
the (a) nullification of the Deed of Sale executed between Isabel Raroque, as seller, and Ronald
Cardona, as buyer, and (b) issuance of an emancipation patent in his favor.
The MTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for ejectment filed by the petitioner, on the
ground of the existence of a tenancy relationship between the respondent and Isabel Raroque. The
plaintiff appealed the decision to the regional trial court.
In a parallel development, Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Roberto Caoayan, rendered a

Decision granting the petition of the respondent. The Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Isabel
Raroque in favor of Ronald Cardona was declared void ab initio and the DAR Provincial Office was
ordered to fast track the granting of the emancipation patent in respondents favor over the land in
question.
Aggrieved by the decision, the petitioner decided to appeal the decision. However, instead of
perfecting her appeal to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in
Quezon City, she filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. She averred therein that she received a copy of the decision of the PARAD on August 7,
2000 and, thus, had until August 30, 2000 to file the petition. She, likewise, prayed that she be given
an extension of fifteen days or until September 15, 2000 within which to file her petition. According
to the computation of the petitioners, the last day of the 15-day extension would fall on September 15,
2000. Thus, the petitioner filed the petition for review on the said date.
The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting the petitioners motion for extension of 15 days. It,
however, clarified that the last day of the additional 15-day extension would fall on September 15,
2000 as counted by the petitioner. The said resolution was received by the petitioner on October 3,
2000. The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for having been filed out of
time, as the same was filed one day late.
The regional trial court rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the MTC. The
RTC ruled that the defendant failed to prove the existence of any tenancy relationship between him
and Isabel Raroque, the only basis used by the MTC being the defendants claim that such relationship
existed.
He did not file a petition for review of the decision of the CA. The petitioner filed a petition for
review on certiorari with this Court for the nullification of the resolutions of the CA dismissing her
petition.
Issue
Whether or not the appeal is proper.
Held
No.
We agree with the petitioner that she was guilty of excusable negligence when she overlooked that the
month of August consists not of thirty (30) days, but of thirty-one (31) days. In Samala vs. Court of
Appeals, we held that a one-day delay does not justify the outright dismissal of an appeal.
Nonetheless, we resolve to deny due course to and dismiss the instant petition for review on certiorari
on the ground that the proper remedy from a decision of the PARAD was an appeal to the DARAB
and not a petition for review in the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Under the said rules, the petitioner should have appealed the decision of the PARAD to the DARAB
orally or in writing, and perfected the said appeal within the requisite period and in the manner
provided therefor. The petitioner failed to do so.
The well-entrenched rule is that appeal is merely a statutory right and must be availed of within the
period and in the manner provided for by law; otherwise, upon the lapse of the period to appeal from a
decision or final order and no appeal has been perfected by the aggrieved party, such final order or
decision ipso facto becomes final and executory. The appellate court does not acquire appellate
jurisdiction over a belated appeal from the said order or decision.
Canedo v. Kampilan Security and Detective Agency, 2013

Facts
Respondent agency hired petitioner as security guard and assigned him at the Naga Power Barge 102
of the National Power Corporation (NPC).
For not wearing proper uniform while on duty, petitioner was suspended for a month.
NPC informed respondent agency that it was no longer interested in petitioners services and thus
requested for his replacement.
Petitioner requested respondent Arquiza to issue a certification in connection with his intended
retirement effective that month. Thus, respondent Arquiza issued the Certification.
This is to certify that Mr. Luciano Paragoso Caedo whose address is at Lower Bunga, Toledo City was
employed by this agency from November 20, 1996 up to May 7, 2003 as Security Guard assigned at NPC,
Sigpit Substation. He was terminated from his employment by this agency on May 7, 2003 as per clients
request.
Five days later, petitioner filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension and non-payment of monetary benefits against respondents.
Based on the June 25, 2003 Certification, the Labor Arbiter held that petitioner was illegally
dismissed from the service. He also found petitioners prior suspension illegal and granted him all his
monetary claims except for underpayment of wages.
Respondents filed a Memorandum of Appea before the NLRC arguing that the Labor Arbiter erred in
concluding that petitioner was illegally dismissed based solely on the Certification. The NLRC
initially affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiters Decision.
However, in resolving respondents Motion for Reconsideration, the NLRC reversed itself and set
aside its earlier Decision.
Hence, he sought recourse to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari.
The CA denied the Petition after it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. The
CA concluded that petitioner was merely placed on temporary "off-detail" which is not equivalent to
dismissal. However, like the NLRC, the CA found that petitioner was deprived of due process when
he was suspended and thus affirmed his entitlement to his salary during the period of suspension.
He now comes to this Court through this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue
Whether or not questions of fact can be raised in this petition.
Held
Yes.
The primordial issue in this Petition is whether petitioner was dismissed from service. At the outset,
the Court notes that this is a question of fact which cannot be raised in a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45. However, when there is no uniformity in the factual findings of the tribunals
below, as in this case, this Court is resolved to again examine the records as well as the evidence
presented to determine which findings conform with the evidentiary facts.
In illegal dismissal cases, "while the employer bears the burden x x x to prove that the termination
was for a valid or authorized cause, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact
of dismissal from service." The burden of proving the allegations rests upon the party alleging and the
proof must be clear, positive and convincing. Thus, in this case, it is incumbent upon petitioner to
prove his claim of dismissal.
Petitioner relies on the word "terminated" as used in the Certification issued him by respondent
Arquiza and argues that the same is a clear indication that he was dismissed from service. We are,
however, not persuaded. Petitioner cannot simply rely on this piece of document since the fact of
dismissal must be evidenced by positive and overt acts of an employer indicating an intention to
dismiss. Here, aside from this single document, petitioner proffered no other evidence showing that he
was dismissed from employment. While it is true that he was not allowed to report for work after the
period of his suspension expired, the same was due to NPCs request for his replacement as NPC was
no longer interested in his services. And as correctly argued by respondents, petitioner from that point
onward is not considered dismissed but merely on a floating status. "Such a floating status is lawful
and not unusual for security guards employed in security agencies as their assignments primarily
depend on the contracts entered into by the agency with third parties."
Esteban v. Marcelo, 2013

Facts
The late Gabriel O. Esteban, substituted by his son, petitioner Mark Anthony Esteban, had been in
possession of a piece of land since the 1950s. In the 1960s, the late Esteban's sister constructed a
foundry shop at the property. In the 1970s, after the foundry operations had proven unproductive, the
respondents-spouses Rodrigo and Carmen Marcelo were allowed to reside therein, for a monthly
rental fee of P50.00. Since March 2001, the respondents-spouses have stopped paying the rental fee
(which by that time amounted to P160.00). The late Esteban, through a lawyer, sent the respondents-
spouses a demand letter requiring them to settle their arrears and to vacate within five (5) days from
receipt thereof. For failure to comply with the demand to pay and to vacate, the late Esteban instituted
an unlawful detainer case against the respondents-spouses on December 6, 2005.
The MeTCs and RTCs Rulings
The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ruled that there was a valid ground for ejectment; with the
jurisdictional demand to vacate complied with, the respondents-spouses must vacate the property,
pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 1673 of the New Civil Code, on the grounds of expiration of
the lease and nonpayment of monthly rentals. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) fully
affirmed the MeTC ruling.
The CA Ruling
The respondents-spouses appealed the RTCs ruling to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC. The CA
ruled that the respondents-spouses qualifies as beneficiary under Section 16 of Republic Act No. (RA)
7279.
Issue
Whether or not issues not raised in the lower court can be raised for the first time on appeal.
Held
No.
Issues not raised may not be considered and ruled upon
The rule on the propriety of resolving issues not raised before the lower courts cannot be raised on
appeal: "points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court
will not be and ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal. Basic consideration of due process impels this rule."
As the petitioner correctly observed, the respondents-spouses never intimated, directly or indirectly,
that they were seeking the protection of RA 7279. Therefore, the CA did not have any authority to
rule that the respondents-spouses qualified as beneficiaries under RA 7279.
Dycoco v. Court of Appeals, 2013

Facts
Petitioner-spouses filed a complaint for ejectment, cancellation of certificates of land transfer,
damages and injunction against private respondents Nelly Siapno-Sanchez and Inocencio Berma in
the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
In their complaint, petitioner-spouses alleged that they are the absolute and registered owners of Lot
No. 216. According to them, the respondents named in the complaint took advantage of the liberality
of petitioner-spouses, entered the subject property, successfully registered themselves as tenants for
agrarian reform purposes, and occupied and cultivated the property to the prejudice of petitioner-
spouses. Said respondents deprived petitioner-spouses of the enjoyment and possession of the
property without paying petitioner-spouses or the Land Bank the rentals due thereon. Moreover, in
violation of agrarian reform laws, said respondents subleased their respective landholdings to other
persons.
Thereafter, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision finding private respondents "not worthy to
become beneficiaries" under Presidential Decree No. 27.
Respondents filed an appeal in the DARAB.
The DARAB found that both private respondents were beneficiaries of Presidential Decree No. 27
and that they are no longer tenants but owners of their respective portions of the property.
Petitioner-spouses received a copy of the DARAB decision on April 3, 2000 and had until April 18,
2000 to file an appeal. They filed a motion in the Court of Appeals praying for an extension of 30
days within which to file their intended petition. The Court of Appeals granted them an extension of
15 days, with warning that no further extension will be given. Thus, petitioner-spouses had until May
3, 2000 to file their petition.
Petitioner-spouses filed the petition by registered mail on May 8, 2000. The petition was denied due
course and dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
The petition (for review), filed under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is DENIED DUE COURSE
and, as a consequence, DISMISSED, for late filing, as the petition was filed beyond the extended period of
fifteen (15) days granted under Resolution dated May 5, 2000, which resolution was issued pursuant to Section
4 of Rule 43, as follows.
Issue
Whether or not the CA committed GAD.
Held
No.
Firstly, petitioner-spouses are before this Court with a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court which is a wrong remedy.
The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals were final and appealable judgments. Thus, petitioner-
spouses should have filed an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, in this Court.
The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal.
This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the
findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution. The existence and availability of
the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter
remedy is the unavailability of appeal.
The failure of petitioner-spouses to file an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
cannot be remedied by the mere expedient of conjuring grave abuse of discretion to avail of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
Secondly, petitioner-spouses claim that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing their appeal on the ground of late filing. This is also wrong.
The Court of Appeals granted petitioner-spouses a 15-day extension, within which to file their
intended petition. The action of the Court of Appeals was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, as the original deadline of petitioner-spouses was April 18, 2000, they had until
May 3, 2000 to file their intended petition. Petitioner-spouses, however, filed the petition on May 8,
2000. Petitioner-spouses even admit that their petition in the Court of Appeals was filed five days
after the extended period. It is therefore clear that the Court of Appeals simply applied the rules, while
petitioner-spouses concededly failed to observe the very same rules. As such, the Court of Appeals
dismissal of the petition of petitioner-spouses was discretion duly exercised, not misused or abused.
In this case, nowhere in the petition did petitioner-spouses show that the issuance of the Resolutions
was patent and gross that would warrant striking them down through a petition for certiorari under
Thirdly, petitioner-spouses make it appear that there are compelling reasons to support their petition --
deprivation of property without just compensation and denial of due process. The petitioner-spouses,
however, belatedly raised these issues and failed to substantiate the same.
Petitioner-spouses themselves did not consider the issue of just compensation as compelling enough
because they did not raise it in the complaint or in the position paper which they filed in the Office of
the Provincial Adjudicator. They only claimed just compensation for the first time on appeal, that is,
when they filed their petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The settled rule that issues not
raised in the proceedings below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal bursts the bubble that is
the alleged compelling nature of petitioner-spouses claim.
On jurisdictional grounds, petitioner-spouses could not validly present for the first time the issue of
nonpayment of just compensation in the Court of Appeals. Under the law, the DARAB has primary,
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving payments for lands awarded under
Presidential Decree No. 27.
Ang v. San Joaquin, 2013

Facts
Petitioner Vicente Ang (Ang) is the proprietor of Virose Furniture and Glass Supply (Virose).
Respondents Ceferino San Joaquin, Jr. (San Joaquin) and Diosdado Fernandez (Fernandez) were
regular employees of Virose.
Through the years, San Joaquin who is Angs first cousin, their mothers being sisters became a
pahinante or delivery helper, and later on an all-around worker of Virose.
Respondents attended the court hearing relative to the 41 criminal cases filed by former Virose
employee Daniel Abrera (Abrera) against Ang for the latters non-remittance of Social Security
System (SSS) contributions. During that hearing, respondents testified against Ang. After the said
hearing Ang began to treat respondents with hostility and antagonism.
Respondents filed against Ang Complaints for illegal constructive dismissal with claims for
backwages and separation pay.
The Labor Arbiter held that respondents were unable to show how Ang discriminated against them.
The Labor Arbiter concluded that respondents were guilty of abandonment of work, and that their
accusation of constructive dismissal was false. As such, respondents were not entitled to the awards as
prayed for in their Complaints.
Respondents filed an Appeal with the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the LA.
Respondents went up to the CA via an original Petition for Certiorari. The CA granted the petition.
The CA held that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC misappreciated the facts which thus led to the
erroneous conclusion that there was no constructive dismissal. It considered Angs act of tearing the
respondents DTRs or time cards as a categorical indication of their dismissal from employment.
Issue
Whether or not the procedural errors are fatal.
Held
No.
In their Comment, respondents cite procedural errors, specifically that the attached copies of the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA were not certified by the appellate courts Clerk of Court
and that the same contained no certification that they were from original copies on file.
The Court opts to forego the matter of procedural errors attributed by respondents. This is a labor case
whose substantive issues must be addressed, more than anything else. Besides, the nature of the
alleged procedural infirmity cannot prod the Court to dismiss the Petition outright without first
considering its merits.
When there is a divergence between the findings of facts of the NLRC and that of the CA, there is a
need to review the records. In the present case, not only is there a divergence of findings of facts; the
conclusions arrived at by the two tribunals are diametrically opposed. For this reason, the doctrine
that the findings of specialized administrative agencies or tribunals should be respected must be set
aside for a moment.
There is considerable reason to believe that Ang began to treat respondents with disdain and
discrimination after the hearing of the criminal cases on August 24, 1999, where respondents testified
against him. Indeed, respondents claim in their Position Paper that Ang began to subject them to
verbal abuse, as well as assigning them tasks which were not part of their work, is not far-fetched. All
these, respondents claim, are rooted in the 41 charges of estafa pending against Ang, where they were
compelled to testify as witnesses for the State. Ang did not successfully dispute this claim; indeed, on
this issue, he has remained silent all along. His silence on this issue is telling; considering that upon
him lay the burden of proof to show that no illegal dismissal was effected. He should have addressed
this issue, which is material and significant to the case as it forms the foundation for respondents
claim of illegal constructive dismissal.
Petition for Annulment of Judgment (Rule 47)

Orbeta v. Sendiong, July 8, 2005
Nery v. Leyson, G.R. No. 139306, August 29, 2000
Ceruila v. Delantar, G.R. No. 140305, December 9, 2005
Salera v. A-1 Investors, G.R. No. 141238, February 15, 2002
Cole v. Court of Appeals, December 26, 2000, G.R. No. 137561
Arcenas v. Queen City Development, G.R. No. 166819, June 16, 2010
Attachment35
Security Pacific v. Amelia Tria-Infante, G.R. No. 1444740, August 31, 2005.36
Facts
Anzures complaint caused the filing of an Information for Violation of BP 22 in the RTC against
Villaluz. Anzures likewise filed an Ex Parte Motion for Preliminary Attachment. As a result, the RTC
issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment after Anzures posted a bond amounting to 2.1M. The sheriff
attached the properties of Villaluz. Thereafter, RTC acquitted Villaluz but held her civilly liable for
2.1M.
On appeal by Villaluz, CA affirmed.
When the case was elevated to the SC, Villaluz posted a Counterbond amounting to 2.5M which was
issued by Security Pacific Assurance Corporation. On the same day, Villaluz filed an Urgent Motion
to Discharge the Attachment. Nonetheless, SC affirmed the CA decision and the decision reached
finality.
Thus, upon Anzures motion, RTC issued a Writ of Execution. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff sent a
Notice of Garnishment on Security Pacific in the amount of 2.5M. However, Security Pacific refused
to assume its obligation on the counterbond. As a result, Anzures filed a Motion to Proceed with the
Garnishment. Over Security Pacifics opposition, the RTC granted said Motion.
Aggrieved, Security Pacific filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA alleging that the sheriff gravely
abused its discretion when it proceeded against Security Pacifics counterbond even if the SC did not
approve of the same. However, CA dismissed the petition.
Security Pacific contends that since the SC did not approve the counterbond and cause the discharge
of the attachment, it cannot be held liable for the counterbond. Essentially, it argues that the mere
filing of a counterbond cannot automatically discharge the attachment without first obtaining an order
of discharge and approval of the bond.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTCS ORDER ALLOWING THE EXECUTION ON THE
COUNTERBOND ISSUED SECURITY PACIFIC IS PROPER.
Held
Yes.
Security Pacifics argument that the mere filing of a counterbond in this case cannot automatically
discharge the attachment without first an order of discharge and approval of the bond, is lame.
Under the Rules, there are 2 ways to secure the discharge of an attachment. First, the party whose
property has been attached or a person appearing on his behalf may post a security. Second, said party
may show that the order of attachment was improperly or irregularly issued. The first applies in the
instant case.
It should be noted that in G.R. No. 106214, per our Resolution dated 15 January 1997, we permitted
Villaluz to file a counter-attachment bond. On 17 February 1997, we required the Anzures to
comment on the sufficiency of the counterbond posted by Villaluz. It is quite palpable that the
necessary steps in the discharge of an attachment upon giving counterbond have been taken. To
35
Edited Roco digests.
36
Counter-bond can be filed only after the writ of attachment has been enforced.
require a specific order for the discharge of the attachment when this Court, in our decision in G.R.
No. 106214, had already declared that Security Pacific is solidarily bound with Villaluz would be
mere surplusage.
Torres v. Satsatin, G.R. No. 166759, November 25, 2009

Facts
The Torres siblings own a parcel of land. Satsatin was authorized to negotiate the sale of the property
to Solar for 35M. Satsatin was supposed to remit 28M to the Torres siblings. However, even after
Solar already paid Satsatin the entire purchase price, Satsatin only remitted a total of 9M. Despite
repeated demands to remit the balance, Satasatin failed to do so. Thus, Torres filed a Complaint for
Sum of Money and Damages in the RTC of Dasmarinas against Satsatin.
An Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Attachment was filed. RTC directed Torres to post a
bond of 7M. Pursuant thereto, RTC issued a Writ of Attachment and deputized a sheriff to serve the
writ on Nov. 15, 2002. On Nov 19, said writ was served upon Satsatin and the sheriff levied on the
latters properties. On Nov 21, the summons and the copy of the Complaint was subsequently served
to Satsatin.
Thereafter, Satsatin filed an Answer and a Motion to Discharge the Writ of Attachment. Nonetheless,
RTC denied the motion and directed Satsatin to file a counterbond in the amount of 7M.
Aggrieved, Satsatin filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. CA found that the RTC gravely abused
its discretion and set aside the RTC order by lifting the levy on Satsatins properties.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA CORRECTLY LIFTED THE ATTACHMENT.
HELD:
YES. WHEN THE ATTACHMENT WAS IMPLEMENTED, THE RTC HAD NOT ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in approving the bond posted by Torres despite
the fact that not all the requisites for its approval were complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is
necessary that all the requisites for its approval are met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected.
Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the SC showing that the company concerned
is qualified to transact business which is valid only for 30 days from the date of its issuance.
However, it is apparent that the Certification issued by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
at the time the bond was issued would clearly show that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty
Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati, Pasay, and Pasig. Therefore,
the surety bond issued by the bonding company should not have been accepted by the RTC of
Dasmarias since the certification secured by the bonding company from the OCA at the time of the
issuance of the bond certified that it may only be accepted in the abovementioned cities. Thus, the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it
issued the writ of attachment founded on the said bond.
Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the distinction

between the ISSUANCE and the IMPLEMENTATION of the writ of attachment is of utmost
importance to the validity of the writ. The distinction is indispensably necessary to determine when
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in order to validly implement the writ
of attachment upon his person.
This Court has long put to rest the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should
be acquired in cases where a party resorts to provisional remedies. A party to a suit may, at any time
after filing the complaint, avail of the provisional remedies under the Rules of Court. The reference
plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues.
In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy of
attachment involves three stages:
1. First, the court issues the order granting the application;
2. Second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and
3. Third, the writ is implemented.
For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first
obtained. However, once the IMPLEMENTATION of the writ commences, the court must have
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and
authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind
the defendant.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the RTC validly issued the writ of attachment on
November 15, 2002, which was implemented on November 19, 2002, it is to be noted that the
summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served only on November 21, 2002.
At the time the RTC issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, it can validly do so since
the motion for its issuance can be filed at the commencement of the action or at any time before
entry of judgment. However, at the time the writ was implemented, the RTC has not acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of Satsatin since no summons was yet served upon them. The proper
officer should have previously or simultaneously with the implementation of the writ of attachment,
served a copy of the summons upon Satsatin in order for the RTC to have acquired jurisdiction upon
them and for the writ to have binding effect. Consequently, even if the writ of attachment was validly
issued, it was improperly or irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and affect Satsatin.
Assuming arguendo that the writ of attachment was validly issued, although the RTC later acquired
jurisdiction over the respondents by service of the summons upon them, such belated service of
summons on respondents cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the
writ.
Insular Savings v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.123638, June 15, 2006

Facts
Far East Bank (FEBTC) instituted an Arbtration case against Insular Savings Bank on account of a
dispute involving 3 unfunded checks amounting to 25.3M drawn against FEBTC. Insular refused to
refund the money to FEBTC. Thus, pending arbitration, FEBTC filed a case in the RTC praying for a
Writ of Preliminary Attachment. RTC asked FEBTC to post a bond of 6M. Thereafter, RTC issued a
Writ of Preliminary Attachment for 25.3M. Therafter, the parties agreed to divide the amount while
the dispute was not yet resolved. So, 12.6M was already in FEBTCs possession. Subsequently,
Insular moved to discharge the attachment by counterbond in the amount of 12.6M. However, RTC
denied the motion stating that the counterbond should be in the amount of 27.2M.
Thus, Insular went to the CA on Petition for Certiorari. However, CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN DENYING INSULARS MOTION TO DISCHARGE
ATTACHMENT BY COUNTERBOND IN THE AMOUNT OF 12.6M.
HELD
YES.
There can be no serious objection to the proposition that the attached property and logically the
counterbond necessary to discharge the lien on such property should as much as possible
correspond in value to, or approximately match the attaching creditors principal claim. Else,
excessive attachment, which ought to be avoidedat all times, shall ensue.
Turning to the case at bar, the records show that the principal claim of FEBTC, as plaintiff a quo, is in
the amount of P25,200,000.00, representing the three (3) unfunded checks drawn against, and
presented for clearing to, FEBTC. Jurisprudence teaches that a writ of attachment cannot be issued for
moral and exemplary damages, and other unliquidated or contingent claim.
The order of attachment fixed the bond to be posted by FEBTC, as applicant, at P6,000,000.00. The
writ of attachment issued on January 27, 1992, in turn, expressly indicated that Insular is justly
indebted to FEBTC in the amount of P25,200,000.00. On February 11, 1992, before the Arbitration
Committee of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation, Insular and FEBTC, however, agreed to
equally divide between themselves, albeit on a temporary basis, the disputed amount of
P25,200,000.00, subject to the outcome of the arbitration proceedings. Thus, the release by Insular of
the amount of P12,600,000.00 to FEBTC. On March 7, 1994, Insular filed a motion to discharge
attachment by counterbond in the amount of P12,600,000.00 which, to Insular, is the extent that
FEBTC may actually be prejudiced in the event its basic complaint for recovery of money against
Insular prospers.
As things stood, therefore, FEBTCs principal claim against Insular immediately prior to the filing of
the motion to discharge attachment has effectively been pruned down to P12,600,000.00. The RTC
was fully aware of this reality. Accordingly, it should have allowed a total discharge of the attachment
on a counterbond based on the reduced claim of FEBTC. If a portion of the claim is already secured,
we see no justifiable reason why such portion should still be subject of counterbond.
With the view we take of this case, the RTC, in requiring Insular to post a counterbond in the amount
of P27,237,700.00, obviously glossed over one certain fundamental. We refer to the fact that the
attachment FEBTC applied for and the corresponding writ issued was only for the amount of P25.2
Million. FEBTC, it bears to stress, did not pray for attachment on its other claims, contingent and
unliquidated as they were. Then, too, the attaching writ rightly excluded such claims. While the
records do not indicate, let alone provide a clear answer as to the actual value of the property levied
upon, it may reasonably be assumed that it is equal to FEBTCs principal claim. Be that as it may, it
was simply unjust for the RTC to base the amount of the counterbond on a figure beyond the
P25,200,000.00 threshold, as later reduced to P12,600,200.00.
The RTC, therefore, committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied Insulars motion to discharge
attachment by counterbond in the amount of P12,600,000.00, an amount more than double the
attachment bond required of, and given by, respondent. As a necessary consequence, the Court of
Appeals committed reversible error when it dismissed petitioners recourse thereto in CA-G.R. SP
No. 34876.
Yu v. Ngo Yet Te, G.R. No. 155868, February 6, 2007

Facts
Spouses Yu bought bars of detergent soap from Te in the amount of 594K and issued 3 postdated
checks in favor of Te. However, these were dishonored. After demands for payment were left
unheeded, Te filed in the RTC an action for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer
for Preliminary Attachment. After Te posted an attachment bond, RTC issued an Order of
Attachment/Levy. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff attached Yus properties consisting of a parcel of land
and several vehicles.
Yu filed their Answer with Counterclaim for Damages on account of the wrongful attachment of their
properties. Likewise, it filed a Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Attachment and claimed
against the bond. The RTC only lifted the attachment on the vehicles.
On appeal, however, CA lifted the attachment on the parcel of land.
Aggrieved, Te filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari in the SC but was denied. This ruling became
conclusive and binding.
Not knowing that the SC already ruled on the matter, RTC ruled in favor of Te and did not rule on
Yus counterclaim. As such, Yu filed an MR which was again denied. Yus Notice of Appeal was
likewise denied. Thus, they filed in the CA a Petition for Certiorari. As a result, CA granted the
petition but it stated that Yu failed to adduce evidence to their entitlement to damages in its
Counterclaim.
Yu contends that they are entitled to their Counterclaim for Damages because of the final judgment on
the wrongful attachment of their properties.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE WRIT OF
ATTACHMENT WAS PROCURED IN BAD FAITH AFTER IT WAS ALREADY ESTABLISHED
BY FINAL JUDGMENT THAT THERE WAS NO GROUND FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SAID
WRIT.
HELD
NO. SPOUSES YU STILL HAS THE BURDEN TO PROVE THE FACTUAL BASIS OF ITS
COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES.
Where there is wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant may recover actual damages even
without proof that the attachment plaintiff acted in bad faith in obtaining the attachment. However, if
it is alleged and established that the attachment was not merely wrongful but also malicious, the
attachment defendant may recover moral damages and exemplary damages as well.
Either way, the wrongfulness of the attachment does not warrant the automatic award of damages to
the attachment defendant; the latter must first discharge the burden of proving the nature and extent of
the loss or injury incurred by reason of the wrongful attachment.
In fine, the CA finding that the attachment of the properties of Spouses Yu was wrongful did not
relieve Spouses Yu of the burden of proving the factual basis of their counterclaim for damages.
Actual damages unproven
To merit an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant
must prove, with the best evidence obtainable, the fact of loss or injury suffered and the amount
thereof. Such loss or injury must be of the kind which is not only capable of proof but must actually
be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. As to its amount, the same must be measurable based
on specific facts, and not on guesswork or speculation. In particular, if the claim for actual damages
covers unrealized profits, the amount of unrealized profits must be established and supported by
independent evidence of the mean income of the business undertaking interrupted by the illegal
seizure. Moreover, Yu did not present evidence as to the damages they suffered by reason of the
wrongful attachment of Lot No. 11.
Temperate damages awarded
Nonetheless, we recognize that Spouses Yu suffered some form of pecuniary loss when their
properties were wrongfully seized, although the amount thereof cannot be definitively ascertained.
Hence, an award of temperate or moderate damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is in order.
Moral and exemplary damages unproven
As to moral and exemplary damages, to merit an award thereof, it must be shown that the wrongful
attachment was obtained by the attachment plaintiff with malice or bad faith, such as by appending a
false affidavit to his application.
Spouses Yu argue that malice attended the issuance of the attachment bond as shown by the fact that
Te deliberately appended to her application for preliminary attachment an Affidavit where Sy
perjured himself by stating that they had no intention to pay their obligations even when he knew this
to be untrue given that they had always paid their obligations; and by accusing them of disposing of
their properties to defraud their creditors even when he knew this to be false, considering that the
location of said properties was known to him. However, the testimony of Josefa Yu herself negates
their claim for moral and exemplary damages.
Thus, we cannot attribute malice nor bad faith to Te in applying for the attachment writ. We cannot
hold her liable for moral and exemplary damages.
Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58)

Universal Motors v. Rojas, A.M. RTJ 03-1814, May 26, 2005
Facts
UMC had a dealership agreement with Nissan Specialist Sales Corporation (NSSC). Pursuant thereto,
NSSC ordered 5.4M worth of Nissan spare parts from UMC. However, the checks used for payment
were all dishonored. Despite demands, no payment was made. As a result, UMC terminated its
agreement with NSSC and filed a complaint for BP 22 and Estafa against NSSC.
On the other hand, NSSC filed a case in the RTC denominated as Complaint for Breach of Contract,
Damages, with Preliminary Injunction and TRO against UMC and its officers. Thereafter, the judge
ordered a summary hearing on the propriety of the issuance of a TRO. Subsequently, NSSC filed an
Amended Complaint which inserted a prayer for TRO which was not found in the original complaint.
After hearing, the judge issued a 20-day TRO against UMC. Thereafter, the judge issued a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction after NSSC posted its bond.
Aggrieved, UMC filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari in the CA assailing the issuance of said
Writ. Later on, CA found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion. It also stated that it issued a
TRO without requiring a bond and that NSSC never applied for a TRO in their complaint.
As a result, UMC filed an Administrative Complaint against Judge Rojas for Serious Misconduct,
Gross Ignorance of the Law, Manifest Partiality, and Grave Abuse of Discretion. In his defense, the
judge denied the charges and claimed that he fact that the caption included a TRO, it was already
tantamount to an express application for said TRO. Nonetheless, the OCA found him guilty of Grave
Abuse of Discretion and fined him 20K.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE ROJAS IS ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR ISSUING A TRO
EVEN IF IT WAS NOT PRAYED FOR IN THE COMPLAINT.
HELD:
YES.
We are not impressed with Judges argument that the caption and the body of the complaint showed
an intent to include a prayer for a TRO. Nowhere in the allegations in the complaint was it shown that
great or irreparable injury would result to the NSSC, pending hearing on the preliminary injunction.
A TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the writ of preliminary
injunction could be heard. A preliminary injunction or TRO may be granted only when the application
in the action or proceeding is verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded.
We note that the relief sought by NSSC in the original complaint consisted mainly of its reinstatement
as dealer of Nissan vehicles and spare parts in Northern Mindanao, and the termination of the
dealership agreement between UMC and NICAD. NSSC did not allege facts to support an urgent need
to issue a TRO to prevent any great or irreparable injury that it might suffer while the preliminary
injunction is being heard. In one case, the Court penalized a judge who awarded reliefs to plaintiffs
without any showing that such reliefs were applied for.
No bond was required to be posted
The judge issued the TRO without requiring the plaintiff to post a bond.
While Section 4(b) of Rule 58 gives the presiding judge the discretion to require a bond before
granting a temporary restraining order, the Rules did not intend to give the judge the license to
exercise such discretion arbitrarily to the prejudice of the defendant. Hence, it follows that unless it
appears that the enjoined party will not suffer any damage, the presiding judge must require the
applicant to post a bond, otherwise the courts could become instruments of oppression and
harassment.
The present Rules now regulate the issuance of temporary restraining orders, not only by requiring a
hearing, but also by imposing a bond on the applicant to prevent the abuse of this relief by litigants.
The TRO issued by the judge effectively enjoined the defendants therein, UMC and NICAD, from
doing business as dealer of Nissan vehicles in Northern Mindanao. It does not require deep thinking
to realize the losses that these companies will suffer if the court orders them to freeze operations. Not
only will they be deprived of potential earnings from sales but they will also have to expend for their
overhead even if they are not able to do business.
Greenstar v. Andiong, A.M. RTJ 041826, February 6, 2008

Facts
Greenstar charged Judge Adiong of the RTC with Gross Ignorance of the Law, among others. He
claims that he was proclaimed as the Punong Barangay during a special election. Thereafter, his
opponent, Alizaman Sangcopan, filed an Action for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
and TRO against the COMELEC commissioners and himself.
Before summons could be served on them, Adiong already issued a TRO without hearing. It is also
alleged that 6 days after the issuance of said TRO, another order was issued extending the effectivity
thereof for another 20 days even before the first TRO had expired. Thereafter, Adiong granted the
application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and, as a matter of course, issued a Writ.
In his defense, Adiong claims that there was valid service of summons and that the issuance of TRO
without prior notice was valid pursuant to Admin Circular which authorizes ex parte issuance of a
TRO in matters of extreme urgency. He likewise claims that the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was also valid.
Nonetheless, OCA found Adiong administratively liable and fined 20K.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE ADIONG IS ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE.
HELD
YES.
No matter how urgent a case may be, this fact cannot justify the procedural shortcuts employed by
respondent judge, i.e. dispensing with the proper service of summons, and the violation of Section 5
of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
It is glaringly obvious from the service return of the sheriff that the proper service as provided for in
the rules was not followed. No copy of the summons was handed to any of the defendants who were
natural persons. Neither was a copy left at any of their residences or offices. What the sheriff did was
to leave a copy of the summons at the residence of Datu Hassan Mangondaya, a total stranger to the
case.
Judge Adiong could not plausibly claim that he issued a 72-hour TRO because, first, he was not the
executive judge. Second, his order did not state that the TRO was effective for 72 hours only. On the
contrary, the defendants were ordered to desist from releasing the subject funds until further orders
from this Court. Third, there was no showing that the order was being issued because of extreme
urgency to justify the issuance of a 72 hour TRO. Judge Adiong only stated in his order that he was
[a]cting on the prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, without finding that the
plaintiff was entitled thereto. Judge Adiongs violations of the Rules in issuing the TRO are patent
and inexcusable.
We also agree that the presumptions of good faith and regularity in the performance of judicial
functions on the part of Judge Adiong were negated by the circumstances on record. First, there was
no proper notice to the herein complainant and the other defendants in Civil Case No. 191203 that an
application for the issuance of a TRO had been filed. Second, Judge Adiong did not conduct a
summary hearing before granting the TRO. Third, as will be discussed hereafter, he contravened the
circular on the raffle of cases.
All these systematically deprived complainant and the other defendants of knowledge of and
participation in the TRO proceedings and ensured the unchallenged victory of Sangcopan therein.
These three points, taken together, paint a picture of bias or partiality on the part of Judge Adiong.
Aldover v. Court of Appeals, 2013

Facts
Reyes were registered owners of a parcel of land in Pasig. They obtained a loan from Aldover secured
by REM over said property. When they failed to pay, Aldover extrajudicially foreclosed on the
mortgage and emerged as the winning bidder. After the Certificate of Sale was annotated, Aldover
filed in the RTC a Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession which was granted. In compliance
thereto, the Sheriff issued a Notice to Vacate. However, this was not fully implemented because other
persons (Respondents) occupying the lot claimed to be owners thereof.
Respondents later on filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Title,
Reconveyance, Damages with Prayer for TRO or Preliminary Injunction against Aldover and Reyes.
However, the RTC denied the prayer for TRO.
Thus, they filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA with Prayer for TRO or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. However, CA dismissed it. On MR, however, CA reconsidered and granted the issuance
of TRO and set for hearing for determination of the propriety of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Aggrieved, Aldover filed an MR but was denied by the CA. After Respodents filed a bond, the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction was issued.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING A
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUCNTION IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS.
Held
NO
Respondents amply justified the grant of the provisional relief they prayed for. A Writ of Preliminary
Injunction is issued at any stage of an action prior to judgment or final order to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied or
adjudicated. To justify its issuance, the applicants must prove the following REQUISITES:
1. That they have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse;
2. There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
3. There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicants; and
4. There is no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury.
Here, respondents alleged in their CA Petition that they possess and own portions of the property
subject of the Writ of Demolition. In support thereof, they annexed to their Petition and Reply deeds
of conveyances, contracts to sell, receipts, etc. showing that the Reyeses already sold to them the
portions of the subject lot they respectively occupy. A number of these documents predate the REM
which the Reyeses executed in favor of Aldover while others were executed subsequent thereto.
Respondents allegation of actual possession is likewise confirmed by the Sheriffs Partial Report
which states that there are several other persons who occupy portions of subject lot and claim to be
the owners thereof. In fine, respondents have indubitably shown that they are in actual possession of
the disputed portions of subject property. Their possession, under Article 433 of the Civil Code, raises
a disputable presumption that they are the owners thereof.
There is preliminary showing that respondents have clear and unmistakable right over the disputed
portions of the property which must be protected during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 86363.
Indeed, the precipitate demolition of their houses would constitute material and substantial invasion of
their right which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. Hence, the need for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. .
Furthermore, we note that although the scheduled hearing on the propriety of issuing a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction did not push through, the parties were nonetheless amply heard thru their
pleadings. At the time the CA issued its challenged January 3, 2005 Resolution, petitioners had
already filed their Comment and Rejoinder where they argued at length why no injunctive relief
should be granted in favor of the respondents. In Land Bank of the Phils. v. Continental Watchman
Agency, Inc., we reiterated our ruling that there can be no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent court in issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction when the parties were amply heard
thereon.
Bacolod City Water v. Labayen, G.R. No. 157994, December 10, 2004
Facts
Bacolod City filed a case for Injunction with a Prayer for TRO and/or Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction against BCWD for announcing that increased water rates will be implemented on April 1,
1999 without any public hearing. As such, the City prayed that before hearing the main case, a TRO
of Preliminary Injunction be issued.
After Position Papers and Motions were filed by the parties, the City filed an Urgent Motion for
Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and set the same for hearing. After hearing on
Feb 24, 2000, the Judge Labayen of the RTC issued an order commanding BCWD to stop, desist, and
refrain from implementing the proposed water rates. Thereafter, the City prayed that the RTC issue a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction against BCWD. Thereafter, the RTC rendered a decision granting
Final Injunction.
As such, BCWD filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA alleging grave abuse. Nonetheless, CA
dismissed the Petition. It stated that the order on Feb 24, 2000 was actually a Preliminary Injunction
and not a TRO. Thus, the RTC merely confirmed such Preliminary Injunction when it rendered a
decision granting a Final Injunction.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC CORRECTLY RENDERED A DECISION GRANTING FINAL
INJUNCTION WHICH CONFIRMS THE ISSUANCE OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
Held
NO. THE PREVIOUS ORDER WAS A TRO AND NOT A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
No preliminary injunction was issued
The sequence of events and the proceedings that transpired in the RTC make a clear conclusion that
the Order issued was a TRO and not a preliminary injunction.
It can be gleaned from the aforequoted Order that what the RTC issued was a TRO and not a
preliminary injunction. The RTC has always referred to it as a TRO in the succeeding Orders it issued
on March 10, 2000 and April 6, 2000. The parties, in their succeeding pleadings, also referred to the
assailed Order as a TRO.
Again, it was only when BCWD expressed its vehement objection on the ruling that the final
injunction confirmed the preliminary injunction previously issued, when the City and the RTC started
to insist that the questioned Order was a preliminary injunction. Given the previous undeviating
references to it as a TRO, City cannot now consider it as a preliminary injunction to justify the
validity of the assailed Decision. The attendant facts and circumstances clearly show that the RTC
issued a TRO.
Injunction as a main action and as a provisional remedy
The MAIN ACTION for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or
proceeding. As a matter of course, in AN ACTION FOR INJUNCTION, the auxiliary remedy of
preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main action
for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and should not
be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to
preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage
of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until
the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.
TRO
A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the
application for preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, a judge may issue a TRO with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue.
If before the expiration of the twenty (20) day period the application for preliminary injunction is
denied, the TRO would be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the
application for preliminary injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the TRO would automatically
expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.
Hence, in the case at bar, since no preliminary injunction was issued, the TRO granted automatically
expired after twenty (20) days under the Rules. The fact that the RTC merely ordered the
respondent[,] its agents, representatives or any person acting in his behalf to stop, desist and refrain
from implementing in their billings the new water rate increase which will start on March 1, 2000
without stating the period for the restraint does not convert the TRO to a preliminary injunction.
The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20) day limited period of effectivity of a TRO is
absolute if issued by a RTC. The failure of the RTC to fix a period for the ordered restraint did not
lend the TRO a breath of semi-permanence which can only be characteristic of a preliminary
injunction. The twenty (20) day period provided by the Rules of Court should be deemed incorporated
in the Order where there is an omission to do so. It is because of this rule on non-extendibility that
respondent City was prompted to move that hearings be set for its application of a preliminary
injunction. The City cannot take advantage of this omission by the RTC.
Decision granting final injunction is premature
Even if we assume that the issued Order was a preliminary injunction, BCDW is correct in contending
that the assailed Decision is premature.
The records reveal that the RTC did not resolve BCWDs MR of the Order denying its Motion to
Dismiss before it issued the assailed Decision. Consequently, there was no answer filed by BCWD, no
joinder of issues, no mandatory pretrial conference, and no trial on the merits, yet, a Decision was
handed down by the RTC.
Calawag v. University of the Philippines-Visayas, 2013

Facts
Calawag et al were enrolled in the Master of Science in Fisheries in UP Visayas. After they enrolled
in their thesis program, they drafted their thesis titles and obtained the consent of a certain professor
to be their thesis adviser and other faculty members consent to constitute their respective thesis
committees. This was sent to Dean Baylon for approval. However, the Dean disapproved the
composition of the thesis committees and their tentative thesis topics because they were not
appropriate for their Masters Degrees.
Aggrieved, Calawag et al filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus in the RTC asking the Dean to
approve and constitute the said thesis committees and approve their titles. Likewise, they asked for a
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against the Dean to order him to perform such acts while
the case was pending.
RTC granted the Writ which the Dean refused to follow. Thereafter, UP assailed the said order by
filing a Petition for Certiorari before the CA with a Prayer for TRO. CA issued the TRO against the
implementation of the RTCs order stating that Calawag et al had no clear right to compel the Dean.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE RTCS PRELIMINARY
MANDATORY INJUNCTION AGAINST UPS DEAN.
Held
NO. CA WAS CORRECT. THERE WAS NO CLEAR RIGHT TO COMPEL THE DEAN TO
APPROVE THE THESIS TITLES AND THE COMMITTEES.
To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, the petitioners must establish the following
requisites:
1. The invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial;
2. The right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and
3. There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Since a PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION commands the performance of an act, it

does not preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive
injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction presents a
FOURTH REQUIREMENT: it is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the
complainants right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the
issuance of injunctive relief is improper.
The CA did not err in ruling that the Calawag et al failed to show a clear and unmistakable right that
needs the protection of a preliminary mandatory injunction. We support the CAs conclusion that the
Dean has the discretion to approve or disapprove the composition of a thesis committee, and, hence,
the Calawag et al had no right for an automatic approval and composition of their thesis committees.
Under the UP Systems faculty manual, the Dean has complete discretion in approving or
disapproving the composition of a thesis committee. Harmonizing this provision with the Graduate
Program Manual of UP Visayas, and the Guidelines for the Master of Science in Fisheries Program,
we agree with the CAs interpretation that the thesis committees composition needs the approval of
the dean after the students have complied with the requisites provided.
Receivership (Rule 59)

Citibank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61508, March 17, 1999
Facts
Douglas Anama executed PNs in favor of Citibank after it obtained a loan from the latter. Said loan
was secured by a Chattel Mortgage over machineries and equipment of Anama. For failing to pay the
installments, Citibank filed a Complaint for Collection of his unpaid balance and delivery of the
chattels before the CFI of Manila. Later on, the CFI issued an Order of Replevin over the chattels
covered. Despite said order, actual delivery of possession did not take place in light of negotiations
for amicable settlement.
After pre-trial conference was held, the CFI ordered the joint management by Citibank and Anama of
the latters business for 10 days. After which, Citibank would be appointed Receiver for said business.
Thereafter, Citibank took over as Receiver. When the amicable settlement failed, CFI tried the case on
the merits.
On motion of Citibank, the CFI issued an Alias Writ of Seizure of the chattels and the sheriff removed
and delivered them to Citibanks possession. They were likewise advertised for public auction. Thus,
he filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. CA granted the petition and ruled that the CFI gravely
abused its discretion because, among others, there was non-compliance with the Receivers Bond and
Oath of Office. As a result, Citibank filed this petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT CITIBANK COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF POSTING A
RECEIVERS BOND AND OATH.
HELD
NO. RULES ON RECEIVERSHIP WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH. PARTICULARLY, THE
OATH.
Citibank contends that although it is in agreement with the CA that a receivers bond is separate and
distinct from a replevin bond, under the circumstances it was not required to file a receivers bond
because it did not assume receivership over the properties. It is further argued that assuming that it did
assume receivership, the Chattel Mortgage expressly provides, that:
In case the MORTGAGEE institutes proceedings, judicially or otherwise, for the foreclosure of this Chattel
Mortgage, or to enforce any of its rights hereunder, the MORTGAGEE shall be entitled as a matter of right to
the appointment of a receiver, without bond, of the mortgaged properties and of such other properties, real or
personal, claims and rights of the MORTGAGOR as shall be necessary or proper to enable the said receiver to
properly control and dispose of the mortgaged properties.
From the evidence on record, it is palpably clear that Citibank did, in fact, assume receivership.
Citibank cannot therefore deny that 9 days after the CFI issued the order of receivership, it informed
Anama that it would, as it did, assume receivership.
Bond not required under the old rules of court
It should be noted that under the old Rules of Court which was in effect at the time this case was still
at trial stage, a bond for the appointment of a receiver was not generally required of the applicant,
except when the application was made ex parte. Therefore, Citibank was not absolutely required to
file a bond. Besides, as stipulated in the chattel mortgage contract between the parties, Citibank, as the
mortgagee, is entitled to the appointment of a receiver without a bond.
Non-compliance with the oath
However, the CA was right in finding a defect in such assumption of receivership in that the
requirement of taking an oath has not been complied with. Consequently, the CFI erred in allowing
the Citibank to assume receivership over the machine shop of Anama without requiring the appointed
receiver to take an oath.
Republic v. Saludares, G.R. No. 111174, March 9, 2000

Facts
PCGG issued a Writ of Sequestration against Lianga Bay Logging Company (LBLC) on the ground
that the shares stock in LBLC owned by one Sabido was illegally acquired wealth. Thereafter, the
Republic via PCGG filed a Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution, and
Damages against Sabido before the Sandiganbayan. Consequently, Sabido filed a Motion to Lift the
Writs of Sequestration which the SB granted. PCGG filed an MR.
Meanwhile, Hung Ming Kuk filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against LBLC with Prayer for
Preliminary Attachment in the RTC but PCGG was not impleaded. Thus, PCGG filed a Petition for
Certiorari in the SC.
Later on, SB denied PCGGs MR. Also, RTC granted the Writ of Preliminary Attachment in favor of
Kuk. For failure to file an Answer, the RTC rendered a judgment by default in favor of Kuk. As such,
Republic filed this Petition for Certiorari questioning whether the RTC can decide on Kuks claim
considering that LBLCs properties were already sequestered.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC PROPERLY GRANTED THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
ATTACHMENT IN FAVOR OF KUK.
HELD
NO. LBLC PROPERTIES WERE ALREADY UNDER VALID SEQUESTRATION WHEN THE
ATTACHMENT WAS ISSUED
In BASECO vs. PCGG, SEQUESTRATION is defined as the process, which may be employed as a
conservatory writ whenever the right of the property is involved, to preserve, pending litigation,
specific property subject to conflicting claims of ownership or liens and privileges.
The Court also noted the relationship between attachment and receivership, on one hand, and
sequestration, freeze order and provisional takeover on the other. The latter are ancillary remedies in
prosecuting the ill-gotten wealth of the previous Marcos regime. The Court observed that
sequestration, freezing and provisional takeover are akin to the provisional remedy of preliminary
attachment or receivership.
By an order of attachment, a sheriff seizes property of a defendant in a civil suit so that it may stand
as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be obtained, and not disposed of, or
dissipated, or lost intentionally, or otherwise, pending the action. When a writ of attachment has been
levied on real property or any interest therein belonging to the judgment debtor, the levy creates a lien
which nothing can destroy but its dissolution. This well-settled rule is likewise applicable to a writ of
sequestration.
Attachment is in the nature of a proceeding in rem. It is against a particular property of a debtor. The
attaching creditor thereby acquires a specific lien upon the attached property which ripens into a
judgment against the res when the order of sale is made. Such a proceeding is in effect a finding that
the property attached is an indebted thing and results in its virtual condemnation to pay for the
owners debt. The law does not provide the length of time during which an attachment lien shall
continue after the rendition of the judgment, and it must therefore continue until the debt is paid, or
sale is had under execution issued in the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the statement
discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.
In our view, the disputed properties of LBLC were already under Custodio legis by virtue of a valid
writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG on April 2, 1986, when Judge Saludares issued the assailed
writ of attachment in favor of Hung Ming Kuk. At that time the writ of sequestration issued by PCGG
against LBLC was subsisting. Said writ of the PCGG could not be interfered with by the RTC of
Lianga, because the PCGG is a coordinate and co-equal body. The PCGG had acquired by operation
Tantano v. Espino-Caboverde, 2013

Facts
Tantano et al are children of Caboverde. Caboverdes children are registered owners of certain parcels
of land in Zamboanga del Norte after they purchased the same from their parents. Later on, some of
the siblings filed a Complaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale in the RTC against the other siblings,
Tantano et al. In their Answer, Tantano et al argued for the validty of the sale.
Fearing that the properties would be squandered, Caboverde filed in the RTC a Petition/Application to
place the parcels of land under Receivership. She claimed that she could not enjoy the property since
the income derived was solely appropriated by her children and that she needs share in the income for
her daily sustenance and medical expenses. After hearing on the Application, the RTC granted it but
did not appoint one of the children to be receiver since she was party to the other case. Thus,
Caboverde nominated her husbands relative and one of the children nominated a former barangay
kagawad.
Aggrieved, Tantano filed an MR questioning the grant of the application. However, the RTC denied
the MR. Thereafter, both nominees took their oaths and posted the approve bond of 100K each. Thus,
Tantano filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA contending that substantial requirements under the
Rules on Receivership were not complied with such as the bond requirement and lack of factual and
legal basis. However, CA denied the petition. MR was likewise denied.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC CORRECTLY GRANTED THE APPLICATION FOR
RECEIVERSHIP.
HELD
NO.
We have repeatedly held that receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted with utmost circumspection
and only in extreme situations.
To recall, the RTC approved the application for receivership on the stated rationale that receivership
was the most convenient and feasible means to preserve and administer the disputed properties. As a
corollary, the RTC, agreeing with Caboverde, held that placing the disputed properties under
receivership would ensure that she would receive her share in the income which she supposedly
needed in order to pay for her vitamins, medicines, her regular checkups and daily sustenance.
Considering that, as the CA put it, the applicant was already an octogenarian who may not live up to
the day when the conflict will be finally settled, the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted the application for receivership since it
was justified under Sec. 1(d), Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 1. Appointment of a receiver. Upon a verified application, one or more receivers of the property
subject of the action or proceeding may be appointed by the court where the action is pending, or by the Court
of Appeals or by the Supreme Court, or a member thereof, in the following cases:
(d) Whenever in other cases it appears that the appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and feasible
means of preserving, administering, or disposing of the property in litigation.
Indeed, Sec. 1(d) above is couched in general terms and broad in scope, encompassing instances not
covered by the other grounds enumerated under the said section. However, in granting applications
for receivership on the basis of this section, courts must remain mindful of the basic principle that
receivership may be granted only when the circumstances so demand, either because the property
sought to be placed in the hands of a receiver is in danger of being lost or because they run the risk of
being impaired, and that being a drastic and harsh remedy, receivership must be granted only when
there is a clear showing of necessity for it in order to save the plaintiff from grave and immediate loss
or damage.
Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider:

1. Whether or not the injury resulting from such appointment would probably be greater than the
injury ensuing if the status quo is left undisturbed; and
2. Whether or not the appointment will imperil the interest of others whose rights deserve as
much a consideration from the court as those of the person requesting for receivership.
Moreover, this Court has consistently ruled that where the effect of the appointment of a receiver is to
take real estate out of the possession of the defendant before the final adjudication of the rights of the
parties, the appointment should be made only in extreme cases.
After carefully considering the foregoing principles and the facts and circumstances of this case, We
find that the grant of Caboverdes Application for Receivership has no leg to stand on for reasons
discussed below.
First, Caboverdes alleged need for income to defray her medical expenses and support is not a valid
justification for the appointment of a receiver. The approval of an application for receivership merely
on this ground is not only unwarranted but also an arbitrary exercise of discretion because financial
need and like reasons are not found in Sec. 1 of Rule 59 which prescribes specific grounds or reasons
for granting receivership.
Second, there is no clear showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being lost or materially
impaired and that placing them under receivership is most convenient and feasible means to preserve,
administer or dispose of them. Caboverde has not presented or alleged anything else to prove that the
disputed properties were in danger of being wasted or materially injured and that the appointment of a
receiver was the most convenient and feasible means to preserve their integrity.
Third, placing the disputed properties under receivership is not necessary to save Caboverde from
grave and immediate loss or irremediable damage. Contrary to her assertions, Caboverde is assured of
receiving income under the PSA approved by the RTC providing that she was entitled to receive a
share of 1/2 of the net income derived from the uncontroverted properties.
Finally, it must be noted that the defendants in Civil Case No. S760 are the registered owners of the
disputed properties that were in their possession. In cases such as this, it is settled jurisprudence that
the appointment should be made only in extreme cases and on a clear showing of necessity in order to
save the plaintiff from grave and irremediable loss or damage.
A receiver should not be appointed to deprive a party who is in possession of the property in
litigation, just as a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued to transfer property in litigation
from the possession of one party to another where the legal title is in dispute and the party having
possession asserts ownership in himself, except in a very clear case of evident usurpation.
Furthermore, this Court has declared that the appointment of a receiver is not proper when the rights
of the parties, one of whom is in possession of the property, depend on the determination of their
respective claims to the title of such property unless such property is in danger of being materially
injured or lost, as by the prospective foreclosure of a mortgage on it or its portions are being occupied
by third persons claiming adverse title.
In any event, Dominaldas rights may be amply protected during the pendency of Civil Case No. S760
by causing her adverse claim to be annotated on the certificates of title covering the disputed
properties.
Filing of applicants bond is mandatory; Receivers bond is discretionary
As regards the issue of whether or not the CA was correct in ruling that a bond was not required prior
to the appointment of the receivers in this case, We rule in the negative.
Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall
require the applicant to file abond executed to the party against whom the application is presented.
The use of the word shall denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in
this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence, the filing of an applicants bond is
required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a receivers bond rests upon the discretion
of the court. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 clearly states that the court may, in its discretion, at any time after the
appointment, require an additional bond as further security for such damages.
Replevin (Rule 60)

Twin Ace Holding v. Rufina and Company, G.R. No. 160191, June 8, 2006.
Facts
Twin Ace manufactures liquors and uses new bottles for the purpose. It filed in the RTC a Complaint
for Recovery of Possession of Personal Property against Rufina because the latter allegedly used Twin
Aces bottles for its manufacture of patis without authority from Twin Ace. After Twin Ace posted a
bond, RTC granted the application for the Issuance of Writ of Replevin. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff
was able to seize around 26K empty bottles from Rufina.
In its Answer with Writ of Preliminary Injunction, Rufina claims that it was the owner thereof
because it purchased said bottles from junk dealers. As such, RTC ruled in favor of Rufina and
dismissed the complaint and dissolved the writ.
On appeal by Twin Ace, CA affirmed with modification.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC correctly dissolved the writ of replevin.
Held
Yes.
Rule 60, Section 2(a), of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a party praying for the recovery of
possession of personal property must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who
personally knows the facts that he is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is
entitled to the possession thereof.
It must be borne in mind that REPLEVIN is a possessory action the gist of which focuses on the right
of possession that, in turn, is dependent on a legal basis that, not infrequently, looks to the ownership
of the object sought to be replevined. Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in
an action for replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is
offered, the writ should not be issued.
In this case, Twin Ace has not shown that it is entitled to the possession of the bottles in question and
consequently there is thus no basis for the demand by it of due compensation.
Superlines Transportation v. PNCC, G.R. No. 169596, March 28, 2007

Facts
One of Superlines buses swerved and crashed into the radio room of PNCC. The incident was
initially investigated by PNCCs toll way patrol. Subsequently, the investigation was turned over to
the Alabang Traffic Bureau. However, due to lack of space, upon request of traffic investigator
Lopera, the bus was towed by the PNCC to its compound.
Thereafter, Superlines requested for PNCC to release the bus but it was denied in spite of PNCCs
undertaking to repair the damaged radio room. Consequently, Superlines filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Personal Property (Replevin) with Damages against PNCC in the RTC. Superlines opted
to forego with the Writ of Replevin and just waited for the RTCs decision because it could not post a
bond.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, PNCC claimed that they could not release the bus because they
merely towned the same for safekeeping pursuant to an order by the police. As a result, RTC
dismissed the Complaint and awarded to PNCC their Counterclaim.
On appeal, the ruling was affirmed and the CA stated that Superlines should have brought the case
against the police.
Issue
Whether or not Suprelines is entitled to the return of its propery.
Held
Yes.
In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly
entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered.
PNCC already admitted Superlines ownership of the bus and therefore consideration of whether
PNCC has been wrongfully detaining it is in order. Following the conduct of an investigation of the
accident, the bus was towed by PNCC on the request of Lopera.
The defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same. It was not
distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution
or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis. The seizure and impounding of
Superlines bus, on Loperas request, were unquestionably violative of the right to be let alone by
the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.
That a year after the incident the driver of the bus was criminally charged for reckless imprudence
resulting to damage to property in which the bus could possibly be held as evidence does not affect
the outcome of this case.
It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But the rule applies
only where the property is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule against warrantless
searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions. Property subject of litigation is not by that fact alone
in custodia legis. Only when property is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it considered in
the custody of the law, and not otherwise.
Dagudag v. Paderanga, A.M.-RTJ No. 06-2017, June 19, 2008

Facts
PNP Regional Maritime Group headed by Gen. Dagudag and the DENR intercepted and inspected
shipping container vans owned by NMC Container Lines containing illegal forest products from CDO
to Cebu. The shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains. The crew of the vessel
failed to produce certificates and documents covering said forest products as required by the DENR.
Thus, since nobody claimed said products within a reasonable period, they are considered abandoned.
DENR thus issued a seizure receipt to NMC. Then, it was recommended that the products be
confiscated in favor of the government.
Thereafter, one Roger Edma filed before the RTC a Complaint for Issuance of a Writ of Replevin
praying that DENR, CENRO, and Gen. Dagudag to deliver the forest products to him. As a result, the
judge issued a Writ of Replevin and ordered the sheriff to take possession of the products. Aggrieved,
Dagudag et al filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Replevin and prayed that said Writ be set aside and
dismissed. Nonetheless, the judge denied said motion.
As a result, Dagudag filed an Administrative complaint in the OCA charging the judge with gross
ignorance of the law because Edma cannot avail of the remedy of replevin from the RTC without first
exhausting administrative remedies available to him. Dagudag claimed that the judge should have
dismissed the replevin suit. OCA recommended that the judge be held liable for gross ignorance of
the law.
Issue
Whether or not the judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law.
Held
Yes.
The forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. without the required legal
documents and were abandoned by the unknown owner. Consequently, the DENR seized the forest
products. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons.
First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of
cases pending before administrative agencies. Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative
remedy. He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages.
Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending
before administrative agencies of special competence. The DENR is the agency responsible for the
enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for replevin itself stated that members of DENRs Task
Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products and brought them to the DENR Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office. This should have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR
had custody of the forest products, that administrative proceedings may have been commenced, and
that the replevin suit had to be dismissed outright.
Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin.
There was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the forest products in
accordance with law.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law,
in our view the [properties seized] were validly deemed in custodia legis. [They] could not be subject
to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in
the custody of the law, and not otherwise.
Judge Paderangas acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin
constitute gross ignorance of the law.
Support Pendete Lite (Rule 61)

Mangonon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006
Facts
Belen Mangonon filed a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support with Application for
Support Pendente Lite on behalf of her twin daughters Rina and Rica. It was alleged that her
daughters were born out of her marriage with one Federico Delgado. However, the marriage was
subsequently annulled. Thereafter, she was married again and claimed that her daughters were raised
by her and her second husband.
Mangonon filed the case because their daughters were about to enter colleges in the States. Despite
their admissions to respective universities, they were financially incapable of pursuing for said
education. Demands were likewise made upon the grandfather, Francisco Delgado. Mangonon prayed
that they should be ordered to provide general and educational support in the amount of $50,000 per
year.
After Francisco and Federico filed their Answers, Mangonon filed an Urgent Motion to Set
Application for Support Pendente Lite for Hearing. Over the opposition of the Deglados, the RTC
ordered that a monthly support of P5K for each child be provided.
Unsatisfied with the measly amount, Mangonon filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. CA affirmed
the RTC ruling.
Issue
Whether or not the daughters are entitled to support pendente lite.
Held
Yes.
A court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order.
Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case
before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind
and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough
that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.
After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the evidence presented, we find that Mangonon
was able to establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin daughters to the Delgados and the
twins entitlement to support pendente lite.
Grandfather is obliged to provide support
Having addressed the issue of the propriety of the RTCs grant of support pendente lite in favor of
Rica and Rina, the next question is who should be made liable for said award. The pertinent provision
of the Family Code on this subject states:
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the
following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
In this case, both the RTC and the CA held respondent Federico liable to provide monthly support
pendente lite in the total amount of P10,000.00 by taking into consideration his supposed income of
P30,000.00 to P40,000.00 per month. We are, however, unconvinced as to the veracity of this ground
relied upon by the RTC and the CA.
The RTC gave full credence to Federicos allegation in his Answer and his testimony as to the amount
of his income. We have, however, reviewed the records of this case and found them bereft of evidence
to support his assertions regarding his employment and his earning.
Franciscos assertion that Mangonon had the means to support her daughters education is belied by
the fact that Mangonon was even forced by her financial status in the USA to secure the loan from the
federal government. Moreover, even Rica and Rina themselves were forced by the circumstances they
found themselves in to secure loans under their names so as not to delay their entrance to college.
There being prima facie evidence showing that Mangonon and Federico are the parents of Rica and
Rina, they are primarily charged to support their childrens college education. In view however of
their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by Francisco.
It bears stressing that Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of
Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns and manages 12 gasoline stations, substantial real
estate, and is engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding. It having been established that
Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters education, he, in lieu of Mangonon
and Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.
Manner of providing support
Anent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could
perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina, Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move
here to the Philippines to study in any of the local universities.
In this case, this Court believes that Francisco could not avail himself of this option. From the records,
we gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the relationship between Francisco, on one
hand, and Mangonon and her twin daughters, on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. All of these,
however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one
another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been affected. Given all these,
we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who
have disowned them.
Amount of support pendent lite
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the provision of the law
mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold Francisco liable for half of the amount
of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite.
Interpleader (Rule 62)37

Ocampo vs. Tirona, G.R. No. 147382, 6 April 2005
Facts
Ocampo alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land (subject land). Ocampo bought the subject
land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the subject lands registered owner Alipio Breton Cruz. Tirona, on
the other hand, is a lessee occupying a portion of the subject land. In recognition of Ocampos right of
ownership over the subject premises, Tirona paid monthly rentals.
However, Ocampo received a letter from Callejo Law Office stating that, in view of the fact that the
subject premises was declared under area for priority development, Tirona is invoking her right of
first refusal and in connection thereto Tirona will temporarily stop paying her monthly rentals until
and unless the National Housing Authority have processed the pertinent papers as regards the amount
due to Ocampo by reason of the implementation of the above law.
Ocampo wrote a letter to Tirona demanding upon Tirona to pay the rentals in arrears and to vacate the
premises. Despite receipt of said letter, Tirona failed and refused to heed Ocampos demands. Ocampo
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against Tirona. Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola,
who claimed to be the owner of the subject land, filed a motion with leave to file intervention before
the RTC.
Issue
Whether or not Tirona was in good faith in paying rent to the real owner, Maria Lourdes.
Held
Not in good faith.
The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As
a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to
court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a
bill of interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to
whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property.
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in
his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or
claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to
court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to
demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to
determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a
person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one
liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a
new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the
action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject land. All the elements required for an unlawful
detainer case to prosper are present. Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the subject land from
Tironas lessor. Tironas continued occupation of the subject land amounted to acquiescence to
Ocampos terms. However, Tirona eventually refused to pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.
37
Cases under SCA are taken from Roco digests.
Maglente v. Padilla, G.R. No. 148182, March 7, 2007

Facts
Philippine Realty Corp (PRC) owns a parcel of land in Intramuros. It entered into a Lease Contract
with Maglente which provided that Maglente had the Right of First Refusal in case PRC would sell
the property. During the lease, Maglente subleased the property to Gabello et al. When the lease was
about to expire, PRC offered to sell the property to Maglente. The latter expressed its desire to
purchase the same.
Thereafter, PRC filed a Complaint for Interpleader in the RTC against Maglente and Gabello et al so
they could litigate among themselves who had the right to purchase said property. RTC ruled in favor
of Maglente. Aggrieved, Gabello et al reached the SC. However, it was affirmed that Maglente had
the right to purchase. Thus, judgment was entered. Subsequently, a Writ of Execution was issued for
PRC to execute a Contract of Sale in favor of Maglente. PRC complied.
Afterwards, Maglente filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession. However, Gabello et al,
who were in possession of said property, objected on the ground that the decision on the Interpleader
case only resolved Maglentes right to purchase but did not declare them as owners. Thus, the RTC
denied the Motion of Maglente. Aggrieved, they filed this Petition for Certiorari.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT MAGLENTE IS ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF POSSESSION AFTER
BEING ADJUDGED AS THE PROPER PARTIES TO BUY THE PROPERTY IN THE
INTERPLEADER CASE
Held
No.
THE INTERPLEADER CASE DID NOT RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP.
A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances:

1. Land registration proceedings;
2. Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property;
3. Judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party
has intervened, and
4. Execution sales.
Here, Maglente seeks the writ as a consequence of the RTCs decision ordering the execution of a
contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor. The writ does not lie in such a case.
Furthermore, the RTCs decision in the interpleader case (affirmed by both the CA and the SC)
merely resolved the question of who had the right to purchase PRCs property. The directive was only
for PRC to execute the necessary contract in favor of Maglente as the winning parties, nothing else.
It was clear that, at that point, Maglente were not yet the owners of the property. The execution of the
deed of sale in their favor was only preliminary to their eventual acquisition of the property.
Likewise, although we stated in G.R. No. 111743 that the contract of sale between Maglente and PRC
had already been perfected, we refrained from declaring them the owners since, pending the execution
of the deed of sale or delivery of the property, ownership had yet to transfer to them at that time.
Thus, Maglentes argument that the RTCs writ of execution in the interpleader case carried with it
the corollary right to a writ of possession is without merit. A writ of possession complements the writ
of execution only when the right of possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case
directly relating to either. The interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue.
Arreza v. Diaz, G. R. No. 133113, August 30, 2001

Facts
Bliss Development Corporation owns a housing unit in QC. In the course of a case involving Arreza
and Diaz in the RTC of Makati, Bliss filed a Complaint for Interpleader against the two. RTC ruled in
favor of Arreza and ordered the transfer of rights in favor of Arreza. Said decision became final and
Bliss executed a Contract to Sell in favor of Arreza. Also, Diaz was made to deliver the property with
all its improvements to Arreza.
Subsequently, Diaz filed a Complaint against Bliss and Arreza in the RTC of Makati seeking
reimbursement of the costs of acquisition and improvements on the property. In response, Arreza filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata. However, this was denied.
Thus, he filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA but it was dismissed. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT DIAZS CLAIMS FOR REIMBURSEMENT IS BARRED BY RES
JUDICATA
Held
Yes.
HE SHOULD HAVE PUT IT IN ISSUE IN THE INTERPLEADER CASE.
Worthy of note, the prior case for interpleader filed with the Regional Trial Court was settled with
finality with this Courts resolution in G.R. No. 128726. The judgment therein is now final.
In its assailed decision, the CA pointed out that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide that in a
case for interpleader, the court shall determine the respective rights and obligations of the parties and
adjudicate their respective claims. The CA noted, however, that the defendants in that interpleader
case, namely Diaz and Arreza, did not pursue the issue of damages and reimbursement although the
answer of Diaz did pray for affirmative relief arising out of the rights of a buyer in good faith.
Diaz in effect argues that it was incumbent upon Arreza as a party in Civil Case No. 942086 to put in
issue Diazs demands for reimbursement. However, it was not Arrezas duty to do the lawyering for
Diaz. As stated by the CA, the court in a complaint for interpleader shall determine the rights and
obligations of the parties and adjudicate, their respective claims. Such rights, obligations and claims
could only be adjudicated if put forward by the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights.
The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
parties in an interpleader action may file counterclaims, crossclaims, third party complaints and
responsive pleadings thereto, as provided by these Rules. The second paragraph was added to
Section 5 to expressly authorize the additional pleadings and claims enumerated therein, in the
interest of a complete adjudication of the controversy and its incidents.
Pursuant to said Rules, Diaz should have filed his claims against Arreza in the interpleader action.
Having asserted his rights as a buyer in good faith in his answer, and praying relief therefor, Diaz
should have crystallized his demand into specific claims for reimbursement by Arreza. This he failed
to do.
Having failed to set up his claim for reimbursement, said claim of respondent Diaz being in the nature
of a compulsory counterclaim is now barred.
Declaratory Relief (Rule 63)

Almeda v. Bathala Marketing, G.R. No. 150608, January 28, 2008
Facts
Almeda leased its property to Bathala Marketing Industries Inc for 4 years. One of the provisions of
the lease contract stated that if a new tax is imposed, Bathala will pay additional rent. In another
provision, it was also stated that the rent would likewise be adjusted in cases of extraordinary
inflation.
Thereafter, Almeda demanded that Bathala pay VAT and pay the adjusted rentals pursuant to the
provisions of its lease contract. However, Bathala refused to pay. To prevent further damage and
prejudice, Bathala instituted an Action for Declaratory Relief to determine the correct interpretation of
said provisions. Then, Almeda commenced in another court a separate Action for Rescission,
Ejectment, and Damages.
Thereafter, Almeda moved to dismiss the action for declaratory relief on the ground that Bathala was
already in breach of its obligation. However, the RTC denied the motion.
On appeal, CA affirmed.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER.
Held
YES.
Decisional law enumerates the REQUISITES of an action for declaratory relief, as follows:
1. The subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
2. The terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction;
3. There must have been no breach of the documents in question;
4. There must be an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one between
persons whose interests are adverse;
5. The issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
6. Adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that Almeda insist
that Bathala was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed. We do not agree.
After Almeda demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, Bathala
complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals
stipulated therein. Bathala religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency
of the present suit. There is no showing that Bathala committed an act constituting a breach of the
subject contract of lease. Thus, Bathala is not barred from instituting before the trial court the petition
for declaratory relief.
It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation we held that the petition for
declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful
detainer. However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful
detainer case had already been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the declaratory relief
case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that the action for declaratory relief be preferred
over the action for unlawful detainer.
Conversely, in the case at bench, the RTC had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during
the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the RTC, where the rescission case was on
appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the action for
declaratory relief.
Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory
relief action instead of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case
before the trial court. The resolution of the present petition would write finis to the parties dispute, as
it would settle once and for all the question of the proper interpretation of the two contractual
stipulations subject of this controversy.
Malana v. Tapa, G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009

Facts
Malana filed in the RTC a Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages against
Tappa. They claimed that they were compelled to file in the RTC to remove the cloud from their title
over the property in question. However, before they could file an Answer, the RTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction after it was found that the property had a value less than P20,000
and thus was properly within the MTCs jurisdiction.
In Malanas MR, it averred that the principal cause of action was Quieting of Title. Thus, the
Complaint should not have been dismissed because under Rule 63 Section 1, an action to quiet title
fell under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Nonetheless, RTC denied the MR.
ISSUE
WHETHER THE RTC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED
MALANAS COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
HELD:
NO. SECOND PARAGRAPH OF RULE 63 SEC 1 SHOULD BE READ WITH THE LAWS OF
JURISDICTION (BP 129)
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly
made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court.
The FIRST PARAGRAPH of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general
circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief. A petition for declaratory
relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its SECOND PARAGRAPH that:
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to
consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, MAY be brought under this Rule.
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to:
1. An action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the
Civil Code;
2. An action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and
3. An action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a
right to repurchase.
These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the
adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the
judgment into effect.
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that
an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word may that an action for
quieting of title may be brought under [the] Rule on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person
desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court. The use of the word may in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive
and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses
the word SHALL and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not
exceed P20,000.00.
Contract was already breached
In the present case, Malanas Complaint for quieting of title was filed after Malana already demanded
and Tappa refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to
the latters express claim of ownership over the subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa,
in direct challenge to Malanas title.
Since Malana averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their
property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria,
not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed 1
year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object ones recovery of possession over the
real property as owner.
Malanas Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over
such an action would depend on the value of the property involved.
Sabistana v. Muertegi, 201338

Facts
Garcia executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale over an unregistered land in favor of Muertegui. The
latter took actual possession of said lot. Years later, Garcia again sold the lot to Atty. Sabitsana,
Muerteguis family lawyer through a notarized Deed of Sale which was registered in the register of
deeds. Title was thereafter issued in Sabitsanas name.
Years later, Sabitsana wrote a letter to the DENR and claimed that he was the true owner of said
property. As a consequence, Muertegui filed an Action for Quieting of Title and Preliminary
Injunction in the RTC against Sabitsana and claimed that they bought the lots in bad faith.
In their Answer, Sabitsana contended that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because it
involved title to or interest in a parcel of land with an assessed value of merely P1,230. Nevertheless,
RTC ruled in favor of Muertegui.
After Sabitsanas MR was denied, he appealed. However, CA denied the appeal. Hence, this petition.
Sabitsana contends that the CA erred in holding that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE ACTION FOR QUIETING OF
TITLE EVEN IF THE AMOUNT OF THE PROPERTY INVOLVED IS ONLY P1,230.
HELD:
YES.
On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be
instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63
of the Rules of Court, an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be
brought in the appropriate RTC.
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by Sabitsanas August 24, 1998
letter-opposition to Muertegis application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a cloud from
being cast upon his application for a title, Muertegi filed Civil Case No. B1097 to obtain a declaration
of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which properly falls within the
jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.
38
Reverses the previous case of Malana
Republic v. Roque, 2013

Facts
Atty. Harry Roque et al filed a Petiton for Declaratory Relief in the RTC assailing the
constitutionality of several provisions of the Human Security Act. The proceedings were suspended
on account of several petitions filed in the SC which likewise assailed the constitutionality of the
Human Security Act. Then, in 2010, SC upheld the constitutionality of the law in the Southern
Hemishphere case.
In 2012, the Republic filed their Motion to Dismiss stating that Roque failed to satisfy the requisites
for Declaratory Relief and that the Human Security Act was already upheld as valid in Southern
Hemisphere. However, the Motion to Dismiss was denied by the RTC which stated that the action
was properly filed.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
THE MOTION TO DISMISS.
HELD:
YES. NOT ALL REQUISITES OF DECLARATORY RELIEF WERE PRESENT.
The Court observes that while no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed on the part of the RTC
when it found that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 in the Southern
Hemisphere cases, it, however, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled that Roques petition had met
all the requisites for an action for declaratory relief. Consequently, its denial of the subject motion to
dismiss was altogether improper.
Case law states that the following are the REQUISITES FOR AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF:
1. The subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
2. The terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction;
3. There must have been no breach of the documents in question;
4. There must be an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one between
persons whose interests are adverse;
5. The issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
6. Adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
The Court observes that while the first, second, and third requirements appear to exist in this case, the
4th, 5th, and 6th requirements, however, remain wanting.
NO ACTUAL JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening
seeds of one exists in this case.
A perusal of Roques petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to demonstrate
how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372.
It is well to note that Roque also lack the required locus standi to mount their constitutional challenge
against the implementation of the abovestated provisions of RA 9372 since they have not shown any
direct and personal interest in the case.
NOT RIPE FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the
controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, remain highly speculative
and merely theorized. It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
NO NEED TO CONSIDER RELIEFS SINCE NO THREAT OR INJURY EXISTS IN THE FIRST

PLACE
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the
availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the Roque exists in the first
place.
Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus (Rule 65)39

Republic v. Carmel Development, G.R. No.142572, February 20, 2002
Facts
Carmel Development filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against the DECS and Caloocan
School Board to recover possession of a parcel of land occupied by Pangarap Elementary and High
School which were established by DECS. For failure to file an Answer, RTC ruled that DECS was in
default and allowed Carmel to present evidence ex parte.
Upon DECS motion, the RTC lifted the default order. However, the RTC denied the motion to
dismiss the case. Thus, DECS filed an MR which the RTC likewise denied.
Aggrieved, DECS filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA seeking to annul the RTCs previous ordrs.
Nevertheless, the CA dismissed the Petition on the ground that the petition was not accompanied by
certified true copies of the assailed orders of the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 but only by duplicate
originals.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA CORRECTLY DISMISSED ITS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
Held
No.
DECS contends that either duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed orders is allowed
under Rule 46. On the other hand, Carmel insists that Rule 65 is the rule that governs.
This issue has been settled in Rosa Yap Paras and Valente Dy Yap vs. Judge Ismael O. Baldado and
Justo De Jesus Paras wherein it was held that:
The filing of original actions for certiorari in the Court of Appeals is governed by Section 3, Rule 46 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that the petition for certiorari be accompanied by a clearly
legible duplicate original OR certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof x x
x. The same Section provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
.
Rule 46 applies to original actions for certiorari because Section 2 thereof expressly states that [t]his
Rule shall apply to original actions for certiorari, x x x. That Rule 46 applies to actions for certiorari
filed before the Court of Appeals can hardly be disputed.
Rule 46 should be construed in relation to Rule 65 without rendering any of its provisions useless.
This is evident in Section 6 of Rule 65 which provides that [i]n petitions for certiorari before the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provision of Section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed.
In fine, Rule 46 primarily governs original actions for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals but Rule
65 generally serves to supplement the same. Rules 46 and 65 coexist with each other and should be
construed so as to give effect to every provision of both rules.
Clearly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for certiorari filed by the
Department of Education on the ground that it was accompanied by mere duplicate originals instead
of certified true copies of the assailed orders.
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 396 defines DUPLICATE ORIGINALS in this wise:
39
Edited Roco digests.
1. The duplicate original copy shall be understood to be that copy of the decision, judgment,
resolution or order which is intended for and furnished to a party in the case or proceeding in
the court or adjudicative body which rendered and issued the same.
2. The duplicate original copy must be duly signed or initialed by the authorities or the
corresponding officer or representative of the issuing entity, or shall at least bear the dry seal
thereof or any other official indication of the authenticity and completeness of such copy.
Jiao et al. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 182331, April 18, 2012

Facts
Jiao et al were regular employees of Philbank with at least 10 years of service. Said company likewise
provided for a Gratuity Plan for its employees. Thereafter, Philbank merged with Globalbank wherein
Philbank was the surviving corporation. However, the bank operated under the name of Globalbank.
Due to the merger, Jiao et als positions became redundant. As such, they availed of the Separation
Package and were required to sign a Release and Quitclaim in consideration of their receipt of their
separation pay.
Years later, Metrobank acquired the assets and liabilities of Globalbank. Thereafter, Jiao et al filed
Complaints for Non-payment of Separation Pay before the NLRC. LA dismissed the complaint and
absolved Metrobank from liability upon finding that Jiao et al were already separated from the
company even before Metrobank came into the picture. On appeal, NLRC affirmed. Aggrieved, Jiao
et al elevated the case to the CA via Petition for Certiorari.
CA dismissed the petition for failure of Jiao et al to file an MR of the NLRC decision before resorting
to the Petition for Certiorari. MR denied. Hence, this petition. Jiao et al contends that they opted not
to file an MR because the issues were already passed upon by the NLRC.
Issue
WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING THEIR PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR
FAILURE TO FILE AN MR AGAINST THE NLRC DECISION.
Held
NO. DISMISSAL WAS PROPER.
Jiao et al do not have the discretion or prerogative to determine the propriety of complying with
procedural rules. This Court had repeatedly emphasized in various cases involving the tedious
attempts of litigants to relieve themselves of the consequences of their neglect to follow a simple
procedural requirement for perfecting a petition for certiorari that he who seeks a writ of certiorari
must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law
and the Rules.
The Jiao et al may not arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for
reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a MR, they must
show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so.
As the CA correctly noted, Jiao et al did not bother to explain their omission and only did so in
their MR of the dismissal of their petition. Aside from the fact that such belated effort will not
resurrect their application for a writ of certiorari, the reason proffered by them does not fall under
any of the recognized instances when the filing of a motion for reconsideration may be
dispensed with. Whimsical and arbitrary deviations from the rules cannot be condoned in the guise of
a plea for a liberal interpretation thereof. We cannot respond with alacrity to every claim of injustice
and bend the rules to placate vociferous protestors crying and claiming to be victims of a wrong.
PNB v. Arcobillas, 2013

Facts
Arcobillas, working as teller at PNB, erroneously posted $5,517 in one of its clients accounts which
should have only been $138. Said amount was later withdrawn by the client to the damage of PNB in
the amount of P214,641. After discovery, Arcobillas was administratively charged with neglect of
duty.
In her affidavit, Arcobillas admitted and apologized for her mistake and stated that she did not benefit
from the misposting. Later, PNB found Arcobillas guilty of gross neglect and imposed on her a
penalty of forced resignation with benefits. After her plea for reconsideration was denied, Arcobillas
filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against PNB in the NLRC.
LA ordered Arcobillas reinstatement. On appeal, NLRC affimed the LA but held her to be equally
liable for the losses suffered. Still aggrieved, PNB, without filing an MR of the NLRC decision, filed
a Motion to Extend Time to Flle a Petition for Certiorari. Thereafter, it filed a Petition for Certiorari in
the CA. Despite the non-filing of an MR, CA took cognizance of the petition but nonetheless
dismissed it. Thus, PNB filed an MR which was denied. Hence, this Petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT PNBS FAILURE TO FILE AN MR BEFORE IT FILED ITS PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI IS A FATAL INFIRMITY.
Held
YES. MR SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED BEFORE RESORTING TO THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI.
It is a well-established rule that a [M]otion for [R]econsideration is an indispensable condition before

an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari.
Of course, the RULE IS NOT ABSOLUTE and jurisprudence has laid down EXCEPTIONS when the
filing of a [P]etition for [C]ertiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a [M]otion for
[R]econsideration, such as:
1. Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
2. Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
3. Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of
the action is perishable;
4. Where, under the circumstances, an MR would be useless;
5. Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
6. Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relied by the trial court is improbable;
7. Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
8. Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and
9. Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
Here, PNB did not at all allege to which of the above mentioned exceptions this case falls. Neither did
it present any plausible justification for dispensing with the requirement of a prior MR before the
NLRC.
Despite this, the CA still took cognizance of PNBs Petition for Certiorari and ignored this significant
flaw. It bears to stress that the filing of a MR is not a mere technicality of procedure. It is a
jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly complied with. Thus, PNBs failure
to file a [M]otion for [R]econsideration with the NLRC before availing [itself] of the special civil
action for certiorari is a fatal infirmity.
In view thereof, the CA erred in entertaining the Petition for Certiorari filed before it. It follows,
therefore, that the proceedings before it and its assailed Decision are considered null and void. Hence,
the final and executory Decision of the NLRC dated August 31, 2004 stands.
City Government of Quezon City v. Bayantel, G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006
Facts
Initially, Bayantel, a franchise holder allowed to operate telecoms business, enjoyed tax exemption as
regards real property and franchise tax. When the LGC was passed, said exemptions were withdrawn.
Thereafter, Bayantels legislative franchise was likewise amended in accordance with the LGC.
Likewise, the QC government also enacted an Ordinance imposing real property tax on telecoms
which included Bayantel who had properties in QC. Subsequently, the Public Telecoms Policy Act
was passed which stated that any advantage, privilege, or exemption granted shall be accorded to
grantees of such franchises.
Pursuant thereto, Bayantel wrote the City Assessor seeking the exclusion of its real properties from
property tax. After being denied, Bayantel appealed to the LBAA. Insisting on its exemption,
Bayantel did not pay the real property taxes assessed against it by QC. As such, the QC Treasurer sent
out Notices of Delinquency with Warrants of Levy against its properties for sale at public auction.
Threatened with the imminent loss of its properties, Bayantel withdrew its appeal in the LBAA and
instead filed in the RTC of QC a Petition for Prohibition with TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction.
RTC ruled that Bayantel was exempt. QC filed an MR but was denied. Thus, QC filed a Petition to
the SC on pure questions of law contending that the RTC should have denied the Petition for
Prohibition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT BAYANTEL IS REQUIRED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES BEFORE SEEKING JUDICIAL RELIEF.
Held
NO. THE CASE FALLS UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
With the reality that Bayantels real properties were already levied upon on account of its non-
payment of real estate taxes thereon, the Court agrees with Bayantel that an appeal to the LBAA is not
a speedy and adequate remedy within the context of the aforequoted Section 2 of Rule 65. This is not
to mention of the auction sale of said properties already scheduled on July 30, 2002.
Moreover, one of the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies rule is

when, as here, only legal issues are to be resolved. In fact, the Court, cognizant of the nature of the
questions presently involved, gave due course to the instant petition. As the Court has said in Ty vs.
Trampe:
Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial action can prosper,
there is a well-settled exception in cases where the controversy does not involve questions of fact but only of
law.
Lest it be overlooked, an appeal to the LBAA, to be properly considered, required prior payment
under protest of the amount of P43,878,208.18, a figure which, in the light of the then prevailing
Asian financial crisis, may have been difficult to raise up. Given this reality, an appeal to the LBAA
may not be considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It is thus understandable why
Bayantel opted to withdraw its earlier appeal with the LBAA and, instead, filed its petition for
prohibition with urgent application for injunctive relief in Civil Case No. Q0247292. The remedy
availed of by Bayantel under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court must be upheld.
LTFRB v. Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc., 2013

Facts
LTFRB sought to implement a law which required PUV operators to obtain accident insurance
policies. For this purpose, the LTFRB created the Passenger Personal Accident Insurance Program. In
this program, LTFRB will accredit 2 groups of insurance providers selected through public bidding to
provide insurance policies to PUV operators. UNITRANS and Stronghold were chosen as insurance
providers under a 5-year contract.
Shortly before the expiration of the agreement, Stronghold participated again in the biddings. To be
qualified, an insurance provider should go through 3 levels of biddings to be qualified. Unfortunately,
Stronghold did not qualify in the 3rd bidding. As a result, Stronghold was excluded by LTFRB from
the pool of qualified bidders.
Before LTFRB could choose the winning bids, Stronghold sought a Writ of Prohibition from the CA
to enjoin LTFRB from opening bid documents and to nullify the bid proceedings. Despite this, CA
merely required LTFRB to comment. Thus, LTFRB was allowed to declare the winners and sign
contacts with the 2 new insurers. Thereafter, LTFRB moved to dismiss Strongholds petition. It
contended that it was properly exercising its regulatory powers.
Eventually, CA ruled in favor of Stronghold and nullified the 3rd round of bidding. Likewise, it
enjoined LTFRB from enforcing the agreement until Stronghold shall have been given the right to
match the best bidder. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN ISSUING THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION AND THUS
ANNULLING LTFRBS BIDDING PROCEEDINGS.
Held
YES. CA SHOULD NOT HAVE ISSUED THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION.
The writ of prohibition lies upon a showing that the assailed proceedings are [conducted] without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It is the extra-jurisdictional nature of the contested proceedings that grounds the
issuance of the writ, enjoining a tribunal or officer from further acting on the matter before it.
Stronghold made no claim that LTFRB lacked jurisdiction to implement the Program or to issue the
References for each round of bidding to set the parameters for the accreditation of insurance
providers. Rather, it rested its case on the theory that LTFRB acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when LTFRB required in the Third Reference a minimum
capital requirement on a per insurer basis. Strongholds case therefore, rises or falls on the question
whether such act of LTFRB amounts to grave abuse of discretion.
The CA answered in the affirmative, holding that LTFRB had abused its discretion when it
unceremoniously released the 3rd Reference without considering the legal ramifications on the terms
of the [First] MOA.
In the first place, the standard under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is grave abuse
of discretion and not mere abuse of discretion. The difference is not a simple matter of semantics.
The writs governed by Rule 65 certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition are extraordinary
remedies designed to correct not mere errors of judgment (i.e., in the appreciation of facts or
interpretation of law) but errors of jurisdiction (i.e., lack or excess of jurisdiction).
By conflating abuse of discretion with grave abuse of discretion, the CA failed to follow the
rigorous standard of Rule 65, diluting its office of correcting only jurisdictional errors.
Further, LTFRB committed no abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, in disqualifying Stronghold
from the third round of bidding. It is not disputed that Stronghold did not meet the minimum
capitalization required for a lead insurer under the Third Reference, leaving LTFRB no choice but to
disqualify it. To find fault in its exclusion, Stronghold charges LTFRB with committing grave abuse
of discretion in abandoning the aggregated mode to reckon compliance with the minimum
capitalization requirement under the First and Second References and in adopting the new
nonaggregated, per insurer basis under the Third Reference. In short, Stronghold questions the
change in the manner by which the minimum capitalization of lead and member insurers is
determined under the Third Reference.
Vivas v. Monetary Board of the BSP, 2013

Facts
Vivas et al acquired controlling interest in the Rural Bank of Faire and transformed it into EuroCredit
Community Bank Inc. (ECBI). As a matter of course, the BSP conducted a general examination on
ECBI. It was found that there were many unsound banking practices. Years later, ECBI refused to go
through another general examination. As such, BSP fined the bank and referred the matter to the
Office of the Special Investigation (OSI) for the filing of the appropriate legal action. Thus, OSI filed
a Complaint for Estafa through Falsification against ECBI and some of its officers in the DOJ.
Later on the Monetary Board of the BSP released Resolution 276 which placed ECBI under
receivership. In assailing said Resolution, Vivas filed a Petition for Prohibition in the SC and ascribed
grave abuse of discretion on the Monetary Board for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking
business and for placing it under receivership.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT PROHIBITION WAS THE PROPER REMEDY TO QUESTION THE
MONETARY BOARDS RESOLUTION.
Held
NO. VIVAS AVAILED OF THE WRONG REMEDY. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN A PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI.
The Monetary Board issued Resolution No. 276, dated March 4, 2010, in the exercise of its power
under R.A. No. 7653. Under Section 30 thereof, any act of the MB placing a bank under
conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may not be restrained or set aside except on a petition for
certiorari.
Granting that a Petition for Prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy under the
circumstances obtaining.
Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct
the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As a
rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be
done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.
Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts
of closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, had already been
issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its placement under receivership by the PDIC were
already accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of prohibition is no longer appropriate. Settled is the
rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.
Petition should have been filed in the CA
Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have been filed with the CA. The
petition is dismissible because it simply ignored the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. True, the Court,
the CA and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not grant the party seeking any of the
extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of his choice. The Vivas has
not advanced any special or important reason which would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under
the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure questions of law. In the case
at bench, there are certainly factual issues as Vivas is questioning the findings of the investigating
team.
Corales v. Republic, 2013

Facts
Corales was elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for 3 consecutive terms. In those 3 terms,
he appointed Dr. Angeles as Municipal Administrator. In his first term, the appointment was
unanimously approved. However, in the last 2 terms, the Sanggunian disapproved on the ground of
nepotism and allegedly because of Dr. Angeles unsatisfactory performance. Despite this, Dr. Angeles
still discharged the duties of his office for which he received salary.
Thereafter Maximo Andal, as Provincial State Auditor, issued an Audit Observation Memorandum
(AOM) to Corales and asking the latter to comment/reply. Instead, Corales and Angeles filed a
Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus against Andal and the Sanggunian before the RTC of San Pablo.
In opposition, SolGen, representing Andal, filed a Motion to Dismiss based on lack of cause of action,
prematurity, and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss by SolGen. MR denied. Thus, the Republic went up the CA. CA
granted the petition in favor of the Republic. Essentially, the CA dismissed Corales action for
Prohibition. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE FILING OF THE SUIT FOR PROHIBITION WAS RIPE.
Held
NO. IT WAS FILED PREMATURELY.
As can be gleaned from the AOM, Corales was simply required to submit his comment/reply on the
observations stated in the AOM. As so keenly observed by the CA, any mention in the AOM that
Corales shall reimburse the salaries paid to Dr. Angeles in light of the repeated disapproval or
rejection by the Sangguniang Bayan of his appointment as Municipal Administrator was merely an
initial opinion, not conclusive, as there was no showing that Andal had taken any affirmative action
thereafter to compel Corales to make the necessary reimbursement. Otherwise stated, it has not been
shown that Andal carried out or enforced what was stated in the AOM.
Corales was given an opportunity to refute the findings and observations in the AOM by requesting
him to comment/reply thereto, but he never did. Concomitantly, the AOM did not contain any
recommendation to the effect that Corales would be held personally liable for the amount that would
be disallowed. It is, therefore, incongruous to conclude that the said AOM is tantamount to a directive
requiring Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to and received by Dr. Angeles during the latters stint
as Municipal Administrator after his appointment thereto was held invalid for want of conformity
from the Sangguniang Bayan.
Viewed in this light, this Court can hardly see any actual case or controversy to warrant the exercise
of its power of judicial review. A question is considered RIPE FOR ADJUDICATION when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
The action taken by the Corales and Angeles to assail the AOM was, indeed, premature and based
entirely on surmises, conjectures and speculations that Corales would eventually be compelled to
reimburse Dr. Angeles salaries, should the audit investigation confirm the irregularity of such
disbursements. Further, as correctly pointed out by the Republic in its Memorandum, what Corales
and Angeles actually assail is Andals authority to request them to file the desired comment/reply to
the AOM, which is beyond the scope of the action for prohibition, as such request is neither an
actionable wrong nor constitutive of an act perceived to be illegal.
From the final order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission
proper. It is the decision or resolution of the Commission proper which can be appealed to this Court.
Clearly, Corales and Angeles have all the remedies available to them at the administrative level but
they failed to exhaust the same and instead, immediately sought judicial intervention. Otherwise
stated, the auditing process has just begun but they already thwarted the same by immediately filing a
Petition for Prohibition.
Raul Lambino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

Esquivel v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 137237, September 17, 2002
Dolot v. Paje, 2013
Quo Warranto (Rule 66)

Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009
Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting, G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009
Expropriation (Rule 67)

Bardillon v. Bgy. Masili, G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003
Facts
Barangay Masili filed a Complaint for Expropriation against Bardillon in the MTC of
Calamba for the purpose of acquiring parcel of land to erect a multi-purpose hall for the
barangay. MTC dismissed the case for failure of the Barangay and its counsel to appear at the
pre-trial. MR was likewise denied.
Subsequently, a Second Complaint for Eminent Domain was filed in the RTC of Calamba
and sought to expropriate the same property for the same purpose. In response, Bardillon
moved to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata. However, the judge denied the
Motion to Dismiss and held that there was no res judicata because the MTC which previously
dismissed the case had no jurisdiction over the expropriation proceeding. Thereafter, the RTC
ruled in favor of the Barangay and issued a Writ of Possession in its favor.
On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this Petition. Bardillon claims that the MTC has jurisdiction
of the case because the value of the land was only P11,448.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE MTC HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE EXPROPRIATION
CASE.
Held
NO. RTC HAD JURISDICTION BECAUSE IT IS INCAPABLE OF PECUNARY
ESTIMATION. SINCE MTC HAD NO JURISDICTION, NO RES JUDICATA.
An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with
the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take property for public use. As
such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the RTC.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the
court is dutybound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely
incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is
satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation .
To reiterate, an expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value
of the land, because the subject of the action is the governments exercise of eminent domain
a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, the doctrine of res
judicata finds no application even if the Order of dismissal may have been an adjudication on
the merits.
ENTRY INTO THE PREMISES WAS PROPER

The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are
expressly and specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. On the part of local government units, expropriation is also governed by Section
19 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the

REQUISITES FOR AUTHORIZING IMMEDIATE ENTRY are as follows:
1. The filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance ; and
2. The deposit of the amount equivalent to 15%of the fair market value of the property
to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration.
In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of the Barangay after it had
filed the Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required was proper, because
it had complied with the foregoing requisites.
The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly addressed to the RTC in
the course of the expropriation proceedings. If Bardillon objects to the necessity of the
takeover of her property , she should say so in her Answer to the Complaint. The RTC has
the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to
determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it.
Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. No. 170375, July 7, 2010

Facts
Iron and Steel Authority (now National Steel Corporation) was created in 1973 pursuant to
PD 2729. Its existence was only until 1988. In 1983, ISA filed a Complaint for Expropriation
against Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp (MCFC) and its mortgagee, PNB in the RTC presided
by Judge Mangotara.
During the pendency of the case, ISAs statutory existence expired. Thus, MCFC filed a
Motion to Dismiss for ISAs lack of capacity to sue. RTC granted the Motion. CA likewise
affirmed the dismissal. On appeal to the SC, the SC remanded the case to the RTC so the
Republic could be substituted in place of ISA. This became final and executory. However, no
motion for execution was filed.
In the 1997 Cacho case, part of the land in question was adjudged in favor of Cacho and the
decision lapsed into finality.
Because of this, the Republic filed a Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint and
to implead Cacho and their successors-in-interest. MCFC opposed this contending that the
Republic was already time barred. As a result, RTC denied the Republics Motion for Leave.
An MR was filed to assail the said order. Later on, MCFC filed a Motion to Dismiss for
failure of Republic to implead indispensible parties because MCFC insisted it was not the
owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated but rather it was Cacho. As a result,
the RTC dismissed the case for not having been filed against the owner-indispensible party.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY IS AN INDISPENSIBLE
PARTY IN AN EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING.
Held
NOT NECESSARILY. AN OWNER IN AN EXPROPRIATION CASE IS NOT
NECESSARILY THE INDISPENSIBLE PARTY.
The right of the Republic to be substituted for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106 had long
been affirmed by no less than this Court in the ISA case. The ISA case had already become
final and executory, and entry of judgment was made.
The failure of the Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not render the
substitution void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it is
directed to enforce the terms of the writ. The November 16, 2001 Order of the RTC Branch 1
should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a final and executory judgment of this Court,
already rendering a motion for and issuance of a writ of execution superfluous.
For sure, defendants in an expropriation case are NOT LIMITED to the owners of the
property to be expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the property owner alone.
They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the property. When
[property] is taken by eminent domain, the owner is not necessarily the only person who is
entitled to compensation.
At the time of the filing of the Complaint for Expropriation in 1983, possessory/occupancy
rights of MCFC over the parcels of land sought to be expropriated were undisputed. Being
the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated, MCFC could very well be
named a defendant in Civil Case No. 106. The RTC Branch 1 evidently erred in dismissing
the Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC for not being a proper party.
Also erroneous was the dismissal by the RTC Branch 1 of the original Complaint for
Expropriation for having been filed only against MCFC, the occupant of the subject land, but
not the owner/s of the said property. Dismissal is not the remedy for misjoinder or nonjoinder
of parties .
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had

of an action. Now, is the owner of the property an indispensable party in an action for
expropriation? Not necessarily, when the property already appears to belong to the Republic,
there is no sense in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings against itself. It can
still, however, file a complaint for expropriation against the private persons occupying the
property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an indispensable
party.
To recall, Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the parcels of land
reserved to NSC are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the Republic. Letter of
Instructions No. 1277 recognized only the occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to
institute expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for said occupancy
rights. Therefore, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party in the original
Complaint for Expropriation in Civil Case No. 106.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, July 7, 2010, August 14, 2009

Facts
Reyes owns a parcel of land in CDO. DPHW wanted to built an extension road on Osmena
St. Without initiating an expropriation proceeding, DPWH took possession of Reyes
property on Dec 20, 1990. Thus, Reyes sent letters to DPWH to express its objection to the
taking of the property. Likewise, Reyes requested to appraise her property but this was
denied. Thus, Reyes filed a Complaint Claiming Just Compensation and Damages in the RTC
of CDO against DPWH. Before the reports could be sent by the commissioners, DPWH said
that it was ready to pay Reyes just compensation of P3,200 psm. Thus, Reyes filed an Urgent
Motion for DPWH to deposit said amount. However, DWPH was only able to deposit
P2,121,600 in the RTC months later. Meanwhile, new commissioners submitted their report
based on the values of 1990. Thereafter, RTC held that Reyes is entitled to 4,696,000 based
on the values in 1990 but the basis was obscure in the actual decision. Thus, the CA
remanded the case.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN REMANDING THE CASE TO RECONVENE
THE COMMISSIONERS TO DETERMINE CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR THE
REMAINING LOT.
Held
NO.
Valuation of just compensation
Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from
the owner and appropriated by the government. However, if the government takes possession
before the institution of expropriation proceedings , the value should be fixed as of the time
of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint.
The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination
of the value when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the
commencement of the proceedings.
When there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for damages
or just compensation , the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just
compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before
commissioners is dispensable.
RTC HAD NO BASIS IN DETERMINING THE JUST COMPENSATION
In this case, DPWH took possession of the subject property without initiating expropriation
proceedings. Consequently, Reyes filed the instant case for just compensation and damages.
To determine just compensation, the RTC appointed 3 commissioners pursuant to Section 5
of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. None of the parties objected to such
appointment. The RTCs appointment of commissioners in this particular case is not
improper. The appointment was done mainly to aid the RTC in determining just
compensation , and it was not opposed by the parties . Besides, the RTC is not bound by the
commissioners recommended valuation of the subject property.
However, we agree with the CA that the RTCs decision is not clear as to its basis for
ascertaining just compensation. The RTC simply gave the total amount of just compensation
due to the property owner without laying down its basis. Thus, there is no way to determine
whether the adjudged just compensation is based on competent evidence. For this reason
alone, a remand of the case to the trial court for proper determination of just compensation is
in order.
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED
No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to grant
consequential damages. If as a result of the expropriation made by DPWH, the remaining lot
(i.e., the 297 square meter lot) of Reyes suffers from IMPAIRMENT or decrease in value,
consequential damages may be awarded to Reyes.
On the other hand, if the expropriation results to BENEFITS to the remaining lot of Reyes,
these consequential benefits may be deducted from the awarded consequential damages, if
any, or from the market value of the expropriated property.
An award of consequential damages for property not taken is not tantamount to unjust
enrichment of the property owner.
NPC v. Santa Loro, G.R. No. 175176, October 17, 2008

Facts
To implement its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, NPC expropriated various parcels of
land in the Municipality of Carmen in Cebu. Among the affected lots were those owned by
Santa Loro vda. De Capin. Thus, to be able to enter into their property, NPC obtained their
permission. Later, Capin signed the permits in return for NPCs payment of just
compensation.
After construction was completed, restrictions were imposed upon the use of Capins
property such that they lost income. After NPC paid Capin just compensation, Capin found
out that the other landowners in their Municipality who brought the expropriation
proceedings to court and entered into compromise agreements with NPC and were able to
receive much greater just compensation.
Accordingly, Capin filed a Complaint for Rescission of Agreement, Recovery of Possession

of Parcels of Land, Removal of Tower and Transmission Lines, Damages, etc against NPC in
the RTC. Thereafter, the parties during pre-trial that they would submit to Summary
Judgment. Later, RTC ruled in favor of Capin and ordered NPC to pay damages amounting to
448 psm for the 3,199 sqm taken by NPC. MR denied. On appeal, CA affirmed. MR denied.
NPC contends that the RTC should have appointed commissioners in accordance with Rule
67 and not according to the rules on Summary Judgments because the case was Reversed
Eminent Domain.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT RTC SHOULD HAVE FIRST APPOINTED COMMISSIONERS
BEFORE HOLDING NPC LIABLE.
Held
NO. THE COMPLAINT IS ONE FOR DAMAGES.
It should be emphasized that the present case stemmed from a Complaint for Rescission of
Agreement, Recovery of Possession of Parcels of Land, Removal of Tower and Transmission
Lines, Damages and Other Reliefs filed by the Capin against NPC. It was an ordinary civil
action for the rescission of Capins agreement with NPC, as well as recovery of the
possession of the lots taken, for failure of petitioner to comply with its obligation to pay just
compensation for the respondents properties. Payment of just compensation or damages was
an alternative remedy, akin to specific performance by the NPC of its obligation under its
agreement with respondents, which would prevent the rescission of the agreements altogether
and the return of the possession of the properties to Capin. The parties, at the Pre-Trial
Conference, implicitly agreed to pursue the remedy for payment of damages rather than
rescission of the agreement.
Clearly, the proceedings before the RTC were not for expropriation , but were for damages,
to which Section 5, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court is irrelevant. Reference may be
made to National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals. In the said case, after therein
petitioner NAPOCOR withdrew its second Petition for Expropriation, what was left for the
trial courts determination was the counterclaim of therein private respondent Antonino
Pobre, contained in his Motion to Dismiss, for damages. The Court ruled therein:
This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for expropriation. Since
this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages , the provisions of the Rules of Court on the
ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for
instance, was dispensable.
Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer
of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on
property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the
term expropriation.
Apo Fruits v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, December 4, 2009

Facts
Apo Fruits (AFC) and Hijo Plantation (HPI) offered to sell land to the government through
DAR pursuant to CARP. DAR issued a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) in favor of AFC and
HPI in order to pay for the lands for 165,000 per hectare. This was rejected for being
unreasonably low. As such, DAR directed Land Bank (LBP) to deposit amounts in the
accounts of AFC and HPI. They each withdrew the amounts. Thereafter, TCT was issued in
favor of DAR which would be distributed to the farmers.
Later, AFC and HPI filed separate Complaints for Determination of Just Compensation in the
DARAB. Since DARAB did not act on the complaints for more than 3 years, 2 complaints
were then filed with the RTC and the cases were consolidated. RTC ruled in favor of AFC
and HPI and ordered just compensation of 1.383 Billion in T-Bills, interests, attys fees, costs,
and Commissioners fees. Lanbnd Banks MR was denied. Thus, Land Bank filed a Notice of
Appeal. However, pending appeal, a case was decided stating that the mode of appeal from
the RTC as Special Agrarian Court should be via Petition for Review. So, RTC denied the
appeal. In the CA, RTCs order was nullified. AFC and HPIs MR was denied. Thus, they
went up to the SC via Rule 45.
SC partially granted Petition. When Land Bank filed an MR, SC deleted the interest rate and
attorneys fees. So, AFC and HPI filed their MR which was denied by the SC. Thereafter,
judgment was entered. Unfazed, AFC and HPI still filed a Motion for Leave to File and
Admit a 2nd MR regarding the denial of the award of interest and attorneys fees.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT AFC AND HPI ARE ENTITLED LEGAL INTEREST AND
ATTORNEYS FEES.
Held
NO. LAND BANK ALREADY PAID JUST COMPENSATION WITHOUT UNDUE
DELAY.
AFC and HPI are not entitled to recover interest on the just compensation and attorneys fees.
The taking of property under CARL is an exercise by the State of the power of eminent
domain.
Just compensation is fixed at the time of the actual taking by the State. Thus, if property is
taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over
the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value, to be computed from
the time the property is taken up to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited
with the court.
Interest is to be imposed on the just compensation only in case of delay in its payment, which
fact must be sufficiently established. The history of this case proves that Land Bank did not
incur delay in the payment of the just compensation. As earlier mentioned, after AFC and
HPI voluntarily offered to sell their lands on October 12, 1995, DAR referred their VOS
applications to Land Bank for initial valuation. Land Bank initially fixed the just
compensation at P165,484.47/hectare, that is, P86,900,925.88, for AFC, and
P164,478,178.14, for HPI. However, they both rejected Land Banks initial valuation,
prompting Land Bank to open deposit accounts in the their names , and to credit in said
accounts the amounts equivalent to their valuations . Although AFC withdrew the amount of
P26,409,549.86, while HPI withdrew P45,481,706.76, they still filed with DARAB separate
complaints for determination of just compensation.
The Third Division justified its deletion of the award of interest thuswise:
AFC and HPI now blame LBP for allegedly incurring delay in the determination and payment of just
compensation. However, the same is without basis as AFC and HPIs proper recourse after rejecting the initial
valuations of respondent LBP was to bring the matter to the RTC acting as a SAC, and not to file two
complaints for determination of just compensation with the DAR, which was just circuitous as it had already
determined the just compensation of the subject properties taken with the aid of LBP.
Republic v. Holy Trinity Development Corp., G.R. No. 172410, April 14, 2008
Facts
The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) sought to expropriate parcels of land to construct the
NLEX. Thus, it filed Consolidated Complaints for Expropriation in the RTC of Malolos.
Holy Trinity Realty was one of the respondents. In accordance with RA 8974 (An Act to
Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site, or Location for National Government
Infrastructure Projects and for Other Purposes), TRB made a deposit of 28M in the DPWH
account in Land Bank. Thereafter, TRB filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a
Writ of Possession since it already made a deposit and, thus, pursuant to Rule 67 Sec 2, the
issuance of the Writ if ministerial.
RTC grante the motion. However, the landowners did not voluntary vacate the properties. So,
they sought help from the PNP. Later on, Holy Trinity filed a Motion to Withdraw the
Deposit in the RTC and sought to withdraw the principal amount and any interest accruing
thereon. Withdrawal of the principal was allowed but the withdrawal of the accrued interest
was still to be determined in a proceeding. Pending the proceedings, the account earned
interest. Then, RTC ruled that said interests belonged to Holy Trinity pursuant to the
principle of accession. TRBs MR was granted and stated that the issue as to interest should
be determined before the Board of Commissioners. Holy Trinity filed an MR but was denied.
On certiorari, CA granted the petition and ruled that the intresest belonged to Holy Trinity by
accession. Hence, this petition. TRB contends that pursuant to RA 8974 and Rule 67 Sec 2,
the landowner is entitled to an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for
purposes of taxation/current zonal valuation of the BIR.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT INTEREST ACCRUED FROM THE DEPOSIT MADE IN THE
EXPROPRIATION CASE BELONGED TO THE LANDOWNER.
Held
YES.
At the outset, we call attention to a significant oversight in the TRBs line of reasoning. It
failed to distinguish between the expropriation procedures under Republic Act No. 8974 and
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
speak of different procedures, with the former specifically governing expropriation
proceedings for national government infrastructure projects . Thus, in Republic v. Gingoyon,
we held:
There are at least TWO CRUCIAL DIFFERENCES between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No.
8974 and Rule 67. Under the STATUTE, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the
property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in RULE 67, the
Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. Moreover,
Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market
value of the property as stated in the tax declaration OR the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the
replacement cost method.
If expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national
infrastructure projects , the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule
67 continues to apply. There is no question that the proceedings in this case deal with the
expropriation of properties intended for a national government infrastructure project.
Therefore, the RTC correctly applied the procedure laid out in Republic Act No. 8974, by
requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the properties
sought to be expropriated before the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the Republic.
Landowner owns the interest
Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency of the government pays
just compensation twice:
1. Immediately upon the filing of the complaint, where the amount to be paid is 100% of
the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR
(initial payment); and
2. When the decision of the court in the determination of just compensation becomes
final and executory, where the implementing agency shall pay the owner the
difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined
by the court (final payment).
Holy Trinity never alleged that it was seeking interest because of delay in either of the two
payments enumerated above. In fact, Holy Trinitys cause of action is based on the prompt
initial payment of just compensation, which effectively transferred the ownership of the
amount paid to it. Being the owner of the amount paid, Holy Trinity is claiming, by the right
of accession, the interest earned by the same while on deposit with the bank.
That the expropriation account was in the name of DPWH, and not of HTRDC, is of no
moment. Considering that the expropriation account is in the name of DPWH, then, DPWH
should at most be deemed as the trustee of the amounts deposited in the said accounts
irrefragably intended as initial payment for the landowners of the properties subject of the
expropriation, until said landowners are allowed by the RTC to withdraw the same.
Judicial Foreclosure (Rule 68)

Huerta Alba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128567, September 1, 2000
Facts
Huerta Alba mortgage 4 parcels of land in favor of Intercon Fund Resource Inc. The latter
assigns its rights over the mortgage to Syndicated Management. Syndicated filed a Complaint
for Judicial Foreclosure against Huerta Alba to foreclose on said properties. RTC, CA, and
the SC all ruled in favor of Syndicated. Thereafter, the decision became final and executory
and was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
As such, Syndicated filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution in the RTC which
was granted. Huerta Alba sought nullify the other by filing a Motion to Quash contending
that the 150-day period for Equity Redemption has not yet lapsed. However, RTC denied
this. On appeal, CA dismissed the appeal. Consequently, Huerta Alba filed in the CA a
Motion for Clarification as regards the commencement of the 1-year period for the Right of
Redemption of the properties in question. Again this was denied. Hence, this petition. Huerta
Alba contends that it should be allowed to redeem the properties within 1 year from the sale
as a result of a foreclosure of mortgage
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT HUERTA ALBA IS ENTTILED TO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
UNDER THE GENERAL BANKING ACT
Held
NO.
From the various decisions, resolutions and orders a quo it can be gleaned that what Huerta
Alba has been adjudged to have was only the equity of redemption over subject properties.
On the distinction between the equity of redemption and right of redemption, the case of
Gregorio Y. Limpin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, comes to the fore. Held the Court in
the said case:
The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different from and should not be confused with the right of redemption.
The RIGHT OF REDEMPTION in relation to a mortgage understood in the sense of a prerogative to
reacquire mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure sale exists only in the case of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE except
only where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking institution .
Where a mortgage is FORECLOSED EXTRAJUDICIALLY, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor the right of
redemption within one (1) year from the registration of the sheriffs certificate of foreclosure sale. Where the
FORECLOSURE IS JUDICIALLY EFFECTED, however, no equivalent right of redemption exists. The law
declares that a judicial foreclosure sale, when confirmed by an order of the court, x x shall operate to divest the
rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption
as may be allowed by law. Such rights exceptionally allowed by law (i.e., even after confirmation by an order
of the court) are those granted by the charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the
General Banking Act (R.A. 337).
These laws confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the
right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure after confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale
which right may be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date of registration of the
certificate of sale in the Registry of Property. But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of
judicial foreclosure of a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or banking institution. In such a
case, the foreclosure sale, when confirmed by an order of the court shall operate to divest the rights of all the
parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser.
There then exists only what is known as the equity of redemption . This is simply the right of the defendant
mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within
the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final , in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure
sale but prior to its confirmation. After such order of confirmation, no redemption can be effected any longer.
Bacaling v. Muya, G.R. No. 148404, April 11, 2002

Facts
Sps. Bacaling owned parcels of land which they subdivided into 110 sub-lots. Later, the
Bureau of Lands approved the subdivision plan for purposes of developing it into a low-cost
housing residential community known as the Bacaling-Moreno Subdivision. To get funds for
the development, Bacaling obtained a loan from GSIS. To secure said loan, Bacaling
executed in favor of GSIS a REM over the said property. However, the Bacalings were not
able to pay. Consequently, in 1961, GSIS foreclosed on the lots. The case reached all the way
to the SC. It was only in 1989 wherein Bacaling was restored as the owner.
Meanwhile, while the case was pending, a dispute over the property arose between Bacaling
and Muya. Bacaling claims that Muya clandestinely entered and occupied the property. On
the other hand, Muya claims that they started out as assigns as tenat-tillers of the land and
eventually became agricultural tenants under a leasehold. As such, they were able to secure
Certificates of Land Transfer in their names. After the SC case ruled in favor of Bacaling, the
latter filed a Petition for Cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer against Muya in the
DAR. However, this was dismissed. As a result, Bacaling appealed to the Office of the
President which reversed the DAR and ordered the cancellation of said Certificates.
Aggrieved, Muya appealed to the CA. CA reversed the OP and validated the Certificates.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT MUYA ET AL ARE AGRICULTURAL TENANTS
Held
NO.
The requisites in order to have a valid agricultural leasehold relationship are:

1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2. The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land;
3. There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4. The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
6. The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
We find that the first, third and sixth requisites are lacking in the case at bar. One legal
conclusion adduced from the facts in Government Service Insurance System v. Court of
Appeals provides that GSIS, not Bacaling, was the owner of the subject properties from 1961
up to 1989 as a result of the foreclosure and confirmation of the sale of the subject properties.
Although the confirmation only came in 1975, the ownership is deemed to have been vested
to GSIS way back in 1961, the year of the sale of the foreclosed properties. This is due to the
fact that the date of confirmation by the trial court of the foreclosure sale retroacts to the date
of the actual sale itself.
Thus, Muya cannot validly claim that they are legitimate and recognized tenants of the
subject parcels of land for the reason that their agreement to till the land was not with GSIS,
the real landowner. There is no showing that GSIS consented to such tenancy relationship nor
is there proof that GSIS received a share in the harvest of the tenants. Consequently, Muya
cannot claim security of tenure and other rights accorded by our agrarian laws considering
that they have not been validly instituted as agricultural lessees of the subject parcels of land.
And from the time Bacaling recovered the subject properties from GSIS up to the time the
former changed her legal position in the instant case, Bacaling has consistently disclaimed
Muya as her alleged tenants. Bacalings current legal posture cannot also overturn our finding
since, as earlier mentioned, the said change of mind of Bacaling has little or no evidentiary
weight under the circumstances.
Monzon v. Relova, G.R. No. 171827, September 17, 2008

Facts
Monzon executed separate PNs in favor of Spouses Relova and Spouses Perez. Said PNs
were secured by REM over separate lots in Tagaytay. Thereafter, Deeds of Sale were
executed in favor of Relova and Perez. As it happens, Monzon previously mortgaged both
properties in favor of Coastal Lending Corp to secure its indebtedness with the latter. Since
Monzon defaulted on its obligation to pay Coastal, the latter Extrajudicially Foreclosed on
the mortgage which covered both lots.
Addio Properties acquired the lots at auction. However, there was a residue because the bid
price exceeded the mortgage debt. Consequently, Relova and Perez filed a Petition for
Injunction against Monzon and the Clerk of Court of RTC of Tagaytay and claimed that the
residue be delivered to them pursuant to Rule 68 Section 4. In its Answer, Monzon claimed
that the Petition failed to state a cause of action. RTC ruled in favor of Relova and Perez. On
appeal, CA dismissed.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT RELOVA AND PEREZ ARE ENTITLED TO THE RESIDUE
PURSUANT TO SEC 4 OF RULE 68.
Held
NO. THIS IS A CASE FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE.
Rule 68 governs the judicial foreclosure of mortgages. Extrajudicial foreclosure of

mortgages, which was what transpired in the case at bar, is governed by Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7353, Section 18 of Republic Act
No. 7906, and Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791. A.M. No. 9910050, issued on 14
December 1999, provides for the procedure to be observed in the conduct of an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale.
Thus, we clarified the different types of sales in Supena v. De la Rosa, to wit:

We have three different types of sales, namely: an ordinary execution sale , a judicial foreclosure sale , and an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. An ORDINARY EXECUTION SALE is governed by the pertinent provisions of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments. Rule 68 of the Rules,
captioned Foreclosure of Mortgage, governs JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE SALES. On the other hand, Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special
Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages, applies in cases of EXTRAJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE SALES of real estate mortgages.
Unlike Rule 68, which governs judicial foreclosure sales, neither Act No. 3135 as amended, nor A.M. No.
9910050 grants to junior encumbrancers the right to receive the balance of the purchase price. The only right
given to second mortgagees in said issuances is the RIGHT TO REDEEM the foreclosed property pursuant to
Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118,
Even if, for the sake of argument, Rule 68 is to be applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, such right
can only be given to second mortgagees who are made parties to the (judicial) foreclosure. While a second
mortgagee is a proper and in a sense even a necessary party to a proceeding to foreclose a first mortgage on real
property, he is not an indispensable party , because a valid decree may be made, as between the mortgagor and
the first mortgagee, without regard to the second mortgage; but the consequence of a failure to make the second
mortgagee a party to the proceeding is that the lien of the second mortgagee on the equity of redemption is not
affected by the decree of foreclosure.
In view of the foregoing discussions, we find that Relova and Perez do not have a cause of
action against the Clerk of Court for the delivery of the subject amounts on the basis of
Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, for the reason that the foregoing Rule does not
apply to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.
CASE MAY PROSPER AS TO MONZON
However, while the case should indeed be dismissed insofar as Atty. Luna is concerned, the
same is not necessarily true with respect to Monzon. Other than Relovas prayer that the
amount due to them be delivered by Atty. Luna to them, they also pray for a judgment
declaring Monzon liable for such amounts. Said prayer, as argued by Monzon herself, may
constitute a cause of action for collection of sum of money against Monzon.
The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and bring,
instead, an ordinary action to recover the indebtedness with the right to execute a judgment
thereon on all the properties of the debtor including the subject matter of the mortgage,
subject to the qualification that if he fails in the remedy elected by him, he cannot pursue
further the remedy he has waived.
However, due to the fact that construing Relovas Petition for Injunction to be one for a
collection of sum of money would entail a waiver by Relova of the mortgage executed over
the subject properties, we should proceed with caution before making such construction. We,
therefore, resolve that upon the remand of this case to the trial court, Relova should be
ordered to manifest whether the Petition for Injunction should be treated as a complaint for
the collection of a sum of money.
Nagtalon v. UCPB, 2013

Facts
Nagtalon entered into a Credit Accommodation Agreement with UCBP which was secured
by a REM over parcels of land in Aklan. When Nagtalon failed to pay, UCBP extrajudicially
foreclosed on the properties. UCPB likewise bought the properties at auction. After the lapse
of the redemption period without redemption being made, UCPB consolidated ownership
over the properties. Also, they filed an Ex Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession with the RTC.
As a result, Nagtalon opposed on the ground that there was a civil case pending assailing the
validity of the Credit Accommodation Agreement. Consequently, RTC held in abeyance the
Writ of Possession on the ground of prematurity due to the pendency of the civil case. MR
was denied. On appeal, CA reversed stating that the issuance of the Writ was ministerial and
ordered the RTC to issue the same. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE CAN BAR THE
ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION.
Held
NO. WRIT OF POSSESSION MUST ISSUE. IT IS A MINISTERIAL FUNCTION OF THE RTC.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a
public auction is a ministerial function of the court, which cannot be enjoined or restrained, even by
the filing of a civil case for the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure and consequent auction sale .
We have long recognized the rule that once title to the property has been consolidated in the buyers
name upon failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property within the 1-year redemption period, the
writ of possession becomes a MATTER OF RIGHT belonging to the buyer. Consequently, the buyer
can demand possession of the property at anytime.
Its right to possession has then ripened into the right of a confirmed absolute owner and the issuance
of the writ becomes a ministerial function that does not admit of the exercise of the courts discretion.
The court, acting on an application for its issuance, should issue the writ as a matter of course and
without any delay.
A writ of possession may be issued either:

1. Within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or
2. After the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond.
PENDING CASE NOT A BAR
In the case of Spouses Montano T. Tolosa and Merlinda Tolosa v. United Coconut Planters Bank, a
case closely similar to the present petition, the Court explained that a pending action for annulment of
mortgage or foreclosure (where the nullity of the loan documents and mortgage had been alleged)
does not stay the issuance of a writ of possession. It reiterated the wellestablished rule that as a
ministerial function of the court, the judge need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the
manner of its foreclosure, as these are the questions that should be properly decided by a court of
competent jurisdiction in the pending case filed before it. It added that questions on the regularity and
the validity of the mortgage and foreclosure cannot be invoked as justification for opposing the
issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the new owner.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE MINISTERIAL ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION

1. Gross inadequacy of purchase price
2. Third party claiming right adverse to debtor/mortgagor

3. Failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to mortgagor
Judicial Partition (Rule 69)

Sepulveda v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005
Ejectment (Rule 70)

Inocencio v. Hospicio de San Jose, 2013
Serrano v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 162366, November 10, 2006
Esteban v. Marcelo, 2013
Philippine Tourism Authority v. Sabandal-Herzentiel, 2013
Contempt (Rule 71)

Curata v. PPA, G.R. No. 154211, June 22, 2009
Fuentes v. Albarracin, A.M. RTJ 05-1587, April 15, 2005
Criminal Procedure Syllabus40
Complaint or Information (Rule 110)

People v. Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647
Facts
Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count
of attempted rape in the complaints which read as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of December 1995, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 12 years of age, against her will and
consent.
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar
Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but
nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of
cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the complainant's mother.
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The trial court found the testimony of complainant to be spontaneous and credible. She narrated the
obscene details of her harrowing experience which no girl of tender age would have known unless she
herself had experienced it. It found the delay in reporting the rape understandable due to the fear
complainant had of her father who had moral ascendancy over her. Also, the quarrel between
complainant's parents was not sufficient motive for the wife to lodge a serious charge of rape against
appellant. It disregarded the Compromise Agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sumbong
since complainant was not assisted by a lawyer when she signed the same. Besides, she testified in
open court that she was pursuing the case against her father. The trial court found the accused guilty.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court.
Issue
Whether or not the accused can be convicted of the 2nd count of attempted rape.
Held
No.
We affirm the trial court's conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150 for the crimes of rape
committed in September 1993 and on December 29, 1995. However, we acquit appellant in Criminal
Case No. 96-151 for the crime of attempted rape for failure to allege in the complaint the specific acts
constitutive of attempted rape.
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being
40
Most of the digests here are edited Roco digests.
mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element
of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the
accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.
The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does not allege specific
acts or omission constituting the elements of the crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient
allegation of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein
that the appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the complainant does not satisfy the test of
sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the one who drafted
the complaint. This insufficiency therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of
conviction; otherwise we would be violating the right of the appellant to be informed of the nature of
the accusation against him.
Sasot v. People, 462 SCRA 138

Facts
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation pursuant to a complaint by the
NBA Properties, Inc., against petitioners for possible violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal
Code on unfair competition. The NBI stated that petitioners are engaged in the manufacture, printing,
sale, and distribution of counterfeit NBA garment products. Hence, it recommended petitioners
prosecution for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
In a Special Power of Attorney, Rick Welts, as President of NBA Properties, Inc., constituted the law
firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell, as the companys attorney-in-fact,
and to act for and on behalf of the company, in the filing of criminal, civil and administrative
complaints, among others. The Special Power of Attorney was notarized by Nicole Brown of New
York County and certified by Norman Goodman, County Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme Court of
the State of New York. Consul Cecilia B. Rebong of the Consulate General of the Philippines, New
York, authenticated the certification. Welts also executed a Complaint-Affidavit before Notary Public
Nicole J. Brown of the State of New York.
Thereafter, Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez recommended the filing of an Information
against petitioners for violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.[6] The accusatory portion
of the Information reads:
Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the following grounds:
I. THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE
II. AND THIS HONORABLE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED OR
THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED
In support of the foregoing, petitioners argue that the fiscal should have dismissed Weltss complaint
because under the rules, the complaint must be sworn to before the prosecutor and the copy on record
appears to be only a fax transmittal.
The trial court denied petitioners motion to quash.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) which was
dismissed.
Issue
Whether or not the motion to quash should be granted.
Held
No.
The Court does not find any justification for the quashal of the Information filed against petitioners.
For one, while petitioners raise in their motion to quash the grounds that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person
of the accused, their arguments focused on an alleged defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal,
complainants capacity to sue and petitioners exculpatory defenses against the crime of unfair
competition.
Nowhere in the rules is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal and the
complainants capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to quash.
For another, under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint is
substantially sufficient if it states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by
complainants affidavit and his witnesses and supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to
before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their
absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally examined the affiants
and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. All these have
been duly satisfied in the complaint filed before Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez. It
must be noted that even the absence of an oath in the complaint does not necessarily render it invalid.
Want of oath is a mere defect of form, which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on
the merits.
In this case, Weltss Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by Notary Public Nicole

Brown of the State of New York that the same has been subscribed and sworn to before her on
February 12, 1998, duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate. While the copy on record of the
complaint-affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy thereof, Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez stated
that complainants representative will present the authenticated notarized original in court, and
Prosecutor Guray manifested that the original copy is already on hand. It is apt to state at this point
that the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties and
functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy.
Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave
abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court
should respect such determination.
More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Article 189 of the Revised Penal
Code is a public crime. It is essentially an act against the State and it is the latter which principally
stands as the injured party. The complainants capacity to sue in such case becomes immaterial.
Lasoy v. Zenarosa, 455 SCRA 360

Facts
After an information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned, pleaded guilty and were
convicted and after they had applied for probation, may the information be amended and the accused
arraigned anew on the ground that the information was allegedly altered/tampered with?
In an Information accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were charged as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully sell or
offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said
law.
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced.
On the same date, both accused applied for probation.
Plaintiff People of the Philippines filed two separate motions, first, to admit amended Information,
and second, to set aside the arraignment of the accused, as well as the decision of the trial court. In
plaintiffs motion to admit amended information, it alleged:
1. That for some unknown reason both accused herein were charged of (sic) Violation of Sec. 4,
Art. II, R.P. 6425.
2. That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having
been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully sell, or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.
3. When in truth and in fact the said accused should be charged for transportation and delivery,
with intent to sell and to gain, of Forty-Five (45) pieces of dried marijuana fruiting tops
weighing 42.410 kilos from La Trinidad to Metro Manila.
The Motion to Admit Amended Information was DENIED, as the court had already decided this case
on the basis that the accused was arrested in possession of 42.410 grams of marijuana and it is too late
at this stage to amend the information.
However, the trial court resolved the second motion in the following manner:
The Motion to Set Aside the Arraignment of the Accused as well as the Decision is hereby GRANTED, the
jurisdiction over drug of small quantity as in the case at bar should be tried by the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Another information (with the correct word kilos) was filed. Both accused filed a Motion to Quash.
The trial court denied accuseds motion to quash, and scheduled the arraignment of the accused under
the amended information.
Issue
Whether or not the first information is valid.
Held
Yes.
FIRST, it cannot be denied that the request for appropriate inquest proceedings addressed to the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City and received by Prosecutor Querijero, stated that the accused were
apprehended for conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with each other in facilitating and
effecting the transportation and delivery . . . of fortyfive pieces of dried marijuana leaves (already in
bricks) and weighing approximately forty-five kilos.
In the joint affidavit of the poseur-buyer, PO3 Ernesto Jimenez Viray, Jr., and arresting officer SPOI
Inadio U. Ibay, Jr., it is stated that the accused were caught with approximately 45 kilos of dried
marijuana fruiting tops. For some unknown reasons, however, the Information filed against the
accused reflected a much lesser quantity, i.e., 42.410 grams.
The question is whether this is sufficient to consider the first Information under which the accused
were arraigned invalid.
If the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know
what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that
the information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the information.
The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law.
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the first information is valid inasmuch as it
sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that
is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied with.
Furthermore, the first information, applying Rule 110 Section 6, shows on its face that it is valid.
People v. Batin, G.R. No. 177223, November 28, 2007

Facts
We are reviewing herein the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, convicting father and son, Castor and Neil Batin, of the crime of
murder. The conviction was for the killing of one Eugenio Refugio.
The Information against Castor and Neil Batin was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City, alleging as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of October, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and with
evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one EUGENIO
REFUGIO y ZOSA, by then and there shooting him with a handgun, hitting him on the right side of his
stomach, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Eugenio Refugio y Zosa, in such amount as
may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Castor and Neil Batin entered pleas of not guilty.
The trial court rendered its Decision finding both accused guilty of murder, qualified by treachery.
Neil and Castor Batin filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. However, accused Neil Batin filed an
Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The People interposed no objection to the Motion, which was
granted.
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision affirming, with modification, the Decision of the
trial court.
Issue
Whether or not treachery was sufficiently alleged.
Held
Yes.
According to the trial court, treachery was attendant in the killing of Eugenio because Castor ordered
Neil to fire at Eugenio after they clearly saw that he was still leaning against the mango tree and being
restrained by Josephine who had her arms on his shoulders. Thereby, the accused insured their safety
from any defensive or retaliatory act of Eugenio who, in that position of helplessness and
unpreparedness, obviously had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate even if he wanted to.
The accused thus consciously used the firearm to assault from a distance, all the more to enhance the
chances of killing the victim without risk to themselves.
Castor does not refute the above findings of the trial court that treachery was sufficiently proven
during the trial. All that Castor claims before us is that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
not specifically alleged in the Information. Castor claims that this charge does not allege the specific
treacherous acts of the accused. According to Castor, the allegation therein that the accused with
treachery x x x, attack, assault and employ personal violence is a mere conclusion of law by the one
who drafted the said Information. Hence, it did not satisfy the test of sufficiency of Information as
provided in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
We hold that the allegation of treachery in the Information is sufficient. Jurisprudence is replete with
cases wherein we found the allegation of treachery sufficient without any further explanation as to the
circumstances surrounding it. Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information because these
are matters of defense. Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be
proved during the trial.
People v. Cachapero, G.R. No. 153008, May 20, 2004

Facts
Larry Cachapero y Basilio appeals the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) finding him guilty
of rape.
The Information charged appellant in these words:

"That sometime in March 1998, in the Municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously by means of force and intimidation succeed in having sexual intercourse with Anna Laurence
Toledo, a 7-year old minor."
Upon his arraignment appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. After trial in due
course, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision.
Issue
Whether or not the information is fatally defective for failing to allege the precise hour of the rape.
Held
No.
Contending that time is a material ingredient of rape, appellant argues that the Information was fatally
defective for failing to state the precise hour when the crime was committed. Such infirmity, he
added, jeopardized his right to be properly informed of the charge against him.
We disagree. The time of occurrence is not an essential element of rape. This being so, its precise date
and hour need not be alleged in the complaint or information.
The Information in this case alleged that the crime was committed "sometime in March 1998" which,
according to private complainant, was more or less at the closing of the school year. Being reasonably
definite and certain, this approximation sufficiently meets the requirement of the law. After all,
Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court merely requires that the information must state, among
others, the approximate time of the commission of the offense.
Moreover, objections as to the form of the complaint or information cannot be made for the first time
on appeal. If the present appellant found the Information insufficient, he should have moved before
arraignment either for a bill of particulars, for him to be properly informed of the exact date of the
alleged rape; or for the quashal of the Information, on the ground that it did not conform with the
prescribed form. Having failed to pursue either remedy, he is deemed to have waived objection to any
formal defect in the Information.
By cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and presenting evidence for the defense, appellants
counsel actively took part in the trial. Furthermore, the defense never objected to the presentation of
the prosecution evidence proving that the offense had been committed in March 1998. Appellant has
not shown that he was deprived of a proper defense, for he was in fact able to foist an alibi. It cannot
be said, therefore, that his constitutionally protected right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him has been violated.
Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 189343, July 10, 2013

Facts
An Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan against Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca.
That on or about the 5th and subsequent thereto, at Cebu City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, ALAN C. GAVIOLA, EUSTAQUIO B. CESA,
BENILDA N. BACASMAS and EDNA J. JACA, public officers, being then the City Administrator, City
Treasurer, Cash Division Chief and City Accountant, respectively, of the Cebu City Government, in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to Office, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping with each other [sic], with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and with gross
inexcusable negligence, did then and there allow LUZ M. GONZALES, Accountant I, Disbursing Officer-
Designate of the Cebu City Government, to obtain cash advances despite the fact that she has previous
unliquidated cash advances, thus allowing LUZ M. GONZALES to accumulate Cash Advances amounting to
NINE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED TEN day of March 1998, and for sometime prior THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO PESOS AND 60/100 (P9,810,752.60), PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, which remains
unliquidated, thus accused in the performance of their official functions, had given unwarranted benefits to LUZ
M. GONZALES and themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government, particularly the Cebu City
Government.
The Sandiganbayan did not give credence to the defense of the accused, but instead afforded
significant weight to the COA Narrative Report submitted in evidence. It found that the accused, as
public officers, had acted with gross inexcusable negligence by religiously disregarding the
instructions for preparing a disbursement voucher and by being totally remiss in their respective
duties and functions under the Local Government Code of 1991. Their gross inexcusable negligence
amounted to bad faith, because they still continued with the illegal practice even if they admittedly
had knowledge of the relevant law and COA rules and regulations. The Sandiganbayan held that the
acts of the accused had caused not only undue injury to the government but also gave unwarranted
benefit to Gonzales by allowing her to obtain cash advances to which she was not entitled. Lastly, it
found conspiracy to be present in the acts and omissions of the accused showing that they had
confederated, connived with, and mutually helped one another in causing undue injury to the
government through the loss of public money.
Gaviola, Cesa, Bacasmas, and Jaca individually filed their Motions for Reconsideration. The
Sandiganbayan denied the Motions for Reconsideration of the accused. It ruled that the Information
was sufficient, because the three modes of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 commonly involved
willful, intentional, and conscious acts or omissions when there is a duty to act on the part of the
public official or employee. Furthermore, the three modes may all be alleged in one Information. The
Sandiganbayan held that the accused were all guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. The anti-graft
court also stated that the undue injury to the government was unquestionable because of the shortage
amounting to P9,810,752.60.
Issue
Whether or not the information is defective.
Held
No.
Cesa and Gaviola question the sufficiency of the Information on three grounds: first, it did not specify
a reasonable time frame within which the offense was committed, in violation of their right to be
informed of the charge against them; second, not all of the accused were named, as Gonzales was not
charged in the Information; and third, the Information did not specify an offense, because negligence
and conspiracy cannot co-exist in a crime.
The Sandiganbayan earlier held that the Information was sufficient in that it contained no inherent
contradiction and properly charged an offense. We uphold its ruling for the following reasons:
First, it is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was committed, except when it is a
material ingredient thereof. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission. Here, the date is not a material ingredient of the crime,
not having been committed on one day alone, but rather within a period of time ranging from 20
September 1995 to 5 March 1998. Hence, stating the exact dates of the commission of the crime is not
only unnecessary, but impossible as well. That the Information alleged a date and a period during
which the crime was committed was sufficient, because it duly informed petitioners that before and
until 5 March 1998, over nine million pesos had been taken by Gonzales as a result of petitioners
acts. These acts caused undue injury to the government and unwarranted benefits to the said
paymaster.
Second, Cesa contends that Gonzales should have been included in the Information, because the latter
incurred cash shortages and allegedly had unliquidated cash advances. Cesa is wrong. The
Information seeks to hold petitioners accountable for their actions, which allowed Gonzales to obtain
cash advances, and paved the way for her to incur cash shortages, leading to a loss of over nine
million pesos. Thus, the Information correctly excluded her because her alleged acts did not fall under
the crime charged in the Information.
Third and last, the Information is sufficient, because it adequately describes the nature and cause of
the accusation against petitioners, namely the violation of the aforementioned law. The use of the
three phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "inexcusable negligence" in the same
Information does not mean that three distinct offenses were thereby charged but only implied that the
offense charged may have been committed through any of the modes provided by the law. In addition,
there was no inconsistency in alleging both the presence of conspiracy and gross inexcusable
negligence, because the latter was not simple negligence.
Rather, the negligence involved a willful, intentional, and conscious indifference to the consequences
of ones actions or omissions.
Saludaga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 184537, April 23, 2010

Facts
An Information charging both petitioners with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
by causing undue injury to the government.
The Third Division granted petitioners Motion to Quash and dismissed the information for failure of
the prosecution to allege and prove the amount of actual damages caused the government, an essential
element of the crime charged.
The OSP re-filed the Information charging the petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the government.
The information, subject of the petition, now reads:

The undersigned Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses,
MAYOR QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for the violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of
Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused QUINTIN B.
SALUDAGA, a high ranking public official being then the Mayor of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and
committing the crime herein charged while in the discharge of his official administrative function, conspiring
and conniving with accused SPO2 FIEL B. GENIO, a member of Lavezares Police Force (PNP) and with the
late OLIMPIO LEGUA, a private individual, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally give unwarranted benefit or advantage to the late Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and
non-accredited NGO, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality by then and there entering into a Pakyaw
Contract with the latter for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and
Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, in the amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P48,500.00) each or a total of NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00) Philippine
Currency, without the benefit of a competitive public bidding to the prejudice of the Government and public
interest.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation.
Petitioners contend that the failure of the prosecution to conduct a new preliminary investigation
before the filing of the second Information constituted a violation of the law because the latter
charged a different offense that is, violation of Section 3(e) by giving unwarranted benefit to private
parties. Hence, there was a substitution of the first Information. They argue that assuming that no
substitution took place, at the very least, there was a substantial amendment in the new information
and that its submission should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation.
The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners motion for preliminary investigation. The graft court found
that there is no substituted information or substantial amendment that would warrant the conduct of a
new preliminary investigation.
Issue
Whether or not there was substitution of the information.
Held
No.
Petitioners were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
In a string of decisions, the Court has consistently ruled:

R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements that the public officer should
have acted by causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or by giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. The use of the disjunctive term
or connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), or as aptly held in Santiago, as two
(2) different modes of committing the offense. This does not however indicate that each mode constitutes a
distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or under both.
Contrary to the argument of petitioners, there is no substituted information. The Information dated
August 17, 2007 filed in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263 charged the same offense, that is,
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Only the mode of commission was modified.
While jurisprudence, the most recent being Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, provides that there are two
(2) acts or modes of committing the offense, thus: a) by causing any undue injury to any party,
including the government; or b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference, it does not mean that each act or mode constitutes a distinct offense. An accused may be
charged under either mode or under both should both modes concur.
Petitioners reliance on the Teehankee v. Madayag, ruling that, in substitution of information another
preliminary investigation is entailed and that the accused has to plead anew to the new information is
not applicable to the present case because, as already stated, there is no substitution of information
there being no change in the nature of the offense charged.
Consequently, petitioners cannot invoke the principle enunciated in Villaflor v. Vivar, that failure to
conduct a new preliminary investigation is tantamount to a violation of their rights. While it is true
that preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial,
the denial of petitioners claim for a new investigation, however, did not deprive them of their right to
due process. An examination of the records of the case discloses that there was a full-blown
preliminary investigation wherein both petitioners actively participated.
Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. NO. 157472, September 28, 2007

Facts
An Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner committed as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle
hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which caused his
instantaneous death.
With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. However, on the same day and after the
arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order directing the trial prosecutor to correct and
amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank
alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to
Murder.
Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word Homicide
and instead wrote the word Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information.
The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide,
with the correction of the spelling of the victims name from Escuita to Escueta.
Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy,
considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the
dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder,
the public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the
Instant Motion on the ground of double jeopardy.
The respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner stated that contrary to respondent judge's conclusion that disregard of rank
qualifies the killing to Murder, it is a generic aggravating circumstance which only serves to affect the
imposition of the period of the penalty. Petitioner also argued that the amendment and/or correction
ordered by the respondent judge was substantial; and under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done, since petitioner had already been arraigned and he would
be placed in double jeopardy.
The respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue
Whether or not the information was substituted.
Held
No.
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in amending the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge in
the Information for Homicide. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or
substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal
amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in Teehankee.
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only
change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the
Information, with the crossing out of word Homicide and its replacement by the word Murder. There
was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the
jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly the same
as those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any change in
the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying circumstance.
Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from Homicide to Murder as
purely formal.
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused
has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused.
The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no
longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have
would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory
portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide,
there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any
possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that disrespect on account of rank qualified the crime
to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance, we do not find that he
committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information after
petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was
only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner.
Cabo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NO. 169509, June 16, 2006

Facts
An information for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
was filed against petitioner and her co-accused Bonifacio C. Balahay
Petitioner filed a motion seeking the courts permission to travel abroad for a family vacation. The
Sandiganbayan granted the same. However, accused Jocelyn E. Cabo, with her express conformity,
was ordered arraigned conditionally.
Jocelyn E. Cabo pleaded not guilty to the offense charged in the Information.
Balahay filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the same does not charge any
offense. The information failed to allege that Balahay had to intervene in the said contract under the
law, in his official capacity as municipal mayor.
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution sustaining Balahays contention that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. The
Sandiganbayan, however, did not order the immediate quashal of the information. The Sandiganbayan
thus gave the prosecution a period of 15 days from notice within which to file an amended
information that is sufficient as to both form and substance.
The prosecution filed an amended information which incorporated all the essential elements of the
crime charged.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Cancel Second Arraignment on the ground that the amended information
pertained to Balahay alone. Petitioner claimed that she could no longer be re-arraigned on the
amended information since substantial amendment of an information is not allowed after a plea had
already been made thereon.
The Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution denying petitioners motion for lack of merit.
Issue
Whether or not the amendment of the information placed the petition in double jeopardy.
Held
No.
At any rate, with or without a valid plea, still petitioner cannot rely upon the principle of double
jeopardy to avoid arraignment on the amended information. In the instant case, the original
information to which petitioner entered a plea of not guilty was neither valid nor sufficient to sustain a
conviction, and the criminal case was also neither dismissed nor terminated. Double jeopardy could
not, therefore, attach even if petitioner is assumed to have been unconditionally arraigned on the
original charge.
It should be noted that the previous information in Criminal Case No. 27959 failed to allege all the
essential elements of violation of Section 3(b), R.A. No. 3019. It, in fact, did not charge any offense
and was, to all intents and purposes, void and defective. A valid conviction cannot be sustained on the
basis of such information. Petitioner was resultantly not placed in danger of being convicted when she
entered her plea of not guilty to the insufficient indictment.
Moreover, there was no dismissal or termination of the case against petitioner. What the
Sandiganbayan ordered was for the amendment of the information pursuant to the express provision
of Section 4, Rule 117.
The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the foregoing provision when petitioners co-accused filed a
motion to quash the original information on the ground that the same does not charge an offense.
Contrary to petitioners submission, the original information can be cured by amendment even after
she had pleaded thereto, since the amendments ordered by the court below were only as to matters of
form and not of substance. The amendment ordered by the Sandiganbayan did not violate the first
paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110.
In the case at bar, while certain elements of the crime charged were missing in the indictment, the
amended information did not change the nature of the offense which is for violation of Section 3(b),
R.A. No. 3019. The amended information merely clarified the factual averments in the accusatory
portion of the previous information, in order to reflect with definiteness the essential elements of the
crime charged.
An examination of the two informations in this case would justify the preceding observation. While
the first information alleged that Balahay committed the offense with the use of his influence as such
public official together with petitioner, the amended information stated that he did so in the
performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his official position, with grave abuse of
authority while conspiring and confederating with petitioner. Then too, while it was averred
previously that Balahay received and accepted the money from petitioner, with the latter giving and
granting the said amount to accused Balahay in consideration of the said accused having officially
intervened in the undertaking by the OIDCI of such contract for consultancy services, the amended
information simply specified that Balahay received the money for his own benefit or use and that the
contract mentioned in the first information was one that Balahay, in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law.
Consequently, even if we treat petitioners arraignment on the original information as unconditional,

the same would not bar the amendment of the original information under Section 14, Rule 110. Re-
arraignment on the amended information will not prejudice petitioners rights since the alterations
introduced therein did not change the nature of the crime.
All told, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the re-
arraignment of petitioner on the amended information.
Kummer v. People, G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013

Facts
The prosecution filed an information for homicide against the petitioner and Johan. Both accused
were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
The RTC found the prosecutions evidence persuasive based on the testimonies of prosecution
eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and Malana who both testified that the petitioner shot Mallo. The
testimonial evidence, coupled by the positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left hand of Johan
and on the petitioners right hand, as well as the corroborative testimony of the other prosecution
witnesses, led the RTC to find both the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. Thereafter, the prosecution amended the date of commission in the Infromation from
July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988.
Johan, still a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, was released on the recognizance of
his father, Moises Kummer. Johan subsequently left the country without notifying the court; hence,
only the petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction with the CA.
The CA rejected the petitioners arguments and affirmed the RTC judgment. In sum, the CA found
Malana and Cuntapays positive identification and the corroborative evidence presented by the
prosecution more than sufficient to convict the petitioner of the crime charged.
On further appeal to this Court, the petitioner submits the issue of whether the CA committed a
reversible error in affirming the RTCs decision convicting her of the crime of homicide.
Issue
Whether or not the change in the date is a substantial amendment.
Held
No.
Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is merely a formal
amendment, thus, no arraignment is required
The petitioner claims that she was not arraigned on the amended information for which she was
convicted. The petitioners argument is founded on the flawed understanding of the rules on
amendment and misconception on the necessity of arraignment in every case. Thus, we do not see any
merit in this claim.
A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is more
formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the
proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense.
It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense
was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. The act may be alleged to
have been committed at any time as near as to the actual date at which date the offense was
committed, as the information will permit. Under the circumstances, the precise time is not an
essential ingredient of the crime of homicide.
Having established that a change of date of the commission of a crime is a formal amendment, we
proceed to the next question of whether an arraignment is necessary.
The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This
however, we hastily clarify, pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments
that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged in the original
complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and
affect the line of defense; and do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an
amendment in the date of the commission of the offense.
We further stress that an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules,
does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an
arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, has
already been attained when the accused was arraigned the first time. The subsequent amendment
could not have conceivably come as a surprise to the accused simply because the amendment did not
charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution.
Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show that
the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one
month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence cited above, the
change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment - it does not
change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of
an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense
under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of
defenses used by the petitioner. This is also true with respect to the pieces of evidence presented by
the petitioner. The effected amendment was of this nature and did not need a second plea.
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 172476-99, September 15, 2010

Panaguiton v. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008
People v. Romuladez, G.R. No. 166510, April 29, 2009
Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.169823, September 11, 2013
Pinote v. Ayco, 477 SCRA 409
Bureau of Customs v. Whelan, G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 201141

Facts
Mark Sensing Philippines Inc (MSPI) imported pieces of finished bet slips and rolls of thermal papers
for the use of the PSCO. However, MSPI did not pay any taxes or duties. This prompted the Bureau
of Customs to file a criminal complaint before the DOJ against MSPI officers Sherman, Whelan,
Cajigal, and Lingan for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code.
After finding probable cause, the State Prosecutor recommended the filing of Information against
them. Aggrieved, Whelan et al filed a Petition for Review before the Secretary. Before it was
resolved, an Information was filed before the CTA. Later on, the Secretary resolved to reverse the
finding of probable cause and directed the withdrawal of the Information.
The Bureau filed an MR but was denied. Consequently, it elevated the case before the CA.
Meanwhile, the Prosecutor filed before the CTA a Motion to Withdraw the Information. Whelan et al
likewise moved for the dismissal of the case. CTA withdrew the Information and dismissed the case.
Thus, the Bureau filed an MR. However, CTA Noted Without Action said MR and stated that an
Entry of Judgment was already issued since the state did not file an MR. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE CTA GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT NOTED
WITHOUT ACTION THE BUREAUS MR OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASE.
Held
NO.
It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the government
whose principal power and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to
this power is the right to prosecute violators.
All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction and
control of public prosecutors. In the PROSECUTION OF SPECIAL LAWS, the exigencies of public
service sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from different government agencies
to assist the public prosecutor. The designation does not, however, detract from the public prosecutor
having control and supervision over the case.
As stated in the above-quoted ratio of the Resolution of the CTA, it noted without action the Bureaus
MR, entry of judgment having been made as no Motion for Execution was filed by the State
Prosecutor.
By merely noting without action the Bureaus MR, the CTA did not gravely abuse its discretion. For,
as stated earlier, a public prosecutor has control and supervision over the cases. The participation in
the case of private complainant (Bureau), is limited to that of a witness, both in the criminal and civil
aspect of the case.
Parenthetically, the Bureau is not represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in
instituting the present petition, which contravenes established doctrine that the OSG shall represent
the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of lawyers.
41
Roco digest.
Flores v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 188197, August 03, 2010

Facts
During the pre-incorporation stage of Enviboard Manufacturing Inc (EMI), Lim tricked Flores into
purchasing compact equipments used for the manufacture of fiber boards. He was able to persuade
Flores to purchase said equipment for 60M when the true purchase price was actually 38M.
Thus, Flores filed a complaint against Lim for estafa before the State Prosecutor of Cebu. After Lim
submitted his counter-affidavits, the prosecutor dismissed the case for lack of probable cause. So,
Flores filed a Petition for Review with the Secretary who, in turn, dismissed the petition and affirmed
the finding. Flores filed an MR. As a result, the Secretary reconsidered and directed the filing of an
Information for Other Deceits in the MTC of Cebu.
Pursuant thereto, an Information was filed in the MTC of Cebu. Lim filed an MR of the Secretarys
order. Later, the Secretary reversed its earlier finding and ordered the withdrawal of the Information.
So, the Prosecutor moved to withdraw the Information filed in the MTC. However, MTC denied the
withdrawal of the Information.
Meanwhile, a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Secretarys order directing the withdrawal of the
Information was filed in the CA by Flores. CA ruled that the Secretary did not abuse its discretion.
MR denied. Hence this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE MTCS DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW
INFORMATION RENDERED THE ISSUE RAISED IN THE CA MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
Held
YES. ONCE AN INFORMATION HAS ALREADY BEEN FILED, THE COURTS HAVE
JURISDICTION OF THE CASE AND MAY MAKE THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT FINDING OF
THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
[O]nce a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in
Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to
do with the case before it.
In this case, on a petition for review, the Secretary of Justice found probable cause for Other Deceits
against Lim; thus, the proper Information was filed in Court pursuant to the directive of the Secretary
of Justice. Upon filing of the Information, the MTCC acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Lim filed an MR of the May 31, 2006 Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. There was nothing
procedurally infirm in this course of action inasmuch as there is nothing in Crespo that bars the
Secretary of Justice from reviewing resolutions of his subordinates in an appeal or petition for review
in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice was merely advised in Crespo that, as far as practicable, he
should not take cognizance of an appeal when the complaint or information is already filed in court.
This is also true with respect to an MR before the Secretary of Justice. Review, whether on appeal or
on MR, as an act of supervision and control by the Secretary of Justice over the prosecutors, finds
basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or
negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency
may be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after
administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed. In any case, the grant of a
motion to dismiss or a motion to withdraw the information, which the prosecution may file after the
Secretary of Justice reverses the finding of probable cause, is subject to the discretion of the court.
In this case, the Secretary of Justice, reversed himself in his March 22, 2007 Resolution, and directed
the withdrawal of the Information against Lim. In compliance with this directive, the prosecutor filed
a Motion to Withdraw Information on May 3, 2007. Flores, on the other hand, filed on May 22, 2007
a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to assail the March 22, 2007 Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice. Then, on June 20, 2007, the MTCC denied the Motion to Withdraw Information
on the ground that, based on its own assessment, there exists probable cause to hold Lim for trial for
the crime of Other Deceits.
In view of the June 20, 2007 MTCC Resolution, Flores manifested before the Court of Appeals this
disposition, attaching a copy of the said Resolution to his pleading. Meanwhile, Lim filed an MR with
the MTCC. Cognizant of the pending petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals and Lims MR of
the June 20, 2007 Resolution, the MTCC suspended the proceedings before it, and deferred the
arraignment of Lim until the resolution of Flores certiorari petition of the Court of Appeals.
Verily, it bears stressing that the trial court is NOT BOUND to adopt the resolution of the Secretary
of Justice, in spite of being affirmed by the appellate courts, since it is mandated to independently
evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation
of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be an
abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.
Civil aspect of a criminal action (Rule 111)

Bun Tiong v. Balboa, G.R. No. 158177, January 28, 2008
Facts
Balboa filed an action for Collection of Sum of Money in the RTC of Manila against Lo Bun Tiong
and Teng. The amount sought covers 3 post-dated checks issued by Teng which were dishonored.
Subsequently, Balboa filed separate criminal complaints for violation of BP 22 against Teng before
the MTC of Manila in connection with the same checks.
For the civil case, the RTC found Teng and Lo Bun Tiong liable in the sum of 5M. Thereafter, in the
criminal case, the MTC acquitted Teng of the charges for failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. However, there was a finding of Tengs civil liability for the amounts covered by the checks.
Teng appealed to the RTC and prayed for the deletion of the award of civil liability in the BP 22. As
an appellate court, RTC modified the MTC decision by deleting the award of civil damages.
Meanwhile, the decision in the RTC was appealed to the CA but the CA dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the RTC decision. MR was denied. Hence, this petition. Lo Bun Tion argues that Balboa
committed forum shopping.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT BALBOA COMMITTED FORUM SHOPPING WHEN IT SEPARATELY
FILED A CRIMINAL CASE FOR VIOLATION OF BP 22 AND A CIVIL ACTION FOR SUM OF
MONEY OVER THE SAME CHECKS.
Held
NO. CASE IS GOVERNED BY THE 1985 RULES OF COURT.
There is identity of parties and causes of action between a civil case for the recovery of sum of money
as a result of the issuance of bouncing checks, and a criminal case for the prosecution of a B.P. No. 22
violation. Thus, it ordered the dismissal of the civil action so as to prevent double payment of the
claim.
Supreme Court Circular No. 5797 effective September 16, 1997, provides:
The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such action separately shall be allowed or recognized.
This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The foregoing, however, are NOT APPLICABLE to the present case. It is worth noting that Civil
Case No. 9782225 was filed on February 24, 1997, and Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78 on July 21,
1997, PRIOR to the adoption of Supreme Court Circular No. 5797 on September 16, 1997. Thus, at
the time of filing of Civil Case No. 9782225 and Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78, the governing
rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court,
Under the foregoing rule, an action for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense charged
is necessarily included in the criminal proceedings, unless (1) there is an express waiver of the civil
action, or (2) there is a reservation to institute a separate one, or (3) the civil action was filed prior to
the criminal complaint. Since Balboa instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then Civil
Case No. 9782225 may proceed independently of Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78, and there is no
forum shopping to speak of.
Even under the amended rules, a separate proceeding for the recovery of civil liability in cases of
violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when the civil case is filed ahead of the criminal case.
The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the
criminal case.
Moreover, the RTC, in its Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 0220454446, already deleted the award of
civil damages. Records do not disclose that appeal had been taken therefrom. There is, therefore, no
double recovery of the amounts covered by the checks or unjust enrichment on the part of Balboa.
Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011

Facts
An information charging Eduardo Simon with violation of BP 22 was filed in the MTC of Manila. It
alleged that Simon issued a check amounting to P336,000 in favor of Chan but was later dishonored
for insufficiency of funds. Subsequently, Chan commenced a civil action for Collection of Sum of
Money with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Attachment in the MTC of Manila against
Simon to recover the principal amount of the check.
The MTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment. Thereafter, Simon filed an Urgent Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia. On the other hand, Chan opposed said motion by contending
that there was an implied reservation to file a civil action when the information did not allege any
damage suffered as well as no evidence was adduced to prove damages.
As a result, MTC dismissed Chans complaint on the ground of litis pendentia. MR was denied. RTC
likewise affirmed the ruling. On appeal, however, CA reversed and allowed Chans complaint. MR
denied. Hence, this appeal.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT CHANS ACTION TO RECOVER THE AMOUNT OF THE UNFUNDED
CHECK WAS AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION.
Held
NO.
The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil
liability. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless
check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
However, there is NO INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION to recover the value of a bouncing check
issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The provisions of
the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case are nonetheless
applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right
of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is
simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any assumed vested
right, because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on
November 1, 1997. Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines
shall henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized.
The CAs reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez to give due course to the civil
action of Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI
Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this case, which is a
prosecution for a violation of BP 22.
Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and
distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22, the procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities
arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa,
the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an
independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, as DMPI Employees has
allowed.
In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the
reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance
of the bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation,
supra.
Asilo v. People, G.R. Nos. 159017-18, March 09, 2011

Facts
Vda. De Coronado entered into a 20-year lease contract with the Municipality of Nagcarlan wherein
Vda de Coronado would lease a portion of the Nagcarlan Public Market in which she would build her
store. Visitacion Coronado took over when her mother died. Later, there was a fire in the Nagcarlan
Public Market. Upon Visitacions request for inspection, the District Engineer reported that the store
was intact and could continue to operate.
Mayor Commendador directed that Visitacions store would be demolished. In opposition, Visitacion
replied stating that the contract is still binding. Thereafter, an order to vacate was sent. Thereafter,
Mayor Commendador was authorized to demolish the store by legal means. Pursuant thereto,
Commendador authorized the demolition with Municipal Administrator Asilo and Angeles
supervising it.
Consequently, Visitacion filed in the RTC a Complaint for Damages against Commendador, Asilo,
and Angeles. Subsequently, a criminal complaint for violation of RA 3019 was filed against
Commendador, Asilo, and Angeles before the Ombudsman. Later, an Information was filed in the
Sandiganbayan.
During arraignment, a plea of not guilty was entered. During the pendency of the case, Angeles died.
Thus, on motion by Angeles counsel and without opposition from the Prosecution, Sandiganbayan
ordered the dismissal of the case against Angeles. Soon after, Mayor Commendador also died.
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding Commendador and Asilo guilty and affirmed the dismissal
of the case as to Angeles.
On MR, counsel for the former Mayor argued the death caused the total extinguishment of his
criminal and civil liability. However, Sandiganbayan only granted the MR insofar as the
extinguishment of the criminal liability is concerned. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEATH OF THE ACCUSED EXTINGUISHED BOTH THEIR
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITIES
Held
ONLY CRIMINAL LIABILITY WAS EXTINGUISHED. THE CIVIL LIABILITY NOT ARISING
FROM DELICT SURVIVED. HOWEVER, ONLY MAYOR COMMENDADORS CIVIL
LIABILITY REMAINED BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION DID NOT CONTEST THE RULING
THAT HIS CIVIL LIABILITY WAS ALSO EXTINGUISHED.
It must be noted that when Angeles died, a motion to drop him as an accused was filed by his counsel
with no objection on the part of the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan acted favorably on the motion
and issued an Order dismissing all the cases filed against Angeles. On the other hand, when Mayor
Comendador died and an adverse decision was rendered against him which resulted in the filing of a
motion for reconsideration by Mayor Comendadors counsel, the prosecution opposed the Motion
specifying the ground that the civil liability did not arise from delict, hence, survived the death of the
accused. The Sandiganbayan upheld the opposition of the prosecution which disposition was not
appealed.
We note, first off, that the death of Angeles and of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the
case extinguished their criminal liabilities.
We now hold, as did the Sandiganbayan that the civil liability of Mayor Comendador survived his
death; and that of Angeles could have likewise survived had it not been for the fact that the resolution
of the Sandiganbayan that his death extinguished the civil liability was not questioned and lapsed into
finality.
Guidelines:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the)
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore may be pursued but only by way of filing a
SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 of the New Civil Code, which should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have extinguished the civil
liability if the same arose directly from the crime committed. However, in this case, the civil liability
is based on another source of obligation, the law on human relations.
Indeed, the basic facts of this case point squarely to the applicability of the law on human relations.
First, the complaint for civil liability was filed way AHEAD of the information on the Anti-Graft
Law. And, the complaint for damages specifically invoked Mayor Comendadors violation of
Visitacions right to due process.
The Court is in one with the prosecution that there was a violation of the right to private property of
Visitacion. The accused public officials should have accorded the spouses the due process of law
guaranteed by the Constitution and New Civil Code. The Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions as asserted
by the defense will not, as already shown, justify demolition of the store without court order.
This Court in a number of decisions held that even if there is already a writ of execution, there must
still be a need for a special order for the purpose of demolition issued by the court before the officer in
charge can destroy, demolish or remove improvements over the contested property.
People v. Bayot, G.R. No. 200030, April 18, 2012

Facts
An Information charging Bayot for raping a 44-year old woman was filed before the RTC. Trial
ensued after Bayot entered a plea of not guilty. As a matter of course, in July 2000, RTC found Bayot
guilty as charged and ordered him to pay the victim 40K as indemnity.
In 2006, on intermediate review with the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed but modified the
indemnity to 50K and added an award of moral damages amount to 50K. However, the Penal
Superintendent of Bilibid informed the CA that Bayot died in December 2004 by submitting a
Certificate of Death. Nonetheless, PAO still appealed on behalf of Bayot.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT BAYOTS DEATH EXTINGUISHED THE INDEMNITY TO THE VICTIM
Held
Yes.
Bayots death on 4 December 2004, during the pendency of his appeal before the CA, extinguished
not only his criminal liability for the crime of rape committed against AAA, but also his civil liability
solely arising from or based on said crime.
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically provides the effect of death of the
accused on his criminal, as well as civil, liability. It reads thus:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.]
The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his CRIMINAL LIABILITY,
as well as the CIVIL LIABILITY EX DELICTO. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action
is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is
on the criminal case.
Evidently, it is already unnecessary to rule on Bayots appeal. Bayots appeal was still pending and no
final judgment had been rendered against him at the time of his death. Thus, whether or not Bayot was
guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that h did incur criminal
liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death, following the
provisions of Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and this Courts ruling in People v. Bayotas.
In the same breath, the appealed Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals finding
appellant guilty of the crime of rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay
AAA P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages had become ineffectual.
People v. Tirso Velasco, G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 200042

Facts
Alex and twin brother Levi Vinculado as well as their uncle Miguel Vinculado were shot one day in
San Ildefonso, Bulacan. As a result, Alex died. Levi and Miguel were seriously injured but survived.
Consequently, 3 informations for Murder and Frustrated Murder were filed against Mayor Galvez and
his bodyguard Diego. Said cases were raffled to Judge Velascos sala in the RTC of Malolos.
In a consolidated decision, Diego was found guilty of Murder and Frustrated Murder. However,
Mayor Galvez was acquitted on all charges on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
Aggrieved, the Government challenged the acquittal of Mayor Galvez by filing a Petition for
Certiorari in the SC and ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Velasco. In order not
to violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the government based their argument in US jurisprudence
which allows review of acquittals decreed by US trial courts.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACQUITTAL OF MAYOR GALVEZ CAN BE REVIEWED DESPITE
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
Held
Yes.
It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at
the level of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the
FINALITY OF ACQUITTAL RULE in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution,
statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double
jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.
In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the
Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of MISTRIAL, as in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan. Condemning the trial before the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator
Benigno Ninoy Aquino, which resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, this Court
minced no words in declaring that:
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Courts setting aside of the trial
courts judgment of acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is
denied due process. [T]he sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial, and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the
predetermined final outcome of acquittal and absolution as innocent of all the respondent-accused[.]
Thus, the doctrine that double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial may apply only when the
Court finds that the criminal trial was a sham because the prosecution representing the sovereign
people in the criminal case was denied due process.
Petitioner assails the decision rendered by the court a quo as blatantly inconsistent with the material
facts and evidence on record, reason enough to charge respondent judge with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction resulting in a denial of due process.
The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge acquitting the accused
Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's appreciation and evaluation in esse of the evidence
adduced by the parties. A reading of the questioned decision shows that respondent judge considered
the evidence received at trial. These consisted among others of the testimonies relative to the positions
of the victims vis--vis the accused and the trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot wounds, and
42
An acquittal cannot be the subject of a motion for reconsideration
the opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution. While the appreciation thereof may have
resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does not detract from the fact that
the evidence was considered and passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from the writs
limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of and
therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not to be confused with
errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.
Ching v. Nicdao, G.R. No. 141181, April 27, 2007

Facts
Ching filed criminal complaints for violation of BP 22 against Nicdao. Thereafter, 11 Informations
were filed with the MTC of Dinalupihan. It was alleged that Nicdao borrowed money from Ching. As
a security, Nicdao issued 11 checks totaling to P20,950,000. These checks were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds.
After Nicdao entered a plea of not guilty, trial ensued. In her defense, Nicdao averred that the check
for 20M was a stolen check which she never issued in favor of Ching. Thus, Ching had no right
arising from that stolen check. Likewise, she asserted that the amounts in the 10 other checks had
already been paid.
Nonetheless, MTC found Nicdao guilty for 11 counts of violation of BP 22. On appeal, RTC affirmed
the conviction. When Nicdao appealed to the CA, CA reversed the findings and acquitted Nicdao on
all 11 counts. CA stated found that Nicdao had fully paid the loans. Moreover, it was found that the
20M check was stolen and thus Ching did not acquire any right or interest therein.
Hence, this petition. Ching asserts that, despite acquittal, Nicdao can still be held civilly liable for the
aggregate sum of 20,950,000.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT NICDAO CAN STILL BE HELD CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE AMOUNT
OF THE UNFUNDED CHECKS DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE HAD ALREADY BEEN
ACQUITTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR VIOLATION OF BP 22.
Held
NO. CIVILLY LIABILITY WAS ALSO EXTINGUISHED.
In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, the Court enunciated that the civil liability is not extinguished by
acquittal:
1. Where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt;
2. Where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only
civil in nature; and
3. Where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused
is acquitted.
Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or
where the accused did not commit the act or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of
the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both
may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
From the foregoing, Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may appeal the civil aspect
of the case notwithstanding Nicdaos acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted
with the criminal action since he did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he institute
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
With Chings timely filing of the instant petition for review of the civil aspect of the CAs decision,
the Court thus has the jurisdiction and authority to determine the civil liability of respondent Nicdao
notwithstanding her acquittal.
In order for the petition to prosper, however, it must establish that the judgment of the CA acquitting
Nicdao falls under any of the 3 categories enumerated in Salazar and Sapiera.
The Court holds that Nicdao cannot be held civilly liable to Ching.
ACQUITTAL EXTINGUISHED NICDAOS CIVIL LIABILITY
FIRST, the CAs acquittal of Nicdao is not merely based on reasonable doubt. Rather, it is based on
the finding that she did not commit the act penalized under BP 22. In particular, the CA found that the
P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check which was never issued nor delivered by Nicdao to Ching.
With respect to the ten (10) other checks, the CA established that the loans secured by these checks
had already been extinguished after full payment had been made by Nicdao.
SECOND, in acquitting Nicdao, the CA did not adjudge her to be civilly liable to Ching. In fact, the
CA explicitly stated that she had already fully paid her obligations. On the other hand, its finding
relative to the P20,000,000.00 check that it was a stolen check necessarily absolved respondent
Nicdao of any civil liability thereon as well.
THIRD, while Ching attempts to show that Nicdaos liability did not arise from or was not based
upon the criminal act of which she was acquitted (ex delicto) but from her loan obligations to him (ex
contractu), however, Ching miserably failed to prove by preponderant evidence the existence of these
unpaid loan obligations. Significantly, it can be inferred from the following findings of the CA in its
decision acquitting Nicdao that the act or omission from which her civil liability may arise did not
exist.
Generally checks may constitute evidence of indebtedness. However, in view of the CAs findings
relating to the eleven (11) checks that the P20,000,000.00 was a stolen check and the obligations
secured by the other ten (10) checks had already been fully paid by respondent Nicdao they can no
longer be given credence to establish Nicdaos civil liability to Ching. Such civil liability, therefore,
must be established by preponderant evidence other than the discredited checks.
After a careful examination of the records of the case, the Court holds that the existence of Nicdaos
civil liability to Ching in the amount of P20,950,000.00 representing her unpaid obligations to the
latter has not been sufficiently established by preponderant evidence.
Coscoluella v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.No. 191411, July 15, 2013

Facts
Coscoluella was governor of Negros Occidental for 3 full terms ending in 2001. Nacionales was his
Special Projects Division Head. Malvas was the Health Officer and Amugod was Nacionales
subordinate. A few months after his term ended, a letter-complaint was filed in the Ombudsman
asking requesting the investigation of anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment by
the province which happened a month before Coscoluellas term ended.
In 2002, a Final Evaluation Report upgraded the complaint into a criminal case. As such, Coscoluella
et al filed their counter-affidavits. In 2003, a Resolution was prepared finding probable cause against
them for violation of RA 3019 and recommended the filing of an Information. However, the final
approval came only on May 2009. Days later, an Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan.
Thus, Coscoluella et al filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that his right to speedy disposition of
cases was violated. Then, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to Quash. Aggrieved, Coscoluella
filed their MRs. However, these were denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT COSCOLUELLA ET ALS RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
WAS VIOLATED.
Held
YES. BUT THE PROVINCE CAN STILL INSTITUTE A CIVIL CASE TO RECOVER THE
PUBLIC FUNDS THAT ARE UNACCOUNTED FOR.
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties
in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-
judicial.
In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with
the administration of justice.
It must be noted, however, that the right to speedy disposition of cases should be understood to be a
relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not
be sufficient. Jurisprudence dictates that the right is deemed violated only when the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been denied his right to a speedy disposition
of a case, the following factors may be considered and balanced:
1. The length of delay;
2. The reasons for the delay;
3. The assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
4. The prejudice caused by the delay.
Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that Coscoluellas right to a speedy
disposition of their criminal case had been violated.
While the foregoing pronouncement should, as matter of course, result in the acquittal of Coscoluella
et al, it does not necessarily follow that they are entirely exculpated from any civil liability, assuming
that the same is proven in a subsequent case which the Province may opt to pursue.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that an acquittal in a criminal case does not bar the
private offended party from pursuing a subsequent civil case based on the delict, unless the judgment
of acquittal explicitly declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist. As explained in the case of Abejuela v. People, citing Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.:
The Rules provide: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the
manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered.
In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., we declared:

While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much
because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Based on the violation of Coscoluella et als right to speedy disposition of cases as herein discussed,
the present case stands to be dismissed even before either the prosecution or the defense has been
given the chance to present any evidence. Thus, the Court is unable to make a definite pronouncement
as to whether they indeed committed the acts or omissions from which any civil liability on their part
might arise as prescribed under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, absent this pronouncement, the Province is not precluded from instituting a subsequent
civil case based on the delict if only to recover the amount of P20,000,000.00 in public funds
attributable to their alleged malfeasance.
Dreamwork Construction v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009

Facts
In 2004, Dreamworks Construction, through its President and VP, filed a Complaint-affidavit for
violation of BP 22 against Janiola with the OSP of Las Pinas. Thereafter, an Information was filed in
the MTC on February 2005. Subsequently, in September 2006, Janiola instituted a civil complaint for
rescission of the construction agreement between the parties. The checks subject of the BP 22 cases
were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
Later, Janiola filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the BP 22 case on the ground of the existence
of a prejudicial question. Despite Dreamworks opposition, MTC suspended the proceedings stating
that if said agreement was rescinded and the checks are nullified for lack of consideration, the BP 22
cases must necessarily be dismissed. Moreover, it was stated that the belated filing of the civil case
does not matter because a Motion for Suspension may be filed any time before the prosecution rests.
MR denied. On appeal, RTC affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE BP 22
CASE ON THE GROUND OF EXISTENCE OF A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION WAS PROPER.
Held
NO.
CIVIL ACTION MUST PRECEDE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and the
above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The phrase, previously instituted, was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a
prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the
insertion of subsequent directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical
explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions,
that the civil action must precede the criminal action.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are
susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase previously
instituted civil action in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative
interpretations. The clause before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed in Art.
36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal
action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court
conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil
Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the
civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of
a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the
time that Janiola allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the
civil case was instituted more than two and a half years from the time that Janiola allegedly stopped
construction of the proposed building for no valid reason.
More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of
consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.
Evidently, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show that the filing of
the civil action was a mere afterthought on the part of Janiola and interposed for delay. And as
correctly argued by Dreamworks, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks
to prevent. Thus, Janiolas positions cannot be left to stand.
RESOLUTION OF CIVIL CASE IS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF THE PROSECUTION OF THE

CRIMINAL ACTION
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no
prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case.
The fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that
the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus,
this Court has held in a long line of cases that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored
checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People, we ruled:
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for
which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding
such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner.
Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010

Facts
On October 2004, Maria Pimentel filed an Action for Frustrated Parricide against Joselito Pimental,
her husband, before the RTC of QC. On February 2005, Joselito received summons to appear before
the RTC of Antipolo for Pre-Trial and trial of civil case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Art. 36 of the Family Code. Said case was filed by Maria on November 2004.
Thereafter, Joselito filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend the Proceedings before the RTC of QC on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. He stated that since relationship was a key element
in Parricide, the outcome of the Annulment case would have a bearing on the criminal case.
RTC of QC held that there was no prejudicial question. MR was denied. CA also dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari filed before it. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION OF THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE BASED ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
THAT WARRANTS THE SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR FRUSTRATED
PARRICIDE.
Held
NO.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In
this case, the Information for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC
Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC
Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q04130415 for pretrial and trial on 14 February 2005.
Joselito was served summons in Civil Case No. 047392 on 7 February 2005. Marias petition in Civil
Case No. 047392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004.
Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE NOT A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN CRIMINAL CASE
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which
punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage
is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The issue in the civil case for ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE under Article 36 of the Family Code
is whether Joselito is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The issue in PARRICIDE is whether the accused killed the victim.
In this case, since Joselito was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all
the acts of execution which would have killed Maria as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of Joselitos will. At the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, Joselito and Maria were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case
the petition in Civil Case No. 047392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was
committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between
Joselito and Maria is annulled, Joselito could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
San Miguel Properties v. Perez, G.R. No.192253, September 18, 201343

Facts
San Miguel Properties (SMP) purchased from BF Homes, then represented by a rehabilitation receiver
appointed by SEC, residential lots in BF Homes Paranaque. The transactions were embodied in 3
Deeds of Sale. The TCTs covering the first 2 Deeds of Sale were fully delivered to SMP. However,
some TCTs covered by the third Deed of Sale were not delivered. BF Homes claimed that it withheld
the delivery of the TCTs because the SEC-appointed receiver was replaced and thus had no authority
to deliver said TCTs.
As a result, in August 2000, SMP filed a complaint affidavit in the City Prosecutor of Las Pinas
charging officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of PD 957 (Subdivision Law).
At the same time, SMP sued BF Homes for Specific Performance in the HLURB to compel them to
deliver the TCTs.
Thereafter, on October 2000, the City Prosecutor dismissed SMPs criminal complaint on the ground
that there existed a prejudicial question until after the issue on liability of BF Homes was determined
by the SEC or HLURB. SMPs MR was denied. SMP appealed to the DOJ but was also denied
because of the pendency of the administrative case before the HLURB. CA likewise dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari. Hence, this appeal.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE HLURB ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BROUGHT TO COMPEL THE
DELIVERY OF THE TCTS COULD BE A REASON TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS ON
THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PREJUDICIAL QUESTION.
Held
YES.
BF Homes posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a
prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for violation of Section 25
of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San
Miguel Properties submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil
action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the
HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge
for the criminal violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because
the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere
except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.
The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question
rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so
related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of Presidential Decree No.
957, such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of
guilt in the criminal case. An examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus necessary.
An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in the
specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to
fulfill it. Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there must first be a
breach of the contract.
43
A previously instituted civil action can include an administrative action.
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots and
condominiums in view of the increasing number of incidents wherein real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide
and maintain properly the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming
magnitude of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from
liens and encumbrances. Presidential Decree No. 957 authorizes the suspension and revocation of the
registration and license of the real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers in
certain instances, as well as provides the procedure to be observed in such instances; it prescribes
administrative fines and other penalties in case of violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions.
Conformably with the foregoing, the ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE in the HLURB
would determine whether or not SMP was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20
TCTs, while the CRIMINAL ACTION would decide whether or not BF Homes directors and
officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs.
The resolution of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold
San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did
not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been
terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal
case.
Jurisdiction to Issue Hold Departure Orders

(Regular Courts Distinguished with
the Sandiganbayan)
Father Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 182161, December 03, 2009
Facts
Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege. Respondent DOJ Secretary
Raul Gonzales issued a Hold Departure Order (HDO) ordering respondent Commissioner of
Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of
national security and public safety.
After finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion, the DOJ
Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information before the Regional Trial Court.
Later, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others
for lack of probable cause.
Petitioners counsel wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of the HDO in view of the
dismissal of the Criminal Case.
Petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against
petitioner, the HDO still subsists; Petitioner was held by BID officials at the NAIA as his name is
included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been for the timely intervention of petitioners
counsel, petitioner would not have been able to take his scheduled flight to Hong Kong.
Issue
Whether or not petitioners right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the
issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Held
No.
Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole gamut of liberties
protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues that [liberty] includes the right to exist and the right
to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude and includes the right of the citizens to be free
to use his faculties in all lawful ways. Part of the right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is the
right of a person to travel.
Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his right
to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon
to rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules
thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As we have stated in Marcos
v. Sandiganbayan, a persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very
necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be
permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts sound discretion.
Here, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal
case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel
was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life,
liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the provision of Section 22 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads:
Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate
petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.
Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-Makati a
motion to lift HDO in the Criminal Case. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a
motion to lift the DOJs HDO, as his co-accused did in the same criminal case. Petitioner argues that
it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said HDO, and that it is his intention not to
limit his remedy to the lifting of the HDO but also to question before this Court the constitutionality
of the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue an HDO.
Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to separately and
directly intervene through the writ of amparo.
Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the
DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioners apprehension is at best merely speculative.
Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a
writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this
occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules
and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of
2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist
Orders and for Other Purposes).
Mondejar v. Buban, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1349, July 12, 2001

Facts
There was a criminal case for violation of BP 22 against Mondejar in the MTC of Tacloban. In said
case, Judge Buban issued a hold-departure order against her. Aggrieved, Mondejar charged Buban
with gross ignorance of the law for violating Circular 39-97. Buban admitted having issued said order
because he was not aware of said circular. Thereafter, he ordered that said hold-departure order be
lifted. The OCA recommended that Buban be severely reprimanded.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT AN MTC JUDGE CAN ISSUE A HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER
Held
NO. ONLY SECOND LEVEL COURTS CAN ISSUE HDOS. JUDGE IS REPRIMANDED.
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides that
hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
regional trial courts. Clearly then, criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts
do not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on the part of respondent judge to have
issued one in the instant case.
Mupas v. Espanol, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1850, July 14, 2004

Facts
A comlaint for syndicated estafa was filed against Eva Mahilan before the MTC of Dasmarinas in the
sala of Judge Mupas. The latter conducted Preliminary Investigation and issued a warrant of arrest
and recommended no bail. Thereafter, the private complainants filed a Motion to Transfer Malihan
from the municipal jail to the provincial jail. They likewise invoked Executive Judge Espanols
authority to supervise all detainees. Also, Malihan filed an Urgent Petition for Bail. Thus, Judge
Mupas required the private complainants to comment or oppose the Petition for Bail.
However, Judge Espanol issued orders transferring Malihan to the provincial jail and directed the
Commissioner on Immigration and Deportation to hold and prevent the departure of Malihan from the
Philippines while the case was pending.
Thus, Judge Mupas filed a complaint and charged Judge Espanol with Gross Ignorance of the Law
and Usurpation for issuing the assailed orders while the cases were still pending in the MTC.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT EXECUTIVE JUDGE ESPANOL SHOULD BE REPRIMANDED FOR
ISSUING AN HDO IN A CRIMINAL CASE PENDING PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN
THE MTC.
Held
YES. FOR AN HDO TO ISSUE, THE CRIMINAL CASE MUST BE PENDING IN THE SALA OF
THE RTC CONCERNED.
With regard to the hold-departure order, Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-
departure orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Criminal cases within
the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular. It is logical to
state that the criminal cases must be pending in the sala of the RTC concerned.
In this case, at time of the issuance of the hold departure order, the criminal cases were only in the
preliminary investigation stage in the MTC to determine whether there is reasonable ground to believe
that accused Eva Malihan is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial. Judge Mupas
findings had not yet been elevated to and reviewed by the provincial prosecutor. Espanols issuance of
the hold-departure order was therefore premature and clearly contravenes the mandate of Circular No.
39-97 proscribing the precipitate and indiscriminate issuance of hold-departure orders. All told,
Espanols claim of good intention finds no convincing justification.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by

the allegations of the Complaint
Dazon v. Yap, G.R. No. 157095, January 15, 2010
Facts
Respondent Kenneth Y. Yap was the president of Primetown Property Group, Inc., (Primetown) the
developer of Kiener Hills Mactan Condominium, a low-rise condominium project. Petitioner Ma.
Luisa G. Dazon entered into a contract with Primetown for the purchase of Unit No. C-108 of the said
condominium project. Petitioner made a downpayment and several installment payments. Primetown,
however, failed to finish the condominium project. Thus, petitioner demanded for the refund of her
payments from Primetown, pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 957 (1976),
otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree". Primetown
failed to refund petitioner's payments.
Petitioner filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Lapu-Lapu City against
respondent as president of Primetown for violation of Section 23 in relation to Section 39 of PD 957.
Subsequently, after a finding of probable cause, an Information was filed with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu
City.
Meanwhile, respondent, in connection with the resolution finding probable cause filed a Petition for
Review with the Department of Justice (DOJ). The DOJ rendered a Resolution ordering the trial
prosecutor to cause the withdrawal of the Information. Hence, the prosecutor filed a Motion to
Withdraw Information with the RTC. The RTC granted the motion.
Issue
Whether or not a regional trial court has jurisdiction over a criminal action arising from violation of
PD 957
Held
Yes.
Jurisdiction over criminal actions arising from violations of PD 957 is vested in the regular courts.
The scope and limitation of the jurisdiction of the HLURB are well-defined. Its precusor, the National
Housing Authority (NHA), was vested under PD 957 with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real
estate trade and business, specifically the registration of subdivision or condominium projects and
dealers, brokers and salesmen of subdivision lots or condominium units, issuance and suspension of
license to sell; and revocation of registration certificate and license to sell. Its jurisdiction was later
expanded under PD 1344 (1978) to include adjudication of certain cases.
Noticeably, cases that are criminal in nature are not mentioned in the enumeration quoted above. The
primordial function of the HLURB, after all, is the regulation of the real estate trade and business and
not the conviction and punishment of criminals.
Administrative agencies being tribunals of limited jurisdiction can only wield such powers as are
specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes. PD 957 makes the following specific grant of
powers to the NHA (now HLURB) for the imposition of administrative fines, and it also mentions
penalties for criminal cases.
Having limited, under Section 38 of PD 957, the grant of power to the former NHA, now HLURB,
over the imposition of fines to those which do not exceed ten thousand pesos, it is clear that the power
in relation to criminal liability mentioned in the immediately succeeding provision, to impose, upon
conviction, fines above ten thousand pesos and/or imprisonment, was not conferred on it. Section 39,
unlike Section 38, conspicuously does not state that it is the MIA that may impose the punishment
specified therein.
Not having been specifically conferred with power to hear and decide cases which are criminal in
nature, as well as to impose penalties therefor, we find that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over
criminal actions arising from violations of PD 957.
It is the RTC that has jurisdiction over criminal cases arising from violations of PD 957 based on B.P
129.
In the present case, the affidavit-complaint alleges the violation of Section 23 of PD 957 and asks for
the institution of a criminal action against respondent Yap, as President of Primetown. The Office of
the City Prosecutor found probable cause for the filing of an'Information for the subject offense. The
DOJ made no reversal of such finding of probable cause. Instead, it directed the withdrawal of the
information on the erroneous premise that it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the
case. However, as above-discussed, and contrary to the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, it is not
the HLURB but the RTC that has jurisdiction to hear the said criminal action.
Foz v. People, October 9, 2009, G.R. No. 167764

Facts
Foz and Fajardo were columnist and Editor-Publisher of Panay News, a daily publication with
considerable circulation in Iloilo. In one of its publications, it wrote an article regarding the company
doctor of SMC named Dr. Portigo who was allegedly incompetent and took advantage of the poor
employees.
As a result, an Information was filed in the RTC of Iloilo charging Foz and Fajardo with Libel. RTC
found them guilty as charged. Foz and Fajardos MR was denied. On appeal, CA affirmed the
convictions. MR denied. Hence, this petition. In Fozs reply, they raised for the first time the issue
that the Information for libel did not contain allegations to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CAN BE RAISED FOR THE
FIRST TIME IN A REPLY FILED BEFORE THE SC.
Held
YES.
In Fukuzume v. People, the Court ruled:

The rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense
charged may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.
Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the
accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.
While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was
considered to be barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case,
which justified the departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v. People
that:
The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific
rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation. In Agbayani v. Sayo, the rules on venue in Article
360 were restated as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a PUBLIC OFFICIAL or a PRIVATE PERSON, the criminal
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL, the criminal action may also be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a PUBLIC OFFICER WHOSE OFFICE IS IN MANILA at the time
of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
4. If the offended party is a PUBLIC OFFICER HOLDING OFFICE OUTSIDE OF MANILA,
the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held
office at the time of the commission of the offense.
Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the
publication of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city
where the libelous article was printed and first published, OR in the province where Dr. Portigo
actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
The allegations in the Information that Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable
circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region only showed that Iloilo was the place
where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication was
printed and first published in Iloilo City.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may also file the
libel case in the RTC of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense. The Information filed against Foz failed to allege the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the
Information alleges that Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City,
such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the
time of the commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another
place.
Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article
360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision
convicting Foz of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its
filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

People v. Sandiganbayan, August 25, 2009, G.R. No. 167304
Facts
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungson of Toledo City. She was able to get a
cash advance of P71K to defray expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection
which she headed. After 2 years later, no liquidation was made. So, the City Auditor demanded that
she paid the amount. Also, COA submitted an investigation report in the Ombudsman and
recommended that she be investigated for violations of the Auditing Code.
The Ombudsman recommended the filing of an Information for Malversation against her. Then, an
Information was filed in the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed a Motion to Defer Arraignmen
and Motion for Reinvestigation and averred that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case
because, at the time of the commission, she was then a local official occupying a position of Salary
Grade 26. Despite the opposition of the Special Prosecutor, the case was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction without prejudice. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAD JURISDICTION OVER A VIOLATION OF
THE AUDITING CODE BY A MEMBER OF THE SANGGUNIAN PANLUNGSOD WITH
SALARY GRADE 26.
Held
YES. IT FALLS UNDER SEC 4 (B)
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended. The alleged commission of
the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the
Information was on May 21, 2004.
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the TIME OF THE
INSTITUTION of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.
The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249 (amendments to P.D. No 1606), where it
expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation
of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of
the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense[.]
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public
officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception
is contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be
determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense
applies in this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of
R.A. No. 8249 shall govern.
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under
Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for
the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by,
among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may
still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are:
1. Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
2. City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
3. Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher;
4. Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
5. PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
6. City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office
of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and
7. Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office
also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, Amante, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office,
falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected
with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance,
though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the
crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is
held to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against
Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was
committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
Serrana v. Sandiganbayan, January 22, 2008, G.R. 162059

Facts
Hannah Serana was a senior student at UP-Cebu. She was appointed by Erap as a student regent of
UP. As such, she discussed with Erap her desire to renovate Vinzons Hall in UP Diliman. For this
purpose, she created the Office of the Student Regent Foundation Inc (OSRFI). Thereafter, Erap gave
OSRFI a check for 15M for the renovation of Vinzons Hall. However, no renovation took place.
The succeeding student regent filed a complaint for Malversation with the Ombudsman. Finding
probable cause, it filed an Information for estafa in the Sandiganbayan against Hannah Serana and her
brother. Serana moved to Quash the Information claiming that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over estafa cases. Sandiganbayan denied the motion. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER GOVERNMENT
SCHOLAR CHARGED WITH ESTAFA.
Held
YES.
JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS NOT SET BY RA 3019.
It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on
August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which
constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No.
3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No.
3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In
fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by Serana, deals not with the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for
their penalties.
SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER ESTAFA
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over OTHER FELONIES committed by public officials
in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the
offenses included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public
officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the
offense is committed in relation to their office.
UP STUDENT REGENT IS A PUBLIC OFFICER
It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. While the
FIRST PART of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its SECOND
PART specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27
and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Serana falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of
law.
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. Serana falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a
non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, Serana is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated
by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At
most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the
public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.
IN RELATION TO PUBLIC OFFICE
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that Serana, being then a student
regent of U.P., while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation
to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother,
JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud the government.
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not
quash the information based on this ground.
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NO. 165835, June 22, 2005

Facts
Petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership, J6, of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II of the Office of the
Ombudsman, after due investigation, filed a complaint against petitioner with public respondent
Office of the Ombudsman, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, violation of Art. 183 of the
Revised Penal Code, and violation of the Civil Service Law. A case was filed against petitioner.
Petitioners wife Clarita Depakakibo Garcia, and their three sons, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo and Timothy
Mark, all surnamed Garcia, were impleaded in the complaint for violation of R.A. No. 1379 insofar as
they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating,
using and disposing of his ill-gotten wealth.
The Republic of the Philippines, acting through public respondent Office of the Ombudsman, filed
before the Sandiganbayan, a Petition with Verified Urgent Ex Parte Application for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Attachment against petitioner, his wife, and three sons, seeking the forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired properties under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, as amended. The petition alleged that
the Office of the Ombudsman, after conducting an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation in
criminal cases, has determined that a prima facie case exists against Maj. Gen. Garcia and the other
respondents therein who hold such properties for, with, or on behalf of, Maj. Gen. Garcia, since
during his incumbency as a soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts of money and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and his other lawful
income, if any.
Acting on the Republics prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, the Sandiganbayan
issued the questioned Resolution granting the relief prayed for. Petitioner (as respondent a quo) filed a
Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 0193 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No. 1379. On even date, petitioner filed the present Petition,
raising the same issue of lack jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan.
Issue
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
Held
Yes.
In the face of the prevailing jurisprudence and the present state of statutory law on the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, petitioners argumentthat the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the
petition for forfeiture it being "civil" in nature and the Sandiganbayan allegedly having no jurisdiction
over civil actionscollapses completely.
The civil nature of an action for forfeiture was first recognized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, thus:
"[T]he rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and, therefore, civil in nature."
However, the Court has had occasion to rule that forfeiture of illegally acquired property partakes the
nature of a penalty. In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., the Court cited voluminous authorities in support of its
declaration of the criminal or penal nature of forfeiture proceedings. Cabal v. Kapunan modified the
earlier ruling in Almeda, Sr. v. Perez. The Court in Cabal held that the doctrine laid down in Almeda
refers to the purely procedural aspect of the forfeiture proceedings and has no bearing on the
substantial rights of respondents, particularly their constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The Sandiganbayan is vested with jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379, entitled "An Act
Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By
Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Proceedings Therefor." What acts would
constitute a violation of such a law? A reading of R.A. No. 1379 establishes that it does not enumerate
any prohibited acts the commission of which would necessitate the imposition of a penalty. Instead, it
provides the procedure for forfeiture to be followed in case a public officer or employee has acquired
during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property. Section
1256 of the law provides a penalty but it is only imposed upon the public officer or employee who
transfers or conveys the unlawfully acquired property; it does not penalize the officer or employee for
making the unlawful acquisition. In effect, as observed in Almeda, Sr. v. Perez, it imposes the penalty
of forfeiture of the properties unlawfully acquired upon the respondent public officer or employee.
It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the
illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty. The soundness of this reasoning becomes even more
obvious when we consider that the respondent in such forfeiture proceedings is a public officer or
employee and the violation of R.A. No. 1379 was committed during the respondent officer or
employees incumbency and in relation to his office. This is in line with the purpose behind the
creation of the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft courtto address the urgent problem of dishonesty in
public service.
Following the same analysis, petitioner should therefore abandon his erroneous belief that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over petitions for forfeiture filed against President Marcos, his
family and cronies.
Dismissal of the Complaint because of inordinate

delay
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70
Facts
In 1974, one Antonio de los Reyes filed a formal report with the Presidential Security Command
regarding Secretary Tatads (Public Information) alleged violations of RA 3019. Said report was not
acted upon until the end of 1979 when it became known that Tatad had a falling out with Marcos
which resulted in his resignation from his cabinet. As such, the complaint in 1974 was resurrected in
the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan.
Two months after Tatads resignation was accepted, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint for
investigation and report. In 1980, it was recommended that charges for violation of RA 3019 be
brought against Tatad. By 1982, all affidavits/counter affidavits were already ready for disposition by
the Tanodbayan. However, it was only in 1985 that the Tanodbayan resolved to recommend the filing
of criminal informations against Tatad. Thus, 5 Informations for violation of RA 3019 were filed
before the Sandiganbayan.
Tatad moved to Quash the informations. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to Quash and
allowed the amendment of the Tanodbayans informations. Tatad filed an MR which was denied.
Hence, this petition assailing the denial of his motion to quash on the ground that his constitutional
right to due process and speedy disposition of cases had been violated.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT TATAD WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES AGAINST HIM.
Held
YES. CRIMINAL CASES SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
A painstaking review of the facts cannot but leave the impression that political motivations played a
vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint
came to life only after Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from
established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation which require the submission
of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the
Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for fact-finding
investigation and report.
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing attempt to
involve an office directly under the President in the prosecutorial process, lending credence to the
suspicion that the prosecution was politically motivated.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation cannot be justified on
the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a 10-day period for the prosecutor
to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination.
While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely directory, yet, on
the other hand, it cannot be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly
cannot be assumed that the law has included a provision that is deliberately intended to become
meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process.
A delay of close to 3 years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance
obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the
long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that the delay may be due to a painstaking and
grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be
deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal
of the information. True but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving
the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation
cannot be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to hold that the
inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant
case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a
speedy disposition of the cases against him.
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 188165, December 11, 2013

Facts
Congressman Wilfrido B. Villarama of Bulacan (Cong. Villarama) delivered a privilege speech in the
House of Representatives denouncing acts of bribery allegedly committed by a high ranking
government official whom he then called the "2 Million Dollar Man." In reaction, the Office of the
President directed the Presidential Anti- Graft and Commission (PAGC) to conduct an inquiry on the
expos of Cong. Villarama. PAGC sent written communications to Cong. Villarama, Cong. Mark
Jimenez, Senator Panfilo Lacson and respondent Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez inviting them
to provide information and documents on the alleged bribery subject of the expos.
Cong. Villarama responded by letter to PAGCs invitation by confirming that Secretary Perez was the
government official who "ha[d] knowledge or connection with the bribery subject of his expose."
Secretary Perez denied being the Million-Dollar Man referred to in Cong. Villaramas privilege
speech. Cong. Jimenez delivered a privilege speech in the House of Representatives confirming Cong.
Villaramas expos, and accusing Secretary Perez of extorting US$2 Million from him.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan four informations against respondents,
namely:
1. For violation of Sec. 3 (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended;
2. For Robbery (Art. 293, in relation to Art. 294, Revised Penal Code;
3. For Falsification of Public/Official Document under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and
4. For violation of Section 7, Rep. Act 3019, as amended, in relation to Section 8, Rep. Act
6713.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the cases based on, among others:

The totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances bears unmistakably the earmarks of inordinate
delay, making the applicability of the doctrine enunciated in Anchangco Jr. and Duterte cases cited in the
parties pleadings irrefragable.
Accordingly, there being a clear violation of the constitutional right of the accused, the prosecution is ousted of
any authority to file the information and we hereby order the quashing of the information and the consequent
dismissal of this case.
Issue
Whether or not there was inordinate delay.
Held
Yes.
The Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding that there had been an
inordinate delay in the resolution against respondents of the charge in Criminal Case No. SB-08-
CRM-0266.
Upon its finding that the Office of the Ombudsman had incurred inordinate delay in resolving the
complaint Cong. Jimenez had brought against the respondents, the Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal
Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266 mainly to uphold their constitutional right to the speedy disposition of
their case.
But now comes the State contending that the delay in the resolution of the case against the
respondents was neither inordinate nor solely attributable to the Office of the Ombudsman. The State
supported its contention by listing the various incidents that had caused the delay in the investigation,
and then laying part of the blame on the respondents themselves.
Was the delay on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman vexatious, capricious, and oppressive?
We answer in the affirmative.
The acts of the respondents that the Office of the Ombudsman investigated had supposedly occurred
in the period from February 13, 2001 to February 23, 2001. Yet, the criminal complaint came to be
initiated only on November 25, 2002 It was only on November 6, 2006, however, when the Special
Panel issued the Joint Resolution recommending that the criminal informations be filed against the
respondents. Ombudsman Gutierrez approved the Joint Resolution only on January 5, 2007. The
Special Panel issued the second Joint Resolution denying the respondents motion for reconsideration
on January 25, 2008, and Ombudsman Gutierrez approved this resolution only on April 15, 2008.
Ultimately, the informations charging the respondents with four different crimes based on the
complaint of Cong. Jimenez were all filed on April 15, 2008, thereby leading to the commencement
of Criminal Case No. SB-08- CRM-0265 and Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266. In sum, the fact-
finding investigation and preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman lasted nearly five
years and five months.
It is clear from the foregoing that the Office of the Ombudsman had taken an unusually long period of
time just to investigate the criminal complaint and to determine whether to criminally charge the
respondents in the Sandiganbayan.
To emphasize, it is incumbent for the State to prove that the delay was reasonable, or that the delay
was not attributable to it. In both regards, the State miserably failed.
For one, the State explains that the criminal cases could not be immediately filed in court primarily
because of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish probable cause, and to enable it to obtain the
document and other evidence it needed to await the ratification of the Agreement Concerning Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region (RP-
HKSAR Agreement), and the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Swiss Confederation (RP-Swiss MLAT).
To us, however, the States dependence on the ratification of the two treaties was not a sufficient
justification for the delay. At no time should the progress and success of the preliminary investigation
of a criminal case be made dependent upon the ratification of a treaty by the Senate that would
provide to the prosecutorial arm of the State, already powerful and overwhelming in terms of its
resources, an undue advantage unavailable at the time of the investigation. To allow the delay under
those terms would definitely violate fair play and nullify due process of law.
There was really no sufficient justification tendered by the State for the long delay of more than five
years in bringing the charges against the respondents before the proper court.
The State further argues that the fact-finding investigation should not be considered a part of the
preliminary investigation because the former was only preparatory in relation to the latter; and that the
period spent in the former should not be factored in the computation of the period devoted to the
preliminary investigation.
The argument cannot pass fair scrutiny.
The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution applies to all
cases pending before all judicial, quasijudicial or administrative bodies. The guarantee would be
defeated or rendered inutile if the hair-splitting distinction by the State is accepted. Whether or not the
fact-finding investigation was separate from the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman should not matter for purposes of determining if the respondents right to the speedy
disposition of their cases had been violated.
Anti-Graft Cases in the Sandiganbayan

Venus v. Desierto, 298 SCRA 219
Facts
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan authorized Municipal Mayor Venus to purchase Lot X that the
municipality badly needed. Lot X was currently in the Board of Liquidators possession. Venus
offered to buy Lot X from the Board but the latter refused. The Board required Venus to participate in
the public bidding for Lox X. But Venus couldnt participate in the public bidding on the
municipalitys behalf due to the numerous requirements which the municipality cant comply with in
time. Instead, Venus participated in his personal capacity in the bidding and won Lot X.
Afterwards, Venus allowed the municipality to use Lot X during his incumbency as mayor. After 4
years, Venus lost his re-election bid and stopped allowing the municipality to use Lot X. The
Municipality then filed a complaint charging Venus with violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act before the Provincial Prosecutor.
Ultimately, the Ombudsman filed an information before the Sandiganbayan against Venus for
violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Sandiganbayan noted Venus received the
notice of the informations filing a day after the information was actually filed. Venus was thereby
deprived of his statutory right to file a motion for reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan granted Venus
motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration before the OSP. The Sandiganbayan held in
abeyance Venus arraignment pending consideration by the Ombudsman of said motion for
reconsideration. The Ombudsman dismissed Venus motion to dismiss the case.
Issue
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan was bound by the prosecutors recommendation.
Held
The Sandiganbayan isnt bound.
Under the principles governing criminal procedure, the Sandiganbayan, or any trial court for that
matter, is mandated to independently evaluate the cases merits and may either agree or disagree with
the prosecutors recommendation.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan allowed Venus to file a motion to reconsider the Special Prosecution
Officer Ines adverse resolution, which was approved by the Special Prosecutor and Ombudsman. The
Sandiganbayan also directed Special Prosecution Officer Pascual to resolve the motion within 30 days
from receipt. The Sandiganbayan thus deferred to the Ombudsmans authority to reinvestigate the
case and facts. In short, the Sandiganbayan was willing to accept and adopt the Ombudsmans and
Office of the Special Prosecutors final resolution on the issue if Venus actually committed the
offense charged. However, the Sandiganbayan isnt bound by such quasi-judicial findings.
The logical thing to do is to remand the case to the Sandiganbayan but the case should be dismissed
because theres no probable cause and the complaint was simply political harassment.
Magcusi v. Sandiganbayan, 240 SCRA 13

Facts
The Bureau of Aquatics and Fisheries (BFAR) entered into a contract of service with Dexter Corp.
represented by its Manager Ancla. Under the contract, Dexter Corp. will build an ice-making plant
and cold storage facility in Surigao City. BFAR Engineer Enriquez is charged with rendering the
accomplishment reports on the constructions progress and certifying Dexters work
accomplishments.
Pursuant thereto, Enriquez prepared the reports and certifications, bearing Anclas signature, and
forwarded them to BFAR Regional Director Magcusi. Magcusi approved the reports and certifications
and directed the corresponding vouchers and check prepared in Dexters favor. The vouchers and
checks were then transmitted to the BFAR Central Office where Director Gonzales approved the
documents and released the checks to Dexter.
However, it turns out such reports and certifications were false and the work stated therein was
unfinished. A case was filed before the Sandiganbayan against Magcusi for estafa through
falsification of a public document. The Sandiganbayan convicted Magcusi on the basis of a
conspiracy between him, Ancla, and Enriquez.
Issue
Whether or not Magcusi was criminally liable?
Held
Magcusi wasnt criminally liable.
Conspiracy isnt the product of negligence but of intention on the part of cohorts. But a person may be
held liable as co-principal if through an act of reckless imprudence he allowed a crime to be
committed which without his reckless negligence would not have been accomplished. However, a
head of office who relies in good faith, albeit misplaced, on a subordinate upon whom the primary
responsibility rests, absent a clear case of conspiracy, isnt criminally liable.
In this case, the actions Magcusi performed allowing Ancla and Enriquez to commit the crime involve
the very duties he had to discharge in performing his official duties. Theres no proof that Magcusi
had any knowledge of irregularity committed by either Enriquez or Ancla. Magcusi was merely lax in
his duties by relying too much on Enriquezs official reports but for conspiracy to exist there must be
a conscious design to commit an offense.
Next, Magcusi is allowed to rely to a reasonable extent on his subordinates work and their good faith.
Hes not required to examine every report or document in detail provided he has no added reason
compelling him to do so.
Sistoza v. Desierto , G.R. No. 144784, September 3, 2002

Facts
The Bureau of Corrections offered a public bidding for supply of tomato paste. Among the bidders
were Elias General and Filcrafts Industries. Filcrafts Industries made the best bid but the contract was
awarded to Elias General instead, who had the 2nd best bid. The Management and Accounting
divisions of the Bureau of Corrections confirmed the biddings regularity, approved the bids, and
prepared the corresponding purchase order. Director of Bureau of Corrections Sistoza affixed his
signature to the P.O. Sistoza endorsed the P.O. to the DOJ but the latter disapproved the P.O. because
Elias General gave only the 2nd best bid and no justification to explain why it won. Sistoza was
persistent and by his 3rd endorsement, The DOJ approved the P.O. and released the money to Elias
General.
Meanwhile, one of the losing bidders filed a complaint before the Ombudsman alleging Sistoza and
other officers at the Bureau of Correction violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Ombudsman investigated the complaint and directed the filing of criminal charges before the
Sandiganbayan reasoning Sistoza was negligent in his duties. Sistoza merely approved the P.O.
without examining the bids and checking if the government got the best deal it could.
Issue
Whether or not the SC can direct the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the criminal case against Sistoza.
Held
The SC can direct the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case.
The SC can dismiss a criminal case being heard by a trial court for want of probable cause.
In this case, theres no probable cause Sistoza violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
acts charged against Sistoza dont amount to manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence as the law contemplates. Sistoza merely relied upon supporting documents
with no patent defect and coupled with a certification of regularity made by his subordinates. There
were no patent and established flaws in the award made to the 2nd best bidder that wouldve made
Sistozas approval irregular and criminal in nature.
Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman

Department of Justice v. Liwag, February 11, 2005, G.R. No. 149311
Facts
Mary Ong, a former undercover agent of the PAOCTF and PNP Narcotics Group, filed a complaint
before the Ombudsman against PNP General Lacson, Col. Aquino, and other high ranking officials of
the PNP. Thereafter, Lacson et al filed their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges against
them be dismissed.
Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the NBI alleging the same facts in
her complaint with the Ombudsman. Thereafter, NBI Director Wycoco recommended to DOJ
Secretary Perez that Lacson be investigated for the alleged crimes of kidnapping for ransom and
murder of several individuals.
As a result, the DOJ subpoenaed Lacson and directed them to submit their counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence. However, Lacson manifested that the DOJ should dismiss the complaint filed
by Mary Ong since there are already similar complaints pending before the Ombudsman which
alleged similar set of facts. Likewise, they claim that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. DOJ denied the manifestation.
Consequently, Lacson filed a Petition for Prohibition in the RTC of Manila against the DOJ and
averred that DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation on the complaints filed by
Mary Ong because it violated the Ombudsmans primary and exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, Judge
Liwag prohibited DOJ from conducting said preliminary investigation. Aggrieved, DOJ and NBI filed
this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE DOJ HAS JURISDICTION TO CONDUCT A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A COMPLAINT INVOLVING THE SAME
ACCUSED, FACTS, AND CIRCUMSTANCES BEFORE THE OMBUDSMAN.
Held
DOJ HAS NO JURISDICTION.
Congress itself acknowledged the significant role played by the Office of Ombudsman when it
enacted Republic Act No. 6770. Section 15 (1) of said law gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency, the investigation of such cases. This power to take over a case at any time is not
given to other investigative bodies. All this means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not coequal with other investigative bodies, such as the
DOJ. The Ombudsman can delegate the power but the delegate cannot claim equal power.
Clearly, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of cases
involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary
power and primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed
against public officers and employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In
contrast, the DOJ is an extension of the executive department, bereft of the constitutional
independence granted to the Ombudsman.
DOJ cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter, the settled rule is that the
body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of the others.
Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct
of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the
same case before both bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which will first
complete the investigation.
In the present case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has
the authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ. Mary Ong
filed a complaint against Lacson initially with the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation which was immediately acted on by said Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the
records, she thereafter refilled substantially the same complaint with the NBI and the DOJ.
Lazatin v. Desierto, June 5, 2009, G.R. No. 147097

Facts
The Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint against Cong. Lazatin
for Illegal Use of Public Funds and Violation of RA 3019 after the discovery of certain irregularities
in the use of the CDF. It was alleged that Lazatin was able to convert his CDF to cash.
After Preliminary Investigation, it was recommended that Lazatin be charged with 14 counts of
Malversation and violation of RA 3019. Thus, Informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan.
Consequently, Lazatin moved for and was granted Reconsideration/Reinvestigation.
Subsequently, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) submitted to the Ombudsman a Resolution
recommending the dismissal of the cases for insufficiency of evidence. However, the Ombudsman
disapproved the OSP Resolution and returned to the Sandiganbayan for continuation of the
proceedings. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE OMBUDSMAN HAD AUTHORITY TO OVERTURN THE OSPS
RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSING THE CASES AGAINST LAZATIN.
Held
YES. OMBUDSMAN IS NOT MERELY CLOTHED WITH THE POWER TO INVESTIGATE
AND RECOMMEND FILING OF CASES. RATHER IT ALSO HAD THE POWER TO
PROSECUTE.
It has long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman
prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional infirmity. The issue
of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the Constitution had been fully dissected as far
back as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.
Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with the
Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such
other functions or duties as may be provided by law.
The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under the Office of the
Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop.
The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero. More recently, in
Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop and
Camanag, declared that the OSP is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may
only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman and ruled that
under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and
Deputy Ombudsman. The Courts ruling in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute
based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also made the foundation for the
decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the
power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is,
therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the
grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Angeles v. Merceditas Gutierrez, G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173, March 21, 2012
Facts
Judge Angeles of RTC of Caloocan filed a criminal Complaint against Senior State Prosecutor
Velasco before the Ombudsman for allegedly giving unwarranted benefit to the accused in a
smuggling case, engaging in private practice by insisting on the reopening of child abuse cases against
Judge Angeles, and falsification of public documents.
Thereafter, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges against Velasco. It was stated that, after evaluation
of the facts and evidence presented, there was no cause to conduct a preliminary investigation or an
administrative adjudication regarding the charges.
The first charge was dismissed because Angeles had no sufficient personal interest in the subject
matter. The second charge was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The third
charge was dismissed because it was not raised at the earliest opportunity. Angeles MR was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
Held
NO.
The GENERAL RULE has always been non-interference by the courts in the exercise by the office of
the prosecutor or the Ombudsman of its plenary investigative and prosecutorial powers.
In Esquivel v. Ombudsman, we explained thus:

The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere
with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling
reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon the constitutional mandate and the court
will not interfere in its exercise.
We emphasized that if the latter, using professional judgment, finds a case dismissible, the Court shall
respect that finding, unless the exercise of such discretionary power was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DISCRETIONARY
The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or of whether there exists a reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, is
usually done after the conduct of a preliminary investigation. However, a preliminary investigation is
by no means mandatory.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman Rules of Procedure),
specifically Section 2 of Rule II, states:
Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be: a)
dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; b) referred to respondent for comment; c) indorsed to the proper
government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or
official for fact-finding investigation; e) referred for administrative adjudication; or f) subjected to a preliminary
investigation.
We reiterate that the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be
filed, including whether a preliminary investigation is warranted. The Court therefore gives due
deference to the Ombudsmans decision to no longer conduct a preliminary investigation in this case
on the criminal charges leveled against respondent Velasco.
Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014
Facts
We resolve the Office of the President's (OP 's) motion for reconsideration of our Decision which
ruled on the petitions filed by Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III and Special Prosecutor
Wendell Barreras-Sulit. Their petitions challenged the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of Republic
Act (RA) No. 6770.
In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and
ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i) found Gonzales guilty of Gross
Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on him
the penalty of dismissal.
Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the disciplinary proceedings
against her, solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to disciplinary proceedings. The
Court affirmed the continuation of the proceedings against her after upholding the constitutionality of
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.
The fallo of our assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 1 O-J-460 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of
backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the
Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner.
In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. ll-B-003 against Special Prosecutor
Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a
betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
In view of the Courts ruling, the OP filed the present motion for reconsideration through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Issue
Whether or not the OP has jurisdiction in displinary proceeding over a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor.
Held
No Deputy Ombudsman
Yes Special Prosectuor
c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy
Ombudsman violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional
Our discussions, particularly the Courts expressed caution against presidential interference with the
constitutional commissions, on one hand, and those expressed by the framers of the 1987
Constitution, on the other, in protecting the independence of the Constitutional Commissions, speak
for themselves as overwhelming reasons to invalidate Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 for violating the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by
the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the
Ombudsmans disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes
its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the
Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks
and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as
agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected
to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only
because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust
is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and
corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void.
D. The Special Prosecutor: The Constitutional Issue
Even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the composition of the
Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic component of that Office militates
against a differential treatment between the Ombudsmans Deputies, on one hand, and the Special
Prosecutor himself, on the other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for
her Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the
Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties.
In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court was confronted with an argument that, at bottom, the
Office of the Special Prosecutor is not a subordinate agency of the Office of the Ombudsman and is,
in fact, separate and distinct from the latter. In debunking that argument, the Court said:
Firstly, the petitioners misconstrue Commissioner Romulo's statement as authority to advocate that the intent
of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the
President. Xxx
In the second place, Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be
henceforth known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise its powers as
now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created
under this Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No.
1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then that Congress may remove any of the
Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D. N0. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those powers
conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of paragraph 8,
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or
perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is indubitable then that Congress has the
power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman.
Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the Special Prosecutor to be at par
with the Ombudsman's deputies, at least insofar as an extraneous disciplinary authority is concerned,
and must also enjoy the same grant of independence under the Constitution.
III. SUMMARY OF VOTING

In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to reverse its Decision
insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned. We declared Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in
violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
However, by another vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the
independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.
Review of Decisions of the Ombudsman

Antonino v. Desierto, December 18, 2008, G.R. No. 144492
Facts
Cong. Antonino filed a criminal complaint before the Ombudsan for violation of RA 3019 against the
Mayor Nunez, Sanggunian Panlungsod of General Santos, and other city officials thereof for
allegedly conspiring to dispose a lot of the Magsaysay Park in violation of the law and the citys
charter.
The Ombudsman directed the filing of informations against the accused but dismissed the case against
Mayor Nunez and other officials after it found that they were not involved in the conspiracy.
Aggrieved, Antonino filed an MR but it was denied by the Ombudsman. It stated that Ombudsman
already lost jurisdiction over the case because the Informations were already filed and pending before
the Sandiganbayan.
Hence, this petition. Antonino claims that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in the
exercise of its investigatory and prosecutor functions by ignoring and disregarding pieces of
substantial evidence which established the existence of a conspiracy to fraudulently sell the lot in
Magsaysay Park.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DISMISSED THE CASE IN SO FAR AS THE OTHER PEOPLE ARE CONCERNED.
Held
NO.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of
his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons that indicate
otherwise.
Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court when the finding of the Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as what the petitioner did in this case, consistent with our
ruling in Collantes v. Marcelo, where we laid down the FOLLOWING EXCEPTIONS to the rule:
1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
1. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity
of actions;
2. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;
3. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
4. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
5. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
6. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
7. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
8. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
9. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied.
The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman is found wanting in this case. Thus,
this Court finds no reason to deviate from the general rule. Indeed, while the Ombudsmans discretion
in determining the existence of probable cause is not absolute, nonetheless, Antonino must prove that
such discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsmans findings by
this Court. In this respect, Antonino fails.
Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 146731, January 13, 2004
Facts
Agustina Enemecio is a utility worker at the Cebu State College of Science and Technology.
Servando Bernante is an Assistant Professor of said college. Enemecio filed an administrative
complaint (gross misconduct, falsification, malversation, dishonesty) as well as a criminal complaint
(falsification of public document) against Bernante before the Ombudsman.
She alleged that Bernante caused the spray painting of obscenities against her on the walls of the
college. Also, she claimed that Bernante screamed defamatory words against her. Also, she averred
that Bernante falsified his leave application by saying he was on forced leave while in truth he was
actually serving a 20-day prison term.
Subsequently, the Ombudsman dismissed both administrative and criminal complaints. Enemecios
MR was likewise denied. As a result, she filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA
to assail the resolutions dismissing the complaints. However, the CA dismissed the petition and stated
that the proper remedy should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 43. In her MR, Enemecio
claimed that the dismissal was final and unappealable under RA 6770. However, this was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 FILED BEFORE THE
CA IS THE PROPER REMEDY TO QUESTION THE DISMISSAL OF A CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE OMBUDSMAN.
Held
No,
The CA dismissed Enemecios petition and denied her MR. Enemecio now comes to this Court via
this petition for review, claiming that what was involved in the petition before the appellate court
was the administrative, not the criminal case.
We cannot countenance the sudden and complete turnabout of Enemecio and her counsel, Atty.
Terence L. Fernandez. Atty. Fernandezs conduct has fallen far too short of the honesty required of
every member of the Bar.
It is clear from the records that Atty. Fernandez filed Ombudsmans Resolution and Order dismissing
the criminal case, not the administrative case against Bernante. For this reason, the CA in its 7
December 2000 Resolution rectified itself and stated that Fabian does not apply to Enemecios
petition as the Fabian ruling applies only to administrative disciplinary actions.
Atty. Fernandezs attempt to mislead this Court in a last ditch effort to secure a decision favorable to
his clients cause does not escape our attention.
Even if we consider Enemecios petition before the Court of Appeals as questioning the dismissal of
the administrative case against Bernante, the action must also fail.
Appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS

should be brought to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. The only provision affected by the Fabian
ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule 43 as the proper
mode of appeal. All other matters in Section 27 of RA 6770, including the finality or non-finality of
decisions of the Ombudsman, remain valid.
In any event, jurisprudence now holds that where the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of
probable cause in criminal cases is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess
of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari WITH THE SUPREME COURT
under Rule 65. Since Enemecio filed a certiorari petition before the CA, instead of the Supreme
Court, she availed of a wrong remedy in the wrong forum. Hence, the instant petition should be
dismissed outright.
Even if we consider the substance of the case, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the
Ombudsmans determination of whether there exists a prima facie case against Bernante.
Baviera v. Zoleta, G.R. NO. 169098, October 12, 2006

Facts
Manuel Baviera is a former employee of Standard Chartered Bank. He filed several complaints in the
SEC, BSP, AMLC, NLRC, and DOJ against officers/directors of SCB including its CFO, Sridhar
Raman. Also, Baviera requested from the Secretary of Justice for an HDO against Raman which was
granted by Sec. Datumanong. Thus, an HDO was issued.
When Sec. Datumanong went to Vienna for a conference, USEC Gutierrez became Acting Secretary.
Thereafter, when Raman was about to go to Singapore, Gutierrez allowed him to leave.
As a result, Baviera filed a Complaint against Gutierrez for violation of RA 3019. In her Counter-
Affidavit, Gutierrez claimed that she violated no rule or law and that DOJ may allow persons covered
by HDOs to travel abroad for a specific purpose and for a specific period. Likewise, she asked the
Ombudsman to dismiss the complaint.
Later, Prosecutor Rolando Zoleta issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal of the criminal
complaint against Gutierrez for insufficiency of evidence. The Ombudsman approved this. Baviera
filed an MR but was denied. So, he filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA assailing the resolutions of
the Ombudsman. However, CA dismissed the petition on the ground of improper remedy. MR denied.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED IN THE CA IS A PROPER
REMEDY TO ASSAIL A RESOLUTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN DISMISSING A CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT AGAINST AN ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.
Held
NO. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED IN THE SC.
In 1999, this Court ruled in Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario that the remedy of the aggrieved party from a
resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman finding the presence or absence of probable cause in
criminal cases was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in this Court. The Court reiterated its
ruling in Kuizon v. Desierto and Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario. And on February 22, 2006, in Pontejos v.
Office of the Ombudsman, the Court ruled that the remedy to challenge the Resolution of the
Ombudsman at the conclusion of a preliminary investigation was to file a petition for certiorari in this
Court under Rule 65.
In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court rejected the contention of petitioner therein that petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order/Resolution of the OMB in criminal cases should be filed
in the CA, conformably with the principle of hierarchy of courts.
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction. The Ombudsmans exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic
manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The Court has reviewed the assailed resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, and finds that
Baviera likewise failed to establish probable cause for violation of Sections 3(a), (e) and (j) of RA No.
3019. Indeed, in the absence of a clear case of abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with
the exercise of the Ombudsmans discretion, who, based on his own findings and deliberate
consideration of the case, either dismisses a complaint or proceeds with it.
Procedure before the Ombudsman

Sesbreno v. Aglugub, February 28, 2005, A.M. No. MTJ 05-1581
Facts
Complaints were filed against several individuals from working in the Traffic Management Unit of
San Pedro, Laguna for Falsification, Grave Threats, and Usurpation of Authority. After conducting
preliminary investigation, Judge Aglugub dismissed all the charges except for the Usurpation of
Authority. Thereafter, an Urgent Manifestation was filed alleging that the accused were also charged
with violation of RA 10.
Acting on this, Judge Aglugub issued an Order stating that the violation of RA 10 was alleged but was
not ruled upon due to oversight. However, since RA 10 only applies to members of seditious
organizations, no probable cause was found. Thus, the charge for violation of RA 10 was also
dismissed. Thereafter, Judge Aglugub ordered the records forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutors
Office (PPO) for review. PPO affirmed the order of dismissal and remanded the case to court for
further proceedings as regards the charge of Usurpation of Authority.
As a result, Atty. Sesbreno filed an administrative complaint against Judge Aglugub on the ground
that the latter was grossly ignorant of the law when it failed to order the transmittal of the records to
the Ombudsman instead of the PPO. In her defense, judge contended that pursuant to the Ombudsman
Act, the PPO has been designated as the Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor. However, OCA
recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint.
Atty. Sesbreno asserts that since the charge for violation of RA 10 is cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction to review the resolution dismissing the
charge.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE AGLUGUB SHOULD HAVE TRANSMITTED HER ORDER
DISMISSING THE CHARGE FOR VIOLATION OF RA 10 TO THE OMBUDSMAN INSTEAD
OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTORS OFFICE.
Held
NO. JUDGE AGLUGUB IS NOT LIABLE FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW.
This issue is answered by Administrative Order No. 8 entitled Clarifying and Modifying Certain
Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, which provides that all prosecutors are now deputized
Ombudsman prosecutors. Moreover, [R]esolutions in Ombudsman cases against public officers and
employees prepared by a deputized assistant prosecutor shall be submitted to the Provincial or City
Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn, forward the same to the Deputy Ombudsman of the area with
his recommendation for the approval or disapproval thereof. The Deputy Ombudsman shall take
appropriate final action thereon, including the approval of its filing in the proper regular court or the
dismissal of the complaint, if the crime charged is punishable by prision correccional or lower, or fine
of not more than P6,000.00 or both. Resolutions involving offenses falling within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan shall be forwarded by the Deputy Ombudsman with his recommendation thereon
to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Thus, Judge Aglugub did not err and was, in fact, merely acting in accordance with law when she
forwarded the case for violation of R.A. 10 to the PPO. The fact that the PPO remanded the case to
the court for further proceedings instead of forwarding the same to the Deputy Ombudsman as
required by Administrative Order No. 8 is quite another matter. In any event, Judge Aglugub should
have taken the necessary steps to remedy the lapse in order to preclude delay in the disposition of the
case.
Enriquez v. Caminade, A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1966, March 21, 2006
Power of the Secretary of Justice over Prosecutors

Dino et al. v. Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, December 04, 2009
People v. Duca, October 9, 2009, G.R. No. 171175
Role of the OSG in criminal cases

Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. NO. 152577, September 21, 2005
Rule 112 Preliminary Investigation

Community Rural Bank v. Talavera, 455 SCRA 34
Serag v. Court of Appeals, 473 SCRA 590
Soriano v. People, G.R. No.162336, February 1, 2010
Samuel Lee v. KBC Bank, G.R. No. 164673, January 15, 2011
Okabe v. Gutierrez, May 27, 2004, G.R.No. 150185
Rule 113 Arrest

People v. De Leon , G.R. No. 169858, January 26, 2010
People v. Laguio, March 16, 2007, G.R. No. 128587
Valdez v. People, G.R.170180, November 23, 2007
Rolito Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No.101837, February 11, 1992
Rule 114 Bail

Mabutas v. Perello, A.M.-RTJ No. 03-1817, June 8, 2005.
Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.181922, March 17, 2010
Domingo v. Pagayatan, A.M.-RTJ No.03-1751, June 10, 2003
Lachica v. Tormis, A.M.-RTJ No. 05-1609September 20, 2005
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003
Rule 115 Rights of the Accused

Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, 456 SCRA 45
Andrado v. People, 452 SCRA 685
Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, 465 SCRA 465
Libuit v. People, 469 SCRA 510
Magtolis v. Salud, 469 SCRA 439
Herrera v. Alba, 460 SCRA 197
Yulo v. People, 452 SCRA 705
Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases Against
Maguindanao Governor Ampatuan, June 2011
Rule 116
Adasa v. Abalos, G.R. No. 168617, February 19, 2007
Facts
Abalos filed a complaint against Adasa before the City Prosecutor. The complaint alleges Adasa
received and encashed 2 checks issued in Abalos name without Abalos knowledge and consent.
Despite repeated demands, Adasa refused to pay the value of the checks. The City Prosecutor found
probable cause and filed 2 criminal informations for estafa against Adasa. Adasa was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty.
Later, Adasa filed a petition before the DOJ questioning the City Prosecutors finding of probable
cause. The DOJ reversed the City Prosecutor and directed the case be withdrawn. Abalos filed an MR
before the DOJ but the latter denied the same. The City Prosecutor then filed a motion to withdraw
which the court granted. Abalos filed a certiorari petition before the CA challenging the DOJs
decision. The CA granted the petition and reversed the DOJ.
Issue
Whether or not the DOJ can still entertain a petition for review despite the fact the accused has
already been arraigned.
Held
DOJ cant entertain such petition.
The pertinent provisions to this controversy are Sec. 7 & 12 of DOJ Circular 70. Sec. 7 pertains to the
action on the petition the DOJ must take. While Sec. 12 enumerates the options the DOJ has regarding
the petitions disposition.
Sec. 7 specifically applies to a situation involving a petition that is

1. Clearly without merit
2. Manifestly intended to delay
3. Filed after the accused has already been arraigned.
In the first 2 situations, the Secretary may choose to dismiss the petition outright. But in the 3rd
situation, the Secretary mustnt give due course to the petition.
Sec. 12 meanwhile provides the actions the DOJ can take concerning the petition. The Secretary can
reverse, modify, affirm the resolution or dismiss the appeal. The same Sec. 12 also provides the
reasons for dismissing a petition.
Consequently, the instant case falls squarely under the 3rd situation in Sec. 7 because Adasa was
already arraigned at the time he filed his petition before the DOJ. The Secretary shouldve dismissed
the petition outright. The Secretarys action of giving due course to the petition constitutes grave
abuse of discretion and all her actions concerning the petition are void.
People v. Documento, G.R. No. 188706, March 17, 2010

Facts
Documento was charged with 2 counts of rape before the RTC. On arraignment, Documento pleaded
not guilty but subsequently changed his plea to guilty. The prosecution then started presenting its
evidence and Documento presented himself as the defenses sole witness. The RTC convicted
Documento and the CA affirmed the conviction.
Issue
Whether or not the conviction should be reversed because the RTC didnt properly conduct a
searching inquiry on the voluntariness and full comprehension of his guilty plea.
Held
No reversal.
Here, the RTC failed to conduct the prescribed searching inquiry to determine if Documentos guilty
plea was knowingly made. The questions propounded to him dont comply with the guidelines the SC
set.
He wasnt fully apprised of the consequences of his guilty plea. Documento pleaded guilty believing
the penalty would be reduced, which wasnt the case. Further, the RTC failed to inform him of his
right to present evidence notwithstanding the guilty plea.
Consequently, the guilty plea is inefficacious.
However, that doesnt mean conviction should be reversed and the case remanded to the RTC.
Because Documentos guilty plea wasnt the sole basis for his conviction, there was other evidence
proving his guilt.
Virata v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.114331, May 27, 1997
Rule 117
Los Banos v. Pedro, G.R. No. 173588, April 22, 2009
Facts
It was a day before the May national and local elections and the police set up checkpoints. At one of
these checkpoints, the police saw Pedro carrying a gun carry case and Pedro couldnt show any
Comelec authority to carry a firearm when asked for one. The police asked him to open the case,
which he did, which revealed the firearm and ammunition. The Government then filed an information
in court for violation of the election gun ban against Pedro.
Pedro then filed a Motion to Quash arguing that the information contains averments which, if true,
would constitute a legal excuse of justification and/or the facts charged dont constitute an offense.
Pedro also presented a Comelec certification declaring him exempt from the gun ban.
The RTC granted the motion to quash. But the Government moved to reopen the case arguing Pedros
Comelec certification was falsified and the Government was deprived of due process because the
information was quashed without a hearing. The RTC granted the Governments motion causing
Pedro to appeal the RTCs decision
Issue
Whether or not the RoC Rule 117 Sec. 8 applies in this case.
Held
Doesnt apply.
A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails, before entering his plea, the validity of
the criminal complaint or the criminal information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in
point of law, or for defect apparent on the face of the Information. The motion, as a rule,
hypothetically admits the truth of the facts spelled out in the complaint or information.
Meanwhile, a case is provisionally dismissed if the following requisites concur:

(1) The prosecution with the express consent of the accused, or the accused, moves for a
provisional dismissal of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for its
provisional dismissal
(2) The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case
(3) The court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally
(4) The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case
A motion to quash and a provisional dismissal are different concepts whose respective rules refer to
different situations that shouldnt be confused with one another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic
or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, the remedy is a motion to quash. All other
reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information, before arraignment and under the
circumstances provided in Sec. 8, fall under provisional dismissal.44
Here, the RTC erred in granting Pedros motion to quash because:

(1) The information duly charged a specific offense and provides the details on how the offense
was committed
(2) The Comelec certification granting Pedro exemption from the gun ban cant support a motion
to quash grounded on the legal excuse or justification found on the face of the information.
44
See case for side-by-side comparison of a Motion to Quash and Provisional Dismissal
Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180122

Facts
The National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded a contract for infrastructure works to A.C. Cruz
Construction. The contractor commenced the works with complainant Candido Fajutag as Project
Engineer.
However, the contractor incurred delays in completing the project. The Inventory and Acceptance
Committee (Committee) determined the contracts total accomplishment at only 40% causing NHA to
rescind the contract. NHA then awarded the remaining work under the contract to Triad Construction
and Development Corp. (Triad). The NHA then paid A.C. Cruz Construction based on the
Committees inventory report listing the works accomplished.
Later, Triad discovered that certain items listed as accomplished under the inventory report were in
fact non-existent. The COA investigated the matter and uncovered ghost activities causing the
Government to file a criminal information for Act. 3019 against Lazarte and other Committee
officials for the false inventory report.
Lazarte filed a motion to quash on the ground, among others, that the facts charged in the information
dont constitute an offense. But the Sandiganbayan denied the same causing Lazarte to appeal by
certiorari to the appellate court.
Issue
Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy in appealing a denied motion to quash.
Held
Generally no. Except if theres grave abuse of discretion.
A denial of a motion to quash isnt correctible by certiorari. When a motion to quash in a criminal
case is denied, the remedy isnt a petition for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in the motion to quash. The exception is if the
court, in denying the motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
Here, the Sandiganbayan didnt commit grave abuse of discretion.
The test in reflecting the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged dont
constitute an offense is if the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the crime defined in law. Matters outside of the alleged facts wont be considered.
In this case, the information alleges all the essential elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Act. 3019.
People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, October 7, 200345

Facts
Lacson was charged with murder in court but the RTC provisionally dismissed the case in March
1999. In December 2000 the Time-bar rule took effect. The State then revived the criminal case in
June 2001.
Lacson argues the criminal action is barred under the Time-bar rule considering the State had only 2-
years from March 1999 to revive the case. But the case was revived only after 2 years and 3 months.
Issue
Whether or not the Time-bar under the RoC Rule 117 Sec 8 is prospective or Retroactive.
Held
Prospective. The 2-year period should be counted from December 2000.
The Court isnt mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because its favorable to the
accused. The Court approved the Time-bar rule to benefit both the accused and the State. It benefits
the accused by reinforcing his constitutional right to speedy disposition of the case. It benefits the
State by removing the malaise that plagues the criminal justice systems administration.
The Time-bar rule is to be applied prospectively and not retroactively, otherwise the rule would defeat
the very purpose for which it was intended. The State would be denied its right to due process and
result in injustice for failing to comply with a rule that didnt exist yet.
In this case, the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed in March 1999 before the Time-bar rule
took effect in December 2000. If the rule was applied retroactively, the State would have only 1 year
and 3 months to file the criminal informations The said period is less by 7 months compared to the 2-
year period provided in the Time-bar rule.
The proper application the Time-bar rule is prospective and the State has 2-years from December
2000 to file the criminal informations. Giving the Time-bar rule prospective application harmonizes
the same with its intent.
45
Prescriptive period for counting the Provisional Dismissal period is from issuance of the order of Provisional
Dismissal.
Rule 118
Office of the Court Administrator v. Espanol, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1872, October 18,
2004
Facts
Judge Espanol of the RTC of Dasmarinas was about to reach the compulsory retirement age. Prior
thereto, her branch was audited. Thereafter, she was told via Memorandum to decide all the cases
already submitted for decision. In her compliance, she pointed out that since the directive was
received by her 2 days before her retirement, the 69 listed case could not be all disposed of due to
human limitation. She likewise averred that, pursuant to law, she prioritized an election case which
involved the review of thousands of ballots from different precincts. Nonetheless, a administrative
charge was filed against her for Gross Inefficiency. OCA found her guilty and recommended a fine of
10,000 to be deducted from her retirement fee.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE ESPANOL IS LIABLE FOR GROSS INEFFICIENCY
Held
Yes.
The 1987 Constitution mandates trial judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and to decide
cases and matters within three (3) months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum.
In the disposition of cases, members of the bench have always been exhorted to observe strict
adherence to the foregoing rule to prevent delay, a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and
confidence in our justice system. Hence, a clear failure to comply with the reglementary period is
regarded as inexcusable gross inefficiency.
This Court is aware of the predicament that plagues Judge Espanol, as well as most other trial judges
in the country. The problem of case inputs grossly exceeding case outputs may be traced to several
factors, the most prevalent of which are the large number of cases filed, indiscriminate grant of
continuances to litigants, inefficient case flow management by judges, and unrealistic management of
the calendar of cases.
To solve these problems, this Court has, in several instances, advised judges to follow certain
guidelines to facilitate speedy case disposition. Among these measures is the discouragement of
continuances, except for exceptional reasons. To enforce due diligence in the dispatch of judicial
business without arbitrarily or unreasonably forcing cases to trial when counsels are unprepared,
judges should endeavor to hold them to a proper appreciation of their duties to the public, as well as to
their own clients and to the adverse party.
In CRIMINAL CASES, pretrial is mandatory because, at the outset, litigation is abbreviated by the
identification of contentious issues. In CIVIL CASES, judges are also required to take advantage of
the pretrial conference to arrive at settlements and compromises between the parties, to ask the latter
to explore the possibility of submitting their cases to any of the alternative modes of dispute
resolution, and at least to reduce and limit the issues for trial. Judges are further directed to implement
and observe strictly the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 119, providing for a continuous day-to-day
trial as far as practicable until termination.
People v. Sunga, G.R. No. 126029, March 23, 2003

Facts
Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Locil Cui and several others raped and killed Jocelyn Tan, a 16 year old
high school student of Palawan Integrated National School. Her body was found at a coffee
plantation. Thereafter, arrests were made. Then, preliminary investigations were conducted by the
MTC which culminated in the filing of an Information for Rape with Homicide before the RTC of
Puerto Princessa.
After all the accused pleaded not guilty, since there was no direct evidence, the prosecution filed a
Motion to Discharge Locil Cui to be a state witness, considering that she was only a minor and
implicated only as an accomplice. After trial, RTC convicted Sunga and Lansang as principals and
imposed a penalty of death. Said conviction was based on the testimony of the state witness (Locil
Cui) as well as Sungas 2 extrajudicial confessions executed before the police. Hence, this automatic
review.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT SUNGA AND LANSANGS GUILT WAS PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Held
NO. ACQUITTED. THE TESTIMONY OF THE STATE WITNESS WAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY
CORROBORATED BECAUSE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF SUNGA WERE
DONE IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or coconspirator
imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be
regarded as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of
the crime. The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable
testimony and strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes
manifest.
Was Locils testimony corroborated in its material points by the prosecutions other evidence? If in
the affirmative, was the corroborative evidence unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances to
such an extent that Locils trustworthiness becomes manifest?
Sungas 2 extrajudicial confessions, which strictly speaking were admissions for they referred to
statements of fact which did not directly involve an acknowledgement of guilt or of the criminal intent
to commit the offense with which he was charged, could have lent corroborative support to Locils
testimony, having likewise given details of how the crime took place. Contrary, however, to the
RTCs ruling, this Court finds Sungas admissions to be inadmissible in evidence not only against him
but also against his co-accused appellants.
The right to counsel was denied Sunga during his execution of Exhibit A admission before the
police on the ground that the counsel who assisted him, Atty. Agustin Rocamora, was the City Legal
Officer of Puerto Princesa.
The independent counsel for the accused in custodial investigations cannot be a special counsel,
public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused. A legal officer of the city, like Atty. Rocamora, provides legal aid
and support to the mayor and the city in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people,
which includes maintenance of peace and order and, as such, his office is akin to that of a prosecutor
who unquestionably cannot represent the accused during custodial investigation due to conflict of
interest.
That Sunga chose him to be his counsel, even if true, did not render his admission admissible. Being
of a very low educational attainment, Sunga could not have possibly known the ramifications of his
choice of a city legal officer to be his counsel. The duty of law enforcers to inform him of his
Constitutional rights during custodial interrogations to their full, proper and precise extent does not
appear to have been discharged.
From the foregoing testimony of SPO2 Janoras, it can be gathered that Atty. Rocamora did not, if at
all, fully apprise Sunga of his rights and options prior to giving his (Sungas) admission. Evidently,
Atty. Rocamora, without more, merely acted to facilitate the taking of the admission from Sunga.
Moreover, that Sunga was first questioned by SPO4 Pantollano and Patrolman Bolos before he was
investigated by SPO2 Janoras does not escape the attention of this Court. At that point, Sunga was
already under custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel.
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.
Like Exhibit A, Sungas second extrajudicial Admission Exhibit I is inadmissible, due to the
absence of counsel to assist him when he executed it on August 3, 1994 before the NBI of Puerto
Princesa City. Although Sunga declared in open court that he made such admission in connection with
his desire to apply as state witness which admission he later repudiated, this does not make Exhibit
I admissible. Sunga was at the time still under detention at the NBI office and had been languishing
in jail since his arrest in mid-July 1994.
The right TO COUNSEL APPLIES IN CERTAIN PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS that can be deemed
critical stages in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-
custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will
be subjected to no less than the States processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing
those who might be liable for criminal prosecution. In the case at bar, Sunga was thrust into the
preliminary investigation and while he did have a counsel, for the latters lack of vigilance and
commitment to Sungas rights, he was virtually denied his right to counsel.
Rule 119
People v. Hernandez, August 28, 2006, G.R. No. 154218
Facts
Aquilino Pimental Jr., a senatorial candidate in the 1995 elections, filed a complaint against Salayon
and Llorente, Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Canvassers of Pasig City for allegedly
committing dagdag bawas in violation of the Election Reforms Law. Thereafter, a total of 321
informations were filed against Salayon and Llorente in 4 branches of the RTC of Pasig. Thereafter,
Omnibus Motions were filed seeking to consolidate the cases and to declare the multiple informations
as constituting only 1 offense. Senior State Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo filed his oppositions.
Subsequently, the RTC under Judge Hernandez declared that the cases be consolidated and declared
them to constitute 1 offense. Additionally, arraignment and pre-trial were set. Bagabuyo filed an MR
but this was denied and set another schedule for arraignment and pre-trial. During arraignment they
pleaded not guilty but Bagabuyo was absent. They proceeded in the presence of Public Prosecutor
Jabson. Bagabuyo filed an MR asking the RTC to nullify the arraignment. Thus, the RTC reset the
hearing. However, Bagabuyo failed to appear on July 6, 2001. Subsequently, Bagabuyo likewise did
not appear on the following hearing dates: July 26, 2001, September 4, 2001, October 3, 2001, and
October 15, 2001.
As a result, Llorente moved to dismiss the case on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.
RTC later granted the motion and dismissed the case against both of them. Aggrieved, Bagabuyo filed
in the SC a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus asking that the order dismissing the
cases be recalled and set aside. SC referred the Petition to the CA. In its decision, the CA denied the
Petition. Hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT
JUDGE HERNANDEZ CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CASES ON THE GROUND
THAT LLORENTE AND SALAYONS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL WERE VIOLATED.
Held
No.
Clearly, the 111 days that have elapsed from the time Llorente and Salayon were arraigned on June
15, 2001 up to the filing of their Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the denial of their right to speedy
trial on October 4, 2001 is beyond the 80-day limit provided under the law and the rules. The
incidents that transpired before the trial court likewise show that the postponements at the instance of
the prosecution were not justified.
The government invokes the exclusions provided in Section 3 (a) (3) and (f), Rule 119 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, As correctly held by the CA, delay resulting from
extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders must be read in harmony with Section 7, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court which provides that the [p]etition [under Rule 65] shall not interrupt the course
of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been
issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
This was clearly spelled out by Judge Hernandez when, in addition to granting a 30-day continuance
in view of the manifestation of the prosecution that it would file an appeal from the interlocutory
order of the trial court with a higher court, the trial court, in its August 2, 2001 Order, gave a warning
that [i]n the event that the prosecution shall not be able to get any restraining order to stop the
proceedings in this case, the hearing on [September 4, 2001] shall proceed as scheduled.
Despite this warning, however, Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo did not appear for the prosecution
on the September 4, 2001 hearing set by the trial court and the court only received a call from the
secretary of said Senior State Prosecutor that the latter had his tooth extracted and would not be in a
position to appear at the hearing. What made the manner of postponement worse was that Atty.
Galimpin, the private prosecutor, informed the trial court that he saw Senior State Prosecutor
Bagabuyo at the Office of the Clerk of Court, which is located at the first floor of the same building
where the trial court sits.
The governments reliance on Section 3(f) of Rule 119 is also misplaced as nowhere in the Orders
granting continuance did Judge Hernandez set forth that his order was based on findings that the
ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in
a speedy trial, as required under the law and the Rules of Court. To the contrary, the successive
continuances granted by the trial court were compelled by the repeated absence of the public
prosecutor or his refusal to proceed with the pretrial and trial.
Dayap v. Sendiong, G.R. No. 177960, January 29, 2009

Facts
Jeffrey Dayap was charged in an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Less
Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property. It was alleged that while he was recklessly driving
a 10-wheeler truck, he hit the car driven by Lou Sendiong with Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy as
passengers. As a result thereof, Lou died and the passengers suffered injuries. Said Information was in
the MTC of Sibulan Negros Oriental.
After pleading not guilty, pretrial and trial proceeded. After the prosecution rested its case, Dayap
sought leave of court to file Demurrer to Evidence which was granted. Thus, he filed his Demurrer on
the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, MTC
granted the demurrer and acquitted Dayap.
Aggrieved, Sendiong filed a Petition for Certiorari in the RTC on the ground that MTC failed to
observe the order of trial provided in Sec 11 Rule 119 as well as failing to rule on the civil liability of
Dayap. Nonetheless, RTC affirmed the acquittal but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for
proceedings on the civil aspect. It likewise stated that the MTC complied with Sec 11 except that the
defense no longer presented evidence after the demurrer was granted which is allowed under Sec 23
Rule 119. MR denied.
Thus, Sendiong appealed via Petition for Review under Rule 42. CA ruled that the MTC proceedings
were null and void because the RTC had jurisdiction over the case considering that there was no proof
of the total value of the property damaged. MR denied. Hence, this petition. Dayap contends that the
proceedings in the MTC were not without jurisdiction.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE MTC WERE NULL AND VOID
Held
No.
When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32 (2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had
already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first level
courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties including those for civil liability. It explicitly states that in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
It follows that criminal cases for reckless imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC.
Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not
have original jurisdiction over the criminal case.
Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and
the proceedings before it were valid and legal.
As the records show, the MTC granted Dayaps demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the
offense on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do
so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. But while the dismissal order consequent to a
demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari under
Accordingly, Sendiong filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in
resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules
of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal
complaint.
CA SHOULD NOT HAVE REMANDED THE CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ON THE
CIVIL ASPECT
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist. This is because when the accused files a demurrer to
evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only
evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution.
What the trial court should do is issue an ORDER OR PARTIAL JUDGMENT granting the demurrer
to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by
way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case.
A scrutiny of the MTCs decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the findings
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that Dayap did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him; hence, Dayaps civil liability has been extinguished by
his acquittal.
Salazar v. People, September 23, 2003, G.R.No. 151931

Facts
Salazar bought 300 cavans of rice from JY Brothers Marketing Corporation. In payment, Salazar
indorsed a check drawn against Prudential Bank by a certain Timario in the amount of P214K. After
the cavans of rice were delivered, the check was presented but was dishonored because it was under a
closed account. After being informed thereof, Salazar replaced the check with another which was
drawn against Solid Bank. However, it was returned for being Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit
(DAUD).
Thus, a complaint was filed. Thereafter, an Information for Estafa by means of Bouncing Check was
filed against Salazar and Timario. After pleading not guilty, trial ensued. After the prosecution rested,
Salazar filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court and contended that there was no evidence
to prove that there was a conspiracy, that Art. 315 only penalizes the issuer of the check whereas she
was merely an indorser with respect to the first check, and that DAUD means that the account had
sufficient funds but was restricted because the check had not been cleared.
RTC of Legazpi acquitted Salazar but ordered her to remit the P214K for her purchase of the cavans
of rice. Salazar filed an MR as regards the civil aspect with a plea that she be allowed to present
evidence pursuant to Rule 33 (Civil Demurrer). However, the RTC denied the MR. Hence this
petition.
Salazar avers that the RTC denied her due process when she was not given the opportunity to adduce
evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT SALAZAR SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE TO
REBUT THE FINDING OF HER CIVIL LIABILITY AFTER HE DEMURRER WAS GRANTED
IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
Held
Yes.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the
accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended party,
said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a NULLITY for the reason that the
constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby violated.
This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced
evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the
evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial judgment
granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for continuation of trial
for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private complainant to
adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may adduce their sur-rebuttal evidence as
provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case on the basis of the evidence
of the prosecution and the accused.
In this case, Salazar was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code. The civil action arising from the delict was impliedly instituted since there was no waiver by
the private offended party of the civil liability nor a reservation of the civil action. Neither did he file
a civil action before the institution of the criminal action. Salazar was granted leave of court to file a
demurrer to evidence. The court issued an order granting the demurrer on its finding that the liability
of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil.
However, the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered Salazar to pay for
her purchases from the private complainant even before Salazar could adduce evidence thereon.
Patently, therefore, he was denied her right to due process.
Manguerra v. Risos, G.R. No. 152643, August 28, 2008

Facts
Risos et al were charged in an Information with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents
before the RTC of Cebu. It was alleged that Risos et al falsified the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
where they made it appear that Concepcion Manguerra affixed her signature to the deed.
However, Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu, was unexpectedly confined in Makati Med while
on vacation in Manila and was thus advised to stay therein for further treatment. Moreover, since
there was also a civil action for declaration of nullity of the mortgage filed prior to the criminal case,
the criminal proceedings were suspended on motion of Risos et al.
Later on, pursuant to Rule 23, Concepcions lawyer filed a Motion to Take Deposition of his client
stating that there was a need to perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical condition
and old age. RTC of Cebu granted the motion and directed her deposition to be taken before the Clerk
of Court of Makati. Despite Risos et als objection, her deposition was finally taken.
Aggrieved, Risos et al filed a Petition for Certiorari assailing the order of the RTC allowing
deposition to be taken. CA granted this and ruled that any deposition taken was void because
examination of prosecution witnesses is governed by Rule 119 Sec 15 and not Rule 23. Under the
former provision, the deposition should be taken where the case was pending (Cebu) and that the
accused (Risos et al) should have the opportunity to meet the witness face to face. Hence, this
petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE OFFENDED PARTY CAN BE DEPOSED UNDER RULE 23 EVEN IF
THE CASE IS A CRIMINAL CASE.
Held
NO. RULE 119 SEC 15 APPLIES
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to
Manguerra, was too sick to travel and appear before the RTC.
Manguerra contends that Concepcions advanced age and health condition exempt her from the
application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the
application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The contention does not persuade.
The very reason offered by Manguerra to exempt Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at
once the ground which places her squarely within the coverage of the same provision. Rule 119
specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined:
1. If the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or
2. If the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.
Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been too sick at that time,
her motion would have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she
would have been compelled to appear before the court for examination during the trial proper.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the
conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary that
the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same
after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in
the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall be made
before the court where the case is pending. Contrary to Manguerras contention, there is nothing in the
rule which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement applies only to cases where the
witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present
case. Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions.
Manguerra further insists that Rule 23 applies to the instant case, because the rules on civil procedure
apply suppletorily to criminal cases. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the
situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his
deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending.
Salvanera v. People, G.R. No. 143093, May 21, 2007

Facts
Ruben Parane was shot dead. As such, Rimberto Salvanera (mastermind), Felicano Abutin (getaway
driver), Edgardo Langcay (hitman), and Domingo Tampelix (delivered money to hitman) were
charged in an Information for Murder before the RTC.
All the accused were detained except for Langcay who remained at large. Thus, Salvanera applied for
bail. Likewise, the prosecution moved to discharge Abutin and Tampelix to serve as state witnesses.
RTC granted bail and denied the motion for discharge. MR was denied. As a result, the prosecution
appealed. CA granted the appeal and cancelled Salvaneras bail bond and discharged Abutin and
Tampelix to become state witnesses. MR of Salvenera was denied. Hence, this petition.
According to Salvanera, the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged must be substantially
corroborated by other prosecution witnesses who are not accused in the same criminal case. He argues
that it is just natural for a person accused of a crime to put the blame on others
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT ABUTIN AND TAMPELIX WERE PROPERLY DISCHARGED TO
BECOME STATE WITNESSES.
Held
YES.
In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions must
be present, namely:
1. Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
2. The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
3. The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
4. The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
5. The trial court is satisfied that:
a. There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
b. There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c. The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d. Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e. Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
We agree with the CA in dismissing this reasoning as specious. To require the 2 witnesses Parane and
Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same points is to render
nugatory the other requisite that there must be no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state witness.
The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very same evidence
as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies
to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other respects. It is
enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or evidence.
In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that the testimonies of Abutin and
Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each others testimonies and the circumstances
disclosed through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and to such extent that their
trustworthiness becomes manifest.
As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the conspirators.
Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because only
they have knowledge of the crime. The other prosecution witnesses are not eye-witnesses to the
crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The
testimonies of Salvanera and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link
Salvanera to the commission of the crime.
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process.
It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a
higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to
be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain
the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the
law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the
timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The
POWER TO PROSECUTE includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary
right to decide whom not to prosecute.
People v. Estacio, G.R. No.171655, July 22, 2009

Facts
Maritess Ang, Pablo Estacio, and Hildo Sumipo went to Casa Leonisa bar in QC to meet Charlie
Chua. Ang earlier told Sumipo that she would settle her debt to Chua. She also mentioned that
deretsong dukot na rin. Then, Chua arrived and spoke with Ang. Later, the group boarded Chuas
car. Not long after, Estacio pulled out a gun and ordered Chua to pull over. Sumipo was ordered to
take the wheel and proceed to Bulacan. While driving, Sumipo tried to dissuade Ang and Estacio from
pursuing their plan. Upon reaching a secluded place in Bulacan, Estacio ordered Sumipo to stop the
car. Thereafter, Ang and Estacio brought Chua out to a grassy place and returned with Estacios hands
bloodied.
Thereafter, Estacio went to Sumipos house and called up Chuas mother to demand ransom of 15M.
Since she could not afford the amount, it was reduced to 10M. Still finding the amount to steep, it was
lowered to 5M to which she agreed. Ang directed her to leave the money in a garbage can in Pizza
Hut Greenhills.
As a result, an Information was filed charging Ang, Estacio, and Sumipo with Kidnapping with
Murder. Sumipo would later be discharged as a state witness.
RTC of QC thereafter convicted Ang and Estacio and sentenced them to death. On intermediate
review, CA affirmed the conviction. Hence, this automatic review. Ang contends that the RTC erred
in discharging Sumipo as state witness and relying on his testimony to convict them.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN DISCHARGING SUMIPO AS STATE WITNESS
AND RELYING ON HIS TESTIMONY TO CONVICT ANG AND ESTACIO.
Held
YES. HOWEVER, THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS JUST MURDER.
The Court finds that the offense of which appellants were convicted was erroneously designated. In
the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. Although Ang and Estacio bound and gagged
Chua and transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did these acts to facilitate his killing, not
because they intended to detain or confine him. Their intention from the beginning was to kill the
victim is confirmed by the conversation which Sumipo heard in the car in which Maritess said that a
knife would be used to kill him so that it would not create noise. The subsequent demand for ransom
was an afterthought which did not qualify their prior acts as kidnapping.
The crime committed was thus plain Murder. The killing was qualified by treachery. The victim was
gagged, bound, and taken from Quezon City to an isolated place in Bulacan against his will to prevent
him from defending himself and to facilitate the killing.
DISCHARGE OF SUMIPO AS STATE WITNESS WAS PROPER
Respecting the assigned error in discharging Sumipo as a state witness, the same does not lie.
Sumipo was the only person other than Ang and Estacia who had personal knowledge of the acts for
which they were being prosecuted. Only he could positively identify them as the perpetrators of the
crime. He does not appear to be the most guilty. He did not participate in planning the commission of
the crime. He in fact at first thought that Ang was joking when she said, Diretsong dukot na rin kay
Charlie. He tried to dissuade them from pursuing their plan. He did not participate in the actual
stabbing. And he tried to extricate himself from the attempts to extract ransom from the victims
family.
Sumipos testimony was corroborated on material points. The victims mother testified regarding the
demands for ransom. Cesar Moscoso, an employee of Casa Leonisa, testified to seeing the victim,
Estacio, and Ang at the bar restaurant on the day and at the time in question. Henry Hong, the victims
cousin who arrived at Pizza Hut, Greenhills ahead of the victims brother during the scheduled
delivery of the ransom, testified to seeing Estacio there with companions. And the victims skeletal
remains were found at the scene of the crime upon Estacios information and direction.
And there is no proof that Sumipo had, at any time, been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Even assuming arguendo that the discharge of Sumipo as a state witness was erroneous,
such error would not affect the competency and quality of his testimony.
Rule 120
Merencillo v. People, G.R. No. 142369, April 13, 2007
Facts
Juanito Merencillo worked in the BIR as a Group Supervising Examiner. He demanded from one
Maria Angeles Cesar P20,000 for the release of the latters Certificate Authorizing Registration in
relation to the latters sale of real property to Ramasola Superstudio Inc. Cesar brought this to the
attention of the police in Tagbilaran City. In response to this, the police coordinated with Cesar for the
entrapment of Merencillo.
During the entrapment operation, Cesar handed over an envelope containing marked money and
bogus money to Merencillo. Thereafter, the entrapment team proceeded to arrest him. As a result
thereof, 2 Informations for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and for Direct Bribery under the RPC.
Merencillo pleaded not guilty to both. Then, joint trial of the cases ensued. The RTC of Tagbilaran
found him guilty as charged under the 2 Informations. Aggrieved, Merencillo appealed to the
Sandiganbayan. However, the appeal was denied. Hence, this petition.
Merencillo asserts that the Sandiganbayan failed to recognize that he was placed in double jeopardy
when he was prosecuted for violation of Sec 3 (b) of RA 3019 and Direct Bribery.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT MERENCILLO WAS TWICE PUT IN JEOPARDY WHEN HE WAS
PROSECUTED FOR CRIMES UNDER THE RA 3019 AND THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
Held
NO.
Section 3 of RA 3019 begins with the following statement:

Sec. 3.In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following [acts]
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared unlawful[.]
One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under the Revised
Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged with
a felony under the Revised Penal Code. There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged
simultaneously or successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code.
The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it
or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. An offense charged
NECESSARILY INCLUDES that which is proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished under Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code and those of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 shows that there is
neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the 2 offenses. While they have common elements,
not all the essential elements of one offense are included among or form part of those enumerated in
the other.
Whereas the mere request or demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is enough to
constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift
or present is required in direct bribery.
Moreover, the ambit of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited only to contracts or
transactions involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene
under the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general scope: (a) performance
of an act constituting a crime; (b) execution of an unjust act which does not constitute a crime and (c)
agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an act which is his official duty to do.
Although the 2 charges against Merencillo stemmed from the same transaction, the same act gave rise
to two separate and distinct offenses. No double jeopardy attached since there was a variance between
the elements of the offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy proceeds
from a second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one.
Consulta v. People, G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009

Facts
Nelia Silvestre and 2 others boarded a tricycle on their way to Pembo, Makati. Thereafter, Consulta
and his brother blocked the tricycle. The driver fled as a result of their threats. Thereafter, invectives
were hurled against Silvestre. Likewise, Consulta grabbed the 18K gold necklace around Silvestres
neck.
As a result of this, they reported the incident to the police. Consequently, an Information was filed
before the RTC of Makati which alleged that, Consulta, with intent to gain, and by means of force,
violence, and intimidation, carried away Silvestres gold necklace.
During trial, Consulta claimed that the incident arose because Silvestres family and their family were
not in good terms. The former even filed cases against the latter which, however, ended in acquittal.
This allegation was not denied.
After trial, RTC convicted Consulta of Robbery and ruled that intent to gain was presumed from the
unlawful taking. CA affirmed the conviction. Hence, this petition. Consulta argues that the
prosecution was not able to prove that he committed the crime charged in the Information.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT CONSULTA COMMITTED ROBBERY WITH FORCE AND
INTIMIDATION AGAINST PERSON.
Held
NO. INTENT TO GAIN WAS LACKING. HOWEVER, LIABLE FOR GRAVE COERCION AS
THE INFORMATION NECESSARILY INCLUDES SUCH FELONY.
The Court finds that under the circumstances surrounding the incidental encounter of the parties, the
taking of Nelias necklace does not indicate presence of intent to gain on Consultas part. That intent
to gain on Consultas part is difficult to appreciate gains light given his undenied claim that his
relationship with Nelia is rife with ill-feelings, manifested by, among other things, the filing of
complaints against him by Nelia and her family which were subsequently dismissed or ended in his
acquittal.
Absent intent to gain on the part of Consulta, robbery does not lie against him. He is not necessarily
scot-free, however. For [w]hen there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
GRAVE COERCION, like robbery, has violence for one of its elements. The difference in robbery
and grave coercion lies in the intent in the commission of the act.
The Court finds that by Consultas employment of threats, intimidation and violence consisting of,
inter alia, uttering of invectives, driving away of the tricycle driver, and kicking of the tricycle, Nelia
was prevented from proceeding to her destination.
Ching v. Nicdao, G.R. No. 141181, April 27, 2007

Facts
Ching filed criminal complaints for violation of BP 22 against Nicdao. Thereafter, 11 Informations
were filed with the MTC of Dinalupihan. It was alleged that Nicdao borrowed money from Ching. As
a security, Nicdao issued 11 checks totaling P20,950,000. These checks were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds.
After Nicdao entered a plea of not guilty, trial ensued. In her defense, Nicdao averred that the check
for 20M was a stolen check which she never issued in favor of Ching. Thus, Ching had no right
arising from that stolen check. Likewise, she asserted that the amounts in the 10 other checks had
already been paid.
Nonetheless, MTC found Nicdao guilty for 11 counts of violation of BP 22. On appeal, RTC affirmed
the conviction. When Nicdao appealed to the CA, CA reversed the findings and acquitted Nicdao on
all 11 counts. CA stated found that Nicdao had fully paid the loans. Moreover, it was found that the
20M check was stolen and thus Ching did not acquire any right or interest therein.
Hence, this petition. Ching asserts that, despite acquittal, Nicdao can still be held civilly liable for the
aggregate sum of 20,950,000.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT NICDAO CAN STILL BE HELD CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE AMOUNT
OF THE UNFUNDED CHECKS DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE HAD ALREADY BEEN
ACQUITTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR VIOLATION OF BP 22.
Held
NO. CIVILLY LIABILITY WAS ALSO EXTINGUISHED.
In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, the Court enunciated that the civil liability is not extinguished by
acquittal:
1. Where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt;
2. Where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only
civil in nature; and
3. Where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused
is acquitted.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of
the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both
may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
From the foregoing, Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may appeal the civil aspect
of the case notwithstanding Nicdaos acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted
with the criminal action since he did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he institute
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
With Chings timely filing of the instant petition for review of the civil aspect of the CAs decision,
the Court thus has the jurisdiction and authority to determine the civil liability of respondent Nicdao
notwithstanding her acquittal. In order for the petition to prosper, however, it must establish that the
judgment of the CA acquitting Nicdao falls under any of the 3 categories enumerated in Salazar and
Sapiera. Salazar also enunciated that the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a
finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the act or omission imputed to
him. For reasons that will be discussed shortly, the Court holds that Nicdao cannot be held civilly
liable to Ching.
Rule 121
Writ of Habeas Corpus of Reynaldo de Villa, G.R.No.158802, November 17, 2004
Facts
In the case of People v. Reynaldo de Villa, the SC found de Villa guilty of raping his niece, 12-year
old Aileen Mendoza. In said ruling, it affirmed the award of support in favor of Leahlyn Mendoza, the
putative child born of said rape. Currently, de Villa is currently serving his sentence at the New
Bilibid Prison.
June de Villa, son of Reynaldo, brings at issue once again the guilt or innocence of his father 3 years
after the promulgation of said decision. For this purpose, he filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and
Motion for New Trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. It was contended that, during trial,
they were unaware that DNA testing could determine the paternity of Leahlyn. The Petition was
supported by a finding of the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research Institute
that, based on saliva samples of Leahlyn and Reynaldo, the latter could not have sired the former due
to absence of a match between genetic markers in their respective samples.
It is argued that since paternity has already been conclusively disproved, the prior conviction must be
overturned.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE REMEDY OF NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE.
Held
NO.
In the recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that review of a judgment of conviction is
allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very specific instances, such
as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding:
1. there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person;
2. The court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
3. An excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.
In fine, we find that de Villa invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek a
re-examination of the records of People v. de Villa, without asserting any legal grounds therefor. For
all intents and purposes, de Villa seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his conviction. We
are being asked to re-examine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in this case, not on its own,
but in light of the new DNA evidence that de Villa seeks to present to this Court. This relief is outside
the scope of a habeas corpus petition. The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail.
Coupled with the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, de Villa seeks a new trial to
relitigate the issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza.
It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendozas paternity is not central to the issue of de
Villas guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question,
separate and distinct from the question of the father of her child.
Recently, in the case of People v. Alberio, we ruled that the fact or not of the victims pregnancy and
resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an
essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the victim bore was fathered by the
purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment in determining an individuals
guilt.
In the instant case, however, we note that the grant of child support to Leahlyn Mendoza indicates that
our Decision was based, at least in small measure, on the victims claim that de Villa fathered her
child. This claim was given credence by the trial court, and, as a finding of fact, was affirmed by this
Court on automatic review.
The fact of the childs paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant to the civil award of child support.
It is only tangentially related to the issue of de Villas guilt. However, if it can be conclusively
determined that the he did not sire Leahlyn Mendoza, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt,
and allow the acquittal of de Villa on this basis.
Be that as it may, it appears that de Villa once more relies upon erroneous legal grounds in resorting
to the remedy of a motion for new trial.
In the case at bar, de Villa anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly newly-discovered evidence.
The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has
long attained finality, and entry of judgment was made as far back as January 16, 2002. Moreover,
upon an examination of the evidence presented, we do not find that the DNA evidence falls within the
statutory or jurisprudential definition of newly-discovered evidence.
In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, we
nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for newly-discovered evidence that would merit a
new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with
the exercise of reasonable diligence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de
Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen
Mendozas testimony and positive identification as its bases. The Solicitor General reiterates, and
correctly so, that the pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape.
Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa
should be discharged. Although de Villa claims that conviction was based solely on a finding of
paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction was based on the clear and
convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given credence by the trial court, was affirmed
on appeal.
Sumiran v. Damaso, G.R. No. 162518, August 19, 2009

Facts
Sumiran filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Spouses Damaso in the RTC of Antipolo.
Sumiran is likewise the private complainant for violation of BP 22 against Damaso. These 2 cases
were consolidated and jointly tried. On February 21, 2003, the RTC acquitted Damaso. On March 6,
2003, Sumiran filed an MR. On May 9, 2003, RTC denied Sumirans MR. Thereafter, Sumiran filed a
Notice of Appeal on May 19, 2003.
RTC denied the Notice of Appeal for having been filed out of time. It was ruled that since Sumiran
filed his MR on the 13th day (March 6) of the reglementary period, he had belatedly filed his Notice
of Appeal when he filed it 10 days (May 19) after receipt of the denial of the MR on May 9.
Aggrieved, Sumiran filed an MR of the RTCs denial. However, this was denied. As a result, Sumiran
filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. Nonetheless, CA dismissed it. Hence, this petition. Sumiran
alleges that CA erred in ruling that his period to appeal had lapsed.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT SUMIRANS PERIOD OF APPEAL THE JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
HAVE LAPSED.
Held
NO. ADOPTING NEYPES, THE SC APPLIED THE FRESH PERIOD RULE IN THIS CRIMINAL
CASE.
As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals that by virtue of the
power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court
is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing or denying a MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL or MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION. This would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away
with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted.
The RETROACTIVITY of the Neypes rule in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to
the date of promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in Fil-
Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia,
Since this case was already pending in this Court at the time of promulgation of Neypes, then,
ineluctably, the Court must also apply the foregoing rulings to the present case. Sumiran is entitled to
a fresh period of 15 days counted from May 19, 2003, the date of his receipt of the Order
denying his MR of the RTC Decision within which to file his notice of appeal. Therefore, when he
filed said notice on May 29, 2003, or only ten (10) days after receipt of the Order denying his motion
for reconsideration, his period to appeal had not yet lapsed.
Rule 122 to Rule 125

People v. Abon, G.R.No.169245, February 15, 2008
Facts
Nelson Abon raped his 13 year old daughter. As a result, an Information charging Abon with
Qualified Rape was filed before the RTC. Abon pleaded not guilty. During trial, he interposed denial
as well as alibi as defenses. Nevertheless, RTC convicted Abon and imposed on him the death
penalty. Due to said penalty, the case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review. However, the
case was transferred to the CA for intermediate review pursuant to People v. Mateo. CA affirmed the
conviction.
Thereafter, Abon filed a Supplemetal Brief before the SC and contended that the CA erred in
affirming Abons conviction for qualified rape.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT CA GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OF ABON FOR QUALIFIED RAPE.
Held
NO. REDUCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Where the penalty imposed by the RTC is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an appeal is made
directly to this Court by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. On the other hand, a case
where the penalty imposed is death will be automatically reviewed by the Court without a need for
filing a notice of appeal.
However, Mateo modified these rules by providing an intermediate review of the cases by the CA
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death. Pursuant to Mateos
ruling, the Court issued A.M. No. 00-503-SC 2004-10-12, amending the pertinent rules governing
review of death penalty cases thus:
(c) The appeal in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or where a lesser penalty is imposed for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose
out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more, serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance
with paragraph (a) of this Rule.
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it
shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.
Also affecting the rules on appeal is the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines, which took effect on June 29,
2006. Under Sec. 2 of RA 9346, the imposition of the death penalty is prohibited, and in lieu thereof,
it imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); or life imprisonment, when the law violated does not
make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.
Consequently, in the provisions of the Rules of Court on appeals, death penalty cases are no longer
operational. Having clarified the rules on appeal in criminal proceedings, we now discuss the
substantive issues of the instant case.
The RTC and CA extensively discussed the trustworthiness of the victims testimony describing her
fathers bestiality against her. We find no reason to overturn their findings.
Rape victims, especially those of tender age, would not concoct a story of sexual violation, or allow
an examination of their private parts and undergo public trial, if they are not motivated by the desire
to obtain justice for the wrong committed against them. Moreover, a rape victims testimony against
her father goes against the grain of Filipino culture as it yields unspeakable trauma and social stigma
on the child and the entire family. Thus, great weight is given to an accusation a child directs against
her father.
As regards the penalty imposed, in view of the effectivity of RA 9346, the penalty of death is reduced
to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole. Also, we find that the increased amount of
damages awarded by the CA is proper and is consistent with recent jurisprudence on the matter.
Quidet v. People, G.R. No.170289, April 8, 2010

Facts
On the way to visit a friend, Jimmy Tagarda, Andrew Tagarda, Edwin Balani, and Rolando Mabayo
came across Rosie Quidet, Feliciano Taban, and Aurelio Tubo. Thereafter, a fight ensued. In the
course thereof, Jimmy and Andrew ended up being stabbed. As a result, Jimmy died while Andrew
sustained stab wounds but survived.
As a matter of course, 2 Informations were filed against Quidet, Taban, and Tubo for Homicide and
Frusrated Homicide. All of them entered a plea of not guilty for Frustrated Homicide. On the other
hand, Taban entered a plea of guilt in the Homicide charge. Consequently, partial judgment was
rendered against him. Thereafter, trial ensued. Afterwards, RTC found Quidet and Tubo guilty of
Homicide and all 3 guilty of Frustated Homicide. Conspiracy was found. Only Quidet appealed.
On appeal, CA upheld the ruling on Homicide but reduced Frustrated Homicide to Attempted
Homicide after finding that no mortal wounds were inflicted. CA likewise modified the penalty of
Taban and Tubo consistent with the finding of Attempted Homicide.
Issue
WHETFHER OR NOT THE CA ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE
WAS CONSPIRACY.
Held
YES.
As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to evaluate the
testimonial evidence, are accorded respect by this Court. But where the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which can affect
the result of the case, this Court is duty-bound to correct this palpable error for the right to liberty,
which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away.
In the instant case, we find that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Quidet
conspired with Taban and Tubo in committing the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide.
For failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, Quidets liability is
separate and individual. Considering that it was duly established that Quidet boxed Jimmy and
Andrew and absent proof of the extent of the injuries sustained by the latter from these acts, Quidet
should only be made liable for two counts of slight physical injuries. In addition, he should pay
P5,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Jimmy and another P5,000.00 as moral damages to
Andrew. Actual damages arising from said acts cannot, however, be awarded for failure to prove the
same.
Anent the penalty imposed on Taban and Tubo, in Criminal Case No. 92080, the CA correctly
modified the same. The crime committed was attempted homicide and not frustrated homicide
because the stab wounds that Andrew sustained were not life-threatening.
Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal their conviction, this part of the CAs judgment is favorable
to them, thus, they are entitled to a reduction of their prison terms.
The rule is that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
The period of preventive imprisonment of Feliciano Taban, Jr., Aurelio Tubo and Rosie Quidet shall
be credited in their favor in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Deus v. People, G.R. No. 178405, October 15, 2008

Facts
Acting on an informants tip, a buy-bust team was formed and proceeded to Barangay Pembo. In the
course of the buy-bust operation, Reynaldo Deus was arrested after he sold 0.01g of shabu to the
poseur-buyer. Accordingly, an Information charging Deus of selling illegal drugs in violation Sec 5 of
RA 9165 was filed before the RTC of Makati. After trial, RTC found Deus guilty as charged and
sentenced him to life imprisonment. Without the assistance of counsel, Deus filed an MR which the
RTC denied. Subsequently, he filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA as well as a motion to
litigate as a pauper. Thereafter, the CA appointed and designated PAO as counsel de oficio for Deus.
However, the Petition was still dismissed on the ground that he availed of the wrong remedy. Instead
of filing an ordinary appeal through a notice of appeal in the court which rendered judgment, he
immediately went up to the CA via Certiorari. MR was denied. Hence, this petition.
Deus argues that Sec 8 Rule 124 should be applied and that the CA should not have dismissed his
petition since he was represented by counsel de oficio. Essentially, he appeals for a liberal
interpretation of the rules.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA CORRECTLY DISMISSED DEUS PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI.
Held
YES BUT SC SAID, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
SHOULD BE TREATED AS AN APPEAL.
Basic is the rule that the mode of appeal in cases decided by the regional trial court in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction is by a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment appealed
from.
On the other hand, the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are available
only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or where another adequate remedy is
available for the correction of the error.
Since the judgment of conviction had not been appealed within the time and in the manner prescribed
by the rules, it became final and executory upon the lapse of the reglementary appeal period.
Deus likewise erred in contending that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court prohibits the
dismissal of the certiorari petition when appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio. First, said
provision only refers to dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. Second, the
dismissal of the appeal is conditioned on the appellants failure to file a brief. An appellants brief is a
pleading filed in an ordinary appeal. Clearly, Section 8 contemplates an ordinary appeal filed before
the Court of Appeals.
The aforecited legal principles notwithstanding, we agree with the OSG that the CA should have
treated the certiorari petition as an appeal.
Deus was not represented by counsel when he filed the petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. Thus, he cannot be presumed to know the legal remedies to take in pursuing his appeal.
Moreover, his right to liberty is at stake. These attending circumstances should have spurred the CA
to relax the rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice. It should have extended the same
liberality it evinced in granting the two motions for extension filed by Deus.
Hence, the dismissal of the petition on the basis of a technicality should be set aside. The CA should
be directed to resolve the petition, treated as an ordinary appeal, on the merits.
Tamayo v. People, G.R. No. 174698, July 28, 2008

Facts
Aurora Tamayo and Erlinda Anicas went to the house of Sotto in Tarlac. They introduced themselves
as assemblers of passenger jeeps payable on installment basis. Sotto wanted to have a Malaguena-
type jeep assembled. So, Tamayo said that the price was 120K and that it would be delivered within a
month. Sotto then made a series of partial payments.
After a month, Sotto asked for the jeep but Tamayo gave excuses why the jeep cannot be produced.
Sotto hired a lawyer to make demand letters against Tamaya. When the jeep or the money could not
be delivered/returned, Sotto filed a complaint. As a matter of course, an Information for Estafa was
filed in the RTC of Tarlac. After the trial, RTC convicted Tamayo. appeal, CA affirmed. Later on, CA
issued a Resolution declaring that the decision had already become final and executory and ordered it
to be entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
Aggrieved, Tamayo manifested before the RTC that while the case was pending in the CA, she settled
her dispute with Sotto and that Sotto would no longer pursue the case against her. Thereafter, she filed
a Motion to Suspend Writ of Execution on the ground of said supervening facts. Nonetheless, RTC
denied on the ground that the CA decision had already become final and executory. Hence, this
petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DECISION AFFIRMING THE ESTAFA CONVICTION WHICH
HAS ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY BE MODIFIED OR SET ASIDE ON
ACCOUNT OF THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BETWEEN TAMAYO AND SOTTO.
Held
NO.
A judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside only if the judgment is not yet final. Further, a
judgment becomes final when no appeal is seasonably perfected.
Under the Rules of Court, judgments of the Court of Appeals in criminal cases MUST BE
APPEALED by the accused within fifteen (15) days from service of a copy thereof upon the accused
or her counsel either:
1. Filing a motion for reconsideration; or
2. Filing a motion for new trial; or
3. By filing a petition for review on certiorari to this Court.
The Court of Appeals noted that, based on its Judicial Records Division, Tamayo did not file a motion
for reconsideration or new trial of its Decision. Neither did Tamayo file a petition for review of such
decision before this Court within the period as aforementioned. Thus, it declared its Decision as final
and executory, and ordered the same to be entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
It is clear from the foregoing that Tamayo did not appeal the Decision of the Court of Appeals despite
her, or her former counsels, receipt of the same.. As such, it cannot be modified or set aside anymore
in accordance with Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
It is a hornbook doctrine in our criminal law that the criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a
compromise, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the government on
its own motion, even though complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by
the private offended party. As in this case, the alleged compromise between Tamayo and Pedro,
wherein she allegedly reimbursed to Pedro the amount swindled in exchange for Pedros consent to
dismiss the instant case, does not extinguish petitioners criminal liability for estafa.
People v. Taruc, G.R. 185202, February 18, 2009

Facts
Francisco Taruc was charged in an Information filed before the RTC of Bataan for the Murder of one
Emelito Sualog. Upon arraignment, Taruc, represented by PAO, pleaded not guilty. During trial,
before the prosecution witness could be cross-examined, Taruc escaped from Bataan Provincial Jail.
As a result, RTC considered that Taruc waived his right to cross-examine and then promulgated its
judgment of conviction while Taruc was still at large. Death penalty was imposed.
Despite his absence, PAO still represented him on automatic review in the CA. Notwithstanding the
escape, CA granted PAOs Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellants Brief. After filing said
brief, the case was submitted for decision. CA affirmed the conviction but lowered the penalty to
Reclusion Perpetua. PAO filed a Notice of Appeal to appeal the CA decision before the SC. CA gave
due course and directed that the case records be elevated to the SC. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT TARUC HAS LOST HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL ON ACCOUNT OF HIS
ESCAPE FROM PRISON.
Held
YES. WHILE AT LARGE, TARUC CANNOT SEEK RELIEF FROM THE COURT
[O]nce an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he
loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. Although Rule 124, Section 8
particularly applies to the Court of Appeals, it has been extended to the Supreme Court by Rule 125,
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
It is indisputable that Taruc herein, by escaping from jail, was not present at the promulgation by the
RTC of its Decision, finding him guilty of the crime of murder. Taruc failed to surrender and file the
required motion within 15 days from the promulgation of the RTC Decision. This alone already
deprived him of any remedy against said judgment of conviction available under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, including the right to appeal the same.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the escape of Taruc did not preclude the Court of Appeals from
exercising its review jurisdiction, considering that what was involved was capital punishment.
Automatic review being mandatory, it is not only a power of the court but a duty to review all death
penalty cases.
In this case, considering that the penalty imposed by the trial court was death, the Court of Appeals
rightly took cognizance of the case. Upon review by the appellate court, however, it modified the
penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
BY ESCAPING PRISON, Taruc impliedly waived his right to appeal. By putting himself beyond the
reach and application of the legal processes of the land, Taruc revealed his contempt of the law and
placed himself in a position to speculate, at his pleasure on his chances for a reversal. In the process,
he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.
Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.
Taruc, in the case at bar, has remained at large for most of the proceedings before the RTC, as well as
for the entirety of the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, and even until now when
his appeal is pending before this Court. He cannot so audaciously hope that his appeal before this
Court would succeed. He only hopes in vain.
Rule 126
Marimla v. People, G.R. No. 158467, October 16, 2009
Facts
Special Investigator Lagasca of the NBI applied for 2 Search Warrants in the RTC of Manila seeking
permission to search Marimlas house in Angeles City and the premises of an address in Porac,
Pampanga. It was alleged that, based on prior surveillance operations and test buys conducted,
Lagasca had personal knowledge that shabu and weed are being kept therein.
Executive Judge Guarina III examined the application through searching questions and answers.
Thereafter, he issued a Search Warrant. Pursuant to said warrant, NBI operatives searched Marimlas
house and were able to seize cash and illegal drugs. As a matter of course, an Information for
violation of CDDA was filed before RTC of Angeles under Judge Viola.
Marimla filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized on the
ground that the application of the search warrant was outside of its territorial jurisdiction and that the
warrant was issued without the authority of NBI Director but only the Deputy Director. Thus, the
evidence seized were inadmissible.
Judge Viola denied the Motion to Quash and to Suppress. Marimlas MR was likewise denied. Hence,
this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
MARIMLAS MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT AND TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
ILLEGALLY SEIZED.
Held
NO. ENFORCEMENT OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS VALID.
At the heart of the present controversy are A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, Clarifying the Guidelines on the
Application for the Enforceability of Search Warrants, which was enacted on January 25, 2000; and
A.M. No. 00-50-03-SC, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1,
2000, specifically, Section 2, Rule 126 thereof.
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of
Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes,
illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the PNP,
NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF.
On the other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application
for search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed, and (b) for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced.
Marimla contends that the application for search warrant was defective. They aver that the application
for search warrant filed by SI Lagasca was not personally endorsed by the NBI Head, Director
Wycoco, but instead endorsed only by Deputy Director Nasol and that while SI Lagasca declared that
Deputy Director Nasol was commissioned to sign the authorization letter in behalf of Director
Wycoco, the same was not duly substantiated.
Marimla concludes that the absence of the signature of Director Wycoco was a fatal defect that
rendered the application on the questioned search warrant void per se, and the issued search warrant
null and void because the spring cannot rise above its source.
We disagree.
Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF
from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant to their assistant
heads. Thus, Deputy Director Nasols endorsement had the same force and effect as an endorsement
issued by Director Wycoco himself. The finding of the RTC in the questioned Orders that Deputy
Director Nasol possessed the authority to sign for and in behalf of Director Wycoco is unassailable.
ENFORCEMENT OF THE WARRANT DID NOT GO BEYOND ITS TERRITORIAL

JURISDICTION
Marimla also asserts that the questioned Search Warrant was void ab initio.
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants provided
therein shall continue until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-
09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-80-02-SC entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation
Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated
that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila
and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Chan v. Honda Motors, G.R.No.172775, December 19, 2007

Facts
Special Investigator Lacaran of the NBI applied for Search Warrants against Chan for alleged
violation of the IP Code (Unfair Competition) in the RTC of Manila. As a result, Judge Tipon issued 2
Search Warrants against Chan and Zeng at 2 different addresses in Caloocan City who were both
operating under the name and style Dragon Spirit Motorcycle Center.
Said warrants ordered the search and seizure of motorcycles bearing the model DS-110, DSM-110,
SUPER WAVE, DS-125, DSM-125, WAVE R, and WAVE. Pursuant thereto, NBI conducted a
search of the premises indicated and were able to seize several motorcycles including one bearing the
model name WAVE CX.
Aggrieved, Chan and Zeng filed in the RTC a Joint Motion to Quash Search Warrants and to Return
Illegally Seized Items stating that said warrants were issued without probable cause and were in the
nature of general warrants. Over Honda Motors opposition, RTC quashed them. MR was denied.
As such, Honda filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. CA granted the petition and set aside the
RTCs order. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE SEARCH WARRANTS ISSUED WERE VALID .
Held
YES.
In the case at bar, Chan & Zeng capitalize on the first paragraph of the Application for Search
Warrant executed by NBI SI Lacaran to support their argument that he lacked the personal knowledge
required by both the Rules of Court and by jurisprudence. However, the very next paragraph of the
application reveals the tremulous nature of their argument for it is clearly stated therein that far from
merely relying on mere information and belief, NBI SI Lacaran personally verified the report and
found [it] to be a fact. This, to our mind, removed the basis of his application from mere hearsay and
supported the earlier finding of probable cause on the part of the examining judge. We cannot, thus,
agree in his Order of 20 February 2004 quashing the search warrants he earlier issued on 14
November 2003.
It is likewise well to reiterate here that PROBABLE CAUSE, as far as the issuance of a search
warrant is concerned, has been uniformly defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
NOT A GENERAL WARRANT
Chan & Zeng also argue that the search warrants in question partook the nature of general search
warrants in that they included motorcycles bearing the model name WAVE. They insist that word
WAVE is generic and that it fails to pass the requirement of particularity of the items to be seized.
They also maintain that had the word WAVE been enough, there would have been no need for them
to state in their application for search warrants the specific motorcycle models, i.e., DSM WAVE,
DSM SUPERWAVE 110, and WAVE R 125.
It is elemental that in order to be valid, a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. It is not, however, required that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities.
A reading of the search warrants issued by the RTC in this case reveals that the items to be seized,
including motorcycles, are those which are connected with the alleged violation of the IP Code,
notwithstanding the use of the generic word WAVE.
WARRANTS WERE ISSUED IN RELATION TO A PARTICULAR OFFENSE
In the Application for Search Warrant filed by NBI SI Lacaran, it is clearly stated that what Honda is
complaining about was the alleged violation of the goodwill they have established with respect to
their motorcycle models WAVE 110 S and WAVE 125 S and which goodwill is entitled to
protection in the same manner as other property rights.
Sy Tan v. Sy Tiong, G.R. No. 174570, February 17, 2010

Facts
An Information charging Sy Tiong, Felicidad Chan Sy, et al of Robbery were filed in the RTC of
Manila. It was alleged that Sy Tiong et al took cash, checks, 5 boxes of Hennessy Cognac, TV,
computer, and other documents from Guan Yiak Hardware in Binondo, owned by Romer Sy Tan.
Thereafter, Police Inspector Reyes applied for 2 Search Warrants before the RTC of Manila. In said
applications, it was alleged that Reyes had personal knowledge that Chan Sy had in her possession the
items taken from Guan Yiak Hardware and were kept in the 7th and 8th floors of a building in
Binondo.
As a result, Judge Lanzanas posed searching questions to the applicant and the witnesses presented.
Later on, Search Warrants were issued. Subsequently, the Search Warrants were implemented and
caused the search and seizure of boxes of Henessy and the aforementioned checks.
Aggrieved, Sy Tiong et al filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrants. However, RTC denied the
motion. MR was likewise denied. Thus, Sy Tiong filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. CA granted
the petition and set aside the issuance of the warrants on the ground that there was no probable cause
for issuing the same. Sy Tan filed an MR but was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE SEARCH
WARRANTS ISSUED BY THE RTC OF MANILA FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
Held
NO. THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE.
In the case at bar, the CA concluded that the RTC did not comply with any of the requisites required
for the issuance of the subject search warrants. The CA ratiocinated that although the RTC judge
personally determined if probable cause existed by examining the witnesses through searching
questions, and although the search warrants sufficiently described the place to be searched and things
to be seized, there was no probable cause warranting the issuance of the subject search warrants. We
do not agree.
A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay and the Transcript of Stenographic Notes reveals that Judge
Lanzanas, through searching and probing questions, was satisfied that there were good reasons to
believe that Sy Tiong et al, accompanied by 5 maids, took 5 boxes of Hennessy XO owned by the
Guan Yiak Hardware and brought them to the 8th floor of 524 T. Pinpin St., Binondo, Manila; and
that a person named Yubol took various checks from the companys vault, which was later brought
to the 7th floor of 524 T. Pinpin St., Binondo, Manila. When they entered the premises, Felicidad
Chan Sy was accompanied by 2 policemen, which stunned Romer Sy Tan, so that he was not able to
do anything in the face of the calculated and concerted actions of his grandmother, Felicidad Chan Sy,
and her 7 companions. Based on the foregoing circumstances, Romer Sy Tan believed that the crime
of robbery was committed by the Sy Tiong et al.
Apparent in the case at bar and as aptly found by the RTC judge, there was probable cause justifying
the issuance of the search warrants. This was established by the Sinumpaang Salaysay and the
testimonies, consisting of no less than 37 pages, given by witnesses who had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the crime of robbery had been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense were in the place sought to be searched. The facts narrated by the
witnesses while under oath, when they were asked by the examining judge, were sufficient
justification for the issuance of the subject search warrants.
It is to be noted, however, that while this Court affirms the sufficiency of probable cause in the
issuance of the search warrants in connection with the crime of robbery allegedly committed by the
Sy Tiong, the guilt of the accused still remains to be determined in the appropriate criminal action
against them, not in the present case which is limited only to the propriety of the issuance of the
subject search warrants by the RTC.
Quinicot v. People, G.R. No. 179700, June 22, 2009

Facts
Based on reports from a police informant, a buy-bust operation was conducted in Chin Loong
Restaurant. There, police operatives were able to arrest Gwyn Quinicot for selling shabu to the
poseur-buyer. Upon searching his body, sachets of shabu were also found in his possession. A Receipt
of Property Seized was thereafter issued by one of the arresting officers. As a matter of course, 2
Informations of sale and possession of illegal drugs in violation of the DDA were filed in the RTC of
Negros Oriental.
After pleading not guilty, pre-trial and trial ensued. In his defense, Quinicot asserts that the shabu
found were planted evidence. Nonetheless, the RTC found him guilty as charged. On appeal, CA
affirmed. Quinicots MR was also denied. Hence this petition.
Quinicot contends that the Receipt of Property Seized was defective because it did not comply with
the 2-witness rule.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE 2-WITNESS RULE APPLIES IN WARRANTLESS SEARCHES.
Held
NO. CONVICTION IS SUSTAINED.
Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of the
buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. We have held
that when time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance. In the
instant case, having been accompanied by the informant to the person who was peddling the
dangerous drugs, the policemen need not have conducted any prior surveillance before they undertook
the buy-bust operation.
In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation was planned in less than an hour prior to the buy-bust
operation, after the informant contacted Quinicot and told him that there was a buyer. Under the
situation, the briefing of a team member for only a few minutes cannot be taken against the buy-bust
team, for the team had to cope with what it had at that instant.
The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. There is no need to
present the informant in court where the sale was actually witnessed and adequately proved by
prosecution witnesses. The testimony of an informant who witnessed the illegal sale of shabu is not
essential for conviction and may be dispensed with if the poseur-buyer testified on the same, because
the informants testimony would merely corroborate that of the poseur-buyer. What can be fatal is the
non-presentation of the poseur-buyer, if there is no other eyewitness to the illicit transaction not
the non-presentation of the informant whose testimony under certain circumstances would be merely
corroborative or cumulative.
TWO-WITNESS RULE NOT APPLICABLE TO WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
The Receipt of Property Seized issued by PO1 Domingo Marchan was validly made. It enumerated
the items 3 plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, and other paraphernalia
recovered from petitioners body after he was arrested for selling shabu to the poseur-buyer. The lack
of witnesses signing the same, Quinicot claims, is evidence of a frameup.
We do not agree. The two witnesses were not required to sign the receipt. This 2-witness rule applies
only to searches made under authority of a search warrant of a house, room, or any other
premises in the absence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family. In the case at bar,
there was no search warrant issued and no house, room or premises searched.
Evidence
Admissibility (Rule 128, Section 3)

Garcillano v. House of Representatives
Facts
GMA made a phone call to a Garcillano, a COMELEC official, and allegedly instructed the latter to
manipulate the results in her favor. Unbeknownst to them, their conversation was being recorded and
would be eventually known as the Hello Garci tapes.
As a result, House inquiries involving various Committees were conducted. During said inquiry, NBI
Director Wycoco submitted 7 allegedly original tape recordings thereof. As such, Garcillano filed
in the SC a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction seeking to restrain the Committees from using said
tape recordings since they were obtained by means of an illegal wiretap. It likewise asked that said
recordings be stricken off from the records.
Petitions were filed by seeking to prevent the playing of the recordings in the House and their
subsequent inclusion in the committee. Moreover, the Petition also seek to prohibit or stop the Senate
inquiry on the wiretapped conversation. However, the Petition as regards the House became moot and
academic due to the playing of the tapes in the said Committee hearings.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE SENATE CAN CONDUCT INQUIRIES REGARDING THE HELLO
GARCI TAPES.
Held
NO. SENATE WAS NOT ABLE TO PUBLISH THE RULES ON LEGISLATIVE
INVESTIGATIONS IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION. ALSO, THE INTERNET IS NOT
A MEDIUM FOR PUBLISHING LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS.
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
It was admitted in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation
only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which
the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the
publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is
all the more incorrect.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional
equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages
and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While
we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry
sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions.
Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could
not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in
clear contravention of the Constitution.
People v. Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010

Facts
Lauga is accused of qualified rape against his own daughter, 13-years old.
His daughter was alone at home one night when Lauga raped her. The daughter told her brother about
the rape and the latter sought the assistance of Banting, a Bantay Bayan. Banting found appellant in
his house wearing only his underwear. He invited appellant to the police station, to which appellant
obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because he was unable to
control himself.
Issue
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession before a Bantay Bayan is admissible.
Held
Inadmissible.
Appellant argues that even if he confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayan," the confession
was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver
of such requirement.
The case of People v. Malngan is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for
under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the
admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the
private complainant. The constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to
those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted
to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x of the private complainant.
This Court needs to ascertain whether or not a "bantay bayan" may be deemed a law enforcement
officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
A "bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents living in the area organized for the purpose of
keeping peace in their community,which is an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP."
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Executive Order No. 309, a Peace and Order
Committee in each barangay shall be organized "to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal
Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level." The composition of the Committee includes, among
others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a
Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of
existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government
Organization Representative well-known in his community.
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch
groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on
the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial
investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as
the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
Judicial Notice (Rule 129)

Corinthian Gardens v. Spouses Tanjangco, G.R. No. No. 160795, June 27, 2008.
Facts
Respondents-spouses Tanjangco own lots a & b managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens
Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the other hand, respondents-spouses Cuaso own lot c which is
adjacent to the Tanjangcos lots.
Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot c, a relocation survey was necessary. After the
Cuasos constructed their house, their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos Lot b.
No amicable settlement was reached between the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded that the
Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to
file with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages.
Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De
Dios. The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper
specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation
survey, thereby, exposing them to litigation. The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for approving their
relocation survey and building plans without verifying their accuracy and in making representations
as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos. It ruled that the Cuasos perimeter wall
encroached on the land of the Tanjangos. It, however, ruled that the Cuasos were builders in good
faith. The RTC also ordered the Cuasos to pay monthly rentals commencing from the time of the
filing of the complaint.
Issue
Whether or not the monthly rentals fixed were correct.
Held
Correct.
On the second issue, our ruling in Spouses Badillo v. Tayag is instructive:

Citing Sia v. Court of Appeals, petitioners argue that the MTC may take judicial notice of the reasonable rental
or the general price increase of land in order to determine the amount of rent that may be awarded to them. In
that case, however, this Court relied on the CA's factual findings, which were based on the evidence presented
before the trial court.
In determining reasonable rent, the RTC therein took account of the following factors: 1) the realty assessment
of the land, 2) the increase in realty taxes, and 3) the prevailing rate of rentals in the vicinity. Clearly, the trial
court relied, not on mere judicial notice, but on the evidence presented before it.
Indeed, courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed property.
However, petitioners herein erred in assuming that courts, in determining the amount of rent, could simply rely
on their own appreciation of land values without considering any evidence. As we have said earlier, a court
may fix the reasonable amount of rent, but it must still base its action on the evidence adduced by the parties.
In Herrera v. Bollos, the trial court awarded rent to the defendants in a forcible entry case. Reversing the RTC,
this Court declared that the reasonable amount of rent could be determined not by mere judicial notice, but by
supporting evidence:
x x x A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may take judicial notice of
matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the court must "allow the parties
to be heard thereon." Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in question
without supporting evidence.
Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because evidence is required for a court to determine the
proper rental value. But contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both the RTC and the CA found that
indeed rent was due the Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession and use of their
property. This uniform factual finding of the RTC and the CA was based on the evidence presented
below. Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v. Hao, we considered the increase in the award of rentals as
reasonable given the particular circumstances of each case. We noted therein that the respondent
denied the petitioners the benefits, including rightful possession, of their property for almost a decade.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession and use of their property for
more than two decades through no fault of their own. Thus, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
monthly rental fixed by the CA.
Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008
Facts
In 2001, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Manila and with the approval of Mayor Atienza, enacted
Ordinance 8027. Under said ordinance, the Pandacan area was reclassified from industrial to
commercial. Also, it directed the oil companies operating within said area to cease and desist from
operating within 6 months from the effectivity of the ordinance.
As a result, SJS filed an original Petition for Mandamus in the SC seeking to compel Mayor Atienza
to enforce Ordinance 8027. In 2007, SC ruled that Mayor Atienza has a ministerial duty to enforce
said ordinance.
As a result, the oil companies intervened. Said companies informed the SC that the oil companies
filed complaints before the RTC of Manila assailing the validity of the ordinance and asking for
TROs, writs of preliminary injunction, and status quo orders. These were granted. Moreover, the oil
companies claim that, in 2006, Ordinance 8119 (Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Ordinance) was enacted. Based on this, the oil companies again filed complaints assailing the validity
of new ordinance and seeking to enjoin its enforcement.
The oil companies aver that the implementation of the 2007 decision was impeded by the subsequent
passing of Ordinance 8119.
Issue
Whether or not ordinance 8027 was superseded by ordinance 8119
Held
Not superseded
The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of Ordinance No. 8119
entitled An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations
of 2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto which was
approved by respondent on June 16, 2006. The simple reason was that the Court was never informed
about this ordinance.
While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the rule with respect
to local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of matters covered by
mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Although, Section 50 of RA 409 provides that:

SEC. 50 Judicial notice of ordinances. - All courts sitting in the city shall take judicial notice of the ordinances
passed by the [Sangguniang Panglungsod].
Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances, a
court is not required to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not before it and to which it does not
have access. The party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the
full text of the rules the party desires it to have notice of. Counsel should take the initiative in
requesting that a trial court take judicial notice of an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to
take judicial notice of local ordinances.
The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local ordinance is to remove any
discretion a court might have in determining whether or not to take notice of an ordinance. Such a
statute does not direct the court to act on its own in obtaining evidence for the record and a party must
make the ordinance available to the court for it to take notice.
In its defense, respondent claimed that he did not inform the Court about the enactment of Ordinance
No. 8119 because he believed that it was different from Ordinance No. 8027 and that the two were not
inconsistent with each other.
In the same way that we deem the intervenors late intervention in this case unjustified, we find the
failure of respondent, who was an original party here, inexcusable.
G Holdings, Inc. v. National Mines and Allied Workers, G.R. No. 160236, October 16, 200946
Facts
MMC was incorporated by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Philippine
National Bank (PNB). Later, DBP and PNB transferred it to the National Government for disposition
or privatization because it had become a non-performing asset.
Pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement executed between GHI and Asset Privatization Trust
(APT), the former bought ninety percent (90%) of MMCs shares and financial claims. These
financial claims were converted into three Promissory Notes issued by MMC in favor of GHI, secured
by mortgages over MMCs properties.
Upon the signing of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and upon the full satisfaction of the stipulated
down payment, GHI immediately took physical possession of the mine site and its facilities, and took
full control of the management and operation of MMC.
Almost four years thereafter, a labor dispute arose between MMC and NAMAWU, with the latter
eventually filing with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of Bacolod City a notice of
strike. Then Labor Secretary Quisumbing assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and ruled in favor of
NAMAWU. In two separate cases filed with this Court, we sustained the validity of the Quisumbing
Order, which became final and executory.
The Acting DOLE Secretary Brion directed the issuance of a partial writ of execution and ordered the
DOLE sheriffs to proceed to the MMC premises for the execution of the same. Much later, in 2006,
this Court, entitled Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion and NAMAWU, affirmed the propriety of
the issuance of the Brion Writ.
The Brion Writ was not fully satisfied because MMCs resident manager resisted its enforcement.
DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution and Break-Open
Order. The respondent acting sheriffs, the members of the union, and several armed men implemented
the Sto. Tomas Writ, and levied on the properties of MMC.
GHI filed with the RTC a special civil action for Contempt with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Nullify the Sheriffs
Levy on Properties.
Issue
Whether or not the court can take judicial notice of the courts prior decision upholding NAMAWUs
labor claims.
Held
Can take judicial notice.
Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon.
Arturo D. Brion and NAMAWU, in which we upheld the right of herein private respondent,
NAMAWU, to its labor claims.
Upon the same principle of judicial notice, we acknowledge our Decision in Republic of the
Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. G Holdings, Inc., in which GHI
was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the shares of stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the
delivery of the company notes accompanying the said purchase. These company notes, consisting of
three (3) Promissory Notes, were part of the documents executed in 1992 in the privatization sale of
46
A criminal and civil case pending with the same judge, the judge as a general rule cannot take judicial notice
of the other case unless the judge notifies the parties and the parties do not object.
MMC by the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to GHI. Each of these notes uniformly contains
stipulations establishing and constituting in favor of GHI mortgages over MMCs real and personal
properties.
We find both decisions critically relevant to the instant dispute. In fact, they should have guided the
courts below in the disposition of the controversy at their respective levels. To repeat, these decisions
respectively confirm the right of NAMAWU to its labor claims and affirm the right of GHI to its
financial and mortgage claims over the real and personal properties of MMC, as will be explained
below. The assailed CA decision apparently failed to consider the impact of these two decisions on
the case at bar. Thus, we find it timely to reiterate that: courts have also taken judicial notice of
previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a
previous ruling is applicable to the case under consideration.
In this light, all the more does it become imperative to take judicial notice of the two cases aforesaid,
as they provide the necessary perspective to determine whether GHI is such a party with a valid
ownership claim over the properties subject of the writ of execution. In Juaban v. Espina, we held that
in some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely
connected to the matter in controversy. These cases may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly
interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice. The two cases that we have taken judicial
notice of are of such character, and our review of the instant case cannot stray from the findings and
conclusions therein.
Spouses Latip v. Chua, G.R. No. 177809, October 16, 2009

Facts
Respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building.
Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses Latip.
Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by
Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.
A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already occupying the leased
cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and
should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalies
demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint.
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalies claims. They averred that the lease of the two (2)
cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the
total amount of P2,570,000.00. Rosalie argued said money was only goodwill money, and not
payment for purchase of lease rights.
Issue
Whether or not the CA properly took judicial notice of the practice of paying goodwill money.
Held
CA erred.
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro is instructive:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial
knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are
commonly known.
It is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the
requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay
goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former
even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of common knowledge or notoriously
known.
We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no
evidence to prove her claim that the amount of P2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of
goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA,
containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid
goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules
on evidence provide for matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial
notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously
known, it will not be disputed by the parties.
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary
evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalies appeal before the CA. In short, the
alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court What need not be proved. Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had
knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area.
Judicial Admission (Rule 129, Section 4)

Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008
Facts
In 2001, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Manila and with the approval of Mayor Atienza, enacted
Ordinance 8027. Under said ordinance, the Pandacan area was reclassified from industrial to
commercial. Also, it directed the oil companies operating within said area to cease and desist from
operating within 6 months from the effectivity of the ordinance.
As a result, SJS filed an original Petition for Mandamus in the SC seeking to compel Mayor Atienza
to enforce Ordinance 8027. In 2007, SC ruled that Mayor Atienza has a ministerial duty to enforce
said ordinance.
As a result, the oil companies intervened. Said companies informed the SC that the oil companies
filed complaints before the RTC of Manila assailing the validity of the ordinance and asking for
TROs, writs of preliminary injunction, and status quo orders. These were granted. Moreover, the oil
companies claim that, in 2006, Ordinance 8119 (Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Ordinance) was enacted. Based on this, the oil companies again filed complaints assailing the validity
of new ordinance and seeking to enjoin its enforcement.
The oil companies aver that the implementation of the 2007 decision was impeded by the subsequent
passing of Ordinance 8119.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THERE A JUDICIAL ADMISSION SUCH THAT MAYOR ATIENZA IS
ALREADY CONSIDERED AS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THAT ORDINANCE 8027 WAS
NOT REPEALED BY THE SUBSEQUENT ORDINANCE.
Held
NO JUDICIAL ADMISSION. THEY WERE NOT MADE IN THE SAME PROCEEDING
Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that
it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a position contrary
to or inconsistent with what was pleaded, the aforestated rule is not applicable here.
Mayor Atienza made the statements regarding the ordinances in civil case nos. 03106379 and
06115334 which are not the same as this case before us. To constitute a judicial admission, the
admission must be made in the SAME CASE IN WHICH IT IS OFFERED.
Hence, Mayor Atienza is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not supersede
Ordinance No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be considered estopped.
They rely on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same
time, also impugn its (8119s) validity. We frown on the adoption of inconsistent positions and
distrust any attempt at clever positioning under one or the other on the basis of what appears
advantageous at the moment. Parties cannot take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the
validity of a statute or ordinance. Nonetheless, we will look into the merits of the argument of implied
repeal.
Cuenco v. Talisay Tourist Sports Complex, G.R. No. 174154

Facts
Petitioner leased from respondents the Talisay Tourist Sports Complex to be operated as a cockpit.
Under the Contract of Lease, it was stipulated that petitioner shall, like a good father of the family,
maintain in good condition the furniture, chattels and all other equipment and shall, at all times, keep
the leased premises clean and sanitary. Any damage caused to the furniture, chattels, equipment and
parts of the leased premises shall be the responsibility of petitioner to repair and compensate.
Furthermore, petitioner would give an equivalent to six (6) months rental to answer for whatever
damages may be caused to the premises during the period of the lease.
Upon expiration of the contract, respondent company conducted a public bidding for the lease of the
property. Petitioner participated in the bidding. The lease was eventually awarded to another bidder.
Thereafter, petitioner wrote four (4) demand letters to respondents for the return of the deposit.
As all of his demand letters remained unheeded, petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money,
damages and attorneys fees. He maintained that respondents acted in bad faith in withholding the
amount of the deposit without any justifiable reason.
In their Answer, respondents countered that petitioner caused physical damage to some portions of the
leased premises and the cost of repair and replacement of materials amounted to more than
P500,000.00.
Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding the judicial admission made by counsel during pretrial.
Held
CA erred.
Petitioner questions the CAs finding that there was damage caused the premises while the lease was
still in force. Such finding could only have been based on alleged inventory of the property conducted
by the respondents. Petitioner takes exception to this evidence because of the earlier judicial
admission made by respondents counsel that no inventory was conducted and, accordingly, any
evidence adduced by the respondents contrary to or inconsistent with the judicial admission should be
rejected.
Indeed, at the pre-trial conference, respondents counsel made an admission that no inventory was
made on the leased premises, at least up to that time. This admission was confirmed in the Pre-Trial
Order issued by the trial court.
Obviously, it was on Coronados testimony, as well as on the documentary evidence of an alleged

property inventory conducted, that the CA based its conclusion that the amount of damage sustained
by the leased premises while in the possession of petitioner exceeded the amount of petitioners
deposit. This contradicts the judicial admission made by respondents counsel which should have
been binding on the respondents.
The stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial admissions. The admissions of
parties during the pre-trial, as embodied in the pre-trial order, are binding and conclusive upon them.
Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel, neither did they claim that the same
was made through palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible and may be
relied upon by the courts. The pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt therein may
not be brushed aside in the process of decision-making. Furthermore, an act performed by counsel
within the scope of a general or implied authority is regarded as an act of the client which renders
respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission or representation is conclusive upon
the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Thus, respondents are bound by the admissions made by their counsel at the pre-trial. Accordingly,
the CA committed an error when it gave ample evidentiary weight to respondents evidence
contradictory to the judicial admission.
Toshiba Information v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.No.157594, March 9, 2010

Facts
Toshiba submitted to the BIR its amended VAT returns for the first and second quarters of 1997,
reporting input VAT payments with zero-rated sales.
Toshiba filed with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the
Department of Finance (DOF One-Stop Shop) two separate applications for tax credit/refund of its
unutilized input VAT payments for the first half of 1997. The next day, Toshiba likewise filed with
the CTA a Petition for Review to toll the running of the two-year prescriptive period.
Upon being advised by the CTA, Toshiba and the CIR filed a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues,
wherein the opposing parties agreed and admitted that
1. [Toshiba] is a duly registered value-added tax entity in accordance with Section 107 of the Tax Code, as
amended.
2. [Toshiba] is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax on its export sales in accordance with then Section
100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code, as amended.
With both parties waiving the right to submit their respective memoranda, the CTA rendered its
Decision favoring Toshiba. According to the CTA, the CIR himself admitted during pre-trial
stipulation that the export sales of Toshiba were subject to zero percent (0%) VAT. Toshiba could
then claim tax credit or refund of input VAT paid on its purchases of goods, properties, or services,
directly attributable to such zero-rated sale.
Issue
Whether or not the admissions bind the CIR.
Held
Bind.
More importantly, the arguments of the CIR that Toshiba was VAT-exempt and the latters export
sales were VAT-exempt transactions are inconsistent with the explicit admissions of the CIR in the
Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues (Joint Stipulation) that Toshiba was a registered VAT entity and
that it was subject to zero percent (0%) VAT on its export sales.
The Joint Stipulation was executed and submitted by Toshiba and the CIR upon being advised to do
so by the CTA at the end of the pre-trial conference.
The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated
as a judicial admission. The CIR was bound by these admissions, which he could not eventually
contradict in his Motion for Reconsideration of the CTA Decision, by arguing that Toshiba was
actually a VAT-exempt entity and its export sales were VAT-exempt transactions.
The Court disagrees with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that the CIR could not be bound by his
admissions in the Joint Stipulation because (1) the said admissions were made through palpable
mistake which, if countenanced, would result in falsehood, unfairness and injustice; and (2) the
State could not be put in estoppel by the mistakes of its officials or agents. This Court finds no
evidence of the commission of a mistake, much more, of a palpable one.
The CIR does not deny that his counsel signed the Joint Stipulation, together with the counsel of
Toshiba. The Court observes that the CIR himself never alleged in his Motion for Reconsideration of
the CTA Decision nor in his Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals, that Atty. Biazon
committed a mistake in signing the Joint Stipulation.
The Court of Appeals provided no explanation as to why the admissions of the CIR in his Answer
deserved more weight and credence than those he made in the Joint Stipulation. The appellate court
failed to appreciate that the CIR, through counsel, Atty. Biazon, also signed the Joint Stipulation; and
that absent evidence to the contrary, Atty. Biazon is presumed to have signed the Joint Stipulation
willingly and knowingly, in the regular performance of his official duties.
There is no basis for believing that to bind the CIR to his judicial admissions in the Joint Stipulation
would result in falsehood, unfairness and injustice. The judicial admissions of the CIR are not
intrinsically false, wrong, or illegal.
Paraffin Test
Marturillas v. People, G.R. No. 163217, April 18, 2006
Facts
Lito Santos testified that about 6:00 oclock in the afternoon, he saw his neighbor and kumpare
Artemio Pantinople arrive. Artemio sat for a while on a bench located in front of his store. Lito was
eating supper in their kitchen when he heard a gunshot. Moments later, he saw Artemio clasping his
chest and staggering backwards to the direction of his (Litos) kitchen. Artemio shouted to him,
Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan, meaning Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain. However,
Lito did not approach Artemio right after the shooting incident because Cecilia warned him that he
might also be shot.
Shortly, Lito saw Ernita Pantinople, the wife of Artemio, coming from her house towards the
direction where Artemio was sprawled on the ground. Ernita was hysterical, jumping and shouting,
Kapitan, bakit mo binaril and aking asawa. She also repeatedly cried for help.
The police arrived and found the lifeless body of Artemio sprawled on the ground. Ernita and Lito
then approached the police and informed them that appellant was the one responsible for the shooting.
Armed with the information that appellant was the one responsible for the shooting of Artemio, PO2
Operario proceeded to the house of appellant and informed him that he was a suspect in the killing of
Artemio. He then invited appellant to go with him to the police station and also to bring along with
him his M-14 rifle. Appellant did not say anything. He just got his M-14 rifle and went with the police
to the police station where he was detained the whole night.
Issue
Whether or not the negative results of the parrafin test makes appelant innocent.
Held
Still guilty.
Petitioner takes issue with the negative results of the paraffin test done on him. While they were
negative, that fact alone did not ipso facto prove that he was innocent. Time and time again, this Court
has held that a negative paraffin test result is not a conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun.
In other words, it is possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when culprits wear
gloves, wash their hands afterwards, or are bathed in perspiration. Besides, the prosecution was able
to establish the events during the shooting, including the presence of petitioner at the scene of the
crime. Hence, all other matters, such as the negative paraffin test result, are of lesser probative value.
Photograph as Evidence
Jose v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118441, January 18, 2000
Facts
Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL) is the operator-lessee of a public utility bus
(hereafter referred to as Bus 203). Bus 203 is owned by the Metro Manila Transit Corporation and is
insured with the Government Service Insurance System.
At around six oclock in the morning, Bus 203, then driven by petitioner Armando Jose, collided with
a Ford Escort driven by John Macarubo. As a result of the collision, the driver, John Macarubo, and
its lone passenger, private respondent Rommel Abraham, were seriously injured. Macarubo lapsed
into a coma. Despite surgery, Macarubo failed to recover and died five days later. Abraham survived,
but he became blind on the left eye. In addition, he sustained a fracture on the forehead and multiple
lacerations on the face, which caused him to be hospitalized for a week.
Rommel Abraham instituted Civil Case for damages against petitioners MCL and Armando Jose.
The spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of the deceased John Macarubo, filed their own
suit for damages in the same trial court against MCL alone. On the other hand, MCL filed a third-
party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, registered owner of the Ford Escort on the theory that John
Macarubo was negligent and that he was the "authorized driver" of Juanita Macarubo.
Issue
Whether or not the photographs are sufficient to prove the Ford was negligent
Held
Sufficient.
In the proceedings below, petitioners relied mainly on photographs showing the position of the two
vehicles after the collision. On the other hand, private respondents offered the testimony of Rommel
Abraham to the effect that the collision took place because Bus 203 invaded their lane.
The trial court was justified in relying on the photographs rather than on Rommel Abrahams
testimony which was obviously biased and unsupported by any other evidence. Physical evidence is a
mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence.
In this case, the positions of the two vehicles, as shown in the photographs taken by MCL line
inspector Jesus Custodio about an hour and fifteen minutes after the collision, disputes Abrahams
self-serving testimony that the two vehicles collided because Bus 203 invaded the lane of the Ford
Escort and clearly shows that the case is exactly the opposite of what he claimed happened.
Contrary to Abrahams testimony, the photographs show quite clearly that Bus 203 was in its proper
lane and that it was the Ford Escort which usurped a portion of the opposite lane. The three
photographs show the Ford Escort positioned diagonally on the highway, with its two front wheels
occupying Bus 203s lane. As shown by the photograph, the portion of MacArthur Highway where
the collision took place is marked by a groove which serves as the center line separating the right
from the left lanes. The photograph shows that the left side of Bus 203 is about a few feet from the
center line and that the bus is positioned parallel thereto. This negates the claim that Bus 203 was
overtaking another vehicle and, in so doing, encroached on the opposite lane occupied by the Ford
Escort.
Indeed, Bus 203 could not have been overtaking another vehicle when the collision happened. It was
filled with passengers, and it was considerably heavier and larger than the Ford Escort. If it was
overtaking another vehicle, it necessarily had to accelerate. The acceleration of its speed and its heavy
load would have greatly increased its momentum so that the impact of the collision would have
thrown the smaller and lighter Ford Escort to a considerable distance from the point of impact. The
photograph however, shows that the Ford Escorts smashed hood was only about one or two meters
from Bus 203s damaged left front. If there had been a great impact, such as would be the case if Bus
203 had been running at a high speed, the two vehicles should have ended up far from each other.
The fact remains that when the Ford Escort finally came to a stop, it encroached on the opposite lane
occupied by Bus 203.
The appellate court refused to give credence to the physical evidence on the ground that the
photographs were taken an hour after the collision and that within such span of time the bus could
have been moved because there was no showing that the driver left the scene of the accident. This is
not correct. Constancia Gerolada, Bus 203s conductress, testified that, immediately after the
collision, she and bus driver, petitioner Armando Jose, took the injured driver and passenger of the
Ford Escort to the Fatima Hospital. This fact is not disputed by private respondents.
Rommel Abraham mentioned in his appellants brief in the appellate court a sketch of the scene of the
accident allegedly prepared by one Patrolman Kalale, which shows Bus 203 to be occupying the Ford
Escorts lane. However, the records of this case do not show that such a sketch was ever presented in
evidence in the trial court or that Patrolman Kalale was ever presented as a witness to testify on the
sketch allegedly prepared by him. Under Rule 132, 3 of the Rules on Evidence, courts cannot
consider any evidence unless formally offered by a party.
Best Evidence Rule/Secondary Evidence (Rule 130)

Edsa Shangrila v. BF Corporation, G.R. 145842, June 27, 2008
Facts
A construction contract for the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel Project was executed between Shang and BF
Corporation. In said contract, it stipulated for the payment of the contract price on the basis of work
accomplished. Under this arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to Shang wherein
the latter would re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for
that months progress billing.
BF complied with the procedures and submitted Builders Work Summary (BWS), monthly progress
billings, evaluation of the work in accordance with the Project Managers Instructions (PMI), and
valuations in the Work Variation Orders (WVO) for final re-measurement.
From May 1991 to June 1992, BF submitted 19 progress billings. Based on progress billings 1-13,
Shang paid 85M. According to BF, however, Shang did not re-measure the work done with respect to
progress billings 14-19. Likewise, Shang did not remit any payment even though BF worked
continuously.
After demands to collect failed, BF filed an Action for Sum of Money and Damages in the RTC. In its
defense, Shang claimed that it overpaid BF with respect to progress billings 1-13 and that BF incurred
delays and produced inferior work. Nonetheless, RTC ruled in favor of BF. In the fallo, it held Shang
liable as well as the members of its Board of Directors (e.g. Dean Del). RTC found that Shangs
refusal to pay amounted to bad faith.
Shangs MR was denied. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this petition. Shang contends that pursuant
to the best evidence rule, the photocopies of Progress Billings 14-19, PMIs, and WVOs should not
have been admitted in evidence. On the other hand, BF asserts that there was basis for presenting
secondary evidence considering that the originals were in Shangs possession and refused to hand
them over despite the BFs requests.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE LOWER
COURT ADMITTED THE PHOTOCOPIES OF SAID DOCUMENTS.
Held
NO. IT FALLS UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS OF THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE.
The only actual rule that the term best evidence denotes is the rule requiring that the original of a
writing must, as a general proposition, be produced and secondary evidence of its contents is not
admissible except where the original cannot be had.
SECONDARY EVIDENCE of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to evidence

other than the original instrument or document itself. A party may present secondary evidence of the
contents of a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody
or under the control of the adverse party.
In either instance, however, certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary
evidence.
In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied documents in
question as secondary evidence. Any suggestion that BF failed to lay the required basis for presenting
the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 instead of their originals has to be dismissed.
Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above exchanges, to wit: (1) the existence of the
original documents which Shang had possession of; (2) a request was made on Shang to produce the
documents; (3) Shang was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and (4) Shang was not inclined to
produce them.
Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130.
In other words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the photocopies of
the original document as secondary evidence have been met. These are:
(a) There is proof of the original documents execution or existence;
(b) There is proof of the cause of the original documents unavailability; and
(c) The offeror is in good faith.
To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or
control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given
reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that the offeror offers
satisfactory proof of its existence.
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against whom it
is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has
done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the
document. The notice may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in
open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party
in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the original of
the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence
may be admitted.
Chua Gaw v. Chua G.R. No. 160855, April 16, 2008

Facts
The Spouses Chi were founders of 3 corporations namely Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill, and
Columbia Wood. The spouses had 7 children. When one of the spouses died, the surviving heirs
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights wherein the heirs
settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber.
Meanwhile, Concepcion Chua Gaw, one of the children, asked one of her siblings, Suy Ben Chua, to
lend them P200K for the construction of their house in Bulacan. It was agreed that the loan would be
payable within 6 months without interest. However, Gaw was not able to pay. Failing to heed the
demand letters, Suy Ben Chua filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Gaw in the RTC.
In their Answer, Gaw argues that the P200K was not a loan but his share in the profits of Hagonoy
Lumber after Gaw requested for an accounting and payment of her share in the profits.
During trial, Gaw called Suy Ben Chua to testify as an adverse witness. On direct examination, the
latter testified that he owns the lots on which Hagonoy Lumber stands. On cross-examination, Suy
Ben Chua explained that his sister acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of Partition and that
he was able to acquire the same from his sister through a Deed of Sale.
RTC ruled in favor of Suy Ben Chua. Furthermore, RTC held that the validity of the Deed of Partition
and the Deed of Sale evidencing transfer of ownership of Hagonoy Lumber from Suy Ben Chuas
sister was never impugned. Although Suy Ben Chua failed to produce the originals of said documents,
Gaw judicially admitted the due execution of the Deed of Partition and even acknowledged her
signature thereon. As for the Deed of Sale, since its contents were not put in issue, non-presentation of
the original is not fatal to its authenticity and as to the truth of its contents. On appeal, CA affirmed.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE THE
DEED OF PARTITION AND THE DEED OF SALE.
Held
YES.
We find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant case. Here, there was no dispute as
to the terms of either deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two
deeds. Gaw never even denied their due execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition.
As for the Deed of Sale, Gaw had, in effect, admitted its genuineness and due execution when she
failed to specifically deny it in the manner required by the rules.
Gaw merely claimed that said documents do not express the true agreement and intention of the
parties since they were only provisional paper arrangements made upon the advice of counsel.
Apparently, Gaw does not contest the contents of these deeds but alleges that there was a
contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only
temporary.
An agreement or the contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties rights, duties
and obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the parties. The parties intention is to be
deciphered from the language used in the contract, not from the unilateral post facto assertions of one
of the parties, or of third parties who are strangers to the contract. Thus, when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and there
can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
Sansan v. NLRC, G.R. No. 160855, April 16, 2008

Facts
Equitable PCI entered into a Contract of Services with Helpmate Inc (HI). HI would hire and assign
workers to Equitable to perform janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. Sasan et al were
among those employed and assigned to Equitable. Later, Sasan et al filed complaints for illegal
dismissal against Equitable and HI. They contended that HIs dismissal was null and void because
they considered themselves as regular employees of Equitable.
LA found that HI was a labor-only contractor on the ground that it did not possess the required
substantial capital or investment. As a result, Equitable and HI appealed to the NLRC. During said
appeal, HI presented for the first time several photocopies of documents indicating that HI had
substantial capital and investments.
As a result, NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence presented and declared that HI
is a highly capitalized venture and is thus not engaged in labor only contracting. Sasan filed an MR
but this was denied. In the CA, CA affirmed the finding of the NLRC. Hence, this petition.
Sasan et al contend that the NLRC should not have accepted said documents considering they were
only raised for the first time during appeal.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED TO PROVE THAT HI HAD
SUBSTANTIAL CAPITALIZATION IS ADMISSIBLE.
Held
YES. TECHNICAL RULES OF EVIDENCE ARE NOT BINDING IN LABOR CASES
EVIDENCE MAY BE PRESENTED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
This is not a novel procedural issue, however, and our jurisprudence is already replete with cases
allowing the NLRC to admit evidence, not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the
NLRC for the first time on appeal. Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor
officials should use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of
Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor
cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in
the interest of substantial justice.
In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as
documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The submission of
additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-
evidence.
For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in Sasan et als protestations against the documentary
evidence submitted by HI because they were mere photocopies. Evidently, Sasan et al are invoking
the best evidence rule. Notably, CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES of these documents, acceptable under
the Rules of Court were furnished to Sasan et al.
Even assuming that Sasan et al were given mere photocopies, again, we stress that proceedings before
the NLRC are not covered by the technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the regular
courts.
Sasan et al had more than adequate opportunity when they filed their motion for reconsideration
before the NLRC, their Petition to the Court of Appeals and even to this Court, to refute or present
their counter-evidence to the documentary evidence presented by HI. Having failed in this respect,
Sasan et al cannot now be heard to complain about these documentary evidences presented by HI
upon which the NLRC and the Court of Appeals based its finding that HI is a legitimate job
contractor.
DECS v. del Rosario, G.R. No. 146596, January 26, 2005

Facts
Del Rosario filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against DECS. They alleged that they were
owners of a property in Bulacan, a portion of which is occupied by a school run by DECS. Despite
demands to vacate, DECS refused to heed said demand.
In its Answer, DECS claimed that said portion of the land was donated to them by the predecessor of
Del Rosario. The Deed of Donation was prepared by Judge Natividad and it was accepted by the
Municipal Council through a resolution. In fact, DECS later renamed the school after its donor, Isaias
Del Rosario Primary School.
However, the Deed of Donation was lost when the Municipality transferred to a new building, DECS
sought to prove its existence through the testimonies of 3 witnesses (Nicolas, De Jesus, Judge
Natividad). Thereafter, the RTC ruled in favor of DECS. It held that they were able to prove the
Deeds due execution and acceptance.
On appeal, CA reversed. It held that DECS was unable to prove the existence and due execution of
the Deed. Moreover, it CA opined that the DECS did not conduct a diligent search of said Deed.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECS WAS ABLE TO PROVE THE DUE EXECUTION OR
EXISTENCE OF THE DEED OF DONATION AND THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL RESOLUTION
ACCEPTING THE DONATION AS WELL AS THE LOSS OF THEREOF.
Held
NO.
The best or primary evidence of a donation of real property is an authentic copy of the deed of
donation with all the formalities required by Article 749 of the Civil Code. The duty to produce the
original document arises when the subject of the inquiry are the contents of the writing in which case
there can be no evidence of the contents of the writing other than the writing itself. Simply put, when
a party wants to prove the contents of the document, the best evidence is the original writing itself.
The testimony of Ricardo Nicolas may have established to some extent the existence of the deed of
donation since he testified that he was present when Isaias and the mayor talked about the donation
and that he witnessed the signing of the document. However, Ricardo Nicolas admitted during cross-
examination that he did not read and did not have personal knowledge of the contents of the document
that Isaias and the mayor supposedly signed.
In the same vein, Vidal De Jesus testimony does not help to establish the deed of donations
existence, execution and contents. He testified that he never saw the deed of donation. On cross-
examination, Vidal De Jesus admitted that the information that Isaias donated the lot to the
Municipality was only relayed to him by Judge Natividad himself. If at all, DECS offered Vidal De
Jesus testimony to establish the loss of the deed of donation. Vidal de Jesus testified that the
barangay council tried to get a copy of the deed but the Municipality informed the barangay council
that the deed was lost when the municipal office was transferred to a new building. DECS also made a
search in the DECS office in Malolos but this proved futile too.
This leaves us with Judge Natividads testimony. Judge Natividad testified that he prepared and
notarized the deed of donation. He further testified that there was a municipal council Resolution,
signed in the Office of the Secretary and of the Mayor, accepting the donation and expressing
gratitude to the donor. He furnished the municipal government, the DECS Division Office of Bulacan
and the clerk of court of Sta. Maria a copy of the deed of donation. DECS did not introduce in
evidence the municipal council Resolution accepting the donation. There is also no proof that the
donee communicated in writing its acceptance to the donor aside from the circumstance that DECS
constructed the school during Isaias lifetime without objection on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that these steps were noted in both instruments.
SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF OF LOSS
What mainly militates against DECS claim is, as the Court of Appeals found, inadequate proof that
DECS or the Municipality made a diligent search in the places where the deed of donation may likely
be found and that the search was unsuccessful.
Here, DECS allegedly made a search in the municipal building and in the DECS Division Office in
Bulacan. The copies of the deed of donation furnished these offices were purportedly lost when
these offices transferred to new locations. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out,
Judge Natividad who claimed to have notarized the deed of donation failed to account for other copies
of the deed, which the law strictly enjoins him to record, and furnish to other designated government
offices.
Parole Evidence Rule

ACI Phil.Inc. v. Coquia, G.R. No. 174466, July 14, 2008
Facts
ACI Philippines was in the business of manufacturing fiberglass. Instead of using silica sand, it opted
to use recycled broken glass or flint cullets to save on manufacturing costs. For this purpose, ACI
contracted with Coquia for their purchase through a Purchase Order.
However, ACI demanded the reduction of the purchase price to which Coquia acceded. Nonetheless,
when deliveries were again made, ACI accepted but refused to pay them at the reduced price but
further demanded that it be reduced.
Aggrieved, Coquia filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against ACI seeking
payment for the deliveries made. A few days after the filing of the Complaint, ACI paid for the flint
cullets. In ACIs Answer however, it contended that the agreement stipulated in the Purchase Order
did not express the true intent of the parties because, while it provided that time was of the essence, it
was not specified when ACI needed the flint cullets. However, RTC ignored this.
Subsequently, RTC ruled for Coquia and ordered ACI to pay for the deliveries. On appeal, CA
affirmed and stated that the Purchase Order was a contract of adhesion which must be construed
against ACI. On MR, ACI contends that it did not intimidate Coquia in accepting the reduced price
and that it contracted with Coquia upon the latters assurance that she could promptly deliver the flint
cullets required. However, ACI believes that the RTC and CA erroneously refused to receive evidence
aliunde to prove that time was an important element of the agreement.
Essentially, ACI believes that the RTC should not have granted the objection of Coquia on the ground
of parole evidence rule to preclude ACI from presenting evidence aliunde to prove that time was an
element of their agreement.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE ACCEPTED EVIDENCE
ALIUNDE TO PROVE THAT TIME WAS THE ELEMENT.
Held
YES. THE CASE FALLS UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE.
There is every indication in this case that Coquia, a presumably astute businesswoman who has
dealings with big corporations such as La Tondea as the latters sole buyer of cullets and has the
financial savvy to obtain a loan from a bank, gave her assent to Purchase Order No. 106211 with full
knowledge. She was, in fact, the one who sought a contract with petitioner upon learning of the
latters need for a supply of flint cullets.
We cannot, therefore, apply the rule on contracts of adhesion in construing the provisions of the
purchase orders in this case. Even the conditions of purchase do not reveal any hint of one-sidedness
in favor of ACI.
The Purchase Order specifically mentions that the delivery date shown on (the purchase order) shall
be of the essence of any contract arising and that delivery must be made in strict accordance with
the order or delivery schedule. It is, however, unusually silent as to the date the flint cullets are
needed.
ACI remedied this seeming inadvertence by squarely raising the failure of the purchase order to
express the true intent of the parties, i.e., that ACI entered into a contract with Coquia conditioned
upon the latters prompt delivery of flint cullets, as an issue in its Answer with Counterclaims.
Unfortunately, the RTC sustained Coquias objection based on the parol evidence rule.
The Rules of Court states that a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
the agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties. Since an exception to the parol evidence rule was squarely raised
as an issue in the Answer, the RTC should not have been so inflexible as to completely disregard
ACIs evidence.
Sifting through the testimony of Coquia, we find that although she was not given definite days during
which she should deliver the flint cullets, she was indeed apprised of ACIs urgent need for large
quantities thereof.
Furthermore, ACI presented the unrebutted testimony of Ermilinda Batalon, its materials control
manager, to prove that it agreed to the purchase price only because Coquia assured it of prompt
deliveries sufficient for petitioners production requirements. These testimonies give us a more
complete picture of the transaction between the parties and allow for a more reasoned resolution of
the issues, without overreliance on the tenuous application of the rule on contracts of adhesion.
Seaoil Petroleum Corporation v. Autocorp.Group, G.R. No. 164326, October 17, 2008
Facts
Seaoil purchased an Excavator from Autocorp Group. The cost of the unit was 3M paid in 12 monthly
installments. Said agreement was embodied in a Vehicle Sales Invoice and Vehicle Sales
Confirmation. Both documents were signed by Seaoils president, Francis Yu, on behalf of Seaoil. In
payment of said purchase, 12 postdated checks were issued by Yu on behalf of Seaoil with Autocorp
as payee. Thereafer, the Excavator was delivered to Seaoil.
Upon presentment, the first 2 checks were honored. However, the subsequent checks were not.
Despite repeated demands, Seaoil refused to pay the remaining. As a result, Autocorp filed a
Complaint for Recovery of Personal Property with Damages and Replevin in the RTC of Pasig. RTC
ruled in favor of Autocorp.
On appeal, Autocorp contends that the transaction was not that simple. It explained that the
underlying transaction were only used as conduits to settle an obligation between 2 foreign entities
named Uniline Asia and Focus Point International. It was explained that Paul Rodriguez, one of the
directors of Autocorp was also the owner of Uniline and that Yu was the owner of Focus. Because of
the obligations of Uniline with Focus, the Excavator was used as partial payment.
CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC. It stated that the transaction between Yu and
Rodriguez was merely verbal and cannot alter the written contracts of Seaoil and Autocorp since this
will run counter the parole evidence rule. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN APPLYING THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE.
Held
NO.
Seaoil does not question the validity of the vehicle sales invoice but merely argues that the same does
not reflect the true agreement of the parties. However, Seaoil only had its bare testimony to back up
the alleged arrangement with Rodriguez.
The Monte de Piedad checks the supposedly clear and obvious link between the documentary
evidence and the true transaction between the parties are equivocal at best. There is nothing in
those checks to establish such link. Rodriguez denies that there is such an agreement. Unsubstantiated
testimony, offered as proof of verbal agreements which tends to vary the terms of a written
agreement, is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.
Seaoil would have the Court rule that this case falls within the exceptions of the parol evidence rule,
particularly that the written agreement failed to express the true intent and agreement of the parties.
This argument is untenable.
The Vehicle Sales Invoice is the best evidence of the transaction. A sales invoice is a commercial
document. Commercial documents or papers are those used by merchants or businessmen to promote
or facilitate trade or credit transactions. Business forms, e.g., order slip, delivery charge invoice and
the like, are commonly recognized in ordinary commercial transactions as valid between the parties
and, at the very least, they serve as an acknowledgment that a business transaction has in fact
transpired. These documents are not mere scraps of paper bereft of probative value, but vital pieces of
evidence of commercial transactions. They are written memorials of the details of the consummation
of contracts.
The terms of the subject sales invoice are clear. They show that Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit
Robex 200 LC Excavator paid for by checks issued by one Romeo Valera. This does not, however,
change the fact that Seaoil Petroleum Corporation, as represented by Yu, is the customer or buyer.
The moment a party affixes his or her signature thereon, he or she is bound by all the terms stipulated
therein and is subject to all the legal obligations that may arise from their breach.
Oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of
the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary
evidence.
Hence, Seaoils contention that the document falls within the exception to the parol evidence rule is
untenable. The exception obtains only where the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in
terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the
instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of
the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into
the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument.
Marquez v. Espejo, G.R. No. 168387, August 25, 201047

Facts
Espejo owned 2 parcels of agricultural land denominated as the Lantap Property and the Murong
Property. As owners of the parcels of land, Espejo mortgaged said properties to the Rural Bank of
Bayombong. When they defaulted on their payments, the property was foreclosed and titles were
issued in favor of the banks name.
Later, Espejo was able to buy back one of the lots through a Deed of Sale which stated that the subject
property corresponds to the TCT of the Murong Property.
Thereafter, pursuant to RA 6657, the bank executed Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer in favor of
Marquez (tenants of Murong). The VLT described that the subject thereof was the agricultural land
located in Barangay Murong but indicated that it was covered by the TCT corresponding to the
Lantap Property.
Years later, Espejo filed a complaint in the RARAD for the cancellation of Marquezs CLOA on the
theory that the Murong Property was owned by Espejo pursuant to the buy-back agreement evidenced
by a Deed of Sale. In their Answer, Marquez averred that what they purchased was the Murong
Property and that what Espejo bought back was the Lantap Property.
RARAD based its decision on the descriptions in the TCTs. As such, it ruled that Espejo bought back
the Murong Property while Marquez was granted the CLOA for the Lantap Property. On appeal,
DARAB reversed the decision. In the CA, however, CA applied the Best Evidence Rule and
reinstated the RARAD ruling. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN USING THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE TO DETERMINE
THE SUBJECT OF THE DEEDS.
Held
YES. THE APPLICABLE RULE ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
BECAUSE IT WAS ALLEGED THAT THE CONTRACTS FAILED TO SHOW THE TRUE
INTENTION OF THE PARTIES.
The CA held that the Deed of Sale between Espejo and the bank is the best evidence as to the property
that was sold by the bank to Espejo. Since the Deed of Sale stated that its subject is the land covered
the Murong property, then the property repurchased by Espejo was the Murong property. Likewise,
the CA held that since the VLTs between Marquez and the bank refer to the Lantap property then
the property transferred to Marquez was the Lantap property.
Indeed, the CA erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule.
In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no
dispute regarding the contents of the documents. The real issue is whether the admitted contents of
these documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties. This dispute
reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of the instruments to
adequately express the true intention of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to
evidence outside of the instruments.
The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents and rejected any other
evidence that could shed light on the actual intention of the contracting parties. Though the CA cited
the Best Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence Rule instead.
47
Mistake as an exception for the parol evidence rule must be mutual
The CA gave primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts and refused to admit any other evidence
that would contradict such terms.
However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the first
place, Espejo is not a parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and Marquez; they are strangers to
the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive
only as between the PARTIES and their SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST.
The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party
or a privy of a party to the written document in question, and does not base his claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument.
Moreover, the instant case falls under the EXCEPTIONS TO THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE, as
provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9:
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he
puts in issue in his pleading:
(1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto[.]
Here, Marquezs VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described the subject property as
covered by TCT No. T62836 (Lantap property), but they also describe the subject property as being
located in Barangay Murong. Even Espejos Deed of Sale falls under the exception to the Parol
Evidence Rule. It refers to TCT No. T62096 (Murong property), but RBBI contended that the true
intent was to sell the Lantap property. In short, it was squarely put in issue that the written agreement
failed to express the true intent of the parties.
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the parties
respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties.
It is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap property to Espejo, while the
VLTs were intended to convey the Murong property to Marquez. This may be seen from the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.
Disqualification by Reason of Immaturity

People v. Golimlim, G.R.No. 145225, April 2, 200448
Facts
Private complainant Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), is a mental retardate. When her mother left for
Singapore to work as a domestic helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody of her
(Amparos) sister Jovita Guban and her husband Salvador Golimlim, herein appellant.
Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a certain Rosing, leaving Evelyn with appellant. Taking
advantage of the situation, appellant instructed private complainant to sleep, and soon after she had
laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes. As he poked at her an object which to Evelyn felt
like a knife, he proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina. His lust satisfied, appellant fell asleep.
When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her. Jovita, however, did not believe
her and in fact she scolded her.
Later, Evelyn moved with Lorna Hachero, Evelyns half-sister. Lorna suspected that her sister was
pregnant as she noticed her growing belly. She thus asked her sister how she became pregnant, to
which Evelyn replied that appellant had sexual intercourse with her while holding a knife.
Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal complaint for rape against appellant. Appellant, on being
confronted with the accusation, simply said that it is not true "[b]ecause her mind is not normal," she
having "mentioned many other names of men who ha[d] sexual intercourse with her."
Issue
Whether or not Evelyns mental condition disqualifies her as a witness.
Held
That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony bereft
of truth.
It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to
relate what he or she knows. If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court. To be
sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a
witness. The remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the only person available who knows
the facts, seems inept and primitive. Our rules follow the modern trend of evidence.
Thus, in a long line of cases, this Court has upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly on
statements given in court by the victim who was a mental retardate. From a meticulous scrutiny of the
records of this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyns credibility. To be sure, her testimony is not
without discrepancies, given of course her feeblemindedness.
By the account of Dr. Chona Cuyos-Belmonte, Medical Specialist II at the Psychiatric Department of
the Bicol Medical Center, who examined Evelyn, although Evelyn was suffering from moderate
mental retardation with an IQ of 46, she is capable of perceiving and relating events which happened
to her. As noted in the testimony of Dr. Belmonte, Evelyn could give spontaneous and consistent
answers to the same but differently framed questions under conditions which do not inhibit her from
answering. It could have been in this light that Evelyn was able to relate in court, upon examination
by a female government prosecutor and the exclusion of the public from the proceedings, on Dr.
Belmontes suggestion, how, as quoted below, she was raped and that it was appellant who did it.
48
Mental age governs.
Appellants bare denial is not only an inherently weak defense. It is not supported by clear and
convincing evidence. It cannot thus prevail over the positive declaration of Evelyn who convincingly
identified him as her rapist.
Disqualification by Reason of Death

Sanson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127745, April 22, 2003
Facts
Herein petitioner-appellant Felicito G. Sanson (Sanson), in his capacity as creditor, filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for the settlement of the estate of Juan Bon Fing Sy (the
deceased). Sanson claimed that the deceased was indebted to him and to his sister Celedonia Sanson-
Saquin (Celedonia). Petitioners-appellants Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola
(Angeles) later filed separate claims against the estate.
The RTC appointed Melecia T. Sy, surviving spouse of the deceased, as administratrix of his estate,
following which she was issued letters of administration. During the hearing of the claims against the
estate, Sanson, Celedonia, and Jade Montinola, wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., testified on
the transactions that gave rise thereto, over the objection of the administratrix who invoked the Dead
Mans Statute.
Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified that she had a transaction with the
deceased which is evidenced by six checks issued by him before his death.
Celedonia, in support of the claim of her brother Sanson, testified that she knew that the deceased
issued five checks to Sanson in settlement of a debt.
Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and mother-in-law Angeles,
testified that on separate occasions, the deceased borrowed money from her husband and mother-in-
law, respectively, as shown by three checks issued by the deceased two to Angeles and the other to
Eduardo Montinola, Jr.; before the deceased died.
The administratrix objected to the admission of the checks and check return slips-exhibits offered in
evidence by the claimants upon the ground that the witnesses who testified thereon are disqualified
under the Dead Mans Statute. Specifically with respect to the checks-exhibits identified by Jade, the
administratrix asserted that they are inadmissible because Jade is the daughter-in-law of claimant
Angeles and wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., hence, she is covered by the above-said rule on
disqualification.
Issue
Whether or not the Dead Mans statute applies.
Held
Inapplicable.
As for the administratrixs invocation of the Dead Mans Statute, the same does not likewise lie.
Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is
being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those involved
in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the parties. Should their
testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their relationship to the parties,
there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later,
independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on the basis
of their documentary evidencethe checks.
As to the second assigned error, petitioners argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as
witnesses to each others claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Mans Statute;
besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined them.
The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on
review, the pertinent portion of which reads:
The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from testifying in each others
favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased.
Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between testimony in
his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from testifying for his co-parties. The law
speaks of "parties or assignors of parties to a case." Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson and Saquin on each
others behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls under the prohibition.
But Sansons and Celedonias claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson
is a third party with respect to Celedonias claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to
Sansons claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the others transaction.
In any event, what the Dead Mans Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon a
claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of
testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary
evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
Child Witness Examination Rule

People v. Canete, G.R. No. 491920, March 28, 2003
Facts
Alma Canete and her father Paquito lived in Samar with Paquitos older brother, Kakingcio Canete,
the latters common-law wife. Years later, Paquito became blind and paralytic. One night, when it
was only Canete, Paquito, and Alma in the house, Canete raped her. Canete went on top of her
wearing only short pants. Then, Canete lifted Almas skirt and pulled down her panties. Thereafter,
Canete pulled his shorts down and fucked her.
Later, Alma revealed to Canetes common law spouse that she had been raped by Canete. After a
confrontation, Alma was brought for examination by the Municipal Health Officer. Thereafter, an
Information charging Canete of rape was filed in the RTC of Leyte.
Canete pleaded not guilty during arraignment. As a matter of course, trial ensued. Consequently,
Canete was found guilty as charged and sentenced to death. On automatic review, Canete assails the
RTC decision. In particular, he avers that, when asked how Canete was able to rape Alma when the
former still had his shorts on, the judge took the cudgels for the prosecution and asked Alma leading
questions.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC PROPERLY GAVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
ALMA AS A MINOR PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
Held
YES.
A presiding judge enjoys a great deal of latitude in examining witnesses within the course of
evidentiary rules. The presiding judge should see to it that a testimony should not be incomplete or
obscure. After all, the judge is the arbiter and he must be in a position to satisfy himself as to the
respective claims of the parties in the criminal proceedings.
The Court finds nothing improper in the questions posed by the RTC. Neither are the questions
prejudicial to Canete or suggestive of any partiality of the trial court. It bears stressing that from the
testimony of Alma, Canete was wearing his short pants before he mounted her and even when he was
already on top of her and managed to penetrate her sexual organ with his penis. The public prosecutor
wanted Alma to explain to the court how Canete could have inserted his penis into her vagina
considering that he was still wearing his short pants. Although crudely and ungrammatically phrased,
the question of the public prosecutor where did he let his penis exit considering that he is then
wearing a short pants was not leading.
The RTC should have overruled the objection and allowed Alma to answer the question. However,
the RTC was not precluded from asking questions to avoid further wrangling between the public
prosecutor and Canetes counsel which may have frightened or unnerved Alma, a minor and who was
unused to judicial proceedings. After all, the RTC was mandated to discover the truth. As it turned
out, Alma cried profusely as she testified impelling the trial court to order a continuance. Even the
counsel of Canete agreed to a continuance.
Parenthetically, under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which took
effect on December 15, 2000, child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading questions
may be allowed by the trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will further the interest
of justice. Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse,
frighten and intimidate the child:
Sec. 19. Mode of questioning.The court shall exercise control over the questioning of children so as to (1)
facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the
developmental level of the child, (3) protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid
waste of time.
The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.
Privilege
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 200849
Facts
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong
Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the
National Broadband Network (NBN). The Project was to be financed by the People's Republic of
China.
In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the Senate and
investigation was claimed to be relevant to the consideration of three (3) pending bills in the Senate.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and
cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. Businessman Jose
de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that then
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege". In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c)
whether or not she directed him to approve.
Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him

to appear and testify. However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo
R. Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with petitioner's testimony on the ground of
executive privilege. Petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees. The Senate issued the
Order citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the
Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Issue
Whether or not executive privilege applies.
Held
Applies.
This Court held that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters." There is also a recognition of the
confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet
meetings. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations.
The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the
elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:
49
The Executive Secretary can also invoke executive privilege becase he is the alter-ego of the President.
Governmental privilege privilege of heads of government agencies to withhold information imbued with
public interest.
1. The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential

power."
2. The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in "operational
proximity" with the President.
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely contains
important evidence" and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
of presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or
foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate
to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President. Under
the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
The third element deserves a lengthy discussion.
Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a
compelling or citical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead,
the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function.
Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a possible
disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no dispute on this. The information here is elicited, not
in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita
categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in
relation to her executive and policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner's claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all.
But petitioner made himself available to them during the hearing, where he was questioned for eleven
(11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the
Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to
public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Clearly, there is a recognized public
interest in the confidentiality of certain information. We find the information subject of this case
belonging to such kind.
We now proceed to the issue -- whether the claim is properly invoked by the President.
Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of
privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter." A formal and
proper claim of executive privilege requires a "precise and certain reason" for preserving their
confidentiality.
The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It
serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that "this Office is constrained to
invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised
Secretary Neri accordingly." Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President.
With regard to the existence of "precise and certain reason," we find the grounds relied upon by
Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not "to leave respondent Committees in the dark on
how the requested information could be classified as privileged." The particular ground must only be
specified.
Per Curiam Decision of the Supreme Court in connection with the Letter of the House
Prosecution Panel to Subpoena Justices of the Supreme Court, February 14, 2012
Facts
In connection with the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the Prosecution asked,
through subpoena, for the examination of records and the issuance of certified true copies of the rollos
and the Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberations with respect to cases in which CJ Corona
deliberated upon (i.e. FASAP v. PAL, Navarro v. Ermita, Gutierrez v. House, and League of Cities v.
COMELEC).
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE SC, THROUGH ITS JUSTICES AND COURT PERSONNEL, CAN BE
COMPELLED TO DISCLOSE SAID MATTERS IN THE SENATE SITTING AS AN
IMPEACHMENT COURT.
Held
NO.
Certain informations contained in the records of cases before the Supreme Court are considered
confidential and are exempt from disclosure. The need arises from the dictates of the integrity of the
Courts decision-making function which may be affected by the disclosure of information.
Specifically, the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits the disclosure of
1. The result of the raffle of cases;
2. The actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Courts session;
and
3. The deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before it
(DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE).
Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as privileged communication. The deliberative

process privilege protects from disclosure documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations
and deliberations that are component parts of the process for formulating governmental decisions and
policies. Obviously, the privilege may also be claimed by other court officials and employees when
asked to act on these documents and other communications. TO QUALIFY FOR PROTECTION
under the deliberative process privilege, the agency must show that the document is both
1. Pre-decisional; and
2. Deliberative.
Communications are considered pre-decisional if they were made in the attempt to reach a final
conclusion. A material is DELIBERATIVE, on the other hand, if it reflects the give-and-take of the
consultative process. Court records which are pre-decisional and deliberative in nature are thus
protected and cannot be the subject of a subpoena if judicial privilege is to be preserved.
Additionally, TWO OTHER GROUNDS may be cited for denying access to court records, as well as
preventing members of the bench, from being subjected to compulsory process:
1. The disqualification by reason of privileged communication; and
2. The pendency of an action or matter.
Members of the Court may not be compelled to testify in the impeachment proceedings against the
Chief Justice or other Members of the Court about information they acquired in the performance of
their official function of adjudication, such as information on how deliberations were conducted or the
material inputs that the justices used in decision-making, because the end-result would be the
disclosure of confidential information that could subject them to criminal prosecution. This is to be
differentiated from a situation where the testimony is on a matter which is EXTERNAL to their
adjudicatory functions and duties.
To SUMMARIZE these rules, the following are privileged documents or communications, and are not
subject to disclosure:
1. COURT ACTIONS such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions taken by the Court
on each case included in the agenda of the Courts session on acts done material to pending
cases, except where a party litigant requests information on the result of the raffle of the case,
pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC;
2. COURT DELIBERATIONS or the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases
and matters pending before the Court;
3. COURT RECORDS which are pre-decisional and deliberative in nature, in particular,
documents and other communications which are part of or related to the deliberative process,
i.e., notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of
internal deliberations, and similar papers.
4. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION secured by justices, judges, court officials and
employees in the course of their official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are
privileged even after their term of office.
5. RECORDS OF CASES THAT ARE STILL PENDING FOR DECISION are privileged
materials that cannot be disclosed, except only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have
been made available by the court to the general public.
6. The PRINCIPLE OF COMITY or INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COURTESY demands that
the highest officials of each department be exempt from the compulsory processes of the
other departments.
7. These privileges BELONG TO THE SUPREME COURT AS AN INSTITUTION, not to any
justice or judge in his or her individual capacity. Since the Court is higher than the individual
justices or judges, no sitting or retired justice or judge, not even the Chief Justice, may claim
exception without the consent of the Court.
Mercado v. Vitriolo, AC 5110, May 26, 2005

Facts
Complainants husband filed Civil Case for annulment of their marriage with the RTC. The trial court
had dismissed this annulment case. Later, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died.
Afterwards, respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as new counsel for complainant.
Later, respondent filed a criminal action against complainant for falsification of public document
under the RPC. Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live
Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant allegedly indicated
in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their
marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G.
Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her and alleged that said criminal
complaint for falsification of public document disclosed confidential facts and information relating to
the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted
complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal
case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client
relationship, and should be disbarred.
Issue
Whether or not Vitriolo is guilty of breaching the attorney-client privilege.
Held
Not guilty || Complaint dismissed.
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is

by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter
declines the employment. On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer
for some purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence. The mere relation of attorney and client does
not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be
confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure

between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses
the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but
for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The client
must have transmitted the communication to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice. If
the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal advice, the
privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
Here, the evidence on record fails to substantiate complainants allegations. Complainant didnt even
specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were
couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on
privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of public
documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then
handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts that will determine the merit of her
complaint.
People v. Invencion, G.R. No. 131636, March 5, 2003

Facts
Artemio was charged with thirteen counts of rape. The witnesses presented by the prosecution in its
evidence in chief were Elven Invencion, Eddie Sicat, Gloria Pagala, Dr. Rosario Fider, and Atty.
Florencio Canlas. Presented as rebuttal witnesses were Gloria Pagala and Celestino Navarro.
Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old testified that he is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with
his second common-law wife. Sometime before the end of the school year in 1996, while he was
sleeping in one room with his father Artemio, Cynthia, and two other younger brothers, he was
awakened by Cynthias loud cries. Looking towards her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a
pumping motion. After about two minutes, his father put on his short pants.
Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a drunkard. He angrily
prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her suitors. Whenever he was drunk, he would maul
Elven and quarrel with his stepfather, Celestino Navarro.
Issue
Whether or not the filial privilege rule applies.
Held
Inapplicable.
Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven, as his
son, should have been disqualified as a witness against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. Besides, Elvens testimony appears not to be his but what the prosecution wanted him
to say, as the questions asked were mostly leading questions. Moreover, Elven had ill-motive in
testifying against him, as he (Artemio) was cruel to him.
As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule on filial privilege. This rule is not strictly a rule on
disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an
ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other
privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his
father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven
declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only to tell the
truth.
Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecutions act of propounding leading questions on Elven.
Section 10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court expressly allows leading questions when the witness
is a child of tender years like Elven.
The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves scant consideration.
Such insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and flimsy. As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of
tender age, could not have subjected himself to the ordeal of a public trial had he not been compelled
by a motive other than to bring to justice the despoiler of his sisters virtue. There is no indication that
Elven testified because of anger or any ill-motive against his father, nor is there any showing that he
was unduly pressured or influenced by his mother or by anyone to testify against his father. The rule
is that where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by
improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full
credence.
Extrajudicial Confessions/Confession
People v. Muit, G.R. No. 181043, October 8, 2008
Facts
Millano Muit y Munoz (Muit), Sergio Pancho y Cagumoc, Jr. (Pancho, Jr.), Rolando Dequillo y
Tampos (Dequillo), Romeo Pancho (Romeo), Eduardo Eddie Hermano alias Bobby Reyes alias
Eddie Reyes (Hermano), and Joseph Ferraer (Ferraer) were charged with kidnapping for
ransom with homicide and carnapping in two separate informations.
The prosecution presented, among others, documentary evidence such as the extra judicial
confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, which were executed with the assistance of Atty. Mallare.
Muit executed two extra judicial confessions: the first statement was dated 4 December 1997, in
which he was assisted by Atty. Ernesto Vergara, and the second statement was dated 7 December
1997 in which he was assisted by Atty. Solomon De Jesus and witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio Muit
(Bonifacio), and his brother, Dominador Muit (Dominador). On the other hand, the defense presented
appellants Dequillo, Pancho, Jr., and Muit.
Dequillo, for his part, claimed that he was arrested by the CIDG at his house. At the CIDG Detention
Center, he was questioned about the guns used in the kidnapping of the victim. He was allegedly
tortured when he denied any knowledge about the kidnapping and was forced to sign a statement
without being allowed to read it. Atty. Mallare only came in after he had already signed the statement.
He denied any participation in the crimes charged against him.
Pancho, Jr. claimed that he was arrested and first brought to the Calbayog City Police Station, and
then transferred to Camp Crame. He alleged that the police tortured him and forced him to sign the
written confession of his participation in the crimes. He denied having participated in the commission
of the offenses charged against him.
On the other hand, Muit claimed that he had just attended a gathering of the Rizalistas and was
waiting for his uncle Bonifacio when the police arrested him. He denied having any knowledge of the
crime. He denied knowing the people whose name appeared in his two extra judicial confessions. He
claimed that the names were supplied by the police and that he was not assisted by counsel during the
custodial investigation.
Issue
Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions are admissible.
Held
Admisible.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the case against them.
There is nothing on record to support appellants claim that they were coerced and tortured into
executing their extra judicial confessions. One of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
appellants extra judicial statements is that each contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied, without the knowledge and
information given by appellants. Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers when they
executed their statements.
Appellants claims of torture are not supported by medical certificates from the physical examinations
done on them. These claims of torture were mere afterthoughts as they were raised for the first time
during trial; appellants did not even inform their family members who visited them while they were
imprisoned about the alleged tortures. Claims of torture are easily concocted, and cannot be given
credence unless substantiated by competent and independent corroborating evidence.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also strengthened the prosecutions
case against Romeo. The rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only against the person
making it recognizes various exceptions. One such exception is where several extra judicial
statements had been made by several persons charged with an offense and there could have been no
collusion with reference to said several confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material
respects identical is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against
other persons implicated therein. They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the
person implicated therein to show the probability of the latters actual participation in the commission
of the crime and may likewise serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and
circumstances that other persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and
proved. These are known as interlocking confessions. Nonetheless, the RTC, in convicting Romeo,
relied not only on the aforesaid extra judicial statements but also on Ferraers testimony that Romeo
was introduced to him in his house as the informant when they were planning the kidnapping.
People v. Satorre, G.R. No. 133858, August 12, 2003

Facts
Gliceria Saraum, wife of the victim, testified that she and her two children were asleep inside the
house of her parents. While she was asleep, she was awakened by a gunshot. Gliceria got up and went
out to the porch, where she found her dead husband lying on the ground. Blood oozed out of a
gunshot wound on his head.
Flavio Gelle narrated that he accompanied appellant and his father, Abraham, to the Barangay Captain
where appellant admitted killing Pantilgan. Thereafter, appellant was detained.
Corroborating Gelles story, the Barangay Captain testified that Abraham Satorre and Gelle brought
appellant to her residence where he confessed having killed Pantilgan. Appellant allegedly informed
her that he killed Pantilgan because the latter struck him with a piece of wood. That same evening, she
went to the Carcar Police Station with appellant where she executed an affidavit. She further averred
that appellant voluntarily narrated that he killed Pantilgan with the use of a handgun which he
wrestled from his possession.
Denying the charges against him, appellant claimed that he was asleep inside his house at the time of
the incident. He alleged that Rufino Abayata had a grudge against him because of an incident when he
tied Rufinos cow to prevent it from eating the corn in his farm. He denied having confessed to the
killing of Pantilgan. He disclaimed ownership over the paltik .38 revolver and stated that he could not
even remember having surrendered a firearm to Castaares.
Issue
Whether or not the appellant can be convicted.
Held
Not convicted.
In particular, appellant claims that his alleged confession or admission, which was concocted by the
Barangay Captain, is inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay and for being obtained without a
competent and independent counsel of his choice. In effect, the quantum of evidence adduced by the
prosecution was not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The bare
allegation that he confessed or admitted killing Romero Pantilgan is not proof of guilt.
Evidently, appellants alleged declaration owning up to the killing before the Barangay Captain was a
confession. Since the declaration was not put in writing and made out of court, it is an oral
extrajudicial confession. The nexus that connects appellant to the killing was his alleged oral
extrajudicial confession given to Barangay Captain Cynthia Castaares and two barangay kagawads.
There is no question as to the admissibility of appellants alleged oral extrajudicial confession.

Indeed, as far as admissibility is concerned, Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court makes no
distinction whether the confession is judicial or extrajudicial.
Accordingly, the basic test for the validity of a confession is was it voluntarily and freely made.
The term voluntary means that the accused speaks of his free will and accord, without inducement
of any kind, and with a full and complete knowledge of the nature and consequences of the
confession, and when the speaking is so free from influences affecting the will of the accused, at the
time the confession was made, that it renders it admissible in evidence against him. Plainly, the
admissibility of a confession in evidence hinges on its voluntariness.
On the question of whether a confession is made voluntarily, the age, character, and circumstances
prevailing at the time it was made must be considered. Much depends upon the situation and
surroundings of the accused. The intelligence of the accused or want of it must also be taken into
account. It must be shown that the defendant realized the import of his act.
In the case at bar, appellant was a 19-year old farmer who did not even finish first grade. Granting
that he made the confession in the presence of Barangay Captain Castaares, he may not have realized
the full import of his confession and its consequences. This is not to say that he is not capable of
making the confession out of a desire to tell the truth if prompted by his conscience. What we are
saying is that due to the aforesaid personal circumstances of appellant, the voluntariness of his alleged
oral confession may not be definitively appraised and evaluated.
At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie case against the party by whom it is
made. Such confessions are not conclusive proof of that which they state; it may be proved that they
were uttered in ignorance, or levity, or mistake; and hence, they are, at best, to be regarded as only
cumulative proof which affords but a precarious support and on which, when uncorroborated, a
verdict cannot be permitted to rest.
His statement was not taken nor was his confession reduced into writing. This circumstance alone
casts some doubt on the prosecutions account that appellant freely and voluntarily confessed killing
Pantilgan. It raises questions not only as to the voluntariness of the alleged confession, but also on
whether appellant indeed made an oral confession.
In the case at bar there was no circumstantial evidence to corroborate the extrajudicial confession of
appellant. More importantly, the said confession does not contain details which could have only been
known to appellant.
Furthermore, the events alleged in the confession are inconsistent with the physical evidence. The
fatal gun and the slug extracted from Pantilgans brain can not be considered as corroborative
evidence. While the slug embedded in Pantilgans brain came from the fatal gun, the prosecution was
not able to conclusively establish the ownership of the gun other than the bare testimony of
prosecution witnesses that appellants brothers surrendered the gun to them. This was denied by
appellant and his brothers and there was no other proof linking the gun to him.
Positive Identification
People v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 172468, October 15, 2008
Facts
Accused was charged with arson with homicide.
A summary of the evidence adduced by the prosecution are quoted from the assailed decision of the
CA as follows:
William Lim, a Kagawad of Barangay testified that while eating at their store, his former typist in the
barangay, Jonah, called him to tell that a woman wanted to surrender to a barangay official. Jonah
brought him to the woman who introduced herself as Julie Gil. The latter appeared to be a lesbian,
drunk and very confused. She felt bothered by her conscience and admitted that she burned her
residence. He called up precinct 4 to report the incident, and was told that there was indeed a fire that
took place in the area. He requested for a mobile and the accused was brought to fire station No. 4
where she forcibly took the pen from a policeman in order for her to put in writing the actual incident.
At first, Lim was hesitant thinking that her testimony might not be admissible in court, but since the
accused was very insistent, she was allowed to reduce the incident in writing.
Ronnie Gallardo declared that he was present during the incident. He and his mother occupied the
room next to that of the accused. While lying in bed inside their room, he heard a thud (kalabog)
coming from the room of the accused. He also heard the accused crying. He went out of his room and
when he found the accused door open, he peeped through the door where he noticed the latter
standing. When she saw him, the accused pointed to him the fire on her folding bed made of plastic
with foam. At that time the fire was getting bigger. She then told him xxx pabayaan mo na iyan.
Damay-damay na tayo. At hinatak na niya ako. They went out but he tried to get back to get their
belongings. He, however, failed to get anything from their room because the entire house as well as
the other adjacent houses was already burning. With the help of their neighbors, they tried to put off
the fire which lasted for about two (2) hours, while the accused remained standing, watching it. Since
the incident he never saw the accused until the latter appeared in court.
*There were other testimonies, but these seem to be the most relevant
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT JULIE VILLACORTA-GIL WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED BASED ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Held
YES. THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESS AS TO THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED VILLACORTA-GIL AS THE PERPETRATOR.
The RTC has passed upon enough circumstantial evidence to hold the Villacorta-Gil guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In People v. Gallarde, it distinguished the TWO TYPES OF
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION of a perpetrator of a crime and discussed their legal importance, thus:
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an
eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification.
A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness
to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes DIRECT EVIDENCE. There may, however, be
instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may
still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the
latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an
unbroken chain, leads to the only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the
crime to the exclusion of all others.
If the actual eyewitness are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the
exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and
elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a
proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the
only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial
evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons
would go free and the community would be denied proper protection.
The circumstantial evidence of the prosecution consisted of the following:

1. The testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo about the behavior and remarks of Villacorta-
Gil at the time she caused a public disturbance and threatened to cause chaos and arson and to
drag her neighbors into this turmoil, two days prior to the conflagration;
2. The testimony of Ronnie Gallardo that, when he saw the burning mattress in the room of
Villacorta-Gil, the latter said to him in the vernacular: Pabayaan mo na iyan. Damay-damay
na tayo;
3. The testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo that, at the time he tried to chase Villacorta-Gil
during the fire incident, he again heard her utter a nonchalant remark: Damay-damay na tayo
diyan, huwag ninyo nang patayin ang sunog; and
4. The testimony of Kagawad William Lim that she approached and admitted to him
immediately after the incident that she was the person responsible for the conflagration.
The aforementioned circumstantial evidence would constitute positive identification of Villacorta-Gil

as the perpetrator of the crime charged, to the exclusion of others. She was the person who had the
motive to commit the crime, and the series of events following her threat to cause chaos and arson in
her neighborhood the fire that started in her room, and her actuations and remarks during, as well
as immediately before and after the fire sufficiently points to Villacorta-Gil as the author of the
said crime.
In this case, the RTC found that the prosecution witnesses testified consistently and truthfully. The
chain of events before, during, and after the fire as narrated by the prosecution witnesses
established beyond reasonable doubt that Villacorta-Gil committed the acts alleged in the information,
which constituted the crime of arson with homicide.
Documented Alibi
Lejano v. People, 2010
Facts
Members of the Vizconde family were raped and slain in their home. Around 4 years after the
Vizconde massacre, Jessica Alfaro, an alleged star-witness of the NBI surfaced. During trial in the
RTC, she testified as to Hubert Webbs direct participation in the crime. Alfaro testified that Webb
led Lejano et al in the commission of said crime.
In his defense, Webb presented a alibi that he was in the United States at the time of the commission
of the crime. He asserted that he had a despedida party in 8 March 1991. The next day, he flew to San
Francisco. After passing through Philippine Immigration, his passport was cleared and stamped. Also,
he was in the United Airlines Flights Manifest. Upon arrival in San Francisco, US Immigrations
indicated that Webb entered the US on March 9, 1991. When he returned in October 1992, he went
through the same process.
Nonetheless, RTC found Alfaros testimony convincing and convicted them. CA affirmed.
Essentially, RTC and CA agreed that Webbs alibi cannot stand against Alfaros positive
identification of Webb as the rapist and killer. To said courts, his alibi was fabricated.
Thereafter, Webb asked for a DNA examination which the SC granted. However, NBI informed the
SC that it no longer had custody of the semen sample. Thus, Webb filed an Urgent Motion to Acquit.
One of the issues presented was the sufficiency of Webbs alibi that he was in the United States when
the crime was committed.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT WEBB PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS ALIBI
AND REBUT ALFAROS TESTIMONY THAT HE LED THE OTHERS IN COMMITTING THE
CRIME.
Held
YES. ACQUITTED.
Ultimately, Alfaros quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable,
testimony cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to
jettison a denial and an alibi.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that:
1. He was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and
2. That it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in Paraaque when the Vizconde
killings took place; he was not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did
leave on March 9, 1991, he actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed the crime, erased the
fact of his return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine Immigrations,
smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal way on October
27, 1992. But this ruling practically makes the death of Webb and his passage into the next life the
only acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and inhuman paradigm.
The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webbs passport since he did not leave the original to
be attached to the record. As Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent, the practice when a
party does not want to leave an important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it
marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original.
Stipulations in the course of trial are binding on the parties and on the court.
The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer printout of Webbs arrival in and departure from
that country were authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State
Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason that Webb
failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. But this was unnecessary.
Webbs passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under international
practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that passport
are presumed true.
The U.S. Immigration certification and computer printout, the official certifications of which have
been authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and
departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webbs passport. They have the same evidentiary
value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to testify on them.
Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty attached to a breached
duty, in the routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of the record.
The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification from the U.S.
Immigration office said that it had no record of Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first
certification was amply explained by the U.S. Government and Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated
it in his dissenting opinion, thus:
While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on August 16, 1995 finding no
evidence of lawful admission of Webb, this was already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less than the US
INS Officials.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel
documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals
from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the
Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and
openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the
Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of
evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for
impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what they
state, are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here,
however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webbs passport
and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S. immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S.
and back. The prosecutions rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the lower
courts minds.
Webbs documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaros testimony, not only with respect to him, but
also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court
accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will
not hold together. Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story. Without it, the evidence
against the others must necessarily fall.
Offer of Compromise
People V. Erguiza, G.R. No. 171348, November 26, 2008
Facts
AAA, a thirteen-year old first year high school student, together with her friends, siblings Joy and
Ricky Agbuya were going home when AAAs short pants got hooked on the fence. AAA asked Joy
and Ricky to wait for her but they ran away and left her.
While AAA was trying to unhook her short pants, Larry suddenly grabbed and pulled her. Poking a
knife at her neck, Larry threatened to hurt her if she would make a noise. Accused-appellant dragged
AAA towards a place where a tamarind tree and other thorny plants grow. Then Larry removed his
maong pants and forced AAA to lie down on the grassy ground. Thereafter, he removed her short
pants and panty, mounted himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her private parts and made
push and pull movements. He likewise raised AAAs sando and mashed her breast. AAA felt pain
when accused-appellant entered her and she felt something sticky in her private part after Larry made
the push and pull movements.
Larry told AAA not to tell anybody about the incident otherwise he would kill her and all the
members of her family and then he ran away. Upon reaching home, AAA directly went to bed.
Fearing Larry's threat, AAA kept mum on the incident.
BBB brought her daughter AAA to her grandmother (BBB's mother), a hilot to consult her on the
unusual palpitation on the mid-portion of AAA's throat and the absence of her monthly period. After
examining AAA, her grandmother told BBB that her daughter was pregnant. After much prodding,
and in the presence of her Uncle, Rudy Domingo, AAA finally revealed that she was raped by
accused-appellant.
BBB testified that her daughter AAA stopped going to school after she was raped and that no amount
of money could bring back the lost reputation of her daughter. CCC (AAA's father), testified that the
family of accused-appellant went to their house and initially offered P50,000 and later P150,000.
Issue
Whether or not the compromise offer is admissible in evidence against the accused.
Held
Inadmissible.
Moreover, the testimonies of the witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense conflict on certain
points, more notably the claim by BBB and CCC that the family of appellant offered to settle the case.
This, however, was denied by Albina, who claimed that it was BBB and CCC who demanded
P1,000,000.00.
The offer of compromise allegedly made by Albina is critical to the case at bar in light of law and
jurisprudence that an offer of compromise in a criminal case may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt. In the case at bar, the offer of compromise was first testified to by BBB on
cross-examination
On rebuttal, CCC corroborated the testimony of BBB that the family of appellant offered to settle the
case, However, Albina, the mother of appellant, denied the foregoing allegations. The alleged offer of
the parents of appellant to settle the case cannot be used against appellant as evidence of his guilt.
Appellant testified that he did not ask his parents to settle the case. Moreover, appellant was not
present when the offer to settle was allegedly made.
An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an admission of the party
himself. Although the Court has held in some cases that an attempt of the parents of the accused to
settle the case is an implied admission of guilt, we believe that the better rule is that for a compromise
to amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused should have been present or at least
authorized the proposed compromise. Moreover, it has been held that where the accused was not
present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise would
not save the day for the prosecution.
In addition, the Court, in weighing the evidence presented, may give less weight to the testimonies of
Albina, on the one hand, and BBB and CCC, on the other, as they are related to the appellant and the
victim, respectively. Their testimonies relating to the offer of settlement simply contradict each other.
As a matter of fact, even the lower courts did not consider the alleged offer of settlement in resolving
the case.
Admission by conspirator
Tamargo v. Awigan, G.R.No. 177727, January 19, 2010
Facts
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed. The
police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and
executed an affidavit. He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that
Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of
those who killed Atty. Tamargo. He added that he told the Tamargo family what he knew and that the
sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna.
After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the strength of Gerons affidavit, the
investigating prosecutor issued a resolution dated finding probable cause against Columna and three
John Does. The corresponding Informations for murder were filed.
Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his
participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan (alias
"Mumoy") as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio
Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda. The former was the ex-mayor and the latter
the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in
detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint
against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
Issue
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession is admissible as evidence against respondents.
Held
Inadmissible.
Moreover, Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columnas extrajudicial confession in his affidavit
was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of
a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-
accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The reason for this rule is that:
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or
conduct be used as evidence against him.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators
provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial
confession.
Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators,
it is necessary that
1. The conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself
2. The admission relates to the common object and
3. It has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional
right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence
was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or
circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted
confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and
was inadmissible as evidence against them.
Similar Conduct
Bank of Commerce v. Manalo, G.R. No. 158149, February 9, 2006
Facts
Xavierville Estate Inc (XEI) sold to OBM residential lots in the Xavierville Estate Subdivision. XEI
continued selling the lots as agent of OBM. Thereafter, Manalo offered to purchase a lot in
Xavierville. Thereafter, was asked to choose which lot he wanted to buy so the price and the terms of
payment could be fixed and incorporated in a Conditional Sale. After Manalo made his choice, the lot
was reserved and pegged the price at P200 per sqm with 20% down payment.
In the meantime, OBM was acquired by CBM. CBM was acquired by Boston Bank. Later, Boston
Bank was acquired by Bank of Commerce.
An issue arose because Manalo did not pay the installments. Manalo filed an Action Specific
Performance alleging that they had always been ready, able, and willing to pay the installments. As
such, they were already entitled to the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT MANALO WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT IT ENJOYED SIMILAR TERMS
OF PAYMENT WITH THE OTHER HOMEOWNERS OF XAVIERVILLE.
Held
Insufficiently proved.
The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase price of lots
purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute evidence that XEI also
agreed to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of payment of the P278,448.00.
Respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial court, that, as a matter of business usage, habit or
pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the balance of the purchase price in
installments of 120 months of fixed amounts with pre-computed interests, and that XEI and the
respondents had intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to the sale of the two lots in
question. Indeed, respondents adduced in evidence the three contracts of conditional sale executed by
XEI and other lot buyers merely to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision as sales
agent of OBM after it acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the part of
XEI to require all lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase price of said lots in
120 months.
Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. Courts must contend
with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or pattern of conduct, the offering
party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more
than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature.
Mere similarity of contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently similar circumstances to
outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.
In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key criteria
are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. It is only when examples offered to establish
pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of systematic conduct that
examples are admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response or
ratio of reaction to situations.
However, the respondents inexplicably failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to prove usage,
habit or pattern of conduct of XEI to justify the use of the terms of payment in the contracts of the
other lot buyers, and thus grant respondents the right to pay the P278,448.00 in 120 months,
presumably because of respondents belief that the manner of payment of the said amount is not an
essential element of a contract to sell. There is no evidence that XEI or OBM and all the lot buyers in
the subdivision, including lot buyers who pay part of the downpayment of the property purchased by
them in the form of service, had executed contracts of conditional sale containing uniform terms and
conditions. Moreover, under the terms of the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and three
lot buyers in the subdivision, XEI agreed to grant 120 months within which to pay the balance of the
purchase price to two of them, but granted one 180 months to do so. There is no evidence on record
that XEI granted the same right to buyers of two or more lots.
Dying Declaration
People v. Tabarnero, G.R. No. 168169, February 24, 2010
Facts
Gary Tabarnero went to Ernesto Canatoys house. Thereafter, they had a confrontation which caused
Ernesto to be stabbed 9 times. When the latter was sent to the Provincial Hospital, SPO2 Morales
asked him who stabbed him. In response, Ernesto staid that it was Gary and his father Alberto. Soon
after, he died.
Consequently, Gary and Alberto were charged with Murder. Gary surrendered and admitted to killing
Ernesto but claimed self-defense. On the other hand, Alberto was arrested and denied the charges.
After trial, RTC found conspiracy and convicted both of them for Murder. On appeal, the convictions
were affirmed. Hence, this petition.
For purposes of this topic, Alberto asserts that there was no conspiracy.
Issue
Whether or not the victims dying declaration is admissible.
Held
Admissible.
In insisting upon Albertos innocence, the defense claims that there was no conspiracy between him
and his son, Gary. The defense asserts that Alberto just happened to be near the scene of the crime as
he was looking for his son, whom he saw only after the altercation.
Even more persuasive is the statement of the victim himself, Ernesto, as testified to by SPO2
Morales, that it was the father and son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero from Longos, Bulacan who
stabbed him. While Ernesto was not able to testify in court, his statement is considered admissible
under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (dying declaration).
In applying this exception to the hearsay rule, we held as follows:

It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization by the decedent that his demise or at
least, its imminence -- not so much the rapid eventuation of death -- is at hand. This may be proven by the
statement of the deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature and extent of the decedents wounds, or
other relevant circumstances.
In the case at bar, Ernesto had nine stab wounds which caused his death within the next 48 hours. At
the time he uttered his statement accusing Gary and Alberto of stabbing him, his body was already
very rapidly deteriorating, as shown by his inability to speak and write towards the end of the
questioning.
We have considered that a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence, for no person who
knows of his impending death would make a careless or false accusation. When a person is at the
point of death, every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful
consideration to speak the truth. It is hard to fathom that Ernesto, very weak as he was and with his
body already manifesting an impending demise, would summon every remaining strength he had just
to lie about his true assailants, whom he obviously would want to bring to justice.
Res Gestae
Marturillas v. People, G.R. No. 163217, April 18, 2006
Facts
One day, after Artemio Pantinople had dinner, he was shot on the chest. Immediately after, in the
local dialect, he called out to his neighbor, Lito, and said, Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain.
Lito did not immediately approach Artemio as he feared that he might also be shot. Thereafter, Lito
saw Artemios wife running towards the direction of her husband while shouting, Kapitan, bakit mo
binaril and aking asawa? Hours later, the police came. Thereafter, the went to Brgy Captain
Marturillas house and asked him to go with them to the police station in connection with the killing of
Artemio.
Thereafter, Marturillas was charged with Homicide. During trial, his defense was that of an alibi and
claimed that he was in his house when the alleged shooting occurred. This was all corroborated by his
relatives. Despite this, RTC convicted him of Homicide. CA affirmed the conviction. Hence, this
petition.
Marturillas argues that the RTC and the CA erred in considering Artemios utterances as the latters
dying declaration or as part of the res gestae. Moreover, he contends that he should not have been
found guilty because the paraffin test conducted yielded a negative result.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE UTTERANCES BY ARTEMIO AND HIS WIFE WAS ADMISSIBLE
IN EVIDENCE AS PROOF OF THE IDENTITY OF MARTURILLAS
Held
YES. THEY ARE CONSIDERED AS A DYING DECLARATION AND PART OF THE RES
GESTAE.
Ernita, Artemios wife, positively testified that immediately after the shooting, she had heard her
husband say, Help me pre, I was shot by the captain. This statement was corroborated by another
witness, Lito Santos, who testified on the events immediately preceding and subsequent to the
shooting.
DYING DECLARATION
To be admissible, a DYING DECLARATION must:

1. Refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarants death;
2. Be made under the consciousness of an impending death;
3. Be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper influence;
4. Be offered in a criminal case, in which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and
5. Have been made by a declarant competent to testify as a witness, had that person been called
upon to testify.
The statement of the deceased certainly concerned the cause and circumstances surrounding his death.
He pointed to the person who had shot him. As established by the prosecution, Marturillas was the
only person referred to as kapitan in their place. It was also established that the declarant, at the time
he had given the dying declaration, was under a consciousness of his impending death.
True, he made no express statement showing that he was conscious of his impending death. The law,
however, does not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the inevitability of death.
The perception may be established from surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the
declarants injury and conduct that would justify a conclusion that there was a consciousness of
impending death.
Also, the statement was made freely and voluntarily, without coercion or suggestion, and was offered
as evidence in a criminal case for homicide. In this case, the declarant was the victim who, at the time
he uttered the dying declaration, was competent as a witness.
PART OF THE RES GESTAE
The fact that the victims statement constituted a dying declaration does not preclude it from being
admitted as part of the res gestae, if the elements of both are present.
An IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the
statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the
declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation. A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae
and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, when the following REQUISITES
concur:
1. The principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
2. The statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
3. The statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
All these requisites are present in this case. The principal act, the shooting, was a startling occurrence.
Immediately after, while he was still under the exciting influence of the startling occurrence, the
victim made the declaration without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating Marturillas.
Also, the declaration concerned the one who shot the victim. Thus, the latters statement was correctly
appreciated as part of the res gestae.
Aside from the victims statement, which is part of the res gestae, that of Ernita Kapitan, ngano
nimo gipatay ang akong bana? (Captain, why did you shoot my husband?) may be considered
to be in the same category. Her statement was about the same startling occurrence; it was uttered
spontaneously, right after the shooting, while she had no opportunity to concoct a story against
Marturillas; and it related to the circumstances of the shooting.
Entries in the Regular Course of Business

Security Bank v. Gan, G.R. No. 150464, June 27, 2006
Facts
Eric Gan opened an account with Security Bank. Gan would deposit an initial amount in his current
account and he could draw checks therefrom provided there were sufficient funds. Under a special
agreement with Security Banks branch manager (Qui), Gan was allowed to transfer funds from his
account to another persons account within the same branch. As such, Gan availed of this several
times by depositing checks and withdrawing the proceeds thereof and then transferred them to the
other account. These transactions were covered by Debit Memos because Gan had no sufficient funds
to cover the amounts he transferred.
Eventually, Gan incurred a negative balance in his account. Despite repeated demands, Gan refused to
pay. At this time, the total obligation already reached around 297K. Thus, Security Bank filed a
Complaint for Sum of Money against Gan to recover said amount before the RTC of Manila. In his
Answer, Gan denied liability and argued that the transactions were done without his knowledge and
consent.
To prove its claim, Security Bank presented the bookkeeper (Mercado) who handled Gans account
and recorded the transactions in a ledger. Based on said ledger, Gan allegedly had a negative balance.
RTC dismissed Security Banks complaint and held that it was not able to prove that Gan owed said
amount considering that the ledger cards it presented during trial were merely hearsay evidence. On
appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Security Bank argues that the entries made by Mercado in the ledger were competent evidence to
prove how and when the negative balance was incurred.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT FOR SUM OF MONEY WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED
ON THE GROUND THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO PROVE GANS INDEBTEDNESS
WAS HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
Held
YES.
The entries in the ledger, as testified to by Mercado, were not competent evidence to prove that Gan
consented to the transfers of funds. These entries merely showed that the transfers were indeed made
and that Qui approved them.
Security Banks claim that Gan availed of a special arrangement to transfer funds from his account to
another persons account was a bare allegation that was never substantiated. Admittedly, Mercado had
no personal knowledge of this arrangement. In fact, when asked about the details of the alleged
consent given by Gan to the transfers, he stated that he could not remember because Gan talked to Qui
and not to him. Security Bank could have presented Qui whom they alleged allowed the special
arrangement with Gan. But it did not.
Neither can we accept Security Banks argument that the entries made by Mercado in the ledger were
competent evidence to prove how and when the negative balance was incurred. Security Bank invokes
Section 43 of Rule 130:
Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by
a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received
as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of
duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the admission in evidence of entries in corporate books
required the satisfaction of the following CONDITIONS:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether
legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
The ledger entries did not meet the FIRST and THIRD requisites. Mercado, Security Banks
bookkeeper who prepared the entries, was presented to testify on the transactions pertaining to the
account of respondent. It was in the course of his testimony that the ledger entries were presented.
There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the presentation of the entries as the
person who made them was available to testify in court.
Moreover, Mercado had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entries, particularly those
entries which resulted in the negative balance. He had no knowledge of the truth or falsity of these
entries.
Thus, Security Bank did not prove that Gan had incurred a negative balance in his account.
Consequently, there was nothing to show that Gan was indebted to it in the amount claimed.
Commercial List
Meralco v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 127598, February 22, 2000
Facts
In this Motion for Reconsideration, the Union presented the All Asia Capital report to support its
position favoring a wage increase.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT SAID REPORT IS A CONCLUSIVE DETERMINANT OF THE RATE OF
WAGE INCREASE.
Held
NO.
Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:

Commercial lists and the like.Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to
prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in
that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein.
Under the aforequoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical may be admitted only if
that compilation is published FOR USE BY PERSONS ENGAGED IN THAT OCCUPATION and is
GENERALLY USED AND RELIED UPON by them therein.
As correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper
account and not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no
persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented.
Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news
items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was
regularly prepared by a person in touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as
trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible.
In the same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when the
source of the reports is available. With more reason, mere analyses or projections of such reports
cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case can be easily made available
considering that the same is necessary for compliance with certain governmental requirements.
Opinion Rule
Domingo v. Domingo, G.R. No. 150897, April 11, 2005
Facts
Bruno Domingo was the registered owner of a lot in QC. Turadio was the eldest while Jose and
Leonora are the younger siblings. Sometime in 1970, Bruno needed money for medicine. As a result,
he sold the property to Turadios younger siblings through a Deed of Sale. In 1975, Bruno died.
Years later, Turadio was notified by the QC City Hall that he was living in said property as a squatter.
Turadio found out that this was at the instance of his younger siblings. Subsequently, an Complaint
for Ejectment was filed against Turadio. From this, he discovered the Deed of Sale allegedly executed
by Bruno in favor of the younger siblings.
Thus, he asked the PNP-INC Crime Laboratory to determine whether there was forgery. Based on the
PNP-INCs report, it was found that the signature in the Deed of Sale and Brunos specimen
signatures were not the same. The signatures were also examined by the NBI. However, NBIs
conclusion was that the signatures were done by the same person.
Subsequently, Turadio filed an Action for the Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale alleging that
Brunos signature had been forged. In their defense, his siblings relied on the NBI report. Thereafter,
RTC dismissed the complaint and disregarded the conflicting reports from the PC-INP and NBI. On
appeal, CA affirmed the dismissal of the Complaint. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CONFLICTING REPORTS
FROM THE PC-INP AND NBI AS REGARDS THE SIGNATURE OF BRUNO DOMINGO.
Held
NO.
The law makes no preference, much less distinction among and between the different means in
proving the handwriting of a person. It is likewise clear from the foregoing that courts are not bound
to give probative value or evidentiary value to the opinions of handwriting experts, as resort to
handwriting experts is not mandatory.
In finding that the RTC correctly disregarded the PC-INP Crime Laboratory questioned document
report, the CA observed:
The PC-INP used as standards of comparison the alleged signatures of Bruno in two documents, namely: letter
to the Bureau of Treasury dated April 1, 1958 and Republic Bank Check No. 414356 dated November 2, 1962.
These documents precede by more than eight years the questioned Deed which was executed on December 30,
1970. This circumstance makes the PC-INPs finding questionable.
We find no reason to disagree with the CA. The passage of time and a persons increase in age may
have decisive influence in his handwriting characteristics.
Thus, in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must
be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. As correctly found by the CA, the
examination conducted by the PC-INP Crime Laboratory did not conform to the foregoing standard.
Recall that in the case, the signatures analyzed by the police experts were on documents executed
several years apart. A signature affixed in 1958 or in 1962 may involve characteristics different from
those borne by a signature affixed in 1970. Hence, neither the RTC nor the CA may be faulted for
refusing to place any weight whatsoever on the PC-INP questioned document report.
Character Evidence
People v. Lee, G.R. No. 139070, May 29, 2002
Facts
One evening, Herminia Marquez, 46 years of age and her son, Joseph, 26 years of age, were in the
living room of their house. In their living room, mother and son were watching a basketball game on
television. Herminia looked away from the game and casually glanced at her son. To her complete
surprise, she saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open window behind Joseph. She looked up
and saw accused-appellant Noel Lee peering through the window and holding the gun aimed at
Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body towards the window, and simultaneously,
appellant fired his gun hitting Josephs head. Joseph slumped on the sofa. When no more shots were
fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw accused-appellant flee towards the direction of his house.
Appellant is a well-known figure in their neighborhood and has several criminal cases pending against
him in Caloocan City. He was charged with frustrated homicide in 1984 and attempted murder in
1989.
Accused-appellant had known the victim since childhood and their houses are only two blocks apart.
Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six days before his
death, accused-appellant caught Joseph inside his car trying to steal his car stereo. Joseph scampered
away. As proof of the victims bad reputation, appellant presented a letter handwritten by his mother,
Herminia, addressed to Mayor of Caloocan City. In the letter, Herminia was surrendering her son to
the Mayor for rehabilitation because he was hooked on shabu, a prohibited drug, and was a thief.
Herminia was scared that eventually Joseph might not just steal but kill her and everyone in their
household because of his drug habit.
The accused-appellant likewise explained the two criminal cases filed against him in 1984 and 1989.
The information for attempted murder was dismissed as a result of the victims desistance while in the
frustrated homicide case, the real assailant appeared and admitted his crime.
Issue
Whether or not character evidence of the deceased is admissible.
Held
Inadmissible.
Accused-appellant makes capital of Josephs bad reputation in their community. He alleges that the
victims drug habit led him to commit other crimes and he may have been shot by any of the persons
from whom he had stolen. As proof of Josephs bad character, appellant presented Herminias letter to
Mayor Malonzo seeking his assistance for Josephs rehabilitation from drugs. On rebuttal, Herminia
admitted that she wrote such letter to Mayor Malonzo but denied anything about her sons thievery.
The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a
controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case
were allowed to be influenced by evidence of the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would
be apt to have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into the merits of the
case. After all, the business of the court is to try the case, and not the man; and a very bad man may
have a righteous cause. There are exceptions to this rule however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the
exceptions in both criminal and civil cases.
In criminal cases, the accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait
involved in the offense charged. When the accused presents proof of his good moral character, this
strengthens the presumption of innocence, and where good character and reputation are established,
an inference arises that the accused did not commit the crime charged. The prosecution may not prove
the bad moral character of the accused except only in rebuttal and when such evidence is pertinent to
the moral trait involved in the offense charged. This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the
accused who might otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty but because he is a person of bad
character. The offering of character evidence on his behalf is a privilege of the defendant, and the
prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the defendant to produce such evidence. Once the
defendant raises the issue of his good character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the
defendants bad character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure from refutation, would have a license to
unscrupulously impose a false character upon the tribunal.
The character evidence must be relevant and germane to the kind of the act charged, e.g., on a charge
of rape, character for chastity; on a charge of assault, character for peacefulness or violence; on a
charge for embezzlement, character for honesty and integrity. Such evidence is most commonly
offered to support a claim of self-defense in an assault or homicide case or a claim of consent in a
rape case.
In the Philippine setting, proof of the moral character of the offended party is applied with frequency
in sex offenses and homicide. In rape and acts of lasciviousness or in any prosecution involving an
unchaste act perpetrated by a man against a woman where the willingness of a woman is material, the
womans character as to her chastity is admissible to show whether or not she consented to the mans
act. The exception to this is when the womans consent is immaterial.
In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible in two situations: (1) as
evidence of the deceaseds aggression; and (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the accused. The
pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the deceased or his calmness, gentleness and
peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in determining whether the deceased or the accused
was the aggressor.
When the evidence tends to prove self-defense, the known violent character of the deceased is also
admissible to show that it produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused
and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary.
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the
probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was the
aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between the deceaseds
drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the
positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victims bad character he could have been
killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victims bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder committed
with treachery and premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases
to show that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a
justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary.
Burden of Proof
Manongsong v.Estimo, G.R. No. 136773, June 25, 2003
Facts
Guevara originally owned a 152 sqm property in Las Pinas. Morever, he had 6 children including
Manongsong and Estimo. After Guevara died, his children inherited said property. Thereafter,
Manongsong filed a Complaint claiming that they were owners pro indiviso of the property and thus
prayed for its partition.
In opposition, Estimo claims that Guevaras mother (Justina Navarro) sold the property to them in
1949. To support this, they presented a notarized Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa dated Oct 1957. The
Clerk of Court of the RTC certified that the Kasulatan was notarized.
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of Manongsong. It declared that the Kasulatan was void despite the
absence of evidence attacking its validity. It was declared void on the ground that the property was
conjugal and was not proven to be paraphernal property of Justina Navarro. Thus, partition was
ordered.
After the MR was denied, an appeal was filed in the CA. CA reversed the RTC and held that it erred
in assuming that the property was conjugal at the time Navarro sold it. MR denied. Hence, this
petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT MANONGSONG WAS ABLE TO PROVE, BY THE REQUIRED
QUANTUM OF PROOF, THAT SHE IS A CO-OWNER OF THE LAS PINAS PROPERTY AND
THUS ENTITLED TO DEMAND FOR ITS PARTITION.
Held
NO.
He who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil
case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to
controvert plaintiff s prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff.
Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of
evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendants.
The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public document and
prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution. To assail the authenticity and due
execution of a notarized document, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant. Otherwise the authenticity and due execution of the document should be upheld. The
trial court itself held that (n)o countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn
the documents legality or its validity.
The RTCs conclusion that the Property was conjugal was not based on evidence, but rather on a
misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code
applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor
of the conjugal partnership.
Conclusive Presumption
Datalift Movers v. Belgravia Realty, G.R. No. 144268, August 30, 2006
Facts
Philippine National Railways owned a lot in Manila. It leased it out to Sampaguita Brokerage
pursuant to a Lease Conract. Subsequently, Sampaguita entered into a special arrangement with its
sister company Belgravia Realty whereby the latter would put up on the lot a warehouse for its own
use. However, Belgravia also subleased the warehouse to Datalift pursuant to a 1-year Sublease
Contract.
After the expiration of the Sublease, Datalift continued to be in possession and enjoyment of the
warehouse by acquiescence of Belgravia. Thereafter, due to increases of the rental payment demanded
by PNR from Sampaguita, Belgravia unilaterally increased Datalifts rent. As such, Datalift stopped
paying. After demands to pay and vacate failed, Belgravia and Sampaguita filed an Action for
Ejectment against Datalift in the MTC.
MTC ruled in favor of Belgravia and Sampaguita but reduced the amount of rent to be paid. On
appeal, RTC affirmed. In the CA, Datalifts appeal was denied. It was ruled that there was an implied
new lease created between PNR and Sampaguita. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT DATALIFT, AS LESSEE, CAN QUESTION BELGRAVIA, AS LESSOR,
REGARDING ITS TITLE OR BETTER RIGHT OF POSSESSION.
Held
NO.
Relative to the first argument, the CA decision pertinently reads:

There is no definite showing that the lease contract between PNR and Sampaguita Brokerage, Inc. had been
effectively terminated. As held by the court a quo: (B)y PNR not taking a positive action to eject Sampaguita
from the leased premises up to the present, again, there is a tacit renewal of the lease contract between PNR and
Sampaguita.
The Rules of Court already sufficiently shields Belgravia, as lessor, from being questioned by the
Datalift as lessees, regarding its title or better right of possession as lessor because having admitted
the existence of a lessor-lessee relationship, Datalift is barred from assailing Belgravias title of better
right of possession as their lessor.
Section 2, Rule 131, of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising
out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the
relation of landlord and tenant between them.
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS have been defined as inferences which the law makes so
peremptory that it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong.
As long as the lessor-lessee relationship between Datalift and Belgravia exists as in this case, Datalift,
as lessees, cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that Belgravia
has valid title to or better right of possession to the subject leased premises than they have.
Adverse Party Witness

Chua Gaw v. Gaw, G.R. No. 160855, April 16, 2008
Facts
Facts
The Spouses Chi were founders of 3 corporations namely Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill, and
Columbia Wood. The spouses had 7 children. When one of the spouses died, the surviving heirs
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights wherein the heirs
settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber.
Meanwhile, Concepcion Chua Gaw, one of the children, asked one of her siblings, Suy Ben Chua, to
lend them P200K for the construction of their house in Bulacan. It was agreed that the loan would be
payable within 6 months without interest. However, Gaw was not able to pay. Failing to heed the
demand letters, Suy Ben Chua filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Gaw in the RTC.
In their Answer, Gaw argues that the P200K was not a loan but his share in the profits of Hagonoy
Lumber after Gaw requested for an accounting and payment of her share in the profits.
During trial, Gaw called Suy Ben Chua to testify as an adverse witness. On direct examination, the
latter testified that he owns the lots on which Hagonoy Lumber stands. On cross-examination, Suy
Ben Chua explained that his sister acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of Partition and that
he was able to acquire the same from his sister through a Deed of Sale.
RTC ruled in favor of Suy Ben Chua. Furthermore, RTC held that the validity of the Deed of Partition
and the Deed of Sale evidencing transfer of ownership of Hagonoy Lumber from Suy Ben Chuas
sister was never impugned. Although Suy Ben Chua failed to produce the originals of said documents,
Gaw judicially admitted the due execution of the Deed of Partition and even acknowledged her
signature thereon. As for the Deed of Sale, since its contents were not put in issue, non-presentation of
the original is not fatal to its authenticity and as to the truth of its contents. On appeal, CA affirmed.
Issue
Whether or not the adverse witness testimony was properly considered as part of petitioners
evidence.
Held
Yes.
Petitioner contends that her case was unduly prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the respondents
testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel as part of her evidence.
Petitioner argues that the adverse witness testimony elicited during cross-examination should not be
considered as evidence of the calling party. She contends that the examination of respondent as
adverse witness did not make him her witness and she is not bound by his testimony, particularly
during cross-examination by his own counsel.
We do not agree that petitioners case was prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the respondents
testimony during cross-examination as her evidence.
In the first place, the delineation of a piece of evidence as part of the evidence of one party or the
other is only significant in determining whether the party on whose shoulders lies the burden of proof
was able to meet the quantum of evidence needed to discharge the burden. Thus, it barely matters who
with a piece of evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to consider the entirety of the
evidence presented by both parties. Preponderance of evidence is then determined by considering all
the facts and circumstances of the case, culled from the evidence, regardless of who actually
presented it.
That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily mean that the calling party will not be
bound by the formers testimony. The fact remains that it was at his instance that his adversary was
put on the witness stand. Unlike an ordinary witness, the calling party may impeach an adverse
witness in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad
character. Under a rule permitting the impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling party
does not vouch for the witness veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his testimony if it is not
contradicted or remains unrebutted.
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latters testimony only in
the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to
what the witness testifies on. A rule that provides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be
bound by his testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but
merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching
him. This, the petitioner failed to do.
In the present case, the petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to discredit the respondents testimony
on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property. The petitioner admitted having signed the Deed
of Partition but she insisted that the transfer of the property to Chua Siok Huan was only temporary.
On cross-examination, she confessed that no other document was executed to indicate that the transfer
of the business to Chua Siok Huan was a temporary arrangement. She declared that, after their mother
died in 1993, she did not initiate any action concerning Hagonoy Lumber, and it was only in her
counterclaim in the instant that, for the first time, she raised a claim over the business.
Significantly, the RTCs finding that the P200,000.00 was given to the petitioner and her husband as a
loan is supported by the evidence on record. Hence, we do not agree with the petitioners contention
that the RTC has overlooked certain facts of great weight and value in arriving at its decision. The
RTC merely took into consideration evidence which it found to be more credible than the self-serving
and uncorroborated testimony of the petitioner.
Public Documents
Suerte-Felipe v. People, G.R. No. 170974, March 3, 2008
Facts
Romeo Suerte-Felipe and Godofredo Ariate were arguing over something. All of a sudden, Felipe
fired at Ariate with his .45. Those who tried to help and appease the situation were also shot at. Later,
after being brought to the hospital, Ariate was declared dead. His son identified the body and
requested for an autopsy examination. Said autopsy was conducted by Dr. Lagat. The autopsy report
showed that Ariate sustained 3 gunshot wounds. Moreover, a photographer from the NBI took
pictures of the body.
Thereafter, an Information charging Felipe with Homicide was filed in the RTC. In his defense, Felipe
averred that Ariate and his companions were the unlawful aggressors. Felipe claims that after he
called Ariate out for cursing at and slapping a retard, the latter became hostile towards him.
Nonetheless, RTC found Felipe guilty as charged. On appeal, CA affirmed the conviction. Hence, this
petition.
Felipe argues that there was reasonable doubt regarding his guilt when there was no clear evidence to
support the conclusion that it was Ariates body that was actually autopsied. Essentially, Felipe assails
the probative value of the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body issued after the autopsy.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATE OF IDENTIFICATION OF DEAD BODY
ESTABLISHED THE IDENTITY OF THE VICTIM.
Held
YES.
The presentation in evidence of the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body, the latter being a
public record made in the performance of a duty of officers in the Medico-Legal Office of the
National Bureau of Investigation, is governed by Rule 132, Sections 19 and 23 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
SEC. 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.
Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the
date of the latter.
Thus, entries in the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body are deemed prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein, i.e., that a body has been properly identified as that of Godofredo Ariate. This
prima facie evidence of identification cannot be rebutted by an extremely meticulous fault-finding
inquiry into the chain of custody of the body of the victim, as such body cannot be easily replaced or
substituted by ill-minded persons.
What Felipe is asking of us is not to be sedulous anymore, but to be paranoid and unreasonably
mistrustful of the persons whom our very rules require us to trust. Felipes criticism of the
identification of the body of the victim miserably fails to inject any reasonable doubt in our minds, not
when he is even loath to say that the body autopsied was not that of Godofredo Ariate but that of
some other person.
We must stress at this point that there was no indication of any impropriety or irregularity committed
by the medico-legal officer in this case with respect to the autopsy on the body of the late Godofredo
Ariate. Dr. Lagats duty was to perform the autopsy and not to obsessively investigate the authenticity
of the signature appearing on all requests presented to him. Thus, Dr. Lagat, as a medico-legal officer,
enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties.
Formal Offer of Evidence

Atlas Consolidated v. CIR, G.R. No. 159490, February 18, 2008
Facts
Atlas is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the production of
copper concentrates for export. It registered as a VAT entity and was issued VAT Registration
Certificate.
For the first quarter of 1993, Atlas export sales amounted to PhP 642,685,032.24. Its proceeds were
received in acceptable foreign currency and inwardly remitted in accordance with Central Bank
regulations. For the same period, Atlas paid PhP 7,907,662.53 for input taxes. Hereafter, Atlas filed a
VAT return for the first quarter of 1993 with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on April 20, 1993,
and also filed an amended VAT return.
On September 20, 1993, Atlas applied with the BIR for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund under Section 106(b) of the Tax Code. The certificate would represent the VAT it paid for the
first quarter of 1993 in the amount of PhP 7,907,662.53, which corresponded to the input taxes not
applied against any output VAT.
Atlas then filed a petition for review with the CTA on February 22, 1995 to prevent the running of the
prescriptive period under Sec. 230 of the Tax Code.
Issue
Whether or not Atlas showed sufficient proof.
Held
No.
Consistent with its position before the courts a quo, Atlas argues that the requirements under RR 3-88
are only applicable in administrative claims for refunds before the BIR and not for judicial claims, as
in the instant case. And that it is CTA Circular No. 1-95, as amended by CTA Circular No. 10-97,
which applies and which Atlas asserts it has complied with. It contends that CTA Circular No. 10-97,
being the later law, is deemed to have qualified RR 3-88. Thus, it contends that what is only required
is a submission of a summary of the invoices and a certification from an independent public
accountant.
We are not persuaded.
...Second, the Rules of Court, which is suppletory in quasi-judicial proceedings, particularly Sec. 34
of Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence, is clear that no evidence which has not been formally
offered shall be considered. Thus, where the pertinent invoices or receipts purportedly evidencing the
VAT paid by Atlas were not submitted, the courts a quo evidently could not determine the veracity of
the input VAT Atlas has paid. Moreover, when Atlas likewise failed to submit pertinent export
documents to prove actual export sales with due certification from accredited banks on the export
proceeds in foreign currency with the corresponding conversion rate into Philippine currency, the
courts a quo likewise could not determine the veracity of the export sales as indicated in Atlas
amended VAT return.
It must be noted that the most competent evidence must be adduced and presented to prove the
allegations in a complaint, petition, or protest before a judicial court. And where the best evidence
cannot be submitted, secondary evidence may be presented. In the instant case, the pertinent
documents which are the best pieces of evidence were not presented.
Third, the summary presented by Atlas does not replace the pertinent invoices, receipts, and export
sales documents as competent evidence to prove the fact of refundable or creditable input VAT.
Indeed, the summary presented with the certification by an independent Certified Public Accountant
(CPA) and the testimony of Atlas Accounting and Finance Manager are merely corroborative of the
actual input VAT it paid and the actual export sales. Otherwise, the pertinent invoices, receipts, and
export sales documents are the best and competent pieces of evidence required to substantiate Atlas
claim for tax credit or refund which is merely corroborated by the summary duly certified by a CPA
and the testimony of Atlas employee on the export sales. And when these pertinent documents are
not presented, these could not be corroborated as is true in the instant case.
Be that as it may, even if Atlas has complied with the affidavits-of-merits requirement, its prayer
for a new trial would still not prosper. First, Atlas is guilty of inexcusable negligence in the
prosecution of its case. It is duty-bound to ensure that all proofs required under the rules are duly
presented. Atlas has indeed repeatedly asserted that in its action for the instant judicial claim, the CTA
is bound by its rules and suppletorily by the Rules of Court. It certainly has not exercised the
diligence required of a litigant who has the burden of proof to present all that is required. Second,
forgotten evidence, not presented during the trial nor formally offered, is not newly found evidence
that merits a new trial. Third, and most importantly, it goes against the orderly administration of
justice to allow a party to submit forgotten evidence which it could have offered with the exercise of
ordinary diligence, more so when a decision has already been rendered.
Dizon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140944, April 30, 2008

Facts
When Jose Fernandez died, a Petition for Probate of the Will was filed in the RTC of Manila. RTC
appointed as Administrator retired SC Justice Arsenio Dizon and Atty. Dizon. Dizon informed the
Commissioner of the special proceedings for Fernandezs estate. Thereafter, an Estate Tax Return was
filed with the BIR showing therein that there was no estate tax liabilities.
As a result, BIR Regional Director issued Certifications stating that taxes due had been fully paid and
that the properties in the estate may now be transferred to his heirs. Dizon then requested that the
properties be sold to pay for its creditors who filed claims against the estate.
Meanwhile, however, the Assistant Commissioner issued a Tax Assessment Notice which demanded
payment of deficiency estate tax in the amount of 66M. After the MR was denied, Dizon filed a
Petition for Review before the CTA. As such, trial ensued. Dizon presented documentary evidence.
On the other hand, BIR only presented one of the revenue examiners (Alberto) who conducted the
investigation on the estate tax return. During direct examination, the witness identified several
documents and signatures.
After trial, CTA denied Dizons petition. Citing Vda. de Onate, CTA ruled that even though the BIR
did not formally offered its evidence, they could still be admitted considering that they were properly
identified during the presentation of BIRs witness. On appeal, CA affirmed. MR denied. Hence this
petition. Essentially, Dizon claims that the lack of formal offer is fatal to BIRs cause.
Issue
Whether or not the evidence the BIR submitted can be considered.
Held
No.
Indubitably, no evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the
rules on documentary evidence require that these documents must be formally offered before the
CTA.
The CTA and the CA rely solely on the case of Vda. de Oate on the admission and consideration of
exhibits which were not formally offered during the trial. From the foregoing declaration, however, it
is clear that Vda. de Oate is merely an exception to the general rule. Being an exception, it may be
applied only when there is strict compliance with the requisites mentioned therein; otherwise, the
general rule in Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court should prevail.
In this case, we find that these requirements have not been satisfied. The assailed pieces of evidence
were presented and marked during the trial particularly when Alberto took the witness stand. Alberto
identified these pieces of evidence in his direct testimony. He was also subjected to cross-examination
and re-cross examination by petitioner. But Albertos account and the exchanges between Alberto and
petitioner did not sufficiently describe the contents of the said pieces of evidence presented by the
BIR. In fact, petitioner sought that the lead examiner, one Ma. Anabella A. Abuloc, be summoned to
testify, inasmuch as Alberto was incompetent to answer questions relative to the working papers. The
lead examiner never testified. Moreover, while Alberto's testimony identifying the BIR's evidence
was duly recorded, the BIR documents themselves were not incorporated in the records of the case.
A common fact threads through Vda. de Oate and Ramos that does not exist at all in the instant case.
In the aforementioned cases, the exhibits were marked at the pre-trial proceedings to warrant the
pronouncement that the same were duly incorporated in the records of the case.
The BIR's failure to formally offer these pieces of evidence, despite CTA's directives, is fatal to its
cause. Such failure is aggravated by the fact that not even a single reason was advanced by the BIR to
justify such fatal omission. This, we take against the BIR.
Per the records of this case, the BIR was directed to present its evidence in the hearing of February
21, 1996, but BIR's counsel failed to appear. The CTA denied petitioner's motion to consider BIR's
presentation of evidence as waived, with a warning to BIR that such presentation would be considered
waived if BIR's evidence would not be presented at the next hearing. Again, in the hearing of March
20, 1996, BIR's counsel failed to appear. Thus, in its Resolution dated March 21, 1996, the CTA
considered the BIR to have waived presentation of its evidence. In the same Resolution, the parties
were directed to file their respective memorandum. Petitioner complied but BIR failed to do so. In all
of these proceedings, BIR was duly notified.
Tender of Excluded Evidence

Cruz-Arevalo v. Layosa, A.M. RTJ- 06-2005, July 14, 2006
Facts
Complainant narrates that Conrado R. Cruz executed an authorization letter and a special power of
attorney (SPA) in her favor to represent him in Civil Case while he undergoes medical treatment in
the United States of America (USA). Notwithstanding the presentation of the authorization letter and
SPA during the pre-trial, respondent judge declared Cruz non-suited due to his absence. She also
refused to issue an order to that effect thus depriving Cruz the right to challenge her order by way of
petition for certiorari. Complainant also assails the order of respondent judge to exclude several
paragraphs in the Affidavit which was adopted as the direct testimony of her witness without giving
her counsel a chance to comment on the objections raised by the defendants. Moreover, she refused to
issue a written order excluding certain paragraphs thus depriving complainant the opportunity to file
certiorari proceedings.
Complainant likewise accuses respondent judge of inaction, indifference or collusion by silence with
the defendants for not acting on her Motions for Writs of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad
Testificandum thus providing opportunity for defendant Quimbo to avoid compliance therewith.
Complainant prays for the re-raffling of the case to ensure impartiality and proper dispensation of
justice.
Issue
Whether or not the exclusion of the paragraphs is proper.
Held
Yes.
As regards the exclusion of certain paragraphs in the affidavit of complainants witness, the rule is
that evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or excluded by the court. If a partys
offered documentary or object evidence is excluded, he may move or request that it be attached to
form part of the record of the case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he may state for the record the
name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.
These procedures are known as offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence and are made for
purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered against the offeror, he may in his
appeal assign as error the rejection of the excluded evidence. The appellate court will better
understand and appreciate the assignment of error if the evidence involved is included in the record of
the case.
On the other hand, the ruling on an objection must be given immediately after an objection is made, as
what respondent judge did, unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the
question presented; but the ruling shall always be made during the trial and at such time as will give
the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situations presented by the ruling.
Respondent judge correctly ordered the striking out of portions in Atty. Arevalos affidavit which are
incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. Objections based on irrelevancy and immateriality
need no specification or explanation. Relevancy or materiality of evidence is a matter of logic, since it
is determined simply by ascertaining its logical connection to a fact in issue in the case.
Preponderance of Evidence
Raymundo v. Lunaria, G.R. No. 171036, October 17, 2008
Facts
Petitioners approached respondent Lunaria to help them find a buyer for their property. Respondent
Lunaria was promised a 5% agents commission in the event that he finds a buyer. After respondents
found a buyer, Cecilio Hipolito, an Exclusive Authority to Sell was executed embodying the
agreement made by the parties. After the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property was
registered in the Registry of Deeds, a copy thereof was given to the Far East Bank and Trust Co.,
which was then holding in escrow the amount of P50,000,000 to be disbursed or paid against the total
consideration or price of the property.
Ceferino G. Raymundo, one of the co-owners, advised respondents to go to the bank to receive the
amount of P1,196,000 as partial payment of their total commission. Also, respondents were instructed
to return after seven days to get the balance of the commission due them.
Respondents returned to the bank. However, the check covering the balance of their commission was
already given by the bank manager to Lourdes R. Raymundo, the representative of the petitioners.
Respondents tried to get the check from the petitioners, however, they were told that there is nothing
more due them by way of commission as they have already divided and distributed the balance of the
commissions among their nephews and nieces.
For their part, petitioners counter that there was a subsequent verbal agreement entered into by the
parties after the execution of the written agreement. Said verbal agreement provides that the 5%
agents commission shall be divided as follows: 2/5 for the agents, 2/5 for Lourdes Raymundo, and
1/5 for the buyer, Hipolito. The share given to Lourdes Raymundo shall be in consideration for the
help she would extend in the processing of documents of sale of the property, the payment of the
capital gains tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and in securing an order from the court. The 1/5
commission given to Hipolito, on the other hand, will be used by him for the payment of realty taxes.
Hence, for failure of the respondents to receive the balance of their agents commission, they filed an
action for the collection of a sum of money
Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in requiring petitioners to establish their case by more than a
preponderance of evidence.
Held
No.
As to the second issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in requiring them to prove the
existence of the subsequent verbal agreement by more than a mere preponderance of evidence since
no rule of evidence requires them to do so. In support of this allegation, petitioners presented
petitioner Lourdes Raymundo who testified that she was given 2/5 share of the commission pursuant
to the verbal sharing scheme because she took care of the payment of the capital gains tax, the
preparation of the documents of sale and of securing an authority from the court to sell the property.
For their part, respondents counter that the appellate court did not require petitioners to prove the
existence of the subsequent oral agreement by more than a mere preponderance of evidence. What the
appellate court said is that the petitioners failed to prove and establish the alleged subsequent verbal
agreement even by mere preponderance of evidence.
Petitioners abovecited allegation has no merit. By preponderance of evidence is meant that the
evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. It refers to the weight, credit
and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with
the term greater weight of evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.
Both the appellate court and trial court ruled that the evidence presented by the petitioners is not
sufficient to support their allegation that a subsequent verbal agreement was entered into by the
parties. In fact, both courts correctly observed that if Lourdes Raymundo was in reality offered the 2/5
share of the agents commission for the purpose of assisting respondent Lunaria in the documentation
requirement, then why did the petitioners not present any written court order on her authority, tax
receipt or sales document to support her self-serving testimony? Moreover, even the worksheet
allegedly reflecting the commission sharing was unilaterally prepared by petitioner Lourdes
Raymundo without any showing that respondents participated in the preparation thereof or gave their
assent thereto. Even the alleged payment of 1/5 of the commission to the buyer to be used in the
payment of the realty taxes cannot be given credence since the payment of realty taxes is the
obligation of the owners, and not the buyer. Lastly, if the said sharing agreement was entered into
pursuant to the wishes of the buyer, then he should have been presented as witness to corroborate the
claim of the petitioners. However, he was not.
Corpus Delicti
Rimorin v. People, G.R. No. 146481, April 30, 2003
Facts
After receiving information that certain syndicated groups were engaged in smuggling activities in the
port area of Manila, Col. Lacson set up surveillance stake-out teams. Pursuant thereto, they searched a
cargo truck filled with cases of blue seal/untaxed cigarettes. Said truck was occupied by Police Sgt.
Rimorin and other people.
As a result thereof, an Information for Smuggling in violation of the Tariff and Customs Code was
filed in the RTC against Rimorin et al. During trial, Rimorin denied the charges. After trial, RTC
convicted Rimorin et al despite the fact that the government did not present the seized items. On
appeal, CA affirmed the conviction as regards Rimorin but acquitted his co-accused because the latter
were not found to be in possession of any of said cigarettes. More importantly, CA held that non-
presentation of the seized items was not fatal because the crime was established by other competent
evidence. Hence, this petition.
Essentially, Rimorin argues that he cannot be convicted of smuggling because the government failed
to present the seized items in court. In other words, he equated physical evidence of the smuggled
cigarettes with the corpus delicti.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS NECESSARY TO PRESENT THE SMUGGLED GOODS TO
PROVE THE CORPUS DELICTI.
Held
NO.
The Court, on several occasions, has explained that corpus delicti refers to the FACT OF THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED or to the BODY OR SUBSTANCE OF THE CRIME.
In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to
the body of the person murdered.
Hence, to prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the prosecution to be able show that:
1. A certain fact has been proven say, a person has died or a building has been burned; and
2. A particular person is criminally responsible for the act.
Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a
single witness uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction
therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus delicti had been competently established by
governments evidence, which consisted of the testimonies of credible witnesses and the Custody
Receipt issued by the Bureau of Customs for the confiscated goods.
Col. Panfilo Lacsons testimony on the apprehension of Rimorin and on the seizure of the blue seal
cigarettes was clear and straightforward.
So, too, did Gregorio Abrigo customs warehouse storekeeper of the Bureau categorically testify
that the MISG had turned over to him the seized blue seal cigarettes, for which he issued a Custody
Receipt dated October 15, 1979.
Circumstantial Evidence
People v. Quizon, G.R. No. 142532, November 18, 2003
Facts
Conchita Pasquin was working for Suarez Travel Agencies in Angeles City. One day, she was found
dead and that she had been robbed of her jewelry and P17,000 cash. As a result, her nephew, Johnny
Quizon, was charged with Robbery with Homicide.
During trial, the prosecution presented witnesses to support the allegation that Quizon did the crime.
Rowena, a secretary of a law firm across the street, testified she heard loud noises coming from the
travel agency and that, afterwards, a man with Quizons description left hurriedly from the Suarez
Travel Agency. Also, Myla Miclat and her live-in partner Roel Sicangco testified that they went to the
travel agency to hand over P17K to Conchita for the purchase of plane fare to Guam. While there,
Quizon was there. When Miclat and Sicangco returned a few hours later, Conchita did not respond.
RTC convicted Quizon. It held that despite the absence of direct evidence to establish the guilt of the
accused, there was circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish a conviction. On appeal to the SC,
the Solicitor General filed a manifestation arguing that the circumstantial evidence was not sufficient
to establish a conviction.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF QUIZON.
Held
NO. ACQUITTED.
The Court upholds the recommendation of the Solicitor General. Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
1. There is more than one circumstance;
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The foregoing elements must all be obtaining in order to aptly warrant the conviction of an accused.
The circumstances proved must be congruous with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt.
Evidently, Conchita Magpantay Pasquin was a victim of foul play. The circumstances recited by the
RTC, however, would be insufficient to create in the mind of the Court a moral certainty that Quizon
was the one responsible for the commission of the crime.
Quizons mere presence at the locus criminis would be inadequate to implicate him in the commission
of the crime. No evidence was adduced that he was the last person to see or talk to the victim before
she was killed. Roel Sicangco testified that when he and Myla arrived at Conchitas office, the latter
had just finished talking to a woman and a man with a collectors bag. After Roel and Myla finished
their transaction with Conchita, the same man and woman, whom they saw earlier, again entered
Conchitas office. Roel testified that he saw Johnny come out of the office and board a passenger
jeepney going to Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga.
The prosecution failed to show that Sicangco had any good reason to lie. Even while the RTC had
observed that Conchitas jewelry and money were never found, no evidence was introduced that
Quizon had them, or that he had them in his possession at any time after Conchitas death. The RTC
found it strange that he did not wait for Conchita when the latter said that she was also leaving for
Manila. HE said that he did offer to wait for Conchita but she told him to go ahead as she still had
some other work to attend to.
The fact that Quizon did not attend Conchitas wake is not an indication of either flight or guilt.
Nimfa Quizon would appear to have warned him against going to the wake after he earned the ire of
their relatives who had suspected him to be the killer.
Significantly, no ill-motive was ascribed on Quizon to either kill or rob his own aunt.
The circumstances recited by the RTC might be enough to create some kind of suspicion on the part
of the RTC of Quizons involvement, but suspicion is not enough to warrant conviction. A finding of
guilt based on conjecture, even if likely, cannot satisfy the need for evidence required for a
pronouncement of guilt, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt of the complicity in the crime.
No matter how weak the defense is, it is still imperative for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence for the prosecution, it has been said, must at all times
stand or fall on its own weight and it cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.
An accused has the right to be presumed innocent, and this presumption prevails until and unless it is
overturned by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In case of
any reservation against the guilt of accused, the Court should entertain no other alternative but to
acquit him.
Special Proceedings
Special Proceeding and Summary Proceeding under
Article 41 of the Family Code
Republic v. Court of Appeals, May 5, 2005, G.R. No. 163604.
Facts
In In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc,
Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioners Report
and accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier,
presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the
Family Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the
absent spouse.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial courts order by
filing a Notice of Appeal.
The trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served as required by and pursuant to
Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case being a special proceeding,
disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, it contending that the
declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special
proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.
The Court of Appeals denied the Republics petition on procedural and substantive grounds in this
wise:
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in
the nature of a special proceeding.
Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature of a special
proceeding and not an ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the
presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right
or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can
be enforced against any person.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13, 2000 denying OSGs Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice of Appeal was correctly issued.
The instant petition, being in the nature of a special proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice
of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement
BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court . . .
Issue
Whether or not a declaration of presumptive death for purposes of remarriage is a summary
proceeding.
Held
Yes.
Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored its grant of the petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouses was already dead. In
case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of the absent spouse.
By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of
Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her
desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a summary
proceeding. There is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a
summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of
Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary
proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial courts order sufficed.
Jurisdiction of Probate Court

Munsayac-De Villa v. Court of Appeals, October 28, 2003, G.R. No. 148597.
Facts
A Special Proceeding, entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late Gelacio Munsayac, Sr.
and the Late Vicenta Munsayac was pending before the Regional Trial Court. The said special
proceeding case was filed by petitioners for letters of administration nominating DE VILLA as
administratrix of the intestate estate of their parents. This was opposed by the other children who
nominated a different person to be the administrator of the intestate estate (Munsayac Jr.).
MUNSAYAC, JR. was eventually appointed administrator.
A Request for Inhibition was filed by petitioners. Barely a week after the aforesaid Request for
Inhibition was filed, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the CA
questioning the order to DE VILLA to certain bank time deposit certificates/documents; and the order
of arrest of DE VILLA for failure to produce the said bank certificates/documents.
Respondent Judge issued the order to surrender, under pain of contempt, (a) the amount of the bank
investment discovered in the names of the late VICENTA, DE VILLA and SUNGA made with the
United Coconut Planters Bank, Baguio City (UCPB) under Investment Confirmation No. 0666
worth P13,506,343.33, and which amount was not disclosed by the petitioners in the estate return tax,
(b) as well as the surrender of all the pieces of jewelry given by the late VICENTA to DE VILLA and
SUNGA, subject of the freeze order with the China Banking Corporation.
The Court a quo, on the account of petitioners failure to faithfully comply therewith, ordered the
arrest of petitioners until their compliance to surrender in custodial legis the money.
Issue
Whether or not the probate court can determine the ownership of the properties deposited with or
ordered frozen by the lower court
Held
Yes but only provisionally.
We emphasize at the outset that the main case from which this Petition arose has already been decided
by the CA. The Decision is now final and executory. Already terminated in that main case was
Special Proceedings which had given rise to a number of incidents and petitions including the herein
matter. The CA found that Judge Reyes had gravely abused his discretion when he disallowed the
Extrajudicial Partition executed by the heirs of the Munsayac spouses.
Petitioners, however, argue that since there are still matters pending before the trial judge, such as the
withdrawal/release of money deposited in custodia legis and the lifting of a freeze order on certain
jewelry, his inhibition is still needed.
We disagree. After the CA terminated Special Proceedings, we see no more reason why the inhibition
of Judge Reyes should still be an issue. The Petition therefor has already become moot and academic
in view of the termination of the main case. How can he be inhibited from a case that has already been
decided with finality?
When Judge Reyes issued his Orders commanding the bank manager of the China Bank branch in
Baguio City to freeze the safety deposit box of petitioners and to deposit certain amounts in custodia
legis,] he did so as the presiding judge in the probate court that was hearing Special Proceedings. Now
that the case has finally been terminated, it follows that neither he nor his court has any more right to
hold the properties that were the subject of his Orders in the special proceedings.
Needless to say, the lifting of any freeze order and the return of any property previously deposited
with the court should be effected. The judge had no more discretion to decide whether the amounts
and the property deposited should be released. Likewise, any standing order on any property in
relation to the special proceedings should be lifted. This ruling reiterates the long-standing principle
that a tribunal acting as a probate court exercises limited jurisdiction. However, the determination of
whether a property should be included in the inventory is within its probate jurisdiction. Such
determination is only provisional -- not conclusive -- in character and subject to the final decision in a
separate action that may be instituted by the parties.
Neither are we unmindful of the rule that questions on an advance made or allegedly made by the
deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court that has jurisdiction over the estate
proceedings; and that the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heirs.
In a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated this settled, corollary principle:
generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, but it may do so if the
interested parties are all heirs; or the question is one of collation or advancement; or the parties
consent to its assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are not impaired. These
principles, however, have no more application in this case, since the main proceedings for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased couple have already been decided and terminated.
Indeed, every litigation must come to an end.
To be sure, this Court is not tasked to look into the ownership of the properties deposited with or
ordered frozen by the lower court during the progress of the special proceedings. Neither can Judge
Reyes do so now. Whether those properties should have been adjudicated by the legal heirs of the
Munsayac spouses is beside the point at this time. The former have already entered into an
Extrajudicial Partition representing the final, complete and absolute settlement of their shares as heirs
of the latter. What is left to be done is simply the lifting of any freeze order and the release of any
property originally deposited by petitioners in custodia legis.
In view of the above ruling, we deem it necessary to direct Judge Reyes to immediately lift any freeze
order still pending and to order the release of any property deposited in custodia legis.
CONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY CONTRACTED

BY DECEDENT IN HIS LIFETIME
Lui v. Loy, July 3, 2003, G.R. No. 145982.
Facts
Teodoro Vao, as attorney-in-fact of Jose Vao, sold seven lots of the Banilad Estate to Benito Liu
(through Frank Liu) and Cirilo Pangalo. Meanwhile, Jose Vao passed away.
Benito Liu subsequently paid installments. Apparently, Benito Liu stopped further payments because
Teodoro Vao admitted his inability to transfer the lot titles to Benito Liu. Later, Teodoro Vao
informed Frank Liu that the Supreme Court had already declared valid the will of his father Jose
Vao. Thus, Teodoro Vao could transfer the titles to the buyers names upon payment of the balance of
the purchase price. Frank Liu informed Teodoro Vao that he was ready to pay the balance of the
purchase price of the seven lots. He requested for the execution of a deed of sale of the lots in his
name and the delivery of the titles to him.
Benito Liu and Cirilo Pangalo sold the lots to Frank Liu. However, Teodoro Vao sold the lots to
Teresita Loy and Alfredo Loy.
Frank Liu filed a complaint against Teodoro Vao for specific performance, execution of deed of
absolute sale, issuance of certificates of title and construction of subdivision roads, before the Court
of First Instance of Davao.
The CFI dismissed the case on the ground that Frank Liu should have filed the claim with the probate
court. Thus, Frank Liu filed before the probate court a claim against the Estate of Jose Vao for
Specific Performance, Execution of Deed of Absolute Sale, Issuance of Certificate of Title, and
Construction of Subdivision Roads.
The probate court approved the claim of Frank Liu. Thus, Milagros Vao executed a deed of
conveyance covering the lots in favor of Frank Liu, in compliance with the probate courts order.
The probate court, upon an ex-parte motion filed by Teresita Loy, issued an Order also approving the
sale by Teodoro Vao in her favor.
Milagros Vao filed a motion for reconsideration of the Orders of the probate court. She contended
that she had not been personally served with copies of the motions presented to the Court by Alfredo
Loy, Jr. and by Teresita Loy seeking the approval of the sales of the lots in their favor, as well as the
Orders that were issued by the Court pursuant thereto.
Issue
Whether the probate courts ex-parte approval of the contracts of the Loys was valid?
Held
NO. First of all, there was no notice to all interested parties. Second, there was no court approval
when the administrator sold the lots to the Loys. Further, when the probate court approved the
contracts of the Loys, the probate court had already lost jurisdiction over Lot Nos. 5 and 6 because the
lots no longer formed part of the Estate of Jose Vao.
Despite the clear requirement of Section 8 of Rule 89, the Loys did not notify the administratrix of the
motion and hearing to approve the sale of the lots to them. The administratrix, who had already signed
the deed of sale to Frank Liu as directed by the same probate court, objected to the sale of the same
lots to the Loys.
The failure to notify the administratrix and other interested persons rendered the sale to the Loys void.
The rules make it mandatory that notice be served on the heirs and other interested persons of the
application for approval of any conveyance of property held in trust by the deceased, and where no
such notice is given, the order authorizing the conveyance, as well as the conveyance itself,
is completely void.
Necessity of court approval of sales
Indisputably, an heir can sell his interest in the estate of the decedent, or even his interest in specific
properties of the estate. However, for such disposition to take effect against third parties, the court
must approve such disposition to protect the rights of creditors of the estate. What the deceased can
transfer to his heirs is only the net estate, that is, the gross estate less the liabilities.
In Alfredo Loys case, his seller executed the contract of sale after the death of the registered owner
Jose Vao. The seller was Teodoro Vao who sold the lot in his capacity as sole heir of the deceased
Jose Vao. The contract of sale was binding between Teodoro Vao and Alfredo Loy, Jr., but subject to
the outcome of the probate proceedings.
In Frank Lius case, as successor-in-interest of Benito Liu, his seller was Jose Vao, who during his
lifetime executed the contract to sell through an attorney-in-fact, Teodoro Vao. This is a disposition of
property contracted by the decedent during his lifetime. Section 8 of Rule 89 specifically governs this
sale. Thus, Frank Liu applied to the probate court for the grant of authority to the administratrix to
convey the lots in accordance with the contract made by the decedent Jose Vao during his
lifetime. The probate court approved the application.
In Teresita Loys case, her seller was the Estate of Jose Vao. Teodoro Vao executed the contract of
sale in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Jose Vao, the registered owner of the lots. The
Court has held that a sale of estate property made by an administrator without court authority is void
and does not confer on the purchaser a title that is available against a succeeding administrator.
Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property
belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the
court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court. An administrator under
the circumstances of this case cannot enjoy blanket authority to dispose of real estate as he pleases,
especially where he ignores specific directives to execute proper documents and get court approval for
the sales validity.
Both the law and jurisprudence expressly require court approval before any sale of estate property by
an executor or administrator can take effect.
Determination of the title of the properties part of

the estate
Pacioles v. Ching, August 9, 2005, G.R. No. 127920.
Facts
Miguelita died intestate. She was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor
children. Petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelitas estate.
Miguelitas mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to

petitioners prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is
incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelitas estate
is composed of paraphernal properties.
The intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel (Respondents son) as joint
regular administrators of the estate. Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath
and posting the requisite bond.
Petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion praying, among others, that an Order be
issued directing the partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs.
Respondent opposed petitioners motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate
is premature and precipitate, considering that there is yet no determination whether the properties
specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture. Respondent claimed
that she owns the bulk of Miguelitas estate as an heir and co-owner. Thus, she prayed that a hearing
be scheduled.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set
aside the intestate courts Order which denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the
estate for being premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondents claim of
ownership.
Issue
Whether or not a trial court, acting as an intestate court, can hear and pass upon questions of
ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate.
Held
Yes but only provisionally.
As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve
with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action to resolve title.
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the
intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondents claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said
principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and
passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be
included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate
court.
First, the inventory was not disputed.
And second, Emmanuel, respondents son and representative in the settlement of Miguelitas estate, did
not submit his own inventory. He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those
properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one
shows that he acquiesced with petitioners inventory.
Obviously, respondents purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what
properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to
secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties
comprising the bulk of Miguelitas estate. The intestate court went along with respondent on this point
as evident in its Resolution.
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate court
was actually to determine the propriety of oppositors (respondents) claim. According to the intestate
court, if it is true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelitas) properties, then it
means that she has a material and direct interest in the estate and, hence, she should be given her day
in court. The intended day in court or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondents
contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of Miguelitas estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondents ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for the purpose
of resolving her blanket claim against Miguelitas estate. Although, she made it appear that her only
intent was to determine the accuracy of petitioners inventory, however, a close review of the facts and
the pleadings reveals her real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course
should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction,
sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of
property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to
be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that
of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or
probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions,
which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.
[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator,
and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The
intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over
properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.
Claims against an estate of a partner

Prime Link Properties v. Magat, June 27, 2006, G.R. No. 167379.
Facts
Primelink Properties and the Lazatin siblings entered into a joint venture agreement whereby the
Lazatins shall contribute a huge parcel of land and Primelink shall develop the same into a
subdivision. For 4 years however, Primelink failed to develop the said land. The Lazatins filed a
complaint to rescind the joint venture agreement with prayer for preliminary injunction. In said case,
Primelink was declared in default or failing to file an answer and for asking multiple motions for
extension.
The trial court eventually ruled in favor of the Lazatins and it ordered Primelink to return the
possession of said land to the Lazatins as well as some improvements which Primelink had so far over
the property without the Lazatins paying for said improvements.
This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Primelink is now assailing the order; that turning
over improvements to the Lazatins without reimbursement is unjust; that the Lazatins did not ask the
properties to be placed under their possession but they merely asked for rescission. Citing the ruling
of this Court in Aurbach v. Sanitary Wares Manufacturing Corporation, the appellate court ruled that,
under Philippine law, a joint venture is a form of partnership and is to be governed by the laws of
partnership.
Issue
Whether or not Primelink can demand reimbursement for the improvements it made.
Held
No.
On the second issue, we agree with the CA ruling that petitioner Primelink and respondents entered
into a joint venture as evidenced by their JVA which, under the Courts ruling in Aurbach, is a form
of partnership, and as such is to be governed by the laws on partnership.
When the RTC rescinded the JVA on complaint of respondents based on the evidence on record that
petitioners willfully and persistently committed a breach of the JVA, the court thereby
dissolved/cancelled the partnership. With the rescission of the JVA on account of petitioners
fraudulent acts, all authority of any partner to act for the partnership is terminated except so far as
may be necessary to wind up the partnership affairs or to complete transactions begun but not yet
finished. On dissolution, the partnership is not terminated but continues until the winding up of
partnership affairs is completed. Winding up means the administration of the assets of the partnership
for the purpose of terminating the business and discharging the obligations of the partnership.
The transfer of the possession of the parcels of land and the improvements thereon to respondents was
only for a specific purpose: the winding up of partnership affairs, and the partition and distribution of
the net partnership assets as provided by law. After all, Article 1836 of the New Civil Code provides
that unless otherwise agreed by the parties in their JVA, respondents have the right to wind up the
partnership affairs.
It must be stressed, too, that although respondents acquired possession of the lands and the
improvements thereon, the said lands and improvements remained partnership property, subject to the
rights and obligations of the parties, inter se, of the creditors and of third parties under Articles 1837
and 1838 of the New Civil Code, and subject to the outcome of the settlement of the accounts
between the parties as provided in Article 1839 of the New Civil Code, absent any agreement of the
parties in their JVA to the contrary. Until the partnership accounts are determined, it cannot be
ascertained how much any of the parties is entitled to, if at all.
It was thus premature for petitioner Primelink to be demanding that it be indemnified for the value of
the improvements on the parcels of land owned by the joint venture/partnership. Notably, the JVA of
the parties does not contain any provision designating any party to wind up the affairs of the
partnership.
Claims for lease rentals after the death

Chan v. Court of Appeals, February 27, 2004, G.R. No.147999
Facts
Private respondent Oscar Medalla filed a complaint before the RTC of Mandaluyong City, for
collection of a sum of money arising from breach of a contract of lease and damages, against
petitioners Sui Man Hui Chan and Gonzalo Co.
The complaint alleged that Napoleon C. Medalla as lessor and Ramon Chan as lessee entered into a
Lease Contract over a hotel building. Chan would use the leased premises as a restaurant named
Cypress Inn. Petitioner Gonzalo Co was employed by Ramon Chan as the general manager of Cypress
Inn and acted as his agent in all his dealings with Napoleon Medalla. Ramon Chan died. He was
survived by his wife, petitioner Sui Man Hui Chan, who continued to operate the restaurant.
Napoleon Medalla died. Among his heirs is private respondent Oscar Medalla, who succeeded him as
owner and lessor of the leased premises. The contract was neither amended nor terminated after the
death of the original parties but was continued by their respective successors-in-interest pursuant to
the terms thereof. Petitioners Chan and Co, the latter, in his capacity as agent and general manager,
continued to deal with private respondent Medalla in all transactions pertaining to the contract.
On various occasions, petitioners failed to pay the monthly rentals due on the leased
premises. Medalla then sent demand letters to petitioners, but the latter still failed to pay the unpaid
rentals. Petitioners vacated the premises but without paying their unpaid rentals and realty
taxes. Aggrieved by petitioners refusal to pay the amounts owing, private respondent Medalla
instituted Civil Case.
Issue
Whether or not the claim for unpaid rentals should be made before the estate of Ramon Chan.
Held
No.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTCs Orders because they are not
the real parties-in-interest and hence, were improperly impleaded in the complaint as defendants.
Petitioners insist that they were neither parties nor were they privy to the Contract of Lease between
the late Ramon Chan and Napoleon Medalla. They vigorously assert that any claim for unpaid rentals
should be made against the estate of Ramon Chan pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
We find for private respondent.
We find no merit to petitioners contention that they are not real parties-in-interest since they are not
parties nor signatories to the contract and hence should not have been impleaded as defendants. It is
undeniable that petitioner Chan is an heir of Ramon Chan and, together with petitioner Co, was a
successor-in-interest to the restaurant business of the late Ramon Chan. Both continued to operate the
business after the death of Ramon. Thus, they are real parties-in-interest in the case filed by private
respondent, notwithstanding that they are not signatories to the Contract of Lease.
A lease contract is not essentially personal in character. Thus, the rights and obligations therein are
transmissible to the heirs. The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into
by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not
transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. In the subject Contract of
Lease, not only were there no stipulations prohibiting any transmission of rights, but its very terms
and conditions explicitly provided for the transmission of the rights of the lessor and of the lessee to
their respective heirs and successors. The contract is the law between the parties. The death of a party
does not excuse nonperformance of a contract, which involves a property right, and the rights and
obligations thereunder pass to the successors or representatives of the deceased. Similarly,
nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest
in the subject matter of the contract.
Finally, as to petitioners contention that any claim should have been filed before the estate proceeding
of Ramon Chan pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 86, the trial court found that the unpaid rentals sought
to be claimed were for the period April 1993 to December 1998. Note that Ramon Chan, the original
lessee, died on August 5, 1989. In other words, as the unpaid rentals did not accrue during the lifetime
of Ramon Chan, but well after his death, his estate might not be held liable for them. Hence, there is
no indubitable basis to apply Section 5, Rule 86, of the Revised Rules of Court as petitioners urge
respondents to do.
Sale of Real Property should have the consent of the

probate court.
Lee v. RTC Quezon City Branch 85, February 23, 2004, G.R. No. 146006.
Facts
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on
1956. At the time of the companys incorporation, Dr. Ortaez owned ninety percent (90%) of the
subscribed capital stock.
Dr. Ortaez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortaez), three legitimate children (Rafael,
Jose and Antonio Ortaez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private
respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all
surnamed Ortaez).
Special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez submitted an inventory of the estate of their father.
The legal family entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez,
partitioning the estate among themselves. This was the basis of the number of shares separately sold
by them.
Intestate court: Under the Godoy case, supra, it was held in substance that a sale of a property of the
estate without an Order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. Since the sales
in question were entered into by Juliana S. Ortaez and Jose S. Ortaez in their personal capacity
without prior approval of the Court, the same is not binding upon the Estate.
The appellate court denied his petition, however, ruling that there was no legal justification
whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of the estate by Jose Ortaez, his brother Rafael Ortaez and
mother Juliana Ortaez during the pendency of the settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortaez, without the
requisite approval of the intestate court, when it was clear that there were other heirs to the estate who
stood to be prejudiced thereby. Consequently, the sale made by Jose Ortaez and his mother Juliana
Ortaez to FLAG of the shares of stock they invalidly appropriated for themselves, without approval of
the intestate court, was void.
Issue
Whether or not the sale of shares of stock is valid.
Held
No.
Our jurisprudence is clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or
prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized
disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a separate
action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
Juliana Ortaez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed Ortaez, invalidly entered
into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves,
despite their knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final
settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by
Juliana Ortaez and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortaez) was invalid, the subsequent sale
thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.
An heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In
the present case, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011
shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending
the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause
the other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case.
Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It is well-
settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedents estate.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the
property under administration, made by private respondent, the same having been effected without
authority from said court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the
sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for
as long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioners contention that
the probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power pertaining
to the said court.
The question now is: can the intestate or probate court execute its order nullifying the invalid sale?
We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to
the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or
fraudulent disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other words, enforcement is a
necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate courts power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent
transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property before final adjudication.
We are not dealing here with the issue of inclusion or exclusion of properties in the inventory of the
estate because there is no question that, from the very start, the Philinterlife shares of stock were
owned by the decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortaez. Rather, we are concerned here with the effect of the sale
made by the decedents heirs, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez, without the required approval of the
intestate court. This being so, the contention of petitioners that the determination of the intestate court
was merely provisional and should have been threshed out in a separate proceeding is incorrect.
Special Administrator
Castillo v. Gabriel, November 11, 2005, G.R. No. 162934.
Facts
Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo B. Almoradie, died leaving behind a sizable inheritance. A
little over a month after Crisantas death, her mother, Crisanta Santiago Vda. de Yanga, commenced
an intestate proceeding before the RTC. She alleged, among others, that to her knowledge, her
daughter died intestate leaving an estate being managed by her wastrel and incompetent son-in-law,
Lorenzo, and by two other equally incompetent persons. She prayed that letters of administration be
issued to her son, Mariano Yanga, Jr., also the brother of the deceased, and that she be awarded her
share of the estate of her daughter after due hearing.
However, the RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator. Meantime, the marriage between Crisanta
Yanga-Gabriel and Lorenzo Almoradie was declared void for being bigamous. The RTC then
removed Lorenzo as administrator and appointed Mariano, Jr. in his stead.
Belinda Castillo, claiming to be the only legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a motion for
intervention.
Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally adopted son of Crisanta Y. Gabriel, filed before the RTC a petition for
probate of an alleged will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. He alleged that he
discovered his mothers will in which he was instituted as the sole heir of the testatrix, and designated
as alternate executor for the named executor therein, Francisco S. Yanga, a brother of Crisanta, who
had predeceased the latter sometime.
Belinda Castillo died.
The two (2) special proceedings were consolidated. The probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel
as special administrator of his mothers estate.
The heirs of Belinda filed a Motion praying that they be substituted as party-litigants in lieu of their
late mother Belinda, who died.
Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, Dolores L. Gabriel, filed a "Manifestation and Motion" where she
informed the probate court of her husbands death and prayed that she be admitted as substitute in
place of her late husband, and be appointed as administratrix of the estate of Crisanta Gabriel as well.
The lower court appointed Dolores as special administratrix upon a bond of P200,000.00.
Issue
Whether or not respondent was properly appointed as special administrator.
Held
Yes.
In ruling against the petitioners and dismissing their petition, the CA ratiocinated as follows:
The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the discretion of the court. The order of preference
in the appointment of a regular administrator under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not apply to
the selection of a special administrator. In the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists
only until a regular administrator is appointed, the court determines who is entitled to the administration of the
estate of the decedent. On this point, We hold that the preference of private respondent Dolores Gabriel is with
sufficient reason.
While it is true, as petitioners submit, that private respondent is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir
of Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and is considered a third person to the estate of Crisanta, nonetheless,
private respondent is undeniably entitled to the administration of the said estate because she is an heir
of her husband Roberto, whose estate is the former estate of his adopting mother Crisanta.
The ruling of the CA is correct. The Court has repeatedly held that the appointment of a special
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the probate court. A special administrator is a
representative of a decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an
executor or general administrator is appointed.
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to include any cause
or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the
will is being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the
proceeding on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree
among themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot be immediately
granted, a special administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve the property of the deceased.
Escheat
Republic v. Court of Appeals, January 31, 2002, G.R. No. 143483.
Doctrine
Incidentally, the question may be asked: Does herein private respondent, not being an heir but
allegedly a donee, have the personality to be a claimant within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of the
Revised Rules of Court?
In a special proceeding for escheat the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any
person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an
interested party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat.
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27 June
1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when private respondent
decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment before
the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her right over the escheated
properties militates against recovery.
A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive

against all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who are not parties or
privies thereto.
In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent during the time that the
escheat proceedings were being conducted and the lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction to
escheat them in favor of Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been previously
donated. We recall that a motion for intervention was earlier denied by the escheat court for failure to
show "valid claim or right to the properties in question." Where a person comes into an escheat
proceeding as a claimant, the burden is on such intervenor to establish his title to the property and his
right to intervene. A fortiori, the certificates of title covering the subject properties were in the name
of the decedent indicating that no transfer of ownership involving the disputed properties was ever
made by the deceased during her lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear and convincing proof
showing that the subject lands had been conveyed by Hankins to private respondent Solano, the same
still remained, at least before the escheat, part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court was
right not to assume otherwise. The Court of Appeals therefore cannot perfunctorily presuppose that
the subject properties were no longer part of the decedent's estate at the time the lower court handed
down its decision on the strength of a belated allegation that the same had previously been disposed of
by the owner. It is settled that courts decide only after a close scrutiny of every piece of evidence and
analyze each case with deliberate precision and unadulterated thoroughness, the judgment not being
diluted by speculations, conjectures and unsubstantiated assertions.
Guardianship and custody of children;

Vancil v. Belmes, June 19, 2001
Doctrine
The basic issue for our resolution is who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent
should be his guardian.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural mother of the
minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian.
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal
right to his custody.
Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of
death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive and has
exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right
to be the minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered
convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner
merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her
(respondents) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no
longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify as
a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident of
Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a
guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by
an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not
also qualify as a guardian.
Moreover, we observe that respondents allegation that petitioner has not set foot in the Philippines
since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides, petitioners old age and her conviction of libel
by the Regional Trial Cour filed by one Danilo R. Deen, will give her a second thought of staying
here. Indeed, her coming back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only
two years is not certain.
Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not
within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.
Guardianship court is a court of limited jurisdiction

Payment of Widow's Allowance
Sy Bang v. Sy, October 13, 2009, G.R. No. 114217
Doctrine
It has been 13 years since this Court ordered petitioners to pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy her monthly widows
allowance. Petitioners have since fought tooth and nail against paying the said allowance, grudgingly
complying only upon threat of incarceration. Then, they again argued against the grant of widows
allowance after the DOJ issued its Resolution finding probable cause in the falsification charges
against respondents. They contended that the criminal cases for falsification proved that Rosita is a
mere common-law wife and not a widow and, therefore, not entitled to widows allowance.
This argument deserves scant consideration.
A finding of probable cause does not conclusively prove the charge of falsification against
respondents.
Hence, until the marriage is finally declared void by the court, the same is presumed valid and Rosita
is entitled to receive her widows allowance to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang.
We remind petitioners again that they are duty-bound to comply with whatever the courts, in relation
to the properties under litigation, may order.
Motion to Include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise
Liable for the Payment of Widows Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang
Petitioners filed a Motion to include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy
as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widows Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang.
The Motion is denied.
The widows allowance, as discussed above, is chargeable to Sy Bangs estate. It must be stressed that
the issue of whether the properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique Sy
form part of Sy Bangs estate remains unsettled since this Petition questioning the trial courts Third
Partial Decision has been pending. On the other hand, there has been a categorical pronouncement
that petitioners are holding properties belonging to Sy Bangs estate.
That the full extent of Sy Bangs estate has not yet been determined is no excuse from complying with
this Courts order. Properties of the estate have been identified i.e., those in the names of petitioners
thus, these properties should be made to answer for the widows allowance of Rosita. In any case, the
amount Rosita receives for support, which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to her, will be
deducted from her share of the estate.
Petition for appointment of a guardian is a special

proceeding, without the usual
parties
Almayri v. Pabale, April 30, 2008, G.R.No. 151243
Doctrine
Whether or not the declaration of incompetency constitutes res judicata
There was no identity of parties and issues between the special proceeding on the guardianship of
Nave and the civil case. The decision on the former on her incompetency should not therefore bar by
conclusiveness of judgement the finding in the latter case (civil case) that Nave was competent and
had capacity when she entered into the contract of sale over the subject lot in favor of the Pabale
siblings.
No identity of parties
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo for the appointment
of a guardian over the person and estate of his late wife Nave alleging her incompetence.
A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the usual parties, i.e.,
petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case. Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears
the title: In re: Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo,
petitioner, with no named respondent/s.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the petition contain the names,
ages, and residences of relatives of the supposed minor or incompetent and those having him in their
care, so that those residing within the same province as the minor or incompetent can be notified of
the time and place of the hearing on the petition.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian under Rule 93 of the Rules
of Court is to determine, first, whether a person is indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no
capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified to be appointed
as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people who best could help the trial court settle
such issues would be those who are closest to and most familiar with the supposed minor or
incompetent, namely, his relatives living within the same province and/or the persons caring for him.
It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the minor or incompetent be
likewise identified and notified. The reason is simple: because their presence is not essential to the
proceedings for appointment of a guardian. It is almost a given, and understandably so, that they will
only insist that the supposed minor or incompetent is actually capacitated to enter into contracts, so as
to preserve the validity of said contracts and keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to
comply therewith.
Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and actually took part in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Naves relatives, nor are they the ones caring for her. Although
the rules allow the RTC to direct the giving of other general or special notices of the hearings on the
petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not established that the RTC actually did so in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C.
JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURT

INCLUDES QUESTIONS AS TO
ADVANCEMENT MADE OR ALLEGED TO
HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE DECEASED TO
ANY HEIRS,
Natcher v. Court of Appeals, October 2, 2001, G.R. No. 133000.
Doctrine
Under Sec 2, Rule 90 of Rules of Court, QUESTIONS AS TO ADVANCEMENT MADE OR
ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE DECEASED TO ANY HEIR MAY BE HEARD
AND DETERMINED BY THE COURT HAVING JURISDICTION OF THE ESTATE
PROCEEDINGS.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word MAY it is nevertheless clear that it contemplates a
probate court when it speaks of the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings.
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a
special proceeding.
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement
of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to
have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir.
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor
of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under
the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate
court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del
Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
ADOPTION; Lahom v. Sibulo, June 14, 2003, G.R. No. 143989. While R.A. No. 8552
Doctrine
May a person who adopted a child rescind the decree of adoption?
Diosdado and Isabelitas marriage was not blessed with a child, hence, they took care of Isabelitas
nephew, Jose Melvin, to bring up as their own child. Finally, they decided to adopt Jose Melvin. The
Civil Registrar of Naga changed the surname of Jose Melvin from Sibulo to Lahom in keeping
with the court order granting the adoption.
Many years later, Isabelita, now a widow, filed an action to rescind the adoption of Jose Melvin, on
the following grounds:
1. Jose refused to change his surname, and her husband while still living, out of frustration, has
already decided to rescind the adoption but was only prevailed upon by her;
2. In all his professional dealings and records, Jose Melvin still uses the name Sibulo instead
of Lahom;
3. Jose Melvin only visits her once a year, when she is alone in the city and only lives with her
household helps;
4. He is indifferent, callous, and jealous of the other nephews and nieces of the petitioner.
Jose Melvin filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that under the new laws on adoption, Republic
Act 8552, the adopter cannot rescind anymore the decree of adoption.
The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action.
The Supreme Court, in denying the appeal filed by Isabelita, ruled that:
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke
the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law had already abrogated and repealed the
right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission
of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force,
no longer could be pursued.
SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the
Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the
adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical
and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the
adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However,
the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind
the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it
remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the
hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an
adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the
forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the
grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and
testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
Reception of Evidence in Adoption Cases.

Munsayac v. Reyes. A.M.-RTJ No. 05-
1925, June 26, 2006.
16. In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Ann Astorga, 148311, March 31, 2005.
17. HABEAS CORPUS, Martinez v. Mendoza, August 17, 2006, G.R. 153795.
18. Thornton v. Thornton, August 16, 2004, G.R. No. 154598.SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS; HABEAS CORPUS; CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS AND SUPREME COURT WITH THE FAMILY COURTS IN
HABEAS CORPUS CASES WHERE CUSTODY OF MINORS IS CONCERNED.
19. Veluz v. Villanueva, January 29, 2008, G.R. No. 169482.
20. Camara v. Pagayatan, April 2, 2007, G.R. No. 176563.
21. CHANGE OF NAME; Republic v. Bolante, June 20, 2006, G.R. No. 160597.
22. DECLARATION OF ABSENCE AND DEATH; Manuel v. People, November
29, 2005, G.R. No. 165842.
23. Change of Name, Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, March 30, 2005, G.R. No.
159966.
24. Republic v. Cagandahan, September 12, 2008, G.R. No. 166676
25. Rommel Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174689. October 19,
2007.
26. Parties to cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, Ceruila v.
Delantar, December 9, 2005, G.R. No. 140305.
27. Uy v. Jose Chua, September 18, 2009, G.R. No. 183965, Compromise on Filiation
28. Ramon Ching v. Cheng, November 28, 2011, G.R. 192828
29. Spouses Lebin v. Vilma Mirasol, September 7, 2011, G.R. 164255, Appeal in
Special Proceedings

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1 Remedial Law Review for Atty.

Tranquil by Jason Arteche

Benjamin Bautista v. Shirley Unangast, G.R. No. 173002, July 4, 20084

Chua v. Executive Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, 20135

We answer in the affirmative. We grant the petition.

We see nothing wrong or illegal in granting petitioners request.

IN RE: EXEMPTION OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION FROM PAYMENT

Section 22 of Rule 141 reads:

Thus, NPC is not exempt from payment of filing fees.

Unicapital v. Consing, 20136

In fine, the docket fees paid by respondent were insufficient.

xxx xxx xxx

Pua v. Citibank, G.R. 180064, September 16, 201312

Far East Bank v. Shemberg, G.R. No.163878, December 12, 2006

Sabitsana v. Muertegi, 201313

Ederlinda Gallardo leased two (2) parcels of land to Eulogia Manila.

The MeTC ruled in favor of respondents.

We agree with the petitioners.

EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, PETITIONER, V. BRITISH AIRWAYS, G.R. No. 171092,

1. The court where the carrier is domiciled;

Heirs of Santiago Nisperos v. Nisperos-Ducusin, 2013

The DARAB ruled against petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the CA.

It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government

Hierarchy of Courts; Direct Resort To The Supreme Court Justified

Smart Communications v. Aldecoa, 2013

There is no showing that respondents availed themselves of the afore-mentioned administrative

Cause of Action (Rule 2)

We concur with the CA.

Chua v. Metrobank, et al, G. R. No.182311, August 19, 2009

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways:

NM Rothschild & Sons (AUSTRALIA) Limited, v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company,

The trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss.

Issues more properly ventilated during the trial of the case

Pua v. Citibank, N.A., 2013 (SEC jurisdiction)

Joinder of cause of actions

1. Action for recovery of title and possession

Macawadib v. Philippine National Police Directorate

Constantino v. Heirs of Pedro Constantino

Petitioners argument is unmeritorious.

Is a derivative suit proper in this case?

The requisites for a derivative suit are as follows:

Eventually, the trial court rendered judgment for the Republic.

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:

It is worth mentioning that a Manifestation of Desistance, to which the previously mentioned

Napere v. Barbarona, G.R. No. 160426, January 31, 2008.17

The RTC rendered a Decision against the estate of Juan Napere.

Sumaljap v. Spouses Literato, G.R. No. 149787, June 18, 2008

Application of the Governing Rule.

Survival of the pending action

Duty of Counsel under the Rule.

The Heirs as Legal Representatives.

We likewise said in Gochan v. Young:

Heritage Park Management v. CIAC, G.R. No. 148133, October 8, 2008

Such contention is bereft of merit.

Civil Case No. Q-90-7012

Civil Case No. Q-90-7551

Decision of the Consolidated Cases

Appeal to the Court of Appeals

URC v. Albert Lim, G.R. NO. 154338, October 05, 2007

Fourth Issue: Private Respondents did not Waive Improper Venue

Subject Civil Cases are Personal Actions

This contention is not well-taken.

Interpretation of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3; and Sec. 2 of Rule 4