REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
LA ORDEN The government filed a written opposition to the motion to dismiss (Record
DE PP. BENEDICTINOS DE FILIPINAS, defendant-appellee.
Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Ledesma, Puno, Guytingco, Antonio & Associates for defendant-
appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. EMINENT DOMAIN; EXERCISE OF POWER BY THE STATE; POWER OF
COURTS TO INQUIRE INTO LEGALITY OF EXERCISE. Private property may
be expropriated for public use and upon payment of just compensation and
condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good
and there is genuine necessity therefor of a public character. Consequently,
the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the
right of eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a
genuine necessity therefor (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil.,
349; Manila Railroad Company vs. Hacienda Benito, Inc., 37 349; Manila
Railroad Company vs. Hacienda Benito, Inc., 37 Off. Gaz. 1957).
DECISION
DIZON, J p:
To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda street, the
Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga street from its junction with
Mendiola street, up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry
out this plan it offered to buy a portion of approximately 6,000 square
meters of a bigger parcel belonging to La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de
Filipinas, a domestic religious corporation that owns the San Beda College,
a private educational institution situated on Mendiola street. Not having
been able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the
Government instituted the present expropriation proceedings.
On May 27, 1957 the trial court, upon application of the Government
hereinafter referred to as appellant issued an order fixing the provisional
value of the property in question at P270,000.00 and authorizing appellant
to take immediate possession thereof upon depositing said amount. The
deposit having been made with the City Treasurer of Manila, the trial court
issued the corresponding order directing the Sheriff of Manila to place
appellant in possession of the property aforesaid.
On June 8, 1957, as directed by the Rules of Court, the herein appellee, in
lieu of an answer, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the
following grounds:
"I. That the property sought to be expropriated is already dedicated
to public use and therefore is not subject to expropriation.
"II. That there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation.
"III. That the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a
different site which would entail less expense to the Government and which
would not necessitate the expropriation of a property dedicated to
education.
"IV. That the present action filed by the plaintiff against the defendant
is discriminatory.
"V. That the herein plaintiff does not count-with sufficient funds
through its project of constructing the proposed Azcarraga Extension and to
allow the plaintiff to expropriate defendant's property at this time would be
only to needlessly deprive the latter of the use of its property."
on Appeal, pp. 30-37) while appellee filed a reply thereto (Id. pp. 38-48). On
July 29, 1957, without receiving evidence upon the questions of facts
arising from the complaint, the motion to dismiss and the opposition
thereto filed, the trial court issued the appealed order dismissing the case.
The appealed ordered shows that the trial court limited itself to deciding
the point of whether or not the expropriation of the property in question is
necessary (Rec. on Ap., p. 50) and, having arrived at the conclusion that
such expropriation was not of extreme necessity, dismissed the
proceedings.
It is to be observed that paragraph IV of the complaint expressly alleges
that appellant needs, among other properties, the portion of appellee's
property in question for the purpose of constructing the Azcarraga street
extension, and that paragraph VII of the same complaint expressly alleges
that, in accordance with Section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code,
the President of the Philippines had authorized the acquisition, thru
condemnation proceedings, of the aforesaid parcel of land belonging to
appellee, as evidenced by the third indorsement dated May 15, 1957 of the
Executive Secretary, Office of the President of the Philippines, a copy of
which was attached to the complaint as Annex "C" and made an integral
part thereof. In denial of these allegations appellee's motion to dismiss
alleged that "there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation". Thus
the question of fact decisive of the whole case arose.
It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated
for public use and upon payment of just compensation; that condemnation
of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a
genuine necessity therefor of a public character. Consequently, the courts
have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a genuine
necessity therefor (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil., 349;
Manila Railroad Company vs. Hacienda Benito, Inc., 37 O.G. 1957).
Upon the other hand, it does not need extended argument to show that
whether or not the proposed opening of the Azcarraga extension is a
necessity in order to relieve the daily congestion of traffic on Legarda St., is
a question of fact dependent not only upon the facts of which the trial court
very liberally took judicial notice but also upon other factors that do not
appear of record and must, therefore, be established by means of
evidence. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the parties should have
been given an opportunity to present their respective evidence upon these
factors and others that might be of direct or indirect help in determining
the vital question of fact involved, namely, the need to open the extension
of Azcarraga street to ease and solve the traffic congestion on Legarda
street.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is set aside and the present
case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance
with this decision. .
Without costs.
Bengzon, Acting C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera and Paredes, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 14355. October 31, 1919.]
THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY
OF MANILA ET AL., defendants-appellees.
City Fiscal Diaz for appellant.
Crossfield & O'Brien, Williams, Ferrier & Sycip, Delgado & Delgado,
Filemon Sotto, and Ramon Salinas for appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. EMINENT DOMAIN; EXPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, RIGHT
OF COURTS TO INQUIRE INTO NECESSITY OF. When a municipal
corporation attempts to expropriate private property and an objection is
made thereto by the owner, the courts have ample authority, in this
jurisdiction, to make inquiry, and to hear proof upon an-issue properly
presented, concerning the question whether or not the purpose of the
appropriation is, in fact, for some public use. The right of expropriation is
not inherent power in a municipal corporation and before it can exercise
the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. A municipal
corporation in this jurisdiction cannot expropriate public property. The land
to be expropriated must be private, and the purpose of the expropriation
must be public. If the court. upon trial, finds that neither of said condition
exists, or that either one of them fails, the right to expropriate does not
exist. If the property is taken in the ostensible behalf of a public
improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is being taken
for a use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call for protection
by the courts.
2. ID.; ID. Upon the other hand, the Legislature may directly
determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular
improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the
improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the
proposed improvement, the existence of the public necessity for its
construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the
location selected, and the consequent necessity of taking the lands
selected, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and
the courts have no power to interfere or to substitute their own views for
those of the representatives of the people.
3. ID.; ID. But when the law does not designate the property to be
taken, nor how much may be taken, then the necessity of taking private
property is a question for the courts.
4. ID.; ID. There is a wide distinction between a legislative
declaration that a municipality is given authority to exercise the right of
eminent domain and a decision by the municipality that there exists a
necessity for the exercise of that right in a particular case.
5. ID.; ID. Whether or not it was wise, advisable, or necessary to
confer upon a municipality the power to exercise the right of eminent
domain, is a question with which the courts are not concerned. But
whenever that right or authority is exercised for the purpose of depriving
citizens of their property, the courts are authorized, in this jurisdiction, to
make inquiry and to hear proof upon the necessity in a particular case, and
not the general authority.
6. ID.; ID. In the absence of some constitutional or statutory
provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the
right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial
in their character.
7. ID.; ID. The taking of private property for any use which is not
required by the necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of a state, is
an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain
8. ID.; ID. That government can scarcely be deemed free where
the rights of property are left solely dependent on the legislative body
without restraint. The fundamental maxims of free government seem to
require that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be
held sacred. At least no court of justice would be warranted in assuming
that the power to violate and disregard them lurks in any general grant of
legislative authority or ought to be implied from any general expression of
the people. The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights so vital
to their security and well-being without a very strong and direct expression
of such intention.
9. ID.; ID. The exercise of the right of eminent domain is
necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that
the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by
individuals with greater tenacity and none is guarded by the constitution
and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants.
When the legislature interferes with that right, the plain meaning of the law
should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
10. ID.; ID. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public
character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede, and not
follow, the taking of the property. The general power to exercise the right
of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a
particular case.
11. ID.; CEMETERIES, EXPROPRIATION OF. Where a cemetery is
open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken
for other public uses under a general authority.
12. ID.; ID. The city of Manila is not authorized to expropriate public
property.
Per MALCOLM, J., concurring:
13. EMINENT DOMAIN; POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. The Government of the Philippine Islands is
authorized by the Philippine Bill to acquire real estate for public use by the
exercise of the right of eminent domain.
14. ID.; ID.; CITY OF MANILA. The city of Manila is authorized by the
Philippine Legislature to condemn private property for public use.
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVATE PROPERTY; PUBLIC USE. The Legislature
has the power to authorize the taking of land already applied to one public
use and devote it to another.
16. ID.; ID.; ID., ID.; ID. When the power to take land already
applied to one public use and devote it to another is granted to municipal
or private corporations in express words, no question can arise.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Land already devoted to a public use cannot
be taken by the public for another use which is inconsistent with the first
without special authority from the Legislature or authority granted by
necessary and reasonable implication.
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Land applied to one use should not be taken
for another except in cases of necessity.
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CEMETERIES; CLASSES. Cemeteries are of
two classes: public and private.
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC CEMETERY. A public
cemetery is one used by the general community, or neighborhood, or
church .
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVATE CEMETERY. A private
cemetery is one used only by a family, or a small portion of a community.
22. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CHINESE CEMETERY, CITY OF MANILA.
The Chinese Cemetery in the city of Manila is a public cemetery.
23. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Cemeteries, while still devoted
to pious uses, are sacred, and it cannot be supposed that the Legislature
has intended that they should be violated in the absence of special
provisions on the subject authorizing such invasion.
24. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Held: That since the city of
Manila is only permitted to condemn private property for public use and
since the Chinese Cemetery in the city of Manila is a public cemetery
already devoted to a public use, the city of Manila cannot condemn a
portion of the cemetery for a public street.
DECISION
JOHNSON, J p:
The important question presented by this appeal is: In expropriation
proceedings by the city of Manila, may the courts inquire into, and hear
proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation?
That question arose in the following manner:
On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition
in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein
particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a
public improvement. The petitioner, in the second paragraph of the
petition, alleged:
"That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the
extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire
ownership in fee simple of certain parcels of land situated in the district of
Binondo of said city within Block 83 of said district, and within the
jurisdiction of this court."
The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of
Manila], answering the petition of the plaintiff, alleged that it was a
corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of
the Chinese Community of the City of Manila; that it was the owner of
parcels one and two of the land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
that it denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the said
parcels be expropriated for street purposes; that existing street and roads
furnished ample means of communication for the public in the district
covered by such proposed expropriation; that if the construction of the
street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were
available, which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less
expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a
Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had been
used by the defendant for cemetery purposes; that a great number of
Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said expropriation be carried
into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require
the expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the
bodies to some other place or site and in the purchase of such new sites,
would involve the destruction of existing monuments and the erection of
new monuments in their stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury
to the defendant and to all those persons owning and interested in the
graves and monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the plaintiff
was without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or
portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was
not necessary as a public improvement.
The defendant Ildefonso Tambunting, answering the petition, denied each
and every allegation of the complaint, and alleged that said expropriation
was not a public improvement; that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to
acquire the parcels of land in question; that a portion of the lands in
question was used as a cemetery in which were the graves of his ancestors;
that monuments and tomb-stones of great value were found thereon; that
the land had become quasi-public property of a benevolent association,
dedicated and used for the burial of the dead and that many dead were
buried there; that if the plaintiff deemed it necessary to extend Rizal
Avenue, he had offered and still offers to grant a right of way for the said
extension over other land, without cost to the plaintiff, in order that the
sepulchers, chapels and graves of his ancestors may not be disturbed; that
the land so ordered, free of charge, would answer every public necessity on
the part of the plaintiff.
The defendant Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her husband, Jose Maria
Delgado, and each of the other defendants, answering separately,
presented substantially the same defense as that presented by the
Comunidad de Chinos de Manila and Ildefonso Tambunting above referred
to.
The foregoing parts of the defense presented by the defendants have been
inserted in order to show the general character of the defenses presented
by each of the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the expropriation was
necessary. The defendants each alleged (a) that no necessity existed for
said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which
had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchers
and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street
for public purposes.
Upon the issue thus presented by the petition and the various answers, the
Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, in a very elucidated opinion, with
very clear and explicit reasons, supported by abundance of authorities,
decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular-
strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from
all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs.
From that judgment the plaintiff appealed and presented the above
question as its principal ground of appeal.
The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact, under the
law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it
may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to
ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the
owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the
expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that
the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation
proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method
adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its
value.
That the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands for public
purposes, is not denied. Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of
Manila) provides that "the city (Manila) . . . may condemn private property
for public use."
The Charter of the city of Manila contains no procedure by which the said
authority may be carried into effect. We are driven, therefore, to the
procedure marked out by Act No. 190 to ascertain how the said authority
may be exercised. From an examination of Act No. 190, in its section 241,
we find how the right of eminent domain may be exercised. Said section
241 provides that, "The Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any
province or department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or
public or private corporation having, by law, the right to condemn private
property for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner hereinafter
prescribed."
Section 242 provides that a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be
presented; that the complaint shall state with certainty the right of
condemnation, with a description of the property sought to be condemned
together with the interest of each defendant separately
Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon trial that the right to
expropriate the land in question exists, it shall then appoint commissioners.
Sections 244, 245 and 246 provide the method of procedure and duty of
the commissioners. Section 248 provides for an appeal from the judgment
of the Court of First Instance to the Supreme Court. Said section 248 gives
the Supreme Court authority to inquire into the right of expropriation on the
part of the plaintiff. If the Supreme Court on appeal shall determine that no
right of expropriation existed, it shall remand the cause to the Court of First
Instance with a mandate that the defendant be replaced in the possession
of the property and that he recover whatever damages he may have
sustained by reason of the possession of the plaintiff.
It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the phrase in said section,
"and if the court shall find that the right to expropriate exists," means
simply that, if the court finds that there is some law authorizing the plaintiff
to expropriate, then the courts have no other function than to authorize the
expropriation and to proceed to ascertain the value of the land involved;
that the necessity for the expropriation is a legislative and not a judicial
question.
Upon the question whether expropriation is a legislative function
exclusively, and that the courts cannot intervene except for the purpose of
determining the value of the land in question, there is much legal literature.
Much has been written upon both sides of that question. A careful
examination of the discussions pro and con will disclose the fact that the
decisions depend largely upon particular constitutional or statutory
provisions. It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper authority
should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for
some specified public purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction
to inquire into the purpose of that legislation.
If, upon the other hand, however, the Legislature should grant general
authority to a municipal corporation to expropriate private land for public
purposes, we think the courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction,
under the provisions above quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon
an issue properly presented, concerning whether or not the lands were
private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public. In other words, have
not the courts in this jurisdiction the right, inasmuch as the questions
relating to expropriation must be referred to them (sec. 241, Act No. 190)
for final decision, to ask whether or not the law has been complied with ?
Suppose, in a particular case, it should be denied that the property is not
private property but public, may not the courts hear proof upon that
question? Or, suppose the defense is, that the purpose of the expropriation
is not public but private, or that there exists no public purpose at all, may
not the courts make inquiry and hear proof upon that question?
The city of Manila is given authority to expropriate private lands for public
purposes. Can it be possible that said authority confers the right to
determine for itself that the land is private and that the purpose is public,
and that the people of the city of Manila who pay the taxes for its support,
especially those who are directly affected, may not question one or the
other, or both, of these questions? Can it be successfully contended that
the phrase used in Act No. 190, "and if the court upon trial shall find that
such right exists," means simply that the court shall examine the statutes
simply for the purpose of ascertaining whether a law exists authorizing the
petitioner to exercise the right of eminent domain ? Or, when the case
arrives in the Supreme Court, can it be possible that the phrase, "if the
Supreme Court shall determine that no right of expropriation exists," that
that simply means that the Supreme Court shall also examine the
enactments of the legislature for the purpose of determining whether or not
a law exists permitting the plaintiff to expropriate?
We are of the opinion that the power of the court is not limited to that
question. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist
conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the
question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or
authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case
there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City
of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be
public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists
or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the
right is being exercised in accordance with law
Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is
public, is a question of fact. Whether the land is public or private is also a
question of fact; and, in our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon
the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether
the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the
courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions. Is it
possible that the owner of valuable land in this jurisdiction is compelled to
stand mute while his land is being expropriated for a use not public, with
the right simply to beg the city of Manila to pay him the value of his land?
Does the law in this jurisdiction permit municipalities to expropriate lands,
without question, simply for the purpose of satisfying the aesthetic sense of
those who happen for the time being to be in authority ? Expropriation of
lands usually calls for public expense. The taxpayers are called upon to pay
the costs. Cannot the owners of land question the public use or the public
necessity?
As was said above, there is a wide divergence of opinion upon the authority
of the court to question the necessity or advisability of the exercise of the
right of eminent domain. The divergence is usually found to depend upon
particular statutory or constitutional provisions.
It has been contended and many cases are cited in support of that
contention, and section 158 of volume 10 of Ruling Case Law is cited as
conclusive that the necessity for taking property under the right of
eminent domain is not a judicial question. But those who cited said section
evidently overlooked the section immediately following (sec. 159), which
adds: "But it is obvious that if the property is taken in the ostensible behalf
of a public improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is
being taken for a use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call
for protection by the courts. While many courts have used sweeping
expression in the decisions in which they have disclaimed the power of
supervising the selection of the sites of public improvements, it may be
safely said that the courts of the various states would feel bound to
interfere to prevent an abuse of the discretion delegated by the legislature,
by an attempted appropriation of land in utter disregard of the possible
necessity of its use, or when the alleged purpose was a cloak to some
sinister scheme." Norwich City vs. Johnson, 86 Conn., 151; Bell vs. Mattoon
Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 Ill., 544; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo Ry.
etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368; State vs. Stewart, 74 Wis., 620.)
Said section 158 (10 R. C. L., 183) which is cited as conclusive authority in
support of the contention of the appellant, says:
"The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private
property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the
exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that the
utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for
its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the
location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected
for its site, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine and
the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views for
those of the representatives of the people."
Practically every case cited in support of the above doctrine has been
examined, and we are justified in making the statement that in each case
the legislature directly determined the necessity for the exercise of the
right of eminent domain in the particular case. It is not denied that if the
necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is presented to
the legislative department of the government and that department decides
that there exists a necessity for the exercise of the right in a particular
case, that then and in that case, the courts will not go behind the action of
the legislature and make inquiry concerning the necessity. But in the case
of Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry., etc. Co. (72 Ohio St., 368 [106
Am. St. Rep., 622, 628] ), which is cited in support of the doctrine laid down
in section 158 above quoted, the court said:
"But when the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how
much may be taken, then the necessity of taking particular property is a
question for the courts Where the application to condemn or appropriate is
made directly to the court, the question (of necessity) should be raised and
decided in limine."
The legislative department of the government very rarely undertakes to
designate the precise property which should be taken for public use. It has
generally, like in the present case, merely conferred general authority to
take land for public use when a necessity exists therefor. We believe that it
can be confidently asserted that, under such statute, the allegation of the
necessity for the appropriation is an issuable allegation which it is
competent for the courts to decide. (Lynch vs. Forbes, 161 Mass., 302 [42
Am. St. Rep., 402, 407].)
There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a
municipality is given authority to exercise the right of eminent domain, and
a decision by the municipality that there exists a necessity for the exercise
of that right in a particular case. The first is a declaration simply that there
exist reasons why the right should be conferred upon municipal
corporation, while the second is the application of the right to a particular
case. Certainly, the legislative declaration relating to the advisability of
granting the power cannot be converted into a declaration that a necessity
exists for its exercise in a particular case, and especially so when, perhaps,
the land in question was not within the territorial jurisdiction of the
municipality at the time the legislative authority was granted.
Whether it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a municipality
the power to exercise the right of eminent domain, is a question with which
the courts are not concerned. But when that right or authority is exercised
for the purpose of depriving citizens of their property, the courts are
authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry and to hear proof upon the
necessity in the particular case, and not the general authority.
Volume 15 of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (Cyc.), page 629, is
cited as a further conclusive authority upon the question that the necessity
for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is a legislative and not a
judicial question. Cyclopedia, at the page stated, says:
"In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the
contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent
domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character.
The determination of those questions (the necessity and the expediency)
belongs to the sovereign power; the legislative department is final and
conclusive, and the courts have no power to review it (the necessity and
the expediency) . . . . It (the legislature) may designate the particular
property to be condemned, and its determination in this respect cannot be
reviewed by the courts."
The volume of Cyclopedia, above referred to, cites many cases in support
of the doctrine quoted. While time has not permitted an examination of all
of said citations, many of them have been examined, and it can be
confidently asserted that said cases which are cited in support of the
assertion that, "the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of
eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial," show
clearly and invariably that in each case the legislature itself usually, by a
special law, designated the particular case in which the right of eminent
domain might be exercised by the particular municipal corporation or entity
within the state. (Eastern R. Co. vs. Boston, etc., R. Co., 11 Mass., 125 [15
Am. Rep., 13]; Brooklyn Park Com'rs. vs. Armstrong, 45 N. Y., 234 [6 Am.
Rep., 70]; Hairston vs. Danville, etc. Ry. Co., 208 U. S. 598; Cincinnati vs.
Louisville, etc. Ry. Co., 223 U. S. 390; U. S. vs. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co., 229 U. S., 53; U. S. vs. Gettysburg, etc. Co., 160 U. S., 668;
Traction Co. vs. Mining Co., 196 U. S., 239; Sears vs. City of Akron, 246 U.
S., 351 [erroneously cited as 242 U. S.].)
In the case of Traction Co. vs. Mining Co. (196 U. S., 239), the Supreme
Court of the United States said: "It is erroneous to suppose that the
legislature is beyond the control of the courts in exercising the power of
eminent domain, either as to the nature of the use or the necessity to the
use of any particular property. For if the use be not public or no necessity
for the taking exists, the legislature cannot authorize the taking of private
property against the will of the owner, notwithstanding compensation may
be required."
In the case of School Board of Carolina vs. Saldaa (14 Porto Rico, 339,
356), we find the Supreme Court of Porto Rico, speaking through Justice
MacLeary, quoting approvingly the following, upon the question which we
are discussing: "It is well settled that although the legislature must
necessarily determine in the first instance whether the use for which they
(municipalities, etc.) attempt to exercise the power is a public one or not,
their (municipalities, etc.) determination is not final, but is subject to
correction by the courts, who may undoubtedly declare the statute
unconstitutional, if it shall clearly appear that the use for which it is
proposed to authorize the taking of private property is in reality not public
but private." Many cases are cited in support of that doctrine.
Later, in the same decision, we find the Supreme Court of Porto Rico says:
"At any rate, the rule is quite well settled that in the cases under
consideration the determination of the necessity of taking a particular piece
or a certain amount of land rests ultimately with the courts." (Spring Valley
etc. Co. vs. San Mateo, etc. Co., 64 Cal., 123.) In the case of Board of Water
Com'rs., etc. vs. Johnson (86 Conn., 571 [41 L. R. A., N. S., 1024] ), the
Supreme Court of Connecticut approvingly quoted the following doctrine
from Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.), section 599: "In all such cases the
necessity of public utility of the proposed work or improvement is a judicial
question. In all such cases, where the authority is to take property
necessary for the purpose, the necessity of taking particular property for a
particular purpose is a judicial one, upon which the owner is entitled to be
heard." Riley vs. Charleston, etc. Co., 71 S. C., 457, 489 [110 Am. St. Rep.,
579]; Henderson vs. Lexington 132 Ky., 390, 403.)
The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the
necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of the state, is an
unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain, and beyond the
power of the legislature to delegate. (Bennett vs. Marion, 106 Iowa, 628,
633; Wilson vs. Pittsburg, etc. Co., 222 Pa. St., 541, 545; Greasy, etc. Co.
vs. Ely, etc. Co., 132 Ky., 692, 697.)
In the case of New Central Coal Co. vs. George's, etc. Co. (37 Md., 537,
564), the Supreme Court of the State of Maryland, discussing the question
before us, said: "To justify the exercise of this extreme power ,(eminent
domain) where the legislature has left it to depend upon the necessity that
may be found to exist, in order to accomplish the purposes of the
incorporation, as in this case, the party claiming the right to the exercise of
the power should be required to show at least a reasonable degree of
necessity for its exercise. Any rule less strict than this, with the large and
almost indiscriminate delegation of the right to corporations, would likely
lead to oppression and the sacrifice of private right to corporate power."
In the case of Dewey vs. Chicago, etc. Co. (184 Ill., 426, 433), the court
said: "Its right to condemn property is not a general power of
condemnation, but is limited to cases where a necessity for resort to
private property is shown to exist. Such necessity must appear upon the
face of the petition to condemn. If the necessity is denied the burden is
upon the company (municipality) to establish it." (Highland, etc. Co. vs.
Strickley, 116 Fed., 852, 856; Kiney vs. Citizens' Water & Light Co., 173
Ind., 252, 257; Bell vs Mattoon Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 Ill., 544 [137 Am
St. Rep., 388].)
It is true that many decisions may be found asserting that what is a public
use is a legislative question, and many other decisions declaring with equal
emphasis that it is a judicial question. But, as long as there is a
constitutional or statutory provision denying the right to take land for any
use other than a public use, it occurs to us that the question whether any
particular use is a public one or not is ultimately, at least, a judicial
question. The legislature may, it is true, in effect declare certain uses to be
public, and, under the operation of the well-known rule that a statute will
not be declared to be unconstitutional except in a case free, or
comparatively free, from doubt, the courts will certainly sustain the action
of the legislature, unless it appears that the particular use is clearly not of a
public nature. The decisions must be understood with this limitation; for,
certainly, no court of last resort will be willing to declare that any and every
purpose which the legislature might happen to designate as a public use
shall be conclusively held to be so, irrespective of the purpose in question
and of its manifestly private character. Blackstone in his Commentaries on
the English Law remarks that, so great is the regard of the law for private
property that it will not authorize the least violation of it, even for the public
good, unless there exists a very great necessity therefor.
In the case of Wilkinson vs. Leland (2 Fet. [U. S.], 657), the Supreme Court
of the United States said: "That government can scarcely be deemed free
where the rights of property are left solely dependent on the legislative
body, without restraint. The fundamental maxims of free government seem
to require that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be
held sacred. At least no court of justice in this country would be warranted
in assuming that the power to violate and disregard them a power so
repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil liberty lurked in
any general grant of legislative authority, or ought to be implied from any
general expression of the people. The people ought not to be presumed to
part with rights so vital to their security and well-being without very strong
and direct expression of such intention." (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec.
603; Lecoul vs. Police Jury, 20 La. Ann., 308; Jefferson vs. Jazem, 7 La. Ann.,
182.)
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the English Law, said that the right to
own and possess land a place to live separate and apart from others
to retain it as a home for the family in a way not to be molested by others
is one of the most sacred rights that men are heirs to. That right has
been written into the organic law of every civilized nation. The Acts of
Congress of July 1, 1902, and of August 29, 1916, which provide that "no
law shall be enacted in the Philippine Islands which shall deprive any
person of his property without due process of law," are but a restatement
of the time-honored protection of the absolute right of the individual to his
property. Neither did said Acts of Congress add anything to the law already
existing in the Philippine Islands. The Spaniard fully recognized the
principle and adequately protected the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
against the encroachment upon the private property of the individual.
Article 349 of the Civil Code provides that: "No one may be deprived of his
property unless it be by competent authority, for some purpose of proven
public utility, and after payment of the proper compensation. Unless this
requisite (proven public utility and payment) has been complied with, it
shall be the duty of the courts to protect the owner of such property in its
possession or to restore its possession to him, as the case may be."
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State,
or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights,
and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No
species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is
guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the
freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and,
for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without
his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtly
interpretation. (Bensley vs. Mountain lake Water Co., 13 Cal., 306 and
cases cited [73 Am. Dec., 576].)
The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent
is one of the most delicate exercise of governmental authority. It is to be
watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the
government, the inviolable sanctity which all free constitutions attach to
the right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict observance of the
substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of the
exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse. Not only must the
authority of municipal corporations to take property be expressly conferred
and the use for which it is taken specified, but the power, with all
constitutional limitation and directions for its exercise, must be strictly
pursued. (Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th Ed.], sec. 1040, and cases
cited; Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil., 411.)
It can scarcely be contended that a municipality would be permitted to take
property for some public use unless some public necessity existed therefor.
The right to take private property for public use originates in the necessity,
and the taking must be limited by such necessity. The appellant contends
that inasmuch as the legislature has given it general authority to take
private property for public use, that the legislature has, therefore, settled
the question of the necessity in every case and that the courts are closed
to the owners of the property upon that question. Can it be imagined, when
the legislature adopted section 2429 of Act No. 2711, that it thereby
declared that it was necessary to appropriate the property of Juan de la
Cruz, whose property, perhaps, was not within the city limits at the time
the law was adopted ? The legislature, then, not having declared the
necessity, can it be contemplated that it intended that a municipality
should be the sole judge of the necessity in every case, and that the courts,
in the face of the provision that "if upon trial they shall find that a right
exists," cannot in that trial inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity
for the appropriation in a particular case ?
The Charter of the city of Manila authorizes the taking of private property
for public use. Suppose the owner of the property denies and successfully
proves that the taking of his property serves no public use: Would the
courts not be justified in inquiring into that question and in finally denying
the petition if no public purpose was proved ? Can it be denied that the
courts have a right to inquire into that question? If the courts can ask
questions and decide, upon an issue properly presented, whether the use is
public or not, is not that tantamount to permitting the courts to inquire into
the necessity of the appropriation? If there is no public use, then there is no
necessity, and if there is no necessity, it is difficult to understand how a
public use can necessarily exist. If the courts can inquire into the question
whether a public use exists or not, then it seems that it must follow that
they can examine into the question of the necessity.
The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine
necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow,
the taking of the land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind.,
611; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry.
etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be
confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the
legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within
the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot
be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or
entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular
instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to
exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions
accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority
upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is
admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the
municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case
under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which
the courts have the right to inquire into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for
the exercise of the right of eminent domain is purely legislative and not
judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the legislature in
authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the
question of the right to exercise it in a particular case. (Creston Waterworks
Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the
exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the
case and for the purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St.
Paul. 48 Minn.. 540.)
And, moreover, the record does not show conclusively that the plaintiff has
definitely decided that their exists a necessity for the appropriation of the
particular land described in the complaint. Exhibits 4, 5, 7, and E clearly
indicate that the municipal board believed at one time that other land
might be used for the proposed improvement, thereby avoiding the
necessity of disturbing the quiet resting place of the dead.
Aside from insisting that there exists no necessity for the alleged
improvement, the defendants further contend that the street in question
should not be opened through the cemetery. One of the defendants alleges
that said cemetery is public property. If that allegations is true, then, of
course, the city of Manila cannot appropriate it for public use. The city of
Manila can only expropriate private property.
It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former
is a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church,
while the latter is used only by a family, or a small portion of the
community or neighborhood. (11 C. J., 50.)
Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the
ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And
this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are
held in good faith for future use. (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 434, and
cases cited.)
The cemetery in question seems to have been established under
governmental authority. The Spanish Governor-General, in an order
creating the same, used the following language:
"The cemetery and general hospital for indigent Chinese having been
founded and maintained by the spontaneous and fraternal contribution of
their protector, merchants and industrials, benefactors of mankind, in
consideration of their services to the Government of the Islands its internal
administration, government and regime must necessarily be adjusted to
the taste and traditional practices of those born and educated in China in
order that the sentiments which animated the founders may be perpetually
effectuated."
It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by
the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of
the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question
public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff
must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or
right under the law to expropriate public property.
But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its
appropriation for the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime
of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a
question of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for
such purposes until it is fully established that the greatest necessity exists
therefor.
While we do not contend that the dead must not give place to the living,
and while it is a matter of public knowledge that in the process of time
sepulchers may become the seat of cities and cemeteries traversed by
streets and daily trod by the feet o millions of men, yet, nevertheless
such sacrifices and such uses of the places of the dead should not be made
unless and until it is fully established that there exists an eminent necessity
therefor. While cemeteries and sepulchers and the places of the burial of
the dead are still within the memory and command of the active care of the
living; while they are still devoted to pious uses and sacred regard, it is
difficult to believe that even the legislature would adopt a law expressly
providing that such places, under such circumstances, should be violated.
In such an appropriation, what, we may ask, would be the measure of
damages at law, for the wounded sensibilities of the living, in having the
graves of kindred and loved ones blotted out and desecrated by a common
highway or street for public travel ? The impossibility of measuring the
damage and inadequacy of a remedy at law is too apparent to admit of
argument. To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life
sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except in cases of
necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last
resting place of our friends, should be maintained, and the preventative aid
of the courts should be invoked for that object. (Railroad Company vs.
Cemetery Co., 116 Tenn., 400; Evergreen Cemetery Association vs. The
City of New Haven, 43 Conn., 234; Anderson vs. Acheson, 132 Iowa, 744;
Beatty vs. Kurtz, 2 Peters, 566.)
In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of
the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of
opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining
and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will
answer every purpose of the plaintiff.
For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded that the judgment of the
lower court should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Araullo and Avancea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
The Government of the Philippine Islands is authorized by the Philippine Bill
to acquire real estate for public use by the exercise of the right of eminent
domain. (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, sec 63.) A portion of this power
has been delegated by the Philippine Legislature to the city of Manila,
which is permitted to "condemn private property for public use."
(Administrative Code of 1917, sec. 2429.) The Code of Civil Procedure, in
prescribing how the right of eminent domain may be exercised, also limits
the condemnation to "private property for public use.' (Sec. 241.) As under
the facts actually presented, there can be no question that a public street
constitutes a public use, the only remaining question is whether or not the
Chinese Cemetery and the other property here sought to be taken by the
exercise 'of the right of eminent domain is private property."
As narrowing our inquiry still further, let it be noted that cemeteries are of
two classes, public and private. A public cemetery is one used by the
general community, or neighborhood, or church; while a private cemetery
is one used only by a family, or a small portion of a community (Lay vs.
State, 12 Ind. App., 362; Cemetery Association vs Meninger [1875], 14
Kan., 312.) Our specific question, then, is, whether the Chinese Cemetery in
the city of Manila is a public, or a private graveyard. If it be found to be the
former, it is not subject to condemnation by the city of Manila; if it be found
to be the latter, it is subject to condemnation.
The Chinese Cemetery of Manila was established during the Spanish
administration in the Philippines by public spirited Chinese. The order of the
Governor-General giving governmental recognition to the cemetery reads
as follows: "The cemetery and general hospital for indigent Chinese having
been founded and maintained by the spontaneous and fraternal
contribution of their protectors, merchants and industrials, benefactors of
mankind, in consideration of their services to the Government of the
Islands, its internal administration, government and regime, must
necessarily be adjusted to the taste and traditional practices of those born
and educated in China in order that the sentiments which animated the
founders may be perpetually effectuated." Sometimes after the
inauguration of the new regime in the Philippines) a corporation was
organized to control the cemetery, and a Torrens title for the lands in
question was obtained.
From the time of its creation until the present the cemetery has been used
by the Chinese community for the burial of their dead. It is said that not
less than four hundred graves, many of them with handsome monuments,
would be destroyed by the proposed street. This desecration is attempted
as to the last resting places of the dead of a people who, because of their
peculiar and ingrained ancestral worship, retain more than the usual
reverence for the departed. These facts lead us straight to the conclusion
that the Chinese Cemetery is not used by a family or a small portion of a
community but by a particular race long existing in the country and of
considerable numbers. The case, then, is one of where the city of Manila,
under a general authority permitting it to condemn private property for
public use, is attempting to convert a property already dedicated to a
public use to an entirely different public use; and this, not directly pursuant
to legislative authority, but primarily through the sole advice of the
consulting architect.
Two well considered decisions coming from the American state courts on
almost identical facts are worthy of our consideration. The first is the case
of The Evergreen Cemetery Association vs. The City of New Haven ( [1875],
43 Conn., 234), oft cited by other courts. Here the City of New Haven,
Connecticut, under the general power conferred upon it to lay out,
construct, and maintain all necessary highways within its limits, proceeded
to widen and straighten one of its streets, and in so doing took a small
piece of land belonging to the Evergreen Cemetery Association. This
association was incorporated under the general statute. The city had no
special power to take any part of the cemetery for such purposes. It was
found that the land taken was needed for the purposes of the cemetery and
was not needed for the purpose of widening and straightening the avenue.
The court said that it is unquestionable that the Legislature has the power
to authorize the taking of land already applied to one public use and devote
it to another. When the power is granted to municipal or private
corporations in express words, no question can arise. But, it was added,
"The same land cannot properly be used for burial lots and for a public
highway at the same time. . . . Land therefore applied to one use should not
be taken for the other except in cases of necessity. . . . There is no difficulty
in effecting the desired improvement by taking land on the other side of
the street. . . . The idea of running a public street, regardless of graves,
monuments, and the feelings of the living, through one of our public
cemeteries, would be shocking to the moral sense of the community, and
would not be tolerated except upon the direct necessity." It was then held
that land already devoted to a public use cannot be taken by the public for
another use which is inconsistent With the first, without special authority
from the Legislature, or authority granted by necessary and reasonable
implication.
The second decision is that Of Memphis State Line Railroad Company vs.
forest Hill Cemetery Co. ([1906], 116 Tenn., 400.) Here the purpose of the
proceeding was to condemn a right Of way for the railway company
through the forest Hill Cemetery. The railroad proposed to run through the
southeast corner of the Cemetery where no bodies were interred. The
cemetery had been in use for about eight years, and during this period
thirteen hundred bodies had been buried therein. The Cemetery was under
the control of a corporation which, by its character, held itself out as being
willing to sell lots to any one who applies therefor and pays the price
demanded, except to members of the Negro race.
It was found that there were two other routes along which the railroad
might be located without touching the cemetery, while the present line
might be pursued without interfering with Forest Hill Cemetery by making a
curve around it. In the court below the railroad was granted the right of
condemnation through the cemetery and damages were assessed. On
appeal, the certiorari applied for was granted, and the supersedeas
awarded. The court, in effect, found that the land of the Cemeter Company
was devoted to a public purpose, and that under the general language of
the Tenessee statute of eminent domain it could not be taken from another
public purpose. The court said that in process of time the sepulcheres of
the dead "are made the seats of cities, and are traverse by streets, and
daily trodden by the feet of man. This is inevitable i the course of ages. But
while these places are yet within the memory and under the active care of
the living, while they are still devoted to pious uses, they are sacred, and
we cannot suppose that the legislature intended that they should be
violated, in the absence of special provisions upon the subject authorizing
such invasion, and indicating a method for the disinterment, removal, and
reinterment of the bodies buried, and directing how the expense thereof
shall be borne." Two members of the court, delivering a separate
concurring opinion, concluded with this significant and eloquent sentence:
"The wheels of commerce must stop at the grave."
For the foregoing reasons, and for others which are stated in the principal
decision, I am of the opinion that the judgment of the lower court should be
affirmed.
STREET, J., dissenting:
It may be admitted that, upon the evidence before us, the projected
condemnation of the Chinese Cemetery is unnecessary and perhaps ill-
considered. Nevertheless I concur with Justice Moir in the view that the
authorities of the City of Manila are the proper judges of the propriety of
the condemnation and that this Court should have nothing to do with the
questions of the necessity of the taking.
MOIR, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority opinion in this case , which has not yet been
written, and because of the importance of the question involved, present
my dissent for the record.
This is an action by the city of Manila for the expropriation of lad for an
extension of Rizal Avenue north. The petition for condemnation was
opposed by the "Comunidad de Chinos de Manila" and Ildefonso
Tambunting and various others who obtained permission of the trial court
to intervene in the case.
All of the defendants allege in their opposition that the proposed extension
of Rizal Avenue cuts through a part of the Chinese Cemetery, North of
Manila, and necessitates the destruction of many monuments and the
removal of many graves.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, Honorable S. del Rosario, judge after
the hearing the parties, decided that there was no need for constructing
the street as and where proposed by the city, and dismissed the petition.
The plaintiff appealed and sets up the following errors:
1. The court erred in deciding that the determination of the necessity
and convenience of the expropriation of the lands of the defendants lies
with the court and not with the Municipal Board of the city of Manila.
2. The court erred in permitting the presentation of proofs over the
objection and exception of the plaintiff tending to demonstrate the lack of
necessity of the projected street and the need of the lands in question.
3. The court erred in declaring that the plaintiff had no right to
expropriate the lands in question.
4. The court erred in dismissing the complaint.
The right of the plaintiff to expropriate property for public use cannot be
denied. The "right of eminent domain is inherent in all sovereignties and
therefore would exist without any constitutional recognition . . . The right of
eminent domain antedates constitutions . . . The right can only be denied or
restricted by fundamental law and is right inherent in society." (15 Cyc., pp.
557-8.)
This general right was recognized in the Philippine Code of Civil Procedure
effective October 1st, 1901, which prescribed the manner of exercising the
right. (Section 241 et seq.)
It was further recognized in the Organic Act of July 1st, 1902, which
provides in section 74 "that the Government of the Philippine Islands may
grant franchises . . . including the authority to exercise the right of eminent
domain for the construction and operation of works of public utility and
service, and may authorize said works to be constructed and maintained
over and across the public property of the United States including . . .
reservations." This provision is repeated in the Jones Law of August, 1916.
The legislature of the Islands conferred the right on the city of Manila.
(Section 2429, Administrative Code of 1917; section 2402, Administrative
Code of 1916.)
Clearly having the right of expropriation, the city of Manila selected the line
of its street and asked the court by proper order to place the plaintiff in
possession of the land described in the complaint, and to appoint
Commissioners to inspect the property, appraise the value, and assess the
damages. Instead of doing so, the court entered upon the question of the
right of the city to take the property and the necessity for the taking.
The court says:
"The controversy relates to whether or not the Chinese Cemetery, where a
great majority of this race is buried and other persons belonging to other
nationalities have been formerly inhumed, is private or public; whether or
not said cemetery, in case it is public, would be susceptible to expropriation
for the purpose of public improvements proposed by the city of Manila;
whether or not the latter is justified of the necessity and expediency of
similar expropriation before its right to the same would be upheld by the
courts of justice; and whether or not the appreciation of said necessity
pertains to the legislative or the judicial department before which the
expropriation proceedings have been brought.
"Relative to the first point, it is not necessary for the court to pass upon its
consideration, in view of the conclusion it has arrived at the appreciation of
the other points connected with each other.
"From the testimony of two reputable engineers produced by some of the
defendants, it appears that the land chosen by the plaintiff for the
extension of Rizal Avenue to the municipality of Caloocan is not the best or
the less expensive, although upon it there may be constructed a straight
road, without curves or winding; but that in order to construct said road
upon said land, the city of Manila would have to remove and transfer to
other places about four hundred graves and monuments, make some
grubbings, undergo some leveling and build some bridges the works
thereon, together with the construction of the road and the value of the
lands expropriated, would mean an expenditure which will not be less than
P180,000.
"Beside that considerable amount, the road would have a declivity of 3 per
cent which, in order to cover a distance of one kilometer, would require an
energy equivalent to that which would be expended in covering a distance
of two and one-half kilometers upon a level road.
"On the other hand, if the road would be constructed with the deviation
proposed by Ildefonso Tambunting, one of the defendants, who even
offered to donate gratuitously to the city of Manila part of the land upon
which said road will have to be constructed, the plaintiff entity would be
able to save more than hundreds of thousands of pesos, which can be
invested in other improvements of greater pressure and necessity for the
benefit of the taxpayers; and it will not have to employ more time and incur
greater expenditures in the removal and transfer of the remains buried in
the land of the Chinese Community and of Sr. Tambunting, although with
the insignificant disadvantage that the road would be a little longer by a
still more insignificant extension of 426 meters and 55 centimeters, less
than one-half kilometer, according to the plan included in the records; but it
would offer a better panorama to those who would use it, and who would
not have to traverse in their necessary or pleasure-making trips or walks
any cemetery which, on account of its nature, always deserves the respect
of the travellers. It should be observed that the proposed straight road over
the cemetery, which the city of Manila is proposing to expropriate, does not
lead to any commercial, industrial, or agricultural center, and if with said
road it is endeavored to benefit some community or created interest, the
same object may be obtained by the proposed deviation of the road by the
defendants. The road traced by the plaintiffs has the disadvantage that the
lands on both sides thereof would not serve for residential purposes, for the
reason that no one has the pleasure to construct buildings upon cemeteries
unless it be in very overcrowded cities, so exhausted of land that every
inch thereof represents a dwelling house."
And it is against this ruling, that it lies with the court to determine the
necessity of the proposed street and not with the municipal board, that the
appellant directs its first assignment of error.
It is a right of the city government to determine whether or not it will
construct streets and where, and the courts sole duty was to see that the
value of the property was paid the owners after proper legal proceedings
ascertaining the value.
The law gives the city the right to take private property for public use. It is
assumed it is unnecessary to argue that a public road is a public use.
But it is argued that plaintiff must show that it is necessary to take this land
for a public improvement. The law does not so read, and it is believed that
the great weight of authority, including the United States Supreme Court, is
against the contention.
"The question of necessity is distinct from the question of public use, and
the former question is exclusively for the legislature, except that if the
constitution or statute authorizes the taking of property only in cases of
necessity, then the necessity becomes a judicial question." (McQuillen
Municipal Corporations, Vol. IV, pp. 3090-091.)
"In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the
contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent
domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character.
The determination of those questions belongs to the sovereign power; the
legislative determination is final and conclusive, and the courts have no
power to review it. It rests with the legislature not only to determine when
the power of eminent domain may be exercised, but also the character,
quality, method, and extent of such exercise. And this power is unqualified,
other than by the necessity of providing that compensation shall be made.
Nevertheless, under the express provisions of the constitution of some
states the question of necessity is made a judicial one, to be determined by
the courts and not by the legislature.
"While the legislature may itself exercise the right of determining the
necessity for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, it may, unless
prohibited by the constitution, delegate this power to public officers or to
private corporations established to carry on enterprises in which the public
are interested, and their determination that a necessity for the exercise of
the power exists is conclusive. There is no restraint upon the power except
that requiring compensation to be made. And when the power has been so
delegated it is a subject of legislative discretion to determine what
prudential regulations shall be established to secure a discreet and
judicious exercise of the authority. It has been held that in the absence of
any statutory provision submitting the matter to a court or jury the decision
of the question of necessity lies with the body of individuals to whom the
state has delegated the authority to take, and the legislature may by
express provision confer this power on a corporation to whom the power of
eminent domain is delegated unless prohibited by the constitution. It is of
course competent for the legislature to declare that the question shall be a
judicial one, in which case the court and not the corporation determines the
question of necessity." (15 Cyc., pp. 629-632.)
To the same effect is Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d Edition, section 597).
I quote from the notes to Vol. 5, Encyclopedia of United States Supreme
Court Reports, p. 762, as follows:
"Neither can it be said that there is any fundamental right secured by the
constitution of the United States to have the questions of compensation
and necessity both passed upon by one and the same jury. In many states
the question of necessity is never submitted to the jury which passes upon
the question of compensation. It is either settled affirmatively by the
legislature, or left to the judgment of the corporation invested with the
right to take property by condemnation. The question of necessity is not
one of a judicial character, but rather one for determination by the
lawmaking branch of the government. (Boom Co. vs. Patterson, 98 U. S.,
403, 406 [25 L. ed., 206]; United States vs. Jones, 109 U. S., 513 [27 L. ed.,
1015]; Backus vs. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U. S., 557, 568 [42 L.
ed., 853].)
"Speaking generally, it is for the state primarily and exclusively, to declare
for what local public purposes private property, within its limits, may be
taken upon compensation to the owner, as well as to prescribe a mode in
which it may be condemned and taken. (Madisonville Tract. Co. vs. St.
Bernard Min. Co., 196 U. S., 239, 252 [49 L. ed., 462] .)
"Courts have no power to control the legislative authority in the exercise of
their right to determine when it is necessary or expedient to condemn a
specific piece of property for public purposes. (Adirondack R. Co. vs. New
York States, 176 U. S., 335 [~4 L. ed., 492].)"
10 R. C. L. (p. 183), states the law as follows:
"158. Necessity for taking ordinarily not judicial question. The
legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for
a particular improvement or public use, and it may select the exact location
of the improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the
proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its
construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the
location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected
for its site, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine,
and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views
for these of the representatives of the people. Similarly, when the
legislature has delegated the power of eminent domain to municipal or
public service corporation or other tribunals or bodies, and has given them
discretion as to when the power is to be called into exercise and to what
extent, the court will not inquire into the necessity or propriety of the
taking."
The United States Supreme Court recently said:
"The uses to which this land are to be put are undeniably public uses. When
that is the case the propriety or expediency of the appropriation cannot be
called in question by any other authority." (Cincinnati vs. S. & N. R. R. Co.,
223 U. S., 390, quoting U. S. vs. Jones, 109, U. S., 519.)
And in Sears vs. City of Akron (246 U. S., 242), decided March 4th, 1918, it
said:
"Plaintiff contends that the ordinance is void because the general statute
which authorized the appropriation violates both Article 1, paragraph 10, of
the Federal Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it
authorizes the municipality to determine the necessity for the taking of
private property without the owners having an opportunity to be heard as
to such necessity; that in fact no necessity existed for any taking which
would interfere with the company's project; since the city might have taken
water from the Little Cuyahoga or the Tuscarawas rivers; and furthermore,
that it has taken ten times as much water as it can legitimately use. It is
well settled that while the question whether the purpose of a taking is a
public one is judicial (Hairston vs. Danville & W. R. Co., 208 U. S. 598 [52 L.
ed., 637; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 331; 13 Ann. Cas., 1008] ), the necessity and the
proper extent of a taking is a legislative question. (Shoemaker vs. United
States, 147 U. S., 282, 298 [57 L. ed., 170, 184; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 361];
United States vs. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U. S. 668, 685 [40 L. ed.,
576, 582; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 427]; United States vs. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co., 229 U. S., 53, 65 [57 L. ed., 1063, 1076; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
667].)"
I think the case should be decided in accordance with foregoing citations,
but one other point has been argued so extensively that it ought to be
considered.
It is contended for the defense that this Chinese Cemetery is a public
cemetery and that it cannot therefore be taken for public use. In its answer
the "Comunidad de Chinos de Manila" says it is "a corporation organized
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands," and
that it owns the land which plaintiff seeks to acquire. The facts that it is a
private corporation owning land would seem of necessity to make the land
it owns private land. The fact that it belongs to the Chinese community
deprives it of any public character.
But admitting that it is a public cemetery, although limited in its use to the
Chinese Community of the city of Manila, can it not be taken for public use?
Must we let the reverence we feel for the dead and the sanctity of their
final resting-place obstruct the progress of the living? It will be instructive
to inquire what other jurisdictions have held on that point.
On the Application of Board of Street Openings of New York City to acquire
St. Johns Cemetery (133 N. Y., 329) the court of appeal said:
". . . The board instituted this proceeding under the act to acquire for park
purposes the title to land below One Hundred and Fifty-fifth street known
as St. John's cemetery which belonged to a religious corporation in the city
of New York, commonly called Trinity Church. It was established as a
cemetery as early as 1801, and used for that purpose until 1839, during
which time about ten thousand human bodies had been buried therein. In
1839 an ordinance was passed by the city of New York forbidding
interments south of Eighty-sixth street, and since that time no interments
have been made in the cemetery, but Trinity Church has preserved and
kept it in order and prevented any disturbance thereof.
"It is contended on behalf of Trinity Church that under the general authority
given by the statute of 1887, this land which had been devoted to
cemetery purposes could not be taken for a park. The authority conferred
upon the board by the act is broad and general. It is authorized to take for
park purposes any land south of One Hundred and Fifty-fifth street. . . .
"The fact that lands have previously been devoted to cemetery purposes
does not place them beyond the reach of the power of eminent domain.
That is an absolute transcendent power belonging to the sovereign which
can be exercised for the public welfare whenever the sovereign authority
shall determine that a necessity for its exercise exists. By its existence the
homes and the dwellings of the living, and the resting places of the dead
may be alike condemned.
"It seems always to have been recognized in the laws of this state, that
under the general laws streets and highways could be laid out through
cemeteries, in the absence of special limitation or prohibition. . . ."
In Re Opening of Twenty-second Street (102 Penn. State Reports, 108) the
Supreme Court of the State said:
"This was an action for the opening of a street through a cemetery in the
City of Philadelphia. It was contended for the United American Mechanics
and United Daughters of America Cemetery Association that by an act of
the legislature of the State approved March 20th, 1849, they were forever
exempt from the taking of any their property for streets, roads or alleys
and this Act was formally accepted by the Cemetery Company on April 9th,
1849, and there was, therefore, a contract between the Cemetery Company
and the State of Pennsylvania, which would be violated by the taking of any
part of their property for street purposes. It was further contended that
there were 11,000 persons buried in the cemetery.
"The court held that property and contracts of all kinds must yield to the
demand of the sovereign and that under the power of eminent domain all
properties could be taken, and that if there was a contract between the
State of Pennsylvania and the Cemetery Association, the contract itself
could be taken for public use, and ordered the opening of the street
through the cemetery."
In Vol. 5, Encyclopedia of United States Supreme Court Reports (p. 759), it
is said:
"Although it has been held, that where a state has delegated the power of
eminent domain to a person or corporation, and where by its exercise lands
have been subject to a public use, they cannot be applied to another public
use without specific authority expressed or implied to that effect yet, the
general rule seems to be that the fact that property is already devoted to a
public use, does not exempt it from being appropriated under the right of
eminent domain, but it may be so taken for a use which is clearly superior
or paramount to the one to which it is already devoted." (Citing many
United States Supreme Court decisions.)
A few cases have been cited where the courts refused to allow the opening
of streets through cemeteries, but in my opinion they are not as well
considered as the cases and authorities relied upon herein.
The holding of this court in this case reverses well settled principles of law
of long standing and almost universal acceptance.
The other assignments of error need not be considered as they are involved
in the foregoing.
The decision should be reversed and the record returned to the Court of
First Instance with instructions to proceed with the case in accordance with
this decision.
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General
Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for plaintiff-
appellant.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo for defendant-
appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN; EXPROPRIATION OF
PUBLIC SERVICE UTILITIES; PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION LIKE
EXPROPRIATION OF REAL PROPERTY. Where the Republic may not
compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the
exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone
company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system
and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require,
subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but
no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to
impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss
of title and possession. It is unquestionable that the real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The
use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow interservice connection
between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case
private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If,
under Section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the
interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon
payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not
require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided
just compensation is paid therefor.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL OF PETITION BY COURT A QUO NOT
PROPER IN INSTANT CASE. The Republic's cause of action to compel the
PLDT to execute a contract with the former, through the Bureau, for the use
of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines
under such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, is
predicated upon the radio telephonic isolation of Bureau's facilities from the
outside World if the severance of the interconnection were to be carried out
by the PLDT, thereby preventing the Bureau of Telecommunications from
properly discharging its functions, to the prejudice of the general public.
Save for the prayer to compel the PLDT to enter into a contract (and the
prayer is no essential part of the pleading), the averments make out a case
for compulsory rendering of inter-connecting services by the telephone
company upon such terms and conditions as the court may determine to be
just. And since the lower court found that both parties "are practically at
one that defendant (PLDT) is entitled to reasonable compensation from
plaintiff for the reasonable use of the former's telephone facilities" the
lower court should have proceeded to treat the case as one of
condemnation of such services independently of contract and proceeded to
determine the just and reasonable compensation for the same, instead of
dismissing the petition.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CFI AND NOT THE PSC HAS AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE
JURISDICTION IN EXPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES. The plea that the
court of first instance had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and that
the proper forum for the action was the Public Service Commission, under
the law, the Public Service Commission has no authority to pass upon
actions for the taking of private property under the sovereign right of
eminent domain. Furthermore, while the defendant telephone company is a
public utility corporation whose franchise, equipment and other properties
are under the jurisdiction, supervision and control of the Public Service
Commission, yet the plaintiff's telecommunications network is a public
service owned by the Republic and operated by an instrumentality of the
National Government, hence, exempt under Section 14 of the Public
Service Act, from such jurisdiction, supervision and control. The Bureau of
Telecommunications was created in pursuance of a state policy
reorganizing the government offices and the determination of state policy
is not vested in the Commission.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; ESTOPPEL; GOVERNMENT NOT ESTOPPED BY THE
MISTAKE OF ITS AGENTS. Section 79, subsection (b), of Executive Order
No. 94, Series of 1947 does not limit the Bureau of Telecommunications to
non-commercial activities or prevents it from serving the general public. It
may be that in its original prospectuses the Bureau officials had stated that
the service would be limited to government offices; but such limitations
could not block future expansion of the system, as authorized by the terms
of the Executive Order, nor could the officials of the Bureau bind the
Government not to engage in services that are authorized by law. It is a
well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by
public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the statute
and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part
of its agents.
5. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; FREEDOM TO STIPULATE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS; PARTIES CAN NOT BE COERCED. Parties can not be
coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them
as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to
stipulate such terms and condition is of the essence of our contractual
system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be
annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation or undue influence (Articles
1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines).
6. ID.; ID.; FRAUDULENT CONTRACT OR UNFAIR COMPETITION NOT
PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. The theses that the Bureau's commercial
services constituted unfair competition, and that the Bureau was guilty of
fraud and abuse under its contract, are untenable: (1) the competition is
merely hypothetical, the demand for telephone service being very much
more than the supposed competitors can supply, (2) the PLDT franchise is
non-exclusive, that it is well-known that defendant PLDT is unable to
adequately cope with the current demands for telephone service and that
its right to just compensation for the services rendered to the Government
telephone system and its users is herein recognized and preserved, and (3)
when the Bureau of Telecommunications subscribed to the trunk lines,
defendant knew or should have known that their use by the subscriber was
more or less public and all embracing in nature and the acceptance by the
defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff
had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, implies
assent by the defendant to such extended use. To uphold the PLDT's
contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public to the right of
the PLDT to derive profit from the future expansion of its services under its
non-exclusive franchise.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J p:
Direct appeals, upon a joint record on appeal, by both the plaintiff and the
defendant from the dismissal, after hearing, by the Court of First Instance
of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 35805, of their respective complaint and
counterclaims, but making permanent a preliminary mandatory injunction
therefore issued against the defendant on the inter-connection of telephone
facilities owned and operated by said parties.
The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising
governmental powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one of
which is the Bureau of Telecommunications. That office was created on 1
July 1947, under Executive Order No. 94, with the following powers and
duties, in addition to certain powers and duties formerly vested in the
Director of Posts:
"SEC. 79. The Bureau of Telecommunications shall exercise the
following powers and duties:
"(a) To operate and maintain existing wire-telegraph and radio-
telegraph offices, stations, and facilities, and those to be established to
restore the pre-war telecommunication service under the Bureau of Posts,
as well as such additional offices or stations as may hereafter be
established to provide telecommunication service in places requiring such
service;
"(b) To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain
wire-telephone or radio telephone communication service throughout the
Philippines by utilizing such existing facilities in cities, towns, and provinces
as may be found feasible and under such terms and conditions or
arrangements with the present owners or operators thereof as may be
agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned;
"(c) To prescribe, subject to approval by the Department Head,
equitable rates of charges for messages handled by the system and/or for
timecalls and other services that may be rendered by said system;
"(d) To establish and maintain coastal stations to serve ships at sea or
aircrafts and, when public interest so requires, to engage in the
international telecommunication service in agreement with other countries
desiring to establish such service with the Republic of the Philippines; and
"(e) To abide by all existing rules and regulations prescribed by the
International Telecommunication Convention relative to the accounting,
disposition and exchange of messages handled in the international service,
and those that may hereafter be promulgated by said convention and
adhered to by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines." 1
The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for
short), is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise, Act
3426, as amended by Commonwealth Act 407, to install, operate and
maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and to carry on the
business of electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines and
between the Philippines and the telephone systems of other countries. 2
The RCA Communications, Inc., (which is not a party to the present case,
but has contractual relations with the parties) is an American corporation
authorized to transact business in the Philippines and is the grantee, by
assignment, of a legislative franchise to operate a domestic station for the
reception and transmission of long distance wireless messages (Act 2178)
and to operate broadcasting and radio-telephone and radio-telegraphic
communications services (Act 3180) 3
Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications,
Inc., entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming
from the United States and received by RCA's domestic station, could
automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls
collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United
States. The contracting parties agreed to divide the tolls, as follows: 25% to
PLDT and 75% to RCA. The sharing was amended in 1941 to 30% for PLDT
and 70% for RCA, and again amended in 1947 to a 50-50 basis. The
arrangement was later extended to radio-telephone messages to and from
European and Asiatic countries. Their contract contained a stipulation that
either party could terminate it on a 24-month notice to the other. 4 On 2
February 1956, PLDT gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2
February 1956. 5
Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up
its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation
and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable
government offices to call private parties. 6 Its application for the use of
these trunk lines was in the usual form of applications for telephone
service, containing a statement, above the signature of the applicant, that
the latter will abide by the rules and regulations of the PLDT which are on
file with the Public Service Commission. 7 One of the many rules prohibits
the public use of the service furnished the telephone subscriber for his
private use. 8 The Bureau has extended its services to the general public
since 1948, 9 using the same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the
PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of rates. 10 Through
these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could
make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that the latter could
make a call to the former.
On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications,
entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint
overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey radio-
telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local
residents. 11 Actually, they inaugurated this joint operation on 2 February
1958, under a "provisional" agreement. 12
On 7 April 1958, the defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said
bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch
Exchange (PBX) is interconnected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the
rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the
use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general
public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if
said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT
would sever the telephone connections. 13 When the PLDT received no
reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at
midnight on 12 April 1958. 14 The result was the isolation of the
Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the
United States. 15
At that time, the Bureau was maintaining 5,000 telephones and had 5,000
pending applications for telephone connection. 16 The PLDT was also
maintaining 60,000 telephones and had also 20,000 pending applications.
17 Through the years, neither of them has been able to fill up the demand
for telephone service.
The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on 8 January
1958 that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the
government paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing through the
interconnecting facilities from the Government Telephone System to the
PLDT. 18 The PLDT replied that it was willing to enter into an agreement on
overseas telephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided that the
Bureau would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public
Service Commission and in consideration of 37 1/2% of the gross revenues.
19 In its memorandum in lieu of oral argument in this Court dated 9
February 1964, on page 8, the defendant reduced its offer to 33 1/3% (1/3)
as its share in the overseas telephone service. The proposals were not
accepted by either party.
On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the defendant,
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, in the Court of First Instance
of Manila (Civil Case No. 35805), praying in its complaint for judgment
commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the
Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system
throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court
might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against
the defendant company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone
connections and/or restore those severed.
Acting on the application of the plaintiff, and on the ground that the
severance of telephone connections by the defendant company would
isolate the Philippines from other countries, the court a quo, on 14 April
1958, issued an order for the defendant:
"(1) to forthwith reconnect and restore the seventy-eight (78) trunk lines
that it has disconnected between the facilities of the Government
Telephone System, including its overseas telephone services, and the
facilities of defendant; (2) to refrain from carrying into effect its threat to
sever the existing telephone communication between the Bureau of
Telecommunications and defendant, and not to make connection over its
telephone system of telephone calls coming to the Philippines from foreign
countries through the said Bureau's telephone facilities and the radio
facilities Of RCA Communications, Inc.; and (3) to accept and connect
through its telephone system all such telephone calls coming to the
Philippines from foreign countries until further order of this Court."
On 28 April 1958, the defendant company filed its answer, with
counterclaims.
It denied any obligation on its part to execute a contract of services with
the Bureau of Telecommunications; contested the jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance to compel it to enter into interconnecting agreements, and
averred that it was justified to disconnect the trunk lines heretofore leased
to the Bureau of Telecommunications under the existing agreement
because its facilities were being used in fraud of its rights. The PLDT further
claimed that the Bureau was engaging in commercial telephone operations
in excess of authority, in competition with, and to the prejudice of, the
PLDT, using defendant's own telephone poles, without proper accounting of
revenues.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the
PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were
not in agreement; that under Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau
of Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to servicing
government offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the
trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that
their use by the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the
Bureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the
PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice that would result from the
disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminary injunction
permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint and the
counterclaims.
Both parties appealed.
Taking up first the appeal of the Republic, the latter complains of the action
of the trial court in dismissing the part of its complaint seeking to compel
the defendant to enter into an interconnecting contract with it, because the
parties could not agree on the terms and conditions of the interconnection,
and of its refusal to fix the terms and conditions therefor.
We agree with the court below that parties can not be coerced to enter into
a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal
terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and
conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express
provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence,
intimidation or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of
the Philippines). But the court a quo has apparently overlooked that while
the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the
Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain,
require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the
government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the
government service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court. Normally, of course, the
power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to,
and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason
appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden
upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the
PLDT's lines and services to allow interservice connection between both
telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is
subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If under Section 6, Article
XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare,
transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation,
there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render
services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid
therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be
the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be
for public use.
The Bureau of Telecommunications, under Section 78(b) of Executive Order
No. 94, may operate and maintain wire telephone or radio telephone
communications throughout the Philippines by utilizing existing facilities in
cities, towns, and provinces under such terms and conditions or
arrangement with present owners or operators as may be agreed upon to
the satisfaction of all concerned; but there is nothing in this Section that
would exclude resort to condemnation proceedings where unreasonable or
unjust terms and conditions are exacted, to the extent of crippling or
seriously hampering the operations of said Bureau.
A perusal of the complaint shows that the Republic's cause of action is
predicated upon the radio telephonic isolation of the Bureau's facilities from
the outside world if the severance of interconnection were to be carried out
by the PLDT, thereby preventing the Bureau of Telecommunications from
properly discharging its functions, to the prejudice of the general public.
Save for the prayer to compel the PLDT to enter into a contract (and the
prayer is no essential part of the pleading), the averments make out a case
for compulsory rendering of inter-connecting services by the telephone
company upon such terms and conditions as the court may determine to be
just. And since the lower court found that both parties "are practically at
one that defendant (PLDT) is entitled to reasonable compensation from
plaintiff for the reasonable use of the former's telephone facilities"
(Decision, Record on Appeal, page 224), the lower court should have
proceeded to treat the case as one of condemnation of such services
independently of contract and proceeded to determine the just and
reasonable compensation for the same, instead of dismissing the petition.
This view we have taken of the true nature of the Republic's petition
necessarily results in overruling the plea of defendant- appellant PLDT that
the court of first instance had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and
that the proper forum for the action was the Public Service Commission.
That body, under the law, has no authority to pass upon actions for the
taking of private property under the sovereign right of eminent domain.
Furthermore, while the defendant telephone company is a public utility
corporation whose franchise, equipment and other properties are under the
jurisdiction, supervision and control of the Public Service Commission (Sec.
13, Public Service Act), yet the plaintiff's telecommunications network is a
public service owned by the Republic and operated by an instrumentality of
the National Government, hence exempt, under Section 14 of the Public
Service Act, from such jurisdiction, supervision and control. The Bureau of
Telecommunications was created in pursuance of a state policy
reorganizing the government offices
"to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and
independent Government of the Republic of the Philippines, and for the
purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in its operation"
(Section 1, Republic Act No. 51)
and the determination of state policy is not vested in the Commission
(Utilities Com. vs. Bartonville Bus Line, 290 Ill. 574; 124 N.E. 373)
Defendant PLDT, as appellant, contends that the court below was in error in
not holding that the Bureau of Telecommunications was not empowered to
engage in commercial telephone business, and in ruling that said
defendant was not justified in disconnecting the telephone trunk lines it
had previously leased to the Bureau. We find that the court a quo ruled
correctly in rejecting both assertions.
Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947, reorganizing the Bureau of
Telecommunications, expressly empowered the latter in its Section 79,
subsection (b), to "negotiate for, operate and maintain wire telephone or
radio telephone communication service throughout the Philippines," and, in
subsection (c), "to prescribe subject to approval by the Department Head,
equitable rates of charges for messages handled by the system and/or for
time calls and other services that may be rendered by the system." Nothing
in these provisions limits the Bureau to non-commercial activities or
prevents it from serving the general public. It may be that in its original
prospectuses the Bureau officials had stated that the service would be
limited to government offices: but such limitations could not block future
expansion of the system, as authorized by the terms of the Executive
Order, nor could the officials of the Bureau bind the Government not to
engage in services that are authorized by law. It is a well-known rule that
erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not
block subsequent correct application of the statute (PLDT vs. Collector of
Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 676), and that the Government is never estopped
by mistake or error on the part of its agents (Pineda vs. Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs.
Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724)
The theses that the Bureau's commercial services constituted unfair
competition, and that the Bureau was guilty of fraud and abuse under its
contract, are, likewise, untenable.
First, the competition is merely hypothetical, the demand for telephone
service being very much more than the supposed competitors can supply.
As previously noted, the PLDT had 20,000 pending applications at the time,
and the Bureau had another 5,000. The telephone company's inability to
meet the demands for service are notorious even now. Second, the charter
of the defendant expressly provides:
"Sec. 14.The rights herein granted shall not be exclusive, and the rights
and power to grant to any corporation, association or person other than the
grantee franchise for the telephone or electrical transmission of messages
or signals shall not be impaired or affected by the granting of this
franchise: " (Act 3436)
And third, as the trial court correctly stated, "when the Bureau of
Telecommunications subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or
should have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less public
and all embracing in nature, that is, throughout the Philippines, if not
abroad" (Decision, Record on Appeal, page 216)
The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its
knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to
commercial purposes, continuously since 1948, implies assent by the
defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been
maintained for a long time and the public has patronized both telephone
systems, and their interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too
late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at
liberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines.
". . ., but there is high authority for the position that, when such physical
connection has been voluntarily made, under a fair and workable
arrangement and guaranteed by contract and the continuous line has come
to be patronized and established as a great public convenience, such
connection shall not in breach of the agreement be severed by one of the
parties. In that case, the public is held to have such an interest in the
arrangement that its rights must receive due consideration. This position
finds approval in State ex rel. vs. Cadwaller, 172 Ind. 619, 636, 87 N.E. 650,
and is stated in the elaborate and learned opinion of Chief Justice Myers as
follows: `Such physical connection cannot be required as of right, but if
such connection is voluntarily made by contract, as is here alleged to be
the case, so that the public acquires an interest in its continuance, the act
of the parties in making such connection is equivalent to a declaration of a
purpose to waive the primary right of independence, and it imposes upon
the property such a public status that it may not be disregarded' citing
Mohan v. Mich. Tel. Co., 132 Mich, 242, 93 N.W. 629, and the reasons upon
which it is in part made to rest are referred to in the same opinion, as
follows: `Where private property is by the consent of the owner invested
with a public interest or privilege for the benefit of the public, the owner
can no longer deal with it as private property only, but must hold it subject
to the rights of the public in the exercise of that public interest or privilege
conferred for their benefit.' Allnut v. Inglis (1810) 12 East, 527. The doctrine
of this early case is the acknowledged law." (Clinton-Dunn Tel. Co. v.
Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 74 S.E. 636, 638)
It is clear that the main reason for the objection of the PLDT lies in the fact
that said appellant did not expect that the Bureau's telephone system
would expand with such rapidity as it has done; but this expansion is no
ground for the discontinuance of the service agreed upon.
The last issue urged by the PLDT as appellant is its right to compensation
for the use of its poles for bearing telephone wires of the Bureau of
Telecommunications. Admitting that Section 19 of the PLDT charter
reserves to the Government
"the privilege without compensation of using the poles of the grantee to
attach one ten-pin cross-arm, and to install, maintain and operate wires of
its telegraph system thereon: Provided, however, That the Bureau of Posts
shall have the right to place additional cross-arms and wires on the poles of
the grantee by paying a compensation, the rate of which is to be agreed
upon by the Director of Posts and the grantee; "
the defendant counterclaimed for P8,772.00 for the use of its poles by the
plaintiff, contending that what was allowed free use, under the aforequoted
provision, was one ten-pin cross-arm attachment and only for plaintiff's
telegraph system, not for its telephone system; that said Section could not
refer to the plaintiff's telephone system, because it did not have such
telephone system when defendant acquired its franchise. The implication of
the argument is that plaintiff has to pay for the use of defendant's poles if
such use is for plaintiff's telephone system and has to pay also if it attaches
more than one (1) ten-pin cross-arm for telegraphic purposes.
As there is no proof that the telephone wires strain the poles of the PLDT
more than the telegraph wires, nor that they cause more damage than the
wires of the telegraph system, or that the Government has attached to the
poles more than one ten-pin in cross-arm as permitted by the PLDT charter,
we see no point in this assignment of error. So long as the burden to be
borne by the PLDT poles is not increased, we see no reason why the
reservation in favor of the telegraph wires of the government should not be
extended to its telephone line, any time that the government decided to
engage also in this kind of communication.
In the ultimate analysis, the true objection of the PLDT to continue the link
between its network and that of the Government is that the latter competes
"politically" (sic) with its own telephone services. Considering, however,
that the PLDT franchise is non- exclusive; that it is well-known that
defendant PLDT is unable to adequately cope with the current demands for
telephone service, as shown by the number of pending applications
therefor; and that the PLDT's right to just compensation for the services
rendered to the Government telephone system and its users is herein
recognized and preserved, the objections of defendant-appellant are
without merit. To uphold the PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs
of the general public to the right of the PLDT to derive profit from the future
expansion of its services under its non-exclusive franchise.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance, now under appeal,
is affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the petition of the Republic of
the Philippines to compel the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
to continue servicing the Government telephone system upon such terms,
and for a compensation, that the trial court may determine to be just,
including the period elapsed from the filing of the original complaint or
petition. And for this purpose, the records are ordered returned to the court
of origin for further hearings and other proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146062. June 28, 2001.]
SANTIAGO ESLABAN, JR., in his capacity as Project Manager of the
National Irrigation Administration, petitioner, vs. CLARITA VDA. DE
ONORIO, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Surallah, South
Cotabato, ordering the National Irrigation Administration (NIA for brevity) to
pay respondent the amount of P107,517.60 as just compensation for the
taking of the latter's property.
The facts are as follows:
Respondent Clarita Vda. de Enorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay M.
Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato with an area of 39,512 square meters.
The lot, known as Lot 1210-A-Pad-11-000586, is covered by TCT No. T-
22121 of the Registry of Deeds, South Cotabato. On October 6, 1981,
Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the
construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting
a 24,660 square meter portion thereof. Respondent's husband agreed to
the construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by the
government for the area taken after the processing of documents by the
Commission on Audit.
Sometime in 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed between
respondent and the NIA (Exh. 1). The NIA then paid respondent the amount
of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. Respondent subsequently executed
an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she waived any
compensation for damages to crops and improvements which she suffered
as a result of the construction of a right-of-way on her property (Exh. 2).
The same year, petitioner offered respondent the sum of P35,000,00 by
way of amicable settlement pursuant to Executive Order No. 1035, 18,
which provides in part that
Financial assistance may also be given to owners of lands acquired under
C.A. 141, as amended, for the area or portion subject to the reservation
under Section 12 thereof in such amounts as may be determined by the
implementing agency/instrumentality concerned in consultation with the
Commission on Audit and the assessor's office concerned.
Respondent demanded payment for the taking of her property, but
petitioner refused to pay. Accordingly, respondent filed on December 10,
1990 a complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, praying
that petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of P111,299.55 as compensation
for the portion of her property used in the construction of the canal
constructed by the NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, filed an Answer, in
which he admitted that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the
property of the plaintiff and that NIA paid a certain landowner whose
property had been taken for irrigation purposes, but petitioner interposed
the defense that: (1) the government had not consented to be sued; (2) the
total area used by the NIA for its irrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares,
not 24,600 square meters; and (3) respondent was not entitled to
compensation for the taking of her property considering that she secured
title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent under C.A. No. 141.
At the pre-trial conference, the following facts were stipulated upon: (1)
that the area taken was 24,660 square meters; (2) that it was a portion of
the land covered by TCT No. T-22121 in the name of respondent and her
late husband (Exh. A); and (3) that this area had been taken by the NIA for
the construction of an irrigation canal. 2
On October 18, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
In view of the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and
against the defendant ordering the defendant, National Irrigation
Administration, to pay to plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Seven Thousand
Five Hundred Seventeen Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P107,517.60) as just
compensation for the questioned area of 24,660 square meters of land
owned by plaintiff and taken by said defendant NIA which used it for its
main canal plus costs. 3
On November 15, 1993, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which,
on October 31, 2000, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Hence this petition.
The issues in this case are:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION IS DISMISSIBLE FOR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT LAND GRANTED BY VIRTUE OF A HOMESTEAD
PATENT AND SUBSEQUENTLY REGISTERED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
1529 CEASES TO BE PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION SHALL BE
DETERMINED FROM THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR FROM THE TIME OF THE
FINALITY OF THE DECISION.
4. WHETHER THE AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER OF RIGHTS AND FEES
EXECUTED BY RESPONDENT EXEMPTS PETITIONER FROM MAKING PAYMENT
TO THE FORMER.
We shall deal with these issues in the order they are stated.
First. Rule 7, 5 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides
Certification against foreign shopping. The plaintiff or principal party
shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c)
if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report the fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing . . . .
By reason of Rule 45, 4 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, in
relation to Rule 42, 2 thereof, the requirement of a certificate of non-forum
shopping applies to the filing of petitions for review on certiorari of the
decisions of the Court of Appeals, such as the one filed by petitioner.
As provided in Rule 45, 5, The failure of the petitioner to comply with any
of the foregoing requirements regarding . . . the contents of the document
which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof." IaEHSD
The requirement in Rule 7, 5 that the certification should be executed by
the plaintiff or the principal means that counsel cannot sign the certificate
against forum-shopping. The reason for this is that the plaintiff or principal
knows better than anyone else whether a petition has previously been filed
involving the same case or substantially the same issues. Hence, a
certification signed by counsel alone is defective and constitutes a valid
cause for dismissal of the petition. 4
In this case, the petition for review was filed by Santiago Eslaban, Jr., in his
capacity as Project Manager of the NIA. However, the verification and
certification against forum-shopping were signed by Cesar E. Gonzales, the
administrator of the agency. The real party-in-interest is the NIA, which is a
body corporate. Without being duly authorized by resolution of the board of
the corporation, neither Santiago Eslaban, Jr. nor Cesar E. Gonzales could
sign the certificate against forum-shopping accompanying the petition for
review. Hence, on this ground alone, the petition should be dismissed.
Second. Coming to the merits of the case, the land under litigation, as
already stated, is covered by a transfer certificate of title registered in the
Registry Office of Koronadal, South Cotabato on May 13, 1976. This land
was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (P-25592) P-9800
which was issued pursuant to a homestead patent granted on February 18,
1960. We have held:
Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or conveyed to applicants
thereof, and the deed grant or instrument of conveyance [sales patent]
registered with the Register of Deeds and the corresponding certificate and
owner's duplicate of title issued, such lands are deemed registered lands
under the Torrens System and the certificate of title thus issued is as
conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued to private
lands in ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings. 5
The Solicitor-General contends, however, that an encumbrance is imposed
on the land in question in view of 39 of the Land Registration Act (now P.D.
No. 1529, 44) which provides:
Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes
a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances except those noted on said certificate, and any of the
following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
Third. Any public highway, way, private way established by law, or any
government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the certificate of title
does not state that the boundaries of such highway, way, irrigation canal or
lateral thereof, have been determined.
As this provision says, however, the only servitude which a private property
owner is required to recognize in favor of the government is the easement
of a "public highway, way, private way established by law, or any
government canal or lateral thereof where the certificate of title does not
state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined." This implies
that the same should have been pre-existing at the time of the registration
of the land in order that the registered owner may be compelled to respect
it. Conversely, where the easement is not pre-existing and is sought to be
imposed only after the land has been registered under the Land
Registration Act, proper expropriation proceedings should be had, and just
compensation paid to the registered owner thereof. 6
In this case, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the contested
property was built only on October 6, 1981, several years after the property
had been registered on May 13, 1976. Accordingly, prior expropriation
proceedings should have been filed and just compensation paid to the
owner thereof before it could be taken for public use. DHIcET
Indeed, the rule is that where private property is needed for conversion to
some public use, the first thing obviously that the government should do is
to offer to buy it. 7 If the owner is willing to sell and the parties can agree
on the price and the other conditions of the sale, a voluntary transaction
can then be concluded and the transfer effected without the necessity of a
judicial action. Otherwise, the government will use its power of eminent
domain, subject to the payment of just compensation, to acquire private
property in order to devote it to public use.
Third. With respect to the compensation which the owner of the
condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the
market value which should be paid or "that sum of money which a person,
desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled
to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." 8
Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid
to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just" for then the property owner is made to suffer
the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being
made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss. 9 Nevertheless, as noted in Ansaldo v.
Tantui co, Jr., 10 there are instances where the expropriating agency takes
over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just
compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the
time of filing of the action of eminent domain.
Before its amendment in 1997, Rule 67, 4 provided:
Order of condemnation. When such a motion is overruled or when any
party fails to defend as required by this rule, the court may enter an order
of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint upon the payment of just compensation to be determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint. . . .
It is now provided that SHaATC
SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. If the objections to and the defense Fourth. Petitioner finally contends that it is exempt from paying any
against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, amount to respondent because the latter executed an Affidavit of Waiver of
or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may Rights and Fees of any compensation due in favor of the Municipal
issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right Treasurer of Barangay Sto. Nino, South Cotabato. However, as the Court of
to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or Appeals correctly held:
purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just [I]f NIA intended to bind the appellee to said affidavit, it would not even
compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property have bothered to give her any amount for damages caused on the
or the filing of the complaint. whichever came first. improvements/crops within the appellee's property. This, apparently was
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be not the case, as can be gleaned from the disbursement voucher in the
appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not amount of P4,180.00 (page 10 of the Folder of Exhibits in Civil Case 396)
prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid. issued on September 17, 1983 in favor of the appellee, and the letter from
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to the Office of the Solicitor General recommending the giving of financial
dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court assistance in the amount of P35,000.00" to the appellee.
deems just and equitable. (Emphasis added) Thus, We are inclined to give more credence to the appellee's explanation
Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of that the waiver of rights and fees "pertains only to improvements and crops
the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, "whichever came and not to the value of the land utilized by NIA for its main canal." 15
first." Even before the new rule, however, it was already held in WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of
Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos, 11 that the price of the land at Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the extent that the just
the time of taking, not its value after the passage of time, represents the compensation for the contested property be paid to respondent in the
true value to be paid as just compensation. It was, therefore, error for the amount of P16,047.61 per hectare, with interest at the legal rate of six
Court of Appeals to rule that the just compensation to be paid to percent (6 %) per annum from the time of taking until full payment is
respondent should be determined as of the filing of the complaint in 1990, made. Costs against petitioner. THacES
and not the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was SO ORDERED.
allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent, and it was respondent Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.
who filed the complaint. In the case of Burgos, 12 it was also the property
owner who brought the action for compensation against the government
after 25 years since the taking of his property for the construction of a
road. SEcITC
Indeed, the value of the land may be affected by many factors. It may be
enhanced on account of its taking for public use, just as it may depreciate.
As observed in Republic v. Lara: 13
[W]here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation
proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for
which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have
depreciated its value thereby; or there may have been a natural increase in
the value of the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint
is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property
should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended
that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he
loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is
the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just, i.e., "just" not
only to the individual whose property is taken, "but to the public, which is
to pay for it" . . . .
In this case, the proper valuation for the property in question is P16,047.61
per hectare, the price level for 1982, based on the appraisal report
submitted by the commission (composed of the provincial treasurer,
assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato) constituted by the trial court to
make an assessment of the expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a
per hectare basis. 14
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 106440. January 29, 1996.]
ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA and LEONICA
MANOSCA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila,
Branch 168, HON. GRADUAClON A. REYES CLARAVAL, Presiding
Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 71, and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; INHERENT POWER OF THE STATE; EMINENT
DOMAIN; CONCEPT. Eminent domain, also often referred to as
expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police
power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be
clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our
Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to
grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described
as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the
government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a
method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. It is a right to take
or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to
meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance
even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The
only direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation." This proscription is
intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as
well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be
enforced.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE GUIDELINES SET BY THE SUPREME COURT IN
GUIDO VS. RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION WHERE NOT MEANT TO BE
PRECLUSIVE IN NATURE AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN SHOULD
NOT BE UNDERSTOOD AS BEING CONFINED ONLY TO EXPROPRIATION OF
VAST TRACTS OF LAND AND LANDED ESTATES. The court, in Guido,
merely passed upon the issue of the extent of the President's power under
Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire private lands for
subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for resale to bona fide tenants
or occupants. It was in this particular context of the statute that the Court
had made the pronouncement. The guidelines in Guido were not meant to
be preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the power of eminent domain
should not now be understood as being confined only to the expropriation
of vast tracts of land and landed estates.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF "PUBLIC USE" EXPANDED.
The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for
traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however,
that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The
idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public"
has long been discarded.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SIGNIFICANT FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED IN EMINENT
DOMAIN IS THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER
AND NOT THE CASUAL CONSEQUENCES THAT MIGHT FOLLOW FROM SUCH
EXERCISE. The attempt to give some religious perspective to the case
deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal
objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from the
exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially
to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the
culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and
leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit
may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others
could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely
incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually
benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the
essence and character of public use.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
In this appeal, via a petition for review on certiorari, from the decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals, dated 15 January 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24969
(entitled "Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, et al."), this
Court is asked to resolve whether or not the "public use" requirement of
Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of
a 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical
Institute ("NHI") as a national historical landmark.
The facts of the case are not in dispute.
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada,
Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492)
square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been
the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed
Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The
resolution was, on 06 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education,
Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked
on the legality of the measure. In his opinion No. 133, Series of 1987, the
Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative; he explained:
"According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or objects that
are associated with an event, achievement, characteristic, or modification
that makes a turning point or stage in Philippine history. Thus, the birthsite
of the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who,
admittedly, had made contributions to Philippine history and culture has
been declared as a national landmark. It has been held that places invested
with unusual historical interest is a public use for which the power of
eminent domain may be authorized . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"In view thereof, it is believed that the National Historical Institute as an
agency of the Government charged with the maintenance and care of
national shrines, monuments and landmarks and the development of
historical sites that may be declared as national shrines, monuments and/or
landmarks, may initiate the institution of condemnation proceedings for the
purpose of acquiring the lot in question in accordance with the procedure
provided for in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The proceedings
should be instituted by the office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the
Republic."
Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the office of the
Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation 3 before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI alleging, inter alia,
that.
"Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No; 260, the National
Historical Institute issued Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, which was
approved on January, 1986 by the then Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports, declaring the above described parcel of land which is the birthsite
of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of the 'Iglesia ni Cristo,' as a National Historical
Landmark. The plaintiff per force needs the land as such national historical
landmark which is a public purpose."
At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the
issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the
property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. After a hearing, the trial
court issued, on 03 August 1989, 4 an order fixing the provisional market
(P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00) values of the property and
authorizing the Republic to take over the property once the required sum
would have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro
Manila
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the
intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that
the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious
entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987
Constitution. 5 Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the
implementation of the 3rd August 1989 order of the trial court.
On 15 February 1990, following the filing of respondent Republic of its reply
to petitioners' motion seeking the dismissal of the case, the trial court
issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. 6 Five(5) days later, or on 20
February 1990, 7 another order was issued by the trial court, declaring
moot and academic the motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the
order of 3 August 1989 with the rejection of petitioners' motion to dismiss.
Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order
was likewise denied by the trial court in its 16th April 1991 order. 8
Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals. In its now disputed 15th January 1992 decision, the
appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground that the remedy of
appeal in the ordinary course of law was an adequate remedy an that the
petition itself, in any case, had failed to show any grave abuse of discretion
or lack of jurisdictional competence on the part of the trial court. A motion
for the reconsideration of the decision was denied in the 23rd July 1992
resolution of the appellate court.
We begin, in this present recourse of petitioners, with a few known
postulates.
Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less
frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent
power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to
exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more
to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent
domain is generally so described as "the highest and most exact idea of
property remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some
public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the
State. 9 It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the
state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an
essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus
inseparable from sovereignty. 10 The only direct constitutional qualification
is that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." 11 This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard
against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against
whose property the power is sought to be enforced.
Petitioners assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines
set by this Court in the case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration, 12
to wit: (a) the size of the land expropriated; (b) the large number of people
benefited; and, (c) the extent of social and economic reform. 13 Petitioners
suggest that we confine the concept of expropriation only to the following
public uses, 14 i.e., the
". . . taking of property for military posts, roads, streets, sidewalks, bridges,
ferries, levies, wharves, piers, public buildings including schoolhouses,
parks, playgrounds, plazas, market places, artesian wells, water supply and
sewerage systems, cemeteries, crematories, and railroads."
This view of petitioners is much too limitative and restrictive.
The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent of the
President's power under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically,
acquire private lands for subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for
resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. It was in this particular context of
the statute that the Court had made the pronouncement. The guidelines in
Guido were not meant to be preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the
power of eminent domain should not now be understood as being confined
only to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates. 15
The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the
constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public
need or a public exigency. 16 Black summarizes the characterization given
by various courts to the term: thus:
"Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for
taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, 'public
use' is one which confers some benefit or advantage to the public; it is not
confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to
use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as
public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of
public, a 'public advantage' or 'public benefit' accrues sufficient to
constitute a public use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P.2d 769,
772, 773.
"Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right
to take private property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use
concerning the whole community as distinguished from particular
individuals. But each and every member of society need not be equally
interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if the
object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient. Rindge
Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186.
The term may be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or
what is productive of general benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants of
a small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for a
particular individual. The use must be a needful one for the public, which
cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss and inconvenience. A
'public use' for which land may be taken defies absolute definition for it
changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences,
changing conceptions of scope and functions of government, and other
differing circumstances brought about by an increase in population and
new modes of communication and transportation. Katz v. Brandon, 156
Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,586." 17
The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional
purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public
use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that
"public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long
been discarded. This Court in Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 18 quoting
from Berman v. Parker (348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27), held:
"We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not
desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. See
DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421, 424, 96 L. Ed. 469, 472, 72
S Ct 405. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic
as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case,
the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determination that
take into account a wide variety of values. It is no for us to reappraise
them. If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's
Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth
Amendment that stands in the way.
"Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it
through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent
domain is merely the means to the end. See Luxton v. North River Bridge
Co. 153 US 525, 529, 530, 38 L. ed. 808, 810, 14 S Ct 891; United States v.
Gettysburg Electric R. Co. 160 US 668, 679, 40 L. ed. 576, 580, 16 S Ct
427."
It has been explained as early as Sena v. Manila Railroad Co. 19 that:
". . . A historical research discloses the meaning of the term 'public use' to
be one of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the
individual increase and each demand is a new use to which the resources
of the individual may be devoted. . . . for 'whatever is beneficially employed
for the community is a public use'."
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:
"The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it
was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement.
Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the
case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not
so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power
of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at
least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. one is
the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost
to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power,
of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to
state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use." 20
Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land
Tenure Administration, 21 has viewed the Constitution a dynamic
instrument and one that "is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically"
so as to enable it "to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in
store". Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly
observed that what, in fact, has ultimately emerged is a concept of public
use which is just as broad as "public welfare". 22
Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the
expropriation of (Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to be a
public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain"
when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to
give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration,
for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual
consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The
purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive
contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather
than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar
advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature.
Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of
property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public
use. 23
Petitioners contend that they have been denied due process in the fixing of
the provisional value of their property. Petitioners need merely to be
reminded that what the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard;
24 contrary to petitioners' argument, the records of this case are replete
with pleadings 25 that could have dealt, directly or indirectly, with the
provisional value of the property.
Petitioners, finally, would fault respondent appellate court in sustaining the
trial court's order which considered inapplicable the case of Noble v. City of
Manila. 26 Both courts held correctly. The Republic was not a party to the
alleged contract of exchange between the Iglesia ni Cristo and petitioners
which (the contracting parties) alone, not the Republic, could properly be
bound.
All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law
and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED
Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ, concur.
EN BANC
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 155746. October 13, 2004.]
DIOSDADO LAGCAO, DOROTEO LAGCAO and URSULA LAGCAO,
petitioners, vs. JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA, Branch 23, Regional
Trial Court, Cebu, and the CITY OF CEBU, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision dated July 1, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Cebu City 1 upholding the validity of the
City of Cebu's Ordinance No. 1843, as well as the lower court's order dated
August 26, 2002 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. TcDIEH
In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of
these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City, with an area of
4,048 square meters. In 1965, petitioners purchased Lot 1029 on
installment basis. But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots, including Lot 1029,
reverted to the Province of Cebu. 2 Consequently, the province tried to
annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This
prompted the latter to sue the province for specific performance and
damages in the then Court of First Instance.
On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered
the Province of Cebu to execute the final deed of sale in favor of
petitioners. On June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the appellate court, the Province of
Cebu executed on June 17, 1994 a deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029 in
favor of petitioners. Thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
129306 was issued in the name of petitioners and Crispina Lagcao. 3
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to
discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus, on June 15, 1997,
petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a
decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On
appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC's decision and issued a writ of
execution and order of demolition. CDaSAE
However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu
City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters 4 to the MTCC, requesting the
deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for
a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the mayor's request, the MTCC
issued two orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days from
February 22, 1999. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension
period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution
which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.
5 Then, on June 30, 1999, the SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772 6
which included Lot 1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing.
On July, 19, 2000, Ordinance No. 1843 7 was enacted by the SP of Cebu
City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation
proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered in the
name of petitioners. The intended acquisition was to be used for the benefit
of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to the actual occupants
thereof. For this purpose, the ordinance appropriated the amount of
P6,881,600 for the payment of the subject lot. This ordinance was approved
by Mayor Garcia on August 2, 2000.
On August 29, 2000, petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration
of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being unconstitutional. The trial court
rendered its decision on July 1, 2002 dismissing the complaint filed by
petitioners whose subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied on August 26, 2002. EcICDT
In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional
as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling
it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of "public use"
contemplated in the Constitution. 8 They allege that it will benefit only a
handful of people. The ordinance, according to petitioners, was obviously
passed for politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big source of votes.
In sum, this Court is being asked to resolve whether or not the intended
expropriation by the City of Cebu of a 4,048-square-meter parcel of land
owned by petitioners contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws.
Under Section 48 of RA 7160, 9 otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, 10 local legislative power shall be exercised by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the city. The legislative acts of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod in the exercise of its lawmaking authority are
denominated ordinances. cEAHSC
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can
exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. 11 By virtue
of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to
expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA
7160:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws . . .. (italics supplied).
Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners' lot
was enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the
homeless and low-income residents of the City.
However, while we recognize that housing is one of the most serious social
problems of the country, local government units do not possess unbridled
authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to
this problem.
There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; 12 and
(2) private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. 13 Thus, the exercise by local government units of the
power of eminent domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA 7160
itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with the provisions of
the Constitution and pertinent laws. HcACTE
The exercise of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a
landowner's right to private property, which is as much a constitutionally-
protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of
personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty.
14 Whether directly exercised by the State or by its authorized agents, the
exercise of eminent domain is necessarily in derogation of private rights.
15 For this reason, the need for a painstaking scrutiny cannot be
overemphasized.
The due process clause cannot be trampled upon each time an ordinance
orders the expropriation of a private individual's property. The courts
cannot even adopt hands-off policy simply because public use or public
purpose is invoked by an ordinance, or just compensation has been fixed
and determined. In De Knecht vs. Bautista, 16 we said:
It is obvious then that a land-owner is covered by the mantle of protection
due process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it
is the antithesis of any governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. It
negates state power to act in an oppressive manner. It is, as had been
stressed so often, the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. In that
sense, it stands as a guaranty of justice. That is the standard that must be
met by any governmental agency in the exercise of whatever competence
is entrusted to it. As was so emphatically stressed by the present Chief
Justice, "Acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due
process only under pain of nullity. . . ..
The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine
necessity and that necessity must be of public character. 17 Government
may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be
expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners'
property was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what
necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843
stated no reason for the choice of petitioners' property as the site of a
socialized housing project. HTDAac
Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the
random expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few
tenants or squatters is certainly not the condemnation for public use
contemplated by the Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his property
for the convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the public. 18
RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for
purposes of. urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof
provide:
SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. Lands for socialized housing
shall be acquired in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal
Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement
Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which
have not yet been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands. aTEACS
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to
the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply.
The local government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site
development of government lands. (Emphasis supplied).
SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. The modes of acquiring lands for
purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage,
land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to
the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and
expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to
only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided
further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by
small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: . . .
(Emphasis supplied).
In the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes et
al. vs. City of Manila, 19 we ruled that the above-quoted provisions are
strict limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local
government units, especially with respect to (1) the order of priority in
acquiring land for socialized housing and (2) the resort to expropriation
proceedings as a means to acquiring it. Private lands rank last in the order
of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,
expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of
acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory
because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of
private property against what may be a tyrannical violation of due process
when their property is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use.
SacTCA
We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu
complied strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843
sought to expropriate petitioners' property without any attempt to first
acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu
City failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of
RA 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance
No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy
petitioners' property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160. 20 We therefore
find Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being violative of
the petitioners' right to due process.
It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already
obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of
their property. The judgment in this ejectment case had, in fact, already
attained finality, with a writ of execution and an order of demolition. But
Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to suspend the demolition on the
pretext that the City was still searching for a relocation site for the
squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation site during the
suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843
for the expropriation of petitioners' lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure
and simple. The unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance
was passed clearly indicated that respondent City transgressed the
Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be in accordance
with certain well-established basic principles of a substantive nature. These
principles require that an ordinance (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must
not be unreasonable. 21
Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing substantive
requirements. A clear case of constitutional infirmity having been thus
established, this Court is constrained to nullify the subject ordinance. We
recapitulate:
first, as earlier discussed, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the
pertinent provisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;
second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain
oppression masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance;
third, the fact that petitioners' small property was singled out for
expropriation for the purpose of awarding it to no more than a few
squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitioners, and
fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a reasonable relation
between the end sought and the means adopted. While the objective of the
City of Cebu was to provide adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means
it employed in pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal,
sensible and called for by the circumstances.
Indeed, experience has shown that the disregard of basic liberties and the
use of short-sighted methods in expropriation proceedings have not
achieved the desired results. Over the years, the government, has tried to
remedy the worsening squatter problem. Far from solving it, however,
government's kid-glove approach has only resulted in the multiplication
and proliferation of squatter colonies and blighted areas. A pro-poor
program that is well-studied, adequately funded, genuinely sincere and
truly respectful of everyone's basic rights is what this problem calls for, not
the improvident enactment of politics-based ordinances targeting small
private lots in no rational fashion. ATCaDE
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 1, 2002 decision of
Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is RESERVED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136349. January 23, 2006.]
LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP, petitioner, vs. THE CITY OF PASIG,
HON. MARIETTA A. LEGASPI, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 165 and THE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ, J p:
Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the benefit of
a small community which seeks to have its own sports and recreational
facility, notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a
short distance away, such taking cannot be considered to be for public use.
Its expropriation is not valid. In this case, the Court defines what
constitutes a genuine necessity for public use. EIAHcC
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals dated October 31, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 affirming the
Order 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig City, dated May 7,
1996 in S.C.A. No. 873. Likewise assailed is the Resolution 3 of the same
court dated November 20, 1998 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
The facts of the case are:
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of
land with an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan,
Pasig City, Metro Manila.
In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of
Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500
square meter portion of her property to be used for the "sports
development and recreational activities" of the residents of Barangay
Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted
by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner,
but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the program of the
Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor
sectors of our community."
On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the
intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and
oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to
"provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community."
DTcASE
In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that the purpose
of the expropriation of petitioner's property is "to provide sports and
recreational facilities to its poor residents."
Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a
complaint for expropriation, docketed as SCA No. 873. Respondent prayed
that the trial court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order for the
condemnation of the property; that commissioners be appointed for the
purpose of determining the just compensation; and that judgment be
rendered based on the report of the commissioners.
On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the
following grounds:
I
PLAINTIFF HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN, CONSIDERING THAT:
(A) THERE IS NO GENUINE NECESSITY FOR THE TAKING OF THE
PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED.
(B) PLAINTIFF HAS ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY CHOSEN THE
PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED.
(C) EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT DEFENDANTS PROPERTY MAY
BE EXPROPRIATED BY PLAINTIFF, THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY TO BE EXPROPRIATED FAR EXCEEDS SEVENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND
PESOS (P78,000.00)
II
PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT IS DEFECTIVE IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE,
CONSIDERING THAT:
(A) PLAINTIFF FAILS TO ALLEGE WITH CERTAINTY THE PURPOSE OF
THE EXPROPRIATION.
(B) PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PREREQUISITES LAID
DOWN IN SECTION 34, RULE VI OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; THUS, THE INSTANT
EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING IS PREMATURE.
III
THE GRANTING OF THE EXPROPRIATION WOULD VIOLATE SECTION 261 (V)
OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE. DTSIEc
IV
PLAINTIFF CANNOT TAKE POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY
MERELY DEPOSITING AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO FIFTEEN PERCENT (15%) OF
THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY BASED ON THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 4
On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to
Dismiss, 5 on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate
the property for the sports and recreational activities of the residents of
Pasig. As to the issue of just compensation, the trial court held that the
same is to be determined in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial
court in its Order of July 31, 1996. Forthwith, it appointed the City Assessor
and City Treasurer of Pasig City as commissioners to ascertain the just
compensation. This prompted petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a
special civil action for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41860. On
October 31, 1997, the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
dated November 20, 1998.
Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds:
THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED 31 OCTOBER 1997 (ATTACHMENT "A")
AND RESOLUTION DATED 20 NOVEMBER 1998 (ATTACHMENT "B") ARE
CONTRARY TO LAW, THE RULES OF COURT AND JURISPRUDENCE
CONSIDERING THAT:
I
A. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GENUINE
NECESSITY FOR THE TAKING OF THE PETITIONER'S PROPERTY.
B. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE PUBLIC USE
REQUIREMENT FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH.
C. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT RESPONDENT CITY OF
PASIG HAS COMPLIED WITH ALL CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR THE
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN.
THE COURT A QUO'S ORDER DATED 07 MAY 1996 AND 31 JULY 1996,
WHICH WERE AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, EFFECTIVELY AMOUNT
TO THE TAKING OF PETITIONER'S PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF
LAW:
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING OF RULE ON
ACTIONABLE DOCUMENTS TO THE DOCUMENTS ATTACHED TO
RESPONDENT CITY OF PASIG'S COMPLAINT DATED 07 APRIL 1995 TO
JUSTIFY THE COURT A QUO'S DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S RESPONSIVE
PLEADING TO THE COMPLAINT FOR EXPROPRIATION (THE MOTION TO
DISMISS DATED 21 APRIL 1995).
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULE ON
HYPOTHETICAL ADMISSION OF FACTS ALLEGED IN A COMPLAINT
CONSIDERING THAT THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY PETITIONER IN THE
EXPROPRIATION CASE BELOW WAS THE RESPONSIVE PLEADING REQUIRED
TO BE FILED UNDER THE THEN RULE 67 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND NOT
AN ORDINARY MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 16 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.
The foregoing arguments may be synthesized into two main issues one
substantive and one procedural. We will first address the procedural issue.
TSIDEa
Petitioner filed her Motion to Dismiss the complaint for expropriation on
April 25, 1995. It was denied by the trial court on May 7, 1996. At that time,
the rule on expropriation was governed by Section 3, Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"SEC. 3. Defenses and objections. Within the time specified in the
summons, each defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present in a single
motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all his objections and
defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his property for the use or
purpose specified in the complaint. All such objections and defenses not so
presented are waived. A copy of the motion shall be served on the
plaintiff's attorney of record and filed with the court with proof of service."
The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above Rule clearly constitutes
the responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the
complaint for expropriation. Such motion is the pleading that puts in issue
the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the defendant's property for the use
specified in the complaint. All that the law requires is that a copy of the
said motion be served on plaintiff's attorney of record. It is the court that at
its convenience will set the case for trial after the filing of the said pleading.
6 based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:
The Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that the motion to dismiss
filed by petitioner hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in
the complaint, "specifically that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate
petitioner's property for public use." Pursuant to the above Rule, the motion
is a responsive pleading joining the issues. What the trial court should have
done was to set the case for the reception of evidence to determine
whether there is indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of the property,
instead of summarily making a finding that the taking is for public use and
appointing commissioners to fix just compensation. This is especially so
considering that the purpose of the expropriation was squarely challenged
and put in issue by petitioner in her motion to dismiss.
Significantly, the above Rule allowing a defendant in an expropriation case
to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer was amended by the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Section 3, Rule
67 now expressly mandates that any objection or defense to the taking of
the property of a defendant must be set forth in an answer.
The fact that the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
41860 on October 31, after the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect, is
of no moment. It is only fair that the Rule at the time petitioner filed her
motion to dismiss should govern. The new provision cannot be applied
retroactively to her prejudice.
We now proceed to address the substantive issue.
In the early case of US v. Toribio, 7 this Court defined the power of eminent
domain as "the right of a government to take and appropriate private
property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can
be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation
therefor." It has also been described as the power of the State or its
instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable
from sovereignty and inherent in government. 8
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the
government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units,
other public entities and public utility corporations, 9 subject only to
Constitutional limitations. Local governments have no inherent power of
eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by
statute. 10 Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act
No. 7160) prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent
domain to local government units and lays down the parameters for its
exercise, thus:
"SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may,
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise
the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the
benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided,
however, That, the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless
a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such
offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That, the local government unit
may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court
of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for expropriated property
shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at
the time of the taking of the property." CSHcDT
Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following property be specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be
areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of a public character, must also be shown to exist.
of the taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged Decision
11 and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 are
In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasig failed to REVERSED. The complaint for expropriation filed before the trial court by
establish a genuine necessity which justifies the condemnation of her respondent City of Pasig, docketed as SCA No. 873, is ordered DISMISSED.
property. While she does not dispute the intended public purpose, cDSAEI
nonetheless, she insists that there must be a genuine necessity for the SO ORDERED.
proposed use and purposes. According to petitioner, there is already an
established sports development and recreational activity center at
Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and being utilized by its
residents, including those from Barangay Caniogan. Respondent does not
dispute this. Evidently, there is no "genuine necessity" to justify the
expropriation.
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates
from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 12 we held that the very
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity
and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow,
the taking of the land. In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, 13 we ruled
that "necessity within the rule that the particular property to be
expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a
reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest
benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the
condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit."
Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to
establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner's
property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification 14 issued
by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated November 20, 1994, the basis for
the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation,
indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound
Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the
residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said
Association are desirous of having their own private playground and
recreational facility. Petitioner's lot is the nearest vacant space available.
The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The
necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an
alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the
area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City,
including those of Caniogan.
The right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished rights
of men. It is so fundamental that it has been written into organic law of
every nation where the rule of law prevails. Unless the requisite of genuine
necessity for the expropriation of one's property is clearly established, it
shall be the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to their
private property. Important as the power of eminent domain may be, the
inviolable sanctity which the Constitution attaches to the property of the
individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of private
[G.R. No. L-59603. April 29, 1987.]
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HON.
CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court
of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN
ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Elena M. Cuevas for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUST COMPENSATION; PROVISIONS OF P.D.
NOS. 76, 464, 794 AND 1533 CONSTITUTES IMPERMISSIBLE
ENCROACHMENT ON JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES. The method of
ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this
Court initial in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for
final determination. Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the
court technically would still have the power to determine the just
compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task
would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as
declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence,
it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in
the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said
that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However,
the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be
nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to
choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its
choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise
its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a
grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the
determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.
2. ID.; ID.; VALUATION IN THE DECREE MAY ONLY SERVE AS A
GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN THE DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BUT
MAY NOT SUBSTITUTE THE COURT'S OWN JUDGMENT AS TO WHAT AMOUNT
SHOULD BE AWARDED AND HOW TO ARRIVE AT SUCH AMOUNT; DOCTRINE
ENUNCIATED IN THE CASE OF NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY V. REYES
(123 SCRA 245) ABANDONED. We are convinced and so rule that the trial
court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may only serve as a
guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but
it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should
be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. A return to the earlier well-
established doctrine, to our mind, is more in keeping with the principle that
the judiciary should live up to its mission "by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights." (See Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438, 462; citing
Mercado v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93.) The doctrine we
enunciated in National Housing Authority v. Reyes, supra, therefore, must
necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold this Court's role as the
guardian of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the due process and
equal protection clauses and as the final arbiter over transgressions
committed against constitutional rights.
3. ID.; ID.; DEFINITION OF JUST COMPENSATION; WHAT CONSTITUTES
ARBITRARY AND CONFISCATORY VALUATION. Just compensation means
the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the
property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be
considered. In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the
petitioner as basis for just compensation were made by the Lapu-Lapu
municipal, later city assessor long before martial law, when land was not
only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were stated in
figures constituting only a fraction of their true market value. The private
respondent was not even the owner of the properties at the time. It
purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg the value of the lots
on the basis of documents which are out of date and at prices below the
acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory.
4. ID.; ID.; FACTORS CONSIDERED IN THE VALUATION OF PROPERTIES
FOR EXPROPRIATION. Various factors can come into play in the valuation
of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by
provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering
several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion.
Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land is
based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn,
coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been
cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or
three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often
inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be
absolute substitutes for just compensation.
5. ID.; ID.; DENIAL TO THE OWNER OF EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY OF
THE OPPORTUNITY TO QUESTION THE VALUATION IN THE TAX DOCUMENTS
IS VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS. To say that the owners are estopped to
question the valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity
to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of land owners accept
unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local
assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less
analyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply never occurs
until a demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so. It
is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove
that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is
repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard
work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment
of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually
viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been
presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and
just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION, A JUDICIAL
FUNCTION. The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain
cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature
may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of
the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken
for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-
ness" of the decreed compensation.
7. ID.; ID.; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1533; DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID. We, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which
eliminates the court's discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule
67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise
would be to undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first
place.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential Decrees
Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded Sections
5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that in determining the
just compensation of property in an expropriation case, the only basis
should be its market value as declared by the owner or as determined by
the assessor, whichever is lower. LibLex
On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation
No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in
the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of
1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export
processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation
included, among others, four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of
22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name of the private
respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of
land from the respondent in accordance with the valuation set forth in
Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties
failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property.
The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch
XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of possession against the private respondent, to
expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to P.D. No. 66, as
amended, which empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation
proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones,
in relation to Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of establishing the
Mactan Export Processing Zone.
On October 21, 1980, the respondent judge issued a writ of possession
authorizing the petitioner to take immediate possession of the premises.
On December 23, 1980, the private respondent filed its answer.
At the pre-trial conference on February 13, 1981, the respondent judge
issued an order stating that the parties have agreed that the only issue to
be resolved is the just compensation for the properties and that the pre-
trial is thereby terminated and the hearing on the merits is set on April 2,
1981.
On February 17, 1981, the respondent judge issued the order of
condemnation declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right to take the
properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint. The
respondent judge also issued a second order, subject of this petition,
appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the
court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated.
On June 19, 1981, the three commissioners submitted their consolidated
report recommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair
and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties.
On July 29, 1981, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
order of February 19, 1981 and Objection to Commissioner's Report on the
grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through
commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum
amount set by P.D. No. 1533.
On November 14, 1981, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and gave the latter ten (10) days within which to file its
objection to the Commissioner's Report.
On February 9, 1982, the petitioner filed this present petition for certiorari
and mandamus with preliminary restraining order, enjoining the trial court
from enforcing the order dated February 17, 1981 and from further
proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case.
The only issue raised in this petition is whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule
67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or deemed amended
by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment of commissioners to determine
the just compensation is concerned. Stated in another way, is the exclusive
and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533
valid and constitutional?
The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge acted in excess of his
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and in setting the commissioner's report for
hearing because under P.D. No. 1533, which is the applicable law herein,
the basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value
declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such
market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore,
there is no more need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67
of the Revised Rules of Court and for said commissioners to consider other
highly variable factors in order to determine just compensation. The
petitioner further maintains that P.D. No. 1533 has vested on the assessors
and the property owners themselves the power or duty to fix the market
value of the properties and that said property owners are given the full
opportunity to be heard before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Thus, the vesting on the assessor
or the property owner of the right to determine the just compensation in
expropriation proceedings, with appropriate procedure for appeal to higher
administrative boards, is valid and constitutional.
Prior to the promulgation of P.D. Nos. 76, 464, 794 and 1533, this Court has
interpreted the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution and
established the meaning, under the fundamental law, of just compensation
and who has the power to determine it. Thus, in the following cases,
wherein the filing of the expropriation proceedings were all commenced
prior to the promulgation of the aforementioned decrees, we laid down the
doctrine on just compensation:
Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals (93 SCRA 503, 516),
xxx xxx xxx
". . . And in the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration, 31 SCRA 413, the Court, speaking thru now Chief Justice
Fernando, reiterated the 'well-settled (rule) that just compensation means
the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking.
Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less, than just
compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained,
which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to
the expropriating entity.' "
Garcia v. Court of Appeals (102 SCRA 597, 608),
xxx xxx xxx
". . . Hence, in estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the
property and all the uses to which it may be applied or for which it is
adapted are to be considered and not merely the condition it is in the time
and the use to which it is then applied by the owner. All the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and
capabilities may be shown and considered in estimating its value."
Republic v. Santos (141 SCRA 30, 35-36),
"According to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the
commissioners' report. It may make such order or render such judgment as
shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his
right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the
property expropriated. This Court may substitute its own estimate of the
value as gathered from the record (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez,
32 Phil. 286).
However, the promulgation of the aforementioned decrees practically set
aside the above and many other precedents hammered out in the course of
evidence-laden, well argued, fully heard, studiously deliberated, and
judiciously considered court proceedings. The decrees categorically and
peremptorily limited the definition of just compensation thus:
P.D. No. 76:
xxx xxx xxx
"For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property acquired by
the government for public use, the basis shall be the current and fair
market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value
as determined by the Assessor, whichever is lower."
P.D. No. 464:
"Section 92. Basis for payment of just compensation in expropriation
proceedings. In determining just compensation which private property is
acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the market
value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal
interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the
assessor, whichever is lower."
P.D. No. 794:
"Section 92. Basis for payment of just compensation in expropriation
proceedings. In determining just compensation when private property is
acquired by the government for public use, the same shall not exceed the
market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having
legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the
assessor, whichever is lower."
P.D. No. 1533:
"Section 1. In determining just compensation for private property
acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the compensation to be
paid shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or administrator or
anyone having legal interest in the property or determined by the assessor,
pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to
the recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office to
acquire the property."
We are constrained to declare the provisions of the Decrees on just
compensation unconstitutional and void and accordingly dismiss the instant
petition for lack of merit. cdtai
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees
constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to
render this Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is
reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would
still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property,
following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply
stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or
the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court
to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover,
the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property
is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was
not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the
decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality
or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the
owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower
of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in
determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute
for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just
compensation is concerned.
In the case of National Housing Authority v. Reyes (123 SCRA 245), this
Court upheld P.D. No. 464, as further amended by P.D. Nos. 794, 1224 and
1259. In this case, the petitioner National Housing Authority contended that
the owner's declaration at P1,400.00 which happened to be lower than the
assessor's assessment, is the just compensation for the respondent's
property under section 92 of P.D. No. 464. On the other hand, the private
respondent stressed that while there may be basis for the allegation that
the respondent judge did not follow the decree, the matter is still subject to
his final disposition, he having been vested with the original and competent
authority to exercise his judicial discretion in the light of the constitutional
clauses on due process and equal protection.
To these opposing arguments, this Court ruled that under the conceded
facts, there should be a recognition that the law as it stands must be
applied; that the decree having spoken so clearly and unequivocably calls
for obedience; and that on a matter where the applicable law speaks in no
uncertain language, the Court has no choice except to yield to its
command. We further stated that "the courts should recognize that the rule
introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees does not
upset the established concepts of justice or the constitutional provision on
just compensation for, precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own
valuation of his property."
While the Court yielded to executive prerogative exercised in the form of
absolute law-making power, its members, nonetheless, remained
uncomfortable with the implications of the decision and the abuse and
unfairness which might follow in its wake. For one thing, the President
himself did not seem assured or confident with his own enactment. It was
not enough to lay down the law on determination of just compensation in
P.D. 76. It had to be repeated and reiterated in P.D. 464, P.D. 794, and P.D.
1533. The provision is also found in P.D. 1224, P.D. 1259 and P.D. 1313.
Inspite of its effectivity as general law and the wide publicity given to it, the
questioned provision or an even stricter version had to be embodied in
cases of specific expropriations by decree as in P.D. 1669 expropriating the
Tambunting Estate and P.D. 1670 expropriating the Sunog Apog area in
Tondo, Manila.
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same
question of whether the courts under P.D. 1533, which contains the same
provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the
power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what
is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for
such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
In overruling the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and objection to
the commissioner's report, the trial court said:
"Another consideration why the Court is empowered to appoint
commissioners to assess the just compensation of these properties under
eminent domain proceedings, is the well-entrenched ruling that 'the owner
of property expropriated is entitled to recover from expropriating authority
the fair and full value of the lot, as of the time when possession thereof was
actually taken by the province, plus consequential damages including
attorney's fees from which the consequential benefits, if any should be
deducted, with interest at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the
owner from and after the date of actual taking.' (Capitol Subdivision, Inc. v.
Province of Negros Occidental, 7 SCRA 60). In fine, the decree only
establishes a uniform basis for determining just compensation which the
Court may consider as one of the factors in arriving at 'just compensation,'
as envisage in the Constitution. In the words of Justice Barredo,
'Respondent court's invocation of General Order No. 3 of September 21,
1972 is nothing short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority,
which no judge duly imbued with the implications of the paramount
principle of independence of the judiciary should ever think of doing.' (Lina
v. Purisima, 82 SCRA 344, 361; Cf. Prov. of Pangasinan v. CFI Judge of
Pangasinan, Br. VIII, 80 SCRA 117) Indeed, where this Court simply follows
PD 1533, thereby limiting the determination of just compensation on the
value declared by the owner or administrator or as determined by the
Assessor, whichever is lower, it may result in the deprivation of the
landowner's right of due process to enable it to prove its claim to just
compensation, as mandated by the Constitution. (Uy v. Genato, 57 SCRA
123). The tax declaration under the Real Property Tax Code is,
undoubtedly, for purposes of taxation."
We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that the
valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the
factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the
court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount. A return to the earlier well-established doctrine, to
our mind, is more in keeping with the principle that the judiciary should live
up to its mission "by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights."
(See Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438, 462; citing Mercado v. Court of
First Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93.) The doctrine we enunciated in
National Housing Authority v. Reyes, supra, therefore, must necessarily be
abandoned if we are to uphold this Court's role as the guardian of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the due process and equal protection
clauses and as the final arbiter over transgressions committed against
constitutional rights.
The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily apparent.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the
taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the
facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as
basis for just compensation were made by the Lapu-Lapu municipal, later
city assessor long before martial law, when land was not only much
cheaper but when assessed values of properties were stated in figures
constituting only a fraction of their true market value. The private
respondent was not even the owner of the properties at the time. It
purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg the value of the lots
on the basis of documents which are out of date and at prices below the
acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory.
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties
singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are
usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an
entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are
never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as
its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often
land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings
are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and
estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can
serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.
LLjur
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by
assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The
overwhelming mass of land owners accept unquestioningly what is found in
the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal clerks for
them. They do not even look at, much less analyze, the statements. The
idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is made or a case
filed by an agency authorized to do so.
It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove
that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is
repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard
work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment
of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually
viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been
presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and
just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
As was held in the case of Gideon v. Wainwright (93 ALR 2d, 733, 742):
"In the light of these and many other prior decisions of this Court, it is not
surprising that the Betts Court, when faced with the contention that 'one
charged with crime, who is unable to obtain counsel' must be furnished
counsel by the State,' conceded that '[E]xpressions in the opinions of this
court lend color to the argument . . .' 316 U.S., at 462, 463, 86 L ed. 1602,
62 S Ct. 1252. The fact is that in deciding as it did - that 'appointment of
counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial' the Court in
Betts v. Brady made an abrupt brake with its own well-considered
precedents. In returning to these old precedents, sounder we believe than
the new, we but restore constitutional principles established to achieve a
fair system of justice. . . .'.
We return to older and more sound precedents. This Court has the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules. (See Salonga v. Cruz Pano, supra).
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a
judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make
the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for
public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-
ness" of the decreed compensation.
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's
discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to
undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on February 16, 1982 is
LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-20620. August 15, 1974.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CARMEN M.
VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
C . A. Mendoza & A.V . Raquiza and Alberto Cacnio & Associates for
defendant-appellees.
DECISION
ZALDIVAR, J p:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its
Civil Case No. 1623, an expropriation proceeding.
Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, (hereinafter referred to
as the Republic) filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain
against defendant-appellee, Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, judicial
administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi hereinafter
referred to as Castellvi), over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San
Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga, described as follows:
"A parcel of land, Lot No. 199-B Bureau of Lands Plan Swo-23666. Bounded
on the NE by Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun; on the SE by national road; on the
SW by AFP reservation, and on the NW by AFP reservation. Containing an
area of 759,299 square meters, more or less, and registered in the name of
Alfonso Castellvi under TCT No. 13631 of the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga . . .";
and against defendant-appellee Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun (hereinafter
referred to as Toledo-Gozun), over two parcels of land described as follows:
"A parcel of land (Portion of Lot 1-B, Blk-1, Bureau of Lands Plan Psd,
26254. Bounded on the NE by Lot 3, on the SE by Lot 3; on the SW by Lot 1-
B, Blk. 2 (equivalent to Lot 199-B Swo 23666; on the NW by AFP military
reservation. Containing an area of 450,273 square meters, more or less,
and registered in the name of Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun under TCT No.
8708 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. . . .", and
"A parcel of land (Portion of Lot 3, Blk-1, Bureau of Lands Plan Psd 26254.
Bounded on the NE by Lot No. 3, on the SE by school lot and national road,
on the SW by Lot 1-B Blk 2 (equivalent to Lot 199-B Swo 23666), on the NW
by Lot 1-B, Blk-1. Containing an area of 88,772 square meters, more or
less, and registered in the name of Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun under TCT
No. 8708 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, . . ."
In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair
market value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee
on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per
hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the
provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259,669.10, that the court
authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit
of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court
appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the
court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation.
On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value
of the lands at P259,669.10.
In her "motion to dismiss" filed on July 14, 1959, Castellvi alleged, among
other things, that the land under her administration, being a residential
land, had a fair market value of P15.00 per square meter, so it had a total
market value of P11,389,485.00; that the Republic, through the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, particularly the Philippine Air Force, had been,
despite repeated demands, illegally occupying her property since July 1,
1956, thereby preventing her from using and disposing of it, thus causing
her damages by way of unrealized profits. This defendant prayed that the
complaint be dismissed, or that the Republic be ordered to pay her P15.00
per square meter, or a total of P11,389,485.00, plus interest thereon at 6%
per annum from July 1, 1956; that the Republic be ordered to pay her
P5,000,000.00 as unrealized profits, and the costs of the suit.
By order of the trial court, dated August, 1959, Amparo C. Diaz, Dolores G.
viuda de Gil, Paloma Castellvi, Carmen Castellvi, Rafael Castellvi, Luis
Castellvi, Natividad Castellvi de Raquiza, Jose Castellvi and Consuelo
Castellvi were allowed to intervene as parties defendants. Subsequently,
Joaquin V. Gozun, Jr., husband of defendant Nieves Toledo Gozun, was also
allowed by the court to intervene as a party defendant.
After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga
the amount of P259,669.10, the trial court ordered that the Republic be
placed in possession of the lands. The Republic was actually placed in
possession of the lands on August 10, 1959. 1
In her "motion to dismiss", dated October 22, 1959, Toledo-Gozun alleged,
among other things, that her two parcels of land were residential lands, in
fact a portion with an area of 343,303 square meters had already been
subdivided into different lots for sale to the general public, and the
remaining portion had already been set aside for expansion sites of the
already completed subdivisions; that the fair market value of said lands
was P15.00 per square meter, so they had a total market value of
P8,085,675.00; and she prayed that the complaint be dismissed, or that
she be paid the amount of P8,085,675.00, plus interest thereon at the rate
of 6% per annum from October 13, 1959, and attorney's fees in the amount
of P50,000.00.
Intervenors Jose Castellvi and Consuelo Castellvi in their answer, filed on
February 11, 1960, and also intervenor Joaquin Gozun, Jr., husband of
defendant Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun, in his motion to dismiss, dated May
27, 1960, all alleged that the value of the lands sought to be expropriated
was at the rate of P15.00 per square meter.
On November 4, 1959, the trial court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of
Pampanga to pay defendant Toledo-Gozun the sum of P107,609.00 as
provisional value of her lands. 2 On May 16, 1960 the trial Court authorized
the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Castellvi the
amount of P151,859.80 as provisional value of the land under her
administration, and ordered said defendant to deposit the amount with the
Philippine National Bank under the supervision of the Deputy Clerk of Court.
In another order of May 16, 1960 the trial Court entered an order of
condemnation. 3
The trial Court appointed three commissioners: Atty. Amadeo Yuzon, Clerk
of Court, as commissioner for the court; Atty. Felicisimo G. Pamandanan,
counsel of the Philippine National Bank Branch at Floridablanca, for the
plaintiff; and Atty. Leonardo F. Lansangan, Filipino legal counsel at Clark Air
Base, for the defendants. The Commissioners, after having qualified
themselves, proceeded to the performance of their duties.
On March 15, 1961 the Commissioners submitted their report and
recommendation, wherein, after having determined that the lands sought
to be expropriated were residential lands, they recommended unanimously
that the lowest price that should be paid was P10.00 per square meter, for
both the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun; that an additional P5,000.00
be paid to Toledo-Gozun for improvements found on her land; that legal
interest on the compensation, computed from August 10, 1959, be paid
after deducting the amounts already paid to the owners, and that no
consequential damages be awarded. 4 The Commissioners' report was
objected to by all the parties in the case by defendants Castellvi and
Toledo-Gozun, who insisted that the fair market value of their lands should
be fixed at P15.00 per square meter; and by the Republic, which insisted
that the price to be paid for the lands should be fixed at P0.20 per square
meter. 5
After the parties-defendants and intervenors had filed their respective
memoranda, and the Republic, after several extensions of time, had
adopted as its memorandum its objections to the report of the
Commissioners, the trial court, on May 26, 1961, rendered its decision 6
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, taking into account all the foregoing circumstances, and that
the lands are titled, . . . the rising trend of land values,. . . and the lowered
purchasing power of the Philippine peso, the court finds that the unanimous
recommendation of the commissioners of ten (P10.00) pesos per square
meter for the three lots of the defendants subject of this action is fair and
just."
xxx xxx xxx
"The plaintiff will pay 6% interest per annum on the total value of the lands
of defendant Toledo-Gozun since (sic) the amount deposited as provisional
value from August 10, 1959 until full payment is made to said defendant or
deposit therefor is made in court.
"In respect to the defendant Castellvi, interest at 6% per annum will also be
paid by the plaintiff to defendant Castellvi from July 1, 1956 when plaintiff
commenced its illegal possession of the Castellvi land when the instant
action had not yet been commenced to July 10, 1959 when the provisional
value thereof was actually deposited in court, on the total value of the said
(Castellvi) land as herein adjudged. The same rate of interest shall be paid
from July 11, 1959 on the total value of the land herein adjudged minus the
amount deposited as provisional value, or P151,859.80, such interest to run
until full payment is made to said defendant or deposit therefor is made in
court. All the Intervenors having failed to produce evidence in support of
their respective interventions, said interventions are ordered dismissed.
"The costs shall be charged to the plaintiff."
On June 21, 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or
reconsideration, upon the grounds of newly-discovered evidence, that the
decision was not supported by the evidence, and that the decision was
against the law, against which motion defendants Castellvi and Toledo-
Gozun filed their respective oppositions. On July 8, 1961 when the motion
of the Republic for new trial and/or reconsideration was called for hearing,
the Republic filed a supplemental motion for new trial upon the ground of
additional newly-discovered evidence. This motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration was denied by the court on July 12, 1961.
On July 17, 1961 the Republic gave notice of its intention to appeal from
the decision of May 26, 1961 and the order of July 12, 1961. Defendant
Castellvi also filed, on July 17, 1961, her notice of appeal from the decision
of the trial court.
The Republic filed various ex-parte motions for extension of time within
which to file its record on appeal. The Republic's record on appeal was
finally submitted on December 6, 1961.
Defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed not only a joint opposition to
the approval of the Republic's record on appeal, but also a joint
memorandum in support of their opposition. The Republic also filed a
memorandum in support of its prayer for the approval of its record on
appeal. On December 27, 1961 the trial court issued an order declaring
both the record on appeal filed by the Republic, and the record on appeal
filed by defendant Castellvi as having been filed out of time, thereby
dismissing both appeals.
On January 11, 1962 the Republic filed a "motion to strike out the order of
December 27, 1961 and for reconsideration", and subsequently an
amended record oil appeal, against which motion the defendants Castellvi
and Toledo-Gozun filed their opposition. On July 26, 1962 the trial court
issued an order, stating that "in the interest of expediency, the questions
raised may be properly and finally determined by the Supreme Court," and
at the same time it ordered the Solicitor General to submit a record on
appeal containing copies of orders and pleadings specified therein. In an
order dated November 19, 1962, the trial court approved the Republic's
record on appeal as amended.
Defendant Castellvi did not insist on her appeal. Defendant Toledo-Gozun
did not appeal.
The motion to dismiss the Republic's appeal was reiterated by appellees
Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun before this Court, but this Court denied the
motion.
In her motion of August 11, 1964, appellee Castellvi sought to increase the
provisional value of her land. The Republic, in its comment on Castellvi's
motion, opposed the same. This Court denied Castellvi's motion in a
resolution dated October 2, 1964.
The motion of appellees, Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, dated October 6,
1969, praying that they be authorized to mortgage the lands subject of
expropriation, was denied by this Court or October 14, 1969.
On February 14, 1972, Attys. Alberto Cacnio, and Associates, counsel for
the estate of the late Don Alfonso de Castellvi in the expropriation
proceedings, filed a notice of attorney's lien, stating that as per agreement
with the administrator of the estate of Don Alfonso de Castellvi they shall
receive by way of attorney's fees, "the sum equivalent to ten per centum of
whatever the court may finally decide as the expropriated price of the
property subject matter of the case."
Before this Court, the Republic contends that the lower court erred:
1. In finding the price of P10 per square meter of the lands subject of
the instant proceedings as just compensation;
2. In holding that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation
commenced with the filing of this action;
3. In ordering plaintiff-appellant to pay 6% interest on the adjudged
value of the Castellvi property to start from July of 1956;
4. In denying plaintiff-appellant's motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence.
In its brief, the Republic discusses the second error assigned as the first
issue to be considered. We shall follow the sequence of the Republic's
discussion.
1. In support of the assigned error that the lower court erred in
holding that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced
with the filing of the complaint in this case, the Republic argues that the
"taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special
lease agreement between the Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former
was granted the "right and privilege" to buy the property should the lessor
wish to terminate the lease, and that in the event of such sale, it was
stipulated that the fair market value should be as of the time of occupancy;
and that the permanent improvements amounting to more than half a
million pesos constructed during a period of twelve years on the land,
subject of expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of
permanency and stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the
interest of national security. 7
Appellee Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of
property under the power of eminent domain requires two essential
elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the
private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and (2)
devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This appellee argues that in
the instant case the first element is wanting, for the contract of lease relied
upon provides for a lease from year to year; that the second element is also
wanting, because the Republic was paying the lessor Castellvi a monthly
rental of P445.58; and that the contract of lease does not grant the
Republic the "right and privilege" to buy the premises "at the value at the
time of occupancy." 8
Appellee Toledo-Gozun did not comment on the Republic's argument in
support of the second error assigned, because as far as she was concerned
the Republic had not taken possession of her lands prior to August 10,
1959. 9
In order to better comprehend the issues raised in the appeal, in so far as
the Castellvi property is concerned, it should be noted that the Castellvi
property had been occupied by the Philippine Air Force since 1947 under a
contract of lease, typified by the contract marked Exh. 4-Castellvi, the
pertinent portions of which read:
"CONTRACT OF LEASE
"This AGREEMENT OF LEASE MADE AND ENTERED into by and between
INTESTATE ESTATE OF ALFONSO DE CASTELLVI, represented by CARMEN M.
DE CASTELLVI Judicial Administratrix x x x hereinafter called the LESSOR
and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by MAJ. GEN. CALIXTO
DUQUE, Chief of Staff of the ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
hereinafter called the LESSEE,
"WITNESSETH:
"1. For and in consideration of the rentals hereinafter reserved and
the mutual terms, covenants and conditions of the parties, the LESSOR has,
and by these presents does, lease and let unto the LESSEE the following
described land together with the improvements thereon and appurtenances
thereof, viz:
'Un Terreno, Lote No. 27 del Plano de subdivision Psu 34752, parte de la
hacienda de Campauit, situado en el Barrio de San Jose, Municipio de
Floridablanca, Pampanga . . . midiendo una extension superficial de cuatro
milliones once mil cuatro cientos trienta y cinco (4,001,435) [sic] metros
cuadrados, mas o menos.
'Out of the above described property, 75.93 hectares thereof are actually
occupied and covered by this contract.
'Above lot is more particularly described in TCT No. 1016, province of
Pampanga . . .
of which premises, the LESSOR warrants that he/she/they/is/are the
registered owner(s) and with full authority to execute a contract of this
nature.
"2. The term of this lease shall be for the period beginning July 1,
1952 the date the premises were occupied by the PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE,
AFP until June 30, 1953, subject to renewal for another year at the option of
the LESSEE or unless sooner terminated by the LESSEE as hereinafter
provided.
"3. The LESSOR hereby warrants that the LESSEE shall have quiet,
peaceful and undisturbed possession of the demised premises throughout
the full term or period of this lease and the LESSOR undertakes without
cost to the LESSEE to eject all trespassers, but should the LESSOR fail to do
so, the LESSEE at its option may proceed to do so at the expense of the
LESSOR. The LESSOR further agrees that should he/she/they sell or
encumber all or any part of the herein described premises during the
period of this lease, any conveyance will be conditioned on the right of the
LESSEE hereunder.
"4. The LESSEE shall pay to the LESSOR as monthly rentals under this
lease the sum of FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE PESOS & 58/100(P455.58) . . .
"5. The LESSEE may, at anytime prior to the termination of this lease,
use the property for any purpose or purposes and, at its own costs and
expense make alteration, install facilities and fixtures and erect additions . .
. which facilities or fixtures . . . so placed in, upon or attached to the said
premises shall be and remain property of the LESSEE and may be removed
therefrom by the LESSEE prior to the termination of this lease. The LESSEE
shall surrender possession of the premises upon the expiration or
termination of this lease and if so required by the LESSOR, shall return the
premises in substantially the same condition as that existing at the time
same were first occupied by the AFP, reasonable and ordinary wear and
tear and damages by the elements or by circumstances over which the
LESSEE has no control excepted: PROVIDED, that if the LESSOR so requires
the return of the premises in such condition, the LESSOR shall give written
notice thereof to the LESSEE at least twenty (20) days before the
termination of the lease and provided, further, that should the LESSOR give
notice within the time specified above, the LESSEE shall have the right and
privilege to compensate the LESSOR at the fair value or the equivalent, in
lieu of performance of its obligation, if any, to restore the premises. Fair
value is to be determined as the value at the time of occupancy less fair
wear and tear and depreciation during the period of this lease.
"6. The LESSEE may terminate this lease at any time during the term
hereof by giving written notice to the LESSOR at least thirty (30) days in
advance . . ."
"7. The LESSEE should not be responsible, except under special
legislation for any damages to the premises by reason of combat
operations, acts of GOD, the elements or other acts and deeds not due to
the negligence on the part of the LESSEE.
"8. This LEASE AGREEMENT supersedes and voids any and all
agreements and undertakings, oral or written, previously entered into
between the parties covering the property herein leased, the same having
been merged herein. This AGREEMENT may not be modified or altered
except by instrument in writing only duly signed by the parties." 10
It was stipulated by the parties, that "the foregoing contract of lease (Exh.
4, Castellvi) is 'similar in terms and conditions, including the date', with the
annual contracts entered into from year to year between defendant
Castellvi and the Republic of the Philippines (p. 17, t.s.n., Vol. III)". 11 It is
undisputed, therefore, that the Republic occupied Castellvi's land from July
1, 1947, by virtue of the above-mentioned contract, on a year to year basis
(from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year) under the
terms and conditions therein stated.
Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic
sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to
vacate the leased premises after the termination of the contract, on July 11,
1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the latter that the
heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property in
question because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the
general public, demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days
from receipt of the letter, and that the premises be returned in
substantially the same condition as before occupancy (Exh. 5 Castellvi).
A follow-up letter was sent on January 12, 1957, demanding the delivery
and return of the property within one month from said date (Exh. 6
Castellvi). On January 30, 1957, Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief
of Staff, answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for the
army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and
other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already
established on the property, and that, there being no other recourse, the
acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings would be
recommended to the President (Exhibit "7" Castellvi).
Defendant Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 1458, to eject the Philippine Air Force from the
land. While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic instituted these
expropriation proceedings, and, as stated earlier in this opinion, the
Republic was placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959. On
November 21, 1959, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, dismissed
Civil Case No. 1458, upon petition of the parties, in an order which, in part,
reads as follows:
"1. Plaintiff has agreed, as a matter of fact has already signed an
agreement with defendants, whereby she has agreed to receive the rent of
the lands, subject matter of the instant case from June 30, 1966 up to 1959
when the Philippine Air Force was placed in possession by virtue of an order
of the Court upon depositing the provisional amount as fixed by the
Provincial Appraisal Committee with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga;
"2. That because of the above-cited agreement wherein the
administratrix decided to get the rent corresponding to the rent from 1956
up to 1959 and considering that this action is one of illegal detainer and/or
to recover the possession of said land by virtue of nonpayment of rents, the
instant case now has become moot and academic and/or by virtue of the
agreement signed by plaintiff, she has waived her cause of action in the
above-entitled case." 12
The Republic urges that the "taking " of Castellvi's property should be
deemed as of the year 1947 by virtue of afore-quoted lease agreement. In
American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd edition, Section 157, on the subject of
"Eminent Domain, we read the definition of "taking" (in eminent domain) as
follows:
"'Taking' under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as
entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and,
under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or
otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way
as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof." 13
Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of circumstances must be
present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is
present in the instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement the
Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property of Castellvi.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but a
moment's duration" (The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596);
"lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very brief life; operative or
recurring at every moment" (Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1963
edition.) The word "momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy
of (real) property should be construed to mean "a limited period" not
indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of
one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under
the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the
Republic, through the AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent
nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or
intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent of
the owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the
Republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the
same condition as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It
is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land
permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent
improvements. But this "intention" cannot prevail over the clear and
express terms of the lease contract. Intent is to be deduced from the
language employed by the parties, and the terms of the contract, when
unambiguous, as in the instant case, are conclusive in the absence of
averment and proof of mistake or fraud the question being not what the
intention was, but what is expressed in the language used. (City of Manila
v. Rizal Park Co., Inc., 53 Phil. 515, 525); Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Myrick,
71 Phil. 344, 348). Moreover, in order to judge the intention of the
contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be
principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If the intention of the lessee
(Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy permanently Castellvi's property,
why was the contract of lease entered into on year to year basis? Why was
the lease agreement renewed from year to year? Why did not the Republic
expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the Republic
itself, it expropriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at the same
time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them into a jet air
base?" 14 It might really have been the intention of the Republic to
expropriate the lands in question at some future time, but certainly mere
notice much less an implied notice of such intention on the part of the
Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did not, and could not, bind
the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The expropriation must be actually
commenced in court (Republic vs. Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil. 461, 484).
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present
in the instant case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as
lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the
circumstance of the property being devoted to public use is present
because the property was used by the air force of the AFP.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as
to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property
and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and
deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained
as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as
shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the
provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return
the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was
Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because
the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed
monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent
domain on June 26, 1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Castellvi's property for purposes of
eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when
the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find
merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the
"taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that
the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent,
or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the
owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use,
were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi
property in 1947.
Untenable also is the Republic's contention that although the contract
between the parties was one of lease on a year to year basis, it was "in
reality a more or less permanent right to occupy the premises under the
guise of lease with the 'right and privilege' to buy the property should the
lessor wish to terminate the lease," and "the right to buy the property is
merged as an integral part of the lease relationship . . . so much so that the
fair market value has been agreed upon, not as of the time of purchase, but
as of the time of occupancy". 15 We cannot accept the Republic's
contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to a permanent
right to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease made for a
determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land in the instant case,
ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Article 1669, Civil
Code). Neither can it be said that the right of eminent domain may be
exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated (Rule 67,
Section 1, Rules of Court). Nor can it be accepted that the Republic would
enter into a contract of lease where its real intention was to buy, or why the
Republic should enter into a simulated contract of lease ("under the guise
of lease", as expressed by counsel for the Republic) when all the time the
Republic had the right of eminent domain, and could expropriate Castellvi's
land if it wanted to without resorting to any guise whatsoever. Neither can
we see how a right to buy could be merged in a contract of lease in the
absence of any agreement between the parties to that effect. To sustain
the contention of the Republic is to sanction a practice whereby in order to
secure a low price for a land which the government intends to expropriate
(or would eventually expropriate) it would first negotiate with the owner of
the land to lease the land (for say ten or twenty years) then expropriate the
same when the lease is about to terminate, then claim that the "taking" of
the property for the purposes of the expropriation be reckoned as of the
date when the Government started to occupy the property under the lease,
and then assert that the value of the property being expropriated be
reckoned as of the start of the lease, in spite of the fact that the value of
the property, for many good reasons, had in the meantime increased
during the period of the lease. This would be sanctioning what obviously is
a deceptive scheme, which would have the effect of depriving the owner of
the property of its true and fair market value at the time when the
expropriation proceedings were actually instituted in court. The Republic's
claim that it had the "right and privilege" to buy the property at the value
that it had at the time when it first occupied the property as lessee
nowhere appears in the lease contract. What was agreed expressly in
paragraph No. 5 of the lease agreement was that, should the lessor require
the lessee to return the premises in the same condition as at the time the
same was first occupied by the AFP, the lessee would have the "right and
privilege" (or option) of paying the lessor what it would fairly cost to put the
premises in the same condition as it was at the commencement of the
lease, in lieu of the lessee's performance of the undertaking to put the land
in said condition. The "fair value" at the time of occupancy, mentioned in
the lease agreement, does not refer to the value of the property if bought
by the lessee, but refers to the cost of restoring the property in the same
condition as of the time when the lessee took possession of the property.
Such fair value cannot refer to the purchase price, for purchase was never
intended by the parties to the lease contract. It is a rule in the
interpretation of contracts that "However general the terms of a contract
may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are
distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties
intended to agree" (Art. 1372, Civil Code)
We hold, therefore, that the "taking' of the Castellvi property should not be
reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same
pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid
for the Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the
value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an
error when it held that the "taking" of the property under expropriation
commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, 16 the "just
compensation" is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought
to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for
eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine National Bank, L-
14158, April 12, 1961, 1 SCRA 957, 961-962). In the instant case, it is
undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi
property, by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The "taking" of the
Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to
be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the
complaint for eminent domain was filed.
Regarding the two parcels of land of Toledo-Gozun, also sought to be
expropriated, which had never been under lease to the Republic, the
Republic was placed in possession of said lands, also by authority of the
court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of those lands, therefore, must also
be reckoned as of June 26, 1959, the date of the filing of the complaint for
eminent domain.
2. Regarding the first assigned error discussed as the second issue
the Republic maintains that, even assuming that the value of the
expropriated lands is to be determined as of June 26, 1959, the price of
P10.00 per square meter fixed by the lower court "is not only exorbitant but
also unconscionable, and almost fantastic". On the other hand, both
Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun maintain that their lands are residential lands
with a fair market value of not less than P15.00 per square meter.
The lower court found, and declared, that the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-
Gozun are residential lands. The finding of the lower court is in consonance
with the unanimous opinion of the three commissioners who, in their report
to the court, declared that the lands are residential lands.
The Republic assails the finding that the lands are residential, contending
that the plans of the appellees to convert the lands into subdivision for
residential purposes were only on paper, there being no overt acts on the
part of the appellees which indicated that the subdivision project had been
commenced, so that any compensation to be awarded on the basis of the
plans would be speculative. The Republic's contention is not well taken. We
find evidence showing that the lands in question had ceased to be devoted
to the production of agricultural crops, that they had become adaptable for
residential purposes, and that the appellees had actually taken steps to
convert their lands into residential subdivisions even before the Republic
filed the complaint for eminent domain.
In the case of City of Manila vs. Corrales (Phil. 82, 98) this Court laid down
basic guidelines in determining the value of the property expropriated for
public purposes. This Court said:
"In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the
same consideration are to be regarded as in a sale of property between
private parties. The inquiry, in such cases, must be what is the property
worth in the market, viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which
it is at the time applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly
adapted, that is to say, What is it worth from its availability for valuable
uses?
"So many and varied are the circumstances to be taken into account in
determining the value of property condemned for public purposes, that it is
practically impossible to formulate a rule to govern its appraisement in all
cases. Exceptional circumstances will modify the most carefully guarded
rule, but, as a general thing, we should say that the compensation of the
owner is to be estimated by reference to the use for which the property is
suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the community,
or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future. (Miss. and
Rum River Boom Co. vs. Patterson, 98 U.S., 403)."
In expropriation proceedings, therefore, the owner of the land has the right
to its value for the use for which it would bring the most in the market. 17
The owner may thus show every advantage that his property possesses,
present and prospective, in order that the price it could be sold for in the
market may be satisfactorily determined. 18 The owner may also show that
the property is suitable for division into village or town lots. 19
The trial court, therefore, correctly considered, among other circumstances,
the proposed subdivision plans of the lands sought to be expropriated in
finding that those lands are residential lots. This finding of the lower court
is supported not only by the unanimous opinion of the commissioners, as
embodied in their report, but also by the Provincial Appraisal Committee of
the province of Pampanga composed of the Provincial Treasurer, the
Provincial Auditor and the District Engineer. In the minutes of the meeting
of the Provincial Appraisal Committee, held on May 14, 1959 (Exh. 13-
Castellvi) We read in its Resolution No. 10 the following:
"3. Since 1957 the land has been classified as residential in view of its
proximity to the air base and due to the fact that it was not being devoted
to agriculture. In fact, there is a plan to convert it into a subdivision for
residential purposes. The taxes due on the property have been paid based
on its classification as residential land;"
The evidence shows that Castellvi broached the idea of subdividing her
land into residential lots as early as July 11, 1956 in her letter to the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. (Exh. 5-Castellvi) As a
matter of fact, the layout of the subdivision plan was tentatively approved
by the National Planning Commission on September 7, 1956. (Exh. 8-
Castellvi). The land of Castellvi had not been devoted to agriculture since
1947 when it was leased to the Philippine Army. In 1957 said land was
classified as residential, and taxes based on its classification as residential
had been paid since then (Exh. 13-Castellvi). The location of the Castellvi
land justifies its suitability for a residential subdivision. As found by the trial
court, "It is at the left side of the entrance of the Basa Air Base and
bounded on two sides by roads (Exh. 13-Castellvi), paragraphs 1 and 2,
Exh. 12-Castellvi), the poblacion, (of Floridablanca) the municipal building,
and the Pampanga Sugar Mills are closed by. The barrio schoolhouse and
chapel are also near (T.S.N. November 23, 1960, p. 68)". 20
The lands of Toledo-Gozun (Lot 1-B and Lot 3) are practically of the same
condition as the land of Castellvi. The lands of Toledo-Gozun adjoin the land
of Castellvi. They are also contiguous to the Basa Air Base, and are along
the road. These lands are near the barrio schoolhouse, the barrio chapel,
the Pampanga Sugar Mills, and the poblacion of Floridablanca (Exhs. 1, 3
and 4-Toledo-Gozun). As a matter of fact, regarding lot 1-B it had already
been surveyed and subdivided, and its conversion into a residential
subdivision was tentatively approved by the National Planning Commission
on July 8, 1959 (Exhs. 5 and 6 Toledo-Gozun). As early as June, 1958, no
less than 32 man connected with the Philippine Air Force among them
commissioned officers, non-commission officers, and enlisted men had
requested Mr. and Mrs. Joaquin D. Gozun to open a subdivision on their
lands in question (Exhs. 8, 8-A to 8-ZZ-Toledo-Gozun). 21
We agree with the findings, and the conclusions, of the lower court that the
lands that are the subject of expropriation in the present case, as of August
10, 1959 when the same were taken possession of by the Republic, were
residential lands and were adaptable for use as residential subdivisions.
Indeed, the owners of these lands have the right to their value for the use
for which they would bring the most in the market at the time the same
were taken from them. The most important issue to be resolved in the
present case relates to the question of what is the just compensation that
should be paid to the appellees.
The Republic asserts that the fair market value of the lands of the appellees
is P.20 per square meter. The Republic cites the case of Republic vs.
Narciso, et al., L-6594, which this Court decided on May 18, 1956. The
Narciso case involved lands that belonged to Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun,
and to one Donata Montemayor, which were expropriated by the Republic
in 1949 and which are now the site of the Basa Air Base. In the Narciso case
this Court fixed the fair market value at P.20 per square meter. The lands
that are sought to be expropriated in the present case being contiguous to
the lands involved in the Narciso case, it is the stand of the Republic that
the price that should be fixed for the lands now in question should also be
at P.20 per square meter.
We can not sustain the stand of the Republic. We find that the price of P.20
per square meter, as fixed by this Court in the Narciso case, was based on
the allegation of the defendants (owners) in their answer to the complaint
for eminent domain in that case that the price of their lands was P2,000.00
per hectare and that was the price that they asked the court to pay them.
This Court said, then, that the owners of the land could not be given more
than what they had asked, notwithstanding the recommendation of the
majority of the Commission on Appraisal which was adopted by the trial
court that the fair market value of the lands was P3,000.00 per hectare.
We also find that the price of P.20 per square meter in the Narciso case was
considered the fair market value of the lands as of the year 1949 when the
expropriation proceedings were instituted, and at that time the lands were
classified as sugar lands, and assessed for taxation purposes at around
P400.00 per hectare, or P.04 per square meter. 22 While the lands involved
in the present case, like the lands involved in the Narciso case, might have
a fair market value of P.20 per square meter in 1949, it can not be denied
that ten years later, in 1959, when the present proceedings were instituted,
the value of those lands had increased considerably. The evidence shows
that since 1949 those lands were no longer cultivated as sugar lands, and
in 1959 those lands were already classified, and assessed for taxation
purposes, as residential lands. In 1959 the land of Castellvi was assessed at
P1.00 per square meter. 23
The Republic also points out that the Provincial Appraisal Committee of
Pampanga, in its resolution No. 5 of February 15, 1957 (Exhibit D),
recommended the sum of P.20 per square meter as the fair valuation of the
Castellvi property. We find that this resolution was made by the Republic
the basis in asking the court to fix the provisional value of the lands sought
to be expropriated at P259,669.10, which was approved by the court. 24 It
must be considered, however, that the amount fixed as the provisional
value of the lands that are being expropriated does not necessarily
represent the true and correct value of the land. The value is only
"provisional" or "tentative", to serve as the basis for the immediate
occupancy of the property being expropriated by the condemnor. The
records show that this resolution No. 5 was repealed by the same Provincial
Committee on Appraisal in its resolution No. 10 of May 14, 1959 (Exhibit
13-Castellvi). In that resolution No. 10, the appraisal committee stated that
"The Committee has observed that the value of the land in this locality has
increased since 1957 . . .", and recommended the price of P1.50 per square
meter. It follows, therefore, that, contrary to the stand of the Republic, that
resolution No. 5 of the Provincial Appraisal Committee can not be made the
basis for fixing the fair market value of the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-
Gozun.
The Republic further relied on the certification of the Acting Assistant
Provincial Assessor of Pampanga, dated February 8, 1961 (Exhibit K), to the
effect that in 1950 the lands of Toledo-Gozun were classified partly as
sugar land and partly as urban land, and that the sugar land was assessed
at P.40 per square meter, while part of the urban land was assessed at P.40
per square meter and part at P.20 per square meter; and that in 1956 the
Castellvi land was classified as sugar land and was assessed at P450.00 per
hectare, or P.045 per square meter. We can not also consider this
certification of the Acting Assistant Provincial Assessor as a basis for fixing
the fair market value of the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun because,
as the evidence shows, the lands in question, in 1957, were already
classified and assessed for taxation purposes as residential lands. The
certification of the assessor refers to the year 1950 as far as the lands of
Toledo-Gozun are concerned, and to the year 1956 as far as the land of
Castellvi is concerned. Moreover, this Court has held that the valuation
fixed for the purposes of the assessment of the land for taxation purposes
can not bind the landowner where the latter did not intervene in fixing it.
25
On the other hand, the Commissioners, appointed by the court to appraise
the lands that were being expropriated, recommended to the court that the
price of P10.00 per square meter would be the fair market value of the
lands. The commissioners made their recommendation on the basis of their
observation after several ocular inspections of the lands, of their own
personal knowledge of land values in the province of Pampanga, of the
testimonies of the owners of the land, and other witnesses, and of
documentary evidence presented by the appellees. Both Castellvi and
Toledo-Gozun testified that the fair market value of their respective land
was at P15.00 per square meter. The documentary evidence considered by
the commissioners consisted of deeds of sale of residential lands in the
town of San Fernando and in Angeles City, in the province of Pampanga,
which were sold at prices ranging from P8.00 to P20.00 per square meter
(Exhibits 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23-Castellvi). The commissioners
also considered the decision in Civil Case No. 1531 of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, entitled Republic vs. Sabina Tablante, which was an
expropriation case filed on January 13, 1959, involving a parcel of land
adjacent to the Clark Air Base in Angeles City, where the court fixed the
price at P18.00 per square meter (Exhibit 14-Castellvi). In their report, the
commissioners, among other things, said:
". . . This expropriation case is specially pointed out, because the
circumstances and factors involved therein are similar in many respects to
the defendants' lands in this case. The land in Civil Case No. 1531 of this
Court and the lands in the present case (Civil Case No. 1623) are both near
the air bases, the Clark Air Base and the Basa Air Base respectively. There
is a national road fronting them and are situated in a first-class
municipality. As added advantage it may be said that the Basa Air Base
land is very near the sugar mill at Del Carmen, Floridablanca, Pampanga,
owned by the Pampanga Sugar Mills. Also just stone's throw away from the
same lands is a beautiful vacation spot at Palacol, a sitio of the town of
Floridablanca, which counts with a natural swimming pool for vacationists
on weekends. These advantages are not found in the case of the Clark Air
Base. The defendants' lands are nearer to the poblacion of Floridablanca
then Clark Air Base is nearer (sic) to the poblacion of Angeles, Pampanga.
"The deeds of absolute sale, according to the undersigned commissioners,
as well as the land in Civil Case No. 1531 are competent evidence, because
they were executed during the year 1959 and before August 10 of the
same year. More specifically so the land at Clark Air Base which
coincidentally is the subject matter in the complaint in said Civil Case No.
1531, it having been filed on January 13, 1959 and the taking of the land
involved therein was ordered by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on
January 15, 1959, several months before the lands in this case were taken
by the plaintiffs. . .
"From the above and considering further that the lowest as well as the
highest price per square meter obtainable in the market of Pampanga
relative to subdivision lots within its jurisdiction in the year 1959 is very
well known by the Commissioners, the Commission finds that the lowest
price that can be awarded to the lands in question is P10.00 per square
meter." 26
The lower court did not altogether accept the findings of the
Commissioners based on the documentary evidence, but it considered the
documentary evidence as basis for comparison in determining land values.
The lower court arrived at the conclusion that "the unanimous
recommendation of the commissioners of ten (P10.00) pesos per square
meter for the three lots of the defendants subject of this action is fair and
just". 27 In arriving at its conclusion, the lower court took into
consideration, among other circumstances, that the lands are titled, that
there is a rising trend of land values, and the lowered purchasing power of
the Philippine peso.
In the case of Manila Railroad Co. vs. Caligsihan, 40 Phil. 326, 328, this
Court said:
"A court of first instance or, on appeal, the Supreme Court, may change or
modify the report of the commissioners by increasing or reducing the
amount of the award if the facts of the case so justify. While great weight is
attached to the report of the commissioners, yet a court may substitute
therefor its estimate of the value of the property as gathered from the
record in certain cases, as, where the commissioners have applied illegal
principles to the evidence submitted to them, or where they have
disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount
allowed is either palpably inadequate or excessive." 28
The report of the commissioners of appraisal in condemnation proceedings
are not binding, but merely advisory in character, as far as the court is
concerned. 29 In our analysis of the report of the commissioners, We find
points that merit serious consideration in the determination of the just
compensation that should be paid to Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun for their
lands. It should be noted that the commissioners had made ocular
inspections of the lands and had considered the nature and similarities of
said lands in relation to the lands in other places in the province of
Pampanga, like San Fernando and Angeles City. We cannot disregard the
observations of the commissioners regarding the circumstances that make
the lands in question suited for residential purposes their location near
the Basa Air Base, just like the lands in Angeles City that are near the Clark
Air Base, and the facilities that obtain because of their nearness to the big
sugar central of the Pampanga Sugar mills, and to the flourishing first class
town of Floridablanca. It is true that the lands in question are not in the
territory of San Fernando and Angeles City, but, considering the facilities of
modern communications, the town of Floridablanca may be considered
practically adjacent to San Fernando and Angeles City. It is not out of place,
therefore, to compare the land values in Floridablanca to the land values in
San Fernando and Angeles City, and form an idea of the value of the lands
in Floridablanca with reference to the land values in those two other
communities.
The important factor in expropriation proceeding is that the owner is
awarded the just compensation for his property. We have carefully studied
the record, and the evidence, in this case, and after considering the
circumstances attending the lands in question. We have arrived at the
conclusion that the price of P10.00 per square meter, as recommended by
the commissioners and adopted by the lower court, is quite high. It is Our
considered view that the price of P5.00 per square meter would be a fair
valuation of the lands in question and would constitute a just compensation
to the owners thereof. In arriving at this conclusion We have particularly
taken into consideration the resolution of the Provincial Committee on
Appraisal of the province of Pampanga informing, among others, that in the
year 1959 the land of Castellvi could he sold for from P3.00 to P4.00 per
square meter, while the land of Toledo-Gozun could be sold for from P2.50
to P3.00 per square meter. The Court has weighed all the circumstances
relating to this expropriations proceedings, and in fixing the price of the
lands that are being expropriated the Court arrived at a happy medium
between the price as recommended by the commissioners and approved
by the court, and the price advocated by the Republic. This Court has also
taken judicial notice of the fact that the value of the Philippine peso has
considerably gone down since the year 1959. 30 Considering that the lands
of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun are adjoining each other, and are of the
same nature, the Court has deemed it proper to fix the same price for all
these lands.
3. The third issue raised by the Republic relates to the payment of
interest. The Republic maintains that the lower court erred when it ordered
the Republic to pay Castellvi interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the
total amount adjudged as the value of the land of Castellvi, from July 1,
1956 to July 10, 1959. We find merit in this assignment of error.
In ordering the Republic to pay 6% interest on the total value of the land of
Castellvi from July 1, 1956 to July 10, 1959, the lower court held that the
Republic had illegally possessed the land of Castellvi from July 1, 1956,
after its lease of the land had expired on June 30, 1956, until August 10,
1959 when the Republic was placed in possession of the land pursuant to
the writ of possession issued by the court. What really happened was that
the Republic continued to occupy the land of Castellvi after the expiration
of its lease on June 30, 1956, so much so that Castellvi filed an ejectment
case against the Republic in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. 31
However, while that ejectment case was pending, the Republic filed the
complaint for eminent domain in the present case and was placed in
possession of the land on August 10, 1959, and because of the institution of
the expropriation proceedings the ejectment case was later dismissed. In
the order dismissing the ejectment case, the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga said:
"Plaintiff has agreed, as a matter of fact has already signed an agreement
with defendants, whereby she had agreed to receive the rent of the lands,
subject matter of the instant case from June 30, 1956 up to 1959 when the
Philippine Air Force was placed in possession by virtue of an order of the
Court upon depositing the provisional amount as fixed by the Provincial
Appraisal Committee with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; . . ."
If Castellvi had agreed to receive the rentals from June 30, 1956 to August
10, 1959, she should be considered as having allowed her land to be leased
to the Republic until August 10, 1959, and she could not at the same time
be entitled to the payment of interest during the same period on the
amount awarded her as the just compensation of her land. The Republic,
therefore, should pay Castellvi interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the
value of her land, minus the provisional value that was deposited, only from
July 10, 1959 when it deposited in court the provisional value of the land.
4. The fourth error assigned by the Republic relates to the denial by
the lower court of its motion for a new trial based on nearly discovered
evidence. We do not find merit in this assignment of error.
After the lower court had decided this case on May 26, 1961, the Republic
filed a motion for a new trial, supplemented by another motion, both based
upon the ground of newly discovered evidence. The alleged newly
discovered evidence in the motion filed on June 21, 1961 was a deed of
absolute sale executed on January 25, 1961, showing that a certain
Serafin Francisco had sold to Pablo L. Narciso a parcel of sugar land having
an area of 100,000 square meters with a sugar quota of 100 piculs, covered
by P.A. No. 1701, situated in Barrio Fortuna, Floridablanca, for P14,000, or
P.14 per square meter.
In the supplemental motion, the alleged newly discovered evidence were:
(1) a deed of sale of some 35,000 square meters of land situated at
Floridablanca for P7,500.00 (or about P.21 per square meter) executed in
July, 1959, by the spouses Evelyn D. Laird and Cornelio G. Laird in favor of
spouses Bienvenido S. Aguas and Josefina Q. Aguas; and (2) a deed of
absolute sale of a parcel of land having an area of 4,120,101 square
meters, including the sugar quota covered by Plantation Audit No. 16-1345,
situated at Floridablanca, Pampanga, for P860.00 per hectare (a little less
than P.09 per square meter) executed on October 22, 1957 by Jesus Toledo
y Mendoza in favor of the Land Tenure Administration.
We find that the lower court acted correctly when it denied the motions for
a new trial.
To warrant the granting of a new trial based on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, it must appear that the evidence was discovered after
the trial; that even with the exercise of due diligence, the evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trial; and that the evidence
is of such a nature as to alter the result of the case if admitted. 32 The
lower court correctly ruled that these requisites were not complied with.
The lower court, in a well-reasoned order, found that the sales made by
Serafin Francisco to Pablo Narciso and that made by Jesus Toledo to the
Land Tenure Administration were immaterial and irrelevant, because those
sales covered sugarlands with sugar quotas, while the lands sought to be
expropriated in the instant case are residential lands. The lower court also
concluded that the land sold by the spouses Laird to the spouses Aguas
was a sugar land.
We agree with the trial court. In eminent domain proceedings, in order that
evidence as to the sale price of other lands may be admitted in evidence to
prove the fair market value of the land sought to be expropriated, the lands
must, among other things, be shown to be similar.
But even assuming, gratia argumenti, that the lands mentioned in those
deeds of sale were residential, the evidence would still not warrant the
grant of a new trial, for said evidence could have been discovered and
produced at the trial, and they cannot be considered newly discovered
evidence as contemplated in Section 1(b) of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.
Regarding this point, the trial court said:
"The Court will now show that there was no reasonable diligence employed.
"The land described in the deed of sale executed by Serafin Francisco, copy
of which is attached to the original motion, is covered by a Certificate of
Title issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. There is no
question in the mind of the court but this document passed through the
Office of the Register of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the title or
annotating the sale on the certificate of title. It is true that Fiscal Lagman
went to the Office of the Register of Deeds to check conveyances which
may be presented in the evidence in this case as it is now sought to be
done by virtue of the motions at bar, Fiscal Lagman, one of the lawyers of
the plaintiff, did not exercise reasonable diligence as required by the rules.
The assertion that he only went to the office of the Register of Deeds 'now
and then' to check the records in that office only shows the half-hazard [sic]
manner by which the plaintiff looked for evidence to be presented during
the hearing before the Commissioners, if it is at all true that Fiscal Lagman
did what he is supposed to have done according to Solicitor Padua. It would
have been the easiest matter for plaintiff to move for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum directing the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to
come to testify and to bring with him all documents found in his office
pertaining to sales of land in Floridablanca adjacent to or near the lands in
question executed or recorded from 1958 to the present. Even this
elementary precaution was not done by plaintiff's numerous attorneys.
"The same can be said of the deeds of sale attached to the supplementary
motion. They refer to lands covered by certificate of title issued by the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga. For the same reason they could have been
easily discovered if reasonable diligence has been exerted by the
numerous lawyers of the plaintiff in this case. It is noteworthy that all these
deeds of sale could be found in several government offices, namely, in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, the Office of the Provincial
Assessor of Pampanga, the Office of the Clerk of Court as a part of notarial
reports of notaries public that acknowledged these documents, or in the
archives of the National Library. In respect to Annex 'B' of the
supplementary motion copy of the document could also be found in the
Office of the Land Tenure Administration, another government entity. Any
lawyer with a modicum of ability handling this expropriation case would
have right away though [sic] of digging up documents diligently showing
conveyances of lands near or around the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated in this case in the offices that would have naturally come to
his mind such as the offices mentioned above, and had counsel for the
movant really exercised the reasonable diligence required by the Rule'
undoubtedly they would have been able to find these documents and/or
caused the issuance of subpoena duces tecum. . . .
"It is also recalled that during the hearing before the Court of the Report
and Recommendation of the Commissioners and objection thereto, Solicitor
Padua made the observation:
'I understand, Your Honor, that there was a sale that took place in this
place of land recently where the land was sold for P0.20 which is
contiguous to this land.'
"The Court gave him permission to submit said document subject to the
approval of the Court. . . This was before the decision was rendered, and
later promulgated on May 26, 1961 or more than one month after Solicitor
Padua made the above observation. He could have, therefore, checked up
the alleged sale and moved for a reopening to adduce further evidence. He
did not do so. He forgot to present the evidence at a more propitious time.
Now, he seeks to introduce said evidence under the guise of newly-
discovered evidence. Unfortunately, the Court cannot classify it as newly-
discovered evidence, because under the circumstances, the correct
qualification that can be given is 'forgotten evidence'. Forgotten evidence,
however, is not newly-discovered evidence." 33
The granting or denial of a motion for new trial is, as a general rule,
discretionary with the trial court, whose judgment should not be disturbed
unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. 34 We do not see any
abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court when it denied the
motions for a new trial.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified, as follows:
(a) the lands of appellees Carmen vda. de Castellvi and Maria Nieves
Toledo-Gozun, as described in the complaint, are declared expropriated for
public use;
(b) the fair market value of the lands of the appellees is fixed at P5.00
per square meter;
(c) the Republic must pay appellee Castellvi the sum of P3,796,495.00
as just compensation for her one parcel of land that has an area of 759,299
square meters, minus the sum of P151,859.80 that she withdrew out of the
amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value of the land,
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day
full payment is made or deposited in court;
(d) the Republic must pay appellee Toledo-Gozun the sum of
P2,695,225.00 as the just compensation for her two parcels of land that
have a total area of 539,045 square meters, minus the sum of P107,809.00
that she withdrew out of the amount that was deposited in court as the
provisional value of her lands, with interest at the rate of 6%, per annum
from July 10, 1959 until the day full payment is made or deposited in court;
(e) the attorney's lien of Atty. Alberto Cacnio is enforced; and
(f) the costs should be paid by appellant Republic of the Philippines,
as provided in Section 12, Rule 67, and in Section 13 Rule 141, of the Rules
of Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C . J ., Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz Palma and
Aquino, JJ ., concur.
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Makasiar, J J ., did not take part.